The Global Seafood Alliance (GSA) has announced that Cartagena, Colombia, will host the 24th edition of the Responsible Seafood Summit during the week of September 29, 2025, at the InterContinental Cartagena.

GSA announced in late October 2024 on Day 2 of the Responsible Seafood Summit in St. Andrews, Scotland. The vibrant Caribbean city of Cartagena will provide the summit with a unique backdrop for industry stakeholders to address pressing issues, share solutions, and make connections.

“It is exciting for us at GSA to bring our signature event back to South America for the first time in seven years,” said Mike Kocsis, CEO of GSA. The Summit was held in Guayaquil, Ecuador, in 2018. “As Colombia’s relevance in the global seafood industry continues to grow, it’s encouraging that the seafood sector there values responsible production and sourcing in both aquaculture and wild-capture fisheries. We look forward to connecting and collaborating with our global network in Cartagena.”

Cartagena, a UNESCO World Heritage Site, features 11 km of defensive walls built in the 16th century. Travel + Leisure magazine rated the city as one of the “best places to travel” in 2024. For 23 years, the Responsible Seafood Summit has provided a pre-competitive platform for knowledge sharing and idea exchange amongst the world’s seafood thought leaders.

“Cartagena, Colombia, is the perfect setting for the Summit, and USSEC is proud to be a sponsor of this prestigious event,” said Carlos Salinas, Americas Regional Director for the US Soybean Export Council, one of the event’s longstanding sponsors. “As a trusted partner to the aquaculture industry, US soy continues to collaborate to drive growth and sustainability, helping the sector thrive. We look forward to connecting with global leaders to advance innovation and sustainable practices in aquaculture.”

“The Chilean Aquaculture Innovation Club believes that this is an excellent opportunity to highlight LATAM aquaculture’s advancements in technology, productivity, and sustainability,” added Adolfo Alvial, executive director of Club de Innovación Acuícola Chile & Chairman of the Board of the Aquaculture Innovation Alliance.

Photo credit: Global Seafood Alliance (GSA)

Fitch Ratings has affirmed Empresas Públicas de Medellín’s (EPM) long-term foreign and local currency Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at ‘BB+’ and removed the Negative Rating Watch. The outlook is now stable. This action reflects Fitch’s assessment of EPM’s financial and operational stability.

Additionally, Fitch has affirmed the national long-term ratings of several EPM subsidiaries at ‘AAA (col)’ with a stable outlook. These subsidiaries include EPM Inversiones S.A., Empresa de Energía del Quindío S.A. E.S.P. (EDEQ), Centrales Eléctricas del Norte de Santander S.A. E.S.P. (CENS), Central Hidroeléctrica de Caldas S.A. E.S.P. (CHEC), Electrificadora de Santander S.A. E.S.P. (ESSA), Aguas Nacionales EPM S.A. E.S.P. (AGN), and Caribemar de la Costa S.A.S E.S.P. (Afinia). The national short-term ratings for these entities have also been affirmed at ‘F1+(col)’.

Furthermore, Fitch has removed the Negative Rating Watch on Aguas Regionales EPM S.A. E.S.P.’s national long-term rating, affirming it at ‘AA-(col)’ with a stable outlook. It affirmed the national short-term rating at ‘F1+(col)’. Empresas Varias de Medellín S.A. E.S.P. (Emvarias) also had its national long-term rating affirmed at ‘AA+(col)’ with a stable outlook, along with its national short-term rating at ‘F1+(col)’.

These affirmations indicate Fitch’s confidence in the financial health and operational performance of EPM and its subsidiaries.

Headline Image: Hidroituango Hydroelectric Dam. (Photo credit: EPM)

Avianca has begun the implementation of the SSR DPNA code, an IATA-level tool used by airlines so that passengers with intellectual or developmental disabilities can report their condition. Those travelers with intellectual disabilities, psychosocial disabilities, neurodivergence, within the autism spectrum, with Down syndrome, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), cognitive disorders related to aging (Alzheimer’s, dementia), or other related medical diagnosis, may voluntarily identify themselves through this code to receive personalized and free assistance.

Through this new option, which is available at customer contact points such as booking flow and management, special assistance website, and contact center, the airline, in addition to identifying travelers, can adapt its service to the needs of users who require it, providing an increasingly accessible experience according to their needs. To date, more than 1,500 people have voluntarily used this code.

“Inclusion, diversity, and accessibility are a priority for Avianca, so we are taking a step into the future and creating strategies that are more friendly to all our users. We are happy to provide solutions to allow people to have tools at hand that accommodate their needs and allow them to have a better experience when traveling,” said Michael Swiatek, Chief Accessibility Officer of Abra.

Since each person is different and their needs may vary, when requesting the contact center, the user, or their companion must explain to the Avianca agent what type of help or assistance they require. If the request is made through digital channels, it is advisable to go to the counter at the airport to detail the type of support they require. This initiative is part of the more than 32 actions that make up the “Avianca Accessible” program, which was born to understand each disability, its characteristics, and the best way to address them with a quality and personalized service.

One of the biggest challenges in accessibility is understanding the world of neurodiverse people and their specific needs in contexts such as air travel. Therefore, in addition to the DPNA code, Avianca has worked on actions to train its teams in assertive communication, definition, and characteristics of each disability, as well as handling challenging situations.

In addition to this, the recent launch of its website on accessibility (Avianca—Intellectual Disability), which includes a specific section to serve travelers with intellectual or cognitive disabilities, in addition to a guide built together with Lifesense, (a Bogotá-based mental health service) which includes specific recommendations so that this group of travelers can better prepare.

Headline Image Credit: imslavinsky from Pixabay.

The prospects for peace in Colombia appear increasingly remote as illegal armed groups fragment amid a gold and cocaine bonanza.

President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace (Paz Total) policy, designed to negotiate agreements with the country’s main armed groups and criminal gangs, is struggling to make any headway as he passes the halfway point of his four-year administration. The negotiations have had profound effects on the criminal dynamics in the country.

SEE ALSO: What Is Behind Increased Violence in Colombia?

After initial progress in dialogue with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), talks collapsed in May last year when a faction of the group split off to pursue separate peace negotiations. The ELN’s extensive infrastructure and leadership in Venezuela, where Nicolás Maduro remains in power following a widely criticized election, has further undermined the chances of peace with the Marxist-Leninist rebel force.

Similarly, negotiations with dissidents of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) have faced significant setbacks. Fragmentation within these groups has sparked infighting, with splinter factions emerging from the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) and the Second Marquetalia, the two largest dissident factions. As a result, the government is engaging with only a small portion of each group.

The country’s most powerful drug-trafficking organization, the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), remains largely outside the Total Peace framework. Efforts have been stalled by the absence of a legal framework for negotiations and a potential peace deal. Similar legal obstacles have hindered progress in “urban peace laboratories” in cities like Buenaventura, Quibdó, and Medellín, where gangs dominate neighborhoods through drug trafficking and extortion rackets.

As Petro begins the third year of his presidency, InSight Crime reviews the key developments in Colombia’s peace dialogues and examines their criminal implications for 2025.

ELN

Initial progress with the ELN effectively unraveled as disputes with the government led to the collapse of negotiations.

In January last year, the Comuneros del Sur Front (Frente Comuneros del Sur – FCS), an ELN faction in southern Nariño, broke ranks, announcing plans to pursue separate “regional dialogue” with the government. Frustrated by the limited progress at the national level and growing threats from rival groups, the FCS sought a more localized approach. However, ELN top commander Eliecer Erlinto Chamorro, alias “Antonio García,” condemned these parallel dialogues as unauthorized and illegitimate.

SEE ALSO: Kidnappings Surge in Colombia Amid ELN Peace Negotiations

By May, the FCS formally severed ties with the ELN, emerging as a dissident faction of the guerrilla group. It quickly established dialogue with the government, advanced in peace talks, and even committed to a partial weapons handover, according to Carlos Augusto Erazo Murcia, head of the government’s negotiating team.

This was followed by the collapse of a bilateral ceasefire between the ELN and the government, which expired in August without renewal. After the ceasefire lapse, the ELN escalated hostilities by attacking a military base in Arauca in September, killing three soldiers. In response, the government suspended peace talks indefinitely.

The ELN and the government resumed talks on November 25, agreeing to reconvene in 2025 to reassess the dialogue process and explore the possibility of a renewed ceasefire.

The ELN also stands to benefit greatly from what was widely considered a stolen election in Venezuela, extending by another six years of Maduro’s time at the helm of the country. Venezuela remains a critical hub for the ELN, hosting much of its leadership and infrastructure.

Since the FARC’s demobilization in 2016, the ELN has expanded its presence in Venezuela and Colombia’s border departments, strengthening its operations through a symbiotic relationship with the Maduro regime. The group now controls entire sections of the border, managing smuggling and drug-trafficking corridors between the two countries, while maintaining corridors moving troops. Its influence spans eight of Venezuela’s 24 states, with significant income derived from controlling illegal mining and cocaine production zones.

With little interference and often support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—who depend on the income generated by these groups, particularly amid severe US sanctions—the ELN has solidified its presence along the 2,219 km border with Venezuela and uses this haven to project into Colombia. This growing entrenchment further undermines the Total Peace initiative.

Ex-FARC

Government dialogue with the EMC, the largest ex-FARC organization, has also splintered the group. In March, Petro suspended a bilateral ceasefire with the EMC in the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño due to ongoing violence against Indigenous communities. This decision deepened internal divisions within the EMC. Its leader, Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias “Iván Mordisco,” refused further negotiations until the ceasefire was reinstated, while another faction, led by Alexander Díaz, alias “Calarcá Córdoba,” opted to continue talks.

By April, the government expelled Mordisco’s faction from the peace talks, shifting its focus to negotiations exclusively with Calarcá’s bloc. In July, his group signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement, marking a tentative step forward. However, significant challenges remain: Calarcá’s faction has been accused of threatening demobilized FARC members in Caquetá, and in December, six soldiers were killed in a minefield allegedly planted by the group.

Mordisco’s wing, on the other hand, has intensified violent activities, particularly in Cauca, an important region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. By September, Cauca had recorded 466 violent incidents over 12 months, the most of any department during that period, with numbers continuing to rise through the end of 2024.

Meanwhile, the Second Marquetalia, a separate group of FARC dissidents led by Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” became the third major group to enter Total Peace negotiations in 2024. However, internal divisions also plagued this effort. In November, two key factions—the Border Command and the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico)—broke away, frustrated by Márquez’s leadership. They formed the National Bolivarian Army Coordinator (Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano), led by José Vicente Lesmes, alias “Walter Mendoza.”

AGC and Urban Groups

The AGC has been largely excluded from the Total Peace initiative thus far, but signs emerged in 2024 that Petro sought to change this. In July, he authorized dialogue with the group, signaling a potential shift in policy.

But significant obstacles remain. The government’s classification of the AGC as a high-impact organized crime group, rather than a political organization like the ELN or FARC dissidents, has become a sticking point in the negotiations. This designation precludes the AGC from seeking transitional justice terms, such as guarantees against extradition and amnesty, similar to those offered to the FARC in the 2016 peace agreement. Under Colombian law, high-impact organized crime groups are only eligible for limited judicial benefits, such as reduced sentences, making negotiations far less appealing for the AGC.

SEE ALSO: GameChangers 2023: The Cocaine Flash-to-Bang in 2024

Despite minor progress—such as the attorney general lifting arrest warrants for key AGC leaders—negotiations have yielded few tangible results. Tensions remain high: in December, the military bombed an AGC camp in northern Antioquia, underscoring the ongoing hostilities.

Moreover, skepticism about the AGC’s intentions persists. Some analysts suggest the group is using negotiations as a tactical maneuver to secure a bilateral ceasefire and reduce military pressure, rather than genuinely committing to demobilization. At the same time, its ongoing territorial expansion and dominance over key criminal economies fuel doubts about its willingness to disarm.

The absence of a legal framework for gang demobilization, or “transition to legality,” as it is officially termed, has also hindered progress in cities like Medellín, Quibdó, and Buenaventura.

Efforts to pass legislation to formalize a framework for gang demobilization have stalled in Colombia’s gridlocked congress, leaving urban peace efforts in limbo.

In Medellín, several gangs agreed to reduce violence following Petro’s 2022 election, resulting in a notable drop in homicide rates. In June 2023, Petro initiated a dialogue table with former gang leaders at Itagüí prison, but progress faltered in 2024.

In Quibdó, the gangs Los Mexicanos, Lokos Yam, and RPS began talks in August 2023, achieving significant milestones like a commitment to halt the extortion of teachers and health workers. But in September 2024, a ceasefire between the gangs collapsed, amidst incursions by the AGC into the city. In December, Petro authorized exploratory talks to include three additional groups—the Zetas, Cabí, and AGC—in the Quibdó table.

In Buenaventura, negotiations with the Spartans and Shottas—which together command over 1,700 members—have produced mixed results. The groups agreed to a truce in August 2023, significantly reducing violence throughout 2024. While tensions flared in March when the Spartans temporarily withdrew from the negotiations, they eventually returned to the table, and have renewed the ceasefire, currently set to last until February 2025.

Looking Forward

Several key factors will significantly influence peace negotiations in 2025.

First, the fragmentation of major groups within the Total Peace process highlights the challenges of negotiating with organizations that appear unified but are, in fact, loose coalitions of diverse factions. The Comuneros del Sur’s split from the ELN exposed the group’s limited control over its regional fronts. Similarly, the EMC’s divided leadership—between Mordisco and Calarcá—mirrors the internal tensions within the Second Marquetalia, where Iván Márquez has struggled to maintain cohesion among factions like the Border Command.

These fractures risk escalating violence as splinter groups vie for territorial control and factions excluded from peace talks increase attacks on government targets.

Since the EMC split, clashes between Mordisco’s and Calarcá’s factions have escalated in Putumayo, a key region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. Violence has also surged in other southwestern departments, such as Cauca. The deadly ELN attack on the military base could also foreshadow more violent confrontations between criminal groups and government forces, despite the relative lull achieved by ceasefires in 2024.

Second, the absence of widespread ceasefires with criminal groups has leveled the criminal playing field once again. Ceasefires maintained by the ELN and EMC in 2023 temporarily shifted criminal dynamics, allowing these groups to expand their territorial control, recruit new members, and focus on rival factions rather than government forces.

“We know [armed groups] have taken advantage of the ceasefire to try to increase their illegal control over the territory,” Colombia’s Minister of Defense said in a press conference in March 2024.

This reprieve boosted profits from drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion. In contrast, the AGC, excluded from ceasefire agreements, continued to face government offensives.

SEE ALSO: The Informants of Tibú: How the Colombian State Unleashed a Wave of Femicides

Currently, only the Calarcá dissidents and the FCS have active bilateral ceasefires with the government. The FCS, being relatively small, is unlikely to use the ceasefire for significant territorial expansion but will likely consolidate its holdings and defend against incoming EMC incursions into Nariño. Conversely, the Calarcá dissidents are better positioned to exploit their ceasefire to strengthen their presence in critical drug trafficking zones, particularly along the Amazonian border with Brazil and in parts of the Venezuelan frontier.

For groups like the Mordisco dissidents and the ELN, the absence of ceasefires means they will lose their distinct advantage as they compete for control over territories essential for drug trafficking, illegal mining, and other key revenue streams. However, the lack of ceasefires could give the AGC an edge.

Despite facing sustained military pressure, the AGC has expanded along the Pacific coast in Chocó, the Caribbean coast in Bolívar, Córdoba, and Cesar, and is encircling Catatumbo in Norte de Santander—one of Colombia’s most critical coca cultivation regions. With its criminal rivals now experiencing the same pressure it has endured, the AGC is poised to solidify and take even greater control as cocaine production explodes and gold prices approach record highs.

Third, Maduro’s dependence on Colombian criminal groups ensures that the ELN and Second Marquetalia will continue to strengthen their footholds in Venezuela and along Colombia’s border. With minimal interference—and often direct support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—both groups have entrenched themselves in the region, controlling key criminal economies such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and contraband smuggling.

With the prospect of six more years of protection under Maduro, these groups have little immediate incentive to engage in peace negotiations. Instead, they are well-positioned to expand their operations further.

This article, written by Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

Libero Copper & Gold Corporation (TSXV: LBC) (OTCQB: LBCMF) (FRA: 29H) has announced the appointment of Frank Balint as strategic advisor, a role in which he will be actively engaged in guiding the company’s ongoing exploration and growth at its flagship Mocoa copper-molybdenum project in Colombia.

Balint is a highly respected mining executive and Professional Geologist (P.Geo) with over 40 years of industry experience—most notably at Inmet Mining Corporation, where he served as Vice President of Corporate Development and Vice President of Exploration. Under his leadership, Inmet’s market capitalization grew from under $200 million to over $5 billion, culminating in its acquisition by First Quantum Minerals. He was instrumental in advancing Cobre Panama, one of the world’s largest porphyry copper deposits, and contributed to multiple exploration initiatives and M&A transactions globally.

Beyond Inmet, Balint has held directorships at Wolfden Resources (TSX, sold to Zinifex for $363 million CAD), GoldQuest Mining Corp., and Doré Copper Mining Corp. He holds a P.Geo (Retired) in Ontario and earned an HBSc in Geology from Lakehead University.

“Frank’s proven track record—from discovery and financing to readying world-class porphyry mines for construction—makes him the ideal strategic advisor as we advance our flagship Mocoa copper-molybdenum project in Colombia. His geological perspective complements the strong technical expertise we already have, and he’ll be actively involved on the ground—helping interpret new data and guide the design of upcoming drill holes,” said Libero Copper President & CEO Ian Harris.

Accelerating Mocoa’s Growth

In his new role, Balint will work closely with Libero’s geology and technical teams to review and rank newly identified porphyry centers, advising on how best to refine each target for future drilling. He will also provide critical input on hole planning for the ongoing 14,000-meter program, aiming to maximize resource expansion and explore potential extensions of the known deposit. By guiding the refinement of geological models and interpreting new data, he will offer fresh perspectives on managing geological complexities while enhancing Mocoa’s long-term potential.

About the Mocoa Porphyry Copper-Molybdenum Deposit

The Mocoa deposit is located in the department of Putumayo, 10 kilometers from the town of Mocoa. Libero Copper’s district scale holdings cover over 1,000 km2 through titles and applications, encompassing most of the Jurassic porphyry belt in southern Colombia. Mocoa was discovered in 1973 when the United Nations and the Colombian government conducted a regional stream sediment geochemical survey. Between 1978 and 1983, an exploration program was carried out that consisted of geological mapping, surface sampling, ground geophysics (IP, magnetics), 31 diamond drill holes totaling 18,321 meters, and metallurgical test work B2Gold subsequently executed diamond drill programs in 2008 and 2012.

The Mocoa deposit appears to be open in both directions along strike and at depth. Current work on the property has identified additional porphyry targets, including the possible expansion of known mineralization. The Mocoa deposit is situated in the Central Cordillera of Colombia, a 30-kilometer-wide tectonic belt underlain by volcano-sedimentary, sedimentary, and intrusive rocks that range in age from Triassic-Jurassic to Quaternary and by remnants of Paleozoic metasediments and metamorphic rocks of Precambrian age.

This belt hosts several other porphyry-copper deposits in Ecuador, such as Mirador, San Carlos, Panantza, and Solaris’ Warintza. Copper-molybdenum mineralization is associated with dacite porphyry intrusions of the Middle Jurassic age that are emplaced into andesitic and dacitic volcanics. The Mocoa porphyry system exhibits a classical zonal pattern of hydrothermal alteration and mineralization, with a deeper central core of potassic alteration overlain by sericitization and surrounded by propylitization.

Mineralization consists of disseminated chalcopyrite, molybdenite and local bornite, and chalcocite associated with multiphase veins, stockwork, and hydrothermal breccias. The Mocoa deposit is roughly cylindrical, with a 600-meter diameter. High-grade copper-molybdenum mineralization continues to depths of more than 1,000 meters.

Headline Image: Frank Balint. Photo credit: Libero Copper.

Colombian police and immigration authorities have captured alleged international fraudster Loany Lismeiry Ortiz Nova, from the Dominican Republic, as she tried to leave Colombia and cross by land into Venezuela. Ortiz Nova was in Colombia having an aesthetic nose operation, though investigators suspect she was also attempting to avoid arrest. After several weeks of searching, authorities received intelligence that she was attempting to leave Colombia via the Venezuelan border. On February 14, 2025, she was intercepted at the Atanasio Girardot International Bridge (formerly Tienditas Bridge), a key border crossing between Colombia and Venezuela, near Cúcuta, Norte de Santander.

During a routine immigration checkpoint, Colombian migration officials verified her identity and discovered that she was the subject of an Interpol Red Notice. Upon confirmation, Colombian authorities immediately notified the Metropolitan Police of Cúcuta, who took her into custody and transferred her to the Criminal Investigation Section (SIJIN) in that city.

The filing of the Interpol order involved the Dominican Republic’s Public Prosecutor’s Office, the National Police’s Division of Investigation of Money Laundering and Terrorism (DILAT), and the OCN Office of Interpol Santo Domingo. Ortiz Nova is alleged to be the principal leader of a criminal organization implicated in real estate fraud and money laundering, known as the “Guepardo Case,” which was dismantled on February 7, 2025.

The Guepardo Case involves a criminal organization that allegedly used technological tools and social media to attract victims interested in purchasing real estate in the Dominican Republic

The criminal network reportedly promoted real estate projects, attracting buyers from the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, the United States, and Europe. They utilized the branding of RE/MAX, one of the largest international real estate brokerages, to lend credibility to their schemes.

According to the Dominican Procuraduria (Public Prosecutor’s Office), information from the Dominican Republic’s General Directorate of Migration indicated that Ortiz Nova departed for Bogotá, Colombia, on November 13, 2024, during the ongoing investigation. She was expected to return on November 19, 2024, but failed to do so, allegedly to evade legal proceedings. Authorities later determined that she had traveled to Colombia with a stopover in Panama and had no intention of returning.

Claudio Cordero, the Dominican Anti-Money Laundering Public Prosecutor overseeing the case, stated that the Attorney General’s Office will soon provide the necessary documentation to Colombian authorities to initiate Ortiz Nova’s extradition. This process aims to have her face charges related to real estate fraud and money laundering, which have affected numerous victims.

On February 11, 2025, the La Romana Prosecutor’s Office, in collaboration with the Specialized Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Prosecutor’s Office, arrested another suspect, Yves Alexandre Giroux. Giroux had fled during a raid on February 7, 2025, and was later apprehended in an exclusive villa in Cocotal, Punta Cana.
Additionally, suspects Marisol Nova Nolasco and Rocío del Alba Rodríguez de Moya have been detained and brought to justice. On February 18, 2025, the Judicial Office of Permanent Attention Services in La Romana imposed coercive measures on Giroux, Nova Nolasco, and Rodríguez de Moya.

The Guepardo Case involves a criminal organization that allegedly used technological tools and social media to attract victims interested in purchasing real estate in the Dominican Republic. Operating under the facade of a company named Novasco Real Estate S.R.L., they offered property projects at prices significantly below market value, enticing buyers who ultimately fell victim to fraud.

Authorities have identified at least 122 victims of this scheme, including 32 foreign nationals. Investigations suggest that the organization deceived these individuals through fraudulent online promotions, illicitly obtaining substantial sums of money. Ortiz Nova’s arrest underscores the effectiveness of international cooperation and stringent migration controls in combating organized crime. Colombian authorities acted immediately upon verifying her identity and discovering an active Interpol red notice against her. She remains in police custody in Cúcuta, Colombia, awaiting extradition proceedings to the Dominican Republic, where she will face judicial processes.

This case highlights the necessity of robust international collaboration to address transnational fraud and the importance of public awareness regarding the risks associated with online transactions involving unverified real estate entities.

Headline Image: Arrest of Loany Lismeiry Ortiz Nova. Photo credit: Colombia National Police.

In these days of fake news, tribalism, and rampant social networks, the story of the fallen narco criminal ‘Papa Smurf’ is the gift that keeps on giving. Whilst originally the story revolved around his illegally gained money finding its way into Petro’s election campaign, before subsequently being returned and then disappearing on the route, there is also a lot of speculation about whether the previous presidential administrations were also in bed with the blue man with a beautiful white beard. As usual in Colombia, there is probably involvement on both sides, and the full truth isn’t convenient for anyone. That said, in a week when the history of the Ukrainian war was altered, the world is pretty much the same.

The big economic headline was Q4 GDP from Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística — DANE Colombia, which was at (2.3%) to the top of expectations, according to Fedesarrollo. That is a 0.6% increase QoQ. The biggest contributions were from commerce/transport (+4.4%), public sector (+4%) and agriculture (+6.5%). The underperformance was from mining which dropped 5.9% driven by weak coal numbers. This brought us to a full-year GDP growth of 1.7%—very much as expected by the same analysts who are predicting 2.6% for 2025 which would be a solid number.

Elsewhere, Ecopetrol announced its latest reserve data. Oil now stands at 7.6 years (little changed) whilst there was a drop to 6.7 years for gas—combining the two there was a marginal increase when compared to 2023. Finally, total production of oil or equivalent rose to 250 million barrels in 2024—the highest in 9 years. The sector is in flux and work needs to be done, but still not the disaster often reported.

More chaos with the pension reform, as the constitutional court received 57 lawsuits against the government. All this does is jam up the court and stop the sector from getting on with life. Amidst all this chaos, the Peso has had a decent week thus far ($4098) and remains one of the best-performing currencies in 2025—albeit off a low base.

Have a great day.

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Headline Image Credit: hangela from Pixabay.

Avianca has announced the launch of a new direct route between Bogotá and Dallas, scheduled to commence on May 26, 2025. The airline plans to operate four weekly flights on this route, utilizing Airbus A320 aircraft, each with a capacity of 180 passengers, totaling 1,440 seats per week.

The proposed flight schedule is as follows:

This new route will enhance Avianca’s existing operations between Colombia and the United States, which currently include connections to Miami, Orlando, New York, Fort Lauderdale, Tampa, Chicago, Washington, and Boston.

“We continue to strengthen connectivity between the Americas. We are very excited to bring our customers closer to this incredible city, known for its great urban art district, and to promote cultural, commercial, and tourist exchange between both regions. In addition, the new operation to Dallas is added to the three direct routes that we announced at the beginning of the year to the United States, allowing our travelers to enjoy 21 routes between this country and Latin America during the high season,” said David Alemán, Avianca sales director for Colombia.

Tickets for the Bogotá-Dallas route are available for purchase through Avianca’s official channels, including their website, mobile application, physical sales points, and authorized travel agencies.

The initiation of this route is subject to governmental approval.

Headline Image: Airbus A320 operated by Avianca. Photo credit: Avianca.

In 2024, marked by moderate economic growth, the Colombian agricultural sector stood out as a key driver of the economy, with a significant increase of 8.1% in its added value compared to the previous year. The agriculture, livestock, hunting, forestry, and fishing sectors presented an added value of $158.1 billion USD and contributed 10.2% of the gross value added generated by the economy.

The growth of agricultural activity was mainly driven by coffee; which experienced a notable increase of 22.5%. It was followed by agricultural crops without coffee, with an increase of 8.3%; and livestock, with 5.6%. Despite difficulties in other subsectors, such as forestry (-9.4%) and fishing (-3%), the agricultural sector continues to consolidate itself as an essential pillar in the Colombian economy.

In the fourth quarter of 2024, the agriculture, livestock, hunting, forestry, and fishing sectors led economic growth, with an increase of 6.5%, exceeding GDP growth of 2.3% by 4.2 percentage points. This boost was mainly based on the strong performance of coffee (33.1%) and livestock (6.6%); with this, the agricultural sector was consolidated as the one with the greatest expansion within the country’s economy.

Dora Inés Rey, acting director of the UPRA, said: “The growth of the agricultural sector in 2024 is a reflection of the constant effort of our farmers and producers. Coffee, livestock, and other agricultural crops continue to prove to be key to the national economy and, from the UPRA, we work to strengthen the sector and ensure its continued growth.”

Photo credit: Colombia’s Rural Agricultural Planning Unit (UPRA)

Fitch Ratings has released a report analyzing the credit ratings of Colombian municipalities and districts during 2024, providing insights ahead of the 2025 review cycle. The study encompasses 27 entities, revealing that most ratings remained unchanged throughout 2024, with approximately 90% maintaining a stable outlook. At the end of 2024, about 74% of these ratings were in the ‘AA’ category or higher, and roughly 37% of the entities were rated ‘AAA’.

This report offers a comprehensive overview of the financial stability and creditworthiness of local governments in Colombia, reflecting their resilience amid various economic challenges. The high percentage of entities retaining strong credit ratings suggests effective fiscal management and a stable economic environment at the municipal level.

For a detailed analysis, refer to the full report titled “Municipios y Distritos Colombianos Muestran Estabilidad Entrando a 2025” available on Fitch Ratings’ official website.

Headline Image: Cartagena, Colombia. Photo credit: Makalu from Pixabay.