José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever,” second-in-command of the Second Marquetalia (Segunda Marquetalia), was allegedly killed in an August 5 ambush in the southern reaches of the Colombia-Venezuela border, according to a statement from the group. The Second Marquetalia is a dissident group of former fighters from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia — FARC), also known as the ex-FARC Mafia.

The statement accused the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional — ELN) of carrying out the attack using explosives and said it also claimed the lives of four other fighters. However, Colombian authorities have so far been unable to independently verify the claims.

*Sierra Sabogal’s death, which occurred during an ELN attack near the Colombia-Venezuela border, was confirmed on August 11 by Colombia’s Defense Minister, Pedro Sánchez.

The Second Marquetalia accused “Pedro Pablo” or “Copete,” commander of the José Daniel Pérez Carrero Front of the ELN’s Eastern War Front, of orchestrating the ambush. He allegedly invited high-ranking members of the Second Marquetalia to a meeting to lure them into the ambush.

“The ELN acted with malice and treachery. They carried out premeditated simultaneous attacks on other Second Marquetalia units located in the region,” the group said in the statement.

The killing is linked to a series of recent armed confrontations between the ELN and Second Marquetalia in the municipality of Maroa in Venezuela’s Amazonas state, which local sources began reporting to InSight Crime on August 3. The battles between both groups, according to those reports, took place along the border with the Colombian department of Guainia.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro confirmed the armed confrontation between the guerrilla groups. “The ELN has entered into war with the Second Marquetalia and their conflict extends into Venezuela, where they have already killed people,” the president said in a post on X.

SEE ALSO: Major Criminal Powers Dispute Key Corridors in Colombia

Before this fighting, both the ELN’s Eastern War Front and the dissident Acacio Medina Front, an ally of the Second Marquetalia, had maintained certain financial arrangements and territorial divisions along this part of the border. This allowed them each to manage the area and oversee illegal mining in Amazonas, as well as the drug trafficking routes that cut through this area.

Zarco Aldinever had been in the crosshairs of Colombian authorities. They accused him of being one of the main suspects behind the June shooting of Senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in the capital city of Bogotá.

The breaking down of the guerrilla alliance in this strategic border region may lead to further military advances from the ELN and spark a new conflict with major implications for both Colombia and Venezuela.

After Hugo Chávez became Venezuela’s president in 1999, he welcomed many FARC commanders into the country who went on to establish operations in several border states. However, when President Nicolás Maduro rose to power in 2013, he established more favorable relations with the ELN. With the tacit support of his regime, the ELN began to expand its operations across the border, eventually displacing some of the dissident FARC factions still there.

The latest flare-up between the ELN and ex-FARC Mafia comes about eight months after the start of another conflict between the guerrilla groups. In January 2025, the ELN launched a violent assault on the ex-FARC’s 33rd Front in the contested Catatumbo region, which is one of the world’s top cocaine-producing areas.

SEE ALSO: Colombia’s Peace Efforts Spark Criminal Disputes and Divisions

With the ELN also controlling key territory on the Venezuelan side in the state of Zulia, this cemented the guerrilla group as the top armed actor on the northern part of the border, granting them access to drug trafficking routes leading to dispatch points in Venezuela.

The ELN’s latest confrontation with the Second Marquetalia in the south suggests this may be the next key battleground for control of the border.

Unlike prior fighting, this conflict may develop more on the Venezuelan side. That is largely because the ex-FARC Mafia’s Acacio Medina Front has more military capacity on that side and can rely on more than a decade of experience operating there. Illegal mining in Amazonas and the drug trafficking corridors near Brazil represent hugely important financial resources for both groups, making it unlikely that either will cede control without a fight.

There is also the risk that the confrontation could expand further north into Venezuela’s Apure state, which borders the Colombian departments of Arauca and Vichada. The Second Marquetalia maintains a strong presence there, particularly in the town of Elorza in the municipality of Rómulo Gallegos. This has long been the preferred place for ex-FARC commanders to operate, and they have taken over ranches and set up camps in the region.

The alleged killing of Zarco Aldinever would add him to a growing list of FARC dissidents killed in Venezuela. Other infamous commanders killed there include Miguel Botache Santanilla, alias “Gentil Duarte,” Seuxis Pausías Hernández Solarte, alias “Jesús Santrich,” Hernán Darío Velásquez Saldarriaga, alias “El Paisa,” and Henry Castellanos Garzón, alias “Romaña.” The Second Marquetalia’s top leader, Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” was also gravely injured in Venezuela.

This article, written by the Venezuela Investigative Unit, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

The 15-year-old who shot Uribe on June 7 in Bogotá has been sentenced to seven years in a juvenile detention center for attempted homicide, the Attorney General’s Office reported on August 27.

The teenager pleaded guilty before Uribe died of his injuries on August 11, which prevented prosecutors from upgrading the charge to homicide, since Colombian law prohibits changes to charges once a formal accusation is filed against a minor. Five adults have also been arrested in connection with the case.

Authorities have suggested that the Second Marquetalia, a dissident faction of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), could have had a hand in Uribe’s killing, but have yet to present concrete evidence. National Police Director Carlos Fernando Triana first suggested a connection to the group in July, and Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez Suárez repeated the claim in August after Uribe’s death.

SEE ALSO: Colombia-Venezuela Border Killing Hints at Growing Guerrilla Conflict

The link to the group is vague, and via one of the five people arrested in connection with Uribe’s murder.

That’s Elder José Arteaga Hernández, alias “El Costeño,” who allegedly began working as a hired assassin after meeting a former FARC fighter known as “Daniel” in prison in 2019, according to police sources cited by Colombian newspaper El Espectador.

Daniel, once a member of the Teófilo Forero Mobile Column, an elite FARC unit behind some of the group’s most notorious attacks, has reportedly been helping rebuild the column within the Second Marquetalia in southern Huila and northern Caquetá, according to Colombian newspaper El Colombiano. Therefore, he would serve as a potential bridge between the Second Marquetalia and the Uribe assassination.

Two other suspects currently in custody also appear tied to Caquetá, where the Teófilo Forero Column is allegedly reorganizing. Katerine Andrea Martínez Martínez, alias “Gabriela,” who supplied the minor with the weapon to shoot Uribe, was arrested in Florencia in June, while Carlos Eduardo Mora González has faced an arms trafficking case before a Florencia court since 2024.

Nearly three months after the shooting of Turbay, investigators have yet to clarify who ordered the crime. The arrests point to a network of low- and mid-level operatives with ties to FARC dissident circles, but no clear political motive has emerged.

However, the available evidence suggests the focus on the Second Marquetalia may be misplaced. Once a feared rebel faction, the group is now among Colombia’s weakest armed organizations, having had its leadership decimated over the past five years.

Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” the group’s leader, was seriously injured in a 2022 attack, prompting repeated reports of his death. He resurfaced in 2024 through a video and later a public appearance, confirming he was alive, though widely believed to be in poor health.

Other senior figures have also been eliminated. Seuxis Pausías Hernández Solarte, alias “Jesús Santrich,” who co-founded the Second Marquetalia with Márquez after rejecting the 2016 peace deal, was killed in 2021. That same year, commanders Hernán Darío Velásquez, alias “El Paisa,” and Henry Castellanos Garzón, alias “Romaña,” were killed in Venezuela’s Apure state. Most recently, in August 2025, José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever,” one of Márquez’s key lieutenants, was also killed in Venezuela.

SEE ALSO: Who Was Behind the Attempted Hit on a Colombian Presidential Hopeful?

As well as these losses, the Second Marquetalia suffered a major rift in November 2024. The Border Command (Comandos de la Frontera – CDF) and the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico – CGP), two of its most influential factions operating in Nariño and Putumayo, announced they were breaking away after disagreements over the group’s stance in peace talks with the government.

Given the group’s fragile internal state and mounting competition from rival criminal actors, authorities have yet to present evidence of any clear motive for the Second Marquetalia to order such an assassination.

Nonetheless, the lack of clarity about the attack underscores the risks heading into Colombia’s elections next year. Uribe’s assassination sets a precedent that could embolden other armed groups to use targeted political violence as leverage. With organized crime interests tied to the continuation of peace talks and possible judicial benefits stemming from negotiations, the next electoral cycle may see criminal actors intervening more directly in politics through violence.

This article, written by Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

Throughout the summer, Turbay had been in critical condition, and intensive care at Bogotá’s Fundación Santa Fé Hospital as he underwent various brain and cranial surgeries led by neurosurgeon Dr. Fernando Hakim in an attempt to save his life. Though at the end of July it appeared his condition may be improving, things turned for the worse in early August.

At the age of five, Uribe Turbay (no relation to former president Alvaro Uribe) lost his mother, journalist Diana Turbay, who died while held kidnapped by Pablo Escobar.  Former President Julio César Turbay was his grandfather. Uribe studied law and public policy at University of The Andes in Bogotá and began his political career as a Liberal Party member of the Bogotá City Council at the age of 25.

Former President Álvaro Uribe invited Uribe Turbay to run for senate with his Centro Democrático party. Uribe Turbay won the seat in 2022 with strong support and served as senator until, at Alvaro Uribe’s invitation, announcing his run for the presidency, with elections next year.

Urbe, dead at the hands of a child assassin, lost his mother to Pablo Escobar when himself a child.

The Assassins

So far, several individuals have been detained for allegedly participating in Uribe’s murder:

• The 15-year-old assassin, who is being held in the Attorney General’s headquarters.
• Carlos Eduardo Mora, who drove the teen to where Uribe was speaking.
• Christian González Ardila, the man who was to drive the getaway motorcycle.
• Elder José Arteaga, “El Costeño” the organizer of the assassination.
• Katerine “Gabriela” Martinez, accomplice and lover of El Costeño, provided the handgun to the assassin.
• William González Cruz, “El Viejo”

The current hypothesis put forward by Colombian law enforcement is that Elder José Arteaga, “El Costeño,”was a local small time gang leader unaffiliated with any of the larger mafia groups that plague Colombia, but while serving prison time in Meta, Colombia, he met “Daniel” (nom de guerre), part of the “Teófilo Forero squad of the Segunda Marquetalia, a guerilla mafia made up of former FARC members who rejected the 2016 peace accord signed between the FARC and the government. Accomplice Katerine Martinez was directed to Caquetá after the shooting by José Arteaga, according to her, to seek protection from the Segunda Marquetalia, active in the area. There she was captured by Colombian authorities.

General Carlos Triana Beltrán, director of Colombia’s National Police, said in a press conference last week that they believe Luciano Marín Arango “Ivan Márquez” and “José Aldinever Sierra Sabogal “Zarco Aldinever,” leaders of the Segunda Marquetalia, are the brains behind the assassination and contracted with El Costeño to carry it out.

Unconfirmed reports from last week say that Zarco Aldinever was killed near the Venezuelan border during a battle between the Segunda Marquetalia and rival guerilla mafia, the ELN. Those reports have not been confirmed and could be an attempt to redirect attention, hopefully (by the Segunda Marquetalia) staving off military action by Colombian forces.

Analysis

The Petro administration had already been criticized for refusing to provide the additional security that Uribe Turbay had asked for. The government is responsible for providing security to presidential candidates and other public figures who may be under threat of political violence, such as social activists, witnesses, legislators and local officials.

Uribe Turbay was the leading of five candidates of Alvaro Uribe’s Centro Democrático party and promised loyalty to the party’s godfather. “I aspire to be the best version of Miguel Uribe for Colombia, but of course with the best advisor in Álvaro Uribe,” he told Medellín’s leading daily El Colombiano in April.

With Alvaro Uribe convicted of witness tampering and the current administration of Gustavo Petro facing its own scandals and unpopularity, Colombia is approaching an especially divided election cycle. Hard core “Uribistas” or Uribe Supporters insist he is innocent despite the evidence and an independent judiciary. One does not have to be an Uribe supporter however, to see that current President Gustavo Petro’s promise of “Total Peace” and an end to guerrilla violence has been a complete failure. Groups such as the ELN, Clan del Golfo and Segunda Marquetalia are gaining territory and becoming even more brazen.

Though Uribe Turbay’s death may have a “sympathy vote” effect, Uribistas were already going to vote for the Centro Democrático candidate, and “pura sangre” (pure blood) Petristas, or Petro supporters, never would. When it comes to the largest group of voters with allegiances neither to Uribe or Petro, it is likely that dissatisfaction with Petro’s handling of security along with a distaste for Alvaro Uribe’s criminal record may lead to the emergence of a candidate from one of the right leaning parties outside of the Centro Democrático, such as Cambio Radical.

To be clear, no one serious is blaming President Petro for being involved in the attack. Still, he is blamed not just by Uribistas, but by other opposition figures for his coddling stance towards guerilla groups like the Segunda Marquetalia, for not providing adequate security for opposition candidates, and a worsening security climate where an act like this assassination can take place.

While there is not yet conclusive proof they are the ones who ordered the attack, the motivation for Segunda Marquetalia could be to stop the likely Uribista candidate early in the electoral process, because of their pledge to eliminate the remnants of guerilla groups like the ELN and Segunda Marquetalia.

A family’s pain

Uribe Turbay leaves behind his wife, María Claudia Tarazona. They met when he was 24 years old. She was 10 years older and had three daughters, so at first didn’t take his advances seriously but over time working together, their bonds grew, and they formed a family, having one more son together.

Photo:Instagram account of  Maria Claudia Tarazona

President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace (Paz Total) policy, designed to negotiate agreements with the country’s main armed groups and criminal gangs, is struggling to make any headway as he passes the halfway point of his four-year administration. The negotiations have had profound effects on the criminal dynamics in the country.

SEE ALSO: What Is Behind Increased Violence in Colombia?

After initial progress in dialogue with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), talks collapsed in May last year when a faction of the group split off to pursue separate peace negotiations. The ELN’s extensive infrastructure and leadership in Venezuela, where Nicolás Maduro remains in power following a widely criticized election, has further undermined the chances of peace with the Marxist-Leninist rebel force.

Similarly, negotiations with dissidents of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) have faced significant setbacks. Fragmentation within these groups has sparked infighting, with splinter factions emerging from the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) and the Second Marquetalia, the two largest dissident factions. As a result, the government is engaging with only a small portion of each group.

The country’s most powerful drug-trafficking organization, the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), remains largely outside the Total Peace framework. Efforts have been stalled by the absence of a legal framework for negotiations and a potential peace deal. Similar legal obstacles have hindered progress in “urban peace laboratories” in cities like Buenaventura, Quibdó, and Medellín, where gangs dominate neighborhoods through drug trafficking and extortion rackets.

As Petro begins the third year of his presidency, InSight Crime reviews the key developments in Colombia’s peace dialogues and examines their criminal implications for 2025.

ELN

Initial progress with the ELN effectively unraveled as disputes with the government led to the collapse of negotiations.

In January last year, the Comuneros del Sur Front (Frente Comuneros del Sur – FCS), an ELN faction in southern Nariño, broke ranks, announcing plans to pursue separate “regional dialogue” with the government. Frustrated by the limited progress at the national level and growing threats from rival groups, the FCS sought a more localized approach. However, ELN top commander Eliecer Erlinto Chamorro, alias “Antonio García,” condemned these parallel dialogues as unauthorized and illegitimate.

SEE ALSO: Kidnappings Surge in Colombia Amid ELN Peace Negotiations

By May, the FCS formally severed ties with the ELN, emerging as a dissident faction of the guerrilla group. It quickly established dialogue with the government, advanced in peace talks, and even committed to a partial weapons handover, according to Carlos Augusto Erazo Murcia, head of the government’s negotiating team.

This was followed by the collapse of a bilateral ceasefire between the ELN and the government, which expired in August without renewal. After the ceasefire lapse, the ELN escalated hostilities by attacking a military base in Arauca in September, killing three soldiers. In response, the government suspended peace talks indefinitely.

The ELN and the government resumed talks on November 25, agreeing to reconvene in 2025 to reassess the dialogue process and explore the possibility of a renewed ceasefire.

The ELN also stands to benefit greatly from what was widely considered a stolen election in Venezuela, extending by another six years of Maduro’s time at the helm of the country. Venezuela remains a critical hub for the ELN, hosting much of its leadership and infrastructure.

Since the FARC’s demobilization in 2016, the ELN has expanded its presence in Venezuela and Colombia’s border departments, strengthening its operations through a symbiotic relationship with the Maduro regime. The group now controls entire sections of the border, managing smuggling and drug-trafficking corridors between the two countries, while maintaining corridors moving troops. Its influence spans eight of Venezuela’s 24 states, with significant income derived from controlling illegal mining and cocaine production zones.

With little interference and often support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—who depend on the income generated by these groups, particularly amid severe US sanctions—the ELN has solidified its presence along the 2,219 km border with Venezuela and uses this haven to project into Colombia. This growing entrenchment further undermines the Total Peace initiative.

Ex-FARC

Government dialogue with the EMC, the largest ex-FARC organization, has also splintered the group. In March, Petro suspended a bilateral ceasefire with the EMC in the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño due to ongoing violence against Indigenous communities. This decision deepened internal divisions within the EMC. Its leader, Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias “Iván Mordisco,” refused further negotiations until the ceasefire was reinstated, while another faction, led by Alexander Díaz, alias “Calarcá Córdoba,” opted to continue talks.

By April, the government expelled Mordisco’s faction from the peace talks, shifting its focus to negotiations exclusively with Calarcá’s bloc. In July, his group signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement, marking a tentative step forward. However, significant challenges remain: Calarcá’s faction has been accused of threatening demobilized FARC members in Caquetá, and in December, six soldiers were killed in a minefield allegedly planted by the group.

Mordisco’s wing, on the other hand, has intensified violent activities, particularly in Cauca, an important region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. By September, Cauca had recorded 466 violent incidents over 12 months, the most of any department during that period, with numbers continuing to rise through the end of 2024.

Meanwhile, the Second Marquetalia, a separate group of FARC dissidents led by Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” became the third major group to enter Total Peace negotiations in 2024. However, internal divisions also plagued this effort. In November, two key factions—the Border Command and the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico)—broke away, frustrated by Márquez’s leadership. They formed the National Bolivarian Army Coordinator (Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano), led by José Vicente Lesmes, alias “Walter Mendoza.”

AGC and Urban Groups

The AGC has been largely excluded from the Total Peace initiative thus far, but signs emerged in 2024 that Petro sought to change this. In July, he authorized dialogue with the group, signaling a potential shift in policy.

But significant obstacles remain. The government’s classification of the AGC as a high-impact organized crime group, rather than a political organization like the ELN or FARC dissidents, has become a sticking point in the negotiations. This designation precludes the AGC from seeking transitional justice terms, such as guarantees against extradition and amnesty, similar to those offered to the FARC in the 2016 peace agreement. Under Colombian law, high-impact organized crime groups are only eligible for limited judicial benefits, such as reduced sentences, making negotiations far less appealing for the AGC.

SEE ALSO: GameChangers 2023: The Cocaine Flash-to-Bang in 2024

Despite minor progress—such as the attorney general lifting arrest warrants for key AGC leaders—negotiations have yielded few tangible results. Tensions remain high: in December, the military bombed an AGC camp in northern Antioquia, underscoring the ongoing hostilities.

Moreover, skepticism about the AGC’s intentions persists. Some analysts suggest the group is using negotiations as a tactical maneuver to secure a bilateral ceasefire and reduce military pressure, rather than genuinely committing to demobilization. At the same time, its ongoing territorial expansion and dominance over key criminal economies fuel doubts about its willingness to disarm.

The absence of a legal framework for gang demobilization, or “transition to legality,” as it is officially termed, has also hindered progress in cities like Medellín, Quibdó, and Buenaventura.

Efforts to pass legislation to formalize a framework for gang demobilization have stalled in Colombia’s gridlocked congress, leaving urban peace efforts in limbo.

In Medellín, several gangs agreed to reduce violence following Petro’s 2022 election, resulting in a notable drop in homicide rates. In June 2023, Petro initiated a dialogue table with former gang leaders at Itagüí prison, but progress faltered in 2024.

In Quibdó, the gangs Los Mexicanos, Lokos Yam, and RPS began talks in August 2023, achieving significant milestones like a commitment to halt the extortion of teachers and health workers. But in September 2024, a ceasefire between the gangs collapsed, amidst incursions by the AGC into the city. In December, Petro authorized exploratory talks to include three additional groups—the Zetas, Cabí, and AGC—in the Quibdó table.

In Buenaventura, negotiations with the Spartans and Shottas—which together command over 1,700 members—have produced mixed results. The groups agreed to a truce in August 2023, significantly reducing violence throughout 2024. While tensions flared in March when the Spartans temporarily withdrew from the negotiations, they eventually returned to the table, and have renewed the ceasefire, currently set to last until February 2025.

Looking Forward

Several key factors will significantly influence peace negotiations in 2025.

First, the fragmentation of major groups within the Total Peace process highlights the challenges of negotiating with organizations that appear unified but are, in fact, loose coalitions of diverse factions. The Comuneros del Sur’s split from the ELN exposed the group’s limited control over its regional fronts. Similarly, the EMC’s divided leadership—between Mordisco and Calarcá—mirrors the internal tensions within the Second Marquetalia, where Iván Márquez has struggled to maintain cohesion among factions like the Border Command.

These fractures risk escalating violence as splinter groups vie for territorial control and factions excluded from peace talks increase attacks on government targets.

Since the EMC split, clashes between Mordisco’s and Calarcá’s factions have escalated in Putumayo, a key region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. Violence has also surged in other southwestern departments, such as Cauca. The deadly ELN attack on the military base could also foreshadow more violent confrontations between criminal groups and government forces, despite the relative lull achieved by ceasefires in 2024.

Second, the absence of widespread ceasefires with criminal groups has leveled the criminal playing field once again. Ceasefires maintained by the ELN and EMC in 2023 temporarily shifted criminal dynamics, allowing these groups to expand their territorial control, recruit new members, and focus on rival factions rather than government forces.

“We know [armed groups] have taken advantage of the ceasefire to try to increase their illegal control over the territory,” Colombia’s Minister of Defense said in a press conference in March 2024.

This reprieve boosted profits from drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion. In contrast, the AGC, excluded from ceasefire agreements, continued to face government offensives.

SEE ALSO: The Informants of Tibú: How the Colombian State Unleashed a Wave of Femicides

Currently, only the Calarcá dissidents and the FCS have active bilateral ceasefires with the government. The FCS, being relatively small, is unlikely to use the ceasefire for significant territorial expansion but will likely consolidate its holdings and defend against incoming EMC incursions into Nariño. Conversely, the Calarcá dissidents are better positioned to exploit their ceasefire to strengthen their presence in critical drug trafficking zones, particularly along the Amazonian border with Brazil and in parts of the Venezuelan frontier.

For groups like the Mordisco dissidents and the ELN, the absence of ceasefires means they will lose their distinct advantage as they compete for control over territories essential for drug trafficking, illegal mining, and other key revenue streams. However, the lack of ceasefires could give the AGC an edge.

Despite facing sustained military pressure, the AGC has expanded along the Pacific coast in Chocó, the Caribbean coast in Bolívar, Córdoba, and Cesar, and is encircling Catatumbo in Norte de Santander—one of Colombia’s most critical coca cultivation regions. With its criminal rivals now experiencing the same pressure it has endured, the AGC is poised to solidify and take even greater control as cocaine production explodes and gold prices approach record highs.

Third, Maduro’s dependence on Colombian criminal groups ensures that the ELN and Second Marquetalia will continue to strengthen their footholds in Venezuela and along Colombia’s border. With minimal interference—and often direct support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—both groups have entrenched themselves in the region, controlling key criminal economies such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and contraband smuggling.

With the prospect of six more years of protection under Maduro, these groups have little immediate incentive to engage in peace negotiations. Instead, they are well-positioned to expand their operations further.

This article, written by Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

Following a 2016 Peace Accord with the Colombian government, the FARC formally dissolved and disarmed. It no longer exists as a unified organization that engages in terrorism or terrorist activity or has the capability or intent to do so.

The decision to revoke the designation does not change the posture with regards to any charges or potential charges in the United States against former leaders of the FARC, including for narcotrafficking, nor does it remove the stain of the decision by Colombia’s Special Jurisdiction of Peace, which found their actions to be crimes against humanity. However, it will facilitate the ability of the United States to better support implementation of the 2016 accord, including by working with demobilized combatants.

This message has been reprinted in its entirety as issued by the US State Department

The designation of FARC-EP and Segunda Marquetalia is directed at those who refused to demobilize and those who are engaged in terrorist activity. In August 2019, former FARC commanders, including Luciano Marin Arango, alias Ivan Marquez, created Segunda Marquetalia after abandoning the 2016 Peace Accord. Since then, Segunda Marquetalia has engaged in terrorist activity and is responsible for the killings of former FARC members and community leaders. Segunda Marquetalia has also engaged in mass destruction, assassination, hostage-taking, including the kidnapping and holding for ransom of government employees. Segunda Marquetalia is also responsible for the attempted killings of political leaders.

• Luciano Marin Arango, alias Ivan Marquez, is the founder and overall leader of Segunda Marquetalia.
• Hernan Dario Velasquez Saldarriaga, alias El Paisa, is a senior commander in Segunda Marquetalia and serves as the group’s military commander.
• Henry Castellanos Garzon, alias Romana, is a senior leader in Segunda Marquetalia with military operations responsibilities.

Using the moniker of the former FARC and led by Nestor Gregorio Vera Fernandez, alias Ivan Mordisco, and Miguel Santanilla Botache, alias Gentil Duarte, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) is responsible for the vast majority of the armed attacks attributed to FARC dissident elements since 2019. FARC-EP has also been responsible for the killing of political candidates and former FARC members, and the kidnapping of a political operative.

• Nestor Gregorio Vera Fernandez, alias Ivan Mordisco, is the commander and overall leader of FARC-EP.
• Miguel Santanilla Botache, alias Gentil Duarte, is a commander in FARC-EP and deputy to Nestor Gregorio Vera Fernandez.
• Euclides Espana Caicedo, alias Jhon Fredey Henao Munoz, alias Jhonier, is the most senior commander of multiple units of the FARC-EP organization in important territorial areas.

As a result of our actions today, among other consequences, all property and interests in property of these groups and individuals must be blocked and reported to the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). In addition, persons that engage in certain transactions with the persons designated today may themselves be exposed to designation. Furthermore, any foreign financial institution that knowingly facilitates a significant financial transaction or provides significant financial services for the persons designated today could be subject to U.S. correspondent account or payable-through account sanctions. Additionally, it is a crime to knowingly provide material support or resources to Segunda Marquetalia and FARC-EP, or to attempt or conspire to do so.