Colombia’s government told its Pacific Alliance partners this week that it will send Congress the bloc’s free-trade agreement with Singapore, a step meant to bring Bogotá into line with Chile and Peru, where the pact has been in force since May 2025.

The pledge came at the first meeting of the Alliance’s High-Level Group hosted by Mexico since it took over the bloc’s rotating presidency from Colombia earlier this year. The Grupo de Alto Nivel (High-Level Group, or GAN) — the vice ministers of foreign trade and foreign relations from Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru — met August 20 and 21, 2026, in Mexico City, in a session that photos released by the Alliance place inside Mexico’s Secretaría de Economía (Ministry of Economy).

Colombia’s vice minister of foreign trade, Sandra Carvajal Sáenz, told her counterparts that President Abelardo de la Espriella’s government would submit the Pacific Alliance-Singapore agreement to Congress for the legislative and Constitutional Court review that Colombian treaties require before they can take effect. Singapore, Chile and Peru completed those procedures and put the deal into force on May 3, 2025, three years after it was signed at a Pacific Alliance presidential summit in Colombia; Mexico and Colombia are the two Alliance members that have yet to ratify it.

The High-Level Group’s agenda covered four areas. On regional value chains and regulatory cooperation, the vice ministers looked for ways to integrate production across the four countries and cut the regulatory barriers that keep exporters from adding value before selling into outside markets. On public-private coordination, they discussed concrete steps to link the bloc’s technical working groups with governments and with the private-sector Consejo Empresarial de la Alianza del Pacífico (Pacific Alliance Business Council, or CEAP). On small and medium-sized enterprises, the goal is turning those businesses into a bigger driver of the bloc’s trade and growth. And on trade promotion, the vice ministers discussed how the four countries’ promotion agencies affect trade, investment and tourism, and agreed those agencies need to be a governmental priority. Carvajal told her counterparts Colombia was “fully willing to work hard, constructively and decisively with our Pacific Alliance partners to actively contribute to this integration mechanism having an increasingly tangible impact on our economies and, above all, on generating jobs and opportunities for our citizens.”

The vice ministers’ meeting followed a forum the CEAP held on attracting foreign investment to the bloc’s four economies. Speaking on behalf of Commerce, Industry and Tourism Minister Mauricio Gómez Amín, Carvajal said legal and regulatory stability — along with tools such as free-trade zones and trade-facilitation mechanisms — are priorities for the ministry. Gómez Amín made the same point in an August 10 statement from the ministry announcing his appointment: “Colombia needs clear rules, legal certainty and a government that sees business as an ally, not an adversary,” he said. “We are working to unblock projects and bring domestic and foreign capital into infrastructure, logistics, energy, connectivity, agribusiness, tourism and exportable services.”

Carvajal is one of two vice ministers Gómez Amín swore in on August 14, 2026, alongside Manuel Alejandro Naranjo Giraldo as vice minister of business development, El Heraldo reported. She joined the ministry after 17 years at ProColombia and, most recently, as the Caribbean regional manager for the exporters’ association Analdex. Gómez Amín, a Barranquilla lawyer and former senator, took over the ministry after de la Espriella’s government was sworn in this year, El Tiempo reported.

Mexico assumed the Pacific Alliance’s rotating presidency from Colombia on January 30, 2026, after Colombia closed out its own term with the signing of the Bogotá Act. The bloc, created in 2012 by the presidents of Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru to pursue free movement of goods, services, capital and people among its members, is also working through Costa Rica’s bid to join, a process that began when Alliance ministers accepted San José’s candidacy in December 2024, under Chile’s presidency, and has continued through working-group sessions on framework-agreement compliance and trade-protocol negotiations since.

Carvajal used the Mexico City trip to also hold separate bilateral meetings with counterparts from Costa Rica, Mexico, Chile and Peru, the ministry said.

Headline photo: Vice ministers of foreign trade and foreign relations from Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru meet as the Pacific Alliance’s High-Level Group at Mexico’s Secretaría de Economía in Mexico City, August 21, 2026. (Photo courtesy Pacific Alliance)

The decision that kept foreign rescue teams out of Colombia in the first days after the August 10 earthquake did not originate with the government that has spent the past week defending it. It originated with Javier Pava Sánchez, the acting director of the country’s disaster-risk agency, an appointee of former President Gustavo Petro who was still holding the post four days into Abelardo de la Espriella’s administration, and it is set out over two pages under his own digital signature.

The letter, reviewed by Finance Colombia and filed under radicado (case reference) UNGRD 2026EE14740, tells Foreign Minister Omar Bula Escobar that Colombia’s own accredited capacity is sufficient and that “at this stage of the emergency, it is not necessary to request or activate the deployment of specialized international search-and-rescue teams (USAR).” The document’s embedded digital signature records a signing time of 1:45:08 p.m. on Tuesday, August 11. Pava has since said publicly that it went out at 1:20 p.m.

What the Letter Says

The earthquake struck at 7:34 a.m. on Monday, August 10, with a magnitude of 7.4 and an epicenter in the municipality of San José del Palmar, in the department of Chocó, according to the Servicio Geológico Colombiano (Colombian Geological Survey, or SGC), as reported by Pulzo. De la Espriella had been sworn in the previous Friday and had named little more than his cabinet and a handful of front-line officials; the rest of the state was still staffed by Petro appointees or by lower-ranked officials serving on an interim basis, Madrid’s El País reported in the August 12 interview in which Pava gave his account.

Addressed to Bula at the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) and signed by Pava as acting director general of the Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (National Unit for Disaster Risk Management, or UNGRD), the letter states that the country has more than 25 groups with search-and-rescue capabilities and that Chocó, Valle del Cauca and Risaralda had been prioritized. The figure is broader than the 23 UNGRD-accredited USAR teams that Pava, El Tiempo and La Silla Vacía all cite; the letter counts groups with search-and-rescue capability rather than accredited USAR units. Its finding is conditional: should the emergency outgrow national capacity, Colombia would request support, though only from teams holding a valid classification from INSARAG, the United Nations’ International Search and Rescue Advisory Group. It thanks the international community for its offers. No country is named in it.

Interior Minister Rodrigo Lara, of the Ministerio del Interior (Interior Ministry), has described that document as the trigger under Colombian procedure. He set out the mechanism on Blu Radio on August 14. “Requesting international rescuers is not something the foreign minister does motu proprio; it is not the foreign minister’s initiative. The foreign minister is the vehicle for doing it,” he told Néstor Morales. The determination is made by the Puesto de Mando Unificado (Unified Command Post), the interagency body the UNGRD directs. “If the man at the UNGRD, who was Pava, tells the foreign minister no, then the foreign minister cannot go and request any international assistance on his own initiative. That is to say, the initiative belongs to the director of the UNGRD.” Madrid’s El País reported the same sequence from the other direction: once Pava had specified what was needed, the Foreign Ministry went to multilateral bodies and individual governments and asked for precisely that.

Four Offers, and How Pava Weighed Them

Pava told Madrid’s El País by telephone that Bula had informed him before he wrote the letter of four countries offering rescue personnel: El Salvador, Peru, Israel and the United States. His own accounts differ on when that conversation happened: he told Infobae that he met Bula at around 2 p.m. to review the offers, which would place the meeting after the letter was signed. “In Colombia we have an enormous capacity of rescue teams, we have 23 USAR groups, so I looked carefully at what they offered us,” he said. Two he rejected on certification grounds: “In the case of El Salvador, they were not certified teams, they did not have experience in these types of situations. I also told the foreign minister that Peru’s are not certified either.”

His reasoning on the other two was different. “I told him, ‘Ugh, it seems complicated to me,’ because those have a political strategy,” he said of the Israeli and US offers — the director, Madrid’s El País noted, comes from the left. He qualified it in the same breath: “Of course it is good to have help from whoever, no matter where it comes from, but you have to see what we need most and what we already have capacity covered in. Things may change in the coming days, but at that moment we had capacity covered in rescuers.” He then chose between them. “Between Israel and the United States, I prefer the United States. But not the rescuers, because we have a good team here. It seemed better to me that they send their disaster coordination experts, who have very good technology for organizing satellite information in real time.”

To Blu Radio on August 12 and to the news agency Colprensa three days later, he set out the same four decisions in technical terms, without repeating the political characterization. “There was the offer from El Salvador, from Peru, in which, let’s say, their capacity is, on the one hand, they are not certified under INSARAG rules, and on the other hand, they are medium USAR teams, an area in which we have capacity,” he told Blu Radio. On Israel: “Israel has the response team and I said: no, that is not the one that is needed at this moment, and we stayed with that first requirement.” On the United States: “It was said that we would indeed need something related to specialized groups for the technological handling of information, and that is what the United States offers.”

The Letters That Followed

Pava’s defense is that the letter was a snapshot and that he accepted foreign help the same afternoon. In a video posted to his social media accounts on August 14 and in the Colprensa interview, he said he sent two more letters that day: one at about 3 p.m. accepting the US offer of technological and coordination support, and one at 5:20 p.m. asking that offers of humanitarian aid be accepted. “That letter was issued that day at one twenty in the afternoon and corresponds to the requirement conditions at that moment,” he said in the video, according to Infobae. “It is so that toward three in the afternoon I send a new letter to the Foreign Ministry accepting the help of the United States for those activities.”

Neither of the two follow-up letters has been released, but their contents have been described consistently. Madrid’s El País reported that in a later document Pava made explicit that three field hospitals and several thousand kits of food, household goods and cookware were required, including pet food. Infobae and Colprensa describe the 5:20 p.m. letter in the same terms — hygiene and food kits, and field hospitals to reinforce care in Chocó and Pereira.

He also framed the first letter as a technical instrument rather than a refusal. “There has at no point been any intention to limit access for those groups that can help and contribute assertively,” he said in the video. “When one speaks of authorizing USAR groups or search-and-rescue groups, one is speaking of specialized groups that have been accredited by the country sending them and that are accepted in Colombia.” He said the “disinformation” around the letter carried a “perverse intention: to justify the arrival of the Israeli Army’s USAR teams in Cali,” according to La Silla Vacía.

The México Question

México’s absence from the rescue effort became a story of its own, and Pava has described it two ways four days apart. To Madrid’s El País, on the night he announced he would resign, he said Bula had not initially wanted to receive support from México, which has a left-leaning government. To Colprensa on August 15, he said he had raised México himself and been told there was nothing on the table. “What I knew on Tuesday was the offer from only those four countries,” he said. “I asked whether there were any from México or from Chile, which we have had good experiences with, and they told me there were no offers. By Wednesday I found out that there were indeed offers from other countries, but by then those were other decisions the foreign minister had made.” Asked whether political interests shaped which aid was received, he told Colprensa: “Indeed, they are political decisions taken by the Foreign Ministry. Conflict was generated because aid from some countries was prioritized over others because they are political allies. I was left with many doubts about the México matter, because the foreign minister did not speak of further offers… I was lost.”

México’s public position on August 11 was that it was waiting on Bogotá. President Claudia Sheinbaum said that day that a humanitarian package and a specialized Mexican earthquake-rescue team were ready to go but that Colombia had to approve the deployment. “We are awaiting the formal request from the Government of Colombia, but we are ready for the moment they tell us we can go and help,” she said, according to El País. Chile’s President José Antonio Kast made a similar offer. Bula has said Colombia works with countries “without any ideological or political consideration,” a remark he made at a news conference on August 12, according to Chile’s Emol, citing AFP.

Three separate Mexican groups have figured in the argument. Sheinbaum said on August 13 — by which point Pava had been out of the job for a day — that Colombia had not approved entry for the Mexican Army’s rescue brigade, and that the obstacle was documentary: “They asked for certification from Colombia. They are certified, but now they are asking for another certification,” she said, adding that the brigade “is ready to leave at any moment,” La Opinión reported. The civilian Brigada de Rescate Topos Tlatelolco separately announced it would not travel, citing Colombia’s protocols for coordinating incoming teams. A third group, the independent Topos Aztecas, was already working in Cali, La Silla Vacía reported, noting that neither Topos brigade is México’s official state rescue capability. Pava’s own comment to Madrid’s El País about the Mexican volunteers already on the ground: “The Mexican topos (moles) seem to have come without authorization, and now they have to formalize their entry in order to operate.” Sheinbaum said Colombia had requested food parcels, water and medicine. La Opinión reported that México began an operation on August 12 contemplating 58.5 tons of aid, carried by Mexican Air Force C-130 aircraft, through August 14.

The Transition That Was Called Off

Pava spent 48 hours running the earthquake response for an administration that regarded him as the previous president’s man, and he has described the relationship in those terms. “They distrusted me, and I distrusted them,” he told Madrid’s El País. “In the meetings I was a fly in the milk, because they understand that I am from Petro’s very close circle of friends, not a second-tier official.”

The institutional gap was real on both sides. De la Espriella had ordered the customary transition process with the outgoing Petro administration suspended on July 7, Infobae reported at the time, and the incoming UNGRD director had not been named when the earthquake hit. The agency had no permanent director general and none of the three subdirectors who run its core areas — risk knowledge, risk reduction and disaster management — according to El País of Cali. “The UNGRD has 130 employees on provisional appointments and more than 1,000 contractors; with that team there were only some, because others ended their contracts with the end of the government,” he said. “What I did not count on was that there was no official from the other government, that there was no replacement in the post, and that I would arrive on Monday and this earthquake would occur.” He said the agency had more than $35 billion COP available for the first hours of response. Pava had himself replaced members of the UNGRD’s management team during his two months in the post, and defended those changes when Blu Radio put the criticism to him: “At no point was any sub-directorate left abandoned; it was taken on by career staff with experience and capacity.”

What the New Director Did Next

geologist David Santiago Tamayo Roldán, De la Espriella’s own pick, was sworn in as UNGRD director on the morning of Wednesday, August 12, and the government’s position changed the same day, on Lara’s account: “As soon as the new UNGRD director, Doctor Tamayo, arrived, the first thing he did in the morning with the foreign minister was to certify that international aid would be received, and international rescuers arrived.”

That Wednesday morning the Foreign Ministry welcomed a team of 22 US experts specialized not in carrying out rescue work but in coordinating those who do — the support Pava had recommended requesting from Washington. Hours later Tamayo announced Colombia would accept international rescue teams to relieve Colombian crews as needed. More than 54 hours had passed since the earthquake, Madrid’s El País reported.

The published country lists have not matched. Emol, citing AFP, reported on August 12 that Tamayo named four countries: the United States, Israel, El Salvador and Ecuador. México’s La Jornada carried the same four. La Silla Vacía reported three — Israel, the United States and El Salvador — and Lara also said three: “Rescuers were requested from three countries because no more are needed.” He went on: “Because we also cannot receive 4,000 rescuers, because receiving them, the 4,000 rescuers, becomes an additional problem for us.”

Tamayo’s own list changed again four days later. Presenting the national balance on the evening of August 15, he said the emergency had not exceeded the country’s response capacity, while noting that Colombia had accepted specialized international support to reinforce operations. He said three UN-accredited groups were in the country — from the United States, Ecuador and Israel, a trio that drops El Salvador from the list La Silla Vacía and Lara had given; warned local officials not to authorize groups not properly certified for search and rescue; and questioned that many such groups arrive requesting large quantities of resources without the capacity to operate autonomously, El País of Cali reported. Four days after Pava’s letter, the certification threshold and the capacity finding were the new government’s position as well.

What the Capacity Numbers Show

Colombia has 23 UNGRD-accredited USAR teams and roughly 1,000 trained rescuers drawn from the Colombian Red Cross, the Defensa Civil Colombiana (Colombian Civil Defense), fire departments, the armed forces and the national police‘s specialized Ponalsar search-and-rescue unit, according to El Tiempo, which interviewed Silvia Ballén, head of the UNGRD’s national search-and-rescue program. Colombia’s USAR COL-1 team obtained its international INSARAG classification in 2018, making the country one of four in the hemisphere with a UN-certified search-and-rescue team, El Tiempo reported; a team at the heavy classification averages 64 personnel and can sustain field work for seven to 10 days.

Lara said the constraint in some regions was demand, not supply. “In Quibdó 160 rescuers were left idle, with their arms crossed, because there was nothing left to search for or rescue,” he said, adding that they could be moved to Pereira, Dosquebradas or Cali but that local officials were reporting sufficient coverage: “Both the governor and the mayor, the mayors of these cities, tell us that there are enough rescuers.” La Silla Vacía reported that from Wednesday night several regions began closing the rescue phase, with Quibdó moving to reconstruction, Buenaventura expected to follow, and towns such as Quimbaya, in Quindío, requiring no rescue operations because there were no missing persons.

The View From Outside

Foreign governments spent August 11 asking whom to talk to. China’s ambassador to Colombia, Zhu Jingyang, asked the government to name an official and an official liaison for coordinating international assistance. Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele confirmed publicly that Colombia had declined rescue personnel: “The Government of Colombia has requested humanitarian aid only in the form of supplies to assist the families affected by the earthquake,” he wrote on his social media accounts. “We have been informed that its rescue teams, medical teams and other emergency bodies are deployed and attending to the situation, so that at this moment they do not require personnel support.” El Salvador said it would send two cargo planes with 100 tons of supplies instead; Emol reported the shipment arrived. Jens Laerke, spokesman for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, made a similar request for a clear and organized response to the offers on the table, Madrid’s El País reported. Laerke also confirmed that the United Nations had received no formal request for assistance from Colombia, while saying the UN system stood ready to provide all the support within its reach, according to Infobae.

The United States was the exception. Washington announced $15.5 million USD in aid for emergency shelter, food, protection and damage assessment, and the State Department said it had activated a Disaster Assistance Response Team on Monday that would arrive in Colombia on Tuesday. Colombia issued a diplomatic note on Tuesday requesting specific support from the international community, short of a formal international appeal. UN Secretary-General António Guterres wrote that day that “the United Nations remains in close contact with the Colombian authorities and supports the government-led response, as requested.” Infobae reported that Pacto Histórico (Historic Pact) politicians including former Senator María José Pizarro and Representative Mafe Carrascal were pressing De la Espriella to request UN help. On August 12, Israel’s government said Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu had ordered an aid delegation dispatched “following a request from Colombian President Abelardo de la Espriella,” according to Semana.

Where It Stands

Lara has been summoned to Congress to account for the government’s handling of the emergency. “On Tuesday we were summoned to Congress, we have been summoned, I was summoned to Congress so that we explain this situation,” he said, adding: “Watching how they make politics out of this tragedy — that is scavenger politics, frankly. Let’s drop it now.”

The UNGRD’s latest national balance, with a cutoff of 6:30 p.m. on August 15, records 289 people dead, 3,937 injured, 143 missing and 353 rescued across 15 departments and 448 municipalities, with 117,222 people affected. The death toll was revised down from 294 reported that morning and the missing figure from 320, after the agency cross-checked municipal reports against records held by the Fiscalía General de la Nación (Attorney General’s Office), the Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses (National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences) and relief agencies to remove duplicates. Pava has pointed to that volatility in his own defense, telling Colprensa that on the Monday “I had an assessment far below what exists today,” and that at the time of his meeting with Bula the assessment showed the main sites requiring rescue were covered and that what was missing was coordination support and some technological capability.ungrd-carta-a-minexterior.

Full Translation: The UNGRD Letter to Colombia’s Foreign Ministry

The following is Finance Colombia’s translation of the original Spanish-language letter (radicado UNGRD 2026EE14740, dated August 11, 2026, digitally signed at 1:45 p.m.), sent by the UNGRD to Colombia’s Foreign Ministry:

Bogotá D.C.,
Doctor
Omar Bula Escobar
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Calle 10 No. 5 – 51. Palacio de San Carlos

Subject: Update on national search-and-response capacity in light of the earthquake that occurred in Colombia on August 10, 2026.

Dear Minister:

As part of the response to the emergency caused by the 7.4 Mw-magnitude earthquake recorded on August 10, 2026, with its epicenter in the municipality of San José del Palmar, department of Chocó, the National Unit for Disaster Risk Management (UNGRD) wishes to report on the current status of the response and the capabilities available within national territory.

According to information consolidated by the UNGRD’s National Crisis Room, the coordinating entity for risk management in Colombia, and taking into account that the assessment of damages and needs continues to be updated, different territories have been prioritized, particularly the departments of Chocó, Valle del Cauca and Risaralda, according to the needs identified in each of them.

With regard to search and rescue in collapsed structures, Colombia is carrying out response actions through its specialized national capabilities, with search-and-rescue groups accredited by the Government of Colombia, deployed and coordinated through the National Disaster Risk Management System.

At this hour, the country has more than 25 groups with search-and-rescue capabilities, which are sufficient to meet the operational needs identified in the affected areas. Based on the assessment carried out so far and on the national capabilities available, the National Unit for Disaster Risk Management, through its Search and Rescue Program, considers that, at this stage of the emergency, it is not necessary to request or activate the deployment of specialized international search-and-rescue teams (USAR).

This determination corresponds to the current state of the emergency and is subject to ongoing monitoring of conditions on the ground. Should the emergency evolve, or should the identification of new needs exceed available national capabilities, the Government of Colombia will promptly communicate, through established official channels, its specific requirements for international assistance and, if necessary, may request support solely from international search-and-rescue teams holding the corresponding INSARAG classification.

In this regard, the National Unit for Disaster Risk Management expresses its deep gratitude to the international community for its expressions of solidarity and for the offers of technical, operational and humanitarian support in search and rescue received through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the UNGRD.

Colombia maintains active mechanisms of coordination and information exchange with the international community and, in particular, is reporting on the evolution of the response and available capabilities through the corresponding international coordination mechanisms, including the Virtual OSOCC (Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre) platform, within the framework of United Nations mechanisms for coordinating search-and-rescue operations.

Sincerely,

Javier Pava Sánchez
Director General (Acting)

Prepared by: Laura Manuela Bermúdez Caro, contractor, International Cooperation Group – UNGRD
Reviewed by: Nicolás Fernández de Soto, International Cooperation Liaison to the Director General’s Office – UNGRD
Reviewed by: Antonio José López Reales, Coordinator, International Cooperation Group – UNGRD
Reviewed by: Silvia Carolina Ballén Sánchez, Specialized Professional, Management Sub-Directorate – UNGRD
Reviewed by: Johana Andrea Rangel Franco, Specialized Professional, Management Sub-Directorate – UNGRD

Who Is Javier Pava Sánchez?

Javier Pava Sánchez is a geological engineer, a specialist in risk evaluation and disaster prevention and a master’s graduate in territorial planning and population dynamics, according to El Tiempo. Petro appointed him to lead the UNGRD in 2022, and returned him to the agency as acting director through Decree 0611 of June 16, 2026, after the Procuraduría General de la Nación (Inspector General’s Office) suspended director Carlos Carrillo over alleged improper political activity. Carrillo said the measure surprised him and rejected it, telling reporters, according to Infobae: “At no time did I campaign, I never promoted any candidate nor did I request electoral support for any campaign.”

Pava was still the UNGRD’s acting director when he signed the August 11 letter, announced that night that he would step down, and was replaced by Tamayo on the morning of August 12. He remains acting manager of the Fondo Adaptación (Adaptation Fund), another agency in the sector for which the new government has not named a replacement, Madrid’s El País reported. Two days after leaving the UNGRD, in the video responding to Lara, he said: “I want to state to Colombia that I have acted responsibly in the exercise of my functions and consistently with the government I represent, which is the government of President Petro.”

Above image: Javier Pava Sánchez speaks during a meeting at UNGRD headquarters in Bogotá. (Photo: UNGRD handout)

A magnitude 7.4 earthquake struck western Colombia at 7:34 a.m. local time on August 10, with an epicenter about 3 miles (5 kilometers) east of San José del Palmar in the department of Chocó, roughly 150 miles (241 kilometers) from Bogotá, according to the US Geological Survey and Colombia’s Servicio Geológico Colombiano (Colombian Geological Survey). The quake originated at a depth of more than 100 kilometers, classifying it as a deep intraslab event tied to the Nazca Plate’s subduction beneath the South American Plate. Tremors were felt as far away as Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Peru.

As of August 12, Colombian authorities had confirmed more than 188 deaths, over 1,600 injuries, 222 people missing, and 260 people still trapped in debris, according to the Unidad Nacional de Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (National Disaster Risk Management Unit, UNGRD) and figures reported by El Tiempo; earlier tallies from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) put damaged homes at close to 5,000, with 61 buildings collapsed and more than 550 schools and 24 health facilities affected across roughly 16 departments. Chocó, Valle del Cauca, Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío sustained the heaviest damage. President Abelardo De La Espriella declared a national disaster, invoked an economic emergency, and decreed three days of national mourning.

Colombia’s Foreign Ministry, the Cancillería, installed an international cooperation command post led by Foreign Minister Omar Bula to field and coordinate offers of assistance from foreign governments and multilateral organizations. Vice President José Manuel Restrepo said more than 12 countries had formally pledged humanitarian aid or rescue personnel, and that multilateral institutions alone had presented cooperation proposals totaling $1.3 billion USD in assistance of various kinds. “We have already received proposals worth $1.3 billion USD in cooperation of various kinds from multilateral organizations in the midst of this tragedy,” Restrepo said.

“We have already received proposals worth $1.3 billion USD in cooperation of various kinds from multilateral organizations in the midst of this tragedy.” — José Manuel Restrepo, Vice President of Colombia

United States

The US Department of State said it mobilized an initial $15.5 million USD in emergency shelter, food, and protection assistance, along with post-earthquake structural assessments, according to an August 11 media note from the department’s Office of the Spokesperson. The funding is being channeled through five partner organizations: Catholic Relief Services (CRS), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Miyamoto International, the UN World Food Programme, and World Vision. Of the total, $3 million USD routed through CRS draws on funding already committed under a separate, previously announced global assistance award to that organization, meaning it does not represent new incremental spending beyond what State had already budgeted for CRS programming.

The department also activated a Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART), a standing mechanism of humanitarian specialists drawn from across the State Department, with members arriving in Colombia the day of the earthquake to coordinate needs assessments and the broader US government response alongside embassy personnel in Bogotá.

Separately from the new $15.5 million USD package, the State Department noted that as part of its existing $3.8 billion USD contribution to OCHA, the United States had previously provided $200 million USD to the Colombia Pooled Fund, a standing mechanism OCHA can draw on for earthquake-related needs as well as humanitarian programming in Colombia that predates the earthquake. That $200 million USD figure reflects prior funding availability rather than a new pledge tied specifically to the August 10 disaster.

On consular matters, the US Embassy in Bogotá remained open and continued providing emergency and routine passport, notarial, and consular services; its consular agency in Barranquilla also remained open. The embassy advised American citizens in Colombia to enroll in the Smart Traveler Enrollment Program (STEP) at step.state.gov and to follow [@USEmbassyBogota](profile/USEmbassyBogota) and [@TravelGov](profile/TravelGov) on social media for security updates. US citizens seeking assistance can reach the Bureau of Consular Affairs at 888-407-4747 from within the United States, or +1-202-501-4444 from other locations.

Multilateral development banks

The World Bank disposed $200,000 USD in a non-reimbursable grant, without an associated credit line, to fund post-earthquake damage assessments. Susana Cordeiro Guerra, the World Bank’s vice president for Latin America and the Caribbean, offered technical expertise drawn from the institution’s experience responding to disasters elsewhere, in addition to the grant.

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) approved $500,000 USD in non-reimbursable technical cooperation funding, of which $350,000 USD was made immediately available to the Colombian Red Cross and $150,000 USD earmarked for technical support, Restrepo said. Separately, IDB Group President Ilan Goldfajn said the institution has up to $300 million USD in contingent emergency financing available to Colombia should the government request it; wire reports including CNBC and CBC cited a related figure of $50 million USD as immediately available for reconstruction support, reflecting different tranches or reporting of the same contingent facility.

CAF, the Banco de Desarrollo de América Latina y el Caribe (Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean), pledged $500,000 USD in humanitarian donations to be channeled through its Social and Human Development Funds, CAF executive president Sergio Díaz-Granados said.

European Union

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced €2.1 million EUR in humanitarian funding for health, water, sanitation and hygiene, shelter, food, protection, and cash assistance in the hardest-hit areas, according to the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations department (ECHO). The European Union activated its Civil Protection Mechanism, which pools resources among the bloc’s 27 member states, and deployed its Copernicus satellite mapping service to support damage assessment. A further €100,000 EUR was reallocated from an existing EU-funded project implemented by the German Red Cross to meet immediate needs of roughly 2,500 families in Chocó and Valle del Cauca.

Switzerland

The Swiss government approved 1 million CHF (about $1.23 million USD) in aid, with half directed to the UN World Food Programme and local nongovernmental organizations for emergency assistance and the remainder allocated to restoring living conditions in destroyed areas, according to the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. Swiss President Guy Parmelin offered solidarity with Colombia the day of the earthquake.

Spain

Spain’s Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo (Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for Development, AECID) mobilized an initial €1 million EUR package covering shelter materials, water and sanitation kits, medication, and support for deployed health personnel, Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares said. Spain’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported no confirmed Spanish fatalities as of August 12, though it had not yet located 75 Spanish nationals believed to have been in the affected region.

El Salvador

El Salvador’s president, Nayib Bukele, dispatched two aircraft carrying 100 tons of humanitarian aid along with medical and rescue teams, according to the Presidencia de la República de El Salvador (Presidency of the Republic of El Salvador).

Ecuador

Ecuador’s Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility) sent 47 rescuers with canine units and equipment provisioned for seven days of operations.

Mexico

Mexico deployed 255 specialized military search-and-rescue personnel, including canine handlers and medical staff, along with 4 tons of medications, 8.4 tons of food, satellite phones, radios, generators, and tents, according to Mexico’s Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Peru

Peru sent a plane carrying 12.5 tons of supplies and 62 rescuers through its Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Chile

Chilean President José Antonio Kast offered his government’s civil and technical resources through Chile’s Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), without publicly specifying the scope.

Venezuela

Venezuela’s government, through Vice President and Foreign Minister Delcy Rodríguez and the Ministerio del Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores (Ministry of People’s Power for Foreign Affairs), said it would send rescue brigades, an announcement that drew domestic criticism within Colombia given the state of bilateral relations.

Brazil

Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva pledged solidarity and said logistical and technical teams were on standby through Brazil’s Ministério das Relações Exteriores (Ministry of Foreign Affairs).

Argentina

Argentina’s Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Comercio Internacional y Culto (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship) offered material assistance, civil protection assets, and logistics support.

Additional Latin American and Caribbean support

Several other countries in the region conveyed solidarity or more limited offers of support:

• Panama — President José Raúl Mulino offered collaboration “within our capacity” through the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Panamá (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Panama).
• Costa Rica — The government conveyed solidarity through its Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship).
• Dominican Republic — President Luis Abinader said his country stood ready to provide assistance, coordinated through the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de República Dominicana (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic).
• Guatemala — The disaster-response agency, the Coordinadora Nacional para la Reducción de Desastres (National Coordinator for Disaster Reduction, Conred), remained in contact with Colombian counterparts to determine whether a formal request for assistance would follow, President Bernardo Arévalo de León’s government said.
• Cuba — Expressed willingness to help without publicly detailing specific commitments.
• Bolivia — Expressed willingness to help without publicly detailing specific commitments.

Other countries

Vice President Restrepo named Japan, Sweden, and Turkey among the more than 12 governments that formally offered humanitarian aid or rescue support, though itemized figures for their pledges were not publicly available as of this writing. Israel, France, Germany, Italy, and Ukraine also expressed readiness to coordinate assistance, according to Colombian media reporting, without confirmed dollar figures attached to those offers.

Red Cross and Red Crescent movement

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) launched an emergency appeal for 11.7 million CHF to support the Colombian Red Cross, which activated its National Crisis Room and deployed a 30-member urban search-and-rescue team from its Antioquia branch to Chocó, alongside volunteers from its Quindío and Caldas branches. The Colombian Red Cross also activated its Restoring Family Links service to help reunite people separated from missing relatives.

Private sector

Among corporate contributions, Spanish bank BBVA (BME: BBVA) (NYSE: BBVA) said it would provide 3,500 food and hygiene kits, including nonperishable staples and personal care items, distributed through Colombia’s regional food bank network.

How to contribute

Colombian donors and members of the international community seeking a vetted local channel for contributions can direct support through somosone.com.co, the Colombian strategic-philanthropy platform operated by ONE Inversión Social. The organization has partnered with Sankofa Danzafro, La Pascasia, and Presentes Corporación on a Chocó-focused relief campaign, with a donation page linked from the platform’s homepage.

Colombia recorded more than 24 million non-resident visitors during the current presidential term and generated close to $34.43 billion USD in foreign exchange from travel through December 2025, figures released by the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism (Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo, or MinCIT) show. The ministry says tourism has become one of the country’s largest sources of foreign exchange, surpassing traditional export sectors such as coal and coffee.

“Today, Colombia demonstrates that it can also generate wealth from its biodiversity, its cultural heritage, the quality of its services and the talent of its people.” -Diana Marcela Morales, Former Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism

The figures were presented during the Foro Internacional de Turismo: Colombia, un destino por explorar (International Tourism Forum: Colombia, a Destination to Explore), held in Bogotá on July 15. The event brought together tourism associations, business leaders, academics and government officials to discuss the sector’s performance and future, including regenerative tourism, artificial intelligence, smart mobility and innovation in visitor experiences.

Promoted under the campaign Descubre la Diversidad de Colombia, El País de la Belleza (Discover the Diversity of Colombia, the Country of Beauty), the ministry reported that more than 24 million non-resident visitors arrived during the administration of President Gustavo Petro, representing a 109% increase compared with the previous equivalent period. Of those arrivals, 14.8 million were foreign visitors.

According to the Banco de la República, Colombia’s central bank, tourism generated approximately $34.43 billion USD in foreign exchange through December 2025, exceeding revenue from coal and coffee exports. Tourism has also become the country’s largest services export, with 57% of services export earnings coming from the sector.

“For decades, much of the country’s capacity to generate foreign exchange was tied to the export of raw materials,” Former Minister of Commerce, Industry and Tourism Diana Marcela Morales said. “Today, Colombia demonstrates that it can also generate wealth from its biodiversity, its cultural heritage, the quality of its services, the talent of its people and the confidence that millions of people place in choosing the country as a destination. Tourism expresses, perhaps like few other sectors, that transition toward a more diversified economy with greater added value.”

Employment has also expanded alongside visitor growth. Figures from DANE (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, Colombia’s National Administrative Department of Statistics) show that accommodation and food service activities supported approximately 1.8 million jobs in February 2026, a 15% increase compared with the same period in 2019. During 2025, the sector accounted for 4.4% of Colombia’s national value added.

International demand has continued to grow during 2026. In the first quarter, more than 368,000 international airline tickets were sold with Colombia as the destination, representing a 16.7% increase over the previous year. The largest source markets were the United States, Brazil and Mexico.

During the first two months of 2026, approximately 10 million passengers traveled through Colombia’s airports, an 8% increase across domestic and international traffic. Between January and March, the country received 1.58 million non-resident visitors.

The government has also expanded tourism investment beyond major destinations. MinCIT reported that infrastructure projects—including trails, docks, boardwalks and gastronomic plazas—have reached 699 municipalities, representing 63% of Colombia’s territory. According to the ministry, 207 municipalities received tourism investment for the first time.

The ministry also said tourism initiatives now cover all 140 municipalities included in Colombia’s Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial (Development Programs with a Territorial Focus, or PDET), a post-conflict development framework for areas historically affected by armed conflict. Through its Turismo para una Cultura de Paz (Tourism for a Culture of Peace) strategy, more than 999 businesses have joined the Colombia Destinos de Paz (Colombia Peace Destinations) certification.

“Unlike other economic activities, whose benefits tend to concentrate in specific production centers, tourism generates value precisely where a country’s natural, cultural and historical heritage is located,” Morales said. “It is a bridge that connects different cultures and brings opportunities to intermediate municipalities, strengthens rural economies, energizes small businesses and creates incentives to conserve what makes each territory unique.”

Headline Photo: Beachside in Barú, Colombia (photo by Loren Moss)

The Gran Salón Inmobiliario, one of Colombia’s largest real estate events, will return to Bogotá’s Corferias from August 20 to 23, 2026, marking its 20th edition with an expected participation of more than 25,000 visitors and nearly 170 exhibitors.

Organized by Corferias and the Lonja de Bogotá, the fair has operated as a sector partnership since 2005, bringing together developers, financial institutions, housing organizations, and specialized service providers.

The 2026 edition will showcase more than 1,600 real estate projects across approximately 4,900 square meters of exhibition space. The offering will include VIS (vivienda de interés social, or social-interest housing) and non-VIS developments, alongside tourism projects, commercial properties, business developments, and investment opportunities.

International showcase highlights tourism and investment projects

This year’s fair will feature an international showcase, where organizers expect more than 30 exhibitors to present projects focused mainly on tourism investment and short-term rental models.

The event announcement states that participating markets include Panama, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, the United States, the United Arab Emirates, Guatemala, and Spain, with Panama serving as the edition’s guest country. The international section will feature residential, commercial, tourism, and business developments from Colombia and overseas markets.

Academic program and visitor support services

The event will also include an academic agenda focused on topics such as real estate financing, housing subsidies, market trends, sustainability, technology, and emerging investment opportunities.

The organizers also announced experiential areas designed to connect visitors with participating brands and provide additional tools for those evaluating property purchases or investment decisions.

Throughout the four-day event, attendees will have access to financing guidance, information on subsidy programs, expert discussions, and real estate options aimed at different buyer profiles and investment objectives.

According to the organizers, the Gran Salón Inmobiliario continues to focus on connecting real estate supply and demand in a specialized environment, while providing visitors with access to guidance and support throughout the event.

Above photo: View from building of Corferias in Bogota Colombia (Photo: {Rainercol@} / Wikimedia Commons)

The Latin American air freight market, valued at $1.04 billion USD in 2025, is projected to experience sustained growth, driven by expanding e-commerce, increasing cross-border trade, including inter-Latin American trade. Key growth drivers include the rising demand for more reliable and quick turnaround delivery services, particularly for perishable goods and high-value products.

Global air cargo demand rose by 3.4% in 2025 compared with the previous year, according to data released by the International Air Transport Association (IATA).

At the same time, total capacity, measured in available cargo ton-kilometers (ACTK), increased by 3.7% year on year. For international operations, demand rose by 4.2%, while capacity increased by 5.1%.

Latin America Air Freight Industry Concentration & Characteristics

The Latin American air freight industry has been defined by a moderate level of concentration, with a few large global players dominating but now also including several significant regional carriers. While FedEx, UPS, and DHL hold substantial market share, particularly in international freight, regional players like LATAM Cargo, Avianca Cargo (Tampa Air), and Aeromexico maintain strong positions in domestic and regional routes.

Other leading players in the Latin American airfreight industry include IAG Cargo (UK), Copa Airlines (Panama), American Airlines, Delta Airlines, Azul Cargo Express (Brazil) and Emirates Skycargo.

Nicholas Sutherland’s opinions and claims are his own, and not necessarily those of Finance Colombia.

Regional Growth Drivers

• E-commerce explosion – Same-day and next-day service expectations are migrating south, driving express integrators to expand cargo terminals in Latin America and sign block-space agreements with regional carriers.
• Perishables dominance – Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Chile collectively ship more than 1.5 million tons of flowers, fruit, seafood, and pharma each year—commodities that depend on airport infrastructure for freight with reliable 2-8 °C corridors.
• Pharmaceuticals – Colombia, Mexico and Brazil stand out as not only having large national companies, but also some of the largest pharma companies in the world have factories in these countries.

Electronics, jewelry, auto parts, specialized machine parts, and high-value textiles are also driving increased traffic.

Latin America’s Hub Status

For years, Latin America has been spoken of primarily as a supplier, a hub for perishables, electronics, and auto parts feeding the U.S. and Europe. Fast forward to 2025 and something is unmistakably clear: the region is no longer merely sourcing for the world. It is becoming one of the most strategically viable air cargo growth engines, driven by nearshoring, rising consumer markets, and accelerated infrastructure investment.

Leading Locations

Mexico

 Since 2023 the Felipe Ángeles International Airport, also within the Greater Metropolitan Area of Mexico City, has now surpassed the Benito Juarez airport for air cargo with 2025 figures showing 413,224 metric tons in air cargo traffic.

The International Airport of Mexico City, known officially as Benito Juárez International Airport, stands out as the largest airport in the country and is now the second busiest air cargo hub in Mexico and number three in the LATAM region. The figures underline the importance of this hub. In January 2022, the air terminal managed a total of 41,650 tons. In 2023, this number rose to 47,206.8 tons, reflecting an important increase of 5,556.8 tons. It is important to mention that this airport also acts as a center of operations and connections (HUB) for the Mexican airline Aeroméxico, further strengthening its strategic position in the airport and logistics scenario in the region.

The International Airport of Cancun (CUN), located in the Mexican Caribbean, is a major hub in cargo handling in Latin America. With leading-edge facilities and advanced systems for the processing of goods, the airport handles a diversity of products, including consumer goods, textiles, electronic parts and pharmaceutical products. Its strategic location makes it crucial for trade routes between North America, Latin America and Europe and it has undergone constant growth in its volume of cargo.

Colombia

El Dorado International Airport is in Colombia’s capital city, Bogotá, and stands out as the third most important airport in Latin America in terms of freight volume. It registered a 2024 throughput of 809,00 tons, with flowers, perishables and pharma being the main categories.

Colombia has consolidated its position as a world leader in the export of a wide range of products, including products derived from agriculture, foodstuffs and chemical products. The airport has also been consolidated as the center of strategic operations (HUB) for international airline, Avianca.

Two 3,800 m runways at 8,360 ft elevation make BOG a purpose-built wide-body freighter hub. Cargo airlines position here to bridge east-west schedules across the Caribbean, giving forwarders same-night connections into MIA, AMS, and DOH.

Panama

Tocumen International Airport (PTY), Panamá City handled 216,653 tons in 2024 (a 4% increase over 2023). PTY sits astride the Colón Free Zone and the Panamá Canal rail link; a third runway is budgeted for development in 2027 to future-proof capacity.

A new development project called “Tocumen Cargo City”, with an area of 124 hectares, which includes the concession for the development of the cargo terminal and logistics zone, was announced in 2024. This project will take advantage of Tocumen’s competitive advantages as the region’s main air hub that connects daily more than 80 commercial destinations, and more than 50 air cargo destinations integrating a multimodal axis with the country’s maritime and land transport operations,

 Peru

Jorge Chávez International Airport is in the region of Callao, outside of the metropolitan area of Lima (Peru). It stands out as the center of operations and connections for LATAM Airlines.

In 2023 the airport handled 230,993 tons of air freight. The largest quantities of air export products were fresh asparagus, blueberries, salmon and other seafood. In 2024, the airport also added another runway and a new passenger terminal with an adjoining logistics park.

Brazil

São Paulo-Guarulhos International Airport (GRU) had a throughput of 235,600 tons in 2024. Air-sea multimodality is boosted by a 90-minute drive to the Port of Santos. Automotive, machinery, pharma cold-chain (largest airport cool-store in Brazil) are the highest categories of products.

Campinas Viracopos (VCP) airport, in Sao Paulo state (not the city) handles roughly one-third of Brazil’s imported air freight and was voted 2024 Cargo Airport of the Year by routesonline.com . It boasts a 90,000 m² cargo terminal with 11 dedicated cold rooms and a live-animal zone.

 Looking Forward

Governments are aware that there is now fierce rivalry to attract air cargo logistics operations and several have identified the sector as a key segment which would improve the competitiveness of their economies and stimulate economic growth and create skilled employment opportunities. Integration of air cargo, ports, incentives and free zones have become a cornerstone for attracting logistics and manufacturing companies.

Cargo airports in Latin America are writing the next chapter in hemispheric logistics. For independent freight forwarders, and other investors, these hubs are not just transit points, they are strategic pivot points to shorten lead times, diversify modal risk, and command premium margins in niche verticals. Airports are emerging as focal points in this new logistics landscape. Policy support, geography, and international partnerships are essential to attracting international operators and service providers.

Several countries have made successful initiatives to increase investment in the multimodal logistics space including the Dominican Republic, El Salvador (with a focus on increasing Maintenance Repair and Overhaul operations) Ecuador and La Aurora International Airport in Guatemala becoming a major hub, with LAATS, a Guatemalan logistics and freight company, managing all regular cargo flights there.

Attracting Investment in the Caribbean

For countries in the Caribbean to consider becoming air cargo logistics locations, they require international operators to view them as viable long-term locations, therefore several factors need to be considered.

Cold-Chain certification is a cornerstone for diversified airfreight operations. Pharma shippers demand IATA CEIV or WHO GDP accreditation. GRU, VCP, and LIM all hold multiple certifications, allowing forwarders to move temperature-controlled cargo without auxiliary containers significant cost saving.

Customs & Free-Zone Synergy have been the defining characteristics of a country’s success. Many airports interface directly with bonded zones or inland ports. Panama’s Tocumen International Airport’s on-airport logistics park and Panama Pacifico free zone cut transfer times by 24 hours compared with off-site warehousing.

Customs Harmonization and Focused Incentives

Caribbean countries must consider integration of the electronic DUCA-F, a fundamental document for the export of products originating in a Central American country to other countries in the region, within the framework of current trade agreements. It integrates and connects the customs systems of the six countries that make up the Central American region. This interconnection significantly improves customs controls, allowing for the automatic validation of declared data and real-time verification of approvals issued by the single windows and customs authorities of each country.

Airports may waive or discount landing fees for 1–2 years to attract new carriers or new routes. Sao Paulo’s Viracopos International Airport in Brazil runs an incentive program for cargo carriers as it looks to strengthen international hub’s cargo activities. The program aims to develop Viracopos as an international cargo hub, and the gateway’s operator – Aeroportos Brasil Viracopos – wants to increase the number of international flight routes and cargo frequencies. Some of these incentives include 100% exemption of landing fees for operations at the airport’s cargo terminal for the first 24 months of a carrier’s cargo operation.

Like landing fees, building rents can be discounted for air cargo carriers. For example, St. Louis International Airport offers 18 months of waived terminal building rents and landing fees for new transoceanic service and related logistics. Income tax exemptions for the first four (4) years of operation and reduced tax rates (sub 10%) for air cargo-related logistics operations are other ways to compete with nearshore rival locations. Income tax exemptions on rental for developers are essential for infrastructure development. These exemptions can be for twenty years, combined with a reduced tax rate for the following years.

Several Caribbean countries have declared intentions to compete for investment in air logistics, however very few (except for the Dominican Republic) have made it a priority with an accompanying tactical and focused execution plan. Caribbean countries who wish to position themselves as an air cargo hub need to have feasibility studies done by internationally recognized logistics companies along with a well-defined plan for what reasonable short-term and long-term success looks like. It’s also essential to have a realistic outlook of what each country can offer, rival strengths and incentives and a clear understanding of any deficiencies which may pose headwinds to their stated goals.

At the 2025 Colombia Gold Summit, Finance Colombia Executive Editor Loren Moss spoke with Daniel Giraldo, a Managing Director at FTI Consulting (NYSE: FCN), a global business advisory firm specializing in cross-border investment and corporate finance. Giraldo offered his perspective on the geopolitical chessboard, examining what Colombia’s recent decision to join the Belt and Road Initiative means for its future relationship with its largest long-standing ally, the United States.

Finance Colombia: I’m here with Daniel Giraldo of FTI Consulting. So we’re here at the 2025 CGS, Colombia Gold Summit, where we also talk about other precious metals, we talk about silver, we also talk about metals like copper, molybdenum, things like that. You gave an interesting talk yesterday, I don’t want to steal your thunder. Why don’t you summarize your discussion?

Daniel Giraldo: Well, if I could summarize my lecture yesterday, I think there’s a chessboard, a giant global chessboard right now. And there are two main players: US and China. And Colombia is one key figure, a key part of this chessboard. Right now, Colombia is in a key position with lots of opportunities between Chinese investment and the US investment. However, which decisions Colombia takes right now will shift the entire game for the coming years.

Finance Colombia: So we are in the last few months of a government that has been relatively friendly or biased towards China. And hostile might be too strong of a word, but relatively cold towards the United States, talking about the Petro government. Colombia, under Petro, just signed up for the Belt and Road Initiative. What is the significance of that for Colombia, not just in its relationship with the United States, but what does that do or change for Colombia?

Daniel Giraldo: Well, what we are seeing right now is that Colombia signed formally the Belt and Road Initiative earlier this year. And there’s been a lot of tensions with the Trump government. At the same time, the US is the main investor in Colombia. And what we’re seeing is how China, through different initiatives, wants to have a bigger long-term influence in the region. And Colombia is, in a soft way, saying, “We want that for us.” However, that’s not a shift that can be made automatically. That’s not made in a single signature by one president. It takes years and years to forge a relationship. And although the government of Petro, President Petro is showing how they’re very interested in the Chinese investment, and to have a strong relationship with the Chinese government, it’s not the way, to just step out of their major alliances throughout years with the US

Finance Colombia: The way that investment is done in China is fundamentally different than the way investment is done from places like the US or Canada or many European countries. In the US, if you’re going to attract investment in Colombia, it’s going to be with some company. And that company is going to do what it wants to do within the law but not really giving a damn about what Washington says or what Washington wants or what Ottawa says or wants. Whereas in China, it’s very much a government-to-government thing. You have state-owned enterprises, and Xi Jinping or the Communist Party says, “we’re going to invest in this,” whether it’s profitable or not, for whatever kind of geopolitical reasons that they want to do things. So it’s a fundamentally different thing.

If you do a deal with a company in the US, you’re doing a deal with that company. Now, yes, you have to make sure that regulatory things go through. Trump is a little bit more of a patronage type of president where he wants to get involved with things so he can find benefit for himself or his administration. But generally speaking, even still, if we look at investors, if you’re going to bring in someone to invest in one of these mining companies here or exploration, it’s a company. In China, it’s going to be a state-backed company. Now, what does that imply, then, for the way business would be done going forward, number one? And number two, Petro’s on his way out, and maybe there will be another left-wing government to continue his project, it doesn’t look like it at this point. But do you see continuity in that affinity or that participation in the Belt and Road Initiative? Like you mentioned, it’s not a treaty, it’s more of like a memorandum of understanding, like the diplomats like to call it. But what do you foresee over the next two or three years?

Daniel Giraldo: Yeah, I believe every tactic has been launched in a very moderate way somehow. So, of course, Belt and Road is just a framework, and every project that could be contemplated by Chinese government, depending on the feasibility of each one of these projects. So they’re not basically getting married yet, they’re just dating.

They’re just on their first dates. However, we’re married to the US We’ve had a long-standing marriage, and what we are seeing right now is that how investment works for both countries is different. However, for both countries, there are more and more, basically, things they require to be approved.

So in order to achieve this, the US is not being indirect about it. They require trusted partners. They require trusted allies, which get what’s at stake right now. So, Petro’s government has one year left. We are expecting a shift. However, even if Colombia gets a left-wing government or a right-wing government, it doesn’t change the fact that investment in the latest years has been in a rough place.

So Colombia requires this investment, and the country requires a very stable policy framework, regulatory framework, legal framework, in order to get investors feeling safer, with more appeal. And, yes, of course, it’s not the same as an SOE (State Owned Enterprise) Chinese company that wants to invest, that needs the approval of Beijing and all this. In contrast, we have the US. Of course, Washington can say whatever they want. They can say Petro is now on the Clinton list, and they can sanction him personally. But a company, a US company, can still invest here; it changes how they see Colombia in the long run.

Finance Colombia: I think one of the things that is very notable is that the Trump government sanctioned Petro, his son, his wife, and his interior minister personally, rather than imposing sanctions on the country or doing, like, I don’t know, tariff things. Actually, by the time we publish the video, we might know what happens, but right before the Supreme Court right now, actually as we speak, there is a challenge to Trump’s ability to circumvent congressional law. And so if we have a trade pact, like free trade agreement or something like that, a lot of businesses in the US have challenged Trump’s ability to just… you can’t just cancel a law. Congress passed a law, and it’s in effect, and you can’t just cancel it. Well, that’s what they’re arguing. And all of these kind of unilateral, discretionary tariff moves that affect entire economies and entire industries, there’s some uncertainty that is going to be settled there.

“However, we’re married to the US We’ve had a long-standing marriage, and what we are seeing right now is that how investment works for both countries is different.” – Daniel Giraldo

But it’s interesting because it seems that with them sanctioning Petro and Benedetti directly as individuals, they’re saying that they want to maintain some predictability and constancy in the bilateral economic relationship with Colombia. And I think that there have been a lot of missions. Fico, the mayor here in Medellin, some of the other mayors and Colombian congressional people have visited Washington and met with senators and met with people in the State Department and said, “Look, you know, we disagree with what the president’s doing. Wait a few months.” And it seems like Washington has heard that and is not acting too rashly towards Colombia as a country but rather decided to take their ire out directly on the president and his consigliere Armando Benedetti.

Daniel Giraldo: What I believe of this is that Trump’s government can say like, “We’re not afraid. We are not afraid of imposing sanctions. We’re not afraid of not conducting business in the way we used to do it anymore.” And it’s been shown, for example, in the relationship with China, for example, with the Chinese government, with Xi Jinping. And there’s been like an escalation of tariffs, for example, I think up to 130%. I can’t remember the exact number. And then last week they say, “let’s stop this. Let’s trade the sequels.” And it’s also their way of showing the carrot and then showing the mace or bat, this metaphor.

Finance Colombia: Yeah, the stick.

Daniel Giraldo: And with Colombia, I believe it is the same. It’s like we could, if we wanted, to give some sanctions and they will have great consequences in terms of our bilateral trade. However, they’re aware of their position. They’re our main investor. We have a very good relationship in bilateral trade. There’s been years and there’s been decades of both countries benefiting from each other. We have a great position in one of the closest countries to enter South America. And they know this government is just ending. So why would they give us, like give the left-wing parties an opportunity to just bash them and say, “Oh, Trump’s government can’t be trusted.” Whereas if you take another position and say, “Look, this is personal, this is just these individuals, not the whole country.” You still have ground to negotiate, to renegotiate, to benefit. So I believe it is quite tactical.

Finance Colombia: Another thing that you mentioned is the difference on the ground. When you look at, for example, if we talk about the mining sector, not just on the ground, but literally in the ground, the US right now, the Trump administration, and really just the US more broadly, is very concerned about rare earths. And Colombia, even though there’s not yet a lot of mining activity, Colombia does have rare earth potential. There’s already been illegal coltan, cobalt ore mining taking place down in the Amazon, things like that. But it would seem that further damaging relationships with Colombia right now would contravene the political strategy in the US to strengthen its rare earth mineral supply chain.

Daniel Giraldo: Yes, it is completely true. The US has shown how important it is for them to be less dependent on the supply chains of the Chinese government, specifically in terms of their rare earths and critical minerals refining processes. So the US has been in recent weeks signing lots of memorandums of understanding and bilateral agreements with Australia, with Japan, with Malaysia, with Thailand. And they already have very good deals with Argentina, with the Mineral Security Partnership, for example, Mexico, Peru, Argentina. And the Dominican Republic. And Colombia could be in the radar as well. And what Colombia requires to be here and to benefit with the US as well is just to be patient, to get the best and the highest standards of ESG, and to reassure the different governments that it is safe to trade minerals with Colombia. That if they purchase Colombian minerals, they explore the region and they trade with us, they will find quality, they will find high standards of minerals, without assuming lots of risks that these markets don’t want to assess anymore.

Finance Colombia: So longer term, looking out three to five years, are you optimistic or pessimistic about the bilateral relationship between the US and Colombia?

Daniel Giraldo: I feel optimistic, not only because it’s the most comfortable answer, but I do feel optimistic because I believe there is a lot of potential. And right now, the sector is not in its best place. But I believe that sometimes you just have to grit your teeth, take the punch, and then stand up again and do everything that’s in your power to just become better. And Colombia has a history of learning, and the sector will learn as well how to be more competent, how to attract investors, and how to get to the highest standard and quality of their bilateral trade with different countries.

Finance Colombia: Great. Well, Daniel Giraldo from FTI Consulting, you guys are one of the leading strategic consulting firms globally, especially when you look at things like cross-border investment. That seems to be your strong suit, even though you guys are a large firm and you guys do a lot of different things. Always great to see your presence here at CGS, at Colombia Gold Summit. And thanks for your insights.

Daniel Giraldo: It’s a pleasure, thanks for having me.

The third-quarter EBITDAR represents a 15.5% year-over-year increase from the $356 million USD reported in Q3 2024. Total operating revenues reached $1,509 million USD, marking a 12.8% increase compared to the $1,338 million USD recorded in the same period of the prior year. Total operating costs increased by 13.3% year-over-year, settling at $1,290 million USD. Net income for the quarter was $101 million USD, an improvement from $72 million USD in Q3 2024.

Operational and Capacity Metrics

Capacity, measured in Available Seat Kilometers (ASKs), reached 18,284 million, denoting a 6.8% increase compared to Q3 2024. This growth was attributed primarily to a 6.2% year-over-year increase in Stage Length. Passenger departures increased 1.0% year-over-year. The company transported 9.7 million passengers, consistent with the volume in the comparable period of 2024. The network encompassed 169 routes serving 83 destinations across 28 countries. Subsequent to the quarter’s close, Avianca introduced three new international routes, which included Belém (Brazil) and Monterrey (Mexico).

Cost performance for the quarter indicated a reduction in overall per-unit costs. Total Passenger CASK (Cost per Available Seat Kilometer) was 5.7 cents, a 1.9% decrease relative to Q3 2024. This decline was largely driven by Passenger Fuel CASK, which decreased 9.9% to 1.7 cents, resulting from lower fuel prices and increased fuel efficiency. Passenger CASK excluding fuel increased 2.1% year-over-year to 3.9 cents.

Balance Sheet and Credit Rating Actions

As of September 30, 2025, Avianca reported liquidity totaling $1,361 million USD, which represented 24.2% of last-twelve-month revenue. This total includes a cash balance of $1,161 million USD and $200 million USD available through an undrawn Revolving Credit Facility. The Net Debt to last-twelve-month EBITDAR ratio improved sequentially to 2.8x from 2.9x reported on June 30, 2025.

Rating agencies Moody’s and Fitch  upgraded Avianca’s credit ratings to B1 and B+ respectively. Both rating actions were assigned a stable outlook.

Business Unit Performance and Network Development

The cargo division, Avianca Cargo, recorded $157 million USD in revenue during Q3 2025, representing a 14.1% year-over-year increase. The operating freighter fleet currently consists of nine Airbus A330s, following the integration of two additional P2F aircraft during the quarter.

The loyalty program, LifeMiles, reported a 72% year-over-year increase in Q3 2025 Third-Party Cash EBITDA, reaching $77 million USD.

In network strategy, AGIL expanded its Business Class service to 54 additional routes from key operational centers including Bogotá (Colombia), Medellín (Colombia), San Salvador (El Salvador), Quito, and Guayaquil (Ecuador). The company’s passenger operating fleet totaled 161 aircraft as of September 2025, including 134 Airbus A320 family aircraft, 15 Boeing 787s, and 12 Airbus A330s.

Avianca is a member of Star Alliance  and is part of the Abra Group. The Abra Group also controls Gol Linhas Aéreas Inteligentes S.A.   and holds a strategic investment in Wamos Air .

Above photo: Avianca A330F cargo jet (photo courtesy Avianca)

The allocation follows capital discipline criteria and maintains investment levels comparable to projected 2025 year-end figures. Approximately 70% of the total budget ($17.2 trillion COP) is designated for core hydrocarbons operations, including production, refining, and transportation. The remaining 30% ($7.1 trillion COP) is slated for energy transition initiatives, power transmission, and corporate investments.

The 2026 financial model is built on an estimated Brent crude price of $60 USD per barrel and an average annual exchange rate near COP 4,050:1 USD. Under these assumptions, the Ecopetrol Group projects an approximate EBITDA margin of 40%, in line with 2025 levels. Transfers to the Colombian government are estimated at approximately $28 trillion COP. To support these financial targets and maintain debt metrics, the group plans to implement a portfolio rotation program.

A profitability and efficiency program is expected to contribute approximately $5.7 trillion COP, impacting EBITDA, investments, and working capital. This program is structured to support performance in total refining costs and transported barrel costs, while sustaining lifting costs below $12 USD per barrel.

Approximately $1.7 trillion COP is allocated to the company’s “SosTECnibility” strategy, focusing on climate change, sustainable territories, materials and waste management, and occupational health.

Hydrocarbons and Midstream Operations

Investment in exploration and production totals $14 trillion COP, constituting the largest single allocation. This is split with 89% dedicated to crude oil and 11% to natural gas, focused on achieving organic production levels of 730–740 thousand barrels of oil equivalent per day (BOED). Production is anticipated to consist of 80% crude, 15% gas, and 5% white products, utilizing recovery technologies to optimize resources. The strategy involves increasing crude oil output in Colombia to offset natural gas field declines.

The Ecopetrol Group plans to drill between 380 and 430 development wells, with 95% located in Colombia and 5% in the US. The exploration program includes 8 to 10 exploratory wells in Colombia, primarily in offshore, Meta, and Putumayo areas. Gas investments are estimated at $1.5 trillion COP, mainly targeting the Llanos Foothills and offshore areas to develop Caribbean gas, contributing an estimated 105–110,000 BOED.

Transport investments total about $1.5 trillion COP, representing 6% of the budget. The funding is primarily for integrity and reliability projects managed by Cenit, Ocensa, Oleoducto de Colombia S.A.), and Oleoducto del Llano S.A. Transported volumes are targeted between 1,110,000 and 1,120,000 barrels per day.

Refining investments are set at close to $1.7 trillion COP (7% of the budget), targeting reliability, availability, and sustainability at the Barrancabermeja and Cartagena refineries, aiming to reduce product imports and improve fuel quality. Combined refinery throughput is forecast between 410,000 and 420,000 barrels per day.

Energy Transition and Transmission Segment Growth

Interconexión Eléctrica S.A. E.S.P. (ISA) (BVC: ISA), an Ecopetrol subsidiary, is allocated between $6.2 and $6.8 trillion COP in 2026, comprising roughly 26% of the group’s annual budget, with approximately 80% dedicated to its electric transmission business.

For the core energy transition efforts, approximately $0.9 trillion COP (3% of the plan) is earmarked for non-conventional renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. This investment seeks to add approximately 750 MW of clean energy generation capacity from projects in operation, construction, and development.

Renewable Energy Acquisition Moves Ecopetrol Closer to 900 MW Target

In a separate announcement, Ecopetrol confirmed the successful conclusion of negotiations on November 28, 2025, with Grenergy Renovables S.A. (BME: GRE), a Spanish renewable energy company. The negotiations concern the potential acquisition by Ecopetrol of seven solar photovoltaic project companies in Colombia, located across the departments of Córdoba (3), Cesar (2), Magdalena (1), and Sucre (1).

Each of the seven companies owns the assets, licenses, agreements, and permits for a solar project with an estimated renewable energy generation capacity of up to ~12.6 MWp. The completion of this acquisition is contingent upon certain conditions precedent and legal requirements.

Upon closing, the transaction would contribute to Ecopetrol’s decarbonization and energy transition goals by adding installed capacity toward its internal target of 900 MW of self-generated renewable energy. These projects are intended to support low-emission energy generation under competitive conditions for the Ecopetrol Group’s self-consumption, reducing the company’s reliance on bilateral energy contracts and mitigating exposure to spot market energy purchases.

Corporate Governance Changes

Ecopetrol also reported changes to its corporate leadership. During a meeting held on November 27, 2025, the board of directors elected Ángela María Robledo Gómez as Chairwoman and Álvaro Torres Macías as Vice Chairman of the Board. Both individuals were elected to the Ecopetrol Board of Directors in a slate that was “proposed by the government” (President Gustavo Petro’s administration).

Additionally, the company reported the resignation of Independent Director Guillermo García Realpe, citing personal reasons. His resignation is effective as of December 12, 2025. Ecopetrol acknowledged his service to the company during his tenure.

Ecopetrol operates as a key integrated energy firm on the American continent. In Colombia, it is responsible for more than 60% of hydrocarbon production and manages the majority of the nation’s transportation, logistics, and hydrocarbon refining systems. Through its 51.4% stake in ISA, the company holds positions in energy transmission across Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia, as well as road concessions in Chile, and participates in real-time systems management through XM and the Barranquilla – Cartagena coastal highway concession. Internationally, Ecopetrol has drilling and exploration operations in oilfields across the US (Permian basin and the Gulf of Mexico), Brazil, and Mexico.

The revised model delineates two primary functions within EPM. One segment of the organization now oversees strategic management across the 47 companies that comprise the Grupo EPM—which operates in Colombia, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Panama—while the other focuses on direct public service delivery in Medellín and the department of Antioquia. The legal status and public ownership of EPM remain unchanged.

Administrative Adjustments and Workforce Impact

As part of the restructuring, EPM reduced its number of executive positions from 247 to 206. This change shortened reporting lines and flattened hierarchies in several departments. The company reports that 45 internal professionals were promoted to executive roles, and 21 department heads were elevated to higher-level positions.

The reorganization also includes the transformation of EPM’s existing Shared Services Center (CSC) into a proposed sub-management unit called “Global Business Services” (GBS). The GBS model, which is under internal review but not yet approved by the board of directors, aims to consolidate and standardize fragmented processes currently distributed across multiple departments.

GBS structures are widely adopted in multinational corporations for centralized service delivery. In Colombia, similar models are used by Grupo Argos (BVC: GRUPOARGOS, PFGRUPOARG), Grupo Nutresa (BVC: NUTRESA), Organización Corona, Grupo Aval (BVC: GRUPOAVAL, PFAVAL), and Grupo de Energía de Bogotá (BVC: GEB).

Strategic Objectives and Governance

The restructuring is part of EPM’s broader effort to enhance its governance framework and align its operational model with global trends in digital transformation, energy transition, and circular economy practices. The company has emphasized that the changes are not intended to split the organization but to clarify roles and responsibilities between corporate oversight and service execution.

EPM’s leadership team under General Manager John Alberto Maya Salazar includes newly appointed vice presidents across strategic, energy, water and sanitation, finance, regulation, and customer experience divisions.

Photo credit EPM.