Four years after Gustavo Petro took office, Colombia is a different country from the one he inherited in August 2022, but it continues to face some of its deepest historical problems: inequality, violence, drug trafficking, illegal economies, corruption and the state’s limited ability to exercise control over large parts of the country.

Petro came to power with an ambitious promise: to transform the country. His election represented a historic change in itself. For the first time, a leader from the left reached the presidency, and social sectors traditionally distant from power gained direct representation in the executive branch.

Four years later, just as the self-described “Gobierno del Cambio” (Government of Change) comes to an end, the record is mixed. Petro leaves behind measurable social progress, a broader political spectrum capable of competing for power and significant reforms in labor and politics. But he also leaves unfinished projects, a peace policy that failed to achieve its objectives, a persistent crisis in the health care system, corruption scandals, and an administration marked by high ministerial turnover.

Perhaps his deepest legacy lies not in any specific reform, but in demonstrating that Colombian democracy could incorporate sectors that had remained on the margins of power for decades without altering the system of checks and balances that underpins the country’s democratic processes.

The main achievement: A broader democracy

Petro’s election in 2022 was the culmination of a political process Colombia had been experiencing for decades: the gradual expansion of the ideological spectrum with a realistic chance of reaching the presidency.

Francia Márquez‘s rise to the vice presidency carried equally profound significance. A Black woman from a region historically affected by poverty and conflict, her election became a symbol of political mobility and representation in a country where economic and social elites have traditionally dominated the main centers of power.

Márquez built part of her political discourse around the “nadies” (nobodies), an expression intended to champion historically excluded communities. Petro incorporated that narrative during his term and embraced political and social inclusion as one of the defining elements of his administration.

From that perspective, regardless of how its public policies are evaluated, the Petro administration leaves behind a broader democracy: after 2022, Colombia demonstrated that ideological, social, ethnic and regional groups previously distant from presidential power could also reach the Casa de Nariño. It was a necessary message for a country whose guerrilla movements emerged partly in response to the traditional two-party system of the last century.

Paradoxically, that expansion coexisted with an often-conflictive relationship between the president and some of the institutions designed precisely to limit the exercise of power.

At various points, Petro challenged Congress, the courts, the Banco de la República, the media and sectors of the opposition when their decisions stood in the way of parts of his agenda. Those checks, however, are not an anomaly in Colombia’s political system but one of its structural components: the system of checks and balances.

Incoming President Abelardo de la Espriella will likely face a similar reality. Without his own majorities in Congress, his ability to govern will also depend on negotiations, judicial oversight and institutional limits that no president can eliminate simply by winning an election.

Francia Márquez during her inauguration as vice president of Colombia at Plaza de Bolívar in Bogotá on August 7, 2022. Photo courtesy of the Presidency of Colombia.

Less poverty, more employment and higher wages

On social issues, several indicators improved during the Petro administration.

In 2025, according to figures from the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, or DANE, monetary poverty fell to 28%, the lowest level recorded in the country up to that point. Petro had taken office in 2022, when the rate stood at 36.6% following the sharp increase caused by the pandemic.

During the first three years of his administration, about 3.8 million people moved out of monetary poverty and nearly 1 million escaped extreme poverty, according to official DANE figures.

The labor market also improved. Unemployment, which stood at around 11.3% in 2022, fell to about 8% during the first months of 2026.

Petro also ended his term with a 23% increase in the minimum wage for 2026, far above inflation, which closed 2025 at 5.1%. The measure directly benefited about 2.5 million workers and their families and reflected one of the president’s most consistent political priorities: improving workers’ incomes and conditions.

The labor reform moved in the same direction, increasing the amount employers must pay for nighttime, Sunday and holiday work: one of the country’s long-standing labor policy shortcomings.

Those results allow the outgoing government to argue that part of its redistributive agenda produced tangible effects, even though Colombia remains a deeply unequal society.

Reforms that advanced and those left halfway

The record of Petro’s major structural reforms is considerably more complex.

Agrarian reform, one of his central campaign promises, fell far short of its goals. Petro had proposed purchasing 1.5 million hectares of land for distribution to farmers and advancing the formalization of 7 million hectares envisioned under the Peace Agreement.

According to figures from the Ministry of Agriculture, more than 462,000 hectares had been purchased by mid-2026, less than one-third of the announced target.

On pensions, the government succeeded in getting Congress to approve an overhaul of the system that replaced competition between public and private regimes with a system based on a public foundation and additional savings mechanisms administered by private entities. To secure its passage, the executive branch had to compromise on some of its original objectives. The reform was subsequently challenged in court, and its implementation was suspended while the Constitutional Court reviewed the legislative process, which remains unresolved in the absence of a final ruling from the court.

Colombia’s institutional system thus once again demonstrated the limits any president faces when attempting to implement structural transformations without sufficiently broad political consensus.

“Total Peace”, one of the administration’s biggest defeats

If there was one area where results fell particularly far short of initial expectations, it was security policy and the so-called “Total Peace” initiative.

Petro came to power proposing simultaneous negotiations with different armed organizations to reduce violence and move toward resolving the conflicts that persisted after the 2016 agreement with the FARC.

Four years later, his government ended without reaching a final agreement with the main armed groups with which it had opened negotiations.

During that period, organizations such as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), and the Clan del Golfo maintained or expanded their operational capacity in different territories, while the country continued to record kidnappings, recruitment of minors, attacks and killings of social and political leaders.

Political violence reached one of its most serious moments with the killing of presidential hopeful Miguel Uribe, an event that reminded the country of the dangers of political violence that Colombia had believed it had left behind.

The failure of Total Peace to produce sustainable agreements will likely be one of the most difficult aspects of the outgoing president’s legacy to defend.

A health care transformation that never came

Petro also failed to transform the health care system on the terms he had proposed during the campaign.

The reform became one of the main battlegrounds among the executive branch, Congress, insurers, health care providers and different political sectors.

As that dispute continued, patient petitions, complaints and claims increased from about 915,000 in 2021 to 2.1 million in 2025, according to figures from the Superintendencia Nacional de Salud.

By the end of the administration, many patients continued to report difficulties obtaining medications and receiving timely care at hospitals and clinics, while household out-of-pocket spending on health care increased.

Petro profoundly altered the debate over Colombia’s health care model, but he failed to replace it with the system he had promised.

Corruption undermined one of Petro’s central promises

Perhaps one of the government’s most politically costly contradictions was corruption.

Petro had built much of his political career denouncing links among corruption, public contracting, and traditional power structures. His arrival at the presidency came with a promise to govern differently.

His administration, however, ended up being affected by several scandals.

The most significant involved the Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (UNGRD), in which investigations pointed to the alleged use of public resources and contracts to benefit members of Congress in exchange for support for government initiatives.

The instability caused by the legal troubles surrounding Ricardo Roa, who headed the country’s most important oil and gas company, also had a profound economic impact, eroding both the company’s market value and the governance of one of the institutions underpinning the national economy.

Those controversies were compounded by investigations and disputes involving members of the president’s political and family circle. His son, Nicolás Petro, faced criminal proceedings related to funds received during the campaign, while Verónica Alcocer, then the president’s wife, remains at the center of questions over the use of public funds.

Determining individual responsibility is a matter for judicial and oversight authorities, but politically, the cases eroded one of the central elements of the message that had brought Petro to power.

More than 60 ministers in four years

Administrative instability also became a defining feature of the government. Over four years, more than 60 people served across 18 ministries, equivalent to an average of more than three officeholders per ministry.

The changes reflected political crises, disagreements within the governing coalition, differences between ministers and the president, shifts in the executive branch’s priorities and, at various points, difficulties maintaining a stable administrative course.

The result was a government with considerable rhetorical ability to place issues on the public agenda, but greater difficulty turning some of those debates into sustained policies over its four years in office.

Congresswoman María José Pizarro places the presidential sash on Gustavo Petro during his inauguration at Plaza de Bolívar in Bogotá on August 7, 2022. Photo courtesy of the Presidency of Colombia.

Petro changed who can govern, but not the rules of power

Gustavo Petro’s legacy can hardly be reduced to a simple choice between success and failure.

His administration produced tangible social results and expanded the boundaries of political representation in Colombia. It also put issues on the agenda that will likely remain part of the debate under future governments: inequality, the energy transition, agrarian reform, the functioning of the health care system, and representation for historically excluded populations.

But the promise of structural transformation was far broader than the results ultimately achieved.

Petro discovered, as his predecessors did and as De la Espriella probably will, that winning the presidency does not mean controlling the Colombian state. Congress, the courts, oversight agencies, the Banco de la República, regional governments, the media and a deeply polarized civil society impose limits on any political project.

Petro discovered, as his predecessors did and as De la Espriella probably will, that winning the presidency does not mean controlling the Colombian state. Congress, the courts, oversight agencies, the Banco de la República, regional governments, the media and a deeply polarized civil society impose limits on any political project.

In that sense, the main transformation of these four years may have been less institutional than democratic: Petro did not completely change the way Colombia works, but he did help change the idea of who can govern it.

De la Espriella’s arrival at the presidency from the opposite end of the ideological spectrum is, paradoxically, another manifestation of that expansion.

Colombia thus ends four years of its first left-wing government and begins its first far-right government. What remains between the two is a democracy with more diverse political alternatives, but one that is also deeply polarized, with institutions under intense strain and many of the country’s historical problems still unresolved.

Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office is advancing its investigation into the assassination of Senator and presidential pre-candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay. On one hand, it sentenced alias “El Viejo” to more than 22 years in prison for acting as an intermediary between those who ordered the crime and the criminal network that carried out the attack; on the other, it issued arrest warrants for seven individuals belonging to a dissident faction of the FARC accused of ordering the killing.

The assassination of the Centro Democrático party senator and presidential candidate took place on June 7, 2025, in Bogotá while he was participating in campaign-related activities. The attack was carried out by a 14-year-old who fired multiple shots and was immediately captured after an exchange of gunfire with National Police officers and Uribe Turbay’s security team.

General attorney, Luz Adriana Camargo Garzón said the crime was not “an isolated act, but the result of a structured criminal operation that involved both an urban criminal network operating as outsourcing and an organized armed group” known as the “The Segunda Marquetalia.”

Miguel Uribe Londoño, a presidential candidate and the victim’s father, said in a tweet directed at President Gustavo Petro: “President @petrogustavo You harassed Miguel with your verbal abuse, making him a target for assassination. Your government failed to protect him. Your government has been tolerant of drug trafficking, and the criminals who benefited from your total peace used the Second Marquetalia to assassinate Miguel. But the masterminds behind this must continue to be sought within the Colombian government. We cannot continue to accept this violence. This is why Miguel’s legacy needs to be upheld in the Presidency, and I will carry it until the last day of my life.”

Presidente @petrogustavo.

Usted hostigó a Miguel con su violencia verbal poniéndolo como carne de cañón para que lo asesinaran.

Su gobierno no le dio protección.

Su gobierno ha sido tolerante con el narcotráfico y los criminales beneficiados con su paz total utilizaron a la… pic.twitter.com/mPPvVYZgJv

— Miguel Uribe (@migueluribel) March 22, 2026

Judicial developments and convictions

According to the Attorney General’s report, three individuals have already been convicted through plea agreements:

1. Simeón Pérez Marroquín, alias “El Viejo,” identified as the link between those who ordered the crime and the criminal network, was sentenced on March 20 to 22 years and four months in prison.
2. Carlos Mora González, who conducted surveillance at the attack site and transported other suspects, was sentenced to 21 years in prison.
3. Katherine Andrea Martínez, who took part in planning meetings and retrieved the weapon used (a Glock pistol), was sentenced to 21 years and two months in prison.

The 14-year-old who carried out the attack was sentenced under Colombia’s Juvenile Criminal Responsibility System.

Criminal network and FARC dissident involvement

After nine months of investigation, prosecutors established the involvement of the dissident FARC faction known as The Segunda Marquetalia as the group that ordered the crime and issued arrest warrants against several of its alleged leaders and members.

According to the statement, those targeted include Kendry Téllez Álvarez, identified as a possible mastermind; Iván Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez”; Géner García Molina, alias “Jhon 40”; Alberto Cruz Lobo, alias “Enrique Marulanda”; Jhon Jairo Bedoya Arias, alias “Rusbel”; Diógenes Medina Hernández, alias “Gonzalo”, and José Aldinever Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever”.

They face charges of aggravated homicide, conspiracy to commit a crime, and the manufacture, trafficking, possession or carrying of firearms, accessories, parts or ammunition.

Additionally, according to El Colombiano, authorities are offering a reward of up to $5 billion Colombian pesos (around $1,4 million USD) for information leading to the capture of alias “Iván Márquez”, and $4 billion Colombian pesos ($1,2 million USD) for alias “Jhon 40” and “Zarco Aldinever”, identified as key leaders of the group.

“Wanted dead or alive”

According to El Colombiano, “the inclusion of ‘Zarco Aldinever’ on the most-wanted list has raised questions, as he had reportedly been killed in August 2025 in alleged clashes with the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrilla group”

“He is alive; that is, we have no evidence that he is dead. For us, “Zarco Aldinever” is alive. There is no corroborated evidence regarding the rumor that he was killed by the ELN. It remains a rumor, which is why the arrest warrant was issued,” the attorney general said.

Meanwhile, the whereabouts of Iván Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez”, one of the former negotiators of the 2016 peace agreement who later returned to armed activity, remain unknown. He has been reported dead on several occasions, most recently in July 2023, when it was speculated he had died from gunshot wounds in Venezuela.

However, the government has not confirmed those reports. “Despite intelligence efforts by the security forces, there is no reliable information to determine his whereabouts or status,” Defense Minister, Major General (ret.) Pedro Arnulfo Sánchez said.

Photo above. Colombia’s Attorney General Luz Adriana Camargo during a presentation on progress in the Miguel Uribe Turbay case. Photo courtesy of the Attorney General’s Office.

Photo in social media. Miguel Uribe Turbay. Photo courtesy of the Senate of the Republic of Colombia.

If only others had acted in such a dignified manner.

Instead, far too many took it as an opportunity to draw the light of tragedy onto themselves. Some were in a passive-aggressive form that left little to the imagination regarding whom they wanted to blame. Some try to ‘take up the mantle’ of Miguel’s campaign, even though their views are far less conciliatory toward others. And finally, those who just came out and said it: ‘Miguel dead, Alvaro in prison, and a terrorist running the country’. It’s as despicable as it is, unsurprisingly, at a time when a family is trying to mourn its loss.

We will leave the subject there and the family in peace.

Elsewhere, and yes, life goes on, the ANDI – Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia is holding its annual gathering/cocktail party on the coast, and despite their call for the country to pull together at a difficult moment, President Gustavo Petro wasn’t invited, and the rest of the cabinet promptly cancelled. The reason offered up (in short) was that he didn’t appear when invited previously, etc. The ANDI has been critical of Petro’s reform process at every turn, whilst rarely offering alternative solutions, so whether he would have attended is open to debate – regardless, the behavior is unbecoming of either party.

There was positive news from Fedesarrollo as consumer confidence rose once again in July to 5.3% (June 2.2%) – a year ago it was -9%. This was reflected in June retail sales (+10.1%), which again were driven by vehicles, electronics, and domestic goods, a reflection of increasing domestic demand.

The real sector also fared well in June, with manufacturing production (+2.2%) rising for a second month, with 22/39 sectors in positive territory. Industrial production also rose 1.3% having fallen slightly in May.

The Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE Colombia reported that overall Q2 civil works rose by 9% – there was, however, a 7% contraction in building construction for the same period. The overall picture is hard to read, but later today, Q2 GDP is due out (consensus 2.4%), which will give us a better idea of how this vital sector is faring.

The stock market continues to prosper. The bvc-Bolsa de Valores de Colombia S.A. COLCAP is now up 32% (local) & 44% (USD) YTD, volumes have even begun to tick upwards. Again, feel sorry for those badly advised to ship their cash to Miami to gain single-digit returns before costs.

Have a great day.

Regards Roops.

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The posthumous tribute in memory of Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay, honoring his legacy and service to Colombia. Photo credit: Canal Congreso Colombia/YouTube.

Whilst many in Colombia think witness tampering is the least of Uribe’s offenses and liken it to Al Capone’s conviction for tax evasion, it is nonetheless a surprise, and a strong statement by the courts.

Conversely, we now have the extreme right crying foul about the rulings — this after weeks and months of bleating about the protection of the great institutions of Colombia, as Gustavo Petro criticized them on several fronts. The worm has apparently turned, and now social media is full of demands for freedom for Uribe and criticizing the legal system. Whilst predictably, the extreme Republicans in the US are already making noise, this is no ‘Free Nelson Mandela’ situation.

The issue again is polarization. We are still getting past the acidic attitudes surrounding the shooting of Miguel Uribe, and this won’t help as we move towards the 2026 elections.

Moving past politics, the Banco de la República — Colombia made what appears to be a perplexing decision to leave overnight rates unchanged at 9.25%. It was by a 4-3 majority, two voted for a 50bps cut. The reasons given were jumbled and included inflation concerns, even though there was a lower-than-expected reading just a few weeks ago.

Some analysts are suggesting it is due to the 2026 budget announced by Ministerio de Hacienda of $135 billion USD, an increase of 6.5% although $6.3 billion USD will be subject to a successful tax reform that has yet to be presented. This is perhaps bleeding into the central bank’s deficit concerns.

The Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística — DANE Colombia reported that unemployment continues to drop. June saw a national level of 8.6% (the lowest June reading in a decade) and the urban number at 8.3% (10.2%) — the lowest on record for June. Jobs added over the past 12 months totalled 800,000. Positive stuff, and one of the reasons why financial poverty is at record low levels.

Finally, after all the bluster and threats, tariffs with the US were set at 10% — but let’s see how long before Donald Trump’s next tantrum.

Have a spectacular Friday.

Regards Roops.

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Above photo: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld (left) listens as President Álvaro Uribe (right) speaks to a group assembled at the Colombian presidential residence on August 19, 2003. (Photo by TSGT Andy Dunaway, U.S. Air Force)

US relations are again making headlines with support for the country (Plan Colombia) reportedly set to drop by 50% from $410 million USD to $206 million USD. Whilst a blow, in reality, Colombia shouldn’t need to rely on the US for such funds – time to grow up. This week, we also had the Republican extremists referring to Gustavo Petro (and others in the government) as habitual drug users and again making inferences regarding the assassination attempt on Miguel Uribe – all pretty pathetic. It’s hard to take Donald Trump or his cronies seriously when they have threatened any country that deals with Venezuela – he has now reportedly permitted Chevron to resume oil exploration. The New Silk Road seems ever more appealing.

The May trade data from Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE Colombia hit the headlines with a troubling $1.4 billion USD deficit, only adding to concerns over the fiscal situation amongst the press. There is, of course, real pressure to improve the situation, and the government needs to look at the spending situation; however, much of the cause of the problem is an economy that is growing at a healthy pace. Lower inflation and interest rates are driving domestic demand, retail sales, and confidence, which saw imports rise 10.8% in May as locals continue to buy consumer durables from overseas – the main country of origin is at the other end of that Silk Road.

This surge in imports has been accompanied by weak export data. It is noteworthy that Petro has again expressed the need for Colombia to wean itself off its oil & coal dependence and focus more on agriculture. The former two categories are struggling with international sales, whilst the latter is booming. An uncomfortable truth for the elite & the commodity sector.

Another element of the economic recovery is record low unemployment; however, this appears to be an inconvenient truth to the press (Portafolio), preferring to highlight that Colombia has the 3rd worst labor situation in the OECD – OCDE. A particularly lazy piece of journalism, considering the makeup of the 19 other countries in the survey. Yes, there is too much informality, but even Bancolombia this week pointed out that the labor reform should help that situation.

Finally, good news on poverty. The DANE reported a drop in the national number from 34.6% to 31.8%. That is still a disgrace given the natural resources that Colombia enjoys, but considering the sky-high GINI coefficient not a surprise. The good news is that they are record low numbers – but work to do !!

Elsewhere, there has been no advancement in the various reform processes, and the countries’ politicians continue to take cheap shots at one another.

Have a fabulous Friday.

Regards.

Rupert.

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Presidential candidate and Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay with his wife, Maria Claudia Tarazona. (source: social media)

This week little of that, so I will spare you another video with me basking in the sun of the UK.

Rosa Villavicencio, the new temporary foreign minister, is still trying to unravel the US situation in terms of both trade and political vitriol. Little progress this week.

Violence is still making headlines with the Gulf Clan (ex-Paramilitaries), ELN & FARC dissidents making unlikely bed partners as they fight for their share of the narcotics trade.

There are rumblings (only in a quiet news week) about Gustavo Petro looking to ban opinion polls ahead of next year’s elections. Frankly, does anyone on a global scale ever read them? Those locally, if you check the technical information, have long since been unreliable in methodology, inaccurate, and, added to this, the local press cherry-pick how they report them. Miguel Uribe, still struggling for his very life in the hospital, has risen from nowhere to top the most recent polls.

And that is about it. As ever, we have presidents, past and present, being accused of all manner of things, as well as the usual political shenanigans in congress, but I won’t waste your time.

Have a great Friday.

Regards.

Roops.

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President Gustavo Petro. Photo credit: Presidencia de la República de Colombia.

The courts, in the meantime, have blocked the referendum via decree, and whilst Gustavo Petro expressed annoyance, it is now perhaps irrelevant, along with chatter of a national assembly, if the labor reform is passed into law.

Another reform, however, has run into problems. The constitutional court has questioned aspects of the pension reform, even though people have already begun moving assets around, and it has been returned to congress for revision. The legal system in Colombia is one of the slowest and bureaucratic on the planet, and these sorts of ‘after the event’ decisions only help to damage its reputation further.

Miguel Uribe is still fighting for his life, and whilst the political temperature has accordingly cooled, there are still too many in Colombia who wrongly think they are claiming the moral high ground by blaming the government when much of the evidence being discussed by the media points to different hands on the trigger. Many of the corporations and federations may dress up their support for Uribe in calls for unity, but they fail to hide the political message behind their public statements….shameful.

Given the ongoing madness in Washington’s it is good to see the government pushing ahead, looking to seek new partners and alliances. Recently, Colombia signed up to the new Silk Road agreement with China, and now they have been approved to join the BRICS Development Bank in order to potentially source new options for funding and partnerships. Much of the right is uncomfortable with this; however, it is wholly coherent and replicates in some respect what happened when, then number one export market, Venezuela, began to implode, and Colombia needed to seek alternative export partners.

Little economic data this week, however, April Economic Activity (ISE) from Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE Colombia grew just 1.14% YoY in April, the slowest pace in five months. However, the season was more favorable and pointed to continuing healthy growth. We also have the latest import (and deficit) data due out.

Have a great Friday.

Regards Roops.

Never miss Rupert’s latest commentary.
Follow him now on LinkedIn to see What Jumps Out.

Labor reform march. Photo credit: Presidencia de la República de Colombia.

1. Tragic assassination attempt on Miguel Uribe.
2. Multiple bomb attacks in the Cali region.
3. Gustavo Petro signs decree on labor reform referendum.
4. Multiple parties sign a letter stating that the referendum via decree constitutes a Coup d’état.
5. Labor reform 2.0 advancing in the senate/congress.
6. Fiscal reform suspended.
7. May inflation be lower than expected?
8. Continued poor tax returns.
9. Petro again muttering about a national assembly.

There is little transparency, but here are some brief thoughts. In the case of Miguel Uribe, everyone should focus on sending their prayers to the family at this time and calling for national unity. Instead, there are far too many, predictably, trying to exploit the situation for their political gain.

Kudos to those who have followed the path of consolidation (90% of them outside Medellín) and to the others (90% from Medellín) who want to be on the same side of the conversation as Marco Rubio & Benjamin Netanyahu, who simply had to comment, perhaps tone down the rhetoric, it is helping no-one at all in Colombia. There are no clear conclusions as to what happened, and the follow-up terrorism in Cali has only muddied the waters. There is a lot of investigation to be done, and that in Colombia invariably takes a long time.

The referendum isn’t a Coup d’état, and is best left to the courts to decide. Even four members of the cabinet didn’t sign in support. Personally, as Petro has hinted himself, I can see the referendum being scrapped if labor reform 2.0 is successful (now 70% approved), and there seems to be more cross-party support than previously. Regardless, the referendum has to garner over 13 million votes – that is a huge hurdle in this country. As for the national assembly, he’d be lucky to get it half-organized before leaving in 14 months.

The fiscal rule news is a real concern; the Peso dropped 1% post-announcement. We aren’t here just because of the Petro government, but they are holding the baby, and it’s their problem to try to fix. It remains to be seen, at a time of falling oil prices and tax revenues, combined with climbing imports, what can be done. Those tax revenues YTD (May) stand at $30bn, around $1.5bn below expectations.

May inflation (5.05%) from Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE Colombia was considerably lower than April (5.16%) and also the consensus of 5.10%. However, with the Fedesarrollo YE estimate recently rising from 4.4%-4.8%, it’s unlikely that Banco de la República – Colombia will make any move from 9.25% at month end.

I don’t know about anyone else in Colombia, but perhaps we should just cancel Friday and stay in bed.

Regards.

Roops.

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Presidential candidate and Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay with his wife, Maria Claudia Tarazona. (source: social media)

The United Kingdom issued an order to implement the visa requisite for all Colombian travelers starting from November 26. This decision was taken by the UK government due to the “significant and sustained increase in Colombian nationals who have traveled to the UK for purposes that are not permitted under the Immigration Rules for Visitors, such as to live, work or claim asylum in the UK.”

As of mid-January, no visa measures have actually been imposed on British subjects.

The embassy revealed the latest statistics showing the trend related to the asylum requests “rising from 2, 4 and 7 in the first 3 quarters in 2022, to 105 in quarter 4 of 2022. There were 211, 176, 173 and 294 asylum claims in the 4 quarters of 2023, and there have been 227 and 241 asylum claims in the first 2 quarters of 2024. This compares to 19 asylum claims in 2019, 11 in 2020 and 6 in 2021. There have been more asylum claims per quarter in 2023 and 2024 than in the entire 10 years preceding the visa lift.”

Roy Barreras, Colombian ambassador for the UK recognized, in interview with El Tiempo, the problem created for those who abuse the asylum requests and create this unpleasant situation. “A minority of compatriots, as we have warned for months, abused the ease of visa-free travel and have harmed the majority with the irregular practice of applying for false asylum with false documents that have skyrocketed by thousands the applications for these irregular asylums in the United Kingdom.”

Si el Reino Unido ha restablecido la necesidad de visas para el pueblo colombiano, tengo que decir que por el principio de la reciprocidad, el gobierno colombiano pedirá visas a los y las ciudadanas británicas que quieran venir a Colombia https://t.co/btr4exz8ND

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) November 26, 2024

The move would likely hurt Colombia more than the UK

The announcement by Petro didn’t fit well with opposition senator Miguel Uribe Turbay, senator and presidential candidate for the Centro Democrático Party, criticizing the attitude of the government. According to him, the decision to request a visa from UK citizens will affect tourism activity and the investments in the country: “This will close the door to investors and hit hard the tourism industry.”

Another senator from the opposition party, Maria Fernanda Cabal, also criticized the decision to implement a visa for UK visitors. As Uribe Turbay, she blames Petro for his lack of capacity to govern. “He doesn’t build anything; he fights and isolates Colombia. How many fewer investors and tourists   due to this absurd measure?”

As of mid-January, no visa measures have actually been imposed on British subjects, according to both Colombia’s Foreign Relations Ministry and the British Embassy. Travelers are advised to contact appropriate government agencies for updated advice.

Headline photo: Colombian foreign minister Gilberto Murillo (left) discusses with the Colombian President Gustavo Petro (right). (Source: Chancellery web page)

With this decision, the Ministry of Finance, led by recently appointed Diego Guevara, will need to adjust the funding available for the Colombian government’s operations in 2025. The reform had been drafted by former Minister Ricardo Bonilla, who resigned earlier this month following a corruption scandal involving another entity from the government.

A predictable consensus?

The defeat was secured with votes from the right-wing opposition parties, independent parties (including the Liberal and Conservative parties, both of which had previously expressed their discontent through official statements), and some members of the Green Party, despite its partial alignment with the government. Only the left-wing parties in the governing coalition supported the bill.

Congressmen Miguel Uribe and Christian Garcés, who presented their arguments against  the bill, pointed out that the reform was inconvenient and asserted that it further affected an economy that is not going through its best moments. 

“The tax reform is not convenient, it is designed to discourage business formalization, increase the tax burden on individuals, erode investment and savings,” Uribe argued.

Other strong arguments were the low execution rate of the current budget —according to Dapper, as of November 2024 the budget execution rate was the lowest since 2019— and the potential consequences of eliminating the Simplified Tax Regime (RST), which the reform had proposed. Introduced to boost business and labor formalization in Colombia, the RST simplified taxation for small businesses by basing it on gross income rather than net profit.

Luis Fernando Mejía, CEO of the Colombian think tank Fedesarrollo, voiced his concerns about the viability of the project on Twitter/X just hours before the proposal was rejected. 

Mejía criticized measures such as tripling the carbon tax, due to its negative impact on the productive sector, and also warned that the reform would introduce a “minimum presumptive dividend,” a concept that could lead to double taxation on 30% of corporate profits, creating uncertainty and further discouraging investment. Also, he suspects “presumed minimum dividend” could result in double taxation on 30% of corporate profits, potentially creating uncertainty and further discouraging investment.

Earlier this year, president of AmCham Colombia Maria Claudia Lacouture also expressed her concern with the bill in an interview with La República, pointing that “In the current context of economic slowdown, with multiple pressures keeping growth below 1.2%, the best tax reform would be austerity and public spending execution, combined with strategies to foster investment, build trust, and create certainty. This approach could not only generate short-term investment but also attract foreign investment to the country.”

Petro’s administration to face the consequences — and the year to come

Government officials who attempted to save the reform at the Congress expressed their disappointment at this failure. President Gustavo Petro, through his Twitter/X account, offered hints about the government’s future tax policies, stating: “The budget crisis will not be paid for by the people,” meaning that social programs would remain unaffected, and added: “The fight against tax evasion, starting with online gambling and smuggling, must become a central priority.” 

Additionally, with discussions on the labor reform bill proposed by Petro’s government postponed until 2025, Petro suggested that this delay “must be compensated by [a significant increase in] the minimum wage.”

Finance Minister Diego Guevara, according to El Tiempo, described the death of the tax form bill as more than just a ‘fist’ to President Petro, stating: “This is a vote against the regions, a vote against investment,” meaning it is as a setback for regional investment in Colombia and development projects.

The coming year, 2025, will be the last before the 2026 presidential election to determine Gustavo Petro’s successor. In this context, the 2025 budget will now be established via a decree, adjusted to exclude the revenue the failed reform sought to generate.

Headline Photo: Capitolio Nacional (Photo: Oficina de Información y Prensa Cámara de Representantes)