Halfway Through Presidential Term, Gustavo Petro’s “Total Peace” Is Failing

Peace negotiations with Colombia’s last true guerrilla insurgency are on the verge of collapse after the August 3 expiration of a ceasefire between the government and the ELN.

The bilateral ceasefire, in effect for the past year, ended after the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) rejected government offers to discuss a renewal.

The agreement was plagued by continued violence and hostilities, such as armed strikes and kidnappings, with both sides accusing each other of not upholding their end of the bargain.

“Just extending the ceasefire isn’t enough if it doesn’t come with new steps to protect civilians from attacks, hostilities, kidnappings, and threats,” said Otty Patiño, Colombian High Peace Commissioner.

Meanwhile, the ELN has accused the government of not negotiating in good faith.

“What’s the point of urging the ELN to sign new agreements if the previous ones haven’t been upheld?” asked the group’s commander, Eliecer Erlinto Chamorro, alias “Antonio Garcia,” in a statement released on July 26.

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The negotiations between the ELN and the government had advanced further than any other talks held under President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace (Paz Total) plan, which has sought demobilization agreements with criminal and armed groups across Colombia.

But the expiration of the ceasefire adds to a series of recent setbacks, including the ELN’s refusal to stop kidnappings and deepening internal divisions, and could lead the guerrillas to abandon the negotiating table completely.

Ceasefire Violations

While the ceasefire agreement primarily prohibits offensive military operations between the parties, it also includes other conditions, such as banning the ELN from “taking hostages,” widely understood to mean kidnapping.

The ELN has violated the agreement at least 39 times over the past year, according to the Colombian think tank, the Conflict Analysis Resource Center (Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos – CERAC). These violations include five deaths, three injuries, and at least 52 kidnappings.

One of the most notable incidents occurred less than three months after the ceasefire took effect, in October 2023, when ELN members kidnapped the parents of Colombian football star Luis Díaz. After international attention pushed the group to release them, the ELN announced that it would cease kidnappings for ransom — a key part of their criminal operations.

Despite the ELN’s violations, negotiators agreed to extend the ceasefire on February 5 for another six months.

SEE ALSO: What Is Behind Increased Violence in Colombia?

But internal divisions on the ELN side soon became apparent, leading to larger problems for the negotiations.

On February 20, the ELN delegation declared a crisis in the peace negotiations, angered over the government’s “regional dialogue” with the Comuneros del Sur, a dissident ELN faction in Nariño that had started parallel negotiations with the government without the consent of the guerrilla group’s top leaders.

Over the next few months, the ELN temporarily suspended its participation in the talks and reneged on its promise to cease kidnappings, citing the government’s “lack of will” in establishing a donor fund to provide alternative financing, which the group claimed left them reliant on kidnapping. The government, however, argued that the fund could not be established while negotiations were stalled, creating a catch-22 situation.

Willingness for Peace

For weeks leading up to August 3, the government’s negotiation team had warned that time was running out to renew the ceasefire with the ELN, and continuously asked the guerrilla group to resume the peace talks.

At the same time, key officials were critical of the ELN’s willingness to negotiate, especially on the issue of kidnapping, an issue that has derailed negotiations in the past. Patiño stressed that the Colombian government would not sign agreements with the ELN if the group continued the practice.

The government has also questioned the group’s desire for peace.

“After years of dialogue, the ELN still has not answered whether it is willing to transition to peace or if, on the contrary, it sees this process as an opportunity to strengthen themselves militarily,” said the press release.

Some experts agree that the ELN seems to have taken advantage of the negotiations with no intention of ever laying down arms. The group advanced negotiation items that benefited its political cause, without moving forward on demobilization, Jorge Mantilla, a political scientist who studies Colombia’s armed conflict and security, told InSight Crime.

“The ELN has been aiming to buy time from the very start of the negotiations,” Mantilla said

What Does This Mean for the ELN?

The end of the ceasefire between the Colombian government and the ELN has dealt a potentially mortal blow to an already fragile negotiation.

As the ELN has refused to continue negotiations with the government, the process with the group’s dissident Comuneros del Sur Front has moved forward. So far, this is the only ELN front to have split from the Central Command.

If the parallel peace talks succeed, it could encourage other factions to split from the ELN and seek peace with the government, especially among fronts under pressure from belligerent rivals.

The main concern is the Western War Front (Frente de Guerra Occidental – FGOC) in Chocó, which has been fighting a losing battle with the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) since 2018 for control over drug trafficking routes and illegal mining. In this area, the lapse of the ceasefire and an eventual return to military operations against the ELN could push the FGOC to the same decision as the Comuneros del Sur.

In other areas, however, the ELN has taken advantage of the ceasefire to solidify its control. The ELN continues to be a dominant criminal group along large stretches of the Colombia-Venezuela border, increasing its control over rural communities. The lapse of the ceasefire could lead to increased violence in these areas as the group retaliates against the Colombian government and continues its territorial disputes with other criminal actors.

The ELN also has a presence in Venezuela and close ties to the government of President Nicolás Maduro, who claimed victory in recent elections despite irregularities in vote counting.

The Eastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Oriental – FGO) and the Northeastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Nororiental) on the border between Colombia and Venezuela are key to the Maduro regime’s criminal balancing act. Since at least 2016, the ELN has expanded along the border with Venezuela with the approval of the Venezuelan political and military forces, and has adopted an increasingly paramilitary role, defending the interests of the Maduro government. Should Maduro cling to power, these fronts would be less likely to make a deal with the Colombian government.

This article, written by Lara Loaiza and Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America.