In the southern city of Cali, a truck bomb detonated outside the Marco Fidel Suárez Air Force Base on Thursday afternoon, killing at least six civilians and injuring more than 70 others. The powerful explosion, which occurred at approximately 2:50 PM, ripped through a bustling commercial area, leaving a trail of destruction. Eyewitnesses described a scene of chaos and horror, with victims strewn across the street and buildings reduced to rubble.

Hours earlier, in the rural northern municipality (in Colombia, a “municipality” is somewhat equivalent to a county) of Amalfi, Antioquia, a helicopter carrying police officers engaged in coca crop eradication was taken down by an explosive-laden drone. The attack, which claimed the lives of 12 police officers and a civilian, was a chilling demonstration of the evolving tactics and military capacity of the armed groups operating in the region.

The attacks have been widely condemned by national and local officials, who have called for a decisive response to the growing wave of violence. President Gustavo Petro, who campaigned on a promise of achieving “Total Peace” through negotiations with the country’s various armed factions, traveled to Cali to oversee the government’s response. In a statement on X (formerly Twitter), the president attributed the Cali bombing to the Carlos Patiño Front, a dissident faction of the former FARC guerrilla group, and described it as a “terrorist reaction” to recent military operations against them.

However, critics argue that the “Total Peace” policy, which has included ceasefires and negotiations with groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN), Segunda Marquetalia, and the powerful mafia organization, the Clan del Golfo (also known as the Urabeños), has emboldened these organizations, allowing them to expand their territorial control and illicit economies.

Andrés Julián Rendón, the governor of Antioquia, confirmed that the downed helicopter in his department was providing air support for a coca eradication mission. In a public statement, he lamented the loss of life. He called for a more forceful approach to combating the drug trade, which he identified as the primary driver of violence in the region.

Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro campaigned on a promise of “Total Peace” but guerilla groups are thriving during his term, showing no interest in ceasing crime or terrorism.

The mayor of Medellín, Federico Gutierrez, echoed these sentiments, expressing his condolences to the families of the victims and calling for national unity in the face of the growing security crisis. In a recent meeting with US senators, Gutierrez highlighted the interconnectedness of drug trafficking, terrorism, and corruption, and the need for a comprehensive strategy to address these challenges.

In Cali, Mayor Alejandro Eder announced a reward of up to $400 million COP (approximately $90,000 USD) for information leading to the capture of those responsible for the air base attack. “Cali is once again the victim of a narco-terrorist attack,” he declared, ordering the militarization of the city to restore order. Eder also confirmed the capture of two individuals believed to be members of the Jaime Martínez front of the FARC dissidents, who are now in the custody of the Fiscalía General de la Nación.

The acting governor of Valle del Cauca, Dilian Francisca Toro, has also been vocal in her condemnation of the violence, urging a united front against organized crime. “We must work together against this crime,” she stated in a recent interview, highlighting the need for greater coordination between local and national authorities.

The recent attacks have cast a long shadow over the Petro administration’s security policy. While the government has touted record cocaine seizures in 2025, with 601 tons confiscated so far, coca cultivation has also reached historic highs. This paradox suggests that while law enforcement efforts are having some success in interdicting drug shipments, they are failing to address the root of the problem: the relative impunity protecting the narco-mafias, who have enjoyed legitimacy under the Petro administration as negotiating partners. Rather than eradicating the criminal mafias, President Petro has treated them as diplomatic delegations that have come to negotiate as legitimate civil society actors.

The flourishing drug trade has provided a financial windfall for groups like the FARC dissidents and the ELN, allowing them to recruit (often forcibly) new members, acquire sophisticated weaponry such as attack drones, and challenge the authority of the state in a way not seen in years. The use of an explosive-laden drone to down a helicopter is a particularly ominous development, signaling a new level of technological sophistication among these groups.

As the country mourns the victims of these latest attacks, a difficult question hangs in the air: Will President Petro, a former guerrilla himself, abandon his soft-on-terrorism “Total Peace” policy and allow the country’s security forces to persecute these narco-criminals? Nothing in his record says “yes.” Colombia has less than a year until the next president is inaugurated. Colombia experimented with its first leftist president in modern history, who promised “total peace,” but as the mafia groups that plague Colomba are gaining power like it’s the 1980s, as political assassinations have returned to the case of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay, Colombians may turn back to a more hard-line leader who can promise eradication of narco-mafias and the cocaine they produce, while hopefully respecting human and civil rights better than some past administrations.

Cali attack. Photo from Twitter.

Video credit: infoLibre YouTube.

In a recent testimony before the Colombian transitional justice system, one of the most important commanders of the AUC outlined the former paramilitary group’s ties to high-profile politicians, businesses, and military commanders.

Salvatore Mancuso Gómez, a former commander of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC), gave testimony via video call before the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz – JEP) between May 11 and 16. The JEP investigates human rights violations during Colombia’s armed conflict, in which the AUC played a leading and violent role.

Mancuso was behind the expansion of paramilitary groups into northern Colombia between 1994 and 2004, and led several AUC blocs in the departments of Córdoba and Norte de Santander. In the early 2000s, the AUC reached a peace agreement with the Colombian government, although many refused to demobilize and formed new criminal groups. Mancuso was extradited along with other paramilitary leaders to the United States in 2008, where he was sentenced to nearly 16 years in prison for drug trafficking.

Mancuso was released from prison in 2020 and remains in the US. He is now seeking a reduced sentence in Colombia, where he is accused of 5,200 violent crimes, including homicide, forced disappearance, and gender-based violence, among others. The current hearings represent his last chance for a commuted sentence through the JEP, if he can demonstrate, with new information, his role as a linchpin between state agents and paramilitary groups.

Below, InSight Crime presents the main elements of Mancuso’s account of the AUC’s expansive criminal network and its exponential growth in the early 2000s. If corroborated, the claims would illustrate the paramilitaries’ degree of influence and political connections.

The Political Strength of the AUC

During the hearings, Mancuso claimed that the AUC directly intervened in Colombia’s 1998 and 2002 presidential elections.

“There was support in elections, for example, for [Senator] Horacio Serpa, for President [Andrés] Pastrana himself, and for [Álvaro] Uribe,” Mancuso told the JEP. He did not provide many details and asked to elaborate on this issue in a more restricted hearing for security reasons.

Mancuso also claimed that former Vice President Francisco Santos (2002-2010) asked him to form the AUC’s Capital Bloc to fight left-wing guerrillas’ presence in urban areas following the advance of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) into Bogota.

In response, former President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) accused Mancuso of false testimony and filed a complaint with the Colombian Attorney General’s Office for slander and libel. Álvaro Uribe, who was president from 2002 to 2010, published a statement denying that he received help from paramilitaries during his campaign.

The paramilitaries’ political links are well established. More than 250 political leaders, among them 72 congressmen and 15 governors, have been convicted for links to the AUC, in a scandal known as “parapolitics.”

“We set up networks that allowed us to legitimize the political movement, the political discourse, the actions of the self-defense forces,” Mancuso told the JEP.

Paramilitary Cemeteries in Venezuela

Mancuso, who led the Catatumbo bloc in Norte de Santander on Colombia’s northeastern border, said that the bloc buried its victims of forced disappearance in mass graves in Venezuela, with the knowledge of Venezuelan and Colombian armed forces.

“There are self-defense groups’ grave sites there — more than 200 dead bodies of people in San Cristóbal, in Ureña, in San Antonio, in La Fría and in Boca de Grita,” he said.

Forced disappearances were ordered by high-ranking Colombian military commanders, according to Mancuso, who explained that clandestine graves in Venezuela were used to keep the number of known victims in Colombia low.

InSight Crime recently visited Norte de Santander, where expert human rights sources who spoke on condition of anonymity confirmed that forced disappearances by armed groups in the area continue.

False Demobilizations

Officially, one faction of the Popular Liberation Army (Ejército Popular de Liberación – EPL) guerrillas in northwestern Urabá demobilized in 1996. But, according to Mancuso, most of the weapons and men from this process ended up in the ranks of the AUC, and the Colombian government knew.

“We exchanged some weapons, we kept the best weapons that the EPL had, and we gave them the oldest weapons of the self-defense groups,” said Mancuso. “This demobilization took place with a semblance of legality, but what was really done was to transfer the EPL guerrillas to the self-defense forces.”

Mancuso outlined the case of Dairo Antonio Úsuga, alias “Otoniel.” Until his capture in October 2021, Otoniel was the main leader of the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), also known as the Urabeños. Otoniel and his brother, Juan de Dios Úsuga, alias “Giovanny,” were part of the EPL in the 1990s, and after the demobilization process, joined the ranks of the self-defense groups.

Like Mancuso, Otoniel appeared before the JEP to testify about his criminal history. He also confirmed that former guerrillas joined paramilitary groups following the EPL’s demobilization.

Corporate Connections

Private companies have played a large role in financing and expanding paramilitarism in Colombia. Soft drink giant Postobón has been accused of supporting paramilitarism with monthly payments or contributions through national distribution networks by several former paramilitary leaders, including Mancuso, who repeated the claims in the recent hearings. He also mentioned payments by the Bogotá-based brewery, Bavaria, and that three banana companies, including multinational Chiquita, paid 3 cents on the dollar for each box of bananas exported. These profits were distributed among paramilitaries, the vigilante cooperatives known as Convivir, and military commanders.

Mancuso also claimed that Colombia’s state-owned oil company, Ecopetrol, allowed paramilitaries to steal fuel from feeder pipes, even sharing pumping schedules with them. The fuel was then sold at service stations in territories under paramilitary control.

The multinational coal company, Drummond, which has been investigated in the past for alleged links to paramilitarism, also came up in the hearings. Mancuso said that Drummond’s head of security gave paramilitaries lists of names of union members who were then killed by the AUC.

In April, former paramilitary member Jairo de Jesús Charris also testified about this issue to the JEP. In response, Drummond published a statement denying any ties to illegal groups and insisting that there is a cartel of false witnesses against the company.

To date, none of the companies have responded to Mancuso’s recent claims.

This article, written by Sara Garcia, was originally published by Insight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America.

Presented to the Colombian House of Representatives in August, the “Total Peace” project has opened the door to peace talks with 26 criminal groups of various sizes.

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

Aware of how much controversy such an approach would cause, Petro rapidly explained the plan’s broad strokes. Ceasefires could be achieved with all groups involved. Any members of criminal groups who negotiated with the government would not be extradited to the United States, according to the new president. In a gesture of good faith, Petro also suspended arrest warrants and extradition requests for certain members of the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), the most prominent non-state armed actor in Colombia.

“We are going to do everything necessary to open these dialogues and advance them to the fullest. Achieving total peace is an ambitious goal,” Iván Cepeda, a senator with the Alternative Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Alternativo) party and a leading supporter of the Total Peace plan, told InSight Crime.

According to the senator, the plan provides a “general framework” for these peace processes. While some groups, such as the ELN, will be welcomed to negotiating tables with teams of envoys, talks would be started with other groups through authorized spokespersons. Cepeda did not specify which criminal gangs would fall into each category.

Petro’s plan also gives powers to regional political leaders, allowing them to initiate humanitarian dialogues with criminal groups and create temporary relocation zones for members willing to demobilize.

According to Cepeda, those criminal groups exclusively linked to drug trafficking will be the focus of another proposal to be presented in the near future.

InSight Crime Analysis

Petro’s peace proposal is undoubtedly ambitious. But what happens when things go wrong?

An overarching focus on cooperation by criminal groups leaves plenty of room for error, which may force Petro to use similar security policies to his predecessors.

For Total Peace to work, illegal groups in Colombia must agree to negotiate and submit themselves to the country’s judicial process. While Petro’s government has laid out the legal benefits available to those who do lay down their arms, these have not always been attractive to criminal groups and do not resolve the factors that led to Colombia’s continuing cycle of violence.

“The country does not really know who these groups are and how they operate … We have [groups like] the Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo, also known as the Urabeños or the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia). They have particular structures associated with corruption. We do not know to what extent these organizations, especially the Gulf Clan, can guarantee collective compliance [from members],” Jorge Mantilla, director of the conflict and organized violence research at Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), a Colombian think tank, told InSight Crime.

There are other crucial factors that will help or hinder groups’ willingness to demobilize, such as the presence of Colombian authorities in remote regions where they operate, and the range of criminal economies these groups participate in.

While drug trafficking and armed violence are at the heart of Petro’s proposals, Colombian criminal groups are actively involved in a wide range of illicit economies.

SEE ALSO: Exploring Illegal Mining in Colombia’s Amazon

“We have very little information about illegal mining, deforestation, extortion,” added Mantilla. “As long as there is no possibility of deactivating or containing these economies, we will continue this recycling process [where new groups take over]. It will be very difficult to diminish the phenomenon of organized crime,” he said.

Colombia’s recent history proves this. Since the demobilization of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas de Colombia – FARC) in 2017, thousands of former guerrillas have refused to lay down their arms. This led to a network of loosely connected criminal groups known as the ex-FARC Mafia. These groups have often shifted their alliances and rivalries, varyingly fighting side by side or against each other for control of criminal economies left behind by the FARC. Worse, this has only increased the number of groups present in Colombia, further complicating Petro’s task.

Mantilla noted that processes with goals similar to Total Peace have existed in Central America. But while they led to short-term decreases in violence, a return to high levels of violence can be seen if they are not successfully completed.

In Colombia, there appears to be a high risk of eventual failure. Criminal recycling, the fragmentation of existing groups, internecine warfare between those laying down their arms and those refusing to do so — there remain many risk factors that could see a return to the violent norm.

And what can Petro do? There has been little attention given to what will happen to those who refuse to comply.

Challenges to his vision have already begun. Seven police officers were gunned down in the department of Huila in early September allegedly by an ex-FARC Mafia group while a rivalry between the Gulf Clan and a smaller rival recently left over a dozen dead in northern Colombia in two days.

These gruesome events will continue to dog the Total Peace process.

For Cepeda, the answer is clear. There is no Plan B for those who do not lay down their arms, and those who do not comply will face military retaliation, he explained to InSight Crime.

And while Petro has changed the rhetoric around the Colombian armed forces, pledging that it will be an “army of peace,” this may not be possible.

One false step in the Total Peace project may see Petro forced to mobilize his army to chase down criminal targets, returning to the policies of his predecessors, which he once lambasted.

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

Colombia has voted for change in Petro. But, in terms of the fight against organized crime, what shape will this change take?

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

Deforestation appears unstoppable. The production of cocaine continues virtually unabated. Major criminal groups, such as the ELN and the ex-FARC Mafia, pose severe threats across Colombia while a newer generation of urban gangs threaten cities. And finally, what of the relationship with Venezuela, which Gustavo Petro has pledged to repair, despite the regime of President Nicolás Maduro having harbored and even aided guerrilla groups.

Here, InSight Crime analyzes five security challenges awaiting the new president-elect head-on once he enters the Palace of Nariño in August.

The Beating Heart of the Global Cocaine Trade

Despite a slight decline in total coca crops in 2019 and 2020, Colombia remains far and away the world’s largest cocaine producer.

According to figures from the United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime (UNODC), while crops have decreased for four years in a row, crop yields and overall cocaine production are at an all-time high. What’s more, about half of all coca is being farmed in protected areas, such as environmental reserves, Indigenous reservations or Afro-Colombian communities. Furthermore, little to no progress has been made in changing the dynamics in traditional hotspots for coca crops, such as the southern department of Nariño, or Norte de Santander, along the border with Venezuela.

Eradication efforts have shown little long-term impact. According to the UNODC, half of all cleared areas quickly showed signs of replanting and 37 percent of such areas saw new coca crops planted within 500 meters. Additionally, the use of forced eradication remains controversial and the National Crop Substitution Plan, which was supposed to encourage coca farmers to voluntarily move away from the trade by supporting them in developing alternative crops, has stagnated. This has all generated deep mistrust of government policies in coca-growing areas.

Furthermore, the process of extracting cocaine hydrochloride is becoming more effective, with crystallizers able to produce more cocaine than ever. The potential production of cocaine increased from 6.7 kilograms per hectare in 2019 to 7.9 kilograms in 2020, according to the UNODC. This means that approximately 1,228 tons of cocaine can be produced in Colombia every year.

SEE ALSO: Colombia’s Cocaine Keeps On Reaching New Heights: UNODC Report

This naturally has had a major positive effect for organized crime groups. More cocaine means a more constant flow of weapons and money, which in turn means an ability to secure control and expand their territory. The presence of Mexican, Italian and Balkan cartels has also had a direct impact on the demand for more cocaine hydrochloride.

Petro cannot solve the problem alone. Relations with Venezuela will remain the most pressing international obstacle to solving drug trafficking, while shipments to Ecuador have become a huge driver of violence in that country. Cocaine connections to Brazil, Panama and the Caribbean will also require a multilateral approach.

Is the FARC Peace Deal Still Salvageable?

The peace agreement reached in 2016 between the government and the now-demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) is in real trouble. Coca substitution plans have stalled, violence in certain parts of Colombia has worsened and former FARC fighters are regularly threatened and killed.

At a purely legislative level, the Kroc Institute for Peace Studies has estimated that 37 percent of the provisions of the peace agreement have seen only minimal progress. Access to land and viable economic projects for those who laid down their weapons remains difficult.

At the 2021 UN General Assembly, outgoing president Iván Duque highlighted progress made on the agreement during his tenure, although recognizing that criminal groups remained a major obstacle.

The figures do not show much progress. According to figures from the Institute for Development and Peace Studies (Indepaz), 21 former combatants and 86 social leaders and human rights defenders have been killed in Colombia this year alone. During the Duque government to date, at least 930 people belonging to these categories have been assassinated. Not all of these can be directly associated to organized crime. But a large portion of these slain activists were directly working on the implementation of the FARC peace deal, including crop substitution and land restitution.

According to Mateo Gómez, a researcher at Barómetro quoted by the newspaper El Espectador, caring for ex-combatants and those forcibly displaced by violence will be an urgent issue for Gustavo Petro’s incoming government.

The Expansion of Colombia’s Criminal Groups

Of Colombia’s roster of criminal groups, three present the largest problems.

The National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) is arguably in the best position to be a major thorn in the side of Gustavo Petro. While its major enemies have been decimated by criminal rivalries and government action, the ELN has consolidated its presence in Venezuela, taking over many of the spaces left behind by the FARC, and is particularly strong in the border area.

Figuring out how to deal with the ELN will be one of Petro’s foremost priorities. Since the collapse of peace talks in January 2019, after the ELN bombed a police training school, the group has expanded rapidly. While its leadership has expressed itself ready to return to the negotiating table, it showed its strength in February 2022, by paralyzing large parts of the country with a series of coordinated strikes. Any conciliation will be made more difficult by the fact the ELN appears to have at least the tacit approval of Venezuela’s President Maduro to continue its criminal activities in exchange for a cut of the profits.

The dissident FARC, known as the ex-FARC Mafia, are in a precarious state. They remain powerful but fractured and leaderless after a series of targeted strikes has killed many of their commanders in the last 18 months.

Both the major factions of FARC rebels have suffered heavy losses, with the Second Marquetalia in particular now severely weakened. Its commander, Luciano Marín, alias “Iván Márquez,” has not been heard of for many months and could either be in hiding or trying to rebuild his group.

But the ex-FARC Mafia remain strong, especially in the south and the Pacific, commanded by Néstor Gregorio Vera, alias “Iván Mordisco.” However, a series of new leaders have emerged, with less loyalty to the FARC’s political ideologies and more focus on criminal income.

And the Urabeños, also known as the Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo) or the  the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), have been battered but still have potential to cause nationwide problems.

After their leader, Dairo Antonio Úsuga, alias “Otoniel,” was extradited to the United States in May 2022, the group’s cohesion has been in doubt. While the Urabeños have always allowed franchise gangs to operate with some degree of autonomy, recent actions by said franchises have not seemed aligned. This risks forcing Petro to deal with highly active, smaller gangs, who will fight tooth and nail to defend their small part of an overall criminal economy, such as a drug trafficking route.

A similar scenario is already taking place in cities where smaller gangs are fighting for control of microtrafficking and international routes. In the north, the Pachenca have been terrorizing Santa Marta and the Costeños have been fighting for control of drug trafficking in Barranquilla. The Mexicanos and the Local have been staking claims to parts of the Colombian Pacific, the Cordillera has tried to extend its dominance from the southern state of Nariño and La Oficina as always has had a part to play in Medellín.

The Border with Venezuela

For Gustavo Petro, Venezuela may seem like a multi-headed hydra. The ELN and ex-FARC Mafia have grown rapidly in the country. Homegrown Venezuelan gangs are making their mark on Colombian soil. The government of President Maduro has revealed itself to be, if not a facilitator, at least a regulator of the cocaine trade. Human smuggling, contraband and environmental crimes are also rife between the two countries. And there is little to no communication set up between Caracas and Bogotá.

In Norte de Santander, on the Colombian side of the border, the ELN has made itself the dominant criminal actor in the coca-growing enclave of Catatumbo, while continuing its expansion into the interior of Venezuela. The Urabeños are actively trying to establish control of Cúcuta, arguably the most vital criminal crossroads along the border. They also control remote trails between Puerto Santander and San Antonio del Táchira, along which migrants are extorted. And the Venezuelan gang, Tren de Aragua, is clinging on to control of its own cross-border trails, despite facing a war with the ELN.

Further south, outbreaks of violence in Apure and Arauca continue to affect the civilian population. In 2021, during a prolonged fight between the Venezuelan government and the dissident FARC 10^th Front, an estimated 6,000 people were displaced and fled into Colombia. Continuing violence in the area, now involving the ELN, has seen this figure continue to increase, placing a humanitarian crisis into Petro’s hands.

Migration, in general, will be a vital issue for Petro to deal with. Around 2 million Venezuelans have fled to Colombia, many of whom live in economically precarious situations and have been preyed on by criminal groups for recruitment, extortion and more.

The Advance of Environmental Plunder

Successive Colombian governments have stalled in their duties as custodians of the Amazon. Since 2017, 220,000 hectares of forest cover have been lost.

Petro will have to learn from this recent political history. Government initiatives to curb deforestation have been tried. None have lasted for long.

And while specific areas have shown reductions in deforestation, the problem has worsened elsewhere. In 2018, although the total number of hectares deforested fell to 197,159 ha, rates increased drastically in the departments of Meta and Putumayo.

Same story in 2019 when, despite another overall drop, the northern departments of Chocó and Norte de Santander saw deforestation increase. This was heavily linked to the spread of other criminal economies, such as illegal mining and coca cultivation.

According to Rodrigo Botero, director of the Foundation for Conservation and Sustainable Development, this will be one of Petro’s main environmental challenges. Instead of a national approach, Botero suggested that the new government should measure deforestation rates in terms of the forest cover remaining in highly vulnerable areas.

Even in 2022, deforestation is concentrated in similar places. National parks and other protected areas in Meta, Caquetá and Guaviare account for the bulk of deforestation, according to Colombia’s Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies (Instituto de Hidrología, Meteorología y Estudios Ambientales – IDEAM).

The new government will also have to tackle both the legal and illegal drivers of such deforestation. As extensively explored by InSight Crime, the likes of the ELN and ex-FARC Mafia encourage the burning of forests and building of illegal roads through the jungle to further drug trafficking and illegal mining.

However, cattle ranching and palm cultivation remain by far the largest causes of deforestation in Colombia. While legal, these are fed by the illegal appropriate of land, a crime that has received little visibility to date and benefits certain political and business elites.

This practice sees large parcels illegally occupied and the communities living there forcibly displaced. The forest is then cut down and turned into land for pasture. Extortion of nearby communities and money laundering through the forestry trade are common.

A recently created Law for Environmental Crimes, passed in 2021, marks such land appropriation as a crime. But the new president will have to actively confront this criminal economy often hidden in plain sight.

This article by Juan Diego Posada, Juan Diego Cárdenas, and Lara Loaiza has beengenerously shared by Insight Crime under a creative commons license. The original can be read here.

Between February 23 and 26, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) orchestrated a so-called paro armado, or armed strike across Colombia that included violent attacks, according to the Institute for Peace and Development Studies (Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz – Indepaz).

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

For 72 hours, the group blocked off national highways, set off explosions, burned vehicles, carried out targeted killings and hung the ELN’s flag from public buildings. Additionally, armed members of the group patrolled the streets of villages and towns in parts of Colombia where they maintain a strong presence. Indepaz registered 65 separate incidents during the armed strike across the departments of Norte de Santander, Santander, Cesar, Cauca, Nariño, Casanare, Arauca, Valle del Cauca, Huila, Antioquia and Chocó.

Prior to the start of the armed strike, the Colombian government insisted the ELN would not have the ability to carry it out and suggested political interests were behind their attempts to paralyze the country. However, the ELN proved it could do so, both in its traditional strongholds and in areas where it has increased its power since the now-extinct Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) came to a peace agreement with the government in 2016.

Though dissident FARC factions, known as the ex-FARC Mafia, continue to threaten Colombia, the ELN has taken on the mantle of being Colombia’s prime security threat. Already in 2018, InSight Crime named the group its Criminal Winner for the year. And the escalation of its criminal control can be seen by comparing the location and number of events during a previous 72-hour armed strike in March 2020. That strike saw 27 incidents in nine departments. The latest one recorded 38 more incidents in 11 departments. Colombia’s Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz – JEP), recorded actions in even more departments, saying that 17 of Colombia’s 32 departments had been affected by the latest armed strike.

See also: Special Jurisdiction For Peace Warns Of Weakening Authority of Colombian State Under Duque Administration

Here, InSight Crime explores some of the strengths that have allowed the ELN to become Colombia’s largest criminal threat.

Territorial Control

The armed strike showed the range of criminal governance the ELN enjoys in distinct parts of Colombia. Almost half of the incidents during this armed strike took place in Norte de Santander, a crucial area along the Venezuelan border that has been the focus of much criminal violence of late. There, the ELN openly patrolled the streets of several towns, blocked off highways, torched vehicles and left suspected explosive devices. It is no surprise that the ELN has doubled down on Norte de Santander. The local capital, Cúcuta, and its surrounding area are home to trails crossing the Venezuelan border, along which drugs, migrants, weapons and contraband are moved. The ELN has battled for control of the area against a range of Colombian and Venezuelan non-state armed actors, including the ex-FARC Mafia, the Rastrojos, the Urabeños and the Tren de Aragua.

In Cauca, an important coca-growing hub, the placement of explosives devices and the burning of vehicles were recorded. Temporary curfews were also enforced in both departments, and businesses were forced to close.

The armed strike also spread to areas of Colombia that had been spared in 2020. The northwest department of Antioquia and the southwest department of Nariño, crucial for drug trafficking to Central America and Ecuador respectively, felt the impact of the ELN. In El Bagre, a municipality in Antioquia, a number of schools and 90 percent of businesses were closed, according to Gabriel Rodríguez, a government official in the town, who spoke to RCN Radio.

In Nariño, one of Colombia’s main coca-growing areas, the ELN shut down entire highways and burned vehicles to create road blocks. This department has become a frequent backdrop for disputes between ELN and its rivals, as it is one of Colombia’s major dispatch points for cocaine being sent to North America and Europe.

In the eastern department of Arauca, right on the border with Venezuela, the ELN attacked a police station in the town of Fortul, while in nearby Saravena, shopkeepers were forced to close their businesses. In recent months, Arauca has been a regular battleground between the ELN and the ex-FARC 10th Front for control of cross-border drug trafficking and extortion.

An Unstoppable Force

The 2016 peace agreement between the government and the FARC left a major power vacuum, which the ELN has filled.

In 2017, when the FARC demobilized, the ELN was estimated to have some 1,400 members. Its status as the country’s remaining guerrilla force served to fill its ranks. By 2019, the force swelled to about 4,000 militants. Its current number of fighters is hard to estimate but it is likely to be even higher, due to its rapid territorial expansion and its strong presence in Venezuela, which has given the ELN more opportunities for recruitment.

No longer playing second fiddle to the FARC, the ELN has strengthened significantly. Peace talks with the Colombian government, ongoing since 2017, were derailed in January 2019 when a an ELN car bomb exploded at a police training school in Bogotá, killing 21 people.

When Duque attended a security meeting in Arauca to discuss security, ELN members appeared openly on the streets of Arauquita, a town not far from the meeting, making a mockery of the administration’s efforts.

The man responsible for ordering the crime was allegedly Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo, alias “Pablito,” currently the ELN’s third-in-command.

Since the attack, President Iván Duque has ordered security forces to relentlessly target ELN members and infrastructure. But while arrests of ELN members and seizures of its drug shipments happen regularly, the group does not appear to have been significantly weakened.

Instead, its defiance has only grown. When Duque attended a security meeting in the department of Arauca to discuss clashes between the ELN and dissident FARC groups in January this year, ELN members appeared on the streets of Arauquita, a town not far from the meeting.

Catch Me if You Can

While the ELN has maintained some presence in Venezuela since the 1980s, it has steadily strengthened its ties to official and criminal actors in that country, especially in recent years.

InSight Crime has reported on how the ELN has acted as an extension of the Venezuelan State in parts of the country, including enforcing control of criminal activities, fighting rival groups and ensuring authorities get a cut of criminal economies, such as illegal mining.

Venezuela has also become more than a refuge for the ELN. There, the criminal group is now firmly entrenched, drawing manpower and profiting from drug trafficking, illegal mining and other activities.

With the ELN ostensibly an ally of the Venezuelan government, it can use territory and resources there to plan actions, train members and grow stronger without the fear of being attacked by security forces, as in Colombia. This is only reinforced by its control of the border crossings between the two countries, which members can largely do at will.

While the group’s strength in Venezuela grows, its power in Colombia does as well. The range and intensity of the recent armed strike, especially when compared to the one in 2020, show how the ELN has only increased its criminal empire in the country where it was born.

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

See also: 13 Police Injured In Cali Bombing, ELN Claims Responsibility

Óscar Moreno Ricardo (above photo) – arrested in Medellín in early January – is wanted for extradition by US authorities on charges related to drug trafficking, according to Colombian prosecutors, who allege he was the principal actor responsible for coordinating the manufacture and launching of cocaine-laden semi-submersibles off Colombia’s Pacific coast.

SEE ALSO: Tides Are Turning: First Europe-Built ‘Narco-Sub’ Seized in Spain

According to the Attorney General’s Office, Moreno Ricardo’s involvement in the drug trade dates back to 2005, when he served as a pilot on go-fast boats. Prosecutors said he soon coordinated shipments for Mexican cartels and Colombian armed groups. About five years ago, Moreno Ricardo allegedly started manufacturing semi-submersibles that carried as much as five tons of cocaine and were dispatched to Central America, earning him the nickname the “king of narco-submarines,” according to prosecutors. In the underworld, he was allegedly known as “Cachano” and “El Viejo.”

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

Prosecutors said Moreno Ricardo had links to several criminal groups, including Colombia’s Urabeños drug clan; Colombia’s National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) rebel force; and Mexico’s Jalisco Cartel New Generation (Cartel Jalisco Nueva Generación – CJNG).

Moreno Ricardo’s daughter told Colombia’s Bluradio that her father was wrongfully arrested, claiming that he shares a nickname of the accused, “Cachano,” and that he is really a cattle rancher from Acandí, a town in the northern department of Chocó. The wanted man, she said, lives and operates further south in Tumaco, in the department of Nariño.

InSight Crime Analysis

Authorities may have sunk the alleged drug-sub king, but the use of semi-submersibles to move cocaine – which dates back more than three decades – is only increasing, as the knowledge needed to build the vessels spreads.

Although developing narco-submarines requires large investments, their advantages in maritime drug smuggling are without parallel, given how difficult it is to detect and intercept them. In Colombia, where the design and manufacture of the drug submarine has been perfected, authorities seized 31 vessels in 2021, a jump from 23 in 2019.

Traffickers in other parts of the region have also employed drug submarines, with vessels discovered in waters off Suriname, Brazil, Venezuela and Guyana. In 2019, the first drug submarine to be intercepted in Europe was found off the coast of Galicia, Spain. The vessel carried 3 tons of cocaine from Colombia. In 2021, authorities raided a warehouse in Spain’s coastal province of Málaga, where a drug submarine was still in the process of being built.

The recent proliferation of the drug submarine is due in part to criminals who outsource their services to a broad range of trafficking groups. This outsourcing model spares these groups from needing the design, manufacturing and logistical capabilities to deploy such vessels.

SEE ALSO: Submarines for Rent – The Best Option for Traffickers in Colombia

Colombian criminals are leading the way in the “drug submarine-for-hire business.” In December 2020, US and Colombian authorities dismantled an organization that similarly specialized in the manufacture and adaptation of semi-submersibles for the trafficking of cocaine. Its customers included the ELN and Mexican cartels.

In 2018, Suriname authorities arrested several Colombian men employed to build a submarine that could export cocaine from Suriname to Europe. Among those charged was the cousin of Rodrigo Pineda, a heavy machinery salesman accused of being one of the largest manufacturers of semi-submersibles for drug traffickers in the Colombian coastal department of Nariño.

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

But, after years on the run from authorities, is Úsuga, alias “Otoniel,” still as important a drug kingpin as he once was? Does his arrest carry the immediate consequences for Colombian drug trafficking as authorities are making out?

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

Here, InSight Crime examines three essential aspects of Otoniel’s arrest: his place in drug trafficking history, the number of men and money that went toward his capture and the consequences for the vast criminal network he once oversaw.

1. Otoniel was not Escobar

In the hours after Otoniel’s capture, a triumphant President Iván Duque said that “this is the hardest blow that has been dealt to drug trafficking in this century…and is only comparable to the fall of Pablo Escobar in the 1990s.”

There were apparent similarities in the way they both fell. The two drug lords had dedicated task forces after them. The Search Bloc (Bloque de Búsqueda) was created in 1986 to bring down Escobar. Their mission took seven years and a fortune to complete. Otoniel was tracked by a task force of thousands of soldiers in Operation Agamemnon, founded in 2015 to fight the Urabeños. Their mission took six years and a fortune to complete.

SEE ALSO: Profile of Dario Antonio Úsuga, alias ‘Otoniel’

Both oversaw major drug trafficking organizations that were on the decline at the time of their death or capture. The power of the Medellín Cartel, founded by Escobar, had already begun to decline severely by the time he was shot on a rooftop in 1993. Prior to this, attention from authorities had led to the capture and killing of other top Medellín Cartel figures, weakening the organization from within. Pressure from the Cali Cartel, which stood all too ready to fill the drug trafficking void, only hurried its demise.

Otoniel’s Urabeños are also not what they once were. After the demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC) in 2006, the Urabeños broke off and rapidly spread across the country. By 2012, the group was the premier drug trafficking organization in Colombia. However, the country’s cocaine production was such that the Urabeños never had the monopoly the Medellín Cartel once had. Escobar’s organization once handled 80 percent of the world’s cocaine.

While the Urabeños have a sizeable nationwide presence, handling colossal amounts of cocaine, the horizontal nature of the group’s command structure means that Otoniel has not had the single-handed power that Escobar once wielded. Under the control of a “board of directors,” Urabeños leaders sent key lieutenants to open up their own drug trafficking operations across Colombia, seeking control of coca crops, cocaine production and distribution through alliances or violence.

This form of horizontal control worked wonders for the group at the time of its ascendancy. And while the Urabeños remain among Colombia’s major criminal threats, Otoniel was no longer in a position to exert direct control over these disparate groups, given that he spent recent years constantly on the run.

2. The Cost of Bringing Down Otoniel

Ending Otoniel’s years on the run did not come cheap. Since February 2015, Colombian police have hunted the Urabeños as part of the most extensive action against organized crime in the country: Operation Agamemnon.

While it was initially conceived as a short-term operation to hit hard, some 1,200 soldiers and police deployed into the Urabá region with two clear missions: dismantle the Urabeños and capture Otoniel.

Two years later, and with neither of those objectives achieved, the operation was renewed and strengthened. Agamemnon II brought in extra resources from the army, judiciary and Attorney General’s Office.

By early 2021, the operation counted some 3,000 security personnel, according to general Fernando Murillo Orrego, director of Colombia’s judiciary police.

So what did all these troops have to show for it? In an interview with El Tiempo in January 2021, Murillo Orrego said that Agamemnon troops had carried out 1,420 operations in the northern departments of Antioquia, Córdoba, Chocó and Sucre and had arrested over 4,000 people.

Agamemnon’s mission statement involves dismantling one of the most powerful drug trafficking groups in Latin America, with international connections and local support. Still, over the last seven years, it has involved large-scale expenditure. While the amount of money invested by the Colombian government has not been revealed, Agamemnon has not succeeded in its most ambitious objective.

Duque has insisted that Otoniel’s capture marks “the end of the Gulf Clan.” This is false. The group still has about 1,700 active members, according to Colombian police. Many of these are unlikely to be particularly loyal to Otoniel, whose leadership of the group has faded in recent years.

SEE ALSO: Urabeños Leadership Under Mounting Pressure in Colombia

3. What’s Next for the Urabeños?

The Colombian Army finally got their man after years of rumors and anticipation. But will this sustained pressure also weaken the group he once led?

The horizontal nature of the Urabeños means that specific regional leaders may see their loyalties to the group weaken and strike out alone.

But some of the group’s commanders may seek to maintain nationwide sway. Wilmer Antonio Giralda Quiroz, alias “Siopas,” identified as Otoniel’s second-in-command, could try to take control from his base in the northern department of Chocó. He may find a rival in Ávila Villadiego, alias “Chiquito Malo,” who was an ally of Otoniel’s for almost 20 years. Villadiego was reportedly in charge of coordinating the group’s cocaine trafficking operations and is wanted by the United States.

Other factors will help the group survive: They currently control some of the most important coca production areas and drug trafficking routes in Colombia, as well as having the men, the weapons and the contacts to send new shipments out.

The group’s five main armed structures are based in and around the departments of Antioquia, Chocó, Sucre, Bolívar and Córdoba. These all have commanders who came up under Otoniel or were appointed by those closest to him.

While these core groups could break out into internecine violence, there is a greater likelihood of bloodshed in regions where the Urabeños designated control to “franchises.” These franchises were developed by the Urabeños, who sought to co-opt local gangs across Colombia. While such backing might temporarily prove useful to the criminal groups, the arrest of Otoniel is likely to fray ties between Urabeños and their franchisees.

This could be reflected in regions such as Norte de Santander, a crucial coca crop area along the Venezuelan border where the Urabeños are engaged in a long-term fight with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN). The same could happen in other crucial parts of Colombia, such as Nariño, along the border with Ecuador, or northern Colombia, where the Urabeños are present in the strategic cities of Santa Marta and Barranquilla. These groups could well decide that going it alone makes better financial sense than maintaining loyalty to a central unit that no longer exists.

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

The latest slayings occurred in February when five men were shot dead at a coffee farm located in the Tapartó settlement in the Andes municipality, in southeastern Antioquia department, El Tiempo reported.

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

Following the incident, the Minister of Defense, Diego Molano, the director of the National Police, Major General Jorge Luis Vargas, and the governor of Antioquia, Aníbal Gaviria, held a Security Council session in which they called for the arrests of several suspected members of the Urabeños group, which they said were responsible for the killings.

The Andes massacre was the second to take place on a coffee farm in southeastern Antioquia this year. Last year, seven massacres were recorded in this subregion, according to a study by Colombia’s Institute of Studies for Development and Peace (Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz – Indepaz).

InSight Crime Analysis

The Urabeños are battling for control of southeastern Antioquia for two reasons: the region is key to moving drugs to the Pacific coast, and its coffee plantations present a unique market for local drug sales.

Year after year, approximately 80,000 people work seasonally on Antioquia’s coffee farms. The workers, many of them migrants, also present a large consumer market.

The massacres in Southeast Antioquia appear related to a confrontation between gangs associated with the Urabeños, which is also known as the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), and the Medellin-based Oficina de Envigado. Both are looking to control local drug markets.

According to a warning published by the Ombudsman’s Office in August 2020, the municipalities of Ciudad Bolívar, Salgar, Betania, Hispania, Andes and Jardín are all at high risk for conflict over control of microtrafficking.

The Urabeños’ spread across southeastern Antioquia has also brought the group in conflict with the guerrillas of the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional- ELN). The battle is primarily over the department of Chocó and the key drug routes there to Colombia’s Pacific Coast, according to Fernando Quijano, director of Colombia’s Corporation for Peace and Social Development (Corporación para la Paz y el Desarrollo Social – Corpades).

Carlos Zapata, the coordinator of the Human Rights and Peace Observatory within Colombia’s Popular Training Institute (Instituto Popular de Capacitación), told InSight Crime that the Urabeños are looking to maintain control of the routes to the Pacific, while also showing an interest in selling drugs locally. Meanwhile, the investigator added, other groups in the region are looking to do the same.

“They are looking to expand their local client base, but they are also disputing the routes to the Pacific that they have controlled for more than 20 years,” Zapata said.

Whatever their motive, the Urabeños’ strategy to expand their control into southeastern Antioquia has not delivered them the desired results.

Venturing to control new routes towards Chocó seems to have weakened the group’s territorial consolidation efforts, preventing it from building the necessary alliances. Meanwhile, the group continues its war with the ELN to the northwest of the department.

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

Photo courtesy Fiscalia General de Colombia

It’s been nearly 25 years since authorities in Colombia gunned down former Medellín Cartel kingpin Pablo Escobar on a city rooftop. A lot has changed in the country’s underworld since the fall of one of the world’s most legendary criminals.

Photo: A drug lab in Caqueta, Colombia, that was producing coca paste before being busted by Colombian military. (Photo credit: Comando General de las Fuerzas Militares)

From a shift in Colombia’s criminal map, the end of the era of flashy narcos boasting their exuberant wealth, to increased international opportunities and a move away from the Caribbean trafficking route to the Pacific, organized crime in Colombia has taken a new form.

Below, InSight Crime looks at four of the most important changes to Colombia’s underworld since Escobar’s death on December 2, 1993.

1. A New Criminal Map

Without Escobar in the picture, Colombia’s underworld — and Medellín’s in particular — gradually went from being hierarchical and dominated by a few key actors to highly fragmented and horizontal. Today, it’s comprised of various criminal groups increasingly expanding their criminal portfolios.

During the Medellín Cartel’s zenith in the 1980s and early 1990s, Escobar controlled nearly the entire cocaine supply chain, from importing large, multi-ton shipments from Peru and Bolivia into Colombia, storing it, and then coordinating the shipment of the drug into the United States.

His grip over Medellín increased when, in the mid-1980s, he founded a criminal debt-collection service known as the Oficina de Envigado. He used it to coordinate disparate street gangs in the city to violently enforce debts owed to him by both criminal and non-criminal actors.

After Escobar’s death, Diego Murillo Bejarano, alias “Don Berna,” took over the Oficina de Envigado. But Don Berna, who had given the group great influence internationally, was arrested and extradited to the United States in 2008.

This led to a greater fracturing within the Oficina de Envigado, as various capos battled for control of a structure that was becoming increasingly horizontal. Today, the Oficina de Envigado is considered to be a criminal federation made up of various mid-sized criminal groups operating in specific zones of Medellín.

This shift from hierarchy to franchise was replicated across Colombia’s underworld. As Colombia’s historic illegal armies demobilized, fragmented and became increasingly criminal, they too formed more fluid networks based around illegal trade. And coordinating them is a new generation of “Invisibles.”

2. Invisibles, Not Flashy Narcos

Escobar wasn’t afraid to flaunt his riches. His luxurious multimillion-dollar estate Hacienda Nápoles had its own extravagant zoo; he owned high-end cars and apparently ate from solid gold dinner sets.

Today, the cocaine trade is booming like never before. Cocaine production in Colombia reached a record 1,379 metric tons in 2017. However, a new generation of traffickers, that InSight Crime calls the “Invisibles,” has emerged. They’ve learned that showing off a lavish lifestyle and using extreme violence is bad for business. Instead, anonymity is their protection plan.

READ MORE: The ‘Invisibles’: Colombia’s New Generation of Drug Traffickers

One of the individuals who best embodied the profile of an Invisible was José Bayron Piedrahita Ceballos, alias “El Árabe.”

Before his September 2017 arrest in a town not far from Medellín, Piedrahita was best known for his role laundering dirty drug money — including outside of Colombia in Argentina — using the facade of a successful rancher and businessman. This allowed him to stay out of authorities’ spotlight during a criminal career that spanned more than 20 years. On the surface, one would have never known that Piedrahita was one of Colombia’s biggest drug lords, which shows how effective he was at adapting to changing criminal eras over time and staying off of the authorities’ radar.

3. Increased Foreign Influence, Opportunities

Criminal organizations in Colombia, including Escobar’s Medellín Cartel and the now largely demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), have for years forged alliances with Mexican groups to transport cocaine into the United States.

However, the peace agreement signed between the Colombian government and the FARC in November 2016 forced Mexican groups to find new partners, leading them to become increasingly present in the country and create new alliances to ensure the flow of cocaine northward continues unabated.

Mexican groups like the Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco Cartel New Generation (CJNG) appear to be backing competing Colombian drug organizations. Mexicans are also inspecting cocaine production in clandestine Colombian laboratories to guarantee quality.

Indeed, the son of former Sinaloa Cartel kingpin Joaquín Guzmán Loera, alias “El Chapo,” made a prolonged visit to Medellín in 2016 allegedly under the protection of the Oficina de Envigado, which was originally created by Escobar as a type of criminal debt collection agency.

With the Mexicans in control of supplying the U.S. market, Colombia’s criminal groups are looking further afield, including to Europe and China. Profits there are sky high. One kilogram of cocaine worth about $1,600  USD in Colombia can be sold for more than $35,000 USD in Europe, and more than $50,000 USD in China — and the risk of extradition or interdiction is relatively low in comparison to the pressure exerted by U.S. authorities.

(Graphic courtesy of Adam Isacson)

4. Caribbean to Pacific Trafficking Route

Escobar and the Medellín Cartel largely championed the Caribbean air route to traffic cocaine into the United States. Since then, this route has largely been shut down by authorities, and the Pacific trafficking route has gained increased importance as criminal groups have developed more diverse trafficking techniques.

Even in recent years, state crackdowns on trafficking groups on the Caribbean coast — such as the Urabeños — have pressured them to shift their routes towards the Pacific.

Authorities are also reportedly seeing more “narco subs” (submarines or semi-submersibles used for drug trafficking that have been used since the days of the Medellín Cartel), which largely leave from the Pacific coast, as cocaine production spikes.

This article, written by Parker Asmann and Bjorn Kjelstad, was originally published by Insight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America.

Peace negotiations between Colombia’s government and the ELN rebel group have reached their most precarious moment since they began last year. A wave of violence recently spurred Ecuador to back out as guarantor of the discussions. And concerns over the implementation of a 2016 peace deal with the ELN’s guerrilla cousins, the FARC, have hurt the group’s confidence in the ongoing talks. InSight Crime spoke with ELN members and residents of communities where the group operates in order to get a sense of where the shaky process might be headed.

—

In a secluded part of the impoverished department of Chocó in western Colombia, a guerrilla fighter cleans her weapon with pride.

“I joined the guerrilla six years ago,” says the woman, who goes by the alias “Yomira.”

“I joined to fight for the people,” she adds. “Because the truth is the people are done for. It makes me happy to join the fight.”

“With the [FARC] peace process, we expected schools and hospitals to be built. But all we got is more violence.” – community leader from Cabecera

Yomira belongs to the powerful Western War Front of the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), which patrols the jungles of Chocó.

There is a strict routine for those within the ELN’s ranks. The day begins with a 6 a.m. inspection, which is followed by classes in current affairs, Marxist ideology and explosives training. The afternoon is devoted to military exercise. The day ends at 6 p.m. with another inspection and singing of the ELN anthem, which includes a repetition of the lyrics “Not one step back! Liberation or death!”

Residents of the town of Santa Maria de la Loma de Bicordó express reluctant sympathy for the guerrillas’ cause, as well as deep-rooted fear.

“We’re poor and so these guys are the only ones who can help us. But we know they’re not our real friends,” one resident told InSight Crime. “I have a young son. I’m terrified they’ll take him and make him fight.”

There are no more than 100 people in this village. There’s no running water, and electricity is rationed. It comes on only for a few hours in the evening.

While the town is mired in poverty, the San Juan river upon which it sits is a key part of a multibillion-dollar industry. The vast waterway is a strategic route for drug traffickers, linking coca production zones to the Pacific coast from where shipments of cocaine are dispatched to international markets.

The Urabeños, a powerful crime group formed by ex-paramilitary forces, controls the northern part of the San Juan river. The group’s Pacific Bloc keeps a permanent armed guard in the town of Dipurdú, just downstream from the river’s source. The camouflage and rifles of the Urabeños members are visible from passing vessels.

The central section of the river belongs to the ELN. But in the southern delta, where the river empties into the Pacific Ocean, the ELN and Urabeños are fighting for control of territory previously controlled by the largely demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC).

Caught in the crossfire are the riverside communities.

“With the [FARC] peace process, we expected schools and hospitals to be built. But all we got is more violence,” said a community leader from Cabecera, who asked not to be named.

Residents’ experiences with the aftermath of the 2016 FARC peace deal have not engendered confidence about the potential of talks with the ELN.

“If peace with the FARC brought us more war, what will peace with the ELN bring us? Forget it!”

Revolutionaries vs. Reality

The ELN’s engagement in peace talks with the government suggests a willingness to eventually lay down arms. But some leaders are wary of conceding too much to the government.

An officer of the Western War Front who uses the alias “Estasio” believes the FARC negotiated a bad deal.

“They sold out on everything they believed in. The government has made a fool of them,” he said. “We won’t fall for that.”

Inspired by the Cuban revolution and the Liberation Theology promoted by some Catholic priests in the 1960s, the ELN says it is fighting for radical social reform.

“We’ve told the government before,” said a Western War Front commander who uses the alias “Uriel.” “If they want to get rid of the guerrilla, then they need to get rid of the reasons for which we exist.”

Uriel says government negotiators are rushing through the official agenda without full consideration.

“They want to jump to the last points, forgetting the first, which is for us the most important,” he said.

The first topic for discussion is perhaps the most controversial of the six on the agenda. It revolves around “peacebuilding,” which the guerrillas interpret as a process of social reform.

“The ELN has repeatedly said that for them peace involves deep change. The question is how far is the government willing to go,” said Luis Celis, a former guerrilla turned peace advocate.

Estasio, the officer with the Western War Front, says he’s in the struggle for the long run.

“I’m ready to give up my arms and pay my sentence if we can achieve the change we’re fighting for,” he said, clutching his rifle. “But I’m a realist. It won’t happen yet, not with these negotiations.”

There appears little appetite for compromise. Critics are therefore suspicious. There is a concern that some elements of the ELN are prioritizing their criminal interests. The lucrative drug trafficking and illegal gold mining networks in Chocó may be hard to abandon.

Peace Talks as a ‘Test’

Uriel, the ELN commander, describes the peace negotiations as a “test.”

“We’ve told the government before. If they want to get rid of the guerrilla, then they need to get rid of the reasons for which we exist.” – Uriel, a Western War Front commander

“We are analyzing the intention of the government to see if it’s genuine,” he said. “For now, with the implementation of the agreements made in Havana with the FARC, we see that it’s not. This does not give us hope. The government is not living up to our expectations.”

The Western War Front has voiced outspoken opposition to what they call a “neoliberal peace,” which it says would focus on “the silencing of weapons” and not social change. This has led to accusations of dissent within the ELN, but the guerrilla group is not a vertical structure. Each of its eight fronts is autonomous, complicating efforts to make unified decisions about the peace talks.

The Western War Front is the only one of the eight fronts not to have a seat at the negotiating table. But Uriel denies there is division within the ELN. He says internal differences have been misinterpreted and exaggerated by the media.

Celis, the fighter turned peace advocate, also warned against overplaying disagreement.

“It is too early to talk about dissent,” he said. “The negotiations are about exploration. There’s no deal on the table yet so there are bound to be varying opinions.”

Beyond a Ceasefire

The ELN announced a five-day unilateral ceasefire for the first round of Colombia’s presidential election, which took place in late May. The announcement came on the heels of the fifth round of peace dialogues, which kicked off on May 10 in Havana, Cuba. (Ecuador, the original guarantor for the talks, ended its role as host country in April after a wave of violence linked to the ELN there.)

The Colombian government has made it clear that it would prefer a permanent, bilateral ceasefire, but this will be much harder for the ELN negotiators to sell to their rank and file without any concessions from the government.

The commanders of the Western War Front say they want definitive proof of the state’s commitment to a peace that extends beyond a ceasefire and demobilization. They are adamant they want pledges on social reform and structural overhaul.

In the makeshift camp on the banks of the San Juan River, the insurgents gather for their weekly radio conference. It is a chance for the various blocs that make up the Western War Front to discuss strategy, and there is only one message. Through the hiss of the interference, the airwaves carry a bleak directive: “We have no interest in a political solution. We are absolutely not interested in demobilization.”

Uriel is adamant the Western War Front will not change its stance. “If all the enemy wants is to demobilize use, then we are wasting our time,” he says.

It gives cause for pessimism, both inside and outside the ranks of the ELN. “The future has to be about war, not peace,” says Estacio. “Our fight will continue. It must continue.”

This article, written by Mathew Charles, was originally published by Insight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America.