The Colombian Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (MinCIT) has completed the national evaluation stage to select the country’s candidates for the UN Tourism Best Tourism Villages 2026. This initiative is a global program that recognizes rural destinations for cultural preservation, sustainability, and tourism development.

From an initial pool of 27 municipalities across 13 departments, eight were selected to advance to Colombia’s official international nomination phase, which will be submitted by the ministry’s technical team to UN Tourism.

“Twenty-seven municipalities from 13 departments participated, with proposals that reflect the diversity, richness, and commitment of Colombia’s rural territories.” – Diana Marcela Morales Rojas, Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism

The Minister added that the selection process had a technical evaluation and qualitative assessment before identifying the final eight candidates.

The Best Tourism Villages initiative, led by UN Tourism, recognizes rural destinations that preserve their cultural and natural heritage. the goal is to use tourism to support sustainable economic and social development.

The eight shortlisted municipalities now move to the international nomination stage, where they will represent Colombia in UN Tourism’s annual selection process.

Consaca in Narino (Photo: Alcaldía)

Located on the slopes of the Galeras volcano, Consacá combines high-altitude coffee production with traditional craftsmanship. The municipality is recognized for its toquilla-straw handicrafts and its historical connection to independence-era battles in the region.

(Photo: Alcaldía de El Peñón)

El Peñón is a rural municipality in Santander known for its natural landscapes, caves, and agricultural traditions. Its tourism proposal highlights the connection between local communities, farming activities, and the quiet rural experiences offered by its mountain surroundings.

Jericó in Antioquia (Photo: Alcaldía de Jericó)

Surrounded by the Western Cordillera in Antioquia, Jericó combines coffee culture, historic architecture, and deep-rooted traditions. The municipality is known for its flower-lined balconies, religious heritage, and as the birthplace of the carriel, the traditional leather satchel that has become one of the region’s most distinctive symbols.

Marulanda in Caldas (Photo: Alcaldía de Marulanda)

Surrounded by high-altitude páramos in Caldas, Marulanda preserves a rural identity built around sheep farming, wool craftsmanship, and traditional textile production. The municipality also maintains its arriería (muleteer) heritage, connecting its cultural traditions with the mountain landscapes that shape its tourism offer.

(Photo: Alcaldía de Norcasia)

Shaped by rivers descending from the Central Cordillera, Norcasia in Caldas blends cacao production, biodiversity, and adventure tourism with community-led initiatives. Its natural surroundings provide a setting for ecotourism experiences while local traditions remain central to the municipality’s tourism identity.

(Photo: Alcaldía de Paicol)

Often called La Puerta del Viento (The Gateway of the Wind), Paicol in Huila combines natural attractions with deep-rooted cultural traditions. The municipality’s caves, cacao production, and Semana Santa celebrations form part of a tourism offer that connects local heritage, landscapes, and community experiences.

(Photo: Alcaldía de Sesquilé)

Tied to the legend of El Dorado, Sesquilé in Cundinamarca offers a unique connection between ancestral heritage, nature, and rural tourism. Located near Lake Guatavita, the municipality works to preserve its páramo ecosystems and traditional knowledge while showcasing the landscapes that have shaped its cultural identity.

Colombia’s Procuraduría General de la Nación (Inspector General’s Office) has opened a formal preventive inquiry into a troubled government program to build four airports serving some of the country’s most isolated regions, after the Investigative Unit of Caracol Radio (Unidad Investigativa de Caracol Radio) documented that the projects had spent more than 60% of their budget while completing less than 20% of the physical work. The order, made public on June 17, 2026, directs the Aeronáutica Civil (Aerocivil) to account for the program’s schedules, spending and contracting.

The Procuraduría Delegada Segunda para la Vigilancia Preventiva de la Función Pública (Second Delegate Office for Preventive Oversight of Public Function) ordered monitoring of the airport projects prioritized by Aerocivil. In an official letter to the project’s general manager, delegate inspector Samuel Benjamín Arrieta Buelvas cited “possible delays in the execution of the works, differences between the financial execution and the physical progress of the projects, difficulties related to the supply of materials and inputs, observations on the contractual and logistical management of the project, as well as other risks that could affect the completion of the planned works.” The office gave the entity twelve points to answer, among them a detailed accounting of the funds received, committed, disbursed and executed for each airport; the contracts and supply, transport and oversight orders signed; and an explanation of the gap between the money spent and the physical progress recorded.

“It has happened before that I lay the first stone and they never lay another.” — President Gustavo Petro, at the August 2025 launch of the Bahía Solano airport works.

The inquiry follows the investigation by the Investigative Unit of Caracol Radio, also reported by El País and El Colombiano. The terminals were due to be finished in May 2025; none will be ready before President Gustavo Petro’s term ends on August 7, 2026.

The project is part of the program Aeropuertos para los Servicios Aéreos Esenciales (ASAES), created to keep air operations safe and efficient in hard-to-reach areas. The four terminals are in Bahía Solano, in Chocó; Magüí Payán, in Nariño; and Cumaribo and La Primavera, in Vichada — regions where roads are scarce or nonexistent and air travel is often the only permanent link to the rest of the country. Roughly 122,000 people depend on these airports for access to basic services, commerce and mobility.

The numbers at the center of the controversy come from the project’s own contract and oversight documents. The initiative carries an investment of $363.763 billion COP — more than $100 million USD — including a management fee of nearly $23.8 billion COP (about $6.5 million USD) for the state-owned Empresa Nacional Promotora del Desarrollo Territorial (Enterritorio). Aerocivil had disbursed around $214 billion COP, equal to 60% of the budget. Physical progress lagged far behind: Cumaribo was the most advanced at 18.4%, followed by La Primavera at 15.3% and Bahía Solano at just 5.5%, while in Magüí Payán work had not begun at all.

Three state entities share responsibility under an unusual arrangement. Aerocivil is the contracting party and supervisor; Enterritorio — successor to the controversial Fonade — handles overall management, including procurement, supply of materials and oversight; and the Ejército Nacional (National Army) executes the works through its engineering units, a use of the armed forces that Petro has defended since his 2022 campaign as a way to keep civilian contractors from abandoning the sites. Enterritorio, in turn, hired private operators to supply the soldiers with materials, food, spare parts and lodging.

Petro himself has voiced doubt about the works. At the August 2025 event launching the modernization of the José Celestino Mutis airport in Bahía Solano — more than 18 months after the agreement was signed — the president said, “It has happened before that I lay the first stone and they never lay another.” In the months since, the roughly 122,000 residents who stand to benefit have watched the projects stall amid a series of irregularities.

Minutes of the project’s technical-operating committee show problems from the earliest stages: repeated delays in hiring suppliers, late delivery of materials, difficulties getting equipment running and poor coordination among the participating entities. At a meeting on November 22, 2025, the secretary of airport services, Andrés Arboleda, recorded Aerocivil’s concern with Enterritorio’s management — 55% of the resources had been executed while physical progress stood at just 3%. The Army also objected, sending at least 15 letters since late 2023 warning of delays in hiring specialized personnel and shortfalls in the supply and quality certification of materials; in Bahía Solano, it reported, the works still lack all the required environmental permits.

The reporting also raises pointed questions about costs. Citing the contract documents obtained by the Investigative Unit of Caracol Radio, the project paid an intermediation fee of 4.9% plus VAT on billed goods and services — a charge that was neither written into the contract nor approved by the technical-operating committee, yet has already exceeded $4.2 billion COP (about $1.15 million USD) paid to private contractors. Internal documents flagged striking discrepancies between market prices and the amounts billed: wooden stakes billed at $38,000 COP against a real value of $1,000 COP, pavement baskets billed at $900,000 COP versus a calculated $107,000 COP, and a pavement cutter with a market price of $7 million COP that the project sought to bill at $26 million COP. In Bahía Solano alone, Aerocivil acknowledged total possible overruns of about $22 billion COP (around $6 million USD).

Aerocivil rejected budget-increase requests that would have raised the project’s value by roughly $57 billion COP — about 15% of the total. But it paid a price: the number of aerodromes to be upgraded was cut from six to four, dropping Bajo Baudó, in Chocó, and Barrancominas, in Guainía. El Colombiano named several of the private operators involved — DU Brands, Ferretería El Hidrante S.A., the consortia Aeropistas CPG and IRC, and Organización Tiempos de Paz, the last of which it reported is accused of subcontracting and failing to pay local suppliers.

Enterritorio denies any irregularity and attributes much of the delay to external factors. Its acting president, Esmeralda Molina, told the Investigative Unit of Caracol Radio that the complexity of the institutional structure, logistical difficulties, weather conditions and public-order problems had affected the schedule, and defended the experience of the private operators. The entity nonetheless declined to provide specific figures on the disbursements made and the level of compliance achieved by contractors, citing confidentiality and security.

State oversight bodies had already begun to circle before the latest order. The Procuraduría warned in May 2026 that Colombia’s air-transport system faces a “systemic risk” and asked that an investigation into Aerocivil be opened, as El País and Infobae reported. The Contraloría General de la República (Comptroller General’s Office) has separately flagged the ASAES program’s low execution — a weighted physical advance of just 2.31% as of December 2024 — and, in an unrelated audit of an Aerocivil water-treatment contract awarded without environmental permits, identified a presumed fiscal detriment of $5.67 billion COP, according to Portafolio and El Nuevo Siglo.

The episode has renewed scrutiny of convenios interadministrativos (inter-agency agreements) — widely used by public entities subject to state procurement rules to move resources to other state bodies that can then contract more freely, and more opaquely. The accumulated delays have produced four extensions of the agreement; the latest runs to August, though the entities involved already acknowledge that the new deadlines will be hard to meet. The works also drew earlier scrutiny: in November 2025, El País reported that Aerocivil had grounded most of Colombia’s passenger aircraft amid broader oversight failures.

For now, the next administration will inherit a project with the money largely spent but the infrastructure unbuilt — and the communities that were promised the terminals are still waiting. As El País put it, the promised terminals “remain more a project than a reality.”

This article is based on the original investigation by the Investigative Unit of Caracol Radio and the June 17, 2026 order of the Procuraduría General de la Nación, as reported by El País and El Colombiano.

The Norwegian renewable energy company Scatec ASA (OSE: SCATC) has reached financial close and initiated construction on the Barzalosa solar power plant in Colombia. The project, located in the municipio of Nariño within the department of Cundinamarca, has a planned capacity of 130 MWp. Total capital expenditure for the facility is estimated at $121 million USD.

The financing structure for the project is based on a 70% leverage model, utilizing a combination of equity and non-recourse debt. Scatec holds a 65% equity stake in the venture, while Norfund, the Norwegian investment fund for developing countries, provides the remaining 35%. The senior debt was provided by Bancolombia S.A. (NYSE: CIB; BVC: BCOLOMBIA) and the Financiera de Desarrollo Nacional (FDN).

The Financiera de Desarrollo Nacional committed a total of 200,358 million COP to the project. This includes a senior debt facility of up to 164,458 million COP with a term of 18 years, representing approximately 50% of the total project debt. Additionally, the FDN provided a bank guarantee of up to 35,900 million COP to substitute reserve accounts for debt service and operation and maintenance costs. The FDN also acted as a co-structurer for the financial framework of the operation.

“The financing of the Barzalosa project reflects the capacity of the FDN to structure long-term financial solutions that make strategic energy transition projects in Colombia viable,” said Enrique Cadena, Vice President of Structured Finance at the FDN.

The law firm Holland & Knight served as legal counsel to the lenders, Bancolombia and FDN, in the COP 330 billion financing transaction. The legal team was led by partner María Juliana Saa, with support from partner Inés Elvira Vesga and associates Juan Sebastián Parra and Juan Felipe Alonso. Other legal and financial advisors involved in the transaction included Cuatrecasas, which advised the borrower; Brigard Urrutia, which advised FDN regarding the credit facility; and Astris Finance, which provided financial structuring advice.

Revenue for the plant will be supported by a 15-year Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) with BTG Pactual Comercializadora de Energía (BVMF: BPAC11). The agreement covers 85% of the estimated energy production and is denominated in Colombian pesos, with adjustments based on the Producer Price Index. The remaining 15% of production will be sold on the Colombian spot market. The project is also eligible for the Cargo por Confiabilidad (reliability charge) and may access resources from the Inter-American Development Bank and the Climate Investment Funds.

Construction includes the installation of the solar array and the development of a six-kilometer transmission line to connect the plant to the national grid. Scatec is acting as the lead developer and the designated Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) provider, covering approximately 70% of the capital expenditure. The company will also manage operations, maintenance, and asset management. The Barzalosa plant is expected to reach its commercial operation date in the first half of 2027.

Traders and transport operators have suspended a 19-day blockade at the Rumichaca International Bridge, the primary land crossing between Colombia and Ecuador. The protest, catalyzed by a 50% tax imposed by the Ecuadorian government on Colombian goods, was lifted to accommodate travel and commerce during the Semana Santa holiday period. Despite the suspension of the strike, the regional business community reports that significant economic damage and diplomatic tensions persist.

Ecuador’s President Daniel Noboa (photo: Carlos Silva/Presidencia de la República)

The closure of the border crossing created a substantial disruption in binational economic activity. Estimates from the Cámara de Comercio de Ipiales in Nariño, Colombia indicate that losses reached approximately $5 million USD per day due to freight remaining stationary in the border zone. The Comité Gremial de Trabajadores de la Frontera de Ipiales stated that while the reopening is a responsible gesture for the high-traffic holiday season, current tariff policies continue to threaten hundreds of direct and indirect jobs linked to foreign trade.

The Governor of Nariño, Luis Alfonso Escobar, criticized the trade barriers implemented by the administration of Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa. Governor Escobar argued that such measures inadvertently encourage illicit activities in the region. He emphasized that instead of facilitating formal commerce, high tariffs drive trade toward illegality, undermining regional security efforts. To mitigate the conflict, the Comunidad Andina de Naciones (CAN) has initiated high-level dialogues. Diplomatic delegations led by Colombian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Juana Castro and her Ecuadorian counterpart, Alejandro Dávalos, held a virtual working group to address pending issues in trade, transport, energy, and hydrocarbons.

“Decisions adopted without considering the reality of our communities have put at risk the livelihood of merchants, transporters, foreign trade workers, and thousands of people who live from binational exchange,” stated the Comité Gremial de Trabajadores de la Frontera de Ipiales.

Diplomatic friction has extended into the energy sector. President Noboa claimed that in 2017, Ecuador assisted Colombia during a potential blackout by charging 1.6 cents USD per kWh, whereas in 2024, Colombia charged an average of 28 cents USD per kWh during Ecuador’s hydroelectric crisis. In response, the Colombian Minister of Mines and Energy, Edwin Palma, clarified that prices during the 2023-2024 El Niño phenomenon reflected the actual costs of production and distribution, particularly when fossil fuel-powered thermoelectric plants using fuel oil and diesel were activated.

The ongoing trade dispute has impacted more than 5,500 companies over the past two months. Diana Marcela Morales, the Colombian Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism, confirmed scheduled meetings with Ecuadorian officials to de-escalate the conflict and establish fair, transparent rules. Concurrently, the Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo has moved to protect domestic industries by implementing new tariffs on steel and ceramics from countries without existing free trade agreements. These measures aim to counter market distortions and protect a sector that employs more than 50,000 people while promoting circular economy practices and reducing CO2 emissions.

Above photo: Border between Ecuador & Colombia looking towards Ipiales, Colombia (Photo: Cancillería de Colombia)

The 15-year-old who shot Uribe on June 7 in Bogotá has been sentenced to seven years in a juvenile detention center for attempted homicide, the Attorney General’s Office reported on August 27.

The teenager pleaded guilty before Uribe died of his injuries on August 11, which prevented prosecutors from upgrading the charge to homicide, since Colombian law prohibits changes to charges once a formal accusation is filed against a minor. Five adults have also been arrested in connection with the case.

Authorities have suggested that the Second Marquetalia, a dissident faction of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), could have had a hand in Uribe’s killing, but have yet to present concrete evidence. National Police Director Carlos Fernando Triana first suggested a connection to the group in July, and Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez Suárez repeated the claim in August after Uribe’s death.

SEE ALSO: Colombia-Venezuela Border Killing Hints at Growing Guerrilla Conflict

The link to the group is vague, and via one of the five people arrested in connection with Uribe’s murder.

That’s Elder José Arteaga Hernández, alias “El Costeño,” who allegedly began working as a hired assassin after meeting a former FARC fighter known as “Daniel” in prison in 2019, according to police sources cited by Colombian newspaper El Espectador.

Daniel, once a member of the Teófilo Forero Mobile Column, an elite FARC unit behind some of the group’s most notorious attacks, has reportedly been helping rebuild the column within the Second Marquetalia in southern Huila and northern Caquetá, according to Colombian newspaper El Colombiano. Therefore, he would serve as a potential bridge between the Second Marquetalia and the Uribe assassination.

Two other suspects currently in custody also appear tied to Caquetá, where the Teófilo Forero Column is allegedly reorganizing. Katerine Andrea Martínez Martínez, alias “Gabriela,” who supplied the minor with the weapon to shoot Uribe, was arrested in Florencia in June, while Carlos Eduardo Mora González has faced an arms trafficking case before a Florencia court since 2024.

Nearly three months after the shooting of Turbay, investigators have yet to clarify who ordered the crime. The arrests point to a network of low- and mid-level operatives with ties to FARC dissident circles, but no clear political motive has emerged.

However, the available evidence suggests the focus on the Second Marquetalia may be misplaced. Once a feared rebel faction, the group is now among Colombia’s weakest armed organizations, having had its leadership decimated over the past five years.

Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” the group’s leader, was seriously injured in a 2022 attack, prompting repeated reports of his death. He resurfaced in 2024 through a video and later a public appearance, confirming he was alive, though widely believed to be in poor health.

Other senior figures have also been eliminated. Seuxis Pausías Hernández Solarte, alias “Jesús Santrich,” who co-founded the Second Marquetalia with Márquez after rejecting the 2016 peace deal, was killed in 2021. That same year, commanders Hernán Darío Velásquez, alias “El Paisa,” and Henry Castellanos Garzón, alias “Romaña,” were killed in Venezuela’s Apure state. Most recently, in August 2025, José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever,” one of Márquez’s key lieutenants, was also killed in Venezuela.

SEE ALSO: Who Was Behind the Attempted Hit on a Colombian Presidential Hopeful?

As well as these losses, the Second Marquetalia suffered a major rift in November 2024. The Border Command (Comandos de la Frontera – CDF) and the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico – CGP), two of its most influential factions operating in Nariño and Putumayo, announced they were breaking away after disagreements over the group’s stance in peace talks with the government.

Given the group’s fragile internal state and mounting competition from rival criminal actors, authorities have yet to present evidence of any clear motive for the Second Marquetalia to order such an assassination.

Nonetheless, the lack of clarity about the attack underscores the risks heading into Colombia’s elections next year. Uribe’s assassination sets a precedent that could embolden other armed groups to use targeted political violence as leverage. With organized crime interests tied to the continuation of peace talks and possible judicial benefits stemming from negotiations, the next electoral cycle may see criminal actors intervening more directly in politics through violence.

This article, written by Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

After several months of tracking and surveillance, Colombian security forces arrested Larry Amaury Álvarez Núñez, alias “Larry Changa,” leader and co-founder of Tren de Aragua, the Venezuelan-born criminal organization with tentacles across different countries. He was hiding in a luxurious mansion he built from the ground up, in an exclusive rural area of the municipality of Circasia, in the department of Quindío. A security ring of nine bodyguards usually protected him and drove a luxury vehicle around the coffee-growing region.

“‘Larry Changa’ would have arrived in Colombia in 2022, obtaining false documents. He was in charge of the criminal strategy for the territorial expansion of the ‘Tren de Aragua’ in Colombian territory,” the Colombian Ministry of Defense posted on its X account.

Larry Changa, according to Chilean prosecutors and Colombian police who spoke to InSight Crime, was initially responsible for the establishment of Tren de Aragua cells in Chile and the wider logistical deployment in the south of the continent. After his presence was detected by Chilean security agencies, he had to flee and seek a new refuge.

His arrival in Colombia was just another chapter in Tren de Aragua’s continental expansion.

In addition to being the first choice of the nearly eight million Venezuelan migrants who have fled economic collapse, Colombia had already proven to be fertile territory for Tren de Aragua’s operations, expanding its criminal rents and offering refuge to some of its most notorious leaders.

Hiding among more than two million Venezuelans in Colombia, Tren de Aragua had been putting down roots in different parts of the country, including the capital, Bogotá. But the most established strongholds are along the Colombia-Venezuela border, where the Venezuelan criminals charge tolls to migrants. Here, Tren de Aragua begins its exploitation of the exodus, the starting point for the human smuggling networks that extend across South America and northwards to the United States.

La Parada: Tren de Aragua Shows Its Face

The irregular border crossings, known as “trochas,” which allow millions of Venezuelan migrants to enter Colombia, also became strategic routes for the transnational advance of Tren de Aragua.

In 2018, according to authorities and residents consulted by InSight Crime, Tren de Aragua established its first bases in the township of La Parada, in the municipality of Villa del Rosario, in Colombia’s Norte de Santander department. Adopting a low profile, its members took advantage of the growing human flow to consolidate an illicit business that thrived amid the vulnerability of the passing migrants.

At that time, Colombia was home to more than a million Venezuelan migrants scattered across different regions of the country. Villa del Rosario, in particular, had consolidated itself as one of the main entry points, serving as a key corridor for the migratory flow from Venezuela.

“This is an attractive place for them because it is a point where illegality proliferates, especially in smuggling and trafficking of irregular migrants,” an officer from the Metropolitan Police of Cúcuta, the capital of Norte de Santander, who requested anonymity for institutional reasons, told InSight Crime.

Once settled in several different border neighborhoods in La Parada, Tren de Aragua began exercising strict control over the Los Mangos and La Marina trochas, among other clandestine trails. The gang began to dominate several illegal economies through the use of violence and terror.

Migrants became their main target. Since the group’s arrival in this border area and until 2022, the border was closed, and the main legal crossing point, the Simón Bolívar International Bridge. This forced thousands of migrants to use the trochas, exposing them to extortion and abuse. Tren de Aragua charged travelers a $10 toll to cross, while bus drivers carrying migrants had to pay up to $125 in “taxes.”

“Tren de Aragua controls the Colombian side. To travel to Bogotá and then to Quito, Ecuador, you have to pay a fee to that group,” said a resident of La Parada, who preferred not to reveal his identity.

In addition, the gang imposed curfews in the areas under their control and demanded weekly payments of between $10 and $15 from local merchants. Those who refused to pay faced brutal reprisals, such as the throwing of grenades or the use of indiscriminate violence, a Tren de Aragua hallmark. In some areas of La Parada, media reports and security sources revealed the existence of torture houses, where those who disobeyed the rules or did not pay extortion fees were punished.

Faced with the advance of Tren de Aragua and increased insecurity in La Parada and several neighborhoods of the city of Cúcuta, the security forces intensified their efforts, capturing several members of the organization, including some leaders and hired killers.

In addition to facing state action, Tren de Aragua has had to contend with superior criminal rivals.

Following an armed dispute between 2021 and 2022 with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), the Colombian guerrilla group that dominates the criminal scene along the Colombian-Venezuelan border, a territorial division was created. Tren de Aragua was left controlling the Colombian side with no possibility of entering or doing business on the Venezuelan side, which remained under the control of the insurgency, acting with the blessing of the Maduro regime. The ELN was protected in Venezuela, but exposed to the security forces in Colombia.

Despite the state’s offensive and struggles with the ELN and other criminal groups, the gang continued to operate in Villa del Rosario and Cúcuta. Immersed in migrant smuggling, human trafficking, small-scale drug trafficking, prostitution, and extortion, they managed to consolidate themselves as one of the main criminal players in this part of the border.

SEE ALSO: With Venezuelan Criminal Groups Strengthening, Violence in Cúcuta Rises

Tren de Aragua’s criminal fiefdom at this crossing point allowed the entry into Colombia of other gangs of Venezuelan origin that were boosted by the reputation of Tren de Aragua.

Linked to more than 50 murders in Cucuta, according to official reports cited by the local press, the AK-47 gang, led by Jhoswar Saul Hernandez Sanabria, alias “Saul,” – captured in Venezuela – began as a satellite cell of Tren de Aragua before becoming independent. It currently operates in the center of the city, where it extorts merchants and has several drug sales points under its control.

The evolution of this faction, of Venezuelan origin, has escalated into a fierce dispute with other criminal organizations over control of the currency exchange houses. These financial operations, often used as a front for money laundering, have become points of friction. In addition, the recruitment of Colombians into their ranks demonstrates the gang’s ability to offer more attractive incentives than those of local criminal organizations.

Expanding Operations Beyond the Border

In the early morning hours of August 25, 2022, residents of a working-class neighborhood in Bogotá, Colombia, awoke to a gruesome scene. In the middle of the street, abandoned in a cart, were three corpses wrapped in black plastic garbage bags.

Leaving these bodies in public view was no random act. Behind the grim display was a violent territorial dispute between Tren de Aragua and local gangs for control over illicit activities in the Bogotá districts of Kennedy, Bosa, and Los Mártires.

Aníbal Fernández de Soto, then Bogotá’s security secretary, confirmed this in a statement. “The Tren de Aragua organization is the main group responsible for homicides in which bodies have been left in bags in public spaces in several areas of the city,” he said.

Between 2022 and 2023, local authorities documented at least 57 cases of people killed and found wrapped in garbage bags, many of them dismembered and showing clear signs of torture. It is unknown how many of these killings were directly carried out by Tren de Aragua.

The gang’s extreme violence was key to securing its place in the Colombian capital’s criminal underworld.

In its first phase, the group infiltrated Bogotá’s local criminal organizations, triggering a wave of betrayals that ended with its takeover of gangs like the Camilos. This conflict, which left more than 36 dead, allowed the Venezuelan group to consolidate control in strategic areas of Bogotá, including the commercial hub known as Corabastos and retail drug sale points in Kennedy and Ciudad Bolívar.

“To grow, they first ally with other criminal structures. That’s what happened when Tren de Aragua began to emerge in Aragua state and later extended its influence by partnering with organizations in other states to increase its criminal profits,” an investigator with Colombia’s anti-kidnapping and anti-extortion police unit told InSight Crime.

One faction that followed this strategy was the gang led by José Manuel Vera, alias “Satanás.” Initially operating as a satellite of Tren de Aragua, the group eventually gained enough manpower and illicit revenue to break away and form an autonomous network focused on extortion and microtrafficking in several Bogotá neighborhoods.

Although Satanás was arrested in Ecuador in November 2023 and extradited to Colombia, his criminal influence did not end. From inside the Palogordo prison in Santander department – and with the complicity of corrupt guards – his network remained active, using contraband cell phones to extort victims and keep cash flowing. Even behind bars, his power remained intact.

Corruption inside the security forces also impacted the streets of Bogotá.

In early 2023, a joint intelligence operation by the police and the Attorney General’s Office uncovered Tren de Aragua’s infiltration of the capital, identifying one lieutenant and five noncommissioned officers on the gang’s payroll. These police officers provided a range of services to the transnational network, including protecting leaders, collecting extortion payments, selling confidential information, and issuing safe conducts to control areas of sexual exploitation and small-scale drug trafficking in Kennedy.

Colombian authorities have continued investigating the group. In Bogotá, they also discovered that the gang owned several nightclubs used to launder proceeds from its criminal activities. The parties held in these venues – which featured international DJs – helped boost its other businesses, especially retail drug trafficking. The logistical coordinator of these operations, identified by the alias “Eryk,” was arrested in October 2024 after months of investigation.

While Tren de Aragua’s attempts to expand into other parts of the city have been thwarted, the gang has achieved a degree of consolidation in its strongholds in the capital. At the same time, efforts to enter other Colombian departments have failed, particularly in areas where they have encountered more experienced and better-established local criminal structures.

Putting the Brakes on Criminal Greed

After establishing an effective grip on certain territories and illicit economies in Bogotá and Norte de Santander, Tren de Aragua sought to replicate its model in other parts of Colombia.

However, this expansion has been hindered by the presence of more heavily armed local criminal groups and the response of security forces.

Unlike Bogotá, where criminal control is more fragmented, Medellín – famous as the cradle of Pablo Escobar’s drug trafficking empire – has resisted Tren de Aragua’s advance, thanks in part to a consolidated criminal underworld unwilling to cede territory.

“In Medellín, we’ve found it striking, especially compared to other cities, that they haven’t managed to break in,” a police investigator told InSight Crime in 2024.

Security experts consulted for this investigation, including Hugo Acero, former Bogotá security secretary, say the level of criminal governance exercised by structures like the Oficina de Envigado – a federation of criminal organizations that began as a hitman-for-hire network in the 1980s under the Medellín Cartel – prevents new players like Tren de Aragua from putting down roots in this city.

However, the gang did not give up. In Medellín’s busy streets and entrenched criminal underworld, the city has seen multiple Tren de Aragua members seek refuge in 2025 — only to be found by authorities or killed by rival criminals. These opportunities, during which they have also explored the potential of local criminal markets, show the gang’s ongoing interest in Colombia’s second city.

In one case in late July, two alleged members who had arrived in March from the United States used their stay to traffic weapons and sell synthetic drugs, according to Colombian police investigations.

SEE ALSO: Colombia Nabs Another Top Tren de Aragua Leader With Venezuela’s Help

Beyond Medellín, Tren de Aragua and other Venezuelan-origin gangs have also faced resistance in other parts of Colombia.

In 2021, the discovery of a corpse bearing a sign reading “killed for being from Tren de Aragua” revealed the resistance they encountered in Arauca, a border region known for drug and migrant trafficking. Their main rivals there were dissident elements of the now demobilized guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia — FARC), whose experience and military power thwarted the Venezuelan group’s push into this border region.

In addition to FARC dissidents, Arauca is an ELN stronghold, making it an extremely difficult area to penetrate. Tren de Aragua could not replicate its border-expansion strategy there, as it did in Villa del Rosario, unable to defeat two very powerful Colombian criminal structures.

Even so, Tren de Aragua appears to have identified the potential of other areas in Colombia not as places to install a criminal presence, but as safe havens amid heightened security force pressure.

Several major arrests of the group’s leaders have occurred in towns and departments where the group has no visible operations. Instead, members have focused on investments in rural areas in the country’s interior. This was the case with Larry Changa, who was arrested at a mansion under construction in an exclusive sector of Circasia, in the Colombian department of Quindío, driving a luxury vehicle.

Another leading figure in Tren de Aragua’s Chilean operations was also arrested in Colombia. In December 2024, police captured Carlos Francisco Gómez Moreno, alias “Bobby,” in Los Patios, a municipality bordering Villa del Rosario in Norte de Santander. Chilean prosecutors say Bobby is one of Tren de Aragua’s leaders in Chile, suggesting Colombia may have become both a base of operations and a hideout for the gang’s international leadership.

Also noteworthy was the arrest of gang member Jeison Alexander Lorca Salazar, alias “Jeison Comino,” found at a luxury ranch in Los Santos, in the Santander department.

The movements of these Venezuelan criminals have not gone unnoticed. Colombian security forces have actively worked to prevent these transnational organizations from gaining ground in the country, establishing cooperation mechanisms with neighboring nations where Tren de Aragua operates. In some cases, they have even received help from the Venezuelan government, as in the capture of Jeison Comino.

That arrest was billed as a high-level operation, with Jeison Comino described as the gang’s second-in-command. In reality, the criminal, who had been active in Venezuela, was a lieutenant in the gang of El Conejo, one of Tren de Aragua’s satellite groups in Aragua state that weakened after its leader died in 2023.

The lack of reliable, verified information – partly due to the absence of Venezuelan cooperation and the low credibility of the little information they do share – leads to inflated claims about arrests and the gang’s reach.

Even so, other significant captures have dealt real blows to the group’s Colombian expansion, such as that of Salomón Fernández Torres, alias “Salomón,” on June 27, 2024. A top confidant of Niño Guerrero and the group’s financial chief in Bogotá, he was arrested as part of a series of operations by police and prosecutors that, by June 2024, had led to more than 240 Tren de Aragua members being detained.

Authorities now have their sights set on Giovanny Vicente Mosquera Serrano, alias “Giovanny San Vicente,” considered the gang’s top coordinator in Colombia and a liaison between its factions abroad. US authorities have offered a reward of up to $3 million for information leading to his arrest.

But just as the movement of migrants did not stop in Colombia, neither did Tren de Aragua’s operations.

Members of the organization moved into the municipality of Ipiales, in Nariño department at Colombia’s southern border— a strategic point on the migration route to Ecuador, Peru, and Chile — where they profited from migrant flows and extorted locals, according to leaked emails and documents from Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office in what became known as the NarcoFiles project.

Tren de Aragua’s next stop on the migrant trail to the south, Peru, offered a criminal market ripe for extortion, fueled by a growing Venezuelan migrant community that allowed the gang to establish itself. In a less crowded criminal landscape, with less experienced security forces and an unstable political climate, Tren de Aragua was able to flourish like never before.

This article, written by the Venezuela Investigative Unit, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

The prices of products such as carrots, beets, junca and bighead onions, broccoli, and green beans in pods increased by more than 10% driven by a lower supply from key regions such as Cundinamarca, Antioquia, Boyacá, and Nariño. In contrast, products such as cucumber, chocolo (corn), tomatoes, and green beans registered decreases, in some cases also greater than 10%.

In the group of fresh fruits, the price falls in mandarins, lemons, guava, oranges, pineapples, avocados, apples, soursops (guanabana), and bananas stood out. However, some tropical fruits such as tree tomatoes (tomatos de arból), mangoes, and passion fruit showed considerable increases, as did grapes, melons, and dragon fruits (pitaya).

“These price fluctuations respond to both climatic conditions and natural production cycles, which forces us to continue strengthening agricultural planning with data. We continue to advance in tools to anticipate these variations and better guide production and marketing in the territories,” said Dora Inés Rey, director of the UPRA.

In tubers, decreases were recorded in the native and black potato varieties, as well as in the arracacha. However, products such as bananas, yams, and cassava reported moderate increases, in line with their seasonal behavior. In meat, the prices of several cuts of beef, fish, and chicken increased slightly, while Dora Inés Rey presented a generalized, although moderate, reduction.

The behavior of egg prices was on the rise in all categories, and the same happened with artisanal cheeses. In grains and cereals, decreases were observed in products such as yellow corn and imported lentils, while beans such as red cargo and radical increased their price. Finally, among processed foods, increases were recorded in sugar, coffee, chocolates, and refined oils; while decreases were observed in flours, pastes, and mixed vegetable oils.

Pork. Photo credit: ludiarin from Pixabay.

This positive performance was reflected in 16 of the 23 cities with reference wholesale markets, with especially notable increases in Tibasosa (67.8%), Manizales (29.2%), Villavicencio (15.3%), Armenia (12.5%), Medellín (11.3%), and Bogotá (8.4%). Although there were reductions in some points, such as Ipiales (-25.4%) and Santa Marta (-22.8%), the national balance was largely positive.

By food groups, the greatest dynamism was in processed foods (15.3%), grains and cereals (12.8%), fish (10.2%), dairy products and eggs (9.2%) and tubers, roots and bananas (7.0%). Fruit (5.9%) and vegetables (4.4%) also increased. Only the meat group showed a slight decrease (-1.7%).

“This data confirms that the countryside is responding to the country’s food demand. To plan efficiently, we need to know what is coming, from where, and in what quantities. Technical monitoring of supply is key to guaranteeing food security and guiding production from rural territories,” said Dora Inés Rey, director of the UPRA.

In the group of vegetables, 180,620 tons entered, with outstanding behaviors in the supply of beans (33.9%), corn (32%), celery (19.4%), garlic (18.8%), cucumber (17%) and peppers (16.2%). Increases were also reported in carrots, onions, beans and other vegetables. On the other hand, the entry of green peas, cabbage, tomatoes, onions, pumpkins and lettuce decreased.
In the case of Cali, one of the main receiving cities, 42% of the volume of vegetables came from Valle del Cauca, followed by Nariño (22.8%), Bogotá (16.3%), Boyacá (14.3%) and Cauca (2%), evidencing the articulation between producing regions and urban markets.

Onions. Photo credit: moviedo from Pixabay.

Among the foods that reported falls in their prices are black and creole potatoes (more than 10%), arracacha, plantains, and pork, whose different cuts fell without exceeding 5%. Some cuts of chicken, such as wings, legs, and breast, also decreased, as did fruit such as mango, passion fruit, tangerine, lemon, orange, and papaya. In the vegetable group, products such as junca onions, broccoli, green beans in pods, and paprika became cheaper.

In contrast, the largest price increases were recorded in vegetables such as white and red onions, tomatoes, cucumbers, green peas in pods, and carrots, with variations of more than 10%. Products such as beans, pumpkins, and some lettuce also rose. The rise in green peas, for example, was explained by lower availability from regions such as Nariño, Cundinamarca, and Antioquia, while cucumber was affected by harvest pauses in Norte de Santander, Risaralda, and Boyacá.

“Technical monitoring of price behavior is key to understanding the dynamics of the agri-food system. With this data, we can anticipate risks that affect food safety. Productive planning requires reliable information to make timely decisions in public policy,” said Dora Inés Rey, director of the UPRA.

In the group of grains and cereals, decreases were observed in imported products such as dry peas, threshed yellow corn, and lentils, while some varieties of domestic beans, prime rice, and imported husk corn became more expensive. As for processed foods, the prices of refined sugar, wheat flour, vegetable oil, and ground coffee rose, while products such as sunflower oil, cornstarch, and some pasta decreased.

The behavior of prices during May reflects, in several cases, the effect of weather conditions and harvest closures, as well as normal market adjustments. These data allow us to better understand the relationship between production, supply, and prices, which is key to guiding national agri-food policy.

Eggs. Photo credit: akirEVarga from Pixabay.

“Although the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon is in a neutral phase and does not directly influence current weather conditions, the bulletin warns that there is still a high probability of rainfall above historical averages in several departments, with the potential for extreme events that could seriously impact agricultural production systems and rural infrastructure,” said Alfonso Triana.  A specialized professional of the UPRA.

Likewise, Cesar Cortés, UPRA expert, explained: “The UPRA analysis reveals that this risk would especially affect crops of banana, cocoa, coffee, fruit trees, vegetables, roots and tubers, with the possibility of anoxia in soils, spread of diseases and logistical difficulties for marketing, mainly in the Andean, Pacific, Caribbean regions and areas of the Orinoquia and Amazon.”

The departments with the highest concentration of vulnerable hectares are Antioquia, Cundinamarca, Cauca, Boyacá, Tolima, and Nariño, which reinforces the need to take measures with a differential and territorial approach.

The report also provides a detailed overview by region and municipality. “In the Andean region alone, around 340,000 ha were identified at low risk and about 1,500 ha at medium risk, distributed in 41 municipalities. In the Caribbean, more than 85,000 ha are at low risk and 624 ha at medium risk, while in the Pacific, low risk affects about 195,000 ha. In the Amazon and Orinoquía, although the area at risk is smaller, the vulnerability of rural infrastructure is a concern,” said Alexander Rodríguez Romero, UPRA’s technical director of efficient land use and land adaptation.

The bulletin includes an analysis by crop group that shows that, although the cultivated area at medium risk represents only 0.05% of the national total (2,440 ha of 4.7 million), the impact can be severe depending on the type of production:

• Fruit trees: 1,063 ha at risk (43.6% of the total at risk).
• Traditional tropical crops (cocoa, coffee, sugarcane): 891 ha.
• Oilseeds: 182 ha.
• Vegetables: 64 ha with a high proportion affected (0.09% of the total cultivated group).
• Cereals (maize and rice): 99 ha.
• Roots and tubers (potato, cassava, yams): 108 ha.
• Legumes and aromatics: 33 ha in total.

For her part, Dora Inés Rey Martínez, acting director of UPRA, concluded: “Faced with this panorama, UPRA reiterates the need for informed and preventive agroclimatic planning. Producers are recommended to adopt water management, drainage, pest monitoring, and planting staggering practices. Likewise, a call is made to the territorial authorities to strengthen agroclimatic technical assistance and support the most exposed territories with infrastructure and differential actions.”

Key figures:

• 0.7% of the agricultural frontier in Colombia, that is, about 300,000 hectares, is at specific risk, mainly low, due to excess rainfall in different regions of the country for the period between May and October.
• 2,440 hectares under cultivation are estimated at medium risk, especially fruit trees (43.6% of the total).
• Andean and Pacific regions, the most exposed by medium and low risk.

Walking in the rain. Photo credit: wal_172619 from Pixabay.