The decree, issued by the Ministerio de Defensa Nacional (Ministry of Defense), ends the additional special authorization that holders of an individual carrying permit had to obtain on top of their existing license during the suspension. It does not create new rights, authorize unrestricted or indiscriminate carrying, or alter the licensing requirements, restrictions and controls set out in Decree Law 2535 of 1993, Colombia’s foundational arms statute, according to the decree’s text. The state’s constitutional monopoly over weapons, war ammunition and explosives under Article 223 of the Constitution remains in force.

“For years, the citizen who obeys the law was restricted, while criminals kept arming themselves illegally to the teeth. That has to change,” de la Espriella wrote on his X account. He added that the change “does not mean indiscriminate carrying” and that strict controls, requirements and permits from the competent authorities remain in place. “What ends is the general suspension that turned the prohibition into the rule,” he wrote. “To the law-abiding citizen who strictly complies with the law, guarantees within the law. To the criminal illegally armed, the full weight of the law and the full legitimate force of the State.”

Firmé el decreto que levanta la suspensión general de los permisos para el porte de armas de fuego en Colombia.

Durante años se restringió al ciudadano que cumple la ley mientras los criminales siguieron armándose ilegalmente hasta los dientes. Eso tiene que cambiar.

Las cifras… pic.twitter.com/dsZAshWMWS

— DE LA ESPRIELLA STYLE (@DELAESPRIELLAE) September 8, 2026

The suspension traces to Decree 2515 of 2015, signed by then-President Juan Manuel Santos on December 24, 2015. “Colombians deserve a calm and safe Christmas and New Year,” Santos wrote on Twitter at the time, according to El País, which reported the measure was meant to guarantee tranquility and security for Colombians over the holiday season. It initially ran through January 31, 2016, but Santos’s government kept extending it, and every administration since has renewed it in turn. The measure was formalized into a standing, annually revisited policy under Decree 2362 of 2018, signed during the government of Iván Duque, which cited a declining trend in homicides and injuries linked to firearms between 2016 and 2018 as grounds for continuing it. Its most recent extension came from Decree 1482 of December 31, 2025, signed by then-President Gustavo Petro, which pushed the suspension’s expiration to December 31, 2026. Decree 1368 repeals both the 2018 and 2025 measures outright.

The general suspension power itself derives from Article 41 of Decree Law 2535 of 1993, as modified by Law 1119 of 2006, which authorizes Colombia’s competent military authorities to suspend the validity of carrying and possession permits nationwide. Colombia’s Constitutional Court upheld that authority in a 2010 ruling, finding it consistent with the state’s constitutional monopoly on arms.

De la Espriella defended the decision with seizure figures covering January 1 through September 3, 2026: Colombia’s security forces confiscated 15,700 firearms in that period, 14,179 of them linked to the commission of crimes, according to El Tiempo. Of the total, 980 weapons were tied to FARC dissident factions, 551 to the Clan del Golfo and 339 to the National Liberation Army (ELN), the president said, adding that the weapons linked to dissident groups alone included 380 rifles and 65 60-millimeter mortars.

“There is no justification for bandits being armed to the teeth while decent people cannot defend themselves.”

— President Abelardo de la Espriella

The decree specifies that the lifted suspension does not extend to weapons whose permits have expired, been individually suspended, canceled or revoked, been seized or placed under a judicial or administrative measure, or that are subject to a separate legal or judicial prohibition, nor to permits that authorize only possession rather than carrying. Colombia’s military authorities retain their power to issue, renew, suspend, cancel or revoke individual permits, the Policía Nacional (National Police) keeps its inspection and seizure authority, and the Ministry of Defense’s Departamento Control Comercio de Armas, Municiones y Explosivos (Department for the Control of Arms, Ammunition and Explosives Trade) will continue to maintain the registries used to verify which permits remain valid.

The distinction that matters going forward, according to attorney Fabio Humar, is between possession and carrying. “Proving you are licensed to have a weapon requires a permit. But possession is different from carrying, which is what was restricted. What this decree does is authorize carrying,” Humar told El Tiempo.

Former President Gustavo Petro, whose own government signed the most recent extension of the suspension in December 2025, criticized the repeal in a two-word post on X: “La necropolítica,” or “necropolitics” — a concept, Infobae noted, that links state policy to violence and exposure to death.

Above photo: © Loren Moss

A Hercules aircraft operated by the Colombian Air Force (FAC) crashed shortly after takeoff from Puerto Leguízamo, in southern Colombia’s Putumayo department, in a tragedy on Monday, March 23, that left dozens of victims among members of the security forces.

According to Jhon Molina, governor of Putumayo, “58 soldiers, six members of the Air Force and two police officers were among the victims who died in the accident.” A total of 128 people were on board the aircraft. One survived unharmed, and four others remain unaccounted for.

The aircraft, a US-built C-130 Hercules used to transport troops and supplies, went down about one and a half kilometers from the airfield just minutes after takeoff.

Defense Minister, Major General (ret.) Pedro Arnulfo Sánchez, said the crash occurred as the aircraft “was taking off from Puerto Leguízamo (Putumayo, near the border with Peru and Ecuador) while transporting troops from our security forces.”

Investigation underway

The national government authorities said that, based on the information available so far, there is no evidence of an attack by illegal armed groups. According to the defense minister, “the fire triggered the detonation of part of the ammunition being transported, which explains the sounds heard in videos circulating on social media.”

The minister said that “all response protocols for the victims and their families have been activated, along with the corresponding investigation.” In a message posted on X, he added: “I extend my deepest condolences to the families of those affected and, out of respect for their grief, I urge people to avoid speculation until official information is available.”

President Gustavo Petro also addressed structural limitations within the armed forces, noting that bureaucratic processes have delayed modernization efforts. “Renewing the armed forces’ equipment has been a decision of my administration for years. Bureaucratic obstacles in military administration have prevented the approval of the Conpes/Confis (Colombia´s public policy instruments) for over a year since I requested it,” he said.

Statement from the Colombian Air Force

The Colombian Air Force (FAC) expressed its condolences following the crash. We “deeply regrets the tragic accident involving the C-130 Hercules, a loss that brings mourning to our military forces and National Police. The aircraft and its crew were in optimal condition to carry out the mission, with the professionalism that characterizes them.”

The institution added that “the pain and helplessness caused by the unexpected loss of our heroes in this tragic air accident are immense. But that pain is transformed into determination: to honor their memory and legacy with an even greater commitment to the nation, doing what we love: protecting Colombia.”

Gen. Carlos Fernando Silva of the Colombian Air Force said a technical investigation will be conducted with support from the US Air Force to determine the causes of the crash “with transparency and rigor.”

Photos courtesy of the FAC.

The situation escalated after an anti-insurgent operation by the military against a dissident faction of the former FARC, known as the Bloque Móvil Martín Villa. During the confrontation, local shopkeeper Ramiro Antonio Correa was killed under disputed circumstances, leading to outrage from residents who subsequently surrounded and detained the soldiers involved, demanding an explanation.

Conflicting Accounts of a Civilian Death

According to testimony from residents, the military operation began around 11:40 a.m. on Sunday. Correa was working in his store, “Las Gaviotas,” which a community member described as “a warehouse where groceries, sodas, and beers are sold.” When the firefight erupted between the army and dissident forces, Correa and seven other farmworkers sought refuge in a nearby house.

Residents allege that after the combat subsided, soldiers entered the house where the group was sheltering and ordered them to return to the store. It was then, they claim, that Correa was killed.

“Mr. Ramiro was the last one to enter of those who were there. Someone shot him. They killed him,” a local woman stated. “We are outraged because they killed him and, on top of that, they wanted to pass him off as a guerrilla. According to them, there were no dead civilians, but it turns out there was: it was him.”

The military also reported that the soldiers were being intimidated by drones, allegedly carrying explosives.

The community’s anger was further fueled when official reports of the operation did not initially account for a civilian death. The Ministry of Defense, led by Minister Pedro Sánchez, first announced the operation as a success, reporting that Willinton Vanegas Leyva, alias “Dumar,” a leader of the dissident group, and nine other combatants had been killed. Community members insist that Correa was wrongly included in that count.

The Attorney General’s Office (Fiscalía) is now investigating the death, according to a statement from the Military Forces Command.

Government Response and Mediation Efforts

In response to the soldiers’ detention, the government has asserted that the community is being manipulated by armed groups. Minister Sánchez claimed the action was instigated under coercion from alias “Yimmi Martínez,” another local FARC dissident leader. A separate official source attributed the order to an alias “Jimmy Parra,” a commander in the FARC’s Central General Staff (EMC).

Meanwhile, a high-level delegation has arrived in the area to negotiate the soldiers’ release. The group includes representatives from the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, the Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia (Defensoría del Pueblo), the Inspector General’s Office, and the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process (MAPP-OEA). The military high command, including Admiral Francisco Cubides, commander of the Military Forces, is on-site to lead the negotiations.

The government has also prepared a “Plan B,” deploying reinforcements from the Marines, Army Special Forces, and the National Police’s Dialogue and Order Maintenance Unit (UNDMO) to the region in case a negotiated release is not achieved.

Admiral Cubides confirmed that the detained soldiers have their campaign rations and are hydrated, but described a tense environment where they were kept awake by bonfires lit around their position. The military also reported that the soldiers were being intimidated by drones, allegedly carrying explosives.

Johnny Casanova, the mayor of El Retorno, has called for a thorough investigation and urged officials to listen to the community’s version of events.

“We know that serious human rights violations have occurred, resulting in the regrettable loss of human life and affecting peasant and indigenous families in the region,” Mayor Casanova said in a dialogue with local radio station Marandua Stereo.

A statement from the Corps of Retired Generals and Admirals condemned the soldiers’ detention as a “direct attack on the State and its institutions” and called for the government to establish clear protocols to prevent such events. As of Wednesday morning, the soldiers remain held by the community, and negotiations for their release are ongoing.

Colombian soldiers. Photo credit: Alejoturola from Pixabay.

The wave of murders appears to be a direct response to the killing of José Miguel Demoya Hernández, alias ‘Chirimoya’, a commander of the ‘Clan del Golfo’, who died in a military operation on April 4 in Córdoba. His unit, estimated to include more than 2,000 members, drew profits from drug trafficking, extortion, and illegal gold mining—particularly in the region of southern Bolívar, where attacks on the Public Force have intensified. On April 15 a string of targeted killings and attempted attacks against military and police members started. Hitmen are reportedly being paid between $2 to $3 million COP ($450 to $700 USD as of the date of publication) for each assassination, and so far, the violence has claimed the lives of at least 19 police officers and 4 soldiers.

In response, the Colombian government has launched a comprehensive counteroffensive. In his recent declarations to the media, Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez Suárez announced rewards of up to $200 million COP (around $47,000 USD as of the date of publication) for information that could help prevent further attacks. The current leader of the ‘Clan del Golfo’, Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego, alias ‘Chiquito Malo’, is considered the primary target of the authorities. He is a former paramilitary fighter that assumed control of the group after the extradition of ‘Otoniel’ and now leads this robust criminal enterprise of more than 8,000 members.

To safeguard the military and police forces, the Ministry of Defense has issued a circular with eight self-protection guidelines. These include dressing in civilian clothes when off duty, avoiding routine travel patterns, staying alert to suspicious activity, and refraining from using public transport in uniform. Minister Sánchez Suárez also warned in an interview with national daily El Tiempo about possible infiltration within the military and police forces.

“These groups have managed to infiltrate the military forces and the National Police, which means there are criminals within our organization, and the full force of the law is against them. Most likely, in a few days, several of them will be captured,” he told the newspaper.

Facing the threat, state forces have mounted a strong counterattack. According to the latest press release from the Ministry of Defense, since mid-April, authorities have arrested 217 people linked to the ‘Clan del Golfo’ and confiscated 123 firearms, over 15,000 bullets, and 11 explosive devices.

However, even if the response shows a coordinated and determined effort by the state to push back against organized crime and protect those who serve, there are growing concerns that illegal armed groups are regaining ground, exposing the challenges the current government faces in asserting full control over Colombian territory.

Headline photo: Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez Suárez (Photo: MinDefensa)

In an interview with local magazine Cambio on March 6, Attorney General Luz Adriana Camargo stated that a Portuguese court had initially approved the extradition of Marín to Colombia. However, the ruling was appealed, and the final decision is now in the hands of Portugal’s Supreme Court.

Marín’s case has dominated Colombia’s political agenda in recent months after the appearance of allegations linking him to Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. In 2022, Marín attended a campaign meeting in a villa near Bogotá where he allegedly handed over $500,000,000 COP (around $120,000 USD as of the date of publication) to Petro’s political strategist, Xavier Vendrell (a Catalan advisor with a controversial role in Petro’s government) in cash.

President Petro has acknowledged the meeting and admitted that the money was received, but once they realized the origin of the money, they returned it. There is no clear explanation as to why the campaign did not immediately report the matter to authorities: Former Attorney General Francisco Barbosa remarked that no formal complaint was filed regarding the illegal funding. “What is worrying is not only [Petro’s] relationship with this man (trips on his plane, meetings and million-dollar contributions to his campaign), but his absolute silence when these events occurred,” Barbosa stated in a post on X.

As reported by popular Colombian news program Noticias Caracol, shortly after a confidential meeting at Colombia’s Ministry of Defense in late October 2023, in which evidence about the criminal network, bribery and corruption linked to Marín was shared, he managed to escape from Colombia to Spain on October 30, 2023, just before authorities could act. The identity of who warned him remains unknown, but it is believed to be a high-level official that attended the meeting.

In April 2024, Spanish authorities arrested Marín in Valencia, but a local court granted him conditional release, prohibiting him from leaving the country while his legal status was reviewed. However, instead of complying with the order, Marín escaped again. He crossed into Portugal, sought political asylum there and shortly the Judiciary Police, in accordance with the international search warrant sent by Interpol and issued by the Colombian authorities, was arrested in December 2024 in Portugal, where he is now under preventive detention awaiting for extradition.

Diego Marín’s criminal network extends far beyond electoral politics. At the time of his arrest in Portugal, he had been under investigation for years for leading one of Colombia’s largest smuggling and money laundering operations. Authorities have identified a vast corruption network that allegedly included high-ranking police and military officials who facilitated Marín’s contraband empire. According to Colombia newspaper El Tiempo, undercover agents—including a major in the Fiscal and Customs Police (Polfa) who initially accepted bribes—were key players in exposing the scheme.

The revelations have already triggered major repercussions within the government. In February, the administration unexpectedly removed General William René Salamanca from his position as Director of the National Police. The decision came shortly before Cambio was set to publish its report detailing Marín’s illicit financial contributions to Petro’s campaign.

President Petro has sought to distance himself from Marín. “I know how much Marín tried to reach me, thinking I was like the others. The truth will come out. His employees will reveal the traps he set. But I am ready—if the Attorney General’s Office does a thorough job—to expose all the infiltration within the state, no matter who falls,” he said in a post on X.

Every week, new revelations surrounding this case emerge or more high-level officials are implicated in the scandal, potentially leading to political and legal consequences in Colombia or at least re-shaping the future of President Petro’s political aspirations.

No amigos de Caracol TV, el señor Marin no logró meter dinero en la campaña.

No desinformen. Meter dinero en campañas es consignar en sus cuentas o usarlos en la misma. Ordené al portador que devolviera ese dinero de inmediato a su dueño y lo hice porque no me interesa ganar con… https://t.co/LjcwWiP436

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) February 13, 2025

Headline Photo: Diego Marín Buitrago, aka “Papa Pitufo”(Photo: National Police)

In an interview published earlier this month by Semana magazine, Ricardo Díaz, a former army general who served as vice minister of planning and strategy until he his requested resignation was finalized in June, alleged that people tied to the Petro administration offered to pay him $179,000 USD if he oversaw the purchase of three helicopters from Qatar.

Díaz said that he rejected the offer, a request he claims was initiated by retired army officer Eduardo Mejía, who he says had been acting at the bequest of family intermediaries of disgraced former Petro confidant Armando Benedetti and as well as defense contractor firm Force executive Camilo Torres.

After rejecting the request, Díaz claims he reported the incident directly to Defense Minister Iván Velásquez. 

In a formal congressional inquiry, on September 12, Velásquez disputed this account and said no report was ever made. He publicly speculated that Díaz was making false claims due to “pain” caused by Petro removing him from office.

Díaz had said in the interview with Semana that the attitude of his superiors toward him changed after the incident, culminating in a request to resign that included Díaz and two other high-ranking military officials. 

In a long Twitter post on September 14, which aligned with a press release from the presidential administration, Petro said Díaz was requested to resign from his position due to reports of “mistreatment of the work staff by him” and “dissatisfaction” by Velásquesz with his subordinant’s actions. “That’s why he left the ministry,” wrote Petro.

The office of the attorney general and federal prosecutors have opened formal investigations regarding the allegations.

Some 1,228 metric tons of cocaine were produced in 2020. That’s a nearly eight percent increase from 1,136 tons last year, according to a new report by the Illicit Cultivations Monitoring System (Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos — SIMCI) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Meanwhile, the land used to produce coca crops in Colombia dropped to 143,000 hectares in 2020, a seven percent decrease from 2019.

While the trends may appear perplexing, there are reasons – technical, territorial and criminal – that coca and cocaine figures may plausibly be at odds.

Megalabs and New Production Methods

The amount of powdered cocaine extracted from a single hectare of coca increased by more than one kilogram in just a year.

Potential cocaine output jumped from 6.7 kilograms per hectare in 2019 to 7.9 kilograms in 2020, according to the UNODC report.

Three factors are possibly allowing traffickers to produce more cocaine from less coca acreage: larger production facilities, better sowing techniques and more cocaine being extracted from leaves.

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

In the past two years, Colombia’s armed forces have dismantled what anti-drug officials call “mega-laboratories.” These large campsites – able to produce several tons of cocaine – had previously been eschewed in favor of rudimentary sites to avoid detection by authorities.

Among the complexes discovered last year included two with enclosures dedicated to various stages of cocaine processing: warehousing coca leaves, their extraction into paste, and then the production of cocaine hydrochloride, the main ingredient in cocaine. One of the facilities was able to produce up to five tons of cocaine per month.

The massive drug labs were found in coca-rich regions of Nariño, on the southern border with Ecuador, and Catatumbo, on the eastern border with Venezuela. Both were linked to the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), Colombia’s last remaining guerrilla force. The group has taken over a large portion of cocaine production that was once in the hands of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), which demobilized in 2016 after coming to a peace agreement with the government.

SEE ALSO: Investigation – The Cocaine Pipeline to Europe

In addition to the large production sites, advancements in coca cultivation and extraction techniques may be providing traffickers higher yields of cocaine.

Specific coca varieties may “increase the efficiency of cocaine extraction” or produce “a greater amount of cocaine in the leaf,” investigators with the UNODC write in their report, adding that both situations “need to be studied in depth.”

In its report from last year, the UNODC had noted a trend toward increasingly sophisticated production processes, as well as “techniques to get more coca from fewer leaves.”

Concentration of Coca Crops

Nearly 85 percent of coca in Colombia is grown in just five departments, according to the UNODC, and four of these are in remote, lawless border regions that are crucial drug trafficking routes.

The departments of Putumayo, Cauca and Nariño all sit along Colombia’s border with Ecuador, which has become a crucial exit point for cocaine to the United States and Europe.

Meanwhile, Norte de Santander, along the Venezuela border, is one of the most fertile grounds for coca. There, a single municipality, Tibú, accounts for 13 percent of the national total of coca cultivation, with nearly 20,000 hectares.

This mountainous jungle region is home to several armed groups, including the ELN and dissident FARC cells. Gasoline — needed for cocaine production — is commonly contrabanded in the region.

Coca cultivation is also concentrated in protected regions, which are difficult for authorities to access. Over half of all coca crops are located in Special Management Areas (Zonas de Manejo Especial), covering Indigenous reserves, Afro-Colombian communities and natural parks, according to the UNODC.

Replanting and Hidden Crops

Coca cultivation and cocaine production are notoriously hard to detect.

The White House’s Office of National Drug Control Policy, which also reports on coca crops in Colombia, described 245,000 hectares under cultivation in 2020. That’s 102,000 hectares more than the 143,000 hectares reported by the UNODC.

SEE ALSO: Half of All Destroyed Coca Crops Replanted in Colombia

According to the White House, cocaine production capacity rose to 1,010 metric tons — about 200 tons less than the UNODC’s tally.

The reasons for the discrepancies are unclear, but this is the second year in a row in which the numbers have diverged sharply.

One factor could be high levels of replanting coca crops. Coca farmers have long replaced coca immediately after eradication to recoup their losses. Criminal groups also have been known to force farmers to sow more coca. Miguel Ceballos, Colombia’s High Commissioner for Peace, said in 2019 that replanting occurred at a rate of between 50 and 67 percent.

And coca eradication numbers can be unreliable. A 2020 exposé by Semana revealed that Colombia’s government may have been inflating the amount of coca crops destroyed by up to a third. Coca eradicators contracted by Colombia’s military told the news outlet that they often come up against angry farmers when they remove their crops, so they often compromise with them, agreeing to cull just half.

Colombia President Iván Duque, meanwhile, has sought to restart the aerial spraying of coca. Several years ago, the country’s Constitutional Court restricted the use of the herbicide glyphosate by aircraft, citing health concerns. The Ministry of Defense appears ready to resume spraying imminently after meeting certain conditions set by the court, though challenges are still pending.

Farmers are already adept at avoiding fumigation by hiding coca crops under banana plants and other vegetation. And traffickers could also respond to resumed aerial spraying by using more remote and smaller coca plots, pushing plantings further into reserves or onto territory that is harder to spray.

In the Meta department, home to the Sierra de La Macarena National Park, a mountain forest reserve of some 629,000 hectares, traffickers pay to have single hectares of forest cleared. The isolated plots are more difficult to spot by helicopter.

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

Headline photo: Cocaine laboratory in Tolima dismantled, courtesy Colombian Air Force

The Colombian Maritime Authority issued the following statement (translated into English).

In reference to the death of the captain of the “Spirit of Hamburg” cargo ship, Myo Tun Zaw, a national of Burma (Myanmar), in circumstances that are the subject of investigation, the Maritime Directorate General is allowed to clarify that:

1. The Spirit of Hamburg, container ship, flagged to the Isle of Man of the Maersk shipping line, arrived at the port of Cartagena on April 16, 2020 at 7:40 a.m. with 21 crew members onboard, in order to load and unload containers at the port facilities of the Cartagena Regional Port Authority.
2. At approximately 5:00 p.m. on the same day, when the cargo ship was still docked at the port, a report was received from the Protection Officer of the Cartagena Regional Port Authority, reporting the death of the captain, who was found on the main deck of the ship.
3. The specific circumstances of time, mode and place are the subject of investigation by the Colombian judicial authorities.
4. The General Maritime Directorate through the Port Authority of Cartagena opened the corresponding administrative investigation, in application of Decree Law 2324 of 1984 and Decree 730 of 2004 “ By which Chapter XI-2 of the International Agreement is partially regulated for the Safety of Human Life in the Sea of ​​1974-SOLAS-approved by 8^th Law of 1980,” compiled in the Unique Decree of the Defense Sector 1070 of 2015, regarding the verification and compliance with the ship protection plan and the port facility, actions carried out by virtue of its powers as authority of the coastal state.
5. The Colombian Maritime Authority will continue to make available its competence within the investigations that are currently being carried out by different judicial and administrative authorities that have jurisdiction over the events that have occurred, especially by the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation, enforcing the powers of Colombia. as a coastal State so that justice is effectively exercised in our country, in accordance with the national legal order and International Public Law.
6. The General Maritime Directorate has maintained constant communication with the representatives of the shipping company in the port of Cartagena and has issued the corresponding notifications addressed to the flag state of the ship.

Images courtesy Hamburg Sud Line

While nobody was harmed and the plane landed safely at 8:05 pm at El Dorado International Airport in the Colombian capital, the tense, frightening situation was reviewed by top government officials, according to local newspaper El Tiempo. Colombian Defense Minister Luis Carlos Villegas spoke with his Venezuelan counterpart General Vladimir Padrino as soon as the incident became known. Foreign Ministers Maria Angela Holguin of Colombian and Delcy Rodríguez of Venezuela also talked on the phone. Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro then reportedly ordered for an investigation into how this situation could have happened.

Later on Saturday, Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos tried to downplay the significance of the perplexing mid-air encounter and assure the public that this was an isolated incident. “The ministers have spoken and cleared it all up,” said President Santos, according to Reuters. “Everything is normal. There’s no need to worry.”

Avianca cancelled all scheduled flights to Venezuela on Saturday in the aftermath of the confusion and diverted the course for all other flights — such as those to Madrid and Barcelona — to avoid their typical route through Venezuelan airspace. BluRadio in Colombia reported that a flight to Barbados from Colombia was also cancelled.

Later on Saturday, after hearing from government officials that there was no reason for ongoing concern, the airline announced that it would return to flying its normal routes on Sunday, including flights to Venezuela. “After clarifications between the governments of Colombia and Venezuela about the incident registered last night in Venezuelan skies with an Avianca plane, the Colombian civil aviation authority has authorized the restart of operations to and from Venezuela,” said Avianca in a statement on Saturday.

On Saturday morning, Colombia’s Ministry of Defense confirmed the incident and said that the Air Force’s radar and emergency warning system identified the Avianca flight traveling beside “other aircraft with similar flight conditions at close range to the commercial plane.” Crew aboard the flight also reported the collision-warning system had begun to sound. The concerned pilot eventually entered Colombian airspace at 7:19 pm before landing in Bogotá at 8:05 pm local time.

This article has been updated to reflect new information learned throughout the day.

Expodefensa, running from November 30 to December 2, brings together 178 exhibitors, 17 national delegations, and 24 international delegations, from countries such as Brasil, Bulgaria, Canadá, China, The Czech Republic, Germany, France, and Greece. Defense ministers, secretaries of state, national directors, military and police heads are expected to attend, as well as entrepreneurs and executives from companies relevant to the defense industry in Latin America.

Along with the displays and networking opportunities, there will be seminars on threat mitigation, and the battles against terrorism, narcotrafficking, protection against natural disasters, as well as updates on Colombia’s own peace process negotiations.

Information on attending or exhibiting can be found here.