Insight Crime: Colombian Government Blames FARC Dissidents As Duque Turbay Assassination Masterminds Despite Flimsy Evidence

The sentencing of a minor for the fatal shooting of Colombian senator and presidential hopeful Miguel Uribe Turbay has underscored the government’s focus on a group of guerrillas as the alleged masterminds, but evidence remains thin.

The 15-year-old who shot Uribe on June 7 in Bogotá has been sentenced to seven years in a juvenile detention center for attempted homicide, the Attorney General’s Office reported on August 27.

The teenager pleaded guilty before Uribe died of his injuries on August 11, which prevented prosecutors from upgrading the charge to homicide, since Colombian law prohibits changes to charges once a formal accusation is filed against a minor. Five adults have also been arrested in connection with the case.

Authorities have suggested that the Second Marquetalia, a dissident faction of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), could have had a hand in Uribe’s killing, but have yet to present concrete evidence. National Police Director Carlos Fernando Triana first suggested a connection to the group in July, and Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez Suárez repeated the claim in August after Uribe’s death.

SEE ALSO: Colombia-Venezuela Border Killing Hints at Growing Guerrilla Conflict

The link to the group is vague, and via one of the five people arrested in connection with Uribe’s murder.

That’s Elder José Arteaga Hernández, alias “El Costeño,” who allegedly began working as a hired assassin after meeting a former FARC fighter known as “Daniel” in prison in 2019, according to police sources cited by Colombian newspaper El Espectador.

Daniel, once a member of the Teófilo Forero Mobile Column, an elite FARC unit behind some of the group’s most notorious attacks, has reportedly been helping rebuild the column within the Second Marquetalia in southern Huila and northern Caquetá, according to Colombian newspaper El Colombiano. Therefore, he would serve as a potential bridge between the Second Marquetalia and the Uribe assassination.

Two other suspects currently in custody also appear tied to Caquetá, where the Teófilo Forero Column is allegedly reorganizing. Katerine Andrea Martínez Martínez, alias “Gabriela,” who supplied the minor with the weapon to shoot Uribe, was arrested in Florencia in June, while Carlos Eduardo Mora González has faced an arms trafficking case before a Florencia court since 2024.

Nearly three months after the shooting of Turbay, investigators have yet to clarify who ordered the crime. The arrests point to a network of low- and mid-level operatives with ties to FARC dissident circles, but no clear political motive has emerged.

However, the available evidence suggests the focus on the Second Marquetalia may be misplaced. Once a feared rebel faction, the group is now among Colombia’s weakest armed organizations, having had its leadership decimated over the past five years.

Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” the group’s leader, was seriously injured in a 2022 attack, prompting repeated reports of his death. He resurfaced in 2024 through a video and later a public appearance, confirming he was alive, though widely believed to be in poor health.

Other senior figures have also been eliminated. Seuxis Pausías Hernández Solarte, alias “Jesús Santrich,” who co-founded the Second Marquetalia with Márquez after rejecting the 2016 peace deal, was killed in 2021. That same year, commanders Hernán Darío Velásquez, alias “El Paisa,” and Henry Castellanos Garzón, alias “Romaña,” were killed in Venezuela’s Apure state. Most recently, in August 2025, José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever,” one of Márquez’s key lieutenants, was also killed in Venezuela.

SEE ALSO: Who Was Behind the Attempted Hit on a Colombian Presidential Hopeful?

As well as these losses, the Second Marquetalia suffered a major rift in November 2024. The Border Command (Comandos de la Frontera – CDF) and the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico – CGP), two of its most influential factions operating in Nariño and Putumayo, announced they were breaking away after disagreements over the group’s stance in peace talks with the government.

Given the group’s fragile internal state and mounting competition from rival criminal actors, authorities have yet to present evidence of any clear motive for the Second Marquetalia to order such an assassination.

Nonetheless, the lack of clarity about the attack underscores the risks heading into Colombia’s elections next year. Uribe’s assassination sets a precedent that could embolden other armed groups to use targeted political violence as leverage. With organized crime interests tied to the continuation of peace talks and possible judicial benefits stemming from negotiations, the next electoral cycle may see criminal actors intervening more directly in politics through violence.

This article, written by Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.