The geography of the vote split along familiar regional lines. De la Espriella ran strongest in the Andean interior and the eastern plains, winning the departments of Antioquia, Santander, Cundinamarca, Meta, Casanare and Arauca, and posting lopsided margins in cities such as Medellín (819,285 to 421,839), Cúcuta (306,536 to 76,069) and Bucaramanga (229,851 to 117,895). Cepeda carried Bogotá (2,235,514 to 1,933,243), the Pacific and southern departments of Chocó, Cauca, Nariño, Caquetá and Putumayo, and the major Caribbean coastal cities — including Cali, Cartagena, Santa Marta and Barranquilla (375,178 to 309,652), the very city where de la Espriella delivered his victory speech.

Speaking before supporters at Barranquilla’s “Ventana al Mundo,” the president-elect used that address to pivot quickly from the language of the campaign to the language of governing — framing his win less as a partisan triumph than as a national mandate, and laying down early markers on security, the economy, and Colombia’s posture toward the rest of the world.

“This victory does not belong to one man, it does not belong to a party, it does not belong to a region,” he told the crowd. “This victory belongs to all of Colombia.”

A message of conciliation

The most insistent theme of the speech was reconciliation. De la Espriella repeatedly addressed Colombians who did not vote for him, presenting unity as a constitutional obligation rather than a courtesy.

“I am going to govern for all Colombians — for those who voted for me and for those who chose another candidate,” he said. “There will be no victors and no vanquished, there will be no retaliation, there will be no persecution, because in a democracy there are no irreconcilable enemies; there are compatriots who think differently, who think differently, but who have exactly the same rights as we do.”

Citing Article 188 of the Constitution, which holds that the president symbolizes national unity, he said he would assume that role “as a sacred mandate.” To those who opposed him, he added: “This is your victory too, because democracy works precisely when the people decide freely… Your rights, even if you did not vote for me, will be respected. Your opinions will be heard. You will never have to fear for thinking differently.”

He also pledged to earn trust through performance: “My purpose will be to earn your trust with results, not with speeches; with deeds and works, not with promises; with consistency and not with excuses.”

Inclusion across regions and groups

De la Espriella wove a deliberately inclusive geography through the speech, invoking Colombia’s regions and communities one by one. He described a homeland “of all religions… of all ancestral communities, of all young people, of all grandparents, of all entrepreneurs, of all journalists, of all peasant farmers” — “one homeland of all, for all, and built by all.”

In a passage that named nearly every corner of the country, he reached explicitly toward historically peripheral regions: “We are all the lullaby of the Pacific. We are all the grandeur of the Andes. We are all the strength and magic of the Caribbean. We are all the vastness of the plains… We are all the majesty of the Orinoco region… We are all the life of the Amazon. We are all the beauty of our island region.”

His closing call to action was addressed to “the young, the peasant farmers, the women, the business owners, the workers, the soldiers, the police, the mothers, the grandparents, Colombians in general, inside and outside our land” — a list that paired rural and working-class Colombians with the diaspora, whom he singled out elsewhere as “decisive” to the result.

Crime, security, and the rule of law

The speech’s hardest edges were reserved for crime and security — the area where de la Espriella signaled the sharpest break with the outgoing government. He vowed to restore state authority across the whole of the national territory.

“There will be no zones off-limits to the State. There will be no criminals who are immune and untouchable. There will be no organizations above the Constitution and the law,” he said. Addressing “the drug traffickers, the terrorists, the kidnappers, the extortionists, the corrupt who steal the people’s resources,” he declared: “I notify you tonight that Colombia once again has a government and a State.”

Crucially for the rule-of-law framing, he placed that crackdown inside constitutional limits: offenders “will be pursued without respite within the framework of the Constitution and the laws of the Republic… Because true peace is not born of impunity. True peace is born of justice.” He promised the armed forces and police a president who would back and protect them from his August 7 inauguration onward, arguing that “there is no liberty without security.”

A plan of action built on institutional restraint

On governance, de la Espriella presented himself as “a man formed in the law, respectful of the independence of the branches of power, of the Congress and of the high courts,” and promised “an absolutely democratic government and a guarantor of liberty and of our institutions.”

He sketched a “new order” defined by self-imposed limits on executive power: a Congress “able to legislate without pressure from the government,” mayors and governors steering their territories “with the national government as an ally,” and a judicial branch “respected and its decisions obeyed without hesitation, in its full autonomy.” For investors accustomed to weighing institutional stability, the emphasis on predictable, rules-based government was among the speech’s clearest signals.

The economy: recovery without “magic solutions”

De la Espriella was candid about the fiscal inheritance, describing “a nation that is divided, battered, in debt” and one “that demands reconstruction.” He pointedly declined to over-promise: “I am not going to promise miracles, I am not going to deceive the people with magic solutions. Colombia’s national recovery will demand work, sacrifice, discipline, and perseverance.”

He named the health system as a specific priority — “a health system that does not let our people die” — and tied anti-corruption to economic credibility, pledging to “govern with zero corruption, with no room for petty politics, to become again what we ought to be: a respected nation.” The broader economic vision he had invoked earlier was one of “a nation of property owners, of opportunities, of progress for all.”

Foreign relations: a values-based realignment

De la Espriella’s foreign-policy signals pointed toward a clear realignment with democratic and Western partners. “Colombia is once again a firm, reliable, and respectable democracy,” he said. “We will once again take our place among the free nations.”

He drew an explicit line on partnerships: “We are going to strengthen our relations with all the countries that respect democracy. We will not have relations with countries that do not respect liberty and the rule of law.” Colombia, he said, would be “a serious partner, a loyal ally, and a firm voice in defense of liberty on this continent” — language that suggests warmer ties with the United States and like-minded democracies and a cooler stance toward authoritarian-leaning governments in the region.

A pro-growth agenda

For a business audience, the speech bundled several reassuring signals: respect for the independence of Congress and the courts, an explicit anti-corruption and rule-of-law commitment, a security agenda framed as restoring state authority, sober acknowledgment of the debt burden rather than populist spending promises, and a foreign policy oriented toward stable democratic partners. Set against the conciliatory tone toward opponents, the overall message was one of continuity of institutions paired with a change of direction on security and governance.

De la Espriella closed on the note that ran through the address — unity as the country’s path forward: “Today a single Colombia is born, determined to be greater, more joyful, more prosperous, more secure.”

Quotations from the president-elect are drawn from his victory address as delivered in Barranquilla and translated from the original Spanish. Vote totals reflect the Registraduría Nacional’s preliminary count (preconteo) as of the morning of June 22, 2026, and remained subject to the official escrutinio.

Headline photo: Colombian President Elect Abelardo de la Espriella (left) and Vice President Elect José Manuel Restrepo (photo: Twitter screen capture)

On April 10, former Colombian Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva Durán released a formal statement responding to his indictment by the Fiscalía General de la Nación. Leyva faces charges related to his 2023 decision to declare a passport procurement tender void, a process that involved the private security printing firm Thomas Greg & Sons. The former official characterized the legal proceedings as a politically motivated maneuver orchestrated from the Casa de Nariño.

The indictment for prevarication centers on Leyva’s intervention in the bidding process, which the Fiscalía interprets as a deliberate breach of administrative law. In his defense, Leyva maintained that his actions were necessary to address irregularities and ensure the application of the Constitución Política de Colombia. He argued that the prosecuting body’s thesis would criminalize the conduct of any public servant who identifies unconstitutional terms in a government contract.

“If that argument is accepted, then any official who declares a bidding process void because they find the terms and conditions unconstitutional or illegal should go to jail.” — Álvaro Leyva Durán, former Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Leyva also directed accusations toward his successor at the Cancillería, Luis Gilberto Murillo. According to the statement, Murillo suspended a subsequent legal bidding process to justify a state of emergency, which Leyva claims led to an unnecessary markup of approximately $30 billion COP. Furthermore, Leyva alleged that software contracts exceeding $10 billion COP were improperly managed and that the funds remain unaccounted for under the current administration.

The former minister’s statement included severe personal and political criticisms of President Gustavo Petro. Leyva alleged a lack of moral conduct by the head of state during international state visits and questioned the president’s sobriety in public settings. The letter further asserted that US authorities are currently investigating potential links between the executive branch and narcotics trafficking organizations.

Regarding the domestic political landscape, Leyva warned of perceived risks to the Colombian electoral process. He alleged that the administration has engaged in the illegal interception of political candidates and intends to undermine the integrity of future vote counts. Leyva concluded by affirming his intention to defend his record and his legal decisions before the Corte Suprema de Justicia.

COMUNICADO pic.twitter.com/7YYhoHJD4B

— Álvaro Leyva Durán (@AlvaroLeyva) April 10, 2026

Finance Colombia translation of Leyva’s recent open letter dated April 10th

Some time ago, I denounced in a public communiqué that Gustavo Petro had woven against me an atrocious persecution, as retaliation for my denunciations of his closeness to the world of drugs—denunciations that have led to the United States having him cornered today. There I warned that, from within the government, intrigues were being made to throw me in prison and that attempts would be made against my life.

Now, months later, the Attorney General’s Office accuses me of malfeasance (prevaricato) because I declared void a passport tender that, according to that same institution, was based on a “catch-all specifications document” (pliego sastre). For the accusing entity, I should not have fulfilled the obligation of applying the Constitution that I myself helped draft and, by seeking equality, I acted with malicious intent. The world turned upside down.

Understand the gravity: if that thesis is accepted, any official who declares a tender void because they find unconstitutional or illegal specifications must go to prison. So, faced with such a thing, the trial is welcome. I will give the battle in the Supreme Court with all my strength. Because I trust its magistrates, because my life has been a permanent struggle for Colombia, and because justice, reason, and the law are with me.

The acquittal will be the logical consequence of the process in which I will prove, with official documents and among other things, the following: that I left in motion a new, clean, and legal tender, which Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo suspended. That he thus justified another manifest urgency, completely unnecessary, and added an overcharge of nearly 30 billion pesos to it. And that he contracted software for more than 10 billion additional pesos, which was pocketed. All by hand-picking. All murky. All without control. Thus, by brute force, the door was opened to the passport debacle of today. I warned Petro of what was coming down on the country. But he kept silent.

Today I feel the pride of having helped unmask the boss of the mafia that has plunged Colombia into its darkest hours. I took office as his Foreign Minister with the hope of change. But then I came to know his life of vice and decadence. I was slow to understand his vileness and, surely, also slow to denounce it. But from my father Jorge Leyva Urdaneta, exiled for opposing the dictatorship, I inherited courage and respect for institutions; from Álvaro Gómez Hurtado, I learned the necessity of a just order; and from Misael Pastrana Borrero, I learned to think about social peace. So, faithful to myself and to the spirit of my mentors, I denounced in various letters the moral, political, and personal degeneration that I came to know in Gustavo Petro. And time has proven me right.

The President is an infamous being: international human trafficking is a scourge of the poor girls of Colombia, and he, in the middle of a state visit, ends up as a customer of a brothel in Lisbon; he claims to be a champion of peace, but full of hatred he violently divides society with his stale, classist, and racist rhetoric; he claims to fight drug trafficking, but he goes out into the public square drugged, drunk on alcohol and sectarianism, to mistreat and insult those who contradict him, while in the United States his ties to narcos are being investigated. And so, from scandal to scandal, the horrible night does not cease: the homeland trampled by its own President is today the object of all the mockery abroad.

Petro knows that the upcoming electoral process resembles the one recently lived in Chile. And, to avoid the same result, he illegally intercepts candidates, seeks to destroy them, and is already trying to cast a mantle of doubt over the vote count. But Colombia deserves a new dawn. And the radical left, which—turned into the President’s hooligan squad—forgives him everything, seems condemned to the desert. We shall see whether, in the future, they also forgive him for being responsible for their possible defeat. For my part, I remain ready for all battles: always embracing justice against oppression, and with the law as my spear, shield, and banner.

Right now, Fitch expects a moderate contraction of the Colombian economy by 0.5% in 2020, driven by significant slowdown in domestic demand and oil exports, followed by a modest recovery of 2.3% in 2021. A rise in the debt burden in recent years and an expected fall in tax revenues have left the government with less fiscal space to counteract economic shocks, in Fitch’s view. The negative outlook reflects downside risks to the outlook for economic growth and public finances, and to the capacity and quality of the government’s policy response to decisively cut deficits and stabilize debt over the coming years, given the scale of the shock.

 RATING ACTIONS

• Colombia LT IDR BBB- Downgrade BBB 
• ST IDR F3 Downgrade F2 
• LC LT IDR BBB- Downgrade BBB 
• LC ST IDR F3 Downgrade F2 
• Country Ceiling BBB Downgrade BBB+ 
• senior unsecured
• LT BBB- Downgrade BBB 

The recession and fall in oil price will negatively impact government revenues while the fiscal package announced by the government (1.4% of GDP to date) will increase government spending, However, the government has announced its intention to use government funds at the FAE (stabilization fund) and FONPET (a public sector local and regional government pension fund) to finance the higher spending. As a result, Fitch expects the central government deficit to widen to 4.5% of GDP in 2020, up from 2.5% of GDP in 2019. General government debt/GDP is expected to rise above 50%, up from 44% in 2019 (and well above 30% of GDP in 2013 when Colombia was upgraded to BBB), in part due to the sharp depreciation of the Colombian peso (the foreign- currency debt represented over 30% of the total at year-end 2019). GG interest to revenues has also risen significantly to close to 11.6% from 8.7% since 2013, as well.

Although Fitch expects some fiscal consolidation in 2021 as transitory spending fades, government tax revenues will continue to remain under pressure, although possibly higher profits from the central bank and tax administration measures could help make up for some of the losses in 2021. Significantly lower dividends and income taxes from the oil sector as well as further tax cuts associated with the 2019 Economic Growth Law will lead to an overall central government deficit of 3.5% of GDP. As a result, the trajectory of government debt will continue to rise through the forecast period.

Fitch believes that the risks to its fiscal and debt projections are mainly on the downside. Weaker- than-expected economic growth performance, possible additional fiscal support package, difficulty in cutting spending given budgetary rigidities, could keep fiscal deficits higher for longer. The heightened uncertainties surrounding length of the quarantine, the global economic outlook and potentially prolonged low oil price environment represent significant downside risks to Colombia’s growth outlook. A more pronounced downturn could lead to a further deterioration in key sovereign metrics such as GDP per capita, economic growth volatility, the fiscal deficit, and debt to GDP. The recognition of domestic liabilities related to pensions, health and negative court rulings as well as the depreciation of the peso are additional risks to debt stabilization.

In Fitch’s view, although Colombia’s overall macroeconomic policy framework remains solid, the predictability and credibility of the medium-term fiscal policy has deteriorated relative to ‘BBB’ peers, as witnessed by a steady rise in debt to GDP, the difficulty in raising permanent tax revenues, reliance on non-recurrent sources of revenue to meet fiscal targets and the vulnerability of government revenues to oil price shocks amid rigid expenditure demands and low fiscal buffers. Fitch believes additional changes in the short to medium term fiscal targets are likely when the Fiscal Council meets in April given the expected economic downturn and low oil price environment as considered in the fiscal rule.

Fitch believes that further fiscal policy measures to achieve a sustainable increase in the non-oil revenue base are needed to further fiscal consolidation over the medium term to stabilize General Government (GG) debt, given the fiscal spending rigidities. Prospects for such measures appear uncertain given the natural priority to deal with the pandemic. In addition, the possibility of rising social tensions (given the recent protest activity and the expected rise in unemployment rate) as well as the 2022 presidential election cycle, could detract from the implementation of credible measures to address the fiscal weaknesses.

In addition to the significant fiscal deterioration, Colombia’s vulnerability from external shocks has increased as witnessed by the deterioration in its external debt and liquidity metrics. Fitch expects the current account deficit will widen to 4.6% of GDP in 2020, up from 4.3% of GDP in 2019. A fall in exports and remittances are the prime contributors in the deterioration although sharply contracting household consumption and investment will suppress imports. Over the last 10 years, FDI has covered around 70% of the current account deficit. However, the widening current account deficit will lead to an increase in net external debt, which is expected to rise to 17% of GDP in 2020 from 1.6% in 2013, and is expected to continue to increase despite an adjustment in the current account deficit next year to 3.2% of GDP. Higher external financing needs make Colombia vulnerable to the tightening external financing conditions. Despite the increase in Colombia’s international reserves position in 2019, Fitch’s liquidity ratio will remain below 100% for 2020.

Inflation ended at 3.8% in 2019 at the upper end of the 3+/- 1% inflation target. In March 2020, the central bank cut interest rates by 50 bp to 3.75% after remaining on hold for an extended period since May 2018 citing the weak economic outlook that would signify disinflation despite the peso depreciation (over 20% since February 2020). The central bank has also intervened in the local market to provide liquidity – including outright purchase of government and local corporate debt. It has also intervened in the FX market through derivatives (both forwards and swaps).

Fitch revised the Colombian banking sector outlook to Negative on March 27 to reflect the weaker operating environment that will increase asset quality deterioration and affect profitability. However, the banking systems capital and provisioning were relatively solid going into the downturn.

Colombia’s investment grade rating reflects the government’s conservative macroeconomic policies that have underpinned macroeconomic and financial stability. Its ratings are constrained by high commodity dependence, weaker external accounts, rising government debt burden and structural weaknesses in terms of low GDP per capita and weaker governance indicators relative to peers.

ESG – Governance: Colombia has an ESG Relevance Score (RS) of 5 for both Political Stability and Rights and for the Rule of Law, Institutional and Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption, as is the case for all sovereigns. Theses scores reflect the high weight that the World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGI) have in our proprietary Sovereign Rating Model. Colombia has a medium WBGI ranking in the 45th percentile, reflecting a track record of peaceful political transitions, a moderate level of rights for participation in the political process, moderate institutional capacity, established rule of law and a moderate level of corruption. Colombia scores especially poorly in the area of political stability.

SOVEREIGN RATING MODEL (SRM) AND QUALITATIVE OVERLAY (QO)

Fitch’s proprietary SRM assigns Colombia a score equivalent to a rating of ‘BBB-‘ on the Long-Term Foreign Currency (LT FC) IDR scale.

Fitch’s sovereign rating committee did not adjust the output from the SRM to arrive at the final LT FC IDR.

The removal of the +1 notch under Macroeconomic performance, policies and prospects since the previous review reflects the deterioration of fiscal credibility relative to peers given the continued rise in debt to GDP, reliance on extraordinary revenues to meet revised targets under the fiscal rule as well as difficulties in raising permanent sources of tax revenues.

Fitch’s SRM is the agency’s proprietary multiple regression rating model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centred averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score equivalent to a LT FC IDR. Fitch’s QO is a forward-looking qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within our criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully reflected in the SRM.

RATING SENSITIVITIES

The main factors that may, individually or collectively, lead to a downgrade or other negative rating action include:

• Failure to achieve a fiscal consolidation consistent with stabilization and eventual reduction in government debt burden;
• Damage to medium term growth prospects;
• Sustained large external imbalances that lead to a continuous rise in the external debt burden.
• The main factors that may, individually or collectively, lead to an upgrade or other positive rating action include:
• Fiscal consolidation consistent with an improved trajectory for public debt dynamics;
• A return to economic growth prospects consistent with medium term potential above 3%;
• Reduced external imbalances that improve external debt and liquidity ratios.

 BEST/WORST CASE RATING SCENARIO

International scale credit ratings of Public Finance issuers have a best-case rating upgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a positive direction) of three notches over a three-year rating horizon; and a worst-case rating downgrade scenario (defined as the 99th percentile of rating transitions, measured in a negative direction) of three notches over three years. The complete span of best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings for all rating categories ranges from ‘AAA’ to ‘D’. Best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings are based on historical performance. For more information about the methodology used to determine sector-specific best- and worst-case scenario credit ratings click here.

ESG CONSIDERATIONS

Colombia has an ESG Relevance Score of 5 for Political Stability and Rights as World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest weight in Fitch’s SRM and are highly relevant to the rating and a key rating driver with a high weight.

Colombia has an ESG Relevance Score of 5 for Rule of Law, Institutional & Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption as World Bank Governance Indicators have the highest weight in Fitch’s SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and are a key rating driver with a high weight.

Colombia has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Human Rights and Political Freedoms as strong social stability and voice and accountability are reflected in the World Bank Governance Indicators that have the highest weight in the SRM. They are relevant to the rating and a rating driver.

Colombia has an ESG Relevance Score of 4 for Creditor Rights as willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating and is a rating driver for the U.S., as for all sovereigns.

Except for the matters discussed above, the highest level of ESG credit relevance, if present, is a score of 3. This means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity(ies), either due to their nature or to the way in which they are being managed by the entity(ies). For more information on Fitch’s ESG Relevance Scores, visit www.fitchratings.com/esg

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