The President of the Senate of the Republic, Efraín Cepeda Sarabia, announced that the legislative body sent a formal communication to the National Civil Registry, accompanied by the certification of the Secretary General of the Senate, confirming that the proposal for a popular consultation was voted on and not approved by the legislative corporation.
Speaking to reporters from the National Capitol, Cepeda stated that President Petro’s announcement to decree the referendum by decree, “It’s absurd; if he does it at the moment he signs it, if they sign it, he will be sued immediately.”
Cepeda warned that if the head of state calls for such a referendum, “He is violating all laws, violating Colombian justice. Because that is where he should present his legal concerns, and not ignore the decision of congress, which is one of the branches of independent public power. The referendum was denied in the senate plenary session. The certifications are there.”
Finally, the president of the senate expressed his confidence that the institutions will act per the law: “I am sure that the registrar will not agree to call a referendum that has not been approved by Congress.”
President of the Senate of the Republic, Efraín Cepeda Sarabia. Photo credit: Senate of the Republic of Colombia.
The Financial Superintendence of Colombia (SFC) and Banca de las Oportunidades (BdOp) presented the results of the Financial Inclusion Report (RIF) 2024, which reflect the country’s progress and opportunities in access to and use of the products offered by the financial system.
In 2024, the percentage of adults who had at least one deposit or credit product increased by 1.7 percentage points (pp), standing at 96.3% compared to 94.6% in 2023.
On the other hand, the number of adults with at least one deposit product was 37.1 million at the end of 2024, which represents 95.8% of adults in Colombia. This behavior represents an increase of two pp compared to 2023, equivalent to 1.2 million new adults with deposit products.
In this segment, the most popular deposit products were savings accounts, whose an indicator was 82.4% of the adult population, followed by low-amount deposits (DBM), with 76.1%. The usage indicators stood at 54.9% and 64%, respectively.
In deposit products, the coffee region registered universal levels of access and use. It was followed by the Central East region with universal access levels and use of 89.9%. In contrast, the Caribbean (68.3%) and Pacific (67.7%) regions presented the lowest indicators in terms of levels of use.
The financial system faces challenges in closing gaps between rural and urban areas, since in the former, access to financial products is 65.6%, while in the latter, this figure is 100%. As for use, in rural areas it is 53.4%, while in urban areas it reaches 89.3%.
Another persistent challenge in the financial system is closing gender gaps, since, although there has been progress in women’s financial inclusion, they continue to have lower levels of access and use compared to men (with gaps of 6.9 and 4.4 pp, respectively).
By age groups, adults between 41 and 65 years of age registered the highest access to deposit products (99.8%), while young people between 18 and 25 years of age led in active use of low-amount deposits (81.8%). Those over 65 years of age recorded the lowest levels of use in accessing deposits.
Access to credit offered by entities in the financial system increased slightly in 2024. This indicator stood at 35.5% of the adult population, which is equivalent to an increase of 0.2 pp compared to 2023. However, it has not yet reached pre-pandemic levels, when the measurement was higher than 36%.
For the first time, the RIF included information related to access to credit products offered by formal non-financial entities in the real sector such as mobile phone companies and those in the commerce sector, among others, bringing the indicator of access to credit to 50.5% (adding the financial sector and the real sector), equivalent to 19.6 million adults with at least one financing product.
Access to credit in 2024 continued to be concentrated among men, especially between the ages of 26 and 65 living in urban areas, while microcredit continued to decline with a reduction of 0.4 pp, closing at 6.2% of adults with at least one microcredit.
It should be noted that women have more frequent access to microcredit, but receive lower amounts in relation to men. In 2024, 929 microcredits were disbursed to women for every 10,000 adults, while 763. The average amount was $6.9 million COP for women and $8.4 million COP for men.
As for credit cards, access increased to 23.3%, consolidating itself as the most used financing product by the population, but it is still concentrated in urban environments. Consumer credit fell to 19%, with a decrease of 0.4 pp compared to 2023. Housing credit had a slight upturn, but its penetration is still low, with 3.1% of adults with this product, and continues to be concentrated in large cities.
For its part, the Colombian insurance industry had a slight increase in terms of penetration in 2024, reaching 3.3% of GDP, i.e, 0.1 pp more than in 2023. The mass insurance market continues to grow and diversify, accounting for 33.1% of written premiums. Even though the percentage of debtors’ group life had decreased, this line and the Mandatory Traffic Accident Insurance (SOAT) continue to be the main lines of business in this segment. In contrast, it is observed that the microinsurance market maintains a low participation, representing 2% of written premiums.
The indicator of access to financial products for legal entities in Colombia stood at 72.5% in 2024, a slight drop of 0.6 pp compared to 2023.
In this group, the current credit indicator was 26.7%, with an increase of 0.6 pp, and the indicator of access to deposit products reached 72.4%, with a drop of 0.5 pp compared to 2023.
Financial education. Photo credit: Banca de las Oportunidades/Facebook.
Put simply, Colombia is in trouble. Not economically, but politically, there is a total breakdown in corridors of power, and a vacuum where consolidation and understanding should exist.
At the very center is the labor reform. Due to the senate’s rejection of the referendum, Gustavo Petro is threatening to impose the plebiscite via decree. The rabid right/elite are furious at the government circumventing the democratic process and the country’s institutions. Will Petro succeed? Can he practically even get it done? Who even knows? It is far from the first time a president has acted via decree, but more than anything else, it highlights the glitch in the same system that allows Donald Trump to sign papers and cause global chaos.
At the same time, there is a continued effort to push through labor reform 2.0, with the final texts to be approved next week. Ironically, we now have the ANDI – Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia calling on the government not to sabotage it, after spending 12 months opposing it, it does beggar belief.
At the core of the problem? Poor treatment of workers. Many Colombian employers, not all, engage in practices, hiding behind legislation, that simply wouldn’t be accepted in developed countries. The ANDI feels the reform is less harmful than a referendum.
Accordingly, a number of presidential pre-candidates decamped to the Asobancaria congress and contaminated it with their conflicting views. Expect a plethora of legal speak over the coming weeks.
The same congress referred to the OECD – OCDE cutting 2025 GDP estimates from 2.7%-2.5%, and whilst disappointing, it is still a good number. The issue, in large part, is the deficit situation, and exports are a big part of that. This week’s April data was again poor. There was a drop of 6.5% with a 34.7% decline in commodities. Trumponomics at work in the oil sector. There will be much trepidation ahead on the import number from Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE Colombia amid concerns of another huge deficit. This is due to continued robust commercial activity amidst the consumer durables sector, coupled with a record low unemployment figure, people are spending. To highlight this, May vehicle sales rose 33% YoY to 19,707.
The impact of all this turmoil? A strengthening Peso (<$4100) and a stock market up 28% (dollar terms) YTD – go figure!
Have a great day.
Roops.
President Gustavo Petro. Photo credit: Presidencia de la República de Colombia.
Near the banks of the Nechí River — one of the main hubs of illegal gold mining in northern Colombia — Javier*, a community leader with a steady, forceful voice, described to InSight Crime the hardships brought by the latest wave of conflict in El Bagre, a municipality in the Bajo Cauca subregion of Antioquia.
“Just a few months ago, the fighting was so intense that no one dared retrieve the dead,” said Javier, who spoke with InSight Crime at the end of 2024. “At one point, animals were eating the corpses,” he added, lowering his voice.
Over the last 20 years, Javier has seen how a conflict once rooted in ideology — between guerrillas and paramilitaries — has transformed into a battle over coca crops, drug trafficking corridors, and gold deposits.
Today, a resurgence of violence has been sparked by clashes between Colombia’s three main criminal actors: the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), the country’s last remaining insurgency; the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC); and dissidents of the now-defunct Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), known as the ex-FARC mafia—both products of past demobilization efforts.
“The FARC and ELN say, ‘Leave, or we’ll kill you.’ The AGC says, ‘If you leave, we’ll kill you,’” said Javier. “The communities are left with no way out.”
All three groups have sought talks with the Colombian government under the “Total Peace” plan, which aims to negotiate separately with the country’s illegal armed groups. However, this policy has done little to curb the territorial disputes unfolding in Bajo Cauca and throughout Colombia.

Guerrilla-paramilitary clashes in Bajo Cauca date back to the late 1990s. But over the past two decades, these groups have evolved and become further criminalized. Attempts to demobilize their forces – first the 2006 demobilization of the paramilitaries of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC), then the 2016 peace deal with the FARC – led to new conflicts as splinter groups and rivals fought to fill the power vacuum and control the criminal economies left behind.
SEE ALSO: Colombia’s Peace Efforts Spark Criminal Disputes and Divisions
The latest escalation began when the AGC — the most powerful criminal group in Bajo Cauca — moved into the Serranía de San Lucas. Located in the south of the neighboring department of Bolívar, this mountain range is rich in gold deposits and coca crops and has long been an ELN stronghold. Homicides in El Bagre, which connects San Lucas with the Bajo Cauca, rose to 29 last year, up from 20 in 2023. But murders are just one element of the conflict, which has also led to mass displacements and the confinement of whole communities. Some 145 people were displaced to El Bagre in December 2024 following clashes. By early January 2025, that number had risen to 230.
Still, the violence continued. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 395 people were forcibly displaced in Montecristo, southern Bolívar, on February 7, while another 144 were confined to their homes by the fighting. On February 18, 26 people were displaced from Segovia, which borders El Bagre to the south, due to fighting between the ELN and the AGC.
“What we’re seeing now is the AGC gaining ground against the ELN,” Javier said.
To defend its turf, the ELN has allied with the 18th and 36th Fronts of the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente – EMBF).
“The ELN’s alliance with the FARC dissidents is what’s stopped the AGC from advancing in the Serranía de San Lucas,” he added.
Local police told InSight Crime that another group, known as “Los de Abajo” or “Los de Cuturrú” — a remnant of longtime AGC rivals the “Caparros” — also appears to have joined the alliance.
The conflict is driven by a fight for control of a region brimming with criminal opportunities. The area contains over 8,000 hectares of coca crops and vast gold reserves. Between January and September 2024, 11.64 metric tons of gold were extracted from the subregion, accounting for 54% of all gold mined in Antioquia and 41% of Colombia’s total.
Both the AGC and the ELN profit from mining by charging fees for moving machinery and supplies, extorting legal and illegal miners, and taking a cut of gold production or fixed fees per mine.
SEE ALSO: Major Criminal Powers Dispute Key Corridors in Colombia
Bajo Cauca is also a strategic point on Colombia’s criminal map, connecting coca-producing zones in the east and north with drug dispatch points on the Pacific and Caribbean coasts. Controlling this corridor guarantees illicit revenue flows.
But beyond the economic value, groups with deep roots in the region, such as the ELN, are clinging violently to their turf.
“This is about ego. One group wants to take over, the other says, ‘You’re not pushing me out,’” said a humanitarian worker based in Bajo Cauca who asked not to be identified as they had not been authorized to speak publicly.
While violence is concentrated on the border with southern Bolívar, tensions are rising elsewhere in the region. In Cáceres, a municipality in central-western Bajo Cauca, authorities reported the forced displacement of several families in December 2024 due to clashes in San Pablo, a key mining hub.
The AGC has established a permanent presence in San Pablo, where it has battled both the Colombian army and the ELN. In December 2024, four AGC members were killed in an airstrike in the area.
In neighboring Tarazá, in western Bajo Cauca, social leaders, civil society members, and local officials told InSight Crime that tensions are flaring in various hamlets historically used for coca cultivation and cocaine production. The sources warned that violence is likely to worsen in the coming months.
“What’s next? The same as always: massacres, displacement, threats, forced disappearances,” said a public official in Tarazá, who requested anonymity for fear of reprisals.
In early March, the ELN detonated an explosive device on the road linking Tarazá and Medellín, the capital of Antioquia. In December 2024, the group attacked a public transport vehicle on the same route, injuring two people.
The deteriorating security is reflected in homicide statistics: Cáceres recorded 34 murders in 2024, up from 18 in 2023; Tarazá saw 29 homicides, compared to 12 the year before, according to National Police data. Yet killings are only one metric — communities are also suffering from a range of abuses that underscore the grip these groups have over daily life.
As criminal clashes have intensified in Bajo Cauca, so has the pressure on civilians. Each group uses fear and violence to enforce rules, assert control, and project authority.
“The AGC is using the same tactics the FARC used — like laying landmines,” said Javier.
The now-defunct FARC was notorious for mining territory to slow the army’s advance and protect coca fields. While the practice declined after the FARC’s 2016 demobilization, the AGC appears to be reviving it in areas like Cáceres and El Bagre to keep guerrilla rivals out. Mines are often placed along footpaths, trapping rural communities.
The AGC has also imposed rules and distributed behavior manuals, mandating curfews and punishing rule-breakers. The group has confined entire communities during clashes with rivals.
The civilian population has been caught between the competing demands of armed groups. One group demands displacement; another forbids it. Some communities have taken a stand.
“People were displaced for about 15 days. When they came back, they reopened their businesses and agreed to resist the groups,” said Javier. “They told them, ‘Your fight is your problem. Go kill each other — but let us work.’”
However, while Javier and other residents of Bajo Cauca seek to break the cycles of violence they have suffered for generations, the profits on offer from mining and drug trafficking mean armed groups will continue to fight over the territory, and violence will remain their main tool to assert their power.
*Name changed to protect identity.
This article, written by and , was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.
Ecopetrol S.A. (BVC: ECOPETROL; NYSE: EC) has announced that it executed an asset purchase agreement with Statkraft European Wind and Solar Holding, AS on May 20, 2025, for the potential acquisition of its portfolio in Colombia. This portfolio includes one company dedicated to the development and operation of solar and wind assets, six special-purpose entities owning solar projects (614 MW), and three special-purpose entities owning wind projects (750 MW). The agreement is subject to the fulfillment of conditions precedent and other legal requirements, which, once met, are intended to allow Ecopetrol S.A. to acquire the portfolio of up to 1.3 GW.
The companies are owned by Statkraft’s subsidiaries: Enerfín Sociedad de Energía S.L.U and Enerfin Enervento Exterior S.L. The portfolio’s projects are located in the departments of La Guajira, Sucre, Córdoba, Caldas, and Magdalena.
If completed, this acquisition would represent significant progress toward Ecopetrol S.A.’s decarbonization and energy transition goals, particularly the target of incorporating 900 MW of renewable self-generation capacity by 2025, in line with its 2040 Strategy. Additionally, the transaction would support the generation of low-emission energy under competitive conditions for the Ecopetrol Group’s self-consumption, reducing exposure to spot market purchases and contributing to the diversification of the company’s energy matrix.
Photo credit: Ecopetrol/Flickr.
The agricultural sector has consolidated itself as an engine of the Colombian economy, registering a 7.1% growth in added value during the first quarter of 2025, according to the most recent data from the National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE). This performance makes agriculture the economic activity with the second highest growth and contribution, being responsible for a contribution of 0.7 percentage points to the growth of the gross value added to the Colombian economy.
For the first time since comparable quarterly records began (since 2005), agriculture, livestock, hunting, forestry, and fishing reached third place among the 12 branches of economic activity in terms of participation in the value added of the economy, with a share of 11.4%.
“The sustained growth of the agricultural sector not only reflects its strategic importance for the country, but also shows how agriculture continues to be one of the most solid pillars of the Colombian economy; it promotes regional development and job creation,” said Dora Inés Rey, director of the Rural Agricultural Planning Unit (UPRA).
The agricultural sector achieved an outstanding performance in all its divisions. The value added of coffee grew by 31.3%, while fishing and aquaculture also showed a solid increase of 18.2%. Forestry and timber harvesting grew by 11.4 percent, and livestock increased by 8.9 percent. On the other hand, agricultural crops without coffee registered a growth of 2.4%.
The productions that stood out the most, in terms of growth, were cocoa (33.3%), coffee (32.9%), cattle (13.8%), raw milk (12.1%), and walnuts and palm fruits (11.7%). In addition, chicken and eggs also showed positive increases, with a growth of 9.1% and 8.3%, respectively.
With a growth higher than that recorded by GDP, the agricultural sector continues to demonstrate its relevance as a generator of employment and development. During the first quarter of the year, the agricultural sector has remained robust, contributing significantly to the growth of the economy and consolidating itself as an essential pillar for the stability of the country, said Rey.
Headline photo: Coffee from Colombia. Photo credit: Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism (MinCIT)
For nearly six decades, Colombians enjoyed visa-free travel to Israel under a 1966 bilateral agreement that eliminated tourist visa requirements between the two countries. However, in a marked shift, Israeli authorities announced that, as of May 2025, Colombian citizens must now obtain a tourist visa prior to entering the country.
This new requirement comes just months after Israel introduced its Electronic Travel Authorization (ETA) system in January 2025 for travelers from previously visa-exempt countries. The imposition of visa requirements for Colombians, however, goes beyond the ETA framework and reflects a deeper diplomatic rift, following Colombia’s decision to sever ties with Israel amid escalating political tensions.
The Consulate General of Israel in Bogota announced the implementation of the new visa requirement through an announcement on their official website. Colombian citizens planning to visit Israel must now apply for a short-stay tourist visa, which covers purposes such as tourism, medical tourism, business, and short-term non-academic studies. Under the previous ETA system, Colombian nationals could apply online for travel authorization, allowing for a more streamlined entry process. The reinstatement of the visa requirement means a more comprehensive application process, including the submission of various documents and personal information.
Applicants must provide a valid passport (with at least three months of validity beyond the visa period), bank statements from the past three months, proof of employment, proof of accommodation in Israel, two recent passport-size photographs, and travel health insurance covering the entire stay. While round-trip flight tickets are required, they do not need to be submitted at the time of application. To apply, individuals must complete and sign the visa form, compile all required documents into a single PDF, and email it to [email protected]. A personal interview at the consulate may be requested at the discretion of the consular officer, and appointments must be scheduled in advance if needed. Visa processing typically takes between 2 to 3 business days.
The reintroduction of visa requirements comes one year after Colombia’s decision to cut diplomatic ties with Israel on May 1, 2024. At the time, President Gustavo Petro announced the severance during a public address, citing Israel’s military actions in Gaza as “genocidal” and expressing solidarity with the Palestinian people. This was an unexpected move, given the historically close relationship between the two countries, which included military cooperation and trade agreements.
El se llama Elkana, nació en Israel, nunca participó en actividades militares allí, pero en algún concierto de tecno, música terrible, pero que a él le gusta, se enamoró de colombiana.
Con ella tuvo un hijo, también colombiano, que me visitó hace poco en mi oficina. Jugó con… pic.twitter.com/HcuQN6IlpI
— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) March 30, 2025
“When Netanyahu leaves, we will reestablish relations with Israel, establish a consulate in Gaza, in the free and sovereign State of Palestine, and help care for the wounded children of Gaza in our hospitals. We will help rebuild Gaza under the Palestinian flag,” President Petro said in May 2025 via X.
While the visa application process remains open, the current diplomatic climate suggests that Colombian travelers are encouraged to stay informed about any further changes to entry requirements or bilateral relations that may affect their travel plans through the consulate’s website and other official channels.
Headline photo: In July 2024 a Palestinian flag reading “Stop the genocide” covered the facade of the Congress of Colombia. (Photo: Maria José Pizarro / X)
The Global Seafood Alliance (GSA) has announced that registration is now open for the 2025 Responsible Seafood Summit, taking place September 29 to October 2 at the Intercontinental Cartagena de Indias in Cartagena, Colombia.
Now in its 24th year, the Responsible Seafood Summit is the premier international seafood business conference, dedicated to advancing responsible practices throughout the seafood supply chain, encompassing aquaculture, fisheries, and the marketplace. The summit brings together industry leaders from around the globe for three days of networking, field trips, and forward-thinking discussions that address the most pressing challenges and opportunities in seafood production and trade.
This year’s event will include a welcome reception, a cocktail hour celebrating the 2025 Innovation Award finalists, and a special cultural dinner experience highlighting the vibrant flavors and traditions of Colombia’s Caribbean coast. Attendees will also have the opportunity to participate in field trips to explore Colombia’s diverse seafood sector and responsible efforts firsthand.
“We’re excited to bring our event back to South America for the first time since 2018,” said Devan Meserve, GSA’s VP of marketing and communications. “Cartagena, a historic, culturally rich port city with deep ties to the seafood industry, offers an inspiring backdrop for global conversations about the future of responsible seafood. We look forward to welcoming attendees to this vibrant setting.”
Registration includes access to all conference sessions, panels, and breakouts, entry to networking events and evening receptions, select meals throughout the program, the opportunity to sign up for optional field trips, and more.
The summit is designed for a broad range of seafood professionals, including producers, suppliers, buyers, researchers, NGOs, and policymakers—anyone committed to building a more responsible and resilient seafood system.
Early bird registration is available through June 30. GSA has secured discounted hotel room blocks at the Intercontinental Cartagena de Indias, the event’s headquarters. Space is limited. Reserve your hotel room here.
Headline photo: A seafood counter in the Medellín neighborhood of Laureles. Headline (photos: Loren Moss)
Sirs: I want to share a problem that many people living in Colombia face when importing goods through courier services. The issue shows how our customs system, managed by DIAN (Colombia’s taxation authority), creates an unfair burden on ordinary citizens and people living in Colombia.
I am a professional photographer and use Japanese cameras and lenses. Colombia does not make any such equipment, and sellers and resellers here have outrageous prices. I therefore have no other option but to import my camera gear.
Last month, I bought a camera lens online for $500 USD and paid $53 USD for DHL shipping. Colombia’s law clearly states that any item worth less than $200 USD is exempt from customs duties. This makes sense – it helps small importers and regular people who buy personal items online for their personal use.
But here’s where the system becomes unfair. Instead of applying duties only to the amount above $200 USD, DIAN charges customs fees on the full $553 CIF value (item plus shipping costs). This is how my customs fees were calculated:
Additional fees and calculations bring the total to exactly what I paid. Total customs charges: $822.797 COP (about $200 USD)
This means I paid an additional 40% of the item’s value in Colombian customs charges and taxes, turning my $500 USD lens into a $750+ USD purchase when you include shipping and customs fees.
The law says items under $200 USD are exempt from duties. Logic tells us that for items over $200 USD, only the excess amount should be taxed. If someone imports a $199 USD item, they pay zero duties. But if I import a $201 USD item, I suddenly owe duties on the full $201 USD, not just the $1 USD over the limit.
This creates a massive jump in costs for items just over the threshold. It’s like having an income tax system where earning $1 USD more pushes you into a bracket that taxes your entire income at a higher rate, not just the excess.
Most countries with de minimis thresholds apply them correctly. In the United States, items are exempt from duties up to $800 USD, and duties apply only to amounts above that threshold.
For example, using my case, if someone imported a $553 USD item to a country with a $200 exemption (like ours should work), they would calculate duties on $353 USD, not the full $553 USD. This makes the exemption meaningful and creates fair treatment across different purchase values.
This current system hurts regular Colombians in several ways:
Photographic equipment that cannot be repaired in Colombia, and has to be sent to the USA for repair. The cost of parts, service, and courier will push the total cost above $200 USD.
Reduced competitiveness: Local businesses that need to import supplies or equipment face higher costs, making them less competitive compared to companies in countries with fairer customs systems.
Discourages small business: Entrepreneurs who want to import small quantities of products for resale face prohibitive customs costs that make their business models unworkable.
DIAN should change its calculation method to apply customs duties only to the amount above $200 USD. Using my example again:
This would reduce my customs fees from $200 USD to about $110 USD, making the exemption meaningful and fair.
If the shipments are equal to or less than $200 USD, they are exempt from customs duties – this is what the law says. But DIAN’s interpretation makes this exemption almost meaningless for most imports.
Other countries manage to implement fair de minimis systems without losing significant revenue. Colombia can do the same. The current system doesn’t just hurt individual consumers – it reduces our economic competitiveness and discourages the kind of small-scale importing that helps diversify our economy.
I call on DIAN to review their calculation methods and implement a fair system that honors the spirit of the $200 USD exemption. Colombian consumers deserve customs policies that support economic activity, not systems that create artificial barriers to fair trade.
The law already exists. We just need DIAN to apply it fairly.
Photo credit: Mano Chandra Dhas.
In a joint operation between the Medellín Mayor’s Office, the Metropolitan Police of the Aburrá Valley, and the Attorney General’s Office, 10 members of a criminal group calling themselves “El Ghetto” were captured. They are responsible for kidnapping, assaulting, and extorting foreign citizens in nightclubs in Parque Lleras, in El Poblado. Among those arrested is alias “La Madrina,” the manager and legal representative of the businesses involved. 
During the operation, carried out by the Police Gaula (Gaula), two search warrants were executed, during which cell phones, data phones, security recording devices, and more than $1 million USD in cash were seized. All those arrested were charged with aggravated kidnapping for ransom and could face sentences of up to 60 years in prison.
Additionally, asset forfeiture will be requested for these two businesses. “Given these arrests, we also hope that the United States authorities will request the extradition of these criminals, as the law allows, since this is a US citizen. We have to put an end to these criminals who are causing harm in the city. Here, we protect the people, those in Medellín and those who come from outside,” stated Medellín Mayor Federico Gutiérrez.
According to investigations, these individuals exaggeratedly inflated consumer bills, held the victims in nightclubs, beat them, and forced them to make payments under threat. In several cases, they even demanded additional fines after receiving the payments, while the escorts, women who allegedly worked as prostitutes, acted as recruiters and escorts within the criminal scheme.
One of the most serious cases occurred on October 21, 2024, when two Panamanian citizens were forced to pay $19 million after being beaten. On May 14, 2025, an American tourist experienced a similar situation, being beaten and forced to transfer $485 USD. Both incidents were instrumental in opening the investigation, thanks to the victims’ complaints and collaboration.
“There are long-standing merchants here who have done things well, and others have arrived to take over the area. Alias ’El Mexicano’ was captured here, and those businesses are also related to asset forfeiture issues. This was taken over by criminal organizations. Remember when we initially reduced business hours as a shock plan? How some of them, including ‘El Mexicano’ and others, threatened restaurants and property owners in the area to keep them from opening their businesses, and took to the streets to protest against us? What they do is use intimidation as a weapon,” the president recalled.
‘La Madrina,’ the alleged leader of the network, is listed as the manager of three commercial establishments in the area. According to information from the authorities, the woman involved has a weapons permit and is usually escorted by men who present themselves as former military personnel.
The mayor concluded that a working group already exists: “We will continue to support good merchants. Those who comply with the regulations will receive only support from us. This is good news for merchants, tourists, and the city, because we are dismantling criminal organizations.”
According to Bogotá daily El Tiempo investigations, the two nightclubs where the suspects committed the kidnappings for extortion are “Dharma Night Club” and “Guetto,” located in the well-known Parque Lleras neighborhood of Medellín’s Commune 14. It was established that both establishments belong to the same company: the Dharma International SAS business group.
The Dharma International SAS business group was established in Medellín on March 28, 2023, with an initial capital of two million pesos. Its business purpose, according to the company’s records, is the sale of alcoholic beverages for in-store consumption and the sale of prepared meals to be served at the table.
Video and photo credit: Medellín Mayor’s Office.