Colombia’s Information and Communications Technology Minister, Alexandra Falla Zerrate, and Justice and Law Minister Iván Cancino González met in Bogotá on Monday, August 24, 2026, with representatives from Claro, the Colombian unit of Mexico’s América Móvil (NYSE: AMX), Tigo, the local brand of Luxembourg-based Millicom International Cellular (NASDAQ: TIGO), WOM and other mobile carriers to define measures for blocking unauthorized cell phone communications from the country’s prisons. The meeting is the government’s latest attempt to stop inmates from using contraband phones to order extortion and coordinate other crimes from behind bars.

The talks were convened by the Ministerio de Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones (Ministry of Information and Communications Technology, or MinTIC) and the Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho (Ministry of Justice and Law, or MinJusticia) to review measures already in place to restrict illegal signals inside penitentiary facilities and to identify the technical, legal and operational obstacles that remain unresolved.

“Our purpose is clear: authority to shut the door on crime, technology in the service of security, and results that protect the peace of mind of Colombians,” Cancino told La FM after the meeting. He said the working group reviewed what has already been done, the current state of measures restricting unauthorized communications in penitentiary facilities, and the technical and operational challenges still to be resolved.

Representatives of the mobile carriers raised concerns and proposals about the measures under study and said they were willing to work with authorities, according to MinTIC. The ministries have not detailed what a new blocking mechanism would look like; officials said specifics would be announced in the coming days once technical evaluations with the carriers are complete.

The problem long predates Monday’s meeting. In January 2026, Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario (National Penitentiary and Prison Institute, or INPEC) director Col. Daniel Gutiérrez told Noticias RCN, in comments reported by Infobae, that none of the 16 nationally run prisons equipped with signal jammers were effectively blocking illegal signals: six were nominally active but not generating a working block because they ran on 12- to 15-year-old GSM-era technology unable to keep pace with 4G and 5G networks, and the other 10 were entirely out of service. Gutiérrez also said a signal-blocking trial at the maximum-security wing in Cómbita, Boyacá, left the state facing more than $50 billion COP in fines after the jamming disrupted legitimate cell service for nearby residents — a preview of the balance regulators must strike between blocking prison communications and protecting service for law-abiding Colombians nearby.

The stakes were underscored in July 2026, when Colombia’s Fiscalía General de la Nación (Attorney General’s Office, or Fiscalía) charged 17 people, including five INPEC guards, with extortion tied to a scheme run from the El Barne maximum-security prison in Cómbita, according to Vanguardia, citing Agencia EFE. Prosecutors said the guards allowed cell phones and other contraband into the prison so inmates could call victims across several departments and demand payment on behalf of armed criminal structures. Finance Colombia has previously reported on the pattern: a scheme run by the Satanás gang, whose imprisoned leader and members kept extorting Bogotá residents with smuggled phones even after signal jammers were installed, since many of the devices had been pulled from service due to obsolescence or court orders won by nearby residents whose own legitimate calls the jammers had blocked.

The National Police and National Army are also taking part in the effort, MinTIC said, working alongside the ministries and carriers to prevent criminal structures from continuing to direct operations from inside penitentiary facilities. The working group left commitments to keep advancing solutions that strengthen communications control in and around Colombia’s prisons, though the government has yet to say when any new blocking mechanism will take effect.

Headline photo: Ministers Alexandra Falla Zerrate and Iván Cancino González meet with mobile carrier representatives at MinTIC headquarters in Bogotá. (Photo courtesy MinTIC)

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Colombia has Monkeypox.

The Colombian national health institute has confirmed at least 5 cases, all traced to male Colombians returning from Europe. The government has urged calm and stated that Monkeypox is not as contagious as COVID or other communicable diseases. So far most cases are in Bogotá, though there is at least one case in Medellín. Patients are said to be in quarantine.

El @MinSaludCol y el @INSColombia confirman tres casos de viruela símica en Colombia. Claudia Cuéllar, directora de Epidemiología y Demografía del @MinSaludCol, entrega detalles.

ℹ️https://t.co/NZ5ruMdh6X pic.twitter.com/6mq8ZwFRcF

— MinSaludCol (@MinSaludCol) June 24, 2022

Tuluá Prison Fire

At least 52 are dead from a grisly fire in a medium security prison in Tuluá, about 90 minutes north of Cali, Colombia’s third largest city. The prison, built to house 1,000 inmates had 1,200 at the time of the conflagration. inmates, but is built with a capacity for just a thousand.

At least 52 men have died in the fire, with some patients arriving at burn units in Cali with 100 percent of their body burned. So far, not many details have been released, but it appears stacks of mattresses were set aflame in either a prison riot or an escape attempt. President Ivan Duque issued a statement of condolence for the families; so has President elect Gustavo Petro, who went on to criticize the Colombian prison system as structured for revenge instead of rehabilitation.

Andrés Breaks Up With Bonnie

We reported in Finance Colombia on Tropical Storm Bonnie that was headed towards the Southern Caribbean Coast and on towards the Colombian Archipelago of San Andrés and Providencia. The good news is that the storm has passed without causing major damage. The governor of the Caribbean archipelago with a population of 60,000, Everth Hawkins reports 22 homes damaged, but emphasizes San Andrés remains fully open for travel and tourism.

Truth

The Truth Commission, set up under the 2016 peace accords released its final 800 page report last week. Among many other recommendations, it calls for a reframing of the war on drugs, a stronger commitment to human rights by the Colombian defense forces and government, an end to aerial fumigation of coca plants with glyphosate, and an end to the military draft of young men.

The commission also called the rebel insurgents to account for their vast and heinous crimes, such as kidnapping, raping or forcing into combat an estimated 34,000 children.. All told, the commission says approximately 260,000 Colombian civilian noncombatants died during the armed insurgency, that still continues today under antagonists such as the ELN and the FARC dissidents who refused to demobilize and accept the peace deal.

President Elect Gustavo Petro says he will incorporate the truth commission’s recommendations into his administration’s policy. On the other hand, outgoing President Ivan Duque made sure he was out of the country when the report was presented. Duque campaigned against the peace accords, and during his administration, did not make its implementation a priority.

The report’s recommendations are not legally binding, but the report is intended to create a historical record, and present guidance to prevent such atrocities from happening in the future.

Seeking To Calm Fears

There is a little less panic in certain sectors as President Elect Gustavo Petro has appointed some notable non-radicals to his upcoming administration.

Petro has named former senator, one-time presidential candidate, conservative party member, and peace negotiator Alvaro Leyva Durán as the new foreign minister. A left-wing President appointing a conservative party senator to head foreign relations sends a strong message to Colombians & foreign governments that there may be less crazy in store than people feared.

The UN’s former undersecretary of economics and social affairs, José Antonio Ocampo will be the new finance minister.

One of Petro’s opponents for the presidency, the centrist academic Alejandro Gaviria has been named as part of Petro’s transition team, and many think he may be named as Education Minister. Gaviria served as health minister during the presidency of former president Juan Manuel Santos.

Last year, she gained more notoriety for sharing an empanada with equally controversial right wing ex-President Alvaro Uribe (above right), but when the campaign communication manager for leftist presidential hopeful and ex guerilla Gustavo Petro reached out to her in the hopes that she would use her platforms to publicize a meeting between the two, she not only rejected the idea, but publicized the messages, saying that she feared Petro would expropriate her business, or at least make life harder for entrepreneurs and business owners.

“I have to tell you a piece of gossip. Petro told me to meet up, that he and I should sit down and talk, and that we be little friends,” said Barrera. “Friend, I am afraid to leave my company to Petro, I am very afraid that Petro will be president. And where is my company?”

On May 29, Colombians will go to the polls to vote for president. If no candidate wins a majority of votes, the top two candidates will go to a runoff on June 19. According to law, the new president will be inaugurated August 7.

Hello Dane, how are you?

I introduce myself: I’m María Antonia Pardo, director of communications for Gustavo Petro.

Senator Gustavo Petro, former guerilla & current presidential candidate (Credit: Prensa de Bogotá)

I am writing you because the senator is interested in meeting you. It’s inexplicable how those of (corruption scandal) Odebrecht go free and you got five years of prison.

I know it’s late and I ask forgiveness for the hour. If you are interested, please let me know. I also want to do with you your first IG (Instagram) live. You were imprisoned. Who better than a person who has had a second opportunity in life to speak about your current situation.

[Barreras responds with something that can’t be seen, before Pardo continues]

Already a friend of a friend…It’s that you [should] meet with us already.

Not only Petro

With [other candidates] Galán, with De la Calle, with Francia, etc.

That way you can lower the scandal

Because you are left looking like an Uribista [Uribe supporter]

And that frankly is fucked

It’s not convenient for you.

On May 29, Colombians will go to the polls to vote for president. If no candidate wins a majority of votes, the top two candidates will go to a runoff on June 19. According to law, the new president will be inaugurated August 7.

Seven guards of the National Penitentiary and Prison Institute (Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario – INPEC) were charged with allegedly running a clandestine delivery service within the Tramacúa Prison in the northeastern Valledupar department, prosecutors announced.

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

The INPEC guards were said to have acquired a drone to deliver drugs, cellphones, electronics, alcohol and food to inmates at the maximum and medium-security prison.

The contraband goods came at a hefty mark-up. A hamburger delivery reportedly cost around $64 and an order of fried rice set prisoners back an eye-watering $100; alcohol around $255; a delivery of marijuana cost around $385; and sim cards went for $515.

According to the Attorney General’s Office, the prison deliveries generated an income of just under $9,000 per month, which was divided among the seven guards.

The operation was reportedly discovered following a mistaken delivery, in which the drone laden with 18 cellphones landed where it was not supposed to. The INPEC guards are now behind bars themselves.

InSight Crime Analysis

The use of drones to smuggle contraband into prisons has become commonplace across Latin America and around the world.

Cases have been reported across Latin America and internationally. In addition to Colombia, cases have been reported in Ecuador, Chile and Puerto Rico, as well as in the United States and Canada.

The use of drones by prison guards to deliver contraband sets a rarer precedent. However, INPEC, Colombia’s national prison system, has faced numerous corruption scandals in recent years. Officials have been known to charge inmates for perks, accept bribes and extort inmates.

Poorly paid prison guards, who make on average $208 to $625 per month, are easy targets for inmates looking to smuggle contraband into the prison and to flaunt prison rules.

In an interview with El Tiempo in 2019, Elkin Cárdenas, an INPEC employee for more than 20 years, rattled off a list of contributing factors, including a poor selection process, the young age and inexperience of recruits who can be hired at 18 years old, and long work hours. Up until 2021, prison guards could be on shift for up to 24 hours straight, but a decree passed last April limited shifts to 12 hours and a total of 44 hours a week.

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

Headline photo:A joint tactical autonomous air resupply systems (JTAARS) carries a small package during the Maneuver Fires Integrated Experiment (MFIX) at Fort Sill in the United States, April 12. The JTAARS experimented with the possibility to use unmanned aerial vehicles, autonomously… (Photo Credit: U.S. Army) Used for illustrative purposes.

Kenigsberger was sentenced in October by the Fourth Specialized Court of Bogotá for the crimes of conspiracy to commit aggravated trafficking, manufacture or possession of narcotics; and aggravated money laundering.

Kenigsberger, though already convicted, is also still being investigated for participation in sexual exploitation of minors with the promotion of sexual tourism plans that included children. Prosecutors say that Kenigsberger is also facing legal proceedings, including an Interpol red circular for drug trafficking in France, the Netherlands and Israel.

Prosecutors say he is one of the leaders of an international cartel linked with the Japanese Yakuza and Jerusalem mafia in Israel and worked as a liaison with the La Oficina narcotrafficking mafia.

Kenigsberger, an Israeli citizen has lived in Colombia for twenty years and holds Colombian identity documents that allowed him to travel throughout Colombia arranging shipments of cocaine from Colombia to Europe.

Here in Colombia, Cartagena has had a notoriously corrupt city administration. Newly elected Mayor William Dau was voted in on an anti-corruption platform and has quickly made some very powerful enemies taking on criminal structures. Bogotá’s political/civic culture can be described as “battle royale” where it is everyone against everyone: Private sector vs. public sector, north side vs. south side; each new administration seems to try to undo and reverse everything that was done before. Many remember former mayor and now Senator Gustavo Petro’s garbage fiasco where trash piled up on the streets of Bogotá in 2012 as Petro unilaterally canceled contracts with sanitation contractors—without a viable plan to replace them. Corrupt contractors are still in jail over the “Carrusel de Contratos” scandal where politicians and corporate thieves conspired to rob millions during the construction of Avenida El Dorado, the main thoroughfare leading to Bogotá’s international airport. Petro kept the fares on Bogotá’s Transmilenio bus system artificially low to buy popularity, creating an operating deficit and financial crisis that the following administration would have to fix, and automatically vilifying whoever would follow and have to make unpopular, drastic corrections.

On multiple occasions, Finance Colombia has reached out to Mayor Daniel Quintero for comment (on various issues), who through his press secretary has refused comment or reply.

On the other hand, Medellín’s professionally managed metro runs on-time, is clean and safe, and used by riders of almost every socioeconomic stratum. Medellín has continued to win international accolades throughout the years, hosting the World Economic Forum’s Latin America event in 2016, several UN events, and many delegations from foreign municipal governments to learn best practices. Many visit the city’s Ruta-N business and entrepreneurship incubator that can be credited, along with ACI (Agencia de Cooperación Internacionál), the city’s investment promotion agency with bringing countless jobs and investment to the Aburrá Valley; home to Medellin and its immediate suburbs like Envigado, Sabaneta, Itaguí, and Bello.

The city is home to several multinationals: Bancolombia, Colombia’s largest Bank; Grupo Sura, an insurance, investment & health care giant; Cementos Argos, which as a cement producer is the 4^th largest in the United States and exports to 27 countries; Nutresa, which is like a Latin American Unilever or Nestle, and newer companies like Viva Air. More precisely in the Medellín Suburb of Rionegro, the low-cost airline operates routes throughout Colombia & Peru, to and from the US, and is currently in expansion mode despite the COVID-19 Pandemic.

EPM Headquarters Building in Medellín’s Plaza Mayor

Another multinational with a very unusual business model is EPM, Empresas Públicas de Medellín. The public utility is responsible for sanitation, sewers, water, electricity, and natural gas in Medellín and much of the surrounding suburbs and rural areas. In a joint venture with global telecommunications provider Millicom called Tigo Une, it provides faster residential internet service than is available in many US cities. Earlier this year, they purchased the formerly insolvent utility networks of much of Colombia’s Caribbean coastal region. EPM already owns utility operations outside of Colombia, with assets of the multibillion-dollar company stretching from Chile to Mexico. EPM, though it does issue debt on international markets is not a publicly traded company. Neither is it a municipal utility. It is a separate company with professional management and (up until now) a board of directors to provide corporate governance, but with the city of Medellín as the sole shareholder. In the form of dividends, EPM provides almost 30% of Medellín’s municipal budget, but the key to this arrangement has been that it operates as a separate entity, expressly not part of the municipal administration, but of course with the city’s input. The mayor by statute is the chairman of EPM’s board of directors and has prerogative to appoint the CEO. As shareholder, the city also appoints board members.

A breath of fresh air?

Many in Medellín were pleased to see Daniel Quintero elected last year as a “breath of fresh air” and change from the traditional power families that have controlled politics, especially as he defeated Alfredo Ramos, son of a former governor and member of Centro Democrático, the party of “Uribistas,” personal acolytes of former President (now under house arrest for witness-tampering charges) Alvaro Uribe. With Medellín & surrounding Antioquia Uribe’s home turf (he was both mayor of Medellín & governor of Antioquia before becoming president of Colombia), it was something of a surprise that this local who was raised by a single mother who died when he was just 14 in a mostly poor neighborhood (Tricentenario) won the election. As a youth, Quintero worked as a street vendor struggling to put himself through college. No one knew quite what to make of him.

Quintero had politicked at different times as a member of Colombia’s Liberal Party, Conservative Party, and Green Party before establishing the “Tomato Party” as a publicity stunt to get himself noticed (see the headline photo). He gained attention by throwing tomatoes at pictures of politicians and people he didn’t like, such as Alvaro Uribe and then President Juan Manuel Santos, though he decided to support Santos’ re-election in 2014. He was then rewarded with the political appointment of running InnPulsa, Colombia’s national entrepreneurship promotion agency, then becoming vice-minister for ICT (Information & Communication Technologies) under Santos. In the last presidential election, Quintero initially supported mainstream liberal candidate & peace negotiator Humberto De La Calle, before switching his support to controversial former mayor of Bogotá Gustavo Petro’s (mentioned above) candidacy.

So no one knew what to expect, though it is clear they wanted more of the vice-minister of technology or InnPulsa director than the tomato throwing stunt man who once handed former EPM general manager Jorge Londoño a chunk of cheese (nonverbally calling him a rat).

A whiff of Limburger—stinky cheese.

Finance Colombia being primarily a business and finance publication rather than a political journal, heard some low intensity criticism of appointments that Quintero had been making in the city administration and the way he was making them, but did not actively pursue the stories at the time. Quintero made some other moves that seemed politically silly, such as writing the Cuban government to ask for doctors to help with the COVID-19 pandemic. Regardless of the merits of Cuban medical missions (which are very dubious), it is inconceivable that the current national government would permit such activity, and the action could only embarrass the mayor, which it did. Finance Colombia chalked it up to benign political inexperience.

The mayor also fought back a scandal where he was accused on social media of inappropriate sexual conduct before he was mayor, but even more ominous was his reaction to the press, which brought condemnation from Colombia’s Foundation for Press Liberty, FLIP:

“FLIP was able to document that Quintero personally pressured media executives and pointed out journalists as being opponents of his administration as a way to avoid questions about matters on which he must be held accountable…In events related to this situation, administration officials tried to force national and local media to improve the image of the mayor in exchange for advertising. Telemedellín (City government’s official TV channel) officials asked W Radio to rectify a truthful publication and also that the media agree to subscribe and publish a joint statement with Telemedellín to disseminate as true a situation that did not correspond to reality,” said the journalism rights defense group.

In other words, “I will buy advertising with your paper if you help me bury this scandal.” FLIP also denounced the mayor for pressuring newspaper El Espectador to block coverage of the scandal. According to FLIP, and El Espectador’s own account of the misdeeds, the publisher, Fidel Cano, responded by sending the questions to the mayor that his reporters had been trying to ask. “The mayor of Medellín assured the director of the newspaper that he would take legal action if the publication affected his reputation” (he never did).

All this so far and the mayor has served only his first 8 months of a 4-year term.

The mayor’s official press conference, canceled at the last minute, crowing “Why Medellin is the world’s standard in the assertive management of Covid-19” as cases in the city began to skyrocket

On June 27, the Quintero administration scheduled a press conference titled “Why Medellín has one of the lowest contagion and mortality rates in Latin America?” scheduled for July 2^nd, and led by Daniel Quintero himself, backed by Andree Uribe, Medellin’s Secretary of Health, Alejandro Arias, Medellín’s Secretary of Economic Development, and Eleonora Betancur, the director of ACI Medellin. The day before the press conference, it was abruptly canceled. It seemed the mayor wanted to take credit for good news but avoid bad news. The headlines that day in El Colombiano, Medellín’s largest daily? “100,000 cases of Coronavirus in Colombia, Where are we going?” and with 40% of ICU units full, “Doctors of Antioqua appeal for total & obligatory quarantine.”  The last weekend of August the ICUs are now 70.79% full. The day the press conference was to be held, a headline in El Colombiano announced a coronavirus outbreak with 36 infected in the La Paz prison in Medellín’s southern suburb of Itaguí.

The cases—and deaths were just beginning to skyrocket and two months later Colombia has one of the world’s worst mortality rates on a trailing 7 day average. According to the Colombian government, Antioquia department (Medellín is the only large city in Antioquia) alone has had 77,709 cases so far. Colombia now has over 18,000 deaths from COVID-19, most within the past two months. 1,603 in Medellín & surrounding Antioquia.

Last month, EPM general manager Álvaro Guillermo Rendón announced a memorandum of understanding with InnPulsa, the same national government agency formerly run by Quintero himself, that would, if more than just talk, “convert EPM into a laboratory of smart cities, the 4^th industrial revolution, and the orange economy.” All well and good (maybe, but that doesn’t sound like the function of a utility), but what the public did not know was that this fundamental change in corporate strategy and negotiations with the national government were worked out without the knowledge, discussion or approval of the company’s board of directors. EPM was being treated not as a separate entity but part of the municipal administration.

OFFICIAL STATISTICS: As of August 28th, Antioquia had 77,709 total COVID-19 cases, 1.603 deaths and hospital intensive care wards were over 70% of capacity over 80% of Antioquia’s cases are from metro Medellín.

The $2.7 billion dollar WTF

On August 10, EPM sent out a press release (and the mayor tweeted) that EPM would be initiating legal proceedings in the amount of  approximately $2,7 billion US dollars against the consortiums responsible for construction of EPM’s troubled Hidroituango dam that suffered catastrophic setbacks due to unexpected flooding in 2018 and design flaws that were thus revealed. Whether such legal action is a good idea is debatable: On one hand there certainly were defects that have cost the company millions and delayed the project by over a year. On the other hand, litigation could potentially bring the project to a halt, as EPM is still depending upon the parties it is suing to complete the project before certain deadlines, or it faces economic penalties in power generation commitments of over $150 million USD. It is also far from certain that EPM would prevail in its legal crusade against all the parties named, some of which have nothing to do with the construction defects that led to a tunnel blockage during construction.

The shocking thing is that Mayor Quintero along with Rendon and Alexander Sánchez Pérez, EPM’s vice president for legal affairs, declared this multibillion dollar action without discussion, input or even knowledge of the company’s board of directors!

The next day, the entire board of directors, except for Quintero himself, resigned.

Soon Quintero tried to justify his actions saying “there was no time” and he had to act, but he had already been mayor for 8 months and ran on a campaign of rectifying the Hidroituango situation (remember his cheese stunt with the former general manager?) and so was aware of the situation. If not, he had 8 months to be brought up to speed. At any rate, without board ratification, such actions have dubious legal force, and as bad or worse, prove a lack of corporate governance at EPM and direct political control. CEO Rendón clearly answers not to the board of directors but to a politician.

One day after the board of directors of EPM resigned, the entire board of directors of Medellín’s storied Ruta-N also resigned, along with its executive director, Juan Andrés Vásquez. Ruta N was already under its third executive director in Quintero’s 8 month old administration. Vásquez learned that Quintero was replacing him after Quintero announced Trump-style, in the media, saying he “had drifted away from the administration.” Like EPM, Ruta-N is not a city agency directly under the administration, but a public-private partnership with professionalized management and governance, and internal merit-based personnel policies.  Sources inside Ruta-N say that Quintero had been trying to circumvent the qualifications-based hiring of the business incubator to install friends and supporters into sinecures. People inside both organizations indicate that morale is at bottom.

Beverage giant Postobón rescinded its financial support of a health initiative spearheaded by Ruta-N saying it no longer had confidence in the entity’s governance. Postobón had already spent $4 billion pesos on the initiative to build respirators for coronavirus patients but said it would continue to donate, just elsewhere after the board resignation.

That same week, in reaction to what it called “a deterioration of corporate governance controls at the company,” global ratings firm Fitch downgraded EPM’s credit as a bond issuer to one notch above junk bond status. In a statement, the foreign, independent agency stated:

“Fitch believes recent actions taken by the company are contrary to the Governability Agreement, signed on April 23, 2007, between the City of Medellin and EPM’s management, in which the municipality agreed to respect the autonomy of EPM as an industrial and commercial enterprise of the state and to act exclusively through the board of directors.”

Flailing about

The mayor scrambled to assemble a new board of directors for EPM, which as an issuer of debt in the international capital markets, must answer to institutional bondholders. Over the ensuing days, Quintero variously announced that Claro Colombia CEO Juan Carlos Archila would join EPM’s board (creating a conflict since Claro competes with Tigo Une), Grupo Santo Domingo’s Alberto Preciado,  Luis Fernando Rico, formerly of Isagen, another Colombian utility, and Sandra Suarez, the former general manager of newsweekly Semana all rejected Quintero’s oddly public nominations. Did he not confirm with them beforehand if they would accept the appointments, or did they publicly reject the nominations as a rebuke to the mayor?

Meanwhile, EPM’s board representative to Tigo Une, Federico Arango Toro also resigned in a public letter saying he wanted no part of Quintero’s administration.

Banks and insurers are already turning their back on EPM, citing a lack of control at the organization. EPM had to admit that certain loans and lines of credit had been shut off after the board resignations. An internal document seen by Finance Colombia stated that the firm may have difficulty finding or renewing certain insurance coverages.

In the midst of all this, Colombia’s human rights tribunal set up as part of the 2016 Peace Accords, the JEP (Special Jurisdiction for Peace) has subpoenaed general manager Rendón under threat of arrest for ignoring during his 8 months as the utility’s legal representative, a year old subpoena for documents regarding possible obstruction of the search for the remains of victims of violence during the construction of Hidroituango, before Rendón’s appointment.

Medellín’s city council is on scheduled recess, but they have publicly asked the mayor to reconvene a session to discuss the governance crisis. Under law, (article 23, law 136 of 1994), they can only formally convene during a recess at the mayor’s request.

Labor unions & business community united

EPM’s largest labor union, SINPRO has called for a protest on Wednesday, September 2nd, for everyone in the city to turn out their lights for 30 minutes at 8pm, and for workers and the public to gather outside of the company’s headquarters in Plaza Mayor at that time for a rally in defense of EPM.

“When Medellín turns off, we hope that our leaders will understand that this is everyone’s problem, and that a city shut down doesn’t serve anyone. If EPM is in crisis, it doesn’t just shut down the city, it shuts down the country,” said union President Olga Lucia Arango.

The union is also demanding explanation of EPM general manager Rendon’s alleged private gym and luxury remodel during a time the company is under self-imposed austerity orders.

Civic leaders, executives, and nonprofits from across the region have begun to organize in reaction to the mayor, forming on August 25, a veeduría, or citizen’s oversight group ”made up of people with no particular economic interests in either EPM or the mayoralty that will work to take care of the heritage of the city and the interests of all Medellinenses.”

The initiative, called “Todos por Medellín” (Everyone for Medellín) is backed by over 40 groups, including the Chamber of Commerce of Medellin (in Colombia, chambers of commerce perform a quasigovernmental function, for example, as the registry of corporate and nonprofit organizations, and their articles of incorporation), the Intergremial committee (a grémio is a trade group or business association), and Proantioquia, the region’s primary civic benevolent foundation.

The mayor gets combative

Last Thursday, Mayor Quintero showed no contrition, but tried to dismiss the concerns as political machinations. “The oversight is fine, but we need oversight agencies to see everything. They didn’t see a lot of things, for example, $17 trillion of debt in the last 15 years. How come they didn’t see Orbitel, UNE, Antofagasta, Porce III and Hidroituango? A mayor appears to them who responds, has character, then a lot of politicians come out to do oversight. The veeduría is welcome but we are going to review everything. That the mayor is the one who manages the networks and they govern? No!” he said in a press conference.

Taking a page from the playbook of his preferred presidential candidate and apparent ally Gustavo Petro, who had a disastrous term as mayor of Bogotá and was temporarily removed from office by the national government, Quintero frames it all as a nefarious plot against him (does he think international ratings firm Fitch is in on the plot?)

“There are some groups full of politicians who want to carry out processes to revoke the mayor, that have been moving for a long time, we are ready, we have no problems in showing results and what we have done. They are worried because a long time ago they did not meet an independent mayor, a mayor who is not beholden to politicians or businessmen, but to the people,” said Quintero.

Navegamos entre fuerzas oscuras que se resisten al cambio. Con fe y sin miedo seguiremos adelante con transparencia, honestidad y contra la corrupción y la politiquería.

— Daniel Quintero Calle (@QuinteroCalle) August 26, 2020

CAPED CRUSADER? Quintero seems to fancy himself a hero navigating “between dark forces that resist change. With faith and without fear we will continue forward with transparency, honesty, and against the corruption and politicking” he tweeted last week after learning of the group Todos por Medellín.

Analysis

Quintero’s plan seems to be to blame his woes not on his own actions, but on former President Alvaro Uribe. Uribe’s reputation has steadily declined since his presidency, and where he was once seen as the man who rescued Colombia from communist rebels and drug cartels, his legacy has steadily soured as an avalanche of allegations and evidence piles up that tie him directly to paramilitary death squads during his time as governor, and indirectly to narcotraffickers and civilian massacres committed during his presidency. As if that were not enough, he is currently under arrest and confined to his northern Colombia ranch on charges of witness tampering, attempting to frame leftist senator Ivan Cépeda, a nemesis of Uribe in the Colombian senate.

Quintero wants to blame Uribe & his Centro Democrático for his woes, but since Uribe founded the party in 2013 it has never won a mayoral election in Medellín. The last Uribe supporter to hold the office was Luis Pérez from 2001-2004. Perez later abandoned Uribe for President Santos, working in 2015 as his regional campaign coordinator to defeat Uribe’s chosen presidential candidate Ivan Zuluaga.

Blaming the Uribe bogeyman may be a good tactic after the damage that has been done, but those aghast at recent developments extend far outside Uribe’s sphere of influence. Uribe did tweet support for the citizens movement, and Petro in support of Quintero, but opponents of Uribismo are also speaking out against Quintero. Former mayor of Medellín (2004-2008) and governor of Antioquia Sergio Fajardo immediately wrote a letter of concern, on August 12, admonishing Quintero’s actions.

Medellín’s previous mayor, Federico Gutierrez, nicknamed Fico, surprisingly upset Uribe’s candidate Juan Carlos Vélez to win the mayoralty in 2016. His letter, also dated August 12 is even more blunt. “EPM & Medellin are in danger.”

Letter from former Medellín Mayor Federico Gutierrez: “EPM & Medellín Are In Danger”

“The discourse of Quintero is based on lies. He talks of social struggle, of a class struggle, the same ideas of Gustavo Petro, who furthermore was the first to celebrate and support the mayor’s decision to deinstitutionalize EPM, which obliged the board’s renunciation. But look at the contradictions: What kind of social struggle destroys the motors of progress? EPM is that very thing, an incalculable help for the most vulnerable communities, a tool to breach social divides.” – excerpt from Federico Gutierrez’s letter.

Paisas, as people from Medellín & Antioquia call themselves tend center to right on the political spectrum and have less appetite for the far-left adventurism much more popular in Bogotá. Marxist talk like “class struggle” doesn’t go over so well here. Before this editor started Finance Colombia or even moved to Colombia, representatives from the city (going back to before 2013) would call and extend invitations: “Come to Medellín, let us show you what we are doing” with genuine pride. At the time, this editor was an analyst covering the Latin American services sector for a Connecticut-based research firm. “Look, we want to show you the good things we are doing!” Apparently with no other motivation beyond civic pride and attracting investment and positive attention. “We are building the Metrocable system” a network of cable cars extending far up into low income hillside neighborhoods on the valley walls. “We are building it so everyone can participate in our economic growth,” they said, beaming with pride. Not politicians or political appointees, but entry-to mid-level civil servants.

After moving to Colombia, first to Bogotá and launching Finance Colombia, the outreach didn’t stop. Medellín kept calling. “Come see what we are doing!” In 2015, Finance Colombia published “Social Inclusion: The Secret Sauce To Medellín’s Incredible Renaissance.”

They were going about it pragmatically, person to person, neighborhood to neighborhood, but without any ideological polemics or Marxist-Leninist babbling. There was no talk of class struggle, no attack on the city’s beloved institutions, whether well-established like EPM or new innovations like Ruta-N. Generally, each succeeding administration handed the keys over to the next politely, and with decorum.

One thing that unites Paisas, especially those in Medellín is the progress the city has made, going in less than 3 decades from one of the most dangerous on earth to an international showcase. Startups and international businesses have entered Colombia by first setting up operations in Ruta-N then moving out into larger spaces as they gain a foothold in the country. Get in a taxi and instead of trying to rip you off like in some parts of the country, if the driver realizes you are a foreigner, they will inevitably ask “What do you think of Medellín?” and beam with pride like you just presented them their firstborn child if you have something nice to say.

When protesters rioted in Bogotá last November, partially destroying their own transportation infrastructure and battling with police, Paisas marched peacefully. A few vandals were quickly confronted by peaceful protesters, and students came to undo the defacing they caused.

Medellín has built a strong credit rating in international markets for municipal debt, and EPM has enjoyed an investment grade credit and risk profile. There has been a level of peace between labor and employer, business and government rarely seen elsewhere in Latin America. Is it run by saints? Of course not. But that is precisely why the checks and balances of good governance are important, and Quintero seems to either not understand this, or have other priorities. EPM provides the city with more than electricity, water, and natural gas services. The international corporation provides almost 30% of the city’s revenue by way of operating profits. The fortunes of every residence and business in the Aburrá Valley (where Medellín is the largest city) are tied to EPM. The vitality of the city’s foreign investment attraction is tied to Ruta-N. Investors, both institutional and global-minded individuals are attracted by collaboration and progress, and repelled by scandal, conflict and controversy.

Being a crusader is easy. Throwing tomatoes at pictures is easy. A child can do it. Governing is complex and requires accountability. Medellín Mayor Daniel Quintero is sawing at the very foundations of Medellín’s success, by attacking its governance and institutionalism. It may very well be a good idea to take legal action against the consortiums that are (still) building the Hidroituango dam. But to launch a multibillion-dollar lawsuit behind the back of your own board of directors? No deliberation by the body designed to deliberate such fundamental issues? Are we seeing dictatorial tendencies, the likes of which one would expect from a Banana-Republic Caudillo?

When criticized, the new mayor goes into attack mode. Seeing everyone from the labor unions to civic leaders as a cabal “out to get him.” This editor remembers seeing such behavior at the beginnings of Chavismo in Venezuela. It is also Donald Trump’s style. Attack someone who is offering constructive criticism and they often will instinctively get sidetracked trying to defend the legitimacy of their criticism, allowing attention to be shifted from the original critique, no matter how legitimate.

“Ah, he’s going after the elites,” one more populist journalist friend said to this editor, when the conflict between former directors and the mayor became public. “Who the hell do you want running a multibillion-dollar international energy company?” this editor replied. “They had damn sure better be elite and know what they are doing!”

The former EPM board had directors like Javier Gutiérrez, who was former president of oil giant Ecopetrol, and general manager of energy company ISA; Manuel Mejia, former general manager of Colombiana de Comercio (distributor or manufacturer of brands in Colombia such as AKT motorcycles, Foton trucks, Castrol lubricants, Royal Enfield motorcycles, and Kalley appliances); Andrés Correa, formerly part of the insurance multinational SURA; and one of EPM’s own retired executives: Jesús Aristizábal Guevara, a civil engineer.

The new EPM board of directors is notable for having a preschool teacher, community activists, former politicians, lawyers, but no large company leadership experience. The mayor did nominate a few, but they all refused. Now, the mayor’s new board will have to navigate the $2 billion USD litigation that he unilaterally launched, and the war he has started with what seems the entire political, business, civic, and even labor community of Medellín. What do they know about international capital markets and the mechanics of bond pricing and currency risk? This editor wishes them luck. We want to see EPM succeed and Medellín do well. The only way this will happen is if they make drastic course corrections. It is not too late for the mayor.

On the other hand, we are only 8 months into a four-year mayoral term. This editor has never seen so many disparate people and institutions unite since the 9/11 attacks in the US. There, the population at least temporarily united behind then President Bush. In August, 2020, sectors from labor to enterprise are all uniting against Quintero. He is at a juncture in his mayoralty. He can attempt to reconcile, or he can take Gustavo Petro’s style book and fancy himself the martyr and class-struggler that everyone is out to get.

Mayor Quintero talks about making Medellín what he calls “software valley,” but foreign investors will not locate to a destination mired in conflict that can’t keep its lights on. He was elected without a power base, to some degree a rejection of the Uribista alternative. He clearly views the civic dissatisfactions with his moves as an Uribista plot. Surely they are included in his menagerie of new opponents, but they weren’t the ones who led to a loss of $30 million USD in EPM’s outstanding bond value in the space of 3 days. There were no Uribistas behind Wall Street firm Fitch deciding to lower the utility’s credit ratings. The only “forces of darkness” Fitch cited was Quintero’s “deterioration of corporate governance controls at the company.”

In this editorial, Finance Colombia calls on the mayor to rectify his course and work in a more collaborative, professional and transparent spirit with all the city’s stakeholders, or alternatively on Paisas to democratically and civilly protect the trajectory of amazing progress the city has made in the last two decades. Choose quiet progress over loud and bombastic stagnation. Cooperation over tomato-throwing confrontation.

Medellín Mayor Daniel Quintero (Photo courtesy Alcaldia de Medellín)

The charges stem from a two year-old investigation of evidence that Uribe had been trying to convince witnesses to retract statements they had made tying him to paramilitary groups.

Current President Ivan Duque, who owes his political existence to Uribe, quickly came to Uribe’s defense:

“It hurts as a Colombian that many of those who have lacerated the country defend themselves in freedom or, even, are guaranteed never to go to prison, and that an exemplary public servant, who has held the highest dignity of the State, is not allowed defend themselves in freedom, with the presumption of innocence.”

Other “Uribistas” as his defenders and (Uribe’s political party) Centro Democratico partisans are called were organizing this afternoon to take to the streets, despite Coronavirus COVID-19 curfew restrictions. Uribe’s base of supporters is not large nationally, but it is fervent, especially in his home turf of Medellín and the rural areas to the east of the city. The mayors of Bogotá and Medellín have within the last two hours warned that such protests are prohibited due to the Pandemic.

La privación de mi libertad me causa profunda tristeza por mi señora, por mi familia y por los colombianos que todavía creen que algo bueno he hecho por la Patria

— Álvaro Uribe Vélez (@AlvaroUribeVel) August 4, 2020

Above:  Uribe announces his detention via Twitter, saying “The privation of my liberty causes me profound sadness for my wife, for my family, and for the Colombians who still believe that I have done something good for the country.”

Colombian analyst Sergio Guzmán of Colombia Risk Analysis says this is really big: “I mean Uribe is Colombia’s most powerful person, his arrest is likely to suggest that political polarization in Colombia is going to increase substantially during the following two years. Whereas President Duque had a very significant legislative agenda to include issues like pension reform, labor reform, potentially tax reform and healthcare reform, all of it is now likely to take a back seat to a potential reform to the judicial system brought by the ruling party.”

It is certain that the judicial branch will be under intense political pressure, especially with an Uribista, President Ivan Duque occupying Casa de Nariño, Colombia’s presidential palace. “Obviously this also puts the independence of the court’s legitimacy into question, because of the political contours of the case.  However, I think it is important to remember that this case and this arrest is not something that puts into question Uribe’s role in the past 20 years in Colombia. Rather of specific events dealing with a judicial case where there is allegedly substantial evidence to back up the court’s decision, adds Guzmán.

Background

Uribe’s father was killed in 1983 by communist FARC guerrillas near Yarumál, Colombia. Uribe as president was widely hailed domestically and internationally for breaking the back of the FARC militarily, but also entering into a peace accord with anti-FARC paramilitaries. Both the FARC and the paramilitaries, or “paracos” have been responsible for a large portion of Colombia’s narcotics industry. After the paramilitaries signed their peace agreement, many simply continued as apolitical (but generally pro-Uribe) mafias to this day.

Uribe’s popularity began to decline after the candidate he supported as his successor, Juan Manuel Santos refused to act as his puppet after gaining the presidency and went his own way. Santos, who as Uribe’s defense minister was famed for directing some of the most successful actions against the FARC signed a peace agreement with the FARC, which infuriated Uribe and his Centro Democratico militants. Santos eventually received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.

The witness tampering charges stem from a 2018 investigation into allegations that Uribe through his lawyers were pressuring witnesses that had testified under oath that while governor of Antioquia, Uribe was one of the founders of the AUC’s (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or Colombian Self-Defense Force—the paramilitaries) Bloque Metro. Uribe resigned his post as senator, then immediately retracted his resignation. Uribe’s brother Santiago Uribe is awaiting judgement for forming the “12 Apostles” death squad, and for the 1994 murder of Camilo Barrientos. His trial concluded in January of this year, but the judge has yet to hand down a sentence or exoneration.

The witness tampering charges have roots that date back eight years ago, when Uribe accused a Colombian senator, Ivan Cepeda, of bribing witnesses and generally concocting a conspiracy to tie the ex-president to paramilitary-related crimes. The Supreme Court eventually dismissed Uribe’s accusations against his colleague and later began probing into whether it was in fact Uribe who has been illicitly tampering with justice through witness manipulation.

Juan Guillermo Monsalve is a former paramilitary who grew up on the Uribe family’s “Guacharacas” estate near Yarumal, Antioquia; 3 hours northeast of Medellín. He testified that Uribe’s family was allied with the paramilitaries, but now claims Uribe lawyer Diego Cadena pressured him to change his story, and make up the accusation that Uribe nemesis, Senator Iván Cepeda told him to lie. Uribe denounced Cepeda, but the court became suspicious of the story and it both absolved Cepeda and began to investigate Uribe and his lawyer Diego Cadena.

See also: Former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, 2 Sons Are Infected With Coronavirus COVID-2

Another witness, originally called by Uribe as a defense witness, Carlos Enrique Velez Ramirez also testifies that Diego Cadena made various payments to him in exchange for testimony.

Diego Cadenas, Uribe’s attorney admits to giving the money to Vélez “as a humanitarian act.” Cadena now faces his own charges, indicted last week for offering 200 million pesos (just over $53,000 USD) and legal representation to both Vélez and Monsalve if only they would change their testimonies to Uribe’s favor. Cadenas is also under house arrest.

There is a rouge’s gallery of other witnesses and relevant figures, many of them already serving prison time. The defense strategy of Uribe and Cadenas so far seems to be that the key witnesses are conspiring with Ivan Cépeda, though they can’t seem to explain their own payments, or why right-wing paramilitaries would want to conspire with Cepeda of the far-left Polo Democratico party (not to be confused with the right wing Centro Democratico). Just as problematic is that the whole scandal originated with Uribe’s allegations against Cépeda.

With the country polarized and politically divided, one thing can be certain: Uribe’s core of Uribista supporters will stand by him no matter what he is convicted of or how conclusive the evidence is against him. This case will grip the country and either outcome: guilty or not, will shock some portion of the population. Observers will be watching how President Duque handles having his patron & political godfather on trial during his presidency.

“By virtue of Colombian law, we are declaring a sanitary emergency hand in hand with the guidelines of the World Health Organization. A pandemic has been declared and that corresponds to us taking faster and faster measures,” said the president at his Unified Command Post.

The president ordered the cancellation of all public events with over 500 attendees, suspension of cruise ship traffic, and in some cases, the preventive isolation of foreigners in hotels, nursing homes, and isolation for ethnic groups consistent with their world view. The president’s office went on to clarify that this means ethnic groups will be able to apply their own norms and beliefs in compliance with the health orders, such as preventive isolation.

The national soccer tournament scheduled for this weekend has been closed to the public, though the game will be played without fans—unless events determine otherwise, he announced.

For at least 10 days, prison visits will be suspended, and no prisoners will be released, in an attempt to control the virus.

The business sector is being invited by the government to institute flexible and virtual work policies in accordance with occupational and workplace health and safety guidelines.

President Duque reiterated the call for Colombians to adopt care and prevention measures, including constant hand washing with ample soap and water.

Crime and violence cost the United States 2.75% of GDP, by contrast, while it erases just 1.34% of Germany’s GDP, according to the study. At 3.12%, Colombia comes in below the regional average.

Honduras (6.51%) and El Salvador (6.16%), both besieged by drug gang wars in recent years, are being ravaged the most by violence. The Bahamas (4.79%), Jamaica (3.99%), and Brazil (3.78%) are also well above the regional average. Mexico (1.92%), Uruguay (2.23%), Barbados (2.68%), Chile (2.77%), and Peru (2.77%) are the best performers in the study.

“Crime has reached alarming levels in many countries,” said Ana María Rodríguez, manager of the IDB’s institutions for development department. “By providing estimates of the costs of violence at the regional, sub-regional, and national levels, the study will help governments and international cooperation agencies better allocate resources, as well as design better policies to control and prevent crime.”

With just 9% of the world’s population, Latin America and the Caribbean account for almost one-third of global homicides per year, per the IDB. Troublingly, some 90% of these murders go unsolved.

For its part, Colombia has made vast progress on its murder rate in recent years. Its 2016 homicide rate of 24.4 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants was the nation’s lowest in more than four decades, falling to a level not seen since 1974, according to the government.

In all, some 12,000 people were murdered in Colombia last year, less than half as many as 2002, when at least 28,387 people were killed in the country, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. That year, its homicide rate of 68.9 per 100,000 people was more than 10 times higher than Costa Rica (6.3) and nearly twice that of Guatemala (37.0) and Venezuela (38.0).

The IDB notes that it believes its estimates are conservative and that the region could increase its infrastructure spending, for example, by at least 50% if it can get its crime levels down to developed world standards.

Among the various costs calculated are the expenditure on prisons, which reaches $6.5 billion USD per year in the region. Then there is the estimated income that prisoners are unable to make due to incarceration, which is even higher at $7.3 billion USD. Combined, this alone equals 0.39% of GDP. Colombia’s total for these two categories is 0.32%.