Before we start, I will caveat this short note with my belief that neither run-off candidate on June 21 will prove a solution to Colombia’s issues. The talk of the cafes and bars is that these are the weakest second-round choices in recent memory, and we’ve had some poor ones. Their failings are numerous and are perhaps highlighted by the zealots on both sides of this uber-polarized situation, competing ever harder to throw mud at the other side. Some of the TV advertising is frankly nauseating.

This is more a quick chat about where Donald Trump’s own personal moral compass lies. We already saw with the pardon he granted to convicted former Honduran President Hernández, who was serving 45 years for drug and weapons offenses, that he is more than capable of looking past his own self-proclaimed values on drugs if the offender shares the same political persuasion.

Abelardo will, of course, be delighted that his hero and role model has backed him. He appears to share a scary number of his values and numerous other positions, including withdrawal from institutions such as the United Nations. However, others wonder if it might prove as much of a hindrance as a help, but that remains to be seen on June 21.

The irony (carried over from Hernández) lies in Trump’s support of Abelardo, a week after the extradition to the US of Alex Saab, a mega drug lord allied to Nicolás Maduro, to finally meet his judgment day. Saab is a very inconvenient truth for Abelardo, as he was the man who mounted a vociferous defense of one of Colombia’s most notorious criminals – and Saab is far from the only drug lord he has defended. Of course, there is the argument that everyone deserves a just defense, especially if they have bottomless riches; again, that is a decision for one’s personal conscience.

Finally, last week, we had Washington’s War Ministry announce the sinking of yet another speedboat allegedly laden with drugs, although as yet there has been no proof despite 60-plus such attacks at the cost of more than 200 lives. Again, we are reminded of Washington’s incoherent attitude toward drug cartels – an attitude heavily dependent on one’s political beliefs.

God Bless The Donald.

]]> https://www.financecolombia.com/heres-what-scares-me-what-i-like-about-colombias-two-presidential-candidates/ Tue, 16 Jun 2026 03:03:50 +0000 https://www.financecolombia.com/?p=37589 What a De la Espriella or Cepeda win means for security and investment

Two men. Both running to be the next president of Colombia. Both swear they are tough, that they are clean, that they are the answer to a country that is exhausted. And both of them have a problem with the company they keep.

One is a defense lawyer who built his career representing mobsters, paramilitaries, and at least one alleged front man for the Maduro regime — and he tells you those relationships were strictly professional. The other fought to spring a FARC commander out of a maximum-security holding cell — and he tells you that relationship was strictly professional too. One says, in effect, “I only knew the narco because I was his attorney.” The other says, “I only knew the guerrilla because I was a peace negotiator.” Same sentence, opposite ends of the political spectrum. It is the strangest mirror in Colombian politics.

This Sunday, June 21, Colombians return to the polls for the runoff. In the first round on May 31, the right’s Abelardo de la Espriella came first with about 43.7 percent. The left’s Iván Cepeda came second with about 40.9 percent. No one else is left. Whoever wins walks into the Casa de Nariño on August 7.

What follows is an analysis, not an endorsement. I am pro-business, anti-crime, and anti-communist, and I am not Colombian, so I will not presume to tell Colombians how to vote. What I can do is lay out who these two men are, where they came from, and the honest pros and cons of each — because both carry serious problems, and readers with capital, operations, or ties in Colombia deserve them laid out straight. Much of the biographical reporting here draws on the long-form profiles published by La Silla Vacía, among the best political journalism in the country, and on Finance Colombia‘s own coverage of the race.

Who is Abelardo de la Espriella?

Start with de la Espriella, since he holds a slight polling lead. His campaign events are not subtle: the lights go yellow, blue, and red, footage of tigers plays on the screens, smoke machines fire, the national anthem swells, and out he comes flanked by bodyguards in a bulletproof vest, declaring, “Here is your tiger, roaring and biting.” The tiger is his symbol — claw, territory, attack — and the crowd chant is ponle la raya al tigre, “put the stripe on the tiger.” It is a show, and he runs it the same way every time, with discipline.

According to La Silla Vacía’s profile, Abelardo was born in Bogotá in 1978 and grew up in Sahagún and Montería, in Córdoba on the Caribbean side. His mother calls the family riquitos de pueblo — “small-town rich.” A respected name and political connections, but not the rosca, the Bogotá elite, and not one of the great national fortunes. His father was a Liberal Party congressman and an early backer of Álvaro Uribe in Córdoba in 2001; when Uribe reached the presidency, he made the elder De la Espriella a notary. That is where the long relationship between the De la Espriella and Uribe families begins.

From childhood, Abelardo wanted to be seen. By his family’s account he sang opera in the bathroom, had a children’s radio program his father arranged, got himself onto regional television as a teenager, and promised his grandmother a limousine in Miami. He studied law at the Sergio Arboleda University in Bogotá — not an academic powerhouse, but a real breeding ground for the Colombian right — and hustled the whole way through, selling whiskey, perfume, clothing, and emeralds on consignment. The man has always been building a legend about himself.

Here is the part he does not lead with on stage. De la Espriella made his name as a defense lawyer, and not for choirboys. His client list reads like a rogues’ gallery: politicians tied to paramilitary groups, the Nule brothers of the carrusel de contratos contracting scandal in Bogotá, the pyramid-scheme operator David Murcia of DMG, the disgraced Constitutional Court magistrate Jorge Pretelt, and — the big one — Álex Saab, the man the United States accused of being a front man for Nicolás Maduro. Early in his career, at 26, he did legal and public-relations work around the paramilitary demobilization at Santa Fe de Ralito through an NGO he ran. His childhood friend from Córdoba is Salvatore Mancuso, the paramilitary chief.

He will tell you — and it is a legitimate argument — that every defendant has a right to counsel, and that defending an unpopular client is not the same as committing the client’s crimes. Fair enough. We will return to it.

After the lawyering came the brand. He launched a rum called Ron Defensor, “the Defender,” with the vallenato star Silvestre Dangond. He launched a clothing line, released music, wrote books, went through an atheist phase, and then, roughly six years ago, underwent a very public religious conversion. Now he is the “God and family” candidate who calls himself “the Cyrus of Colombia.” By his own design he is a sybarite: Italian suits every year, a Miami mansion valued north of $5 million USD, a private plane, the whole production.

Three facts to keep in your carriel for later. First, he has never held elected office; he ran for a Bogotá council seat as a student in the 1990s, lost, and stayed out of electoral politics for nearly thirty years. Second, he holds three citizenships — American, Italian, and Colombian. Third, his running mate is José Manuel Restrepo, a name that returns in a big way when we reach the pros.

“The ‘tough on crime’ candidate has spent his career defending criminals, and the ‘human rights’ candidate stays silent on half the human rights abuses in his own backyard.” — Loren Moss, Finance Colombia

Who is Iván Cepeda?

If de la Espriella’s story is about a man who wanted to be seen, Cepeda’s is about a man shaped by a death.

On August 9, 1994, a young Iván Cepeda took a bus to Javeriana University, where he taught philosophy, after letting his father leave the house first. On the way he came upon ambulances, police cars, and a crowd around a bullet-riddled car. It was his father’s car. Manuel Cepeda, a senator for the Unión Patriótica, had just been assassinated.

The detail that explains Iván Cepeda is what he did next. He did not collapse over the body. He pulled from his jacket a column his father had written about another murdered activist, crossed the street to tell his wife, and then turned and spoke to journalists — composed, on message, calling on the president and the courts to act. “When my father was murdered,” he later said, “I already knew how I should act, what I should say.” He turned private grief into public, political language. La Silla Vacía describes his entire method of politics as organized around the truth of the victims, and that is exactly right.

Cepeda was born in 1962, while his father was in prison for interviewing a survivor of the army’s bombing of Marquetalia, the peasant enclave that became the founding myth of the FARC. His parents, Manuel Cepeda and Yira Castro, were journalists, communists, and revolutionaries; politics was the air the household breathed. At 13 he was in the Communist Youth. At 17, after his mother’s death, his father sent him to study philosophy in Sofia, Bulgaria. He returned in 1987, by his own account disillusioned with Soviet Marxism and the privilege he had seen inside the party there.

Abelardo de la Espriella is a millionaire defense attorney, singer & rum impresario. (photo: Twitter screencapture)

His father’s assassination was the turning point. The Unión Patriótica — a party born of a peace process, a vehicle for the FARC and the Communist Party to enter electoral politics — was then systematically exterminated, with thousands of members killed. Cepeda channeled all of it. He created the Manuel Cepeda Foundation, built memorial galleries with families of the disappeared, and founded MOVICE, the Movement of Victims of State Crimes. He pursued his father’s case until the Colombian state was held responsible and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights condemned the country.

Then he found his great adversary: Álvaro Uribe. For Cepeda, Uribe symbolizes the establishment he believes must confess its responsibility for paramilitarism and the killing of the left. He spent years pursuing Uribe — prison visits to extradited paramilitaries in the United States, the 2014 debate in Congress — and that work ultimately produced the witness-tampering case that put the former president on trial. Cepeda became, as La Silla Vacía puts it, the leftist who managed to put Uribe in the dock. That is the engine of his political career.

He reached Congress in 2010, famously arriving with a bucket, broom, and mop, promising to clean up a legislature stained by parapolítica — the scandal of lawmakers who colluded with paramilitary groups. He has been there ever since, four terms, mostly on the Second Committee, which handles military promotions, security, and foreign relations. The crucial point about his experience, and I will come back to it, is that he has never governed anything — no city, department, ministry, or large budget. His arena has been Congress as a moral and judicial forum. He was also the principal intellectual architect of Petro’s Paz Total, “Total Peace”; he coined the term.

His running mate is Aida Quilcué, an indigenous Nasa leader and senator who is herself a victim of state violence — her husband was killed by the military as they returned from a minga. One more thing matters because it is human and real: Cepeda is in fragile health. He has beaten cancer twice — colon cancer in 2018, liver cancer treated in 2022 — and people who have worked with him describe a worn body and an iron will. He is intellectually serious, sober, and predictable, the opposite of Petro’s chaos. Whatever you make of his politics, he is no lightweight.

The case for Abelardo de la Espriella

Let me make the genuine case for de la Espriella, as I see it.

He promises to be tough on crime — on the organized armed groups and on ordinary street crime alike. After four years in which armed groups roughly doubled in size under Total Peace, many Colombians are hungry for exactly that, and I understand why. He is pro-business and pro-investment, foreign and domestic, and he has built his whole pitch on the idea that prosperity comes from the private sector rather than the state. He is pro-US and promises to repair the relationship with Washington that frayed under Petro; he is, in fact, a US citizen himself, which tells you which direction he faces.

On the economy, I think he would restore investor confidence and likely work to repair Colombia’s diminished credit rating, which matters enormously for what the country pays to borrow. He supports lower taxes, which is a good thing when paired with genuine fiscal prudence — that is the caveat, but the instinct is right.

The strongest item on his ticket, for me, is his running mate, José Manuel Restrepo. Restrepo served as both Minister of Commerce and Finance Minister in Iván Duque’s cabinet and did the job well, even when Duque did not. He has few critics and brings a level of intellectual seriousness and economic credibility that the top of the ticket does not project on its own. A credible technocrat one heartbeat from the presidency is a real asset.

He wants to shrink the bureaucracy. Colombia’s is not as bloated as some in Latin America, but it can be streamlined — and the bigger problem than handing out sinecures is mermelada, the practice of spreading money through useless government contracts to friends and supporters. If he genuinely goes after that, good. He is also plainly intelligent; a successful defense attorney knows jurisprudence and procedure cold.

Two of his ideas deserve particular credit. He says he wants to promote home ownership for people of modest means, and El País reports a plan for below-market thirty-year mortgages. If that is real and it works, it is a genuinely good idea. The Peruvian author Hernando de Soto, in The Mystery of Capital, explains how broad asset ownership by ordinary people is what formalizes an economy and drives real progress: when you own assets, you can extract value from them, pass them to your descendants, and build lasting wealth. And on health care, he promises to fix the EPS system with financial oversight to root out corruption, rather than blow it up. That is far better than moving to a single-payer government scheme, which I think would be disastrous. The state has not shown the organizational competence to run one. Consider that Petro placed Daniel Quintero, the indicted former mayor of Medellín, in a role overseeing the EPS — and Quintero is accused of looting the city’s coffers. A couple of insolvent EPS providers is a manageable problem; a national government that cannot pay providers and collapses the whole system is not. Patching beats nationalizing.

He supports performance evaluations for teachers, which is reasonable even if FECODE will oppose it, and he wants to expand internet connectivity into rural and underserved regions, which is critical in a country with such a wide gap between rural and urban, rich and poor. Connectivity means opportunity. That is a real list — a coherent pro-growth, pro-security program. Now the other side.

The case against Abelardo de la Espriella

There is a lot here. Start with the Bukele worship. De la Espriella is an open admirer of El Salvador’s president, Nayib Bukele. Bukele has unquestionably cut crime, but he also shows clear authoritarian tendencies and no sign of willingly leaving power. More to the point, Bukele is no friend to a free press, and de la Espriella is notoriously thin-skinned: he uses the courts to file SLAPPs — Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation — designed to force critics to burn money and time on their defense. Even meritless, such suits can bankrupt a person or consume so much of their time they cannot do their job. This is not hypothetical. La Silla Vacía documented dozens of civil suits and criminal complaints against journalists, several of whom admit to censoring themselves. That should worry anyone who cares about press freedom.

He may also turn out to be soft on crime — especially organized crime — which sounds backwards for the “iron fist” candidate until you look at his career. He built it defending mobsters, paracos, and the corrupt: the Nule family, Álex Saab. He is childhood friends with the paramilitary chief Salvatore Mancuso. And he has been linked to a paramilitary known as “Boliche,” Jorge Luís Hernández Villazón, on trial in the United States for narcotrafficking. De la Espriella denies any connection with Boliche and says he knows him only through his work as a defense attorney. Fine — but it is a fair question how tough he will really be on his friends and former clients. That is not a cheap shot; it is a reasonable thing to want answered.

I also do not see a plan for the poor. I have looked, and I find nothing in his platform that signals a comprehensive plan — or much compassion — for the underprivileged and those without access to opportunity in the remote areas: the Pacific coast, the rural zones, the Atlantic coast. Perhaps one exists and I have missed it, but if so, where is it?

He seems inconsistent. This is a man who craves attention — a recording artist, a clothing line, a rum called “Defensor” — who then suddenly finds Jesus and becomes the “God and family” candidate. Maybe it is sincere. Forgive me for being skeptical of a conversion that lines up so neatly with a presidential run.

On the peace process, he has pledged not to implement the 2016 accords that won former President Juan Manuel Santos the Nobel Peace Prize. To be fair, the last two administrations did a poor job implementing them too. But my concern is simple: the people who genuinely laid down their arms need protection. You do not want to teach the next generation that demobilizing gets you killed. He also wants to end the Jurisdicción Especial de Paz, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, arguing it is a political tool that does not deliver real justice. I do not know the JEP well enough to rule on that flatly, but I am skeptical of the claim; my sense is that it is doing some genuine good and should be reformed rather than scrapped.

Colombia 2026 1st round top two (Graphic: Sofi Imfeld for Finance Colombia)

Then there is the absence of a track record. He has never held any office, so there is nothing to go on. Does he become a statesman or a caudillo wannabe? We do not know, and that uncertainty is itself a cost. Finally, the persona. His public identity strikes me as a bit of a gomelo — Colombian slang for a stuck-up rich kid. People often cultivate a public character that has little to do with who they really are, so perhaps the private Abelardo is a prince. But he is asking voters to choose the public one, and the public one rubs me the wrong way.

The case for Iván Cepeda

Now the honest case for Cepeda. He will very likely put real attention on the marginalized and the forgotten parts of the country, and the map backs this up: in the first round he carried the entire Pacific coast, the forested borders with Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil, and most of the Atlantic provinces — the exception being Antioquia, whose population concentrates far to the south around Medellín. Much of that Atlantic coast, outside Barranquilla and the touristy parts of Cartagena, has suffered generations of corruption and chronic underinvestment. Someone paying attention to those places is not a bad thing.

He is consistent and predictable. He has a long career and a coherent, stable ideology. I may disagree with that ideology — you will hear about it in the cons — but no one can call the man unpredictable. You know what you are getting, and in politics that is worth something.

He would try to actually implement Santos’s 2016 peace accords. The pact has real flaws and lacked genuine commitment from the current and previous administrations, but it did demobilize thousands of fighters who are no longer in the bush kidnapping and bombing people. Pushing to finish that work honestly has value.

And to be fair, he is clearly more competent than the ally currently in office. He is more intelligent and more disciplined than Gustavo Petro. Consider how Petro has governed: unable to push through much of his agenda, running the Casa de Nariño like a reality show, cycling more than sixty ministers through nineteen ministries in under four years. How do you accomplish anything while swapping in a new minister roughly every three weeks? I do not think a Cepeda administration would bring the same chaos and palace intrigue. And he would command the largest bloc of support in Congress, so he would be more effective at moving his agenda; he knows how the machinery works. Credit where it is due — he does not stand up in cabinet meetings inventing his own physics. That is a low bar, but Petro keeps walking under it and Cepeda clears it.

Finally, he has a real, lifelong commitment to the victims of violence in Colombia. Whatever else you say about him, that commitment is genuine and it is the through-line of his entire life. That counts.

The case against Iván Cepeda

Iván Cepeda is a senator, former member of the Communist Youth, educated in Bulgaria during the Soviet era, and key player in the negotiation with armed guerilla groups. (photo: Colombian Senate)

And there are many cons. The first is the mirror I opened with: he has shady friends too. He was close to the Chavista senator Piedad Córdoba. Just as de la Espriella calls his contacts with Boliche purely professional, Cepeda says his ties to the FARC commander Raúl Reyes were purely those of a peace negotiator. But Cepeda went further. When the FARC commander Jesús Santrich was locked up and ready to be extradited to the United States on drug-trafficking charges, Cepeda worked fiercely to get him released from the Fiscalía‘s Bunker. Once out, Santrich fled into Venezuela and restarted the Segunda Marquetalia, a FARC dissident network. And here is the part that lands like a gut punch a year later: that same Segunda Marquetalia is the group Colombian prosecutors have now linked to the assassination of presidential candidate and senator Miguel Uribe Turbay, who was shot in Bogotá in June 2025 and died that August. I want to be careful and fair — that is an attribution by the Fiscalía, and serious analysts at Insight Crime have noted the public evidence is thin, so it should not be treated as settled fact. But the chain — Cepeda helps free Santrich, Santrich restarts the Segunda Marquetalia, the Segunda Marquetalia is tied to a magnicidio — is a heavy thing to carry into a presidential race.

Second, he is soft on the guerrillas, broadly. He has a proven record of leniency toward the FARC, the ELN, and armed groups generally, and he is an architect of Petro’s failed Total Peace. Under that nurturing approach those groups have flourished, and I think they would keep flourishing under a Cepeda administration. He seems to see them more as victims of state violence than as the kidnappers, narcotraffickers, extortionists, and terrorists that they are. La Silla Vacía’s own reporting — and they are not a right-wing outlet — concluded that Cepeda bears real political responsibility for the failure of Total Peace, having pushed a negotiation model that was too ambitious, legally ambiguous, and weak before armed groups. When the violence comes from the state, Cepeda sees structure and systemic responsibility; when it comes from the guerrillas, he tends to see context and a chance for peace. That blind spot defines him.

Former 2022 presidential candidate Rodolfo Hernandez (photo: candidate’s website)

Third is his health and his running mate, which is delicate but real. Cepeda has had cancer twice. The late Rodolfo Hernández, who lost to Petro in 2022, died in 2024 of cancer after also having had liver and colon cancer, so the risk is not hypothetical. If Cepeda did not finish his term, Aida Quilcué would take over, and her career — as an indigenous Nasa leader, minga organizer, and senator — has centered on those issues rather than monetary policy, foreign affairs, or national security, which makes her approach to them a genuine unknown. People also doubted Francia Márquez, and she turned out to be the articulate, level-headed one beside Petro’s wilder talk, so I will say nothing against Quilcué as a person. But a possible succession to a medically fragile president is an inarguable risk, and it would be foolish to pretend otherwise.

Fourth, I cannot imagine investor confidence improving under a Cepeda presidency. A data point worth chewing on: the peso is currently strong. Part of that is the dollar’s broad global weakness, but part of it, in my read, is the market reacting to the strong polling of Cepeda’s opponent. Markets vote too, and they are nervous about the left.

Fifth, the father — and I want to be fair here. You cannot reliably judge a son by his father; my own father was a politician, and as an adult I spent most of my life in the party opposite his, with a great relationship and very different philosophies. So I will not convict Iván Cepeda for his father’s beliefs. The difference is that Cepeda does seem broadly aligned with them. His father was secretary general of the Colombian Communist Party, Iván studied in Soviet Bulgaria, and though he says he grew disillusioned with the hypocrisy of Soviet communism, he still appears committed to a far-left ideology. If that is your cup of tea, count it a plus; I have never been fond of Marx or Engels.

Sixth is crop substitution, and this one deserves a direct conversation. On paper it sounds marvelous: rather than spray coca with herbicides that wreck the environment and people’s health, offer farmers a legal alternative and a path out. If it worked the way it is drawn up, I would back it one hundred percent. The problem is the gap between the brochure and the dirt road — and that gap is built on a premise that simply is not true on the ground: the premise that the campesino is a free actor who chooses to grow coca and could, if persuaded, choose to grow something else.

In much of rural Colombia, the small farmer does not get to volunteer. Where the FARC dissidents and the ELN hold territory, the armed group tells the farmer he will cultivate coca, do the manual labor of harvesting it, and sell the leaf or paste to the group at a price the group sets — under penalty of death. Refuse, and the farmer is driven off his land or simply killed. This is not a lifestyle preference; it is coercion at gunpoint. The reporting bears out the broader pattern. Finance Colombia’s coverage, drawn from InSight Crime, documents how the power vacuum left by the FARC’s 2016 demobilization was filled by the ELN, the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces, and FARC dissidents fighting for control of coca zones, and how the state’s failure to deliver on substitution let armed groups fill the vacuum and tighten their grip. The human cost is staggering: after families signed substitution agreements, the murder rate of supportive social leaders rose by 546 percent, according to a study cited by InSight Crime, and only about 5 percent of the program’s 2023 budget was actually executed. You cannot ask a farmer to switch crops when the entity controlling his life and his land is not the government but a guerrilla faction that has already told him what he will plant.

That is why this is not a matter of asking farmers nicely to grow coffee or cacao. It is not their choice. Security has to come first. Crop substitution can only work where the state — not the guerrillas — holds the territory and can guarantee a farmer’s safety when he says no to coca. The armed groups must be displaced before substitution has any chance, and any candidate who treats substitution as a soft alternative to security has the sequence backwards. That is the simple truth of it, and it is the heart of my concern with the Total Peace approach Cepeda helped design.

Seventh, he wants to expand the state’s role across the board, including continuing Petro’s effort to take over the health sector. Before the pandemic, Colombia had one of the best reputations in the world for health-care quality. Is it unequal? Yes — care in an isolated hamlet does not match Cali or Medellín, and the south of Bogotá does not match the north. Then let the government build clinics and hospitals where they are missing. There is no reason to take over the parts of the private system that work in order to do that, unless one objects on ideology to doctors and dentists existing as small businesspeople. That is ideology, not health policy.

Eighth, if Cepeda wins he may well protect Daniel Quintero, the former mayor of Medellín under indictment on more than forty counts of corruption. That kind of debt-collection worries me. And ninth, the selective conscience. Cepeda is a former member of the Communist Youth — a plus if you are a communist, unsettling if you are not. The FARC and ELN are also communist groups; one wonders whether that is the root of his apparent sympathy. He casts himself as a human rights defender yet stays conspicuously silent on the abuses of the Chavista regime in Venezuela. La Silla Vacía documented this in detail: roughly a decade of avoiding criticism of Maduro’s repression, fraudulent elections, and alliances with Colombian guerrillas. Cepeda notices human rights violations committed by people he dislikes while exempting bad actors he is closer to, provided they are communist or socialist. The record on that is fairly clear.

So where does that leave us?

Two men. One built his life on being seen — a brilliant, theatrical defense lawyer for the powerful and the accused, now promising an iron fist while surrounding himself with at least one genuinely serious technocrat in José Manuel Restrepo. The other built his life on a single tragedy — a disciplined, consistent, ideologically committed man of the left who has fought for victims for thirty years, and who carries a blind spot the size of a guerrilla encampment.

Here is the paradox I cannot get past: the “tough on crime” candidate has spent his career defending criminals, and the “human rights” candidate stays silent on half the human rights abuses in his own backyard. Each is, in some way, the very thing he claims to oppose. This is not a runoff between an angel and a devil. It is a runoff between two men who each ask voters to trust that their inconvenient friendships were strictly professional.

I am uneasy about both candidacies, for very different reasons, and I am doing what I said I would: laying it out and handing it to the reader. For deeper background, see Finance Colombia’s earlier survey of how the leading candidates draw divergent maps for foreign capital, security, and the rule of law, its reporting on what is behind Colombia’s increased violence, and its account of the final push of the Total Peace policy. The runoff is Sunday, June 21, and the winner is inaugurated August 7.

Colombia’s first-round presidential election, held Sunday, May 31, 2026, produced a result that crystallizes the country’s political exhaustion with both the governing left and the traditional right. Criminal defense attorney and political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella placed first with more than 10.3 million votes. Leftist Senator Iván Cepeda, a close ally of outgoing President Gustavo Petro and the lead architect of the administration’s Paz Total peace policy, finished second with just under 9.7 million votes. The two will face each other in a runoff election on June 21.

Senator Paloma Valencia, the candidate backed by former President Álvaro Uribe and the standard-bearer of his Uribismo movement, placed a distant third, receiving less than 7% of the vote — fewer than 1.7 million ballots. Former Medellín mayor and Antioquia governor Sergio Fajardo received just over one million votes, while former Bogotá mayor Claudia López finished below 1%, with approximately 225,000 votes. The remaining minor candidates combined for just over 1% of the total.

Under Colombia’s electoral system, the top two finishers advance to a runoff if no candidate surpasses 50% in the first round. The June 21 vote will determine who assumes the presidency on August 7.

Click above to watch the video!

The Candidates: Background and Context

Abelardo de la Espriella, 47, has never held elected office. He built a national profile over more than two decades as a high-profile defense attorney, founding De La Espriella Lawyers in 2002, with offices in Colombia and the United States. His client roster has included controversial figures: he represented Alex Saab, a Colombian-born businessman who became a close associate of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and was implicated in a scheme to launder proceeds from Venezuela’s food-assistance program, the Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción (CLAP). Saab was extradited to the United States, convicted, and later granted clemency before being re-arrested in Venezuela in early 2026. De la Espriella also represented members of the Nule family in connection with the Carrusel de Contratos — a major contracting scandal tied to infrastructure works at Bogotá’s El Dorado airport corridor. He has additionally been reported to have represented individuals linked to organized crime.

De la Espriella has drawn comparisons to figures such as US President Donald Trump and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. His campaign has centered on hard-line security policy, including proposals for large-scale incarceration, expanded military operations against armed groups, and the rejection of negotiations with guerrilla organizations. He is reported to hold Italian and US citizenship in addition to his Colombian nationality, and is said to own property in Florida.

In a notable departure from his defense work, de la Espriella took the side of a victim in a high-profile acid-attack case, acting as a private prosecutor to secure a stronger sentence for the perpetrator — an episode that raised his public profile beyond the defense bar.

Iván Cepeda, 63, enters the runoff as the consolidated candidate of the Colombian left and Petro’s Pacto Histórico coalition. He is the primary legislative architect of Paz Total, the Petro administration’s policy of negotiating simultaneously with multiple armed actors, including the ELN and FARC dissident factions. Cepeda’s family background includes deep ties to the Colombian left: his father was secretary general of the Communist Party, and was assassinated. Cepeda himself studied in communist Bulgaria during the soviet era. The two finalists have an established legal and political history: Uribe attempted to bring criminal charges against Cepeda while both served in the Senate, but the Supreme Court determined that Uribe had fabricated the accusations and attempted to bribe witnesses — a case that resulted in Uribe’s criminal conviction.

“If nothing changes, Abelardo wins.” — Loren Moss, Finance Colombia

The Electoral Map

The geographic distribution of the vote reflects deep regional divisions. Cepeda carried Bogotá, which has trended left for years, particularly in lower-income districts on the city’s south and west sides. Antioquia — historically the heartland of Uribismo and home to Medellín, the country’s second-largest city — voted more than two to one for de la Espriella, a result that signals the weakening grip of Uribe’s movement even in its traditional stronghold.

The heart of coffee-growing country — the departments of Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío also went to de la Espriella. Caquetá, a sparsely populated department in southern Colombia that has suffered sustained guerrilla violence from both the ELN and FARC dissident groups, voted for de la Espriella as well, a result we may interpret as a direct rejection of Petro and Cepeda’s Paz Total.

Cepeda carried Colombia’s Pacific coast, including the chronically neglected department of Chocó, as well as the sparsely populated Amazonas and Putumayo departments bordering Peru and Brazil, and the northern Caribbean coast. The Caribbean coast result is notable, as the region has historically suffered from underdevelopment, infrastructure deficits, and significant income inequality. Norte de Santander with its Catatumbo region on the Venezuelan border and experiencing severe armed-group activity — voted for de la Espriella, a result consistent with public exhaustion over security policy.

The Political Context: From Uribe to Petro and Beyond

Colombia’s current political trajectory is rooted in decisions made across the past two decades. President Uribe served two terms in the early 2000s and, together with then-Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, mounted a sustained military campaign against the FARC that significantly weakened the insurgency. Santos later broke from Uribe after assuming the presidency, governing independently and ultimately negotiating a peace agreement with the FARC — a deal that Uribe actively opposed. A plebiscite on the accord failed, but Santos used legislative maneuvering to implement it anyway.

Colombia 2026 1st round top two (Graphic: Sofi Imfeld for Finance Colombia)

Uribe’s next handpicked candidate, Iván Duque, won the 2018 election but finished his term with approximately 30% approval. Members of his own party publicly distanced themselves from him — Senator María Fernanda Cabal, a staunch Uribista, called Duque a “mamerto” (leftist idiot) while he was still in office. Under his administration, indicators on crime and guerrilla activity worsened, and armed groups including the ELN rebuilt operational capacity that had been degraded under Uribe and Santos.

Petro’s administration has not met initial fears of a Venezuelan-style democratic breakdown: Congress has largely blocked the most radical components of his agenda, including attempts to nationalize the private pension system and convert the healthcare system to a single-payer model. However, crime has increased, armed groups have expanded their operational footprints, and the security situation in several regions has worsened. Paz Total is widely seen as having produced few tangible results.

Uribe himself was convicted of witness tampering and attempted bribery in the case he had brought against Cepeda. Though released from house arrest after conviction, the judges who authorized his release are now reportedly under investigation for judicial corruption. Valencia’s poor performance in the first round — despite being Uribe’s chosen standard-bearer — suggests that Uribismo as a political force is waning, with its core constituency aging and new generations of voters disengaged from the Uribe legacy.

What to Expect Before June 21

Both campaigns will intensify mobilization efforts over the coming three weeks. Cepeda’s movement — Colombia Humana and the broader Pacto Histórico coalition — has historically relied on organized mobilizations, including indigenous community-led mingas, labor unions, and allied social movements. Cepeda’s running mate Senator Aida Quilcué is an indigenous activist, a choice expected to energize those constituencies. FECODE, the Federación Colombiana de Trabajadores de la Educación (Colombia’s main teachers’ federation), is expected to align officially with Cepeda, though individual teachers may not follow union leadership in their voting choices.

On the right, Paloma Valencia issued a public endorsement of de la Espriella immediately following the first-round results. Business community organizations, including ANDI (the Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia) and Fenalco (the Federación Nacional de Comerciantes), do not formally endorse candidates, but their members are widely understood to favor a government that supports private enterprise and market-oriented policy. De la Espriella holds no congressional constituency, meaning whichever candidate wins will face the same dynamic Petro encountered: a fragmented Congress that is likely to act as a check on executive authority.

The question of centrist voter alignment remains open. Fajardo and López are not expected to formally endorse either finalist, and the direction of their combined approximately 1.2 million votes is uncertain.

Winners and Losers by Sector

For international investors and executives operating in Colombia, the policy differences between the two candidates are substantive across several key sectors.

Petroleum and Natural Gas: De la Espriella has stated unequivocally that he will restart petroleum exploration and licensing, which the Petro administration blocked. Ecopetrol S.A. (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL), Colombia’s state-controlled oil company, which also holds producing assets in the US Permian Basin and Gulf of Mexico, has operated under a government that halted new drilling permits. The consequences have included a decline in future production capacity at a time when global oil prices have risen due to Middle East tensions. Colombia has been forced to import natural gas at elevated prices to meet existing domestic demand — including from transportation fleets that were converted to natural gas under government incentive programs. Cepeda would be expected to continue or deepen current restrictions on fossil fuel expansion.

Healthcare: The Petro-Cepeda platform favors a government single-payer model. The administration has already taken over several Entidades Promotoras de Salud (EPS) — Colombia’s managed-care intermediaries — placing the healthcare system in legal and financial uncertainty. Private clinics, hospitals, and physicians who wish to operate outside a government-controlled framework would benefit from a de la Espriella administration. Cepeda’s healthcare agenda would accelerate the shift toward government-managed care.

BPO, Tech, and Call Centers: The BPO sector — which provides large volumes of formal employment, particularly in Medellín, Bogotá, Cali, and Barranquilla — was significantly affected by Petro-era minimum wage increases of 16% and 23% in successive years. These increases created contract renegotiation pressures with international clients, some of whom have shifted or considered shifting operations to competing jurisdictions including Honduras, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Guatemala. At the CX Summit, the industry’s main annual event held in Cartagena, the son of Álvaro Uribe appeared as an invited keynote speaker — a gesture that could be interpreted within the industry as an implicit signal of political alignment. A de la Espriella government, with its orientation toward labor market deregulation and reduced regulatory burden, would be viewed more favorably by this sector. Current Colombian labor law prohibits part-time employment contracts and places significant restrictions on dual employment, making workforce flexibility difficult for businesses that operate outside traditional 40-hour weekly structures.

Mining: The Petro administration has been less aggressive toward mining than toward petroleum, but sector participants expect a more permissive regulatory environment under de la Espriella, and continued constraints under Cepeda.

Security and Tourism: Both candidates have stated support for tourism promotion, but the sector’s trajectory is more directly linked to security conditions. Under current policies, several regions that were accessible to domestic and international travelers several years ago have experienced increased armed-group activity, effectively closing them to tourism. A de la Espriella administration is expected to pursue a more aggressive military posture toward the ELN and FARC dissident factions; a Cepeda government would likely continue dialogue-first approaches. The outcome will directly affect which parts of Colombia’s territory remain accessible to investment and tourism.

Foreign Relations: A de la Espriella government is expected to restore a broadly cooperative relationship with the United States, which deteriorated under Petro following several high-profile diplomatic incidents. De la Espriella has expressed admiration for US President Donald Trump, and reports indicate he holds US citizenship and owns property in Florida. Relations with Ecuador, which have been strained by mutual tariff escalations between Petro and Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, would be expected to normalize. Relations with Venezuela under Cepeda would likely continue along the current allied trajectory, while a de la Espriella government would be expected to take a more critical posture toward Caracas. China and Russia would find a more receptive diplomatic environment under Cepeda, and a cooler one under de la Espriella.

The Poor and Informal Workers: Cepeda’s campaign argues that minimum wage increases and expanded state services benefit lower-income Colombians. Critics counter that elevated formal labor costs have pushed more employment into the informal sector — which currently accounts for approximately half the Colombian workforce — depriving those workers of pension contributions, health benefits, and job security. De la Espriella’s platform, which emphasizes business formation, security, and labor market deregulation, would be presented as generating more formal-sector job creation. The actual distributional effects of either approach remain contested.

The Outlook

Assuming current polling trends hold and Uribista voters consolidate behind de la Espriella as expected following Valencia’s endorsement, de la Espriella enters the runoff as the frontrunner. Cepeda’s path to victory depends on driving high turnout among his base, securing support from centrist voters who did not vote for either finalist in the first round, and potentially benefiting from any missteps by de la Espriella in the final three weeks of campaigning.

The first-round results produced no major electoral violence. The ELN announced a temporary halt to armed actions during the voting period. Authorities detained some individuals reportedly attempting to purchase votes in rural areas, but no large-scale incidents were recorded.

The incoming president will face a Congress with no natural majority aligned to the executive, a healthcare system in partial administrative disarray, a petroleum sector whose future production trajectory is in question, and regions where state presence remains contested by armed groups. The June 21 runoff will determine which vision — market-oriented restructuring or continuation of the Petro project — Colombia pursues for the next four years.

Colombians face three sharply different futures in May 31 vote

Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.

No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.

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A Race Reshaped by Late Polling

The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.

Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.

Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.

Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.

Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.

Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.

Security Policy: The Three Approaches to Armed Groups

Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.

Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.

Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.

De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.

For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.

Business Climate and Employment Conditions

The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.

Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.

Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.

De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.

Foreign Investment, Oil, and Mining

Ecopetrol holds a 31.5% stake in the Gunflint oil field in the Gulf of Mexico.

The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.

Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.

In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.

Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.

De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.

Foreign Policy: Washington Alignment vs. Multipolar Strategy

The US Embassy in Bogotá is said to be the 3rd largest US mission in the world (photo: Loren Moss)

Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.

Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.

Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.

De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.

“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.

Corruption and Judicial Independence

All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.

Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.

Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.

De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.

De la Espriella’s Legal Career: The Documented Record

De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.

Abelardo de la Espriella (screen capture from Twitter video)

His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.

De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.

The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.

Cepeda’s Family History and Ideological Background

Iván Cepeda (from Twitter)

Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.

Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.

The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.

What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.

Paloma Valencia (image Twitter)

Valencia and the Uribe Question

The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.

Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.

She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.

Press Freedom and the Media Environment

Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.

Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.

Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.

De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.

The Ideological Spectrum: Market Liberalism to State Direction

The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.

De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.

Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.

Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.

Minor Candidates: The Rest of the Ballot

Claudia López, senator of Colombia. (Credit: Patty Suescún)

Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.

Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.

Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.

Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.

Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.

Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.

Investment Implications

For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.

A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.

A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.

A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.

The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.

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President Petro called for a criminal investigation against President Donald Trump, which stunned many observers. The demand stemmed from a US military operation in the Caribbean, where missiles were fired at vessels suspected of illicit activities. Petro asserted that the occupants were not traffickers but “simply poor young people from Latin America who have no other option.” The US delegation reportedly exited the assembly hall during Petro’s speech.

“With the forgiveness of those who dominate the United Nations, criminal proceedings must be opened against those officials from the United States, including the senior official who gave the order: President Trump,” Petro declared. He also framed his speech from the position of a leader wronged by US policy, stating, “I speak to you as a president decertified by the same President Trump, without him having the right to do so.”

Gustavo Petro at the UN. Photo credit: Juan Diego Cano -Presidency.

The Colombian president’s remarks extended to broad condemnations, labeling the United States a “white and racist” country leading humanity toward “destruction.” His confrontational rhetoric was not limited to the US, as he also defended Venezuelan leader Nicolás Maduro and controversially downplayed the nature of the transnational criminal organization, Tren de Aragua.

Petro seemed to call for an armed invasion of Palestine and against Israel:

“I invite the nations of the world and their peoples above all, as part of humanity, to unite their armies and weapons.

Palestine must be liberated. I invite the armies of Asia, of the Slavic peoples who so heroically defeated Hitler, the Latin American armies of Bolívar, of Garibaldi, who also had one in Italy, of Martí, of Artigas, of Santa Cruz. Words are no longer necessary in Bolívar’s hour of the sword of freedom or death, because they will not only bomb Gaza, not only the Caribbean, as they already do, but also humanity that cries out for freedom, because from Washington and NATO, they are killing democracy and reviving tyranny and totalitarianism on a global level.

We must raise the red and black flag of freedom or death that Bolívar raised, without forgetting the white color he raised alongside the red and black, the color of peace as hope for life on earth and in the heart of humanity. The United States no longer teaches democracy; instead, it kills it with its migrants and its greed. The United States teaches tyranny.

The UN must begin its change by stopping the genocide in Gaza with the effectiveness of a world-saving army, voted on by the United Nations General Assembly without veto. After saving Gaza, we will move on to the plan to decarbonize the planet’s economy, so that it becomes a democratically constructed global project and establishes global democracy.”

Widespread Condemnation from Colombian Opposition

The reaction from Colombia’s political opposition was swift and severe. Lawmakers from various parties accused Petro of embarrassing the nation on the world stage and irresponsibly damaging crucial diplomatic ties.

Lina María Garrido, a representative from the Cambio Radical party, offered a direct rebuke: “In the name of the majority of Colombians, I offer an apology to the world for the shameful spectacle that Gustavo Petro is putting on at the UN.”

En nombre de la mayoría de los colombianos, le ofrezco disculpas al mundo por el bochornoso espectáculo que está dando @petrogustavo en la ONU. De entrada, les quiero informar que Petro está dispuesto a todo por unos cuantos "me gusta" en sus redes y por tener un reconocimiento,…

— Lina Maria Garrido (@linamariagarri1) September 23, 2025

Representative Katherine Miranda from the Alianza Verde party described the speech as “Ideologized, erratic, and highly confrontational against the US and Europe. He said nothing about Colombia, about the increase in homicides of public forces, recruitment of minors, kidnappings, and extortions.”

“President Petro didn’t speak like a head of state. He didn’t even wear the Colombian flag on his shirt. He’s only interested in the presidency as a podium, a platform to repeat his apocalyptic rhetoric, denounce universal greed, and launch a vapid call for a global revolution. He doesn’t care about his country. ‘Global leader,’ every state office repeats, while the president speaks to an empty audience,” said Petro’s own former education minister, Alejandro Gaviria.

Senator Carlos Fernando Motoa of Cambio Radical suggested Petro was acting as a defender for criminal syndicates. “Now he goes to the United Nations to act as a defender of the Cartel de los Soles, or organizations like Tren de Aragua,” Motoa stated. “This is unprecedented conduct that threatens to destroy our international image and put us on the side of the worst regimes on the continent.”

¡Lo de @PetroGustavo ya es patológico! No sólo defiende criminales con tarimazos en Medellín o mediante políticas infructuosas como la #PazTotal en el resto del territorio colombiano. Ahora acude a las Naciones Unidas para hacer las veces de defensor del Cártel de los Soles u… https://t.co/Qc4hkx1aqc

— Carlos Fernando Motoa (@senadormotoa) September 23, 2025

The criticism continued from Daniel Briceño, a Bogotá councilman for the Centro Democrático party, who posted on X, formerly Twitter, “Fortunately, this is the last time Petro will embarrass Colombia before the UN.”

Petro es un activista de micrófono cobarde y mediocre.

Mientras viaja por el mundo tratando de “solucionar” los problemas de la humanidad, en Colombia se arrodilla ante los peores criminales, los nombra gestores de paz y se acobarda ante la delincuencia.

Apátrida

— Daniel F. Briceño (@Danielbricen) September 26, 2025

Governor of Antioquia, Andrés Julián Rendón, sharply criticized Petro’s assessment of Tren de Aragua. Petro had claimed, “It’s a lie that the Tren de Aragua is a terrorist. They are just common criminals in the form of a gang, enlarged by the stupid idea of blockading Venezuela and keeping its oil.” Rendón retorted that Petro acted “more like an ambassador and spokesman for the narco-dictatorship of his ally Maduro and its criminal structures, than as the representative of millions of Colombians.”

Qué irresponsabilidad la suya Presidente @petrogustavo. Es sabido que le quedó grande gobernar, pero disimule y preocúpese por combatir a Mordisco, Calarcá, Clan de Golfo y cuanto bandido con el que está negociando. Son criminales peligrosos para el pueblo colombiano: desplazan,… pic.twitter.com/X2YvuMd55P

— Andrés Julián (@AndresJRendonC) September 26, 2025

Math professor and former mayor of Medellín and governor of Antioquia, Sergio Fajardo, called Petro’s words “lamentable.”

“President Petro’s performance at the United Nations General Assembly was, once again, lamentable. Trapped in his personal demons and delusions, instead of acting rationally in the country’s interests, the president reiterated his childish confrontation with Trump. Petro stopped governing a while ago and dedicated himself to campaigning, faithful to his anything-goes philosophy. The chaos grows day by day. He will leave, and we will all pay the bill. And what’s missing,” Fajardo tweeted on X.

El espectáculo del presidente Petro en la asamblea general de las naciones unidas fue, de nuevo, lamentable. Atrapado en sus demonios y delirios personales, en lugar de actuar racionalmente en función de los intereses del país, el presidente reiteró su infantil enfrentamiento con…

— Sergio Fajardo (@sergio_fajardo) September 24, 2025

Current senator and aspirant to the 2026 presidential elections, Paloma Valencia, said that Gustavo Petro has surrendered Colombia to violent actors. He has done nothing against drugs. Under him, Colombia has seen its lowest seizures in 12 years, homicides have increased by 8%, kidnappings have doubled, and extortion has skyrocketed. He has handed over the territory to the violent.”

Administration Defends “Disruptive” Speech

Members of Petro’s cabinet staunchly defended his address. Interior Minister Armando Benedetti praised the president’s words as a “courageous and historic intervention with a lot of dignity,” arguing that few leaders have the moral authority to speak so candidly.

Foreign Minister Rosa Villavicencio stated that Petro’s speech was “disruptive in the sense that he has said what many people think but do not dare to say.” She highlighted his critiques of migration policies that criminalize migrants and his call for a new approach to the global drug problem that addresses consumer countries’ roles.

Ex-Diplomat Warns of “Explosive” Consequences

Providing a more measured analysis, former Foreign Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo described Petro’s declarations as “quite explosive” in an interview with BLU Radio. While acknowledging the president’s apparent frustration near the end of his term, Murillo warned that such a stance “strains the relationship with the United States a great deal.”

Murillo emphasized the need for pragmatism in a volatile global environment, noting that a country’s capacity for maneuver is more critical than being right. “Colombia has to be very pragmatic in managing its relations with the United States,” he urged, pointing to the deep historical, economic, and social ties between the two nations. He suggested the speech could have been an opportunity to evaluate progress on his administration’s established foreign policy goals rather than seeking to assign blame.

The former chancellor also found the public discussion on the nature of Tren de Aragua unhelpful, arguing that such matters are best handled through technical and intelligence channels. The fallout from the speech continues to unfold, leaving Colombia’s political landscape deeply divided and its foreign policy at a critical juncture.

Petro’s full, translated UN speeches follow:

New York, September 23, 2025

Mr. Speaker, this is my last speech as President here. It’s already my fourth. In my first, I announced to the Assembly that a conflict could very well break out alongside Ukraine in Palestine. I called for a peace conference.

Those of us without bombs or big budgets are not heard here, but four years later, today, the horrific situation in Palestine led me to think that the same thing, or almost the same thing, could happen in the Colombian Caribbean, when they throw missiles at unarmed young people in the sea.

So now we are facing a different situation, perhaps more global. The barbarism today is global; today it falls upon all of humanity. The missiles targeted 17 unarmed young people in the waters of the Caribbean Sea, perhaps some Colombians. The persecution, imprisonment, chaining, and expulsion of millions of migrants. The missiles that fall on the 70,000 people in Gaza and kill them.

The lack of action on the climate crisis, whose words are being erased at Trump’s orders, is linked to and responds to the same cause. Migration is an excuse for a rich, white, racist society to believe itself a superior race and ignore the fact that its leaders are leading it, along with all of humanity, to the abyss of its own extinction.

They say the missiles in the Caribbean were to stop drugs. That’s a lie. Said here, on this very spot, in 2023 and 2024, were the years in which the most cocaine was seized, and more than 700 drug lords were extradited to the United States and Europe. I extradited them, and my government seized the cocaine.

And we didn’t fire a single missile or kill any young people. These were years in which I proved that voluntary substitution with coca leaf crops is more effective than forcibly eradicating them with glyphosate and using force on Colombia’s poor farmers. I replaced the failed and violent war on drugs with an effective anti-drug policy, which is different from confusing the dead substance with the greedy person.

But they need violence to dominate Colombia and Latin America. They need to destroy dialogue and impose and launch deadly missiles on poor young people in the Caribbean. Anti-drug policy is not about stopping cocaine from reaching the United States.

Anti-drug policy is intended to dominate the people of the South in general. It doesn’t focus on drugs; it focuses on power and domination. That’s why I speak before you as a president deserted by President Trump himself, without any right to do so, neither human nor divine, and without any mental reason.

They want to violate and coerce tens of thousands of farmers from the United States government, which is influenced by powerful Colombian mafia politicians.

Hundreds of thousands of Colombian peasants have been massacred, just as children are massacred in Gaza.

The massacres in Colombia were carried out by politicians who were senators, presidents, and ministers, linked to and bribed by the Colombian drug mafia.

At once allied with the far right in Florida, in the United States, and now allied with the Trump administration, allies for decades with the cocaine drug lords in Colombia—true scumbags, as the Italians say.

Anti-drug policy is made in Washington, United States, by allies of the cocaine mafia. I don’t know if Trump knows that his foreign policy toward Colombia, Venezuela, and the Caribbean is advised by Colombians who are political allies of the cocaine mafia.

I myself denounced these drug-trafficking paramilitary politicians personally, and for a decade in Congress as a senator. They tried to kill me many times for it. They wanted me not to be president and to keep me quiet, and now they want to prevent a new progressive government from continuing. And because of that, they almost denigrate me personally and slander Colombia.

The largest amount of cocaine in the history of the world has been seized in Colombia, and this government did it, and they’re making me a desert.

In Colombia, we have managed to stop the growth rate, the growth rate of coca leaf crops, which was 43% annually during the government of (President Iván) Duque, and I have lowered it this year to 3%, and they did not desertify Duque, who had a drug trafficker financier in his campaign, but they did desertify Petro, because he says things and says the truth.

Therefore, anti-drug policy is not for the public health of society but for the politics of power. They don’t want light to shine in Latin America and for the time of the people to come again. The young people killed by missiles in the Caribbean were not from the Aragua train—perhaps no one here knows its name—or from Hamas; they were Caribbean, possibly Colombian.

And if they were Colombians, with the apologies of those who dominate the United Nations, criminal proceedings should be opened against those officials who are from the United States, even if the highest-ranking official who gave the order, President Trump, who allowed the missiles to be fired at young people who simply wanted to escape poverty, is included. Young people on a boat, if they had an illicit cargo, weren’t drug traffickers; they were simply poor young people from Latin America who had no other option.

Drug traffickers live somewhere else, not in Latin America. Trump launches missiles at unarmed boats of immigrants and accuses them of being drug traffickers and terrorists, even though they don’t have a single weapon to defend themselves. Drug traffickers live in New York, right here, just a few blocks away, and in Miami.

And they make agreements with the (Drug Enforcement Administration) DEA, which allows them to traffic in Africa, Europe, Russia or China but not in the United States, a country that stops the growth of cocaine consumption without reducing it, only because its sick drug addicts went –and are sick– to consume the deadly drug of humanity’s counterculture in times of extinction due to the climate crisis, fentanyl.

This fentanyl is produced in the United States’ industrial apparatus, here, near here, and for consumers, it’s American self-consumption, resulting in the worst understanding of drugs in human history since we first knew wine, alcohol, or beer.

Fentanyl and gasoline addicts: the total poisons of life in the world. Gasoline is worse than fentanyl.

Only the Black people here, ancestral here, more than 20,000 years old, the youth, the women who don’t want to see their children die en masse; white, Black, of all colors who still think, people who still think, who don’t sleep under fentanyl or under lying television, and who can stop the tyranny within the United States itself.

And around the world, citizens are taking to the streets in California, in New York, in Philadelphia, where the bell of liberty was rung despite the armies Trump sends against his own people to intimidate them, in the states of free citizens, in the same states that are no longer united today in the face of the tyranny of evil, of the worst kind, the president of the United States.

Don’t they see that a million Latin Americans have been murdered among themselves, the majority of them Colombians? And another million Americans will die from fentanyl.

Ten years ago, cocaine killed 3,000 people a year in this country, due to poisons mixed with it. Today, fentanyl kills 100,033 times more. The United States has improved—or worsened—with 50 years of absurd policies, and is leading its society to the Dantesque death of the drug that kills the brain and lungs in this death of humanity.

Genocide in Gaza

Trump not only lets missiles fall on young people in the Caribbean, but also imprisons and chains migrants, and allows missiles to be launched at young children, women, and the elderly in Gaza. He makes himself complicit in genocide because it is genocide, and we must shout it out again and again.

This building is a silent witness, and an accomplice, to a genocide in today’s world. When we thought it was Hitler’s sole property, Trump doesn’t talk about democracy, he doesn’t talk about the climate crisis, he doesn’t talk about life; he only threatens and kills, and allows tens of thousands to be killed.

However, during my administration in Colombia, we haven’t increased the homicide rate. We have the lowest unemployment rate of the century in the country, we have the lowest poverty rate of the century according to our statistics, and we boosted our agriculture to 10% annual growth, and our industry to 5% annually, and tourists came like never before, by the millions, to admire our immense beauty.

In a land of beauty and natural, human, and cultural diversity, we seek peace by talking with drug traffickers and rebels. I’m not ashamed to talk, always talking to save lives, putting as a principle the total eradication of illicit economies and the eradication of coca leaf crops by the very will of the peasants who are tired of the violence.

We don’t allow ourselves to be bribed by drug traffickers, as happened under previous Colombian governments, and we’ve already voluntarily eradicated 25,000 hectares. We’re successful in our new policy, which isn’t about drugs, but rather about drug trafficking, which is different.

We are grateful to the countries that have helped us sow peace: Qatar, Cuba, Mexico, the Vatican City, Norway, Brazil, and Venezuela. We are not grateful to those who want to lead us to war among ourselves.

Listen, ladies and gentlemen of the world, Latin America is not just about cocaine, terrorists, or drug traffickers. Latin America potentially has 1,400 gigabytes of clean electric energy capacity annually based on water, wind, and the sun. The United States, in the north, demands 1,200 gigabytes of energy every year, which today is 70% fossil fuels, that is, based on coal, gas, and oil.

If Latin America develops its clean energy potential, it could clean up the entire United States’ fossil energy mix. Listen, all that’s missing is the money, and it would make the greatest contribution to overcoming the climate crisis.

Today, with almost no progress between the potential for clean energy and the enormous absorbent sponge of the Amazon rainforest, Latin America is the vanguard of humanity that could take the first decisive step toward saving the planet and all humanity. It only takes $600 billion to develop its potential.

Africa can do the same with Europe. The sum of this fundamental decarbonization aspect would give us $1 trillion 200 billion—or $1.2 trillion USD, as they say in English. This money is already in the coffers of the United States, Europe, and China, but not a single dollar is moving profitably.

Or worse, it may still be very profitable in terms of human life, including life in the United States, Europe, and China, but they don’t want to become interdependent with Latin America and Africa. They know that linking clean energy from Latin America and Africa to the fossil fuel economies of the North not only decarbonizes the planet and saves it from climate collapse, but also shifts global power.

The one who speaks here sometimes, but speaks every day, is doing so with bombs and not with words. Decarbonization is returning, a global democracy is returning to power, and the relations of production are changing, because life and humanity come first, taking priority over greed.

Greed is the poison of life; it is an antagonistic contradiction, as Mao Zedong (Chinese politician, philosopher, intellectual, military strategist, founder of the Communist Party and the Republic of China) once said, but not thinking about bosses and workers, but between greed and the very life of planet Earth.

According to science, we have 10 years to reach the point of no return. 10 years, and once we reach that point, nothing can be done. We will only observe the catastrophes and feel them, even in our own families, because it will be, because it will be, if you can tell me, irreversible, the extinction of life, including human life.

Irreversibility of the process, no technology, no political or social force, no human mind will be able to do anything to stop the collapse and we have 10 years left, says science, but here they don’t believe in science, said one of the most powerful in the world, they don’t believe in science and that is called irrationalism and Germany, the country of great philosophers, of Feuerbach, of Hegel, of Kant, was philosophically filled with irrationalism.

And today, the United States is being filled with irrationalism, and it was the prelude to Hitler in 1933.

The solution is to stop consuming coal, oil, gas, hydrocarbons, and quickly move to water, sun, green hydrogen, wind, but the word decarbonization now sounds subversive at the conferences of powerful groups of countries, the G7, the G20, and in Davos (Switzerland), the mega-rich, just as the word democracy sounded subversive five centuries ago.

Investing in decarbonization

Even here, in New York, Cartagena, Bogotá, or Paris, and even more so in Madrid, the sums I’m talking about here—$600 billion, $1 trillion, $200 billion—are one or two zeros higher than the amount promised by developed countries.

Giving and it’s alms and they haven’t complied since the COP in Paris, because they’re not interested in decarbonization and the excessive figure on the meager loans from multilateral banks is between zeros, which are just that, pure innocuous alms, pure ideology thinking that the profitability of capital cleans the atmosphere and saves lives, lies, ideological, phantasmagorical, fetishes so that we don’t look up and don’t act as humanity.

The climate crisis requires prioritizing investment in decarbonization and adaptation in all public budgets. It requires a completely different global financial policy and the abolition of the debt risk premium.

Whoever said that countries that emit the most greenhouse gases, like this one, the second or first on Earth, are risky rather than not risky, and that countries that absorb CO2 and have jungles and lots of water and absorb CO2 from the north in the south are risky, because the market says otherwise, if not, it is because it is wrong and is heading towards the abyss of life.

We need to forgive debt in the poorest countries and exchange foreign debt payments for investment in climate crisis adaptation and mitigation. Gentlemen of China, Germany, the United States, Wall Street, Paris, and the London Stock Exchange, if you want to collect the interest on our countries’ foreign debt, you will find cemeteries and dead bodies, and when you go to collect it, you too will find cemeteries and dead bodies. That money is of no use amidst corpses.

Here is another subversive word: plan, global plan. The word was forgotten by the market. Planning was not necessary, they said. When planning is for human beings, it is anathema. So much religious and false belief was unleashed on the market, a fundamentalist belief that the market led to happiness, said Walras, the Swiss economist, and the abyss.

But what the market leads to is not happiness, but death and the abyss, as we see it today. Walras was wrong, neoliberalism was wrong from the start, and we’ve been guiding our countries for 50 years under completely erratic and unscientific formulas, and we haven’t changed them.

The plan must be binding on nation states, carried out in a global democracy, supervised in its compliance by the Security Council, without veto, because let us know that the market does not solve the climate crisis, let us know it once and for all, because it was capital itself that produced it – which is an unequal human relationship between those who are the owners of the coal and oil-hungry machine and the salaried worker, man or woman, who has to produce more and more things for the boss to sell – those things made with the boss’s machine that needs more and more oil, which produced the climate crisis.

Make more, sell more, earn more, more and more, and use more and more, then, coal and oil until today, but not until eternity, because oil and coal have reached their end, which, perhaps, is the end of capital. If not of capital, then of humanity and life.

So, the owner of capital is a powerful human being, and he’s not a thing, he’s not a fetish. That human being, with his greed, with his total enslavement to greed, is the one who will seek approval here, the search for ever more oil, the search for ever more oil in every country, regardless of the poisoning of the atmosphere with CO2, which is the poisoning of all life on the planet.

Drill, drill, and drill, they say, without mercy. So, capital or life, my friends, or greed or life, or barbarism or local and global democracy, or freedom or death, as Bolívar said, and raised this red, black, and also white flag: freedom, red, death, black, white, peace.

World Revolution

A global revolution of the people is possible. What is needed to positively overcome the climate crisis and prevent it from spiraling from crisis to global collapse is a revolution of united peoples, of civilizations, who must engage in dialogue more than the states themselves. It is a revolution of humanity to remain alive on the planet and free, perhaps, allied with some governments that want to defend life today.

The United Nations sees its crisis and the need for its transformation. Here, nation-states that no longer have power gather, and no matter how much they vote, they are ignored, because the nation-state has also reached its decline, perhaps its final one.

It was invented some centuries ago and it no longer works, and it no longer works because capital itself became global, not state-based. The socialism of (Joseph) Stalin (Soviet politician, military man, revolutionary, and dictator) should have become global and not state-based, but Stalin did not have the understanding for it and believed more in the tribe and condemned in Yalta a world revolution in Spain, in Italy, in Greece, and perhaps it would have been Latin America and others.

Humanity is the new political subject that appears, not the nation-state, and therefore, the United Nations must return and transform into a united, although diverse, humanity. A new political subject is appearing in human history, and it is important, and it seems spectacular to me, and it is that we are overcoming the idea of ​​the nation-state to become humanity.

But for humanity to be united and united in action, it must have democracy throughout the world; it must have permanent dialogue amidst diversity. It is the difference that drives us to the possibility of effective coordination of action on a global scale—humanity in dialogue.

Yes, civil humanity, yes, profoundly democratic humanity, yes, hopefully, a humanity of free people, which is its definition, its synonym, because there can be no such thing as enslaved humanity. Enslaved humanity is not humanity; it is beastly. Beastly is the one who enslaves, chains migrants, launches missiles at young people, and riddles children with missiles in a town very close to where Jesus was born.

This can no longer be resolved by states that talk but don’t act; it can’t be resolved by rulers bribed by oil and ready to launch missiles at the peoples of the South. A new political entity then emerges: humanity united and diverse in its cultures. While collapse approaches, and while the old, white societies of Europe and the United States continue to applaud their new, fashionable Hitlers, they listen neither to their youth, nor to their children, nor to humanity, nor to the stars, nor to their grandparents who died as heroes in the fields of Europe, truly fighting against Hitler and his criminal idea of ​​a superior race.

Today, they do the same thing Hitler did: they build concentration camps for migrants and applaud electoral majorities, saying migrants are an inferior race, collectivizing blame on them, as they did with the Jews, calling them terrorists, inferior, and thieves—all drug traffickers, they say. When most drug traffickers are blond and blue-eyed, and keep their enormous fortunes in the world’s largest banks, they don’t live in Bogotá, Caracas, the Caribbean, or Gaza, but in Miami, they are neighbors of the President of the United States, and they live in New York, Paris, Madrid, and Dubai. They live where there is luxury, not poverty, yet they fire missiles where there is poverty, not where there is luxury. It’s a lie that the Aragua train is a terrorist organization; they’re just common criminals in the form of a gang, swelled by the stupid idea of ​​blockading Venezuela and seizing its heavy, already poisonous oil.

Migrants are not criminals; they don’t need to be taken to concentration camps and expelled in chains. Migration is merely a product of the blockade against poorer countries like Iraq, Iran, Cuba, or Venezuela. The economic blockade is nothing less than genocide.

Migration is nothing more than the product of the impoverishment of the poorest countries due to unpayable and greedy debt. Migration is nothing more than the consequence of the wars and oil-fueled invasions unleashed by the United States and the European continent. Migration is nothing more than the consequence of the climate crisis, which is heading toward collapse and leaving tropical lands without water because the vital liquid evaporates as the heat increases.

The migration solution is nothing other than, or very different from, chains, prisons, or missiles. There is no superior race, gentlemen. There is no God’s chosen people.

Neither the United States nor Israel. Ignorant far-right fundamentalists think this way. God’s chosen people are all of humanity.

They use migration as an excuse to do nothing about the climate crisis that wipes out life every day. They leverage migration to win votes from whites and older men and women, but they hide the need to end coal and oil consumption from power, and they incentivize drilling and drilling and drilling. The UN needs to change now.

A different, humane UN must first and foremost stop the genocide in Gaza. Humanity cannot allow another day of genocide, nor can it allow Netanyahu’s genocidaires and his allies in the United States and Europe to go free. The United Nations must uphold international courts of justice, international law, which is the foundation of civilization and the wisdom of humanity encapsulated in history, and must enforce the judgment of its justice.

Diplomacy has already played its part, gentlemen, in the case of Gaza. It couldn’t solve it. It’s not true, and I apologize, Macron, that we can insist and insist on talking and talking when every second a missile falls and destroys the bodies of innocent babies, baby boys and baby girls, in the Arab country of Palestine.

Every day, emotions are vetoed in the UN Security Council; every day that passes, more children are bombed, every time you take bombs, every time you take dead people. The one who vetoes what he thinks is not a mother, is not a father, is not alive, perhaps comes from dark forces, is a robot because he has no heart to veto. The genocide must stop with what follows diplomacy.

It’s like a vote of the United Nations Assembly, not a vote of the Security Council, which vetoes. It’s like a United for Peace for Palestine, forming an armed force to defend the lives of the Palestinian people. It’s about words and weapons today.

They are not blue helmets, untrained and sometimes unwilling to do what they need. They are a powerful army of countries that do not accept genocide. Therefore, I invite the nations of the world and their peoples above all, as part of humanity, to unite their armies and weapons.

Palestine must be liberated. I invite the armies of Asia, of the Slavic peoples who so heroically defeated Hitler, the Latin American armies of Bolívar, of Garibaldi, who also had one in Italy, of Martí, of Artigas, of Santa Cruz. Words are no longer necessary in Bolívar’s hour of the sword of freedom or death, because they will not only bomb Gaza, not only the Caribbean, as they already do, but also humanity that cries out for freedom, because from Washington and NATO, they are killing democracy and reviving tyranny and totalitarianism on a global level.

We must raise the red and black flag of freedom or death that Bolívar raised, without forgetting the white color he raised alongside the red and black, the color of peace as hope for life on earth and in the heart of humanity. The United States no longer teaches democracy; instead, it kills it with its migrants and its greed. The United States teaches tyranny.

The UN must begin its change by stopping the genocide in Gaza with the effectiveness of a world-saving army, voted on by the United Nations General Assembly without veto. After saving Gaza, we will move on to the plan to decarbonize the planet’s economy, so that it becomes a democratically constructed global project and establishes global democracy. The body overseeing its rapid implementation will be the Security Council, but without vetoes. It will be binding on the WTO, the World Bank, the IMF, and the private financial system, given the enormous capacity of the national and global financial system to centralize capital. It is from there that humanity can regulate capital to subordinate it to life and humanity—a capital regulated and subordinated to life and people.

Along this path, the United Nations will transition from an alliance of states to an alliance of diverse peoples and cultures that make up humanity. If we overcome the climate crisis, and we will only do so united as humanity, we will also achieve the United Nations’ transition toward an assembly of peoples, seeking to ensure that every person on the planet is free, seeking to ensure that the minds of every person reach their full potential and interconnect on the planet, because that great mind of humanity, as a powerful intelligence, illuminated by ever-deepening science, will be able not only to save life on the planet but also to fulfill humanity’s mission, expanding life to the stars. A united and free humanity can look to the stars and reach them, just as the Roman legionaries once thought, back when they invented the Latin words ad astra, ad astra to the stars, always in the hour of freedom or death. And death in missiles is real, but so is freedom in the human heart and its capacity for unity, rebellion, and existence.

Thank you very much.

New York (United States), September 24, 2025

Let’s say that, listening to (US President Donald) Trump’s speech yesterday, I remembered an old writer, from the 20th century, who died in 1971, his name was Gyorgy Lukács. Gyorgy was Hungarian and had been involved in the Hungarian revolution back in the 1920s. And he went through, like all intellectuals of that time, Nazi persecution.

And in 1954, he wrote a book called ‘The Assault on Reason.’ I was just talking about it with economist Jeffrey Sachs, who’s here too. Greetings to Joseph Stiglitz.

‘The assault on reason’ is the intellectual idea of ​​writing about how a social thought evolves in society and in these Nazi configurations that existed before 1933, which gives way to the emergence of (Adolf) Hitler in 1933, how some liberals of the Weimar Republic (a German city) decide to hand over power to him, because Hitler was never a majority or was not an electoral majority at that time, the electoral majority was social democrat and communist, divided and killing each other.

The Social Democrats of that time also shot Rosa Luxemburg in the 1920s; later, that division led to the rise of Hitler, but in addition to the political circumstances, there was also a mental circumstance in society, a kind of impotence in allowing irrationalism to take over the intellectual space in a country like Germany, which boasted of having the best philosophers in the world.

Last night, well yesterday, what I saw was that very thing.

In Trump’s speech, and I’ve asked many American citizens I’ve met here, what is the state of American society? Well, we know ours, but here, in a relatively libertarian city like New York, the center of enormous struggles in the past and still today, or California, etc., because if American society moves toward irrationalism, which is what Trump called for, not science, not reason, the assault on reason, then we are in circumstances predating widespread barbarism.

And in light of that, let’s say, if one goes back and looks at these totalitarian proposals throughout history, they have almost always been based on two axes: people’s fear and lies.

(Joseph) Goebbels is a lie. Today, the media is in the hands of big capital, a lie about the possibility of a much more brutal, much more brutal Artificial Intelligence, in terms of information manipulation. If knowledge, which they call the cloud, which is the general intellect of humanity throughout history accumulated here in the present, is privatized—and there’s a reason Trump was on his inauguration day alongside Mr. Elon Musk and the owner of Facebook (Mark Zuckerberg), Microsoft (Bill Gates), etc.—then there’s a pending discussion here, which is global: Will there be private owners of the cloud, that is, of humanity’s accumulated intellect, digitized? Or will it be a global public domain? And that’s a first point of discussion that, I think, Europe can help us a lot with, more than we ourselves, who haven’t developed this topic much.

But this issue of lies and truth is a battlefield today, and we must give truth its weapons, and this means putting science on the side, reason on the side of unreason, and the battle has concrete instruments, debates, concrete spaces, and concrete forces.

The other part is fear.

The fears of humanity

What are you afraid of today? I’m going to finish, I’m already here finishing. Chileans are more disciplined than Colombians, aren’t they? We dance better, so we’re wasting time. We’re going to invite (former Chilean President Michelle) Bachelet to dance here at the United Nations, hopefully at the General Secretariat, wherever they invite us.

We have to go in strong, or else… That’s why I proposed an army to save the world, but so far, Indonesia has responded with a significant yes. We also need to talk about that. Because I learned in my youth that human beings aren’t understood through words alone, and especially now.

So, what fears?

I summarize the fears in three major fears, and they are not the only ones: fear of the climate crisis, it is evident, it is seen every day, even if you deny it, it appears.

There’s no need to explain it much, and it’s only going to get worse. From what we know from science, we’re approaching collapse, and that’s scary, scary to die, scary that your children will die.

Any woman in New York with children will be afraid. Overcoming the crisis allows us to avoid generating fear, and then we would have an alliance within humanity, but if humanity allows itself to be overcome by fear of the climate crisis and, above all, by what we propose to solve it. I’ll conclude.

We propose, in a way, as it’s read or as it can be manipulated, to put an end to comfort, and these are comfort societies. Europe, the Latin American middle classes, and the United States, comfort.

We’re going to get rid of the car, we’re going to get rid of the sooty house, we’re going to get rid of gasoline-powered transportation, etc. We’re going to get rid of everything made with oil, and almost everything is made with oil.

So, the world of wellness is carbonized. When we talk about decarbonization, it’s equivalent to taking away the world of wellness, and obviously, this implies a different discourse, because how comfort can be created with decarbonization, how art can be comfort, and so on—well, I won’t go into that further due to time.

The other fear is the fear of women. And the third fear is the fear of migrants. Fear of free women.

Oh, yes! The men I’ve seen around Colombia are, many of them, terrified of seeing a woman, per se, beautiful and intelligent; they’re overwhelmed. They like to see her beautiful, but not intelligent enough to dominate her.

But when beauty—and I’m not referring to the beauty imposed on us, but to the beauty that each human being has in their own spirit when they express it—combines intelligence, then the loss of power, which they have had for millennia, frightens man.

And that loss of power drives man to the extreme right. And that’s another of humanity’s fears.

And the third is the migrant.

A major current debate. The discussion about migrants has overshadowed the discussion of the climate crisis and has been premeditated, because the discussion about migrants brings in votes in racist societies, and many and majorities. And so, the left, progressivism, has clung to the need to win a majority.

It makes sense, but in racist societies, it sometimes involves bending the principles that say we are equal, free, and united.

So, a progressive discourse in Europe, especially—Pedro (Sánchez, President of the Spanish Government)—has to be very careful, right? It has to confront racism, not coexist with it, that is, an anti-immigrant policy, the same in the United States, the same in Colombia, because we have strong migrations, the same as (Chilean President Gabriel) Boric in Chile, excuse the discussion, and everywhere that grants rights to migrants.

He’s a human being, and every human being is subject to rights everywhere in the world, regardless of their skin color, and regardless of the racist reaction, even the majority of a society, progressivism must be there. Boric, excuse me.

Perhaps power is discussed in Europe not only with the ballot boxes, where only whites, Aryans, go, because the others don’t have the right to go to the polls, but also on the street.

That’s why we see massive European mobilizations and progressive defeats at the ballot box. If we combine the two: the streets and the ballot boxes in a political strategy, we unite the majority of the diverse European people, or the diverse people here in New York, or people everywhere in the world, and progressivism once again becomes the majority and, therefore, powerful.

I’ll leave these thoughts here. I went a little too far, Boric, but excuse me.

Video of the Colombian President’s speech. Video credit Colombian Presidency.

José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever,” second-in-command of the Second Marquetalia (Segunda Marquetalia), was allegedly killed in an August 5 ambush in the southern reaches of the Colombia-Venezuela border, according to a statement from the group. The Second Marquetalia is a dissident group of former fighters from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia — FARC), also known as the ex-FARC Mafia.

The statement accused the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional — ELN) of carrying out the attack using explosives and said it also claimed the lives of four other fighters. However, Colombian authorities have so far been unable to independently verify the claims.

*Sierra Sabogal’s death, which occurred during an ELN attack near the Colombia-Venezuela border, was confirmed on August 11 by Colombia’s Defense Minister, Pedro Sánchez.

The Second Marquetalia accused “Pedro Pablo” or “Copete,” commander of the José Daniel Pérez Carrero Front of the ELN’s Eastern War Front, of orchestrating the ambush. He allegedly invited high-ranking members of the Second Marquetalia to a meeting to lure them into the ambush.

“The ELN acted with malice and treachery. They carried out premeditated simultaneous attacks on other Second Marquetalia units located in the region,” the group said in the statement.

The killing is linked to a series of recent armed confrontations between the ELN and Second Marquetalia in the municipality of Maroa in Venezuela’s Amazonas state, which local sources began reporting to InSight Crime on August 3. The battles between both groups, according to those reports, took place along the border with the Colombian department of Guainia.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro confirmed the armed confrontation between the guerrilla groups. “The ELN has entered into war with the Second Marquetalia and their conflict extends into Venezuela, where they have already killed people,” the president said in a post on X.

SEE ALSO: Major Criminal Powers Dispute Key Corridors in Colombia

Before this fighting, both the ELN’s Eastern War Front and the dissident Acacio Medina Front, an ally of the Second Marquetalia, had maintained certain financial arrangements and territorial divisions along this part of the border. This allowed them each to manage the area and oversee illegal mining in Amazonas, as well as the drug trafficking routes that cut through this area.

Zarco Aldinever had been in the crosshairs of Colombian authorities. They accused him of being one of the main suspects behind the June shooting of Senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in the capital city of Bogotá.

The breaking down of the guerrilla alliance in this strategic border region may lead to further military advances from the ELN and spark a new conflict with major implications for both Colombia and Venezuela.

After Hugo Chávez became Venezuela’s president in 1999, he welcomed many FARC commanders into the country who went on to establish operations in several border states. However, when President Nicolás Maduro rose to power in 2013, he established more favorable relations with the ELN. With the tacit support of his regime, the ELN began to expand its operations across the border, eventually displacing some of the dissident FARC factions still there.

The latest flare-up between the ELN and ex-FARC Mafia comes about eight months after the start of another conflict between the guerrilla groups. In January 2025, the ELN launched a violent assault on the ex-FARC’s 33rd Front in the contested Catatumbo region, which is one of the world’s top cocaine-producing areas.

SEE ALSO: Colombia’s Peace Efforts Spark Criminal Disputes and Divisions

With the ELN also controlling key territory on the Venezuelan side in the state of Zulia, this cemented the guerrilla group as the top armed actor on the northern part of the border, granting them access to drug trafficking routes leading to dispatch points in Venezuela.

The ELN’s latest confrontation with the Second Marquetalia in the south suggests this may be the next key battleground for control of the border.

Unlike prior fighting, this conflict may develop more on the Venezuelan side. That is largely because the ex-FARC Mafia’s Acacio Medina Front has more military capacity on that side and can rely on more than a decade of experience operating there. Illegal mining in Amazonas and the drug trafficking corridors near Brazil represent hugely important financial resources for both groups, making it unlikely that either will cede control without a fight.

There is also the risk that the confrontation could expand further north into Venezuela’s Apure state, which borders the Colombian departments of Arauca and Vichada. The Second Marquetalia maintains a strong presence there, particularly in the town of Elorza in the municipality of Rómulo Gallegos. This has long been the preferred place for ex-FARC commanders to operate, and they have taken over ranches and set up camps in the region.

The alleged killing of Zarco Aldinever would add him to a growing list of FARC dissidents killed in Venezuela. Other infamous commanders killed there include Miguel Botache Santanilla, alias “Gentil Duarte,” Seuxis Pausías Hernández Solarte, alias “Jesús Santrich,” Hernán Darío Velásquez Saldarriaga, alias “El Paisa,” and Henry Castellanos Garzón, alias “Romaña.” The Second Marquetalia’s top leader, Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” was also gravely injured in Venezuela.

This article, written by the Venezuela Investigative Unit, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

Those resources are not coming from commodities. Despite oil production having increased since the days of Duque/Bayon, July exports from Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE Colombia were again down 4.1% with commodities (-25%) and oil (17%) both lower.

There were some sensationalist headlines (Bloomberg around how much tax the rich will pay under the new reform however, it is far more nuanced than that. Consumption accounts for around 27% (of the $6 billion USD), but there are areas of pure common sense within that. Alcohol & tobacco are two areas proposed, as well as VAT on international tourists. Where the rich may get more nervous is that 24% of the reform is geared towards lowering evasion – Colombians are experts at hiding their funds overseas and/or hiring brilliant accountants. Other areas targeted are mining/energy (3%), gambling (6%), & fuel (10%).

It’s a many-headed snake, but just as Perseus took care of Medusa back in Greece, the Colombian Congress will take a sword to the tax reform, as well as the 2026 budget – much of the media debate will prove redundant. Let’s see what is left in a few weeks.

In terms of the overall fiscal picture, made worse every month by the above exports and booming domestic demand, plenty are saying that the key is to reduce government spending by 3-4%/GDP, which seems sensible. But is that in education, the fight against poverty, or perhaps by simply suspending some massive public infrastructure projects?. Whatever Gustavo Petro does, the ANDI – Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia and its peanut gallery members will still be moaning.

Was it a sailboat or a speedboat? Was it carrying drugs? Did the US act legally? Was it dispatched by Nicolás Maduro? Will Donald Trump continue to punch downwards until he finds a country that doesn’t bite back? Is Petro correct to speak of caution, given that Colombia shares a 4000 km land border with Venezuela? Simply a rabbit hole I’m going to avoid.

There was news elsewhere in brief.

The current account deficit widened to 2.5%/GDP in Q2.

Vehicle sales in August hit 21,285, up 29% YoY.

The Colombian birthrate fell again in 2024 by 13.7% – no extinction fear yet, but growth is slowing.

A lumpy Friday to say the least!

Regards.

Roops.

Never miss Rupert’s latest commentary.
Follow him now on LinkedIn to see What Jumps Out.

Roulette wheel. Photo credit: stux from Pixabay.

Colombia is a tough call in terms of impact. Many of its exports to the US are inelastic in terms of demand, but it is a good moment to look around for new markets. According to the press, Colombia is in the 10% bracket, and US negotiators will arrive in May to thrash out the details. The political skirmish with the US from last weekend already appears to have blown over, which suggests there may have been a lot of exaggeration involved.

Forex traders are suffering, as are those with international trade. The Peso jumped above $4400, then fell back – where it will be next work is a guesstimate at best. There was good news from Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE Colombia on the inflation front for March with a 0.52% reading, which translated into 5.09% on a 12m basis. Consensus expectation from Fedesarrollo was 5.17%. This surely now gives Banco de la República – Colombia the space to lower rates in a couple of weeks.

One area where Colombia is caught in a trap is on gas. Local production has struggled, and whilst recent offshore discoveries will help the situation moving forward, there is work to do. The 2024 gas reserves data was published and has dropped to just 6 years, and there is a shortfall to be covered. Initially, the plan was to look for cheap imports from Venezuela; however, Trump’s hostility towards Caracas and the threat of sanctions for those trading with Nicolás Maduro have complicated the situation. To contextualize the situation in 2012, reserves were above 13 years; however, those at the ANH are hoping that we have now reached the bottom, and that increases due to discoveries will change the trend.

Moody’s was again discussing the fiscal rule, and despite some easing, feels that it won’t be achieved in 2025 due to a shortfall in government revenues. Again, we come back to the global chaos, which has seen oil prices collapse to $60. Gas-guzzling Americans will be ecstatic as the driving season approaches, but it is no help to Colombia.

Have a great day.

Roops.

Never miss Rupert’s latest commentary.
Follow him now on LinkedIn to see What Jumps Out.

Natural gas well. Photo credit: Ken Doerr.

President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace (Paz Total) policy, designed to negotiate agreements with the country’s main armed groups and criminal gangs, is struggling to make any headway as he passes the halfway point of his four-year administration. The negotiations have had profound effects on the criminal dynamics in the country.

SEE ALSO: What Is Behind Increased Violence in Colombia?

After initial progress in dialogue with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), talks collapsed in May last year when a faction of the group split off to pursue separate peace negotiations. The ELN’s extensive infrastructure and leadership in Venezuela, where Nicolás Maduro remains in power following a widely criticized election, has further undermined the chances of peace with the Marxist-Leninist rebel force.

Similarly, negotiations with dissidents of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) have faced significant setbacks. Fragmentation within these groups has sparked infighting, with splinter factions emerging from the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) and the Second Marquetalia, the two largest dissident factions. As a result, the government is engaging with only a small portion of each group.

The country’s most powerful drug-trafficking organization, the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), remains largely outside the Total Peace framework. Efforts have been stalled by the absence of a legal framework for negotiations and a potential peace deal. Similar legal obstacles have hindered progress in “urban peace laboratories” in cities like Buenaventura, Quibdó, and Medellín, where gangs dominate neighborhoods through drug trafficking and extortion rackets.

As Petro begins the third year of his presidency, InSight Crime reviews the key developments in Colombia’s peace dialogues and examines their criminal implications for 2025.

ELN

Initial progress with the ELN effectively unraveled as disputes with the government led to the collapse of negotiations.

In January last year, the Comuneros del Sur Front (Frente Comuneros del Sur – FCS), an ELN faction in southern Nariño, broke ranks, announcing plans to pursue separate “regional dialogue” with the government. Frustrated by the limited progress at the national level and growing threats from rival groups, the FCS sought a more localized approach. However, ELN top commander Eliecer Erlinto Chamorro, alias “Antonio García,” condemned these parallel dialogues as unauthorized and illegitimate.

SEE ALSO: Kidnappings Surge in Colombia Amid ELN Peace Negotiations

By May, the FCS formally severed ties with the ELN, emerging as a dissident faction of the guerrilla group. It quickly established dialogue with the government, advanced in peace talks, and even committed to a partial weapons handover, according to Carlos Augusto Erazo Murcia, head of the government’s negotiating team.

This was followed by the collapse of a bilateral ceasefire between the ELN and the government, which expired in August without renewal. After the ceasefire lapse, the ELN escalated hostilities by attacking a military base in Arauca in September, killing three soldiers. In response, the government suspended peace talks indefinitely.

The ELN and the government resumed talks on November 25, agreeing to reconvene in 2025 to reassess the dialogue process and explore the possibility of a renewed ceasefire.

The ELN also stands to benefit greatly from what was widely considered a stolen election in Venezuela, extending by another six years of Maduro’s time at the helm of the country. Venezuela remains a critical hub for the ELN, hosting much of its leadership and infrastructure.

Since the FARC’s demobilization in 2016, the ELN has expanded its presence in Venezuela and Colombia’s border departments, strengthening its operations through a symbiotic relationship with the Maduro regime. The group now controls entire sections of the border, managing smuggling and drug-trafficking corridors between the two countries, while maintaining corridors moving troops. Its influence spans eight of Venezuela’s 24 states, with significant income derived from controlling illegal mining and cocaine production zones.

With little interference and often support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—who depend on the income generated by these groups, particularly amid severe US sanctions—the ELN has solidified its presence along the 2,219 km border with Venezuela and uses this haven to project into Colombia. This growing entrenchment further undermines the Total Peace initiative.

Ex-FARC

Government dialogue with the EMC, the largest ex-FARC organization, has also splintered the group. In March, Petro suspended a bilateral ceasefire with the EMC in the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño due to ongoing violence against Indigenous communities. This decision deepened internal divisions within the EMC. Its leader, Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias “Iván Mordisco,” refused further negotiations until the ceasefire was reinstated, while another faction, led by Alexander Díaz, alias “Calarcá Córdoba,” opted to continue talks.

By April, the government expelled Mordisco’s faction from the peace talks, shifting its focus to negotiations exclusively with Calarcá’s bloc. In July, his group signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement, marking a tentative step forward. However, significant challenges remain: Calarcá’s faction has been accused of threatening demobilized FARC members in Caquetá, and in December, six soldiers were killed in a minefield allegedly planted by the group.

Mordisco’s wing, on the other hand, has intensified violent activities, particularly in Cauca, an important region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. By September, Cauca had recorded 466 violent incidents over 12 months, the most of any department during that period, with numbers continuing to rise through the end of 2024.

Meanwhile, the Second Marquetalia, a separate group of FARC dissidents led by Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” became the third major group to enter Total Peace negotiations in 2024. However, internal divisions also plagued this effort. In November, two key factions—the Border Command and the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico)—broke away, frustrated by Márquez’s leadership. They formed the National Bolivarian Army Coordinator (Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano), led by José Vicente Lesmes, alias “Walter Mendoza.”

AGC and Urban Groups

The AGC has been largely excluded from the Total Peace initiative thus far, but signs emerged in 2024 that Petro sought to change this. In July, he authorized dialogue with the group, signaling a potential shift in policy.

But significant obstacles remain. The government’s classification of the AGC as a high-impact organized crime group, rather than a political organization like the ELN or FARC dissidents, has become a sticking point in the negotiations. This designation precludes the AGC from seeking transitional justice terms, such as guarantees against extradition and amnesty, similar to those offered to the FARC in the 2016 peace agreement. Under Colombian law, high-impact organized crime groups are only eligible for limited judicial benefits, such as reduced sentences, making negotiations far less appealing for the AGC.

SEE ALSO: GameChangers 2023: The Cocaine Flash-to-Bang in 2024

Despite minor progress—such as the attorney general lifting arrest warrants for key AGC leaders—negotiations have yielded few tangible results. Tensions remain high: in December, the military bombed an AGC camp in northern Antioquia, underscoring the ongoing hostilities.

Moreover, skepticism about the AGC’s intentions persists. Some analysts suggest the group is using negotiations as a tactical maneuver to secure a bilateral ceasefire and reduce military pressure, rather than genuinely committing to demobilization. At the same time, its ongoing territorial expansion and dominance over key criminal economies fuel doubts about its willingness to disarm.

The absence of a legal framework for gang demobilization, or “transition to legality,” as it is officially termed, has also hindered progress in cities like Medellín, Quibdó, and Buenaventura.

Efforts to pass legislation to formalize a framework for gang demobilization have stalled in Colombia’s gridlocked congress, leaving urban peace efforts in limbo.

In Medellín, several gangs agreed to reduce violence following Petro’s 2022 election, resulting in a notable drop in homicide rates. In June 2023, Petro initiated a dialogue table with former gang leaders at Itagüí prison, but progress faltered in 2024.

In Quibdó, the gangs Los Mexicanos, Lokos Yam, and RPS began talks in August 2023, achieving significant milestones like a commitment to halt the extortion of teachers and health workers. But in September 2024, a ceasefire between the gangs collapsed, amidst incursions by the AGC into the city. In December, Petro authorized exploratory talks to include three additional groups—the Zetas, Cabí, and AGC—in the Quibdó table.

In Buenaventura, negotiations with the Spartans and Shottas—which together command over 1,700 members—have produced mixed results. The groups agreed to a truce in August 2023, significantly reducing violence throughout 2024. While tensions flared in March when the Spartans temporarily withdrew from the negotiations, they eventually returned to the table, and have renewed the ceasefire, currently set to last until February 2025.

Looking Forward

Several key factors will significantly influence peace negotiations in 2025.

First, the fragmentation of major groups within the Total Peace process highlights the challenges of negotiating with organizations that appear unified but are, in fact, loose coalitions of diverse factions. The Comuneros del Sur’s split from the ELN exposed the group’s limited control over its regional fronts. Similarly, the EMC’s divided leadership—between Mordisco and Calarcá—mirrors the internal tensions within the Second Marquetalia, where Iván Márquez has struggled to maintain cohesion among factions like the Border Command.

These fractures risk escalating violence as splinter groups vie for territorial control and factions excluded from peace talks increase attacks on government targets.

Since the EMC split, clashes between Mordisco’s and Calarcá’s factions have escalated in Putumayo, a key region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. Violence has also surged in other southwestern departments, such as Cauca. The deadly ELN attack on the military base could also foreshadow more violent confrontations between criminal groups and government forces, despite the relative lull achieved by ceasefires in 2024.

Second, the absence of widespread ceasefires with criminal groups has leveled the criminal playing field once again. Ceasefires maintained by the ELN and EMC in 2023 temporarily shifted criminal dynamics, allowing these groups to expand their territorial control, recruit new members, and focus on rival factions rather than government forces.

“We know [armed groups] have taken advantage of the ceasefire to try to increase their illegal control over the territory,” Colombia’s Minister of Defense said in a press conference in March 2024.

This reprieve boosted profits from drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion. In contrast, the AGC, excluded from ceasefire agreements, continued to face government offensives.

SEE ALSO: The Informants of Tibú: How the Colombian State Unleashed a Wave of Femicides

Currently, only the Calarcá dissidents and the FCS have active bilateral ceasefires with the government. The FCS, being relatively small, is unlikely to use the ceasefire for significant territorial expansion but will likely consolidate its holdings and defend against incoming EMC incursions into Nariño. Conversely, the Calarcá dissidents are better positioned to exploit their ceasefire to strengthen their presence in critical drug trafficking zones, particularly along the Amazonian border with Brazil and in parts of the Venezuelan frontier.

For groups like the Mordisco dissidents and the ELN, the absence of ceasefires means they will lose their distinct advantage as they compete for control over territories essential for drug trafficking, illegal mining, and other key revenue streams. However, the lack of ceasefires could give the AGC an edge.

Despite facing sustained military pressure, the AGC has expanded along the Pacific coast in Chocó, the Caribbean coast in Bolívar, Córdoba, and Cesar, and is encircling Catatumbo in Norte de Santander—one of Colombia’s most critical coca cultivation regions. With its criminal rivals now experiencing the same pressure it has endured, the AGC is poised to solidify and take even greater control as cocaine production explodes and gold prices approach record highs.

Third, Maduro’s dependence on Colombian criminal groups ensures that the ELN and Second Marquetalia will continue to strengthen their footholds in Venezuela and along Colombia’s border. With minimal interference—and often direct support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—both groups have entrenched themselves in the region, controlling key criminal economies such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and contraband smuggling.

With the prospect of six more years of protection under Maduro, these groups have little immediate incentive to engage in peace negotiations. Instead, they are well-positioned to expand their operations further.

This article, written by Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

She was released from her duties at DAPRE on January 20, when the government announced Jorge Rojas, previously deputy foreign minister, would be the new head of this office. The office of the Presidency announced her appointment as the new Foreign Minister the next day. Her responsibilities will officially begin on February 1st, but she is already working with the outgoing Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo to facilitate a smooth transition.

Murillo resigned in time to meet the legal requirements to run for political office in the next presidential election.

Murillo who has been dealing with exigencies like the passport printing contract scandal that removed former Foreign Minister Alvaro Leyva, the tense relations with Israel after the Gaza Strip conflict began, and the decisions of the UK and Germany to reimpose visa obligations for Colombians due to abuses of the asylum process, resigned and will leave office next Friday—ostensibly to return to academia. It should be noted however, that Murillo, a former presidential candidate who ran against Petro, resigned in time to meet the legal requirements to run for political office in the next presidential election.

Sarabia has been an important figure in Petro’s government for the last two years serving as a key communication link between ministers and the president. Her position as Petro’s right hand of the President put her into the public eye in May 2023 when a bag with a large amount of money disappeared from her residence. She accused her domestic employee, Merelbys Meza, of taking the money and allegedly forced her to take a polygraph test, This is an open investigation that precipitated her removal from government for seven months, until she returned as the head of the DAPRE.

Her new position will come with some challenges. One of the first tasks she will have is to address the situation created the past Sunday between Petro and the United States President Donald Trump, after Petro denied the entry of two flights bringing back deportees from the US. The initial response from Washington was a package of sanctions against Colombian officials and increasing the tariffs to 50% for Colombian exports, Later the same day, the sanctions were reversed after Petro agreed to Trump’s demands, however, Sarabia will have to carefully manage the diplomatic fallout from the crisis.

Sarabia will also focus her attention on the relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean, as President Petro proposes a unified position from the region against the political decisions made by Washington.

Headline photo: DAPRE Director Laura Sarabia is appointed as new Colombian Chancellor (Source: DAPRE official website)