Colombia recorded more than 24 million non-resident visitors during the current presidential term and generated close to $34.43 billion USD in foreign exchange from travel through December 2025, figures released by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo, or MinCIT) show. The ministry says tourism has become one of the country’s largest sources of foreign exchange, surpassing traditional export sectors such as coal and coffee.

“Today, Colombia demonstrates that it can also generate wealth from its biodiversity, its cultural heritage, the quality of its services and the talent of its people.” -Diana Marcela Morales, Former Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism

The figures were presented during the Foro Internacional de Turismo: Colombia, un destino por explorar (International Tourism Forum: Colombia, a Destination to Explore), held in Bogotá on July 15. The event brought together tourism associations, business leaders, academics and government officials to discuss the sector’s performance and future, including regenerative tourism, artificial intelligence, smart mobility and innovation in visitor experiences.

Promoted under the campaign Descubre la Diversidad de Colombia, El País de la Belleza (Discover the Diversity of Colombia, the Country of Beauty), the ministry reported that more than 24 million non-resident visitors arrived during the administration of President Gustavo Petro, representing a 109% increase compared with the previous equivalent period. Of those arrivals, 14.8 million were foreign visitors.

According to the Banco de la República, Colombia’s central bank, tourism generated approximately $34.43 billion USD in foreign exchange through December 2025, exceeding revenue from coal and coffee exports. Tourism has also become the country’s largest services export, with 57% of services export earnings coming from the sector.

“For decades, much of the country’s capacity to generate foreign exchange was tied to the export of raw materials,” Former Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism Diana Marcela Morales said. “Today, Colombia demonstrates that it can also generate wealth from its biodiversity, its cultural heritage, the quality of its services, the talent of its people and the confidence that millions of people place in choosing the country as a destination. Tourism expresses, perhaps like few other sectors, that transition toward a more diversified economy with greater added value.”

Employment has also expanded alongside visitor growth. Figures from DANE (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, Colombia’s National Administrative Department of Statistics) show that accommodation and food service activities supported approximately 1.8 million jobs in February 2026, a 15% increase compared with the same period in 2019. During 2025, the sector accounted for 4.4% of Colombia’s national value added.

International demand has continued to grow during 2026. In the first quarter, more than 368,000 international airline tickets were sold with Colombia as the destination, representing a 16.7% increase over the previous year. The largest source markets were the United States, Brazil and Mexico.

During the first two months of 2026, approximately 10 million passengers traveled through Colombia’s airports, an 8% increase across domestic and international traffic. Between January and March, the country received 1.58 million non-resident visitors.

The government has also expanded tourism investment beyond major destinations. MinCIT reported that infrastructure projects—including trails, docks, boardwalks and gastronomic plazas—have reached 699 municipalities, representing 63% of Colombia’s territory. According to the ministry, 207 municipalities received tourism investment for the first time.

The ministry also said tourism initiatives now cover all 140 municipalities included in Colombia’s Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial (Development Programs with a Territorial Focus, or PDET), a post-conflict development framework for areas historically affected by armed conflict. Through its Turismo para una Cultura de Paz (Tourism for a Culture of Peace) strategy, more than 999 businesses have joined the Colombia Destinos de Paz (Colombia Peace Destinations) certification.

“Unlike other economic activities, whose benefits tend to concentrate in specific production centers, tourism generates value precisely where a country’s natural, cultural and historical heritage is located,” Morales said. “It is a bridge that connects different cultures and brings opportunities to intermediate municipalities, strengthens rural economies, energizes small businesses and creates incentives to conserve what makes each territory unique.”

Headline Photo: Beachside in Barú, Colombia (photo by Loren Moss)

Four years after Gustavo Petro took office, Colombia is a different country from the one he inherited in August 2022, but it continues to face some of its deepest historical problems: inequality, violence, drug trafficking, illegal economies, corruption and the state’s limited ability to exercise control over large parts of the country.

Petro came to power with an ambitious promise: to transform the country. His election represented a historic change in itself. For the first time, a leader from the left reached the presidency, and social sectors traditionally distant from power gained direct representation in the executive branch.

Four years later, just as the self-described “Gobierno del Cambio” (Government of Change) comes to an end, the record is mixed. Petro leaves behind measurable social progress, a broader political spectrum capable of competing for power and significant reforms in labor and politics. But he also leaves unfinished projects, a peace policy that failed to achieve its objectives, a persistent crisis in the health care system, corruption scandals, and an administration marked by high ministerial turnover.

Perhaps his deepest legacy lies not in any specific reform, but in demonstrating that Colombian democracy could incorporate sectors that had remained on the margins of power for decades without altering the system of checks and balances that underpins the country’s democratic processes.

The main achievement: A broader democracy

Petro’s election in 2022 was the culmination of a political process Colombia had been experiencing for decades: the gradual expansion of the ideological spectrum with a realistic chance of reaching the presidency.

Francia Márquez‘s rise to the vice presidency carried equally profound significance. A Black woman from a region historically affected by poverty and conflict, her election became a symbol of political mobility and representation in a country where economic and social elites have traditionally dominated the main centers of power.

Márquez built part of her political discourse around the “nadies” (nobodies), an expression intended to champion historically excluded communities. Petro incorporated that narrative during his term and embraced political and social inclusion as one of the defining elements of his administration.

From that perspective, regardless of how its public policies are evaluated, the Petro administration leaves behind a broader democracy: after 2022, Colombia demonstrated that ideological, social, ethnic and regional groups previously distant from presidential power could also reach the Casa de Nariño. It was a necessary message for a country whose guerrilla movements emerged partly in response to the traditional two-party system of the last century.

Paradoxically, that expansion coexisted with an often-conflictive relationship between the president and some of the institutions designed precisely to limit the exercise of power.

At various points, Petro challenged Congress, the courts, the Banco de la República, the media and sectors of the opposition when their decisions stood in the way of parts of his agenda. Those checks, however, are not an anomaly in Colombia’s political system but one of its structural components: the system of checks and balances.

Incoming President Abelardo de la Espriella will likely face a similar reality. Without his own majorities in Congress, his ability to govern will also depend on negotiations, judicial oversight and institutional limits that no president can eliminate simply by winning an election.

Francia Márquez during her inauguration as vice president of Colombia at Plaza de Bolívar in Bogotá on August 7, 2022. Photo courtesy of the Presidency of Colombia.

Less poverty, more employment and higher wages

On social issues, several indicators improved during the Petro administration.

In 2025, according to figures from the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, or DANE, monetary poverty fell to 28%, the lowest level recorded in the country up to that point. Petro had taken office in 2022, when the rate stood at 36.6% following the sharp increase caused by the pandemic.

During the first three years of his administration, about 3.8 million people moved out of monetary poverty and nearly 1 million escaped extreme poverty, according to official DANE figures.

The labor market also improved. Unemployment, which stood at around 11.3% in 2022, fell to about 8% during the first months of 2026.

Petro also ended his term with a 23% increase in the minimum wage for 2026, far above inflation, which closed 2025 at 5.1%. The measure directly benefited about 2.5 million workers and their families and reflected one of the president’s most consistent political priorities: improving workers’ incomes and conditions.

The labor reform moved in the same direction, increasing the amount employers must pay for nighttime, Sunday and holiday work: one of the country’s long-standing labor policy shortcomings.

Those results allow the outgoing government to argue that part of its redistributive agenda produced tangible effects, even though Colombia remains a deeply unequal society.

Reforms that advanced and those left halfway

The record of Petro’s major structural reforms is considerably more complex.

Agrarian reform, one of his central campaign promises, fell far short of its goals. Petro had proposed purchasing 1.5 million hectares of land for distribution to farmers and advancing the formalization of 7 million hectares envisioned under the Peace Agreement.

According to figures from the Ministry of Agriculture, more than 462,000 hectares had been purchased by mid-2026, less than one-third of the announced target.

On pensions, the government succeeded in getting Congress to approve an overhaul of the system that replaced competition between public and private regimes with a system based on a public foundation and additional savings mechanisms administered by private entities. To secure its passage, the executive branch had to compromise on some of its original objectives. The reform was subsequently challenged in court, and its implementation was suspended while the Constitutional Court reviewed the legislative process, which remains unresolved in the absence of a final ruling from the court.

Colombia’s institutional system thus once again demonstrated the limits any president faces when attempting to implement structural transformations without sufficiently broad political consensus.

“Total Peace”, one of the administration’s biggest defeats

If there was one area where results fell particularly far short of initial expectations, it was security policy and the so-called “Total Peace” initiative.

Petro came to power proposing simultaneous negotiations with different armed organizations to reduce violence and move toward resolving the conflicts that persisted after the 2016 agreement with the FARC.

Four years later, his government ended without reaching a final agreement with the main armed groups with which it had opened negotiations.

During that period, organizations such as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), and the Clan del Golfo maintained or expanded their operational capacity in different territories, while the country continued to record kidnappings, recruitment of minors, attacks and killings of social and political leaders.

Political violence reached one of its most serious moments with the killing of presidential hopeful Miguel Uribe, an event that reminded the country of the dangers of political violence that Colombia had believed it had left behind.

The failure of Total Peace to produce sustainable agreements will likely be one of the most difficult aspects of the outgoing president’s legacy to defend.

A health care transformation that never came

Petro also failed to transform the health care system on the terms he had proposed during the campaign.

The reform became one of the main battlegrounds among the executive branch, Congress, insurers, health care providers and different political sectors.

As that dispute continued, patient petitions, complaints and claims increased from about 915,000 in 2021 to 2.1 million in 2025, according to figures from the Superintendencia Nacional de Salud.

By the end of the administration, many patients continued to report difficulties obtaining medications and receiving timely care at hospitals and clinics, while household out-of-pocket spending on health care increased.

Petro profoundly altered the debate over Colombia’s health care model, but he failed to replace it with the system he had promised.

Corruption undermined one of Petro’s central promises

Perhaps one of the government’s most politically costly contradictions was corruption.

Petro had built much of his political career denouncing links among corruption, public contracting, and traditional power structures. His arrival at the presidency came with a promise to govern differently.

His administration, however, ended up being affected by several scandals.

The most significant involved the Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (UNGRD), in which investigations pointed to the alleged use of public resources and contracts to benefit members of Congress in exchange for support for government initiatives.

The instability caused by the legal troubles surrounding Ricardo Roa, who headed the country’s most important oil and gas company, also had a profound economic impact, eroding both the company’s market value and the governance of one of the institutions underpinning the national economy.

Those controversies were compounded by investigations and disputes involving members of the president’s political and family circle. His son, Nicolás Petro, faced criminal proceedings related to funds received during the campaign, while Verónica Alcocer, then the president’s wife, remains at the center of questions over the use of public funds.

Determining individual responsibility is a matter for judicial and oversight authorities, but politically, the cases eroded one of the central elements of the message that had brought Petro to power.

More than 60 ministers in four years

Administrative instability also became a defining feature of the government. Over four years, more than 60 people served across 18 ministries, equivalent to an average of more than three officeholders per ministry.

The changes reflected political crises, disagreements within the governing coalition, differences between ministers and the president, shifts in the executive branch’s priorities and, at various points, difficulties maintaining a stable administrative course.

The result was a government with considerable rhetorical ability to place issues on the public agenda, but greater difficulty turning some of those debates into sustained policies over its four years in office.

Congresswoman María José Pizarro places the presidential sash on Gustavo Petro during his inauguration at Plaza de Bolívar in Bogotá on August 7, 2022. Photo courtesy of the Presidency of Colombia.

Petro changed who can govern, but not the rules of power

Gustavo Petro’s legacy can hardly be reduced to a simple choice between success and failure.

His administration produced tangible social results and expanded the boundaries of political representation in Colombia. It also put issues on the agenda that will likely remain part of the debate under future governments: inequality, the energy transition, agrarian reform, the functioning of the health care system, and representation for historically excluded populations.

But the promise of structural transformation was far broader than the results ultimately achieved.

Petro discovered, as his predecessors did and as De la Espriella probably will, that winning the presidency does not mean controlling the Colombian state. Congress, the courts, oversight agencies, the Banco de la República, regional governments, the media and a deeply polarized civil society impose limits on any political project.

Petro discovered, as his predecessors did and as De la Espriella probably will, that winning the presidency does not mean controlling the Colombian state. Congress, the courts, oversight agencies, the Banco de la República, regional governments, the media and a deeply polarized civil society impose limits on any political project.

In that sense, the main transformation of these four years may have been less institutional than democratic: Petro did not completely change the way Colombia works, but he did help change the idea of who can govern it.

De la Espriella’s arrival at the presidency from the opposite end of the ideological spectrum is, paradoxically, another manifestation of that expansion.

Colombia thus ends four years of its first left-wing government and begins its first far-right government. What remains between the two is a democracy with more diverse political alternatives, but one that is also deeply polarized, with institutions under intense strain and many of the country’s historical problems still unresolved.

Colombia’s economy expanded at an estimated annual pace of 2.7% in the second quarter of 2026, according to the latest reading of the Grupo Cibest NowCast Bancolombia indicator. The figure sits 20 basis points below the rolling quarter ending in May, which the group revised upward by 20 basis points to 2.9%. With the second-quarter estimate in hand, the economy is now judged to have grown 2.4% year-over-year in the first half of the year, a pace the analysts say confirms that activity remains below its potential.

“The economy is estimated to have grown 2.4% year-over-year in the first half, confirming that economic activity remains below its potential.” — Grupo Cibest, Economic, Industry and Market Research (July 2, 2026)

NowCast Bancolombia is a family of proprietary, high-frequency indicators built by Grupo Cibest — the financial holding group that owns Bancolombia (NYSE: CIB) and adopted its current name in May 2025 — from transactions across the group’s payment channels. The indices are designed to complement, not replace, the official statistics published by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE, the National Administrative Department of Statistics), whose figures are available through its website.

For the second quarter, the group revised its NowCast forecast upward by 10 basis points to 2.7%, bringing the projection into line with the market consensus average among analysts. The indicator rose from 2.6% at the end of May to 2.7% at the end of June, matching the 2.7% consensus.

Subdued Growth Across the Board

The monthly readings were more subdued. On a seasonally adjusted basis, the NowCast index contracted 1.2% from the prior month in June. In year-over-year terms against June 2025, growth eased to 1.9%, some 0.5 percentage points below the May reading of 2.4%. Measured as a three-month moving average, year-over-year growth held at 2.7%.

At the sector level, the second quarter showed a divergence between primary and secondary activities. Faster growth appeared in recreation, professional services, agriculture, and manufacturing. The public sector, real estate, communications, trade, and electricity utilities held steady growth rates. Construction activity continued to decelerate, while mining was the only sector to contract by the close of the quarter.

Grupo Cibest’s sector heat map, which tracks year-over-year change on a three-month moving-average basis, put entertainment as the standout in June at 9.7%, followed by financial services at 6.0%, and wholesale and retail trade at 4.0%. Manufacturing reached 3.7% and agriculture 3.5%, both near the top of their recent ranges. At the other end, construction slowed sharply to 0.6% after running above 3% for much of the past year, the information sector managed just 0.2%, and mining slipped to -0.5%.

The report was prepared by Grupo Cibest’s Economic, Industry and Market Research area, led on quantitative work by Arturo Yesid González Peña, the group’s Head of Quantitative & Analytics, with Sebastián Ospina Cuartas serving as data controller. It follows the group’s prior-month estimate, which had pointed to a second-quarter acceleration toward 2.6%.

Above: The construction industry’s growth continued to decelerate as Grupo Cibest reports a 2.7% economic growth for Colombia as a whole in the second quarter. Stock photo by Ncpancy via Pixabay.

Colombia’s unemployment rate has held in single digits on a rolling-quarter basis since March 2025, but a closer look at the data shows the improvement rests on weaker foundations than the headline figure implies, according to the latest Radar Bancolombia weekly report, published June 16 by Grupo Cibest, the research arm of Bancolombia (NYSE: CIB, BVC: BCOLOMBIA).

The report’s authors argue that the jobs Colombia is adding are increasingly vulnerable, more dependent on public spending, and of lower quality — limitations the unemployment rate alone does not capture.

The inactivity behind the falling jobless rate

The unemployment rate counts only people actively looking for work, so those who stop searching — the inactive — drop out of the measure even though they still weigh on the market.

“The employment being generated is increasingly vulnerable, more dependent on public spending, and of lower quality.” — Radar Bancolombia, June 16, 2026, Grupo Cibest

Using the metaphor of an iceberg, Grupo Cibest describes unemployment, near 8.7% on a moving-year average to April 2026, as the visible portion. Meanwhile, inactivity, sits below the surface, exceeding 35% of the working-age population according to the report. Between January 2020 and February 2026, the ratio of inactive to unemployed people rose from 4 to 5 for every unemployed person, suggesting the drop in unemployment reflects not only more opportunity but also people leaving the labor force.

Formal jobs, fragile foundations

Formal employment has been rising, but the report flags long-term weaknesses. The Bancolombia Formality Index, part of a new set of employment-vulnerability indicators, closed March 2026 at 72.7 points, above its 2022–2025 average and well above the 50.5 points recorded in March 2025.

Formality and coverage of health and pension contributors both increased through 2026, which appears positive at first glance. Much of that covered employment, however, does not stem from a genuine private-sector recovery. The report’s hypothesis is that the minimum-wage increase at the start of the year raised the cost of formalizing jobs, discouraging formal hiring at the moment the economy most needed it.

Quality is the bigger worry

The Bancolombia Employment Quality Index — which weighs formal workers’ income relative to the minimum wage, the mix of dependent and independent workers, and the share of non-vulnerable formal jobs — stood at 20 points in March 2026, below the prior year and marking a change in trend from the preceding three years. The deterioration reflects a lower income relative to the minimum wage in 2026 compared with the 2022–2025 average, a narrowing gap between dependent and independent workers that points to more independent and vulnerable formal employment, and a rising share of independents within total formal workers.

The report concludes that Colombia needs sustained formalization that does not rely on public spending as the main engine of job creation, nor on minimum-wage adjustments as the main tool of labor policy. The underlying figures draw on the National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, DANE) and its Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (Great Integrated Household Survey, GEIH), with calculations by Grupo Cibest.

Other highlights of the Report

On the domestic economy, the report noted that the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index from the think tank Fedesarrollo eased in May from a high April reading, and estimated that Colombia’s economy grew at a solid pace in April, with commerce expanding at double digits, manufacturing recovering gradually, and consumer confidence likely remaining in double digits in May.

In local markets, the fixed-rate TES curve — Colombia’s peso-denominated government bonds — gained 34 basis points on average the prior week, and the report cited a projected fiscal deficit of 5.3% of GDP under the 2026 Marco Fiscal de Mediano Plazo (Medium-Term Fiscal Framework). Pension fund managers and commercial banks led May purchases of class B TES in the secondary market. The Colombian peso appreciated in line with global and regional trends, while crude prices fell on the prospect of a US–Iran agreement and OPEC approved a fourth consecutive output increase for July.

Stock photo by Kevin Seibel via Pixabay.

Colombia’s hotel industry entered 2026 with occupancy, real revenue, and formal employment all falling at once, a convergence that the country’s main lodging trade group says threatens the financial and labor sustainability of hotels nationwide. 

The Colombian Hotel and Tourism Association (Asociación Hotelera y Turística de Colombia, Cotelco) issued the alert based on the first-quarter results of the National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, DANE) and its Encuesta Mensual de Alojamiento (Monthly Lodging Survey, EMA).

“The results of the Monthly Lodging Survey show that the sector is facing a moment of high pressure: we have lower real income, an occupancy rate that cannot recover the levels of previous years, and a reduction in formal employment,” said José Andrés Duarte, president of Cotelco. “The hotel industry remains an engine of economic and regional development, but it needs conditions that allow companies to sustain their operations and keep generating jobs.”

Occupancy at its lowest in five years

The national occupancy rate stood at 48.4% between January and April 2026, the lowest reading for that period in five years. The figure confirms a downward trend: the indicator reached 52.6% in 2022, 52.1% in 2023, 49.5% in 2024, and 49.3% in 2025. The gap against 2022 amounts to 4.2 percentage points; against 2023, the drop was 3.6 points, while the declines relative to 2024 and 2025 moderated to 1.0 and 0.9 points, respectively. Cotelco sees the recent readings as an apparent stabilization around 49%, though still below the levels recorded during the post-pandemic recovery.

Revenue has not recovered since 2024

Even with this stabilization, however, real revenue in the lodging subsector fell 5.1% between January and April 2026 against the same period of 2025. Comparing January-April 2024 with the same months of 2026, the sector has accumulated a real reduction of 6.9% in billings, a sign that hotels have not fully rebuilt their income levels. For the single month of April 2026, real hotel revenue fell 5.7% year-on-year, according to the EMA.

The contraction was far from uniform across the twelve regions the survey tracks. Antioquia posted the deepest fall, with real revenue down 14.8%, followed by the Central region at -12% and Cartagena at -8.9%. At the other end, only the Pacific region and the Santanderes grew, rising 3.3% and 3.4%, respectively.

While wages have gone up in the hotel sector, headcounts of employed people in the sector have gone down. Photo by Rodrigo Salomón Cañas from Pixabay.

Formal employment keeps shrinking

Because of falling revenue, the personnel employed in the subsector fell 4.1% between January and April 2026 against the same period of 2025, a decline Cotelco attributes to staffing adjustments amid weaker tourism activity. Since 2024, formal employment in the subsector has accumulated a contraction of 5.1%. In April alone, national hotel headcount fell 5.4% year-on-year, with the sharpest cuts in San Andrés and Providencia (12.1%), the Pacific region (6.5%), and Antioquia (6.2%).

The employment cuts coincided with sharp wage increases. Hotel salaries rose 10.9% in April year-on-year, and real wages in the sector accumulated growth of 10.3% between January and April, even as revenue fell and staffing shrank. 

The increases were driven largely by the 23% rise in Colombia’s minimum wage that took effect at the start of the year, with the steepest gains in the Amazon region (21.9%), the Coffee Axis (13.7%), the Pacific (13.3%), and the Caribbean Coast (13.0%). The combination of softer demand and rising operating and labor costs, Cotelco warns, is squeezing the finances of establishments that must sustain daily operations with fewer resources.

Occupancy leaders and the Bogotá exception

San Andrés and Providencia recorded the country’s highest occupancy in April, at 62.6%, up from 58.5% a year earlier. Cartagena remained the second-highest at 59.8%, slightly below the 60% of the prior year. Bogotá registered 55.0% occupancy, with a distinct profile: unlike most regions, where leisure is the main reason for travel, business trips contributed 30.1 percentage points to the capital’s total. Nationally, leisure remained the predominant motive, contributing 25.6 points to the 46.3% total occupancy recorded in April, down from 46.7% in the same month of 2025. Room rates rose only modestly on an annual basis, with single accommodation up 1.8% and double up 2.6%, though both fell month-on-month against March.

“The sector is facing a moment of high pressure: we have lower real income, an occupancy rate that cannot recover the levels of previous years, and a reduction in formal employment.” — Jose Andres Duarte, president of Cotelco

Travel agencies diverge from hotels

While hotels contracted, travel agencies showed relative resilience. The DANE Encuesta Mensual de Agencias de Viaje (Monthly Travel Agency Survey, EMAV) reported that agencies’ nominal revenue grew 2.1% in April, even as their headcount fell 2.8% — the lowest reading since the series began — and average nominal wages rose 11.4%. 

Commissions drove the positive result, contributing 1.7 points to the 2.1% total, while the online sales channel edged up to 37.1% of bookings from 36.3%, and the traditional channel slipped to 62.9% from 63.7%. Because hotel figures are stated in real terms and agency figures in nominal terms, the two are not directly comparable, but the divergence points to a shift in how tourism spending is distributed along the value chain.

Cotelco’s requests to the government

The trade group is calling for technical roundtables with the national government to stimulate tourism demand, strengthen formality, and improve operating conditions. Cotelco has also reiterated the urgency of updating the national tourism registry and tightening control over informal supply, which it says undermines the sustainability of destinations, formal employment, and the safety of residents and visitors. The market closed in 2025 with roughly 12,957 hotels and 297,487 rooms.

The current weakness marks a reversal from the sector’s recent peaks. Finance Colombia has previously reported that Colombia hit record-high hotel occupancy and that March occupancy once reached its best level in 11 years, even as domestic tourism approached pre-pandemic levels. The latest DANE readings suggest that rising visitor numbers are no longer translating into stronger results for the formal lodging sector.

According to a first-quarter report released by DANE, hotel occupancy has fallen as tourism revenue slows its growth. Photo by Manuela Jaeger from Pixabay.

As Colombia heads into its June 21, 2026 presidential runoff, some companies are writing a contractual escape hatch into their deals — a provision the construction trade group Camacol Antioquia calls the “Cláusula Cepeda,” or “Cepeda clause” — that would let them pause or unwind agreements if leftist candidate Iván Cepeda wins, according to Teleantioquia and a televised news report. The accounts come from business representatives describing market sentiment; the prevalence of the clauses has not been independently quantified.

According to Eduardo Loaiza Posada, manager of Camacol Antioquia, “we know that the implementation of the ‘Cepeda clause’ exists in the market.” He said the possibility of a Cepeda win “generates so much uncertainty that many businesspeople have considered that, in the event of his victory, they would unwind deals already agreed.” Loaiza Posada framed the issue as one of confidence: “When there is doubt, uncertainty follows — and uncertainty is legal insecurity,” he told Teleantioquia, adding that “legal insecurity makes investment frightened.”

The trade group says the clauses surfaced across several productive sectors — housing, construction, and the financing of hotels and logistics centers — and that some projects have been shelved outright. “Even companies that were planning to build a new institutional or corporate headquarters have told the builders: ‘Let’s get the contract ready, but if this candidate wins, we undo the deal,'” Loaiza Posada said, according to Teleantioquia. He added that the hesitation is not limited to domestic players, citing instances of international funds and hotel chains reconsidering whether to finance or lend their brand to projects.

In a separate televised report, a real estate agent confirmed that some home purchase-and-sale contracts now include a clause letting the buyer withdraw based on market expectations and on changes to government policy and housing subsidies. The agent said the provision is “very much named at the moment” and is meant to offer investors an additional guarantee against a continuation of the current government’s policies, allowing a party to exit “without any penalty.”

“When there is doubt, uncertainty follows — and uncertainty is legal insecurity.” — Eduardo Loaiza Posada, manager of Camacol Antioquia

The practice is not new, and it is not unique to Cepeda. The same reports note that a “Cláusula Petro” appeared during the 2018 and 2022 campaigns, when Gustavo Petro was a candidate, transferring political expectations onto investment decisions in the same way. Legal commentators have described these as conditional clauses that are valid under Colombian private law: as Portafolio and El Tiempo reported in 2022, a contract can lawfully be made contingent on a future event, including an election outcome, and undone if that event occurs. By that reading, the “Cepeda clause” is a recurring feature of Colombian electoral cycles — a form of risk management — rather than a novel maneuver.

It also lands in a housing market already under strain for reasons that predate the runoff. According to figures from Camacol cited in the broadcast report, more than 134,000 households abandoned plans to buy a home between 2022 and February 2026, a 130% increase in the social-interest (VIS) segment. The report attributed much of that to regulatory uncertainty and policy decisions such as cuts to housing subsidies, alongside higher costs and rising interest rates. Data from the portal Finca Raíz cited in the same report showed sale prices climbing above inflation, with increases of up to 13%, as fewer project launches tightened supply. Colombia builds a little over 100,000 homes a year, the report noted, while DANE figures suggest 230,000 to 250,000 new families form annually — a structural gap that the slowdown widens.

Cepeda’s campaign has not publicly responded to the clause, and his published platform is more measured than the business alarm implies. His roughly 118-page plan, built around the idea of an “economy for life,” does propose a larger role for the state, a stronger internal market, and an emphasis on the peasant, popular and solidarity economy. But as La Silla Vacía and El Colombiano have reported, the document is more moderate than several positions President Petro has defended: it does not call for eliminating the independence of the central bank, a constituent assembly, or forced investments, and the campaign has sought to present a more pragmatic version of the current government’s agenda.

The runoff offers voters two markedly different economic visions — Abelardo de la Espriella campaigning to shrink the state, cut taxes and lean on the private sector, and Cepeda proposing deeper state intervention and expanded social programs — which is what the contractual hedging ultimately reflects: uncertainty about which direction policy will take. Cepeda advanced to the second round after the May 31 first round, in which he took 40.9% of the vote to De la Espriella’s 43.7%. With days to go, the market is watching the result and the signals it will send for housing and investment policy.

Colombia’s economy showed signs of acceleration in the rolling quarter ended in May 2026, according to the latest NowCast Bancolombia report published June 3 by Grupo Cibest, the quantitative research arm of Bancolombia (NYSE: CIB, BVC: BCOLOMBIA). The proprietary economic activity index registered a year-over-year expansion of 2.9% on a three-month moving average basis for the March–May 2026 period, up from 2.2% recorded in the comparable period a year earlier and an improvement of 30 basis points over the prior month’s reading, which was itself revised upward by 30 basis points from an initial estimate of 2.3%.

The report’s authors describe the result as marking a shift in the growth trend, with second-quarter 2026 conditions appearing more favorable than those observed in the first quarter. On a seasonally adjusted month-over-month basis, however, the index showed no change from the prior month, registering 0.0%. On a year-over-year basis using the original, non-seasonally adjusted series, growth came in at 2.2% for May 2026.

For the full second quarter of 2026, the NowCast model projects year-over-year GDP growth of 2.6%, based on the May 31 reading. That estimate is slightly below the market consensus tracked by Latin Focus Consensus Forecasts, which has held steady at 2.7%. The NowCast estimate for 2Q26 was revised up from 2.4% as of April 30.

The NowCast Bancolombia index is constructed by Grupo Cibest using transaction data from the channels and payment methods of the Bancolombia group, processed through quantitative and analytical tools to generate high-frequency estimates of productive activity in Colombia. The index is designed as a complement to official statistics published by the National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, DANE) and is not a substitute for official GDP figures.

“The data suggests that conditions in 2Q26 to date are more favorable than those observed in 1Q26.” — NowCast Bancolombia, June 3, 2026, Grupo Cibest

Sector Performance

At the sector level, the rolling quarter ended in May points to a broad consolidation of trends across Colombia’s productive sectors. Commerce (wholesales and retail) held growth near 3.3% year-over-year, continuing a trend that has been sustained through the first half of 2026. Public administration posted 4.7% year-over-year growth in May, maintaining steady expansion. Real estate services continued its stable trajectory at 2.0%, while financial services accelerated to 5.6% year-over-year in May, up from 2.8% in March.

Construction recorded 3.6% year-over-year growth in May after a period of deceleration that had brought the sector down from highs above 6% in mid-2025. Agriculture registered 3.5% year-over-year growth in May, also showing renewed momentum after a softer stretch earlier in the year. Manufacturing reached 2.4% in May, a modest acceleration from 0.9% in February. Entertainment posted the strongest reading in the heat map at 6.6% year-over-year in May, continuing a recovery that began in mid-2025. Mining remained in modest positive territory at 1.3% in May, though it has been volatile, dipping into negative readings as recently as February 2026 at -2.4%.

The information sector was the weakest performer, posting only 0.2% year-over-year growth in May after recording negative readings in the November 2025 through February 2026 period. Utilities registered 2.2% growth in May, and professional services came in at 1.9%.

The NowCast report was prepared by Arturo Yesid González Peña, Head of Quantitative and Analytics, and Sebastián Ospina Cuartas, Data Controller, within Grupo Cibest’s Economic, Industry and Market Research area. The index is available on Bloomberg under the ticker ALLX COBC<GO>. The report carries a standard disclaimer noting that its projections are subject to risks and uncertainties, and that actual results may differ materially from estimates contained in the document. It does not constitute investment advice.

Above photo: Leatherworking machinery on display at Colombia’s Leather Expo in Bogotá (photo: Loren Moss)

Colombia’s grocery bills changed little in June, according to the latest Grupo Cibest (NYSE: CIB; BVC: CIBEST) Food Prices Monitor, prepared by the economic research team at Bancolombia. The report estimates that total food inflation came in at -0.02% month-over-month for June 2026, a figure consistent with an annual food inflation rate of 6.12%.

“We estimate that total food inflation will come in at -0.02% month-over-month in June 2026. On an annual basis, this is consistent with food inflation of 6.12%.” — Bancolombia economic research team, Food Prices Monitor, June 2026

The monitor tracks short-term movements in staple commodities that carry a high weight in the food component of the Consumer Price Index (CPI). It combines purchasing activity captured in neighborhood stores and small grocery outlets by Servinformacion with wholesale price data from Colombia’s main food markets, reported through the Sistema de Información de Precios y Abastecimiento del Sector Agropecuario (SIPSA, the agricultural price and supply information system) and published by the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE, the National Administrative Department of Statistics).

Meat prices split by category

Within the protein basket, beef prices rose in June while poultry and pork fell. The largest monthly gains were in prepared meats, up 2.4%, and beef, up 0.47%. The steepest declines were in pork, down 1.46%, and poultry, down 0.74%.

Monthly price change by protein category, June 2026. Source: Grupo Cibest / Bancolombia, Food Prices Monitor.

Tubers and onions climb as plantains retreat

Fresh produce showed mixed dynamics. The largest monthly increases were in arracacha, yam and other tubers, up 19%, onions, up 12%, and potatoes, up 6.3%. Moving the other way, plantains fell 8%, blackberries dropped 3%, and vegetables and legumes eased 1.51%.

Monthly price change for selected fresh produce, June 2026. Source: Grupo Cibest / Bancolombia, Food Prices Monitor.

Seasonal correction across processed and perishable food

The report points to a moderation in price dynamics across both the processed and perishable food components. Bancolombia’s team expects processed foods to post a monthly increase of 0.15% in June, 14 basis points lower than in May, which implies an annual inflation rate of 4.62%. Perishables are projected to show a less pronounced contraction, narrowing from -0.99% in May to -0.60% in June and corresponding to a year-over-year increase of 10.9%. The research team attributes those outcomes largely to seasonal factors that continue to support a correction in prices.

Estimated annual food inflation by component, June 2026; monthly change shown inside each bar. Source: Grupo Cibest / Bancolombia, Food Prices Monitor.

Taken together, the estimates leave total food inflation essentially flat on the month at -0.02%, and at 6.12% over the past year. Bancolombia frames the June reading as evidence that the seasonal correction underway in perishable and processed food prices is holding, even as individual items such as tubers and onions continue to swing sharply from one month to the next. The food basket remains one component of the broader inflation picture Bancolombia has tracked through 2026.

Headline image description: A bar graph showing the estimated annual food inflation by component, with monthly changes shown inside each bar. Graph created by Finance Colombia.

Colombians face three sharply different futures in May 31 vote

Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.

No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.

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A Race Reshaped by Late Polling

The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.

Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.

Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.

Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.

Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.

Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.

Security Policy: The Three Approaches to Armed Groups

Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.

Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.

Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.

De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.

For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.

Business Climate and Employment Conditions

The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.

Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.

Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.

De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.

Foreign Investment, Oil, and Mining

Ecopetrol holds a 31.5% stake in the Gunflint oil field in the Gulf of Mexico.

The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.

Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.

In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.

Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.

De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.

Foreign Policy: Washington Alignment vs. Multipolar Strategy

The US Embassy in Bogotá is said to be the 3rd largest US mission in the world (photo: Loren Moss)

Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.

Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.

Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.

De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.

“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.

Corruption and Judicial Independence

All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.

Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.

Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.

De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.

De la Espriella’s Legal Career: The Documented Record

De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.

Abelardo de la Espriella (screen capture from Twitter video)

His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.

De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.

The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.

Cepeda’s Family History and Ideological Background

Iván Cepeda (from Twitter)

Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.

Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.

The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.

What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.

Paloma Valencia (image Twitter)

Valencia and the Uribe Question

The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.

Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.

She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.

Press Freedom and the Media Environment

Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.

Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.

Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.

De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.

The Ideological Spectrum: Market Liberalism to State Direction

The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.

De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.

Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.

Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.

Minor Candidates: The Rest of the Ballot

Claudia López, senator of Colombia. (Credit: Patty Suescún)

Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.

Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.

Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.

Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.

Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.

Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.

Investment Implications

For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.

A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.

A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.

A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.

The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.

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The manufacturing sector was among the quarter’s strongest contributors, posting year-over-year growth of 2.9% and adding 0.3 percentage points to the annual variation in GDP. The sector’s performance placed it among the primary drivers of national economic output for the period.

Within manufacturing, two subsectors recorded particularly pronounced gains. Motor vehicle production expanded 27.8% year-over-year, while metallurgy grew 6.6%. Both categories function as inputs to broader industrial supply chains, and their recovery carries implications for upstream and downstream productive linkages, including employment in skilled manufacturing roles.

“What is notable about the first-quarter results is not solely the magnitude of the growth, but its composition. The performance of sectors such as motor vehicles, metallurgy, and machinery is particularly significant because it demonstrates a recovery of industrial capacities with greater effects on productive linkages, skilled employment, and economic sophistication.” — Diana Marcela Morales Rojas, Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism of Colombia

Separate monthly data from statistical agency DANE’s índice de producción industrial (IPI) showed that real industrial output grew 3.9% in March 2026 compared to March 2025. The expansion was distributed across multiple subsectors, including motor vehicles, metallurgy, machinery and equipment, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, rubber, plastics, and non-metallic minerals, indicating that the manufacturing recovery was not concentrated in a single production category.

Wholesale and retail trade expanded 6.0% in the first quarter, reflecting increased domestic market activity and business commerce. The trade sector’s performance complemented the manufacturing gains and contributed to the overall breadth of the quarter’s expansion.

Not all sectors contributed positively. Construction contracted 5.4% compared to the first quarter of 2025, the weakest result among major economic categories for the period. Public administration, defense, social security, education, and health services grew 5.7%, and reporting by Colombian media citing DANE data indicated that public spending accounted for approximately 46% of total first-quarter growth — a concentration that introduces a structural caveat to the headline figure, as private-sector momentum remains uneven across the economy.

Diana Marcela Morales Rojas, minister of the Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo, addressed the composition of the results in a statement issued alongside the data release. “What is notable about the first-quarter results is not solely the magnitude of the growth, but its composition,” she said. “The recovery of manufacturing, metallurgical, and industrial production activities demonstrates a greater role for sectors associated with transformation, productive capacity, and value-added generation within the national economic dynamic. The performance of sectors such as motor vehicles, metallurgy, and machinery is particularly significant because it demonstrates a recovery of industrial capacities with greater effects on productive linkages, skilled employment, and economic sophistication. These are meaningful indicators of strengthening of the manufacturing structure and national production.”

The first-quarter data were released as Colombia continues to manage elevated monetary policy rates and fiscal pressures that have weighed on investment activity in recent quarters. The Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo indicated that the quarter’s results reflect progress on an agenda oriented toward strengthening industry, domestic production, and commercial activity, though the degree to which private-sector industrial recovery can sustain these gains independently of public spending remains a key variable for subsequent quarters.

Headline photo credit: Tecnoglass