According to Semana, neither sister held any employment or contract with the government during the period in question, yet between 2024 and 2026 they accumulated enough influence to sway executive-branch decisions, and — according to the magazine’s sources — effectively took control of three state entities: the Departamento Administrativo de la Presidencia de la República (Dapre, the administrative department of the presidency), the Fondo Colombia en Paz (Colombia in Peace Fund), and the now-liquidated Ministerio de la Igualdad (Ministry of Equality). El Tiempo, El Espectador, and other Colombian outlets picked up the allegations within hours.

A Price List for Access

The three whistleblowers, whose identities Semana withheld citing safety concerns, described a fixed tariff structure. A first meeting with the sisters cost $1 million COP. Juliana Guerrero would then allegedly handle the lobbying inside the government in exchange for an advance of $200 million COP plus 10 percent of the value of each project awarded, while businessmen were instructed to communicate exclusively with Verónica Guerrero for status updates. A separate $1 million COP fee applied for arranging meetings between mayors and national government officials.

The money, according to the report, was initially collected by David Trespalacios, a young Barranquilla man close to the family, who told the businessmen in a December 10, 2024 message that Verónica “does not want money in her accounts, which is why I have been collecting and delivering. I am handing her cash in Bogotá.” After an apparent falling-out with Trespalacios, Semana reports, the sisters began receiving deposits directly — including through the mobile payments platform Nequi, to an account number that Verónica identified in a December 28, 2024 chat as belonging to her sister Juliana. Deposit receipts reviewed by the magazine include transfers of $5 million COP, $1.8 million COP, $3.2 million COP, $3.95 million COP, $3.05 million COP, and $10 million COP, among others, and one distribution instruction attributed to Trespalacios reads: “Verónica Guerrero, savings account, 12.5 here; Juliana Guerrero, 12.5 here; Wilmer Trespalacios, 10.”

“If it is true, they gave money like fools, thinking that the ministers or I myself act under pressure from women or out of greed.” — President Gustavo Petro, on X

Aqueducts, Housing, and Security Cameras

The promised projects included an aqueduct in a Cesar municipality to be funded by the Ministry of Housing and channeled — according to what Verónica Guerrero told the businessmen — through then-Vice Minister of Water and Basic Sanitation Edward Libreros, whom Petro later fired on camera during a televised October 2025 council of ministers. Airline tickets purchased by the businessmen on December 5, 2024, to fly Verónica from Bogotá to Aguachica, Cesar, and back from Bucaramanga the same day, form part of the evidence. Semana’s report documents her subsequent WhatsApp updates: “My sister is already on it. She already spoke with him (Edward Libreros). They agreed to meet so she can tell him about the commitment.”

Other promised deals included home-improvement programs across multiple municipalities — under terms one businessman described as $35 million COP per municipality awarded, plus 10 percent of each project’s value — a security camera initiative financed by the Fondo Nacional de Seguridad y Convivencia Ciudadana (Fonsecon, the Interior Ministry’s security and coexistence fund), and, in June 2025, an aqueduct contract in La Guajira worth more than $27 billion COP through the Ministry of Housing. “That one is only with me, because I am the one who assigns it,” Verónica allegedly wrote of the La Guajira project.

“The Boss of Bosses”

Throughout the chats, Verónica Guerrero invoked her sister’s access to the highest levels of the government. “Juliana has a meeting today with the boss of bosses,” she wrote on January 21, 2025, when businessmen pressed for results — an expression the whistleblowers say the sisters used to refer to President Petro. In other messages she claimed to be sitting in budget-release meetings, reported that “the boss of bosses has already given clarity and is signing the unfreezing of ministry resources,” and described maneuvering to protect a secretary general at the Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible (Ministry of Environment): “If they topple my secretary, I lose a lot of things here.”

The magazine’s evidence also points to alleged influence or attempted influence at Fiduagraria S.A. (the state agricultural fiduciary), the Agencia Nacional de Tierras (National Land Agency), the Ministerio de Defensa in contracts at the Hospital Militar Central, and the Dapre. One chat suggests money flowed beyond the sisters: “I understand that is for the people inside (the government) and for you,” a businessman wrote, a characterization Verónica confirmed in the exchange, according to Semana.

More Than $600 Million COP, and Nothing Delivered

None of the promised contracts materialized. The three businessmen told Semana they handed over more than $600 million COP in total between 2024 and 2025. “They robbed us and do not want to give the money back,” they told the magazine. When one of them confronted Juliana Guerrero in the second half of 2025 over $70 million COP transferred to her Nequi account, she replied, per the chats: “I have no problem returning that, but let me talk to her (Verónica) first.” No refund followed, the businessmen say. None of the reports reviewed by Finance Colombia includes a public response from either sister; Semana published video of the two attending the Fiestas del Mar festival in Santa Marta on July 24, the night before the story broke.

Las pruebas que aquí se indican, reflejan, que los llamados “empresarios* se pusieron furiosos y a lo mejor entregaron los chats, porque no les cumplieron. Si es verdad, dieron dineros como pendejos, pensando que los ministros o yo mismo, actuamos por presiones de mujeres o por… https://t.co/JWaAtnGYz0

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) July 25, 2026

Petro: They “Gave Money Like Fools”

President Petro responded on his X account the same day, arguing that the story proves his government’s safeguards worked precisely because the contracts were never awarded. “The evidence indicated here reflects that the so-called ‘businessmen’ got furious and probably handed over the chats because they were not delivered for. If it is true, they gave money like fools, thinking that the ministers or I myself act under pressure from women or out of greed,” he wrote, adding: “The magazine would do a great favor by handing those chats to the prosecutor’s office… The corrupt businessmen appear to have been swindled, and the government prevented the theft.” He also quipped that the “boss of bosses apparently torpedoed the deals because he thinks about things other than greed,” and suggested the businessmen might “even turn out to be abelardistas” — a reference to supporters of President-elect Abelardo De La Espriella, who takes office August 7.

Criticism came from inside Petro’s own coalition. Carlos Carrillo, former director of the Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (UNGRD, the national disaster risk management unit) — itself the center of an earlier procurement scandal that shook the Petro administration — wrote on X that although Semana “has an evident political bias, the evidence it publishes against the Guerrero sisters is very serious. The justice system must investigate what crimes may have been committed. It is very worrying that Fonsecon is also being mentioned — the multibillion-peso Interior Ministry fund in the hands of Armando Benedetti’s friends.” Benedetti, the interior minister whom Colombian media have long described as Juliana Guerrero’s political sponsor, was himself sanctioned by the US Treasury’s OFAC in October 2025 alongside President Petro and members of the president’s family.

The report also vindicates warnings made months earlier by Angie Rodríguez, the former Dapre director who left the government in January 2026 and gave an explosive interview to Semana in April: “She (Juliana Guerrero), without any scruples, has the nerve to go to state entities to give orders, to say what gets contracted, who gets hired and who does not. She and her sister go to the Ministry of Equality and make decisions without being public officials,” Rodríguez said at the time.

The Only Case So Far: Fake Diplomas

Despite the mounting allegations, the only criminal proceeding currently facing Juliana Andrea Guerrero Jiménez is the fake-credentials case that derailed her 2025 nomination as vice minister of youth. The Fiscalía General de la Nación (Office of the Attorney General) has finalized an indictment charging her with procedural fraud and ideological falsehood in a public document, alleging she uploaded fake accounting degrees from the Fundación Universitaria San José — an institution where prosecutors say she never attended class or sat an exam — to the government’s SIGEP II résumé system in order to qualify for the vice ministry. The accusation hearing is set for August 5 at 4:00 p.m. before Bogotá’s 46th Circuit Court, two days before Petro leaves office. The university’s former secretary general, Luis Carlos Gutiérrez Martínez, faces charges of falsehood in a public document in the same proceeding for signing off on the degrees.

Guerrero remains the presidency’s delegate to the university council of the Universidad Popular del Cesar (Popular University of Cesar) and retains a state-funded protection detail from the Unidad Nacional de Protección (National Protection Unit). Prior to the events described in the investigation, her only documented government work was an $11 million COP advisory contract at the Interior Ministry, while Verónica Guerrero held two contracts totaling $19 million COP at Colombia Compra Eficiente (Colombia’s public procurement agency) and one for $11 million COP at the Interior Ministry, according to public procurement records cited by Semana.

The scandal lands in the final two weeks of a presidency already battered by corruption cases — from the UNGRD contracting affair to the illicit-enrichment investigation of former foreign minister Laura Sarabia — and hands incoming president De La Espriella’s attorney general appointees an early test: whether the chats, audios, and bank records now in Semana’s possession become a criminal file.

Who’s Who in the Guerrero Case

• Juliana Guerrero — Cesar-born political operator, former Interior Ministry adviser, and failed nominee for vice minister of youth; described by Semana as the most powerful woman in the Petro government. Accused by three businessmen of selling access to ministry contracts; separately indicted for uploading fake university degrees, with an accusation hearing set for August 5.
• Verónica Guerrero — Juliana’s sister and, per the chats, the network’s day-to-day interlocutor with the paying businessmen. Former contractor at Colombia Compra Eficiente and the Interior Ministry, with no state role during the alleged scheme.
• David Trespalacios — A young Barranquilla man close to the Guerrero family who, according to the report, collected cash and deposits so the sisters could keep money out of their own accounts, before a falling-out changed the arrangement.
• Gustavo Petro — Outgoing president of Colombia, leaving office August 7. The “boss of bosses” invoked in the chats, per the whistleblowers. He says the story shows his government blocked the corruption and that the businessmen were swindled.
• Edward Libreros — Former vice minister of water and basic sanitation, named in the chats as the channel for the Cesar aqueduct project; fired by Petro during a televised council of ministers in October 2025. The chats record the sisters’ claims about him; no response from Libreros appears in the published reports.
• Angie Rodríguez — Former Dapre director and one-time Petro confidante who publicly warned in April 2026 that the sisters were giving hiring and contracting orders inside state entities without holding any public office.
• Armando Benedetti — Interior minister and Juliana Guerrero’s longtime political sponsor, per Colombian press reports; sanctioned by OFAC in October 2025. Carrillo warned that Fonsecon, a fund under Benedetti’s ministry, figures in the allegations.
• Carlos Carrillo — Former UNGRD director who called the published evidence “very serious” and urged the justice system to investigate.
• Elvia Milena Sanjuán and Jorge “Popo” Barros — Governor of Cesar and a Cesar departmental deputy linked to the Gnecco political clan, respectively; the businessmen asked the sisters to broker meetings with both. An audio records Juliana agreeing. Neither is accused of wrongdoing in the report.
• Luis Carlos Gutiérrez Martínez — Former secretary general of the Fundación Universitaria San José, dismissed in late 2025 and charged with falsehood in a public document for certifying Guerrero’s degrees.
• The three businessmen — Unnamed contractors from Norte de Santander, Valle del Cauca, Cesar, and Santander who say they paid more than $600 million COP and received nothing. Petro suggests they were simply defrauded; they remain the case’s key witnesses.

Ecopetrol S.A. (NYSE: EC, BVC: ECOPETROL) reported first-quarter 2026 consolidated revenues of 28.6 trillion COP, a decline of 8.7% from 31.4 trillion COP in the year-earlier period, as lower crude oil prices and reduced hydrocarbon production compressed the top line for Colombia’s state-controlled oil and gas company. Against that backdrop, a marked recovery in refining margins and disciplined cost management lifted EBITDA by 1.5% to 13.5 trillion COP, yielding a 47% EBITDA margin and partially offsetting the revenue headwind. At the Q1 2026 average exchange rate of approximately 3,700 COP per USD, the quarter’s revenues translate to roughly $7.73 billion USD and EBITDA to approximately $3.65 billion USD.

Embattled Ecopetrol CEO Ricardo Roa was appointed to the position by Colombian President Gustavo Petro after managing his political campaign. (photo: Ecopetrol)

Net income for the quarter reached 2.9 trillion COP (approximately $784 million USD), down 7.7% year-over-year, reflecting the combined drag of lower revenues, a sharply elevated effective tax rate of 37.1%, and a one-time charge of 1.2 trillion COP for the impuesto al patrimonio — Colombia’s government-mandated wealth levy on large corporations established to fund post-disaster reconstruction measures. The company is also subject to a 10% income tax surcharge applicable for fiscal year 2026, which is embedded in the reported effective rate. The aggregate tax burden absorbed a disproportionate share of operating improvement relative to prior periods, limiting the flow-through of refining gains to the net income line.

Total hydrocarbon production averaged 725.2 thousand barrels of oil equivalent per day (kboed) in Q1 2026, below the 745 kboed recorded in the 2025 annual average cited by management during the March 2026 general shareholders’ meeting. Domestic crude output represented the largest component at approximately 520 thousand barrels per day (kbd). Ecopetrol’s Permian Basin operations in the United States contributed 91.8 kbd, underscoring the continued strategic importance of the international segment. Gas production continued a multi-year declining trend that poses a medium-term domestic supply challenge; management has sought to address this partially through regasification capacity additions at Puerto Bahía and on the Pacific coast, expected to come online in the second half of 2026 with a combined contribution of up to 430 billion BTU per day.

The refining segment delivered the quarter’s most pronounced operational outperformance. Ecopetrol’s domestic refineries, led by Refinería de Cartagena, processed 417.5 kbd of crude throughput. The integrated refining margin rose to $17.3 USD per barrel, a 60% improvement over the same quarter of 2025, driven by favorable differential pricing between domestic crude benchmarks and refined product values alongside ongoing operational efficiency improvements. The Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas (CREG) and the Ministerio de Minas y Energía remain central to the regulatory framework governing downstream margins over the medium term.

The balance sheet carries significant structural and contingent risk items of direct relevance to institutional credit and equity holders. Gross debt stood at 108.1 trillion COP (approximately $29.2 billion USD), representing a leverage ratio of 2.3 times trailing EBITDA — a level that leaves limited room for further deterioration before debt covenants or rating agency thresholds become binding. Ecopetrol holds a receivable of 4.2 trillion COP (approximately $1.14 billion USD) from the Fondo de Estabilización de Precios de los Combustibles (FEPC), a government fuel price stabilization mechanism that represents a claim on the Colombian treasury with timing and recovery risk. A dispute with the Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales (DIAN) over value-added tax assessments totals 12.26 trillion COP (approximately $3.31 billion USD) in aggregate, of which 10.22 trillion COP relates to Ecopetrol’s consolidated operations and 2.04 trillion COP to Refinería de Cartagena. Both cases are under administrative and judicial review; no provisions have been recognized in the financial statements pending resolution, but the potential liability represents a material contingency relative to the company’s quarterly net income.

On the corporate development front, Ecopetrol disclosed three significant transactions during or following the quarter. The company agreed to acquire producing assets from Gran Tierra Energy (NYSE: GTE, TSX: GTE) for $92.4 million USD, adding Colombian upstream production inventory in basins where both companies have operated. In Brazil, Ecopetrol launched a tender offer for shares of Brava Energia (BVMF: BRAV3) at 23 BRL per share, seeking to expand its footprint in that country’s oil and gas sector. And in a transaction that would reshape the mid-size independent landscape in Colombia, the company reached an agreement to acquire Parex Resources (TSX: PXT) for $250 million USD; Parex is a Colombia-focused producer with a complementary asset base across the Llanos and other producing basins. Collectively, the three transactions signal that Ecopetrol’s capital allocation strategy under the current government continues to favor upstream consolidation despite the elevated leverage profile.

The exploration portfolio generated positive news announcements. The Copoazú-1 exploratory well, drilled in Colombia’s Llanos foothills region, was confirmed as a commercial discovery, adding to the domestic reserve base. The Sirius offshore project advanced through the Consulta Previa process — a legally mandated prior consultation with indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities required before development of projects in or near their territories — reaching a milestone in community engagement that brings the project closer to formal development sanction. The Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos (ANH) oversees the licensing framework within which both projects operate.

“Ecopetrol is listed on the New York Stock Exchange; we are governed by the strict regulations of US federal agencies. Agencies like OFAC and the SEC could intervene in the company and could even accelerate the payment of financial obligations, which would be extremely grave for Ecopetrol.” — Martín Ravelo, President, Unión Sindical Obrera (USO)

The ISA transmission segment, managed through Ecopetrol’s majority stake in ISA — Interconexión Eléctrica S.A., contributed stable regulated cash flows during the quarter. ISA completed 46 transmission reinforcement works across its Latin American concession portfolio. The segment also completed the acquisition of 100% of IE Madeira in Brazil, consolidating its position in that country’s power grid interconnection infrastructure. ISA further submitted a competitive bid for the Río Bueno–Puerto Montt high-voltage transmission line concession in Chile, demonstrating the group’s appetite for long-duration, inflation-linked infrastructure assets across the Andes region. For institutional investors evaluating Ecopetrol as a blended hydrocarbons-and-infrastructure holding, ISA’s consistent cash generation provides partial diversification from crude price volatility, though it does not insulate the consolidated entity from headline governance risk.

The most consequential variable for the investment thesis over the near term is Ecopetrol’s prolonged governance crisis. At the company’s general shareholders’ meeting on March 27, 2026, held at the Corferias convention center in Bogotá, minority shareholders loudly heckled president Ricardo Roa — with audible shouts of “¡Fuera, fuera!” reverberating through the hall — as debate over his leadership erupted into open confrontation. The meeting approved a dividend of 121 COP per share for minority holders and a 4 trillion COP distribution to the Colombian government as majority shareholder, payable in two installments by June 30, 2026. Despite the financial business conducted, governance overshadowed the proceedings.

Roa faces two separate judicial proceedings. The Fiscalía General de la Nación formally charged him in connection with alleged influence peddling related to the purchase of an apartment in northern Bogotá — charges he has denied. Separately, the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) is examining whether campaign spending limits were violated during President Gustavo Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign, which Roa managed — an investigation that Finance Colombia has covered in detail. Angela Maria Robledo, Chair of the Board of Directors, defended the board’s decision to retain Roa at the March assembly, citing the constitutional presumption of innocence. However, four of the nine board members had already formally recorded their support for his removal at that point, exposing a divided governance structure at a time when strategic and operational decisions require unified leadership.

The Unión Sindical Obrera (USO), which represents approximately one-third of Ecopetrol’s workforce, issued a production strike ultimatum timed to a March 30 board meeting. Martín Ravelo, president of the USO, framed the leadership crisis explicitly in terms of US regulatory risk: “Ecopetrol is listed on the New York Stock Exchange; we are governed by the strict regulations of US federal agencies. Agencies like OFAC and the SEC could intervene in the company and could even accelerate the payment of financial obligations, which would be extremely grave for Ecopetrol.” Ravelo further warned that the company’s outstanding international debt — which he placed at approximately $30 billion USD and which is exacerbated by elevated interest rates — left Ecopetrol exposed to potential covenant triggers or early repayment demands in a scenario where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Office of Foreign Assets Control were to take enforcement action.

Following sustained pressure from the USO, minority shareholders, and opposition political figures, Ecopetrol’s board approved an extended leave of absence for Roa beginning April 7, 2026. Under the arrangement, Roa used accrued vacation through May 27, followed by 30 calendar days of unpaid leave beginning May 28, extending his absence through the end of June — a period encompassing Colombia’s presidential first round on May 31 and a potential runoff on June 21. Juan Carlos Hurtado Parra, the company’s executive vice president of hydrocarbons and designated first alternate to the presidency since November 2025, was appointed acting president. Hurtado Parra holds an MBA in International Oil and Gas and brings more than 28 years of energy sector experience to the acting role, having previously served as vice president of exploration, development, and production.

The political calendar creates a structural transition risk that sits above the operational and financial results as the primary concern for long-duration investors. Colombia’s incoming government, to be inaugurated August 7, 2026, is widely expected to appoint a new Ecopetrol board and select a new company president. That transition may bring material shifts in strategic priorities — including the pace of upstream investment, the approach to the FEPC receivable recovery, the trajectory of energy transition spending, and the capital allocation balance between the hydrocarbons segment and the ISA infrastructure platform. The Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público and the Ministerio de Minas y Energía will both play key roles in establishing the post-election policy framework under which Ecopetrol operates. Institutional investors holding exposure to Ecopetrol via NYSE: EC or BVC: ECOPETROL must weigh Q1’s genuine operational improvement — most visibly in refining margins and EBITDA stability — against a governance and policy transition risk profile that is unlikely to be resolved before the August handover.

Ecopetrol’s Cartagena refinery (photo courtesy Ecopetrol)

The controversy surrounding the filing of charges against Ricardo Roa Barragán, president of Colombia´s oil and energy company, Ecopetrol, has taken a new turn following the leak of an internal report suggesting that more than $42 million USD may have been transferred to a private company based in the British Virgin Islands.

According to disclosed information, “the media outlet 6AM W obtained documents showing the link between the USD 42 million payment made by Ecopetrol and a company connected to Serafino Iácono,” as stated by the outlet itself.

It is important to recall that on March 11, Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office (Fiscalía General de la Nación – FGN) formally charged Ricardo Roa Barragán with the alleged crime of influence peddling by a public official. According to the accusation, the executive allegedly intervened to favor a third party (Serafino Iácono) in the assignment of a gasification project in exchange for personal benefits. The FGN stated that Roa “ordered that a specific person be assigned to a gasification project in exchange for a reduction in the price of an apartment” located in northern Bogotá. During the hearing, the executive did not accept the charges.

Regarding the leaked documents, 6AM W reports that the published material “is a memorandum produced following a communication between the lawyers of Miller & Chevallier, hired by Ecopetrol, and Charles Cain, head of the Anti-Corruption Unit for Foreign Operators at the US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC).” This suggests that the document is an internal Ecopetrol report produced in 2024.

Additionally, the report includes references to an “audit commissioned by Ecopetrol to Control Risks, which identifies Iácono as a possible beneficiary of the alleged irregular payment of $42 million USD made through a purchase option” of power generation plants linked to the company Genser, associated with the businessman.

The leaked documents can be accessed through the Caracol Radio website via “Las contradicciones de Ecopetrol y Serafino Iácono en el caso del apartamento de Roa y Termomorichal.”

For his part, Serafino Iácono issued a statement, published by La República via the social network X, in which he affirms that since April 7, 2017, he has had no relationship with the company and that the transaction in question took place in 2023, after his departure.

At this stage, although the information has been reported by the media, judicial decisions remain under the authority of Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office, which is leading the proceedings against Ricardo Roa. Iacono said that he would be filing suit against Control Risks, and hired well-known Colombian lawyer Jaime Lombana Villalba to begin the process.

For further context, readers are encouraged to consult the article “Colombia’s Top Prosecutor Charges Ecopetrol President in Alleged Influence-peddling Case,” published by Finance Colombia.

Beyond the communications previously issued and reported by Finance Colombia in the aforementioned article, no new official statements have been released by Ecopetrol’s board of directors since March 12, prior to the information leak. Finance Colombia has reached out to Iacono for comment and will report any additional information.