As Abelardo de la Espriella took the oath of office as Colombia’s president on August 7, the US Department of State announced that Washington intends to provide $1 billion USD in security assistance to his new government, capping a stunning reversal in a bilateral relationship that a year earlier had produced sanctions against a sitting Colombian president, a revoked visa, and a call from the presidential palace for American soldiers to disobey their commander-in-chief.

A US Presidential Delegation led by Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche represented the United States at de la Espriella’s August 7 inauguration in Cali, a city in Colombia’s conflict-scarred southwest that hosted the ceremony instead of the traditional venue in Bogotá. In a statement titled “A New Era in U.S.-Colombia Relations,” the State Department said the delegation “demonstrates US commitment to reinvigorating the US-Colombia relationship and deepening of our shared security and economic partnership,” and that the $1 billion package is intended “as a cornerstone of this renewed partnership.”

A delegation built around security and counternarcotics

Secretary of State Marco Rubio did not travel to Cali, but the delegation Washington sent was heavy with counternarcotics and security officials, according to ColombiaOne and Local 10 News. Alongside Blanche, the group included Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Administrator Terry Cole; US Representative Mario Diaz-Balart of Florida; Sara Carter, director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy; Hugo Guevara of the US Embassy in Bogotá; Cliff Sims, national security adviser to Vice President JD Vance; Viviana Bovo of the State Department’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs; Joseph M. Humire, deputy assistant secretary of war for Americas security affairs; and Chris Jarvis of Joint Task Force Vulcan, which targets transnational criminal organizations.

“Yesterday was the start of a new friendship and partnership working as a team in the fight against drug trafficking and furthering our relationship in countering threats to our national security and public safety,” Blanche wrote in a statement carried by Local 10 News.

Cole struck a similarly pointed tone. “DEA is ready to stand shoulder to shoulder with Colombia again,” he said in a statement cited by Local 10 News. “We will hunt down those who profit from cocaine, corruption, violence, and terror. There will be no safe haven, no protected trafficking route, and no immunity for those who poison our communities.”

The turnaround stands in sharp contrast to where the relationship stood barely 10 months earlier. On October 24, 2025, the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added outgoing President Gustavo Petro to its Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List — known in Colombia as the Lista Clinton (Clinton List), after the 1995 executive order that created it — under Executive Order 14059, which targets foreign persons involved in the global illicit drug trade. OFAC simultaneously designated Petro’s wife, Verónica Alcocer; his son, Nicolás Petro; and his interior minister, Armando Benedetti, according to a Federal Register notice of the action and Finance Colombia’s own reporting at the time. It marked the first time OFAC had designated a sitting, democratically elected head of state of a country long considered a close US ally.

The sanctions followed a September 15, 2025, presidential determination naming Colombia a “major drug transit country or major illicit drug producing country” that had “failed demonstrably” to meet its counternarcotics obligations — the first time Colombia had been placed on that list in more than 25 years.

Relations deteriorated further that same September, when Petro, addressing a pro-Palestinian rally near the United Nations General Assembly in New York, told a crowd: “I ask all the soldiers of the United States’ army, don’t point your rifles against humanity,” and urged them to “disobey the orders of Trump.” The State Department revoked his visa within hours, saying on social media that Petro had “urged US soldiers to disobey orders and incite violence,” according to CBS News. Petro dismissed the punishment, writing on social media that “international law grants me immunity to go to the UN and that there should be no reprisals for my free opinion, because I am a free person,” and noting that as a dual Colombian-European citizen he did not need a US visa, according to Al Jazeera.

Tensions eased only gradually. Petro traveled to Washington for a meeting with President Trump on February 2, 2026, in what CNN described at the time as a shift “from clash to dialogue” after a year of confrontation. Petro remained on the SDN list, and was still lobbying for his own removal from it as late as early July 2026, when he asked Trump by phone to lift the designation on him and his family — a request Trump said he would look into, according to ColombiaOne.

An election fought over the US relationship

De la Espriella, a 48-year-old lawyer and political outsider known to supporters as “El Tigre,” defeated Historic Pact candidate Iván Cepeda in a June 21 runoff, a race Trump endorsed publicly. Petro initially alleged the vote had been manipulated, a claim dismissed by international observers and Colombia’s electoral authorities before he conceded, according to Al Jazeera. The run-up to the inauguration was marked by violence, including a truck bombing near a police station in Cúcuta on August 1 that wounded eight police officers and three civilians, six days before de la Espriella took office, according to Al Jazeera. No group claimed responsibility; dissident factions of the demobilized FARC, the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the Clan del Golfo criminal group are all active in the border region. Security was tightened further ahead of the ceremony itself, held under armored vehicles, soldiers, and vehicle checkpoints in Cali, according to Al Jazeera.

At his swearing-in, de la Espriella broke with Petro’s negotiated-peace strategy toward armed groups, declaring that “the option of dialogue is completely exhausted” and pledging to “relentlessly defeat narco-terrorism.” He also committed Colombia to joining the Shield of the Americas, the US-backed regional counter-cartel coalition that grew out of a March 2026 summit hosted by the Trump administration, and pledged to strengthen state-run Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC) and pursue “responsible and sustainable fracking” to shore up the country’s oil and gas reserves.

Security package now, economic dialogue to follow

Under the State Department’s framework, the $1 billion package — which still requires action by the US Congress — is aimed at strengthening Colombia’s security forces against Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Transnational Criminal Organizations, expanding coca eradication and cocaine interdiction, freezing and prosecuting the finances behind armed groups, tightening border-security coordination, and rebuilding state presence in territory once controlled by armed groups.

The State Department said the two governments will also launch a Bilateral Prosperity Dialogue aimed at stabilizing Colombia’s economy, strengthening its energy sector, and exploring critical mineral investment, alongside efforts to connect Colombian small and medium enterprises in agribusiness, manufacturing, and tech services to US buyers and supply chains. Washington also committed to contributing to relief funds for potential El Niño-related flooding and drought, to modernizing Colombia’s digital, port, and energy infrastructure, and to advancing bilateral cooperation on civil nuclear energy.

Congressional approval of the $1 billion security package remains the first test of whether Friday’s pledges translate into disbursed assistance — and of how durable the “new era” proves once the inauguration goodwill fades.

Ecopetrol S.A. (NYSE: EC, BVC: ECOPETROL) reported first-quarter 2026 consolidated revenues of 28.6 trillion COP, a decline of 8.7% from 31.4 trillion COP in the year-earlier period, as lower crude oil prices and reduced hydrocarbon production compressed the top line for Colombia’s state-controlled oil and gas company. Against that backdrop, a marked recovery in refining margins and disciplined cost management lifted EBITDA by 1.5% to 13.5 trillion COP, yielding a 47% EBITDA margin and partially offsetting the revenue headwind. At the Q1 2026 average exchange rate of approximately 3,700 COP per USD, the quarter’s revenues translate to roughly $7.73 billion USD and EBITDA to approximately $3.65 billion USD.

Embattled Ecopetrol CEO Ricardo Roa was appointed to the position by Colombian President Gustavo Petro after managing his political campaign. (photo: Ecopetrol)

Net income for the quarter reached 2.9 trillion COP (approximately $784 million USD), down 7.7% year-over-year, reflecting the combined drag of lower revenues, a sharply elevated effective tax rate of 37.1%, and a one-time charge of 1.2 trillion COP for the impuesto al patrimonio — Colombia’s government-mandated wealth levy on large corporations established to fund post-disaster reconstruction measures. The company is also subject to a 10% income tax surcharge applicable for fiscal year 2026, which is embedded in the reported effective rate. The aggregate tax burden absorbed a disproportionate share of operating improvement relative to prior periods, limiting the flow-through of refining gains to the net income line.

Total hydrocarbon production averaged 725.2 thousand barrels of oil equivalent per day (kboed) in Q1 2026, below the 745 kboed recorded in the 2025 annual average cited by management during the March 2026 general shareholders’ meeting. Domestic crude output represented the largest component at approximately 520 thousand barrels per day (kbd). Ecopetrol’s Permian Basin operations in the United States contributed 91.8 kbd, underscoring the continued strategic importance of the international segment. Gas production continued a multi-year declining trend that poses a medium-term domestic supply challenge; management has sought to address this partially through regasification capacity additions at Puerto Bahía and on the Pacific coast, expected to come online in the second half of 2026 with a combined contribution of up to 430 billion BTU per day.

The refining segment delivered the quarter’s most pronounced operational outperformance. Ecopetrol’s domestic refineries, led by Refinería de Cartagena, processed 417.5 kbd of crude throughput. The integrated refining margin rose to $17.3 USD per barrel, a 60% improvement over the same quarter of 2025, driven by favorable differential pricing between domestic crude benchmarks and refined product values alongside ongoing operational efficiency improvements. The Comisión de Regulación de Energía y Gas (CREG) and the Ministerio de Minas y Energía remain central to the regulatory framework governing downstream margins over the medium term.

The balance sheet carries significant structural and contingent risk items of direct relevance to institutional credit and equity holders. Gross debt stood at 108.1 trillion COP (approximately $29.2 billion USD), representing a leverage ratio of 2.3 times trailing EBITDA — a level that leaves limited room for further deterioration before debt covenants or rating agency thresholds become binding. Ecopetrol holds a receivable of 4.2 trillion COP (approximately $1.14 billion USD) from the Fondo de Estabilización de Precios de los Combustibles (FEPC), a government fuel price stabilization mechanism that represents a claim on the Colombian treasury with timing and recovery risk. A dispute with the Dirección de Impuestos y Aduanas Nacionales (DIAN) over value-added tax assessments totals 12.26 trillion COP (approximately $3.31 billion USD) in aggregate, of which 10.22 trillion COP relates to Ecopetrol’s consolidated operations and 2.04 trillion COP to Refinería de Cartagena. Both cases are under administrative and judicial review; no provisions have been recognized in the financial statements pending resolution, but the potential liability represents a material contingency relative to the company’s quarterly net income.

On the corporate development front, Ecopetrol disclosed three significant transactions during or following the quarter. The company agreed to acquire producing assets from Gran Tierra Energy (NYSE: GTE, TSX: GTE) for $92.4 million USD, adding Colombian upstream production inventory in basins where both companies have operated. In Brazil, Ecopetrol launched a tender offer for shares of Brava Energia (BVMF: BRAV3) at 23 BRL per share, seeking to expand its footprint in that country’s oil and gas sector. And in a transaction that would reshape the mid-size independent landscape in Colombia, the company reached an agreement to acquire Parex Resources (TSX: PXT) for $250 million USD; Parex is a Colombia-focused producer with a complementary asset base across the Llanos and other producing basins. Collectively, the three transactions signal that Ecopetrol’s capital allocation strategy under the current government continues to favor upstream consolidation despite the elevated leverage profile.

The exploration portfolio generated positive news announcements. The Copoazú-1 exploratory well, drilled in Colombia’s Llanos foothills region, was confirmed as a commercial discovery, adding to the domestic reserve base. The Sirius offshore project advanced through the Consulta Previa process — a legally mandated prior consultation with indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities required before development of projects in or near their territories — reaching a milestone in community engagement that brings the project closer to formal development sanction. The Agencia Nacional de Hidrocarburos (ANH) oversees the licensing framework within which both projects operate.

“Ecopetrol is listed on the New York Stock Exchange; we are governed by the strict regulations of US federal agencies. Agencies like OFAC and the SEC could intervene in the company and could even accelerate the payment of financial obligations, which would be extremely grave for Ecopetrol.” — Martín Ravelo, President, Unión Sindical Obrera (USO)

The ISA transmission segment, managed through Ecopetrol’s majority stake in ISA — Interconexión Eléctrica S.A., contributed stable regulated cash flows during the quarter. ISA completed 46 transmission reinforcement works across its Latin American concession portfolio. The segment also completed the acquisition of 100% of IE Madeira in Brazil, consolidating its position in that country’s power grid interconnection infrastructure. ISA further submitted a competitive bid for the Río Bueno–Puerto Montt high-voltage transmission line concession in Chile, demonstrating the group’s appetite for long-duration, inflation-linked infrastructure assets across the Andes region. For institutional investors evaluating Ecopetrol as a blended hydrocarbons-and-infrastructure holding, ISA’s consistent cash generation provides partial diversification from crude price volatility, though it does not insulate the consolidated entity from headline governance risk.

The most consequential variable for the investment thesis over the near term is Ecopetrol’s prolonged governance crisis. At the company’s general shareholders’ meeting on March 27, 2026, held at the Corferias convention center in Bogotá, minority shareholders loudly heckled president Ricardo Roa — with audible shouts of “¡Fuera, fuera!” reverberating through the hall — as debate over his leadership erupted into open confrontation. The meeting approved a dividend of 121 COP per share for minority holders and a 4 trillion COP distribution to the Colombian government as majority shareholder, payable in two installments by June 30, 2026. Despite the financial business conducted, governance overshadowed the proceedings.

Roa faces two separate judicial proceedings. The Fiscalía General de la Nación formally charged him in connection with alleged influence peddling related to the purchase of an apartment in northern Bogotá — charges he has denied. Separately, the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) is examining whether campaign spending limits were violated during President Gustavo Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign, which Roa managed — an investigation that Finance Colombia has covered in detail. Angela Maria Robledo, Chair of the Board of Directors, defended the board’s decision to retain Roa at the March assembly, citing the constitutional presumption of innocence. However, four of the nine board members had already formally recorded their support for his removal at that point, exposing a divided governance structure at a time when strategic and operational decisions require unified leadership.

The Unión Sindical Obrera (USO), which represents approximately one-third of Ecopetrol’s workforce, issued a production strike ultimatum timed to a March 30 board meeting. Martín Ravelo, president of the USO, framed the leadership crisis explicitly in terms of US regulatory risk: “Ecopetrol is listed on the New York Stock Exchange; we are governed by the strict regulations of US federal agencies. Agencies like OFAC and the SEC could intervene in the company and could even accelerate the payment of financial obligations, which would be extremely grave for Ecopetrol.” Ravelo further warned that the company’s outstanding international debt — which he placed at approximately $30 billion USD and which is exacerbated by elevated interest rates — left Ecopetrol exposed to potential covenant triggers or early repayment demands in a scenario where the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or the Office of Foreign Assets Control were to take enforcement action.

Following sustained pressure from the USO, minority shareholders, and opposition political figures, Ecopetrol’s board approved an extended leave of absence for Roa beginning April 7, 2026. Under the arrangement, Roa used accrued vacation through May 27, followed by 30 calendar days of unpaid leave beginning May 28, extending his absence through the end of June — a period encompassing Colombia’s presidential first round on May 31 and a potential runoff on June 21. Juan Carlos Hurtado Parra, the company’s executive vice president of hydrocarbons and designated first alternate to the presidency since November 2025, was appointed acting president. Hurtado Parra holds an MBA in International Oil and Gas and brings more than 28 years of energy sector experience to the acting role, having previously served as vice president of exploration, development, and production.

The political calendar creates a structural transition risk that sits above the operational and financial results as the primary concern for long-duration investors. Colombia’s incoming government, to be inaugurated August 7, 2026, is widely expected to appoint a new Ecopetrol board and select a new company president. That transition may bring material shifts in strategic priorities — including the pace of upstream investment, the approach to the FEPC receivable recovery, the trajectory of energy transition spending, and the capital allocation balance between the hydrocarbons segment and the ISA infrastructure platform. The Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público and the Ministerio de Minas y Energía will both play key roles in establishing the post-election policy framework under which Ecopetrol operates. Institutional investors holding exposure to Ecopetrol via NYSE: EC or BVC: ECOPETROL must weigh Q1’s genuine operational improvement — most visibly in refining margins and EBITDA stability — against a governance and policy transition risk profile that is unlikely to be resolved before the August handover.

Ecopetrol’s Cartagena refinery (photo courtesy Ecopetrol)

The Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC, BVC: ECOPETROL) General Shareholders’ Meeting concluded at the Corferias convention center in Bogotá, marked by a decline in annual profits and an intensifying debate regarding the continuity of the company’s president, Ricardo Roa. During the assembly, shareholders approved a dividend of $121 COP per share for minority holders and a total payment of $4 trillion COP to the Colombian government, which serves as the majority shareholder. The government’s payout is scheduled for distribution in two installments, to be completed by June 30, 2026.

Click on above image to view shareholder meeting

The financial results for the 2025 fiscal year revealed a significant contraction in net income, which fell to $9 trillion COP from the $14.9 trillion COP reported in 2024. Roa attributed this decline primarily to the volatility of international crude prices. He noted that the average price of Brent crude dropped from $80 USD per barrel to $68 USD per barrel over the period. According to company data, every $1 USD drop in the price of Brent corresponds to a reduction of approximately $500 billion COP in net profit and $700 billion COP in EBITDA. Despite the lower earnings, the company maintained a production level of 745,000 barrels per day and achieved a reserve replacement rate of 121%, the highest in five years.

Governance issues remained the primary focus of the assembly. Minority shareholders expressed concern over the legal challenges facing Roa, who is currently under investigation by the Fiscalía General de la Nación for alleged influence peddling. Additionally, the Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) has raised accusations regarding the alleged violation of spending caps during the presidential campaign of Gustavo Petro, which Roa managed. Angela Maria Robledo, Chair of the Board of Directors, defended the decision to retain Roa, stating that the board has activated a evaluation protocol while respecting the constitutional principle of the presumption of innocence.

Shareholders Erupt In Anger At CEO Ricardo Roa:

🚨Abuchean a Ricardo Roa en asamblea de Ecopetrol

“¡Fuera, fuera!”: Este es el momento del tenso abucheo de los accionistas al presidente de la empresa 🔽

Videos: Néstor Gómez pic.twitter.com/uyjh4chpl2

— EL TIEMPO (@ELTIEMPO) March 27, 2026

“Ecopetrol is listed on the New York Stock Exchange; we are governed by the strict regulations of US federal agencies. Agencies like OFAC and the SEC could intervene in the company and could even accelerate the payment of financial obligations, which would be extremely grave for Ecopetrol,” stated Martín Ravelo, President of the USO.

The Unión Sindical Obrera (USO), the primary labor union representing nearly one-third of the company’s workforce, has issued an ultimatum for Roa’s removal. Martin Ravelo, president of the USO, warned that the union will initiate a national strike and affect crude production if Roa is not aparted from his position by Monday, March 30. Ravelo expressed concern that Ecopetrol, which is subject to the regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), could face federal intervention. He highlighted that Ecopetrol’s current debt has reached $30 billion USD, exacerbated by rising interest rates, and warned that the company lacks the cash flow to respond to potential demands for early repayment of international obligations.

President Gustavo Petro responded to the union’s concerns via social media, stating that the executive branch will take measures to shield the company’s financial future. Petro emphasized the importance of maintaining investment during periods of high oil prices to prepare for future market downturns. He also criticized past administrations for failing to invest sufficiently in clean energy during previous price cycles. In contrast, Ravelo called for the board to maintain its independence from political influence, noting that four of the nine board members have already left formal records supporting Roa’s departure.

Ecopetrol also addressed the national gas supply, with Roa announcing that new regasification alternatives at Puerto Bahía and on the Pacific coast are expected to begin operations in the second half of 2026. These projects are intended to contribute between 186 and 430 Gbtud to the national grid. A third regasification facility in Coveñas is projected to start operations in 2029 with a capacity of 400 Gbtud. Despite these operational plans, the immediate focus of the international investment community remains fixed on the board’s upcoming meeting on Monday, where the leadership deadlock must be resolved to avoid a potential halt in national production.

Headline photo: Former Senator Jorge Robledo admonishes the Ecopetrol board of directors at the March 2026 shareholders’ meeting.

The shareholder meeting, chaired by Colombia’s Minister of Finance and Public Credit, Germán Ávila, approved amendments to the company’s bylaws. Notably, the proposal submitted by the company’s majority shareholder, the Colombian government, which owns 88.49% of shares, was approved with 91.14% of the vote. An alternative proposal from Ecopetrol management received only 0.03% support, with 4.6% voting for neither proposal and 4.2% abstaining.

Separately, the Board of Directors appointed new leadership for two key executive positions, effective November 16.

Juan Carlos Hurtado Parra was named Executive Vice President of Hydrocarbons. Mr. Hurtado, who has been with Ecopetrol for approximately 23 of his 25 years in the energy sector, previously served as Vice President of Exploration, Development, and Production. He holds an Electrical Engineering degree from Universidad Industrial de Santander, a specialization from Universidad del Rosario, and an MBA from the University of Dundee. He replaces Rafael Ernesto Guzmán Ayala.

Rodolfo Mario García Paredes was appointed as the permanent Chief Compliance Officer. Mr. García, an attorney from Universidad del Rosario with a specialization from Universidad de los Andes, has been with the company for over 25 years and had been serving as the acting compliance head since June 2025.

The confirmation of a permanent Chief Compliance Officer occurs during a period of heightened legal and political scrutiny for the company. The appointment follows reporting by El Tiempo that senior compliance officials from Ecopetrol visited the United States Embassy in Bogotá this week. That visit was noted for its timing, coming after the United States Treasury Department imposed OFAC sanctions on President Gustavo Petro along with his wife, son, and interior minister, as reported here by Finance Colombia. The company is also managing the fallout from a contracting scandal at its affiliate Ocensa, also revealed this week by El Tiempo, which led to the resignation of Ocensa’s president.

Ecopetrol S.A. is the largest company in Colombia and is responsible for over 60% of the nation’s hydrocarbon production, in addition to managing transportation, logistics, and refining systems. Following its acquisition of 51.4% of Interconexión Eléctrica S.A. (ISA) (BVC: ISA), the company expanded into energy transmission, management of real-time systems through XM, and road concessions. Ecopetrol also maintains exploration and drilling operations in the United States (Permian basin and Gulf of Mexico) and Brazil. Through ISA, it holds positions in power transmission in Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia.

Above photo: Ecopetrol’s Reficar petroleum refinery in Cartagena. (photo courtesy Ecopetrol)

Banking Sector Statement on the Update of the OFAC Designated Parties List

Bogotá, D.C., October 24, 2025 (@Asobancaria). The Colombian financial system has been a global benchmark in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing for more than three decades. In fact, Colombia was the first country in the Americas to have an anti-money laundering system, following the 1992 Interbank Agreement for the Detection, Prevention, and Suppression of Illicit Capital Movements.

Since then, the country has maintained strict compliance with standards in this area, with collaboration and communication with both U.S. authorities and correspondent banks being essential.

In light of the recent decision by the United States government to include the President of the Republic, members of his family, and the Minister of the Interior on the OFAC list, the sector reiterates its commitment to compliance with international standards. At the same time, it will continue to act in accordance with financial consumer rights, local regulations, and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court.

The Colombian financial system will begin working in coordination with national and international authorities to preserve its stability and integrity, as well as the trust of its citizens.

In other words, the banks, through their trade organization, as not to expose any individual bank, have stated that they intend to comply with sanctions, subject to “financial consumer rights, local regulations, and the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court.”

Analysis

It is hard to imagine a local bank freezing President Gustavo Petro’s personal accounts during the remaining 10 months of his presidency. The President directly controls Colombia’s financial regulation agency, Superfinanciera, and also influences, Banco De La República, the country’s central bank. Once the president leaves office, unless replaced by an ally (somewhat unlikely), there is no love lost between the current leftist president and the financial sector. Aside from this, the local banks would have more to lose being cut off from the international financial system than from facing the ire of Petro’s remaining supporters, post-presidency. The banking sector and its shareholders have faced constant attacks from Petro during his presidency, with him calling them “oligarchs” and “controllers of capital.”

Should a Petro ally actually win next year’s presidential election, all bets are off, as the banks will face pressure to be sympathetic to Petro at the cost of losing access to the international financial system in an environment of accelerating capital flight and diminishing foreign direct investment (FDI).

In the short term, expect local banks to play a waiting game, It is not immediately apparent that Petro or his family has any great wealth to lose abroad, though the designation may seriously retard his apparent ambitions of being some sort of international revolutionary statesman on the global stage post-presidency, with travel and financial restrictions in OFAC compliant jurisdictions, almost everywhere except bastions of liberty such as Iran, Russia, North Korea, Cuba, and Nicaragua.

The designations signal a formal determination by the US Treasury Department that these individuals have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the global illicit drug trade. The action was announced in a Treasury press release detailing the sanctions against the President and his support network, and comes as an escalation in the public spat between Petro and US President Donald Trump.

The Scope of the Designations

Petro with his wife, Veronica Alcocer in Venezuela (Photo: Alexa Rochi, Presidency of Colombia)

The individuals added to the SDN List include:

• PETRO URREGO, Gustavo Francisco (DOB 19 Apr 1960), President of Colombia, designated under the counternarcotics authority of Executive Order 14059.
• ALCOCER GARCIA, Verónica del Socorro (DOB 26 May 1976), President Petro’s wife, designated as linked to Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego.
• PETRO BURGOS, Nicolás Fernando (DOB 21 Jun 1986), President Petro’s son, designated as linked to Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego.
• BENEDETTI VILLANEDA, Armando Alberto (DOB 29 Aug 1967), a former diplomat and high-ranking Colombian official, designated as linked to Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego.

The designations effectively place the individuals in a restrictive financial status typically reserved for terrorists, international criminals, and officials of sanctioned regimes.

The President’s son, Nicolás Petro is already on trial in Colombia by Colombian prosecutors for corruption and dealings with narcotraffickers. Even with his father as president, he has been able to avoid arrest and detention, with his jilted wife, Daysuris Vasquez, serving as a key witness against him.

Petro’s Interior Minister and primary political consigliere, Armando Benedetti has also been sanctioned. Petro’s own former Foreign Minister, Alvaro Leyva has publicly accused the president of being a cocaine addict, while Benedetti has openly admitted that he is a recovering cocaine and alcohol addict.

Immediate Financial and Legal Implications

The designation to the SDN List carries defined and severe consequences under US law, primarily centered on financial blocking:

The sanctions imposed on Petro, his family, & Benedetti are commonly known as being added to “the Clinton List.”

1. Asset Blocking: All property and interests in property of the four designated individuals that are within US jurisdiction, or that come within the possession or control of any US person, are immediately blocked (frozen). This requires US financial institutions and entities to report the blockage of funds, real estate, securities, or other assets to OFAC.
2. Transaction Prohibition: US persons—a category that includes US citizens and permanent residents, entities organized under US laws (and their foreign branches), and any person located within the United States—are prohibited from engaging in any transaction or dealing with the designated individuals. This prohibition extends to making or receiving any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services to or for the benefit of an SDN.
3. The 50 Percent Rule: Any entity owned, directly or indirectly, 50% or more by one or more of the designated individuals is also considered blocked, regardless of whether that entity is explicitly named on the SDN List.

Furthermore, the names are integrated into global compliance screening databases used by most international banks and financial institutions. This development is expected to isolate the designated individuals from the global financial system, making routine actions such as international wire transfers, opening bank accounts, and using credit services highly problematic or impossible.

Impact on Petro’s Future

The SDN designations carry different risks based on the current and future governmental status of the designated officials.

Current Term (Until August 2026)

President Gustavo Petro posing for a photo with his son Nicolás Petro. (Credit: Presidencia de la Republica)

While President Petro holds his position, official governmental dealings between the US and Colombia may continue, potentially protected by principles of sovereign immunity. However, the designation is applied to him as an individual for illicit activities, not in his capacity as head of state.

• Official Duties: US government agencies and diplomats are restricted from conducting personal or financial transactions with the President, which complicates interactions beyond the necessary official capacity.
• Personal Finances: Any personal US-based assets the four individuals may have are blocked. Their personal finances and travel outside of Colombia become subject to severe scrutiny, as non-US financial institutions that engage in transactions with him risk being targeted by secondary sanctions.
• Previous Visa Status: This financial sanction follows a previous action where President Petro’s US visa was revoked earlier this year after he called on the US military to rebel while participating in a pro-Palestine protest in New York. The SDN designation solidifies his inability to travel to the United States and extends the US financial prohibition globally.
• Petro’s wife, son, and Armando Alberto Benedetti face the full immediate weight of the financial sanctions, including total blocking of any US assets and prohibition of transactions with US persons.

Post Presidency

When President Petro’s term ends in August 2026, he and his family will lose any residual protections or considerations afforded by his presidential office.

• Total Isolation: The post-term status is expected to result in complete global financial isolation for all four individuals. Without the shield of public office, any attempt to conduct legitimate business, investment, or banking internationally would be flagged and rejected by compliance systems worldwide due to the fear of secondary sanctions against foreign entities.
• Legal Exposure: The designations are intended to prevent the designated individuals from utilizing the international financial system. Any attempt by the sanctioned persons to circumvent these restrictions after leaving office could result in further investigations and potential criminal charges by US authorities.

Update: Dueling official statements

Friday afternoon, the Colombian & US governments issued the following diplomatic statements (Colombian statement translated to English by Finance Colombia):

US Department of State

U.S. Decision Not to Certify Colombia’s Counternarcotics Efforts and Sanctions Actions Against Colombian Officials Involved in Global Illicit Drug Trade

Due to President Gustavo Petro’s disastrous and ineffective counternarcotics policies, Secretary of State Marco Rubio will not certify Colombia under the criteria of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024, as carried forward by the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2025.  President Trump made it clear in his September 15 determination [on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2026] that Colombia is “failing demonstrably” to uphold its drug control responsibilities.  Petro has since doubled down in defense of his failed policies.

The United States will not turn a blind eye to Petro’s appeasement and emboldening of narco-terrorists.  We are committed to bringing terrorists and drug traffickers to justice and preventing deadly illegal drugs from entering our country.  There must be no impunity for drug traffickers or acts of terrorism or violence by criminal armed groups.

We remain steadfast in our support for Colombian security forces, its justice sector, and departmental and municipal officials, and we will continue to partner with them in our joint efforts to combat drug trafficking.  Today’s decision is not a reflection on these institutions but rather the failures and incompetence of Gustavo Petro and his inner circle.

In addition to today’s announcement of the decision not to certify Colombia, the United States, through the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), is sanctioning four Colombian nationals, including President Gustavo Petro, Petro’s wife Veronica, his son Nicolás, and Minister of Interior Armando Benedetti for their involvement in the global illicit drug trade.  Narcotics trafficking and narcoterrorism continues to fuel violence, corruption, and instability in Colombia, while also posing significant challenges to regional and international security.

Today’s announcement concerns a decision not to certify Colombia for certain FY2025 assistance under section 7045(c)(3)(A) of the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2024 (Div. F, P.L. 118-47), as carried forward by the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act, 2025 (Div. A, P.L. 119-4).  Today’s designation actions were taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059, which targets the international proliferation of illicit drugs and their means of production.  For more information about today’s designations, please see Treasury’s press release.

Colombia Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cancillería)

The Colombian Foreign Ministry once again rejects the unfriendly actions of the United States.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expresses its strong rejection of the inclusion of the President of the Republic of Colombia, Gustavo Petro Urrego, his family, and the Minister of the Interior, Armando Benedetti, on the List of Specially Designated Nationals, updated today by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury. This decision is completely unfounded and constitutes an affront to the President of Colombia, the highest administrative authority and Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and to the entire Colombian people. 

The Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also condemns the offensive and outrageous statements made by Scott Bessent, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, against the Colombian President, which also constitute an insult to someone who has maintained a frontal and tireless fight against drug trafficking for more than three decades, and who has achieved during his administration the largest seizures of illicit drugs in recent history, thanks to a policy defined by him and under his orders as Commander-in-Chief of the Public Force, aimed at comprehensively combating the scourge of drugs.

The OFAC decision and the insulting treatment the President has received in recent days violate not only his honor, but also the memory of the thousands of Colombians who have sacrificed their lives in the fight against drug trafficking.

These hostile acts, which not only insult but also disregard the fight against drug trafficking waged by President Gustavo Petro Urrego, the Armed Forces, and Colombian society, do nothing to normalize diplomatic relations between the two countries.

For Colombia, the strategic relationship with the United States is governed by a vision of the State, independent of the current political cycles of each country, and is based on the close economic, social, and cultural ties built over more than two centuries of collaborative work. The Colombian people expect the United States government to value and respect its relationship with Colombia in the same way other nations do with our country. 

Headline image: Colombian President Gustavo Petro (left) with Interior Minister Armando Benedetti (photo: Presidency of Colombia)

Gutiérrez’s communication highlights a public event held on June 21, 2025, in Medellín titled “A Pact for the Urban Peace of Medellín,” which was promoted by the Presidency of the Republic of Colombia. During the event, nine individuals identified as leaders of criminal organizations were brought onto a stage and presented as “peace spokespersons.”

The mayor’s letter notes that these individuals have firm convictions for various crimes, including homicide, narcotics trafficking, forced disappearance, and extortion. Among those present were Juan Carlos Mesa Vallejo, alias “Tom,” and Freyner Alfonso Ramírez García, alias “Pesebré,” both of whom are on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List maintained by the US Department of the Treasury‘s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

Mi carta al FBI, DEA, Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos 🇺🇸 y Embajada 🇺🇸 sobre el “Tarimazo” de Petro en Medellín con los peores criminales. Algunos de ellos en el radar de los Estados Unidos por tráfico de drogas. Son 7 páginas. Adjunto 4. pic.twitter.com/K0ToeAFh6r

— Fico Gutiérrez (@FicoGutierrez) September 25, 2025

The letter also states that the release of these individuals from the Itagüí prison was not authorized by a judge. It further alleges that the release was requested by Senator Isabel Cristina Zuleta López of the Pacto Histórico political coalition. Senator Zuleta defended her actions in a statement to W Radio, asserting that it was “inexplicable” not to include the leaders of the criminal structures in a public dialogue about urban peace, as they had been recognized by the president for such talks.

Criminal Structures and Transnational Ties

The letter details the history of criminal organizations in Medellín, from the Medellín Cartel of the 1980s to modern-day groups. It names several prominent organized crime groups (G.D.O.s), including “El Mesa,” “Los Chatas,” “Pachelly,” and “La Terraza,” stating that they continue to operate international narcotics trafficking networks.
Gutiérrez’s letter alleges that these Colombian criminal structures have alliances with international organizations such as the Tren de Aragua, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, the Sinaloa Cartel (OTCMKTS: SRBAL), and the Albanian Mafia, among others.

Information Leak at the Attorney General’s Office

In his letter, Gutiérrez also raised concerns about alleged irregularities within the Colombian Attorney General’s Office. He claims that an investigation into Juan Pablo Taborda Samora, alias “Yordi,” and Daniel Muñoz Olaya, the son of criminal leader José Leonardo Muñoz Martínez, alias “Douglas,” was compromised. According to the letter, information regarding an impending arrest operation against Daniel Muñoz was allegedly leaked, preventing his capture. This alleged leak informed “Douglas” of the ongoing investigation against his son, allowing them to evade authorities.

Click on images to enlarge and view originals:

Letter from Mayor Federico Gutierrez to the US Government

The mayor states that there are 7 total pages, but he published only these four above, which appear to be redacted.

Page 1

Seal of the Mayor’s Office of Medellín

Mayor’s Office of Medellín District of Science, Technology, and Innovation

Medellín, July 02, 2025.

Respected

United States Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), US Embassy Bogotá.

Subject: Submission of relevant information regarding the critical security situation and transnational criminality in Medellín, Colombia.

I, Federico Gutiérrez Zuluaga, in my capacity as Mayor of the Special District of Science, Technology, and Innovation of Medellín, identified with NIT 890.905.211-1, respectfully address you to express profound institutional concern over recent events that, stemming from the national policy of the current Colombian Government, are allegedly favoring, directly and indirectly, criminal structures that have historically affected the security of both our city and that of its international allies, among them, the United States of America.

As is widely known by the international community, Medellín has a complex history linked to organized crime. Indeed, from the 1980s, when the Medellín Cartel dominated the global drug trade, to the present day, the city has been a strategic hub for transnational criminal activities. The criminal structures that mutated from a centralized model to fragmented yet interconnected networks, such as the self-styled “Oficina de Envigado” and the current Organized Crime Groups (hereinafter G.D.O.) and Organized Common Crime Groups (hereinafter G.D.C.O.), maintain a very high criminal capacity with international reach.

Today, the 10 G.D.O.s present in Medellín and the Aburrá Valley—among them “El Mesa,” “Los Chatas,” “Pachelly,” “La Terraza,” “Robledo,” and “La Sierra”—and G.D.C.O.s such as “San Pablo” and “La Oficina del Doce,” continue to operate international narcotics trafficking networks with destinations primarily in North America and Europe. These structures maintain active alliances with cartels such as the “Tren de Aragua”, “CJNG”, “Sinaloa Cartel”, “Albanian Mafia”, “Choneros”, “Lobos”, “Cartel de los Soles”, “Maras Salvatruchas”, “Ndrangheta”, “Camorra”, among others, which demonstrates the internationalization of their criminal activities.

Despite this grave and evident reality, the current National Government of Colombia, led by President Gustavo Petro Urrego, has promoted a policy that, under the discourse of “Total Peace,” has publicly legitimized criminal leaders with serious judicial records, many of whom are apparently still active in drug trafficking, exploitation of minors and adolescents, arms trafficking, human trafficking, and other illegal revenues of transnational interest.

Thus, on this past June 21, 2025, during the public event called “A Pact for the Urban Peace of Medellín,” which was promoted by the Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, nine (09) of the top leaders of these structures¹, among them individuals included on the OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) List such as Juan Carlos Mesa Vallejo (alias “Tom”) and Freyner Alfonso Ramírez García (alias “Pesebré”), were displayed on stage as “peace spokespersons,” despite having firm convictions for atrocious crimes (such as homicide, narcotics trafficking, use of minors for the commission of crimes, forced disappearance, extortionate kidnapping, extortion, and criminal conspiracy, among other crimes of extreme gravity) and even though, apparently, they continue to control their criminal structures from the penitentiary center where they are imprisoned (particularly, in the Itagüí prison – Antioquia). This event was also attended by the Minister of Justice and Law (Eduardo Montealegre Lynett), the Minister of the Interior (Armando Alberto Benedetti Villaneda), the Minister of National Education (José Daniel Rojas Medellín), the Minister of Labor (Antonio Sanguino Páez), the Minister of Mines and Energy (Edwin Palma Egea), the Minister of Cultures, Arts and Knowledge of Colombia (Yannai Kadamani Fonrodona), Senators of the Republic Isabel Cristina Zuleta López and León Fredy Muñoz Lopera, Representatives to the Chamber for Antioquia Alex Xavier Flórez Hernández and Pedro Baracutao García Ospina, the Representative to the Chamber for Valle del Cauca Alfredo Mondragón Garzón, and the former mayor of Medellín, now charged by the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation for alleged acts of corruption, Daniel Quintero Calle, among others.

Now, this public act signified a grave institutional violation. This, since it was an act of re-victimization for the people affected by these criminal groups, who have seen their victimizers legitimized in a political setting, without authorization from a Judge of the Republic to leave their place of imprisonment, even though they all currently have a final conviction (and it is being served). Likewise, the departure from the prison was supported by a request from the Historic Pact senator, Isabel Zuleta Cristina Zuleta López.

The foregoing raises serious questions about the separation of powers, due process, and the principle of equality before the law, given that, under the current legal framework, there is no legal basis for reaching an agreement with criminal structures, which does not amount to a submission to justice.

Furthermore, the foregoing occurred in a complex context, not only local but also national. This is because there have apparently been undue leaks of sensitive information and possible undue pressure in high-impact processes, namely:

In events surrounding recent procedural actions carried out by the Attorney General’s Office in the country against members of the G.D.O. “La Terraza,” among them Mr. Juan Pablo Taborda Samora, known in criminal jargon as “Yordi” (the top leader and boss of hitmen for said organization), and against Daniel Muñoz Olaya, son of José Leonardo Muñoz Martínez (alias “Douglas”), arrest warrants were issued against them for different crimes which they apparently took part in to integrate said criminal organization, who, according to the Prosecutor’s Office, are involved in money laundering and illicit enrichment. However, despite details of this operation having been filtered by irregular third parties, which could have jeopardized the success of all the captures (apparently alerting the targets before the proceedings began), and compromising the security of the Judicial Police investigators and the designated prosecutor’s office itself.

Indeed, as was evidenced in an extraordinary security meeting held in the District of Medellín this past June 17, 2025 (which included the participation of the Unit Against Organized Crime of the Attorney General’s Office, the National Police, the National Army of Colombia, the Colombian Air Force, and representatives of state intelligence agencies) and in a meeting on June 19, 2025 aimed at conducting a presentation of the balance of operational results by the National Police, it was established that there was a leak of information hours before the operation, since alias “Douglas” had been informed of a respective investigative process against his son and that his capture would be imminent.

As a result of this situation, not only would the capture of Daniel Muñoz Olaya have been prevented (by evading the action of the public force at the time of the execution of the search with (Additional text appears to be missing beyond this point. The mayor states that there are 7 total pages, but he is making public these four, redacted. -Ed.)

FOOTNOTES:

1: In effect, these are José Leonardo Muñoz Martínez (alias Douglas), Juan Carlos Mesa Vallejo (alias Tom), Jorge de Jesús Vallejo Alarcón (alias Vallejo), Juan Camilo Rendón Castro (alias el Saya), Albert Henao Acevedo (alias Albert), Juan Fernando Álvarez (alias Juan XXIII), Walter Román Jiménez (alias el Tigre), Freyner Ramírez García (alias Pesebré), and Dayron Alberto Muñoz Torres (alias El Indio).
Footnote 2 appears to be redacted.

3: Copy of the official letter of transfer for the competence of relevant information filed on June 25, 2025, before the Attorney General’s Office by the Secretary of Security of the District of Science, Technology, and Innovation of Medellín.

4: Copy of the official letter of transfer of relevant information for the pertinent purposes and request for urgent and necessary protection measures filed on June 25, 2025, before the Attorney General’s Office.

5: Copy of a news article published on June 26, 2025, by Revista Semana.

6: World Drug Report 2025 by UNODC: Global instability aggravates the social, economic, and security impact of the global drug phenomenon, published on June 26, 2025, by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

7: Copy of the publication made on July 1, 2025, on the social network “X” by Caracol Radio.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Federico Andrés Gutiérrez Zuluaga, Mayor of Medellín.

Following a 2016 Peace Accord with the Colombian government, the FARC formally dissolved and disarmed. It no longer exists as a unified organization that engages in terrorism or terrorist activity or has the capability or intent to do so.

The decision to revoke the designation does not change the posture with regards to any charges or potential charges in the United States against former leaders of the FARC, including for narcotrafficking, nor does it remove the stain of the decision by Colombia’s Special Jurisdiction of Peace, which found their actions to be crimes against humanity. However, it will facilitate the ability of the United States to better support implementation of the 2016 accord, including by working with demobilized combatants.

This message has been reprinted in its entirety as issued by the US State Department

The designation of FARC-EP and Segunda Marquetalia is directed at those who refused to demobilize and those who are engaged in terrorist activity. In August 2019, former FARC commanders, including Luciano Marin Arango, alias Ivan Marquez, created Segunda Marquetalia after abandoning the 2016 Peace Accord. Since then, Segunda Marquetalia has engaged in terrorist activity and is responsible for the killings of former FARC members and community leaders. Segunda Marquetalia has also engaged in mass destruction, assassination, hostage-taking, including the kidnapping and holding for ransom of government employees. Segunda Marquetalia is also responsible for the attempted killings of political leaders.

• Luciano Marin Arango, alias Ivan Marquez, is the founder and overall leader of Segunda Marquetalia.
• Hernan Dario Velasquez Saldarriaga, alias El Paisa, is a senior commander in Segunda Marquetalia and serves as the group’s military commander.
• Henry Castellanos Garzon, alias Romana, is a senior leader in Segunda Marquetalia with military operations responsibilities.

Using the moniker of the former FARC and led by Nestor Gregorio Vera Fernandez, alias Ivan Mordisco, and Miguel Santanilla Botache, alias Gentil Duarte, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) is responsible for the vast majority of the armed attacks attributed to FARC dissident elements since 2019. FARC-EP has also been responsible for the killing of political candidates and former FARC members, and the kidnapping of a political operative.

• Nestor Gregorio Vera Fernandez, alias Ivan Mordisco, is the commander and overall leader of FARC-EP.
• Miguel Santanilla Botache, alias Gentil Duarte, is a commander in FARC-EP and deputy to Nestor Gregorio Vera Fernandez.
• Euclides Espana Caicedo, alias Jhon Fredey Henao Munoz, alias Jhonier, is the most senior commander of multiple units of the FARC-EP organization in important territorial areas.

As a result of our actions today, among other consequences, all property and interests in property of these groups and individuals must be blocked and reported to the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the persons designated today may themselves be exposed to designation. Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant financial transaction or provides significant financial services for the persons designated today could be subject to U.S. correspondent account or payable-through account sanctions. Additionally, it is a crime to knowingly provide material support or resources to Segunda Marquetalia and FARC-EP, or to attempt or conspire to do so.

“Today’s designation targets members of Los Urabeños who have endeavored to expand the violent drug trafficking organization’s international influence,” said OFAC Acting Director John E. Smith.  “Treasury will continue to aggressively expose and disrupt the global financial and distribution networks of Los Urabeños and its illicit supporters.”

Los Urabeños has recently endeavored to extend its drug trafficking and money laundering operations to Europe.  

On May 31, 2013, President Obama identified Los Urabeños (also known as Clan Usuga) as a Significant Foreign Narcotics Trafficker pursuant to the Kingpin Act.  Los Urabeños is currently the largest BACRIM (banda criminal or criminal group) operating in Colombia.  It is organized as a network of smaller, loosely affiliated groups engaged in cocaine and arms trafficking, money laundering, extortion, and drug debt collection.  Numerous members of the group utilize go-fast vessel operations to move drug loads between Colombia’s Caribbean coast and various locations throughout Central America and Mexico. Additionally, Los Urabeños has recently endeavored to extend its drug trafficking and money laundering operations to Europe.

The individuals designated today include Victor Alfonso Mosquera Perez (a.k.a. “Negro Mosquera”), who is involved in controlling narcotics trafficking operations for Los Urabeños from Colombia to Europe.  Also included in the designation is Alveiro Feo Alvarado (a.k.a “Benavides”), a financial chief for Los Urabeños who was involved in forging alliances with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and rival Colombian drug trafficking organization Los Rastrojos.  Feo Alvarado was also involved in narcotics trafficking in Colombia on behalf of Los Urabeños.  Mosquera Perez and Feo Alvarado were indicted by the US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida on narcotics-related charges in May and September 2014, respectively.

Also designated today are two Colombian companies controlled by Mosquera Perez: De Expomineria S.A.S. is a mining company based in Medellin, Colombia, and Joyeria MVK is a jewelry business based in the Urabá region in Northern Colombia.

Since June 2000, more than 1,800 individuals and entities have been named pursuant to the Kingpin Act for their role in international narcotics trafficking.  Penalties for violations of the Kingpin Act range from civil penalties of up to $1.075 million per violation to more severe criminal penalties.  Criminal penalties for corporate officers may include up to 30 years in prison and fines up to $5 million.  Criminal fines for corporations may reach $10 million.  Other individuals could face up to 10 years in prison and fines pursuant to Title 18 of the United States Code for criminal violations of the Kingpin Act.

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List: FEO ALVARADO, Alveiro (a.k.a. “BENAVIDES”), Colombia; DOB 16 Jun 1967; POB El Paso, Cesar, Colombia; citizen Colombia; Cedula No. 77162067 (Colombia) (individual) [SDNTK] (Linked To: LOS URABENOS). MOSQUERA PEREZ, Victor Alfonso (a.k.a. “NEGRO MOSQUERA”), Colombia; DOB 14 Sep 1984; POB Turbo, Antioquia, Colombia; citizen Colombia; Cedula No. 8358401 (individual) [SDNTK] (Linked To: LOS URABENOS). The following entities have been added to OFAC’s SDN List: DE EXPOMINERIA S.A.S. (a.k.a. DE EXPOMINERIA S.A.), Calle 40, 81 a 15, Medellin, Colombia; NIT # 900328871-2 (Colombia) [SDNTK]. JOYERIA MVK, Calle 100 # 10-29, Turbo, Antioquia, Colombia; NIT # 8358401-7 (Colombia) [SDNTK].