Two men. Both running to be the next president of Colombia. Both swear they are tough, that they are clean, that they are the answer to a country that is exhausted. And both of them have a problem with the company they keep.

One is a defense lawyer who built his career representing mobsters, paramilitaries, and at least one alleged front man for the Maduro regime — and he tells you those relationships were strictly professional. The other fought to spring a FARC commander out of a maximum-security holding cell — and he tells you that relationship was strictly professional too. One says, in effect, “I only knew the narco because I was his attorney.” The other says, “I only knew the guerrilla because I was a peace negotiator.” Same sentence, opposite ends of the political spectrum. It is the strangest mirror in Colombian politics.

This Sunday, June 21, Colombians return to the polls for the runoff. In the first round on May 31, the right’s Abelardo de la Espriella came first with about 43.7 percent. The left’s Iván Cepeda came second with about 40.9 percent. No one else is left. Whoever wins walks into the Casa de Nariño on August 7.

What follows is an analysis, not an endorsement. I am pro-business, anti-crime, and anti-communist, and I am not Colombian, so I will not presume to tell Colombians how to vote. What I can do is lay out who these two men are, where they came from, and the honest pros and cons of each — because both carry serious problems, and readers with capital, operations, or ties in Colombia deserve them laid out straight. Much of the biographical reporting here draws on the long-form profiles published by La Silla Vacía, among the best political journalism in the country, and on Finance Colombia‘s own coverage of the race.

Who is Abelardo de la Espriella?

Start with de la Espriella, since he holds a slight polling lead. His campaign events are not subtle: the lights go yellow, blue, and red, footage of tigers plays on the screens, smoke machines fire, the national anthem swells, and out he comes flanked by bodyguards in a bulletproof vest, declaring, “Here is your tiger, roaring and biting.” The tiger is his symbol — claw, territory, attack — and the crowd chant is ponle la raya al tigre, “put the stripe on the tiger.” It is a show, and he runs it the same way every time, with discipline.

According to La Silla Vacía’s profile, Abelardo was born in Bogotá in 1978 and grew up in Sahagún and Montería, in Córdoba on the Caribbean side. His mother calls the family riquitos de pueblo — “small-town rich.” A respected name and political connections, but not the rosca, the Bogotá elite, and not one of the great national fortunes. His father was a Liberal Party congressman and an early backer of Álvaro Uribe in Córdoba in 2001; when Uribe reached the presidency, he made the elder De la Espriella a notary. That is where the long relationship between the De la Espriella and Uribe families begins.

From childhood, Abelardo wanted to be seen. By his family’s account he sang opera in the bathroom, had a children’s radio program his father arranged, got himself onto regional television as a teenager, and promised his grandmother a limousine in Miami. He studied law at the Sergio Arboleda University in Bogotá — not an academic powerhouse, but a real breeding ground for the Colombian right — and hustled the whole way through, selling whiskey, perfume, clothing, and emeralds on consignment. The man has always been building a legend about himself.

Here is the part he does not lead with on stage. De la Espriella made his name as a defense lawyer, and not for choirboys. His client list reads like a rogues’ gallery: politicians tied to paramilitary groups, the Nule brothers of the carrusel de contratos contracting scandal in Bogotá, the pyramid-scheme operator David Murcia of DMG, the disgraced Constitutional Court magistrate Jorge Pretelt, and — the big one — Álex Saab, the man the United States accused of being a front man for Nicolás Maduro. Early in his career, at 26, he did legal and public-relations work around the paramilitary demobilization at Santa Fe de Ralito through an NGO he ran. His childhood friend from Córdoba is Salvatore Mancuso, the paramilitary chief.

He will tell you — and it is a legitimate argument — that every defendant has a right to counsel, and that defending an unpopular client is not the same as committing the client’s crimes. Fair enough. We will return to it.

After the lawyering came the brand. He launched a rum called Ron Defensor, “the Defender,” with the vallenato star Silvestre Dangond. He launched a clothing line, released music, wrote books, went through an atheist phase, and then, roughly six years ago, underwent a very public religious conversion. Now he is the “God and family” candidate who calls himself “the Cyrus of Colombia.” By his own design he is a sybarite: Italian suits every year, a Miami mansion valued north of $5 million USD, a private plane, the whole production.

Three facts to keep in your carriel for later. First, he has never held elected office; he ran for a Bogotá council seat as a student in the 1990s, lost, and stayed out of electoral politics for nearly thirty years. Second, he holds three citizenships — American, Italian, and Colombian. Third, his running mate is José Manuel Restrepo, a name that returns in a big way when we reach the pros.

“The ‘tough on crime’ candidate has spent his career defending criminals, and the ‘human rights’ candidate stays silent on half the human rights abuses in his own backyard.” — Loren Moss, Finance Colombia

Who is Iván Cepeda?

If de la Espriella’s story is about a man who wanted to be seen, Cepeda’s is about a man shaped by a death.

On August 9, 1994, a young Iván Cepeda took a bus to Javeriana University, where he taught philosophy, after letting his father leave the house first. On the way he came upon ambulances, police cars, and a crowd around a bullet-riddled car. It was his father’s car. Manuel Cepeda, a senator for the Unión Patriótica, had just been assassinated.

The detail that explains Iván Cepeda is what he did next. He did not collapse over the body. He pulled from his jacket a column his father had written about another murdered activist, crossed the street to tell his wife, and then turned and spoke to journalists — composed, on message, calling on the president and the courts to act. “When my father was murdered,” he later said, “I already knew how I should act, what I should say.” He turned private grief into public, political language. La Silla Vacía describes his entire method of politics as organized around the truth of the victims, and that is exactly right.

Cepeda was born in 1962, while his father was in prison for interviewing a survivor of the army’s bombing of Marquetalia, the peasant enclave that became the founding myth of the FARC. His parents, Manuel Cepeda and Yira Castro, were journalists, communists, and revolutionaries; politics was the air the household breathed. At 13 he was in the Communist Youth. At 17, after his mother’s death, his father sent him to study philosophy in Sofia, Bulgaria. He returned in 1987, by his own account disillusioned with Soviet Marxism and the privilege he had seen inside the party there.

Abelardo de la Espriella is a millionaire defense attorney, singer & rum impresario. (photo: Twitter screencapture)

His father’s assassination was the turning point. The Unión Patriótica — a party born of a peace process, a vehicle for the FARC and the Communist Party to enter electoral politics — was then systematically exterminated, with thousands of members killed. Cepeda channeled all of it. He created the Manuel Cepeda Foundation, built memorial galleries with families of the disappeared, and founded MOVICE, the Movement of Victims of State Crimes. He pursued his father’s case until the Colombian state was held responsible and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights condemned the country.

Then he found his great adversary: Álvaro Uribe. For Cepeda, Uribe symbolizes the establishment he believes must confess its responsibility for paramilitarism and the killing of the left. He spent years pursuing Uribe — prison visits to extradited paramilitaries in the United States, the 2014 debate in Congress — and that work ultimately produced the witness-tampering case that put the former president on trial. Cepeda became, as La Silla Vacía puts it, the leftist who managed to put Uribe in the dock. That is the engine of his political career.

He reached Congress in 2010, famously arriving with a bucket, broom, and mop, promising to clean up a legislature stained by parapolítica — the scandal of lawmakers who colluded with paramilitary groups. He has been there ever since, four terms, mostly on the Second Committee, which handles military promotions, security, and foreign relations. The crucial point about his experience, and I will come back to it, is that he has never governed anything — no city, department, ministry, or large budget. His arena has been Congress as a moral and judicial forum. He was also the principal intellectual architect of Petro’s Paz Total, “Total Peace”; he coined the term.

His running mate is Aida Quilcué, an indigenous Nasa leader and senator who is herself a victim of state violence — her husband was killed by the military as they returned from a minga. One more thing matters because it is human and real: Cepeda is in fragile health. He has beaten cancer twice — colon cancer in 2018, liver cancer treated in 2022 — and people who have worked with him describe a worn body and an iron will. He is intellectually serious, sober, and predictable, the opposite of Petro’s chaos. Whatever you make of his politics, he is no lightweight.

The case for Abelardo de la Espriella

Let me make the genuine case for de la Espriella, as I see it.

He promises to be tough on crime — on the organized armed groups and on ordinary street crime alike. After four years in which armed groups roughly doubled in size under Total Peace, many Colombians are hungry for exactly that, and I understand why. He is pro-business and pro-investment, foreign and domestic, and he has built his whole pitch on the idea that prosperity comes from the private sector rather than the state. He is pro-US and promises to repair the relationship with Washington that frayed under Petro; he is, in fact, a US citizen himself, which tells you which direction he faces.

On the economy, I think he would restore investor confidence and likely work to repair Colombia’s diminished credit rating, which matters enormously for what the country pays to borrow. He supports lower taxes, which is a good thing when paired with genuine fiscal prudence — that is the caveat, but the instinct is right.

The strongest item on his ticket, for me, is his running mate, José Manuel Restrepo. Restrepo served as both Minister of Commerce and Finance Minister in Iván Duque’s cabinet and did the job well, even when Duque did not. He has few critics and brings a level of intellectual seriousness and economic credibility that the top of the ticket does not project on its own. A credible technocrat one heartbeat from the presidency is a real asset.

He wants to shrink the bureaucracy. Colombia’s is not as bloated as some in Latin America, but it can be streamlined — and the bigger problem than handing out sinecures is mermelada, the practice of spreading money through useless government contracts to friends and supporters. If he genuinely goes after that, good. He is also plainly intelligent; a successful defense attorney knows jurisprudence and procedure cold.

Two of his ideas deserve particular credit. He says he wants to promote home ownership for people of modest means, and El País reports a plan for below-market thirty-year mortgages. If that is real and it works, it is a genuinely good idea. The Peruvian author Hernando de Soto, in The Mystery of Capital, explains how broad asset ownership by ordinary people is what formalizes an economy and drives real progress: when you own assets, you can extract value from them, pass them to your descendants, and build lasting wealth. And on health care, he promises to fix the EPS system with financial oversight to root out corruption, rather than blow it up. That is far better than moving to a single-payer government scheme, which I think would be disastrous. The state has not shown the organizational competence to run one. Consider that Petro placed Daniel Quintero, the indicted former mayor of Medellín, in a role overseeing the EPS — and Quintero is accused of looting the city’s coffers. A couple of insolvent EPS providers is a manageable problem; a national government that cannot pay providers and collapses the whole system is not. Patching beats nationalizing.

He supports performance evaluations for teachers, which is reasonable even if FECODE will oppose it, and he wants to expand internet connectivity into rural and underserved regions, which is critical in a country with such a wide gap between rural and urban, rich and poor. Connectivity means opportunity. That is a real list — a coherent pro-growth, pro-security program. Now the other side.

The case against Abelardo de la Espriella

There is a lot here. Start with the Bukele worship. De la Espriella is an open admirer of El Salvador’s president, Nayib Bukele. Bukele has unquestionably cut crime, but he also shows clear authoritarian tendencies and no sign of willingly leaving power. More to the point, Bukele is no friend to a free press, and de la Espriella is notoriously thin-skinned: he uses the courts to file SLAPPs — Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation — designed to force critics to burn money and time on their defense. Even meritless, such suits can bankrupt a person or consume so much of their time they cannot do their job. This is not hypothetical. La Silla Vacía documented dozens of civil suits and criminal complaints against journalists, several of whom admit to censoring themselves. That should worry anyone who cares about press freedom.

He may also turn out to be soft on crime — especially organized crime — which sounds backwards for the “iron fist” candidate until you look at his career. He built it defending mobsters, paracos, and the corrupt: the Nule family, Álex Saab. He is childhood friends with the paramilitary chief Salvatore Mancuso. And he has been linked to a paramilitary known as “Boliche,” Jorge Luís Hernández Villazón, on trial in the United States for narcotrafficking. De la Espriella denies any connection with Boliche and says he knows him only through his work as a defense attorney. Fine — but it is a fair question how tough he will really be on his friends and former clients. That is not a cheap shot; it is a reasonable thing to want answered.

I also do not see a plan for the poor. I have looked, and I find nothing in his platform that signals a comprehensive plan — or much compassion — for the underprivileged and those without access to opportunity in the remote areas: the Pacific coast, the rural zones, the Atlantic coast. Perhaps one exists and I have missed it, but if so, where is it?

He seems inconsistent. This is a man who craves attention — a recording artist, a clothing line, a rum called “Defensor” — who then suddenly finds Jesus and becomes the “God and family” candidate. Maybe it is sincere. Forgive me for being skeptical of a conversion that lines up so neatly with a presidential run.

On the peace process, he has pledged not to implement the 2016 accords that won former President Juan Manuel Santos the Nobel Peace Prize. To be fair, the last two administrations did a poor job implementing them too. But my concern is simple: the people who genuinely laid down their arms need protection. You do not want to teach the next generation that demobilizing gets you killed. He also wants to end the Jurisdicción Especial de Paz, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, arguing it is a political tool that does not deliver real justice. I do not know the JEP well enough to rule on that flatly, but I am skeptical of the claim; my sense is that it is doing some genuine good and should be reformed rather than scrapped.

Colombia 2026 1st round top two (Graphic: Sofi Imfeld for Finance Colombia)

Then there is the absence of a track record. He has never held any office, so there is nothing to go on. Does he become a statesman or a caudillo wannabe? We do not know, and that uncertainty is itself a cost. Finally, the persona. His public identity strikes me as a bit of a gomelo — Colombian slang for a stuck-up rich kid. People often cultivate a public character that has little to do with who they really are, so perhaps the private Abelardo is a prince. But he is asking voters to choose the public one, and the public one rubs me the wrong way.

The case for Iván Cepeda

Now the honest case for Cepeda. He will very likely put real attention on the marginalized and the forgotten parts of the country, and the map backs this up: in the first round he carried the entire Pacific coast, the forested borders with Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil, and most of the Atlantic provinces — the exception being Antioquia, whose population concentrates far to the south around Medellín. Much of that Atlantic coast, outside Barranquilla and the touristy parts of Cartagena, has suffered generations of corruption and chronic underinvestment. Someone paying attention to those places is not a bad thing.

He is consistent and predictable. He has a long career and a coherent, stable ideology. I may disagree with that ideology — you will hear about it in the cons — but no one can call the man unpredictable. You know what you are getting, and in politics that is worth something.

He would try to actually implement Santos’s 2016 peace accords. The pact has real flaws and lacked genuine commitment from the current and previous administrations, but it did demobilize thousands of fighters who are no longer in the bush kidnapping and bombing people. Pushing to finish that work honestly has value.

And to be fair, he is clearly more competent than the ally currently in office. He is more intelligent and more disciplined than Gustavo Petro. Consider how Petro has governed: unable to push through much of his agenda, running the Casa de Nariño like a reality show, cycling more than sixty ministers through nineteen ministries in under four years. How do you accomplish anything while swapping in a new minister roughly every three weeks? I do not think a Cepeda administration would bring the same chaos and palace intrigue. And he would command the largest bloc of support in Congress, so he would be more effective at moving his agenda; he knows how the machinery works. Credit where it is due — he does not stand up in cabinet meetings inventing his own physics. That is a low bar, but Petro keeps walking under it and Cepeda clears it.

Finally, he has a real, lifelong commitment to the victims of violence in Colombia. Whatever else you say about him, that commitment is genuine and it is the through-line of his entire life. That counts.

The case against Iván Cepeda

Iván Cepeda is a senator, former member of the Communist Youth, educated in Bulgaria during the Soviet era, and key player in the negotiation with armed guerilla groups. (photo: Colombian Senate)

And there are many cons. The first is the mirror I opened with: he has shady friends too. He was close to the Chavista senator Piedad Córdoba. Just as de la Espriella calls his contacts with Boliche purely professional, Cepeda says his ties to the FARC commander Raúl Reyes were purely those of a peace negotiator. But Cepeda went further. When the FARC commander Jesús Santrich was locked up and ready to be extradited to the United States on drug-trafficking charges, Cepeda worked fiercely to get him released from the Fiscalía‘s Bunker. Once out, Santrich fled into Venezuela and restarted the Segunda Marquetalia, a FARC dissident network. And here is the part that lands like a gut punch a year later: that same Segunda Marquetalia is the group Colombian prosecutors have now linked to the assassination of presidential candidate and senator Miguel Uribe Turbay, who was shot in Bogotá in June 2025 and died that August. I want to be careful and fair — that is an attribution by the Fiscalía, and serious analysts at Insight Crime have noted the public evidence is thin, so it should not be treated as settled fact. But the chain — Cepeda helps free Santrich, Santrich restarts the Segunda Marquetalia, the Segunda Marquetalia is tied to a magnicidio — is a heavy thing to carry into a presidential race.

Second, he is soft on the guerrillas, broadly. He has a proven record of leniency toward the FARC, the ELN, and armed groups generally, and he is an architect of Petro’s failed Total Peace. Under that nurturing approach those groups have flourished, and I think they would keep flourishing under a Cepeda administration. He seems to see them more as victims of state violence than as the kidnappers, narcotraffickers, extortionists, and terrorists that they are. La Silla Vacía’s own reporting — and they are not a right-wing outlet — concluded that Cepeda bears real political responsibility for the failure of Total Peace, having pushed a negotiation model that was too ambitious, legally ambiguous, and weak before armed groups. When the violence comes from the state, Cepeda sees structure and systemic responsibility; when it comes from the guerrillas, he tends to see context and a chance for peace. That blind spot defines him.

Former 2022 presidential candidate Rodolfo Hernandez (photo: candidate’s website)

Third is his health and his running mate, which is delicate but real. Cepeda has had cancer twice. The late Rodolfo Hernández, who lost to Petro in 2022, died in 2024 of cancer after also having had liver and colon cancer, so the risk is not hypothetical. If Cepeda did not finish his term, Aida Quilcué would take over, and her career — as an indigenous Nasa leader, minga organizer, and senator — has centered on those issues rather than monetary policy, foreign affairs, or national security, which makes her approach to them a genuine unknown. People also doubted Francia Márquez, and she turned out to be the articulate, level-headed one beside Petro’s wilder talk, so I will say nothing against Quilcué as a person. But a possible succession to a medically fragile president is an inarguable risk, and it would be foolish to pretend otherwise.

Fourth, I cannot imagine investor confidence improving under a Cepeda presidency. A data point worth chewing on: the peso is currently strong. Part of that is the dollar’s broad global weakness, but part of it, in my read, is the market reacting to the strong polling of Cepeda’s opponent. Markets vote too, and they are nervous about the left.

Fifth, the father — and I want to be fair here. You cannot reliably judge a son by his father; my own father was a politician, and as an adult I spent most of my life in the party opposite his, with a great relationship and very different philosophies. So I will not convict Iván Cepeda for his father’s beliefs. The difference is that Cepeda does seem broadly aligned with them. His father was secretary general of the Colombian Communist Party, Iván studied in Soviet Bulgaria, and though he says he grew disillusioned with the hypocrisy of Soviet communism, he still appears committed to a far-left ideology. If that is your cup of tea, count it a plus; I have never been fond of Marx or Engels.

Sixth is crop substitution, and this one deserves a direct conversation. On paper it sounds marvelous: rather than spray coca with herbicides that wreck the environment and people’s health, offer farmers a legal alternative and a path out. If it worked the way it is drawn up, I would back it one hundred percent. The problem is the gap between the brochure and the dirt road — and that gap is built on a premise that simply is not true on the ground: the premise that the campesino is a free actor who chooses to grow coca and could, if persuaded, choose to grow something else.

In much of rural Colombia, the small farmer does not get to volunteer. Where the FARC dissidents and the ELN hold territory, the armed group tells the farmer he will cultivate coca, do the manual labor of harvesting it, and sell the leaf or paste to the group at a price the group sets — under penalty of death. Refuse, and the farmer is driven off his land or simply killed. This is not a lifestyle preference; it is coercion at gunpoint. The reporting bears out the broader pattern. Finance Colombia’s coverage, drawn from InSight Crime, documents how the power vacuum left by the FARC’s 2016 demobilization was filled by the ELN, the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces, and FARC dissidents fighting for control of coca zones, and how the state’s failure to deliver on substitution let armed groups fill the vacuum and tighten their grip. The human cost is staggering: after families signed substitution agreements, the murder rate of supportive social leaders rose by 546 percent, according to a study cited by InSight Crime, and only about 5 percent of the program’s 2023 budget was actually executed. You cannot ask a farmer to switch crops when the entity controlling his life and his land is not the government but a guerrilla faction that has already told him what he will plant.

That is why this is not a matter of asking farmers nicely to grow coffee or cacao. It is not their choice. Security has to come first. Crop substitution can only work where the state — not the guerrillas — holds the territory and can guarantee a farmer’s safety when he says no to coca. The armed groups must be displaced before substitution has any chance, and any candidate who treats substitution as a soft alternative to security has the sequence backwards. That is the simple truth of it, and it is the heart of my concern with the Total Peace approach Cepeda helped design.

Seventh, he wants to expand the state’s role across the board, including continuing Petro’s effort to take over the health sector. Before the pandemic, Colombia had one of the best reputations in the world for health-care quality. Is it unequal? Yes — care in an isolated hamlet does not match Cali or Medellín, and the south of Bogotá does not match the north. Then let the government build clinics and hospitals where they are missing. There is no reason to take over the parts of the private system that work in order to do that, unless one objects on ideology to doctors and dentists existing as small businesspeople. That is ideology, not health policy.

Eighth, if Cepeda wins he may well protect Daniel Quintero, the former mayor of Medellín under indictment on more than forty counts of corruption. That kind of debt-collection worries me. And ninth, the selective conscience. Cepeda is a former member of the Communist Youth — a plus if you are a communist, unsettling if you are not. The FARC and ELN are also communist groups; one wonders whether that is the root of his apparent sympathy. He casts himself as a human rights defender yet stays conspicuously silent on the abuses of the Chavista regime in Venezuela. La Silla Vacía documented this in detail: roughly a decade of avoiding criticism of Maduro’s repression, fraudulent elections, and alliances with Colombian guerrillas. Cepeda notices human rights violations committed by people he dislikes while exempting bad actors he is closer to, provided they are communist or socialist. The record on that is fairly clear.

So where does that leave us?

Two men. One built his life on being seen — a brilliant, theatrical defense lawyer for the powerful and the accused, now promising an iron fist while surrounding himself with at least one genuinely serious technocrat in José Manuel Restrepo. The other built his life on a single tragedy — a disciplined, consistent, ideologically committed man of the left who has fought for victims for thirty years, and who carries a blind spot the size of a guerrilla encampment.

Here is the paradox I cannot get past: the “tough on crime” candidate has spent his career defending criminals, and the “human rights” candidate stays silent on half the human rights abuses in his own backyard. Each is, in some way, the very thing he claims to oppose. This is not a runoff between an angel and a devil. It is a runoff between two men who each ask voters to trust that their inconvenient friendships were strictly professional.

I am uneasy about both candidacies, for very different reasons, and I am doing what I said I would: laying it out and handing it to the reader. For deeper background, see Finance Colombia’s earlier survey of how the leading candidates draw divergent maps for foreign capital, security, and the rule of law, its reporting on what is behind Colombia’s increased violence, and its account of the final push of the Total Peace policy. The runoff is Sunday, June 21, and the winner is inaugurated August 7.

Throughout the summer, Turbay had been in critical condition, and intensive care at Bogotá’s Fundación Santa Fé Hospital as he underwent various brain and cranial surgeries led by neurosurgeon Dr. Fernando Hakim in an attempt to save his life. Though at the end of July it appeared his condition may be improving, things turned for the worse in early August.

At the age of five, Uribe Turbay (no relation to former president Alvaro Uribe) lost his mother, journalist Diana Turbay, who died while held kidnapped by Pablo Escobar.  Former President Julio César Turbay was his grandfather. Uribe studied law and public policy at University of The Andes in Bogotá and began his political career as a Liberal Party member of the Bogotá City Council at the age of 25.

Former President Álvaro Uribe invited Uribe Turbay to run for senate with his Centro Democrático party. Uribe Turbay won the seat in 2022 with strong support and served as senator until, at Alvaro Uribe’s invitation, announcing his run for the presidency, with elections next year.

Urbe, dead at the hands of a child assassin, lost his mother to Pablo Escobar when himself a child.

The Assassins

So far, several individuals have been detained for allegedly participating in Uribe’s murder:

• The 15-year-old assassin, who is being held in the Attorney General’s headquarters.
• Carlos Eduardo Mora, who drove the teen to where Uribe was speaking.
• Christian González Ardila, the man who was to drive the getaway motorcycle.
• Elder José Arteaga, “El Costeño” the organizer of the assassination.
• Katerine “Gabriela” Martinez, accomplice and lover of El Costeño, provided the handgun to the assassin.
• William González Cruz, “El Viejo”

The current hypothesis put forward by Colombian law enforcement is that Elder José Arteaga, “El Costeño,”was a local small time gang leader unaffiliated with any of the larger mafia groups that plague Colombia, but while serving prison time in Meta, Colombia, he met “Daniel” (nom de guerre), part of the “Teófilo Forero squad of the Segunda Marquetalia, a guerilla mafia made up of former FARC members who rejected the 2016 peace accord signed between the FARC and the government. Accomplice Katerine Martinez was directed to Caquetá after the shooting by José Arteaga, according to her, to seek protection from the Segunda Marquetalia, active in the area. There she was captured by Colombian authorities.

General Carlos Triana Beltrán, director of Colombia’s National Police, said in a press conference last week that they believe Luciano Marín Arango “Ivan Márquez” and “José Aldinever Sierra Sabogal “Zarco Aldinever,” leaders of the Segunda Marquetalia, are the brains behind the assassination and contracted with El Costeño to carry it out.

Unconfirmed reports from last week say that Zarco Aldinever was killed near the Venezuelan border during a battle between the Segunda Marquetalia and rival guerilla mafia, the ELN. Those reports have not been confirmed and could be an attempt to redirect attention, hopefully (by the Segunda Marquetalia) staving off military action by Colombian forces.

Analysis

The Petro administration had already been criticized for refusing to provide the additional security that Uribe Turbay had asked for. The government is responsible for providing security to presidential candidates and other public figures who may be under threat of political violence, such as social activists, witnesses, legislators and local officials.

Uribe Turbay was the leading of five candidates of Alvaro Uribe’s Centro Democrático party and promised loyalty to the party’s godfather. “I aspire to be the best version of Miguel Uribe for Colombia, but of course with the best advisor in Álvaro Uribe,” he told Medellín’s leading daily El Colombiano in April.

With Alvaro Uribe convicted of witness tampering and the current administration of Gustavo Petro facing its own scandals and unpopularity, Colombia is approaching an especially divided election cycle. Hard core “Uribistas” or Uribe Supporters insist he is innocent despite the evidence and an independent judiciary. One does not have to be an Uribe supporter however, to see that current President Gustavo Petro’s promise of “Total Peace” and an end to guerrilla violence has been a complete failure. Groups such as the ELN, Clan del Golfo and Segunda Marquetalia are gaining territory and becoming even more brazen.

Though Uribe Turbay’s death may have a “sympathy vote” effect, Uribistas were already going to vote for the Centro Democrático candidate, and “pura sangre” (pure blood) Petristas, or Petro supporters, never would. When it comes to the largest group of voters with allegiances neither to Uribe or Petro, it is likely that dissatisfaction with Petro’s handling of security along with a distaste for Alvaro Uribe’s criminal record may lead to the emergence of a candidate from one of the right leaning parties outside of the Centro Democrático, such as Cambio Radical.

To be clear, no one serious is blaming President Petro for being involved in the attack. Still, he is blamed not just by Uribistas, but by other opposition figures for his coddling stance towards guerilla groups like the Segunda Marquetalia, for not providing adequate security for opposition candidates, and a worsening security climate where an act like this assassination can take place.

While there is not yet conclusive proof they are the ones who ordered the attack, the motivation for Segunda Marquetalia could be to stop the likely Uribista candidate early in the electoral process, because of their pledge to eliminate the remnants of guerilla groups like the ELN and Segunda Marquetalia.

A family’s pain

Uribe Turbay leaves behind his wife, María Claudia Tarazona. They met when he was 24 years old. She was 10 years older and had three daughters, so at first didn’t take his advances seriously but over time working together, their bonds grew, and they formed a family, having one more son together.

Photo:Instagram account of  Maria Claudia Tarazona

Uribe Turbay was later transferred to a better equipped hospital in the north of Bogotá where he underwent cranial surgery due to the gravity of his wounds. As of Sunday morning, June 8^th, Uribe’s surgery was successful, though he remains in critical condition. The CTI, Colombia’s equivalent of the FBI, and DIJIN, the national police’s investigative unit, have possession of the youth’s phone and are analyzing messages and contacts.

The following day, Sunday, June 8th, thousands took to the streets in major Colombian cities in solidarity with Uribe Turbay, expressing not necessarily support of his particular candidacy, but rejection of political violence.

Uribe is a “pre-candidate” for Colombia’s presidential elections next May. Pre-candidates are competing within their respective political parties to become the party’s official candidate for the upcoming elections. Other pre-candidates may bypass the party endorsement system by collecting enough signatures to appear on the ballot.

Uribe Turbay belongs to the Centro Democratico political party, controlled by former President Alvaro Uribe, though the two are not related. Uribe Turbay is the son of journalist Diana Consuelo Turbay Quintero, who in 1991 was kidnapped by Pablo Escobar’s Medellín Cartel in 1991 and died in their custody during a failed rescue attempt. In turn, Diana Turbay was the daughter of Julio César Turbay Ayala, who was president of Colombia from 1978 to 1982.

#ATENCIÓN. Se conoce un video que deja ver el momento cuando el congresista Miguel Uribe Turbay recibe los impactos de bala mientras daba un discurso en un parque del b/Modelia.

En desarrollo… https://t.co/HAlu4typX7 pic.twitter.com/d612iyMl37

— Colombia Oscura (@ColombiaOscura_) June 7, 2025

During Julio César Turbay Ayala’s administration, the M-19 rebel group attacked the Dominican embassy in Bogotá, holding several ambassadors hostage, including those from the US, Costa Rica, Venezuela, Israel, and Peru. Colombia’s current leftist President Gustavo Petro was a member of the now-disbanded M-19 guerillas.

Political repercussions

Colombia is in a state of high political tensions, as the leftist president Gustavo Petro, a former armed guerilla, is in the process of attempting to bypass the system of checks and balances and hold a referendum on his labor reforms. The labor reform bill failed to pass congress, and the referendum itself also failed to pass congress, but he is insisting on moving forward with the measure, provoking a constitutional crisis.

Miguel Uribe and his Centro Democratico party have been opponents of the president’s populist agenda, as have several other major political parties, and even a number of the president’s former ministers.

President Petro condemned the assassination attempt and ordered an investigation into Uribe Turbay’s security detail. The government is offering a reward of up to approximately $780,000 USD for information on the perpetrators. All other presidential candidates condemned the attempt and denounced the plague of political violence and common criminality that Colombia suffers from.

Supporters of Petro had called for public marches in support of the president’s proposed reforms for this Wednesday, June 11. This assassination attempt ratchets up tensions, as it recalls “El Bogotazo,” the riots and burning of Bogotá in 1948 after the assassination of presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. The assassination and the repercussions, against the context of political violence between the two main political parties—Liberals and Conservatives—of that time, were ingredients in the rise of communist armed insurgencies during the 1960s of the FARC, ELN, and EPL, and as a response, vigilante groups like the AUC, which later morphed into common mafias.

Who might want Uribe Turbay dead?

• Narcotics mafias – Uribe Turbay’s mother was a victim of Pablo Escobar’s mafia and died when he was just a toddler. He may be expected to crack down hard on these criminal organizations if elected, unlike the current administration of Gustavo Petro, who has through his policies, given them space to regroup and rebuild.
• Left-wing militants – Uribe Turbay belongs to the right-wing (despite the name) Centro Democrático political party, led by former President Alvaro Uribe, which takes a hard-line eradication policy against leftist groups like the ELN and the dissident remnants of the FARC after the 2016 peace accords. Alvaro Uribe has accumulated many political enemies, and not just left-wing ideologues. Still, the leftist militants, like the mafias, have been given space under the current administration to reorganize and strengthen their presence in Colombia. They could expect Uribe Turbay and his partisans to work to eradicate these groups once and for all.
• Current government – very unlikely, as political assassination is not a traditional modus operandi of Colombian governments. And there is no clear benefit the current administration would have by Uribe Turbay’s death. If anything, large segments of the population will blame the current administration, so such a move would not bring them any benefit, especially at the early pre-candidacy stage, where should Uribe Turbay die, it will not prevent a strong opposition candidate from emerging.
• Right-wing rivals – very unlikely, though conspiracy theories are circulating that he was either sacrificed for the effect it would have (sympathy vote), or to move a strong competitor aside for the many rivals that want to represent the opposition. At this time, without evidence, Finance Colombia discounts these theories as wild conjecture, but the thread is worth following.
• Unknown personal beef – This is surprisingly frequent, where an action that appears politically motivated, is actually to settle scores of a personal or business matter, and unrelated to political ideology or ambition. Again, unlikely, but possible.

Witness photo of a car bloodied from the senator’s wounds as rescuers struggled to render first aid.

Continue to follow Finance Colombia for updates on Miguel Uribe Turbay and the situation as it evolves.

Headline photo: Presidential candidate and Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay with his wife, Maria Claudia Tarazona. (source: social media)

With this decision, the Ministry of Finance, led by recently appointed Diego Guevara, will need to adjust the funding available for the Colombian government’s operations in 2025. The reform had been drafted by former Minister Ricardo Bonilla, who resigned earlier this month following a corruption scandal involving another entity from the government.

A predictable consensus?

The defeat was secured with votes from the right-wing opposition parties, independent parties (including the Liberal and Conservative parties, both of which had previously expressed their discontent through official statements), and some members of the Green Party, despite its partial alignment with the government. Only the left-wing parties in the governing coalition supported the bill.

Congressmen Miguel Uribe and Christian Garcés, who presented their arguments against  the bill, pointed out that the reform was inconvenient and asserted that it further affected an economy that is not going through its best moments. 

“The tax reform is not convenient, it is designed to discourage business formalization, increase the tax burden on individuals, erode investment and savings,” Uribe argued.

Other strong arguments were the low execution rate of the current budget —according to Dapper, as of November 2024 the budget execution rate was the lowest since 2019— and the potential consequences of eliminating the Simplified Tax Regime (RST), which the reform had proposed. Introduced to boost business and labor formalization in Colombia, the RST simplified taxation for small businesses by basing it on gross income rather than net profit.

Luis Fernando Mejía, CEO of the Colombian think tank Fedesarrollo, voiced his concerns about the viability of the project on Twitter/X just hours before the proposal was rejected. 

Mejía criticized measures such as tripling the carbon tax, due to its negative impact on the productive sector, and also warned that the reform would introduce a “minimum presumptive dividend,” a concept that could lead to double taxation on 30% of corporate profits, creating uncertainty and further discouraging investment. Also, he suspects “presumed minimum dividend” could result in double taxation on 30% of corporate profits, potentially creating uncertainty and further discouraging investment.

Earlier this year, president of AmCham Colombia Maria Claudia Lacouture also expressed her concern with the bill in an interview with La República, pointing that “In the current context of economic slowdown, with multiple pressures keeping growth below 1.2%, the best tax reform would be austerity and public spending execution, combined with strategies to foster investment, build trust, and create certainty. This approach could not only generate short-term investment but also attract foreign investment to the country.”

Petro’s administration to face the consequences — and the year to come

Government officials who attempted to save the reform at the Congress expressed their disappointment at this failure. President Gustavo Petro, through his Twitter/X account, offered hints about the government’s future tax policies, stating: “The budget crisis will not be paid for by the people,” meaning that social programs would remain unaffected, and added: “The fight against tax evasion, starting with online gambling and smuggling, must become a central priority.” 

Additionally, with discussions on the labor reform bill proposed by Petro’s government postponed until 2025, Petro suggested that this delay “must be compensated by [a significant increase in] the minimum wage.”

Finance Minister Diego Guevara, according to El Tiempo, described the death of the tax form bill as more than just a ‘fist’ to President Petro, stating: “This is a vote against the regions, a vote against investment,” meaning it is as a setback for regional investment in Colombia and development projects.

The coming year, 2025, will be the last before the 2026 presidential election to determine Gustavo Petro’s successor. In this context, the 2025 budget will now be established via a decree, adjusted to exclude the revenue the failed reform sought to generate.

Headline Photo: Capitolio Nacional (Photo: Oficina de Información y Prensa Cámara de Representantes)

Petro began his public life in the late 1970’s as a member of the M‑19, the bloodthirsty urban guerrilla group that—among its many acts of terrorism— stormed the Ministry of Justice in November of 1985, held its magistrates and hundreds of employees as hostages, and ultimately caused the violent death of 111 people.

In 1994, a mere two years after the M‑19’s final official amnesty, which coincided broadly with the introduction of a new constitution in 1991, Petro—then a congressman—invited Hugo Chávez to Bogota, where he hosted him for over a week. At the time, Chávez himself had been recently amnestied, having been sentenced for leading a failed and bloody coup attempt in Caracas in 1992.

Reflecting on his time with Chávez in the Colombian capital, Petro said: “We found an ideological understanding in the fight against corruption and in the Bolivarian discourse.”

This editorial originally ran April 19 in the Cato Institute Blog. It is generously shared under a Creative Commons license. The original can be read here.

Chávez became president of Venezuela in 1999. By 2003, Petro was boasting to a Colombian magazine, which described him as “one of Chávez’s closest advisors on the new model being implemented in Venezuela,” about the country’s change of tack. “We are in a transitional stage,” Petro said, “from a neoliberal model to one that I would call ‘neo‐​populism.’”

Eventually, under Chávez’s price and currency controls, food and basic goods in Venezuela became scarce. So too did Petro’s public statements about the Chavista model. “Neo‐​populism,” it turned out, had been a euphemism for old‐​fashioned socialism. And Petro tried to distance himself from the consequences that he had helped bring about. While running for president in March of 2010, he tweeted:

“We are socialists of the 21^st century and Chávez is a 20^th century socialist. I don’t expropriate the workers’ property.”

But Petro later deleted said tweet.

When Chávez died in 2013, Petro, who was then the mayor of Bogota, attended his funeral in Caracas. At the time, Petro claimed that Chávez had been “a great Latin American leader.” On Twitter, he posted a photograph of a supermarket shelf full of goods, adding a denial that food was scarce in Venezuela, as it had already been for some time.

During his stay in Caracas, Petro spoke to Telesur, Venezuela’s state‐​run media agency, of his initial encounter with Chávez. According to the Bogota mayoralty’s website, Petro said that, in 1994, he and Chávez had sworn to carry out “a Bolivarian integration” of Latin America. “We pledged to fight for that goal,” he said.

Nonetheless, in the run‐​up to the 2018 presidential election, which Petro lost, he once again tried to downplay his close ties to Chavismo. Petro continually claimed that, since he opposed all future oil exploration in Colombia, his economic policies had nothing to do with Chávez’s model for Venezuela, which was oil‐​dependent.

Petro’s radical, even apocalyptic, environmentalist rhetoric helped him to win the 2022 election. His not too subtle pivot from traditional statist to climate change alarmist went largely unopposed. Petro’s political rivals, the news media, and center‐​left opinion leaders meekly allowed him to change the axis of political debate.

It fell to a foreign journalist, Mexico’s Jorge Ramos, to provide the only memorable exception. In a 2018 CNN interview, Ramos asked Petro whether he thought that Chávez had been a dictator. After eluding the question for around 40 seconds, Petro said: “I think that international politics is sharply divided by the issue of climate change.” The following exchange ensued:

Ramos: “No, no, no. Was Hugo Chávez a dictator or not, Mr. Petro? […] We can talk afterwards about climate change if you would like.”

Petro: “Hugo Chávez was elected by the people several times.”

Ramos: “Do you think that Chávez was a dictator?”

Petro: “I think that there was no doubt about his elections according to the information I have.”

Ramos: “But you have not answered me whether Chávez was a dictator or not. [Ramos proceeds to quote Petro’s 2013 tweet praising Chávez as a great leader]A great Latin American leader? He had political prisoners, caused many deaths, censored and controlled all news media. Is that a great political leader?”

Petro: “I think that Chávez died and, since his death, a part of Venezuela admires him and another part does not admire him.”

Ramos: “But you, Mr. Petro […] Many Colombians fear that you will do the same.”

Petro: “I cannot do the same for two fundamental reasons. First, because what I propose for Colombia is to separate the economy from oil and coal….”

Ramos: “But you have not wanted to answer me. It is very simple. For you, was Chávez a dictator or not?”

Petro: “I think that he was elected by the people.”

Petro eventually admitted—with an evident lack of conviction in his body language—that the Venezuelan regime had become authoritarian, but only under Chávez’s successor, Nicolás Maduro, and that Cuba’s statist economy harmed democracy. But Ramos’s pushback had exposed his rhetorical tactic: to claim that Venezuela’s economic and humanitarian collapse was not due to Chávez’s socialist policies, which Petro had celebrated and promoted, but rather to the primacy of the country’s oil industry.

Hence, Petro claimed that his center‐​right opponents, who did not intend to shut down oil exploration and production in the country, were the true proponents of Chavismo in Colombia. Not Petro himself, the one Colombian politician who had helped to bolster Chávez’s power in Venezuela.

Petro got away with his sophistry. Also with his claim that, despite earlier statements about the supposed need to change the constitution, he did not plan to summon a constitutional assembly if elected, as Chávez had done in Venezuela in 1999. Thus, leading politicians and opinion leaders of the center‐​left allowed themselves to be convinced that Petro was a democrat and, as such, represented no menace to Colombia’s republican institutions. In other words, Petro was no Chávez. Nor was Colombia, South America’s longest‐​running democratic republic, as institutionally weak as Venezuela had been when Chávez took over.

A pillar of this theory was the formidable opposition that Petro could face from Congress, where Petro’s party did not hold a majority. But this overlooked the longstanding Colombian tradition of a pro‐​government Congress, whose members are always susceptible to the patronage of a powerful presidency.

Indeed, as Petro was preparing for his inauguration, he formed a coalition not only with the center‐​left Green Party. It also came to include the Liberal Party, a member of the Socialist International since the 1990’s, the nominally center‐​right Party of National Unity, and even the Conservative Party. The formidable opposition theory collapsed even before Petro was sworn into office.

By November of 2022, Petro’s coalition had already approved a tax law that raised rates on formal sector employees and businesses, reinstated a national wealth tax, introduced a sugar tax (which falls most heavily upon the poorest in society), and forbade mining companies from deducting royalty payments from their income taxes. Petro’s “tax reform” really meant hefty tax increases (although this was already the norm in Colombia well before Petro came to power).

More recently Petro has garnered support from the Liberal Party and from Conservative senators for his sabotage of the private pension system. Petro aims to end workers’ ability to choose between the private and public pension alternatives for their mandatory retirement savings; the private system consists of individual retirement accounts, whereas the public version is an unsustainable, pay‐​as‐​you‐​go system that is subsidized through the national budget. Workers in the formal sector are currently free to choose between both models. Petro seeks to force all workers into the state‐​run system, leaving private funds as a voluntary alternative for those earning over three times the minimum wage.

Liberal and Conservative politicians are supporting Petro’s statist pension scheme despite their parties’ official exit from the government. Petro’s original, “National Agreement” government only lasted until the first half of of 2023, when it dawned on the political class that Petro truly intended—as he had said all along— to uproot private sector involvement in the healthcare sector.

Last March, Congress refused to approve Petro’s bid to expand state control of the healthcare system at the expense of private health insurance companies. Petro’s government responded by taking control of the administration of one of the largest private insurance companies, which manages the health funds of 5.7 million members. Petro also announced that it was time to summon an extralegal constitutional assembly since Congress could not “rise to the challenge” of implementing his agenda in full.

When it came to healthcare, the opposition finally became formidable. And Petro moved to make it futile. Analysts had failed to consider that, when push came to shove, Petro did not intend to respect constitutional protocols.

While the current constitution allows the creation of a new constitutional assembly, it requires both chambers of Congress to vote in favor by a majority, followed by the approval of the Constitutional Court and a majority of voters in a plebiscite, after which an election to choose the assembly members must take place. But Petro says that none of these requirements are necessary to change the constitution.

Petro argues that the “constituted” power that emerged in 1991 has been corrupted, while the “constituent” power is “the people,” which he claims to represent. “The constituent power is not summoned,” he said in an interview. “It is the people, which summons itself to decide the country’s fundamental questions. That is the constituent power.”

Petro has hinted that “the people” will express their support for a new constitution through a series of cabildos or town hall meetings that the government will summon across the country.

He thus claims that he can bypass Congress, the courts, and the need for a legal plebiscite to usher in a new constitution. Its pillars, Petro says, should include “the struggle against climate change” and “the decarbonization of the economy.” This implies a constitutional mandate for Petro’s ongoing war against Colombia’s hydrocarbon industry. Petro’s constitution also would include “a monetary policy that prioritizes employment and production.” That is, a takeover of the nominally independent central bank.

Petro’s attempt to create a new, statist constitution is reminiscent of Hugo Chávez’s own methods, replicated by Latin America’s “21^st Century Socialists” Rafael Correa in Ecuador and Evo Morales in Bolivia. Like Petro, who implies that Colombia’s 1991 constitution is obsolete, Chávez affirmed that the Venezuelan constitution was “moribund” when he was sworn in as president.

But even Chávez’s opponents admitted that, in 1999, his constitutional convention “began as a democratic process that in its origins did not involve the rupture of the previous political regime.” Petro, on the other hand, is attempting a full rupture with the established order. He aims to bypass all existing checks and balances to his power.

Petro’s plan is more akin to Nicolás Maduro’s spurious constitutional assembly of 2017, which nullified the power of the National Assembly, where the opposition held a majority since its victory in the election of December, 2015. In that sense, the commentators who still claim that Petro is no Chávez are correct, albeit for none of the reasons they put forth (such as the strength of Colombian institutions).

Rather, Petro’s contempt for the rule of law is arguably greater than that of Chávez during the initial stages of his rule. Then again, whereas Chávez sought to conceal his true intentions during his campaign for the presidency in 1998, Petro campaigned while offering Chavista recipes openly. There were, for instance, his threat to expropriate specific companies, his ambiguity on his intention to change the constitution, and his defense of Marxist doctrine, such as the labor theory of value.

In 2022, a small majority of Colombian voters acted against their better judgment and allowed Petro to hold power. A large majority is now firmly opposed to his government. The question is whether the republic itself will withstand Petro’s imminent constitutional onslaught.

Estrada insists she is innocent and was merely a passenger in the vehicle.

Prosecutor Rashid Alí Cárcamo said that one of Estrada’s two traveling companions tried to bribe the police with a promise of 100 million Colombian pesos, but the police did not accept the bribe. Along with the 39-year-old councilwoman, Martin Alonso Barreto de La Hoz, said to be her boyfriend, and Avelino Villamizar were also arrested. In addition to the narcotics charges, Barreto was also charged with manufacturing, trafficking, carrying, or possessing firearms, accessories, parts or ammunition.

Prosecutors indicated in the arraignment hearing that Barreto was driving, the cocaine was under his seat, and he was in possession of the firearm. Estrada insists she is an innocent victim.

After working at city council that Friday morning, Estrada says she left to join Barreto, who had arrived to pick her up for lunch, along with Villamizar, who they were going to drop off at the gas station, where they were later captured.

“I sat in the front of the vehicle, they offered me the courtesy, so to speak, I was going to have lunch at my apartment in the Pie de la Popa neighborhood. However, I departed from council and two minutes later the police approached, they told us that we had to get out (the vehicle), I identified myself and gave them my councilor’s identification,” testified Estrada.

Estrada’s lawyer, Juan Royero insists the councilor is innocent, saying she was a passenger in the vehicle, it does not belong to her, and she had no idea of contents under the driver’s seat, or weapons in the possession of Barreto…even though he is indicated in multiple accounts as her boyfriend.

Prosecutors have asked that Estrada be denied bail, though she has asked to be released pending trial, insisting she is not a flight risk and must take care of her autistic nine-year-old son. Aside from the prosecution charges, an investigation has been opened in the Procuraduria’s office (Special prosecutor for government employees), and Estrada has been provisionally suspended from City Council and the Liberal Party for three months to address the charges.

The unconventional petroleum and gas extraction method involves injecting water, sand and surfactants (such as detergent) into deep underground shale rock formations to release petroleum and gas trapped within the mineral formations.

“MinEnergía will study the viability of the exploration and production of unconventional deposits. To do this, it will form an independent and multidisciplinary committee of experts that will evaluate and give recommendations. Additionally, the ANH (National Hydrocarbons Agency) will carry out studies led by independent experts to update, deepen and complement the technical knowledge of the exploration and production of these resources, as well as the environmental and social impacts associated with the development of this activity, says the bill.

The proposed legislation mandates that the ANH establishes exploration zones, and ministries of Energy and Environment will update as necessary technical and environmental regulation covering any such exploration and production.

Hydraulic Fracturing is controversial in Colombia, even though to date there has been no hydraulic fracturing in Colombia. During the legislative session, Liberal Party representative Julián Peinado falsely charged that “Fracking caused earthquakes in 8 different states in the United States and has the ability to damage tectonic plates, or to “activate” them. The politician went on to claim that fracking is “toxic chemicals, 75%” attributing his claim to the “Massachusetts Association of Physicians” or as Peinado claimed, the “Asociación de Médicos de Massachusetts.” Even though the US state of Massachusetts “Has no natural gas reserves or production,” according to the US Energy Information Administration.

Peinado’s motion to strike the Fracking provision from the bill was defeated 84 to 25. The bill now goes to the Colombian Senate.

Finance Colombia could not successfully verify the existence of a “Massachusetts Association of Physicians” though there is a Massachusetts Medical Society and a Massachusetts Association of Physician Assistants.

Colombian publication El Colombiano was referred to as a source for this reporting.

Photo: Before they became rivals, then-President Álvaro Uribe (right) and then-Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos (center) meet with U.S. officials in Washington. (Credit: U.S. Defense Department)

Colombians went to the polls this weekend to elect their new representatives in both houses of Congress, and the results reflected the wide plurality of political views in a country that has grow highly divided over an extended peace process, the scourge of corruption, economic stagnation, and how to solve a host of commonplace issues from healthcare and education to security and environmental concerns.

While the coalitions on the right and left both saw movement in terms of representation, the final totals show five parties relatively lumped together, with none grasping the type of numerical seat advantage that will allow it to exert dominance.

The Democratic Center (Centro Democrático) party of former president Álvaro Uribe, however, fared the best in terms of gaining seats while the Party of the U (Partido de la U) of President Juan Manuel Santos lost a lot of ground.

Nevertheless, the leading parties will all still need to continue building coalitions to push their agendas in the next legislative session in what has become the fragmented political landscape in Colombia today.

“We ended up with a very balanced Senate,” stated Medellín-based Bancolombia today in a note to investors. “Whoever wins the presidential election is going to have to work with a broad church and radical changes are unlikely.”

One factor highlighting this dynamic are the gains made yesterday by the Green Alliance (Alianza Verde). Compared to the 2014 congressional election, the smaller, left-wing party nearly doubled its number of seats across the two houses to put it on the map as a more-serious force.

Analysts at the London-based Capital Economics saw the results similarly to those at Bancolombia. “A highly fragmented Congress will lean against a big shift in policy in either direction,” stated the research group in its investors’ note.

In the Senate, the Democratic Center ended up on top with 19 seats, followed by Radical Change (Cambio Radical) with 16, and the Conservative party (Conservador Colombiano) with 15 seats. The Liberal party (Liberal Colombiano) and Party of the U (Partido de la U) were closely behind with 14 seats each.

Among the individual Senate candidates, Uribe received by far the highest volume of national support. The only candidate to come anywhere near the right-wing ex-president’s 875,554 vote tally was two-time former Bogotá mayor Aurelijus Mockus with 540,783, whose large base further showed the rise of the Green Alliance.

Orge Enrique Robledo of the Alternative Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Alternativo) also garnered heavy support, with 226,099 votes, while 10 other candidates finished with more than 100,000 votes.

Results in the territorial-based lower house were similarly stratified, although the top three parties managed to carve out a more substantial advantage in terms of seats won. The Liberal party, with more than 16.6% of the national vote, earned 35 seats followed closely by the Democratic Center with 32 and Radical Change with 30 seats.

The Party of the U, of sitting, and soon to be outgoing, President Santos, fared better in the lower house than the Senate. Its 25 seats put it fourth and ahead of the 21 seats won by the Conservative party, but this still represents a significant drop-off from its power-wielding position throughout the second term of Santos.

The Green Alliance, garnering almost 6% of the national tally, ranked much further behind in the Chamber. Its roughly 884,000 votes were less than half of the top five parties, leaving it with 9 seats.

While much was made about the first-ever electoral participation of the party that emerged from the demobilized FARC guerrilla group, voters gave the former rebels almost no support at the ballot box. The party comprised of ex-guerrilla candidates from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, which has retained the FARC acronym, got less than 0.4% of the national vote in both the Senate and the Chamber. (Regardless of the results, under the peace accord, the FARC party is set to receive five seats in each house of Congress.)

“The FARC, despite all the fears when the peace agreement was signed, mustered a miserly 52,000 votes,” stated Bancolombia,” adding that “they do get give seats as part of the agreement but they are non-voting seats.”

In addition to the congressional election, the primaries to decide the candidates for Colombia’s conservative and liberal factions were also held on Sunday. Iván Duque, on the right, and leftist candidate Gustavo Petro were the runaway winners for each side and will represent their respective coalitions in the May 27 presidential election. They are expected to remain the frontrunners in the race.

While other political wrangling and coalition building could continue to alter the makeup of the rest of the field, other likely presidential candidates include former Medellín mayor Sergio Fajardo, former vice president Germán Lleras Vargas, and lead governmental peace process negotiator Humberto de la Calle.

“The same four candidates are still expected to dominate the polls — Duque, Petro, Lleras, Fajardo — and it is still a close call at this point and the second round is still fully expected to be a left vs. right run off,” stated Bancolombia. “The only factor being discussed during the analysis of last night’s results would be a potential first round victory if either side could create a grand alliance ahead of the vote but that would require certain candidates to withdraw from the election and pledge their support.”

At press time, with more than 98% of the primary ballots counted, leftist Gustavo Petro had received nearly 85% of the votes to represent his side over rival Carlos Caicedo. On the right, conservative Iván Duque had taken more than two-thirds of the votes to beat out challengers Martha Lucía Ramírez (26%) and Alejandro Ordoñez (6%).

Photo: Gustavo Petro and Ivan Duque, the left and right coalition candidates in the 2018 presidential election in Colombia. (Credit: Prensa de Bogotá / Leoboud)

While Petro’s support was larger in percentage terms on his side of the ledger, Duque gained much more support in terms of raw voting totals due to the right’s primary having much higher turnout.

Potentially also running against several non-coalition party candidates — such as former Medellín mayor Sergio Fajardo, former vice president Germán Vargas Lleras, and lead peace process negotiator Humberto de la Calle — these two coalition leaders now become the likely favorites in the May 27 election to replace outgoing two-term President Juan Manuel Santos. (If, as expected, no candidate receives more than 50% of the votes, a second-round run-off election between the top two vote-getters will take place on June 17.)

But the overwhelming margins did not ease the minds of the many Colombians on both sides who suspected impropriety when their local voting sites reportedly ran out of primary ballots to fill out. The outcry was substantial on social media, with at least one video going viral that showed angry voters verbally confronting the location’s elections officials.

READ MORE: Colombia’s Private-Sector-Friendly President? Analyzing the Candidates

To many, it represented yet another hint of manipulation in an election cycle that has seen the issue of corruption move to the forefront following the near-constant revelation of issues like the unprecedented upheaval of the region-wide Odebrecht scandal, a sweeping criminal investigation that has implicated multiple former Supreme Court justices, among other politicians, and various other private sector crimes and instances of graft from public officials.

According to Colombia Reports, the governmental National Register chalked up the problem to a clerical printing error and authorized the stations to photocopy remaining blank ballots on site. The agency refused, however, to extend voting hours to account for the lost time and confusion created in some areas by the lack of ballots.

Congressional Election

The new composition of the Colombian Congress — both its Senate and Chamber of Representatives — was also voted upon today in what was the kickoff of an election season that will overhaul both the legislative and executive branches in Colombia for the next four years. In all, today’s voting will define the selection of 102 members of the Senate and 166 members of the Chamber.

There were not widespread reports of ballot shortages in the congressional elections throughout the day.

Late in the evening, with nearly 90% of the votes tallied, the Democratic Center (Centro Democrático) party, which has come to be synonymous with former president Álvaro Uribe, led the national voting for Senate. Support is widely fragmented, however, with the top five parties all receiving between 19% and 14% of the recorded votes.

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While Democratic Center leads thus far with roughly 19%, it is followed closely by Radical Change (Cambio Radical) at 16%, and three parties that each have received 14% of the votes: the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal), Conservative Party (Partido Conservador), and Party of the U (Partido de la U).

In the lower house, the Liberal Party had a slight edge over the other leaders to take the most seats. Not far behind were Democratic Center and Radical Change followed by Party of the U and the Conservative Party.

The larger number of congress members now on the right side of the aisle, particularly the gains by the Uribe-minded Democratic Center, means that there likely will be more criticism and pressure looming this year for the peace accord with FARC signed in late 2016, the signature work of eight years in office by Party of the U head Santos.

While court rulings could help protect the accord to a degree, aspects of the roughly 300-page document have already been slow to develop under a more-welcoming legislative branch, while Uribe and some others on the far right have pledged to block the implementation of many provisions of the deal. Such tensions would expect to be greater if the right-leaning legislative wave portends a Duque victory in the presidential election.

Today’s election also marked the first to include candidates from the newly created political party of the former FARC guerrilla faction. Though it received paltry support — less than 0.5% in both the Senate and the Chamber — the 2016 peace accord with the government that led to the demobilization of the armed group guarantees the party of FARC to receive five seats in each house.

FARC will run no candidate in May’s presidential election. Former top commander Rodrigo Londoño, aka Timochenko, had launched a campaign earlier this year but he recently called off his plan to run after undergoing heart surgery.