After a Polarized Vote, Colombia’s Next President Must Navigate a Fragmented Congress

The first round of Colombia’s presidential election, held on May 31, 2026, set the stage for a highly competitive runoff on June 21. Far-right candidate Abelardo de la Espriella won 43.7% of the vote (10,361,473 ballots), while ruling-party leftist candidate Iván Cepeda secured 40.9% (9,688,348 votes).

The difference between the two candidates was 673,125 votes, equivalent to 2.84% of the total, a relatively narrow margin that points to a closely contested runoff in a highly polarized political environment.

For De la Espriella, the election marks an unprecedented moment in recent Colombian political history: it is the first time a far-right candidacy has reached a presidential runoff with a realistic chance of winning the presidency. For Cepeda, the race represents an opportunity to continue the political project launched by President Gustavo Petro, the first democratically elected left-wing president in Colombia’s history.

A system designed to limit presidential power

Colombia now finds itself divided between two political visions that appear difficult to reconcile. Regardless of who wins, the next administration is likely to face a period marked by political division, social mobilization and sustained confrontation, reflecting the concentration of support behind two ideologically opposed movements.

Beyond ideological differences, however, the key question for markets, institutions and the international community is how governability would function under either scenario.

Colombia operates under one of Latin America’s most stable institutional frameworks, built on a system of checks and balances among the executive, legislative and judicial branches. This structure has allowed for political alternation, regular elections and the absence of prolonged institutional breakdowns throughout the country’s contemporary history.

In that context, neither candidate has a clear path to implementing major structural reforms without building broad political agreements.

De la Espriella would begin with legislative disadvantages

De la Espriella enters the runoff as the frontrunner after winning the first round, but he faces a significant legislative constraint. His political movement, Salvación Nacional, secured only three seats in the Senate and one seat in the House of Representatives, a level of representation insufficient to pass major reforms without broad congressional coalitions.

Colombia’s Congress consists of 103 senators and 183 representatives. Depending on the type of legislation, bills require simple majorities, absolute majorities or, in the case of constitutional amendments, support equivalent to two-thirds of both chambers.

Given that reality, a De la Espriella administration would depend heavily on alliances with other political forces. His first major endorsement came from Centro Democrático, the party of former President Álvaro Uribe, which holds 46 congressional seats (17 in the Senate and 29 in the House).

He could also seek agreements with conservative parties such as the Conservative Party (29 seats), Cambio Radical (19) and the Party of La U (19).

Even so, legislative arithmetic suggests that each reform would require separate negotiations and continuous political bargaining, including with smaller parties, potentially increasing political costs for the executive branch, as has occurred under Petro’s administration.

Even so, legislative arithmetic suggests that each reform would require separate negotiations and continuous political bargaining, including with smaller parties, potentially increasing political costs for the executive branch, as has occurred under Petro’s administration.

De la Espriella remains far from the numbers needed to secure congressional majorities. As a result, he could seek to appeal directly to voters through referendums or popular consultations. However, such mechanisms involve lengthy procedures and have not always been successful because of participation thresholds and voting requirements.

Examples include former President Juan Manuel Santos’ 2016 peace plebiscite, which reached the participation threshold but was rejected by voters, the 2018 anti-corruption consultation, which failed to obtain enough votes to enact legislation, and former President Álvaro Uribe’s 2003 referendum proposal aimed at reducing the size of the state. For those reasons, this route appears difficult to pursue successfully.

Cepeda would have a broader legislative base

Cepeda’s situation would be different, though not necessarily easier, since he also lacks an outright congressional majority.

In fact, reaching the runoff already represents a significant achievement given that he finished second in the first round. A similar situation occurred in 2014, when Juan Manuel Santos overcame a first-round deficit through multiple political alliances and a campaign centered on national unity around the peace process.

Cepeda is backed by the Pacto Histórico coalition, which emerged as the largest political force in the new Congress with 64 seats across both chambers. Additional support could come from center-left groups such as Alianza por Colombia (20 seats), representatives elected through the Special Peace Constituencies (16 seats), and other smaller progressive parties.

Although that configuration would bring him closer to legislative majorities, it would still fall short of guaranteeing automatic approval of complex reforms.

Petro’s administration offers a useful precedent. Through temporary political agreements, it managed to pass several significant initiatives, including labor reform measures, peace-related policies and a tax reform package. However, it struggled to advance more ambitious projects, including healthcare reform, agrarian and land policies, and the consolidation of the Ministry of Equality.

Cepeda would also inherit part of the political burden associated with the current administration, particularly on issues related to security, public health and economic management.

Proposals such as a future constituent assembly, an initiative championed by Petro, have already generated opposition among political rivals and segments of the electorate, potentially creating additional challenges for a Cepeda administration.

Under either scenario, the next president will need an Interior Minister capable of navigating Congress and building multiple legislative agreements for each major policy initiative.