The citizen committee promoting the convening of a National Constituent Assembly in Colombia announced the suspension of its signature-gathering campaign and the withdrawal of the initiative, in a move that comes during the final stretch of the presidential race and could benefit ruling-party candidate Iván Cepeda’s efforts to attract centrist voters ahead of the June 21 runoff election.

The decision was announced June 4 in a statement signed by Armando Wouriyu Valbuena, spokesperson for the committee leading the initiative, who said the measure resulted from a “process of collective reflection on the national situation and the political moment the country is experiencing.”

President Gustavo Petro publicly supported the decision.

“I support the decision made by the citizen committee for the National Constituent Assembly to suspend the signature-gathering process,” Petro wrote on X.

The president added that “the constituent assembly had no objective other than improving the living conditions of the Colombian people and finally guaranteeing their fundamental rights.”

The proposal had initially been included among political initiatives associated with the ruling coalition and appeared in preliminary versions of the government platform of Iván Cepeda, the Pacto Histórico candidate who will face far-right contender Abelardo de la Espriella in the presidential runoff.

The decision to withdraw the initiative comes as Cepeda’s campaign seeks to expand its electoral support among moderate and independent voters, many of whom have viewed the prospect of constitutional reform with caution and, in some cases, concern.

A recurring idea in Colombian politics

Although the proposal has recently been associated with President Petro and left-wing sectors, the idea of convening a Constituent Assembly has been supported at different times by political leaders from nearly every corner of Colombia’s political spectrum.

Petro himself promoted the idea during the 2022 presidential campaign but later moderated his position after signing a public commitment encouraged by political figures including Claudia López and Antanas Mockus. In that agreement, he pledged not to pursue constitutional changes of that nature during his presidency.

The event became known nationally because Petro signed the so-called “12 Commandments” on a marble plaque, a symbolic gesture that helped build a broad political consensus and secure the support needed to win the presidency.

The debate over constitutional reform, however, predates Petro by decades.

One of the most notable examples involves former President Álvaro Uribe, who today ranks among the most vocal opponents of a constituent assembly promoted by the current administration.

During his presidency, a constitutional amendment allowed immediate presidential reelection. Later, after Colombia’s Constitutional Court and various political sectors blocked some of his initiatives, Uribe proposed a Constituent Assembly focused on reforming the judicial branch.

In 2012, during a forum in Washington, he argued that a constituent assembly limited to judicial reform could respond to public demands at the time.

Three years later, in 2015, and now from the opposition, Uribe again proposed a constituent assembly restricted to reviewing the peace accords negotiated between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, with the aim of modifying aspects of the process.

In 2020, several lawmakers aligned with Uribismo, including Paloma Valencia, who recently finished third in the first round of the presidential election, again proposed a constituent assembly to reform the judicial system and review aspects related to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, or JEP.

The proposal came after Colombia’s Supreme Court ordered Uribe’s preventive detention as part of an investigation into alleged witness tampering, a case that originated from complaints filed by current presidential candidate Iván Cepeda.

De la Espriella also supported the idea in the past

The concept of a constituent assembly has not been foreign to Abelardo de la Espriella, the current far-right presidential candidate.

During a 2017 interview on the local program Semblanzas con Toño Sánchez Jr., De la Espriella defended convening a Constituent Assembly to reform sectors such as justice and health care, while redefining structural aspects of the Colombian state.

“What must be promoted is the elimination of that (…) through a new strong-handed government that repeals that farce by decree and convenes, through the most expeditious legal means, a Constituent Assembly that reforms justice, reforms health care and lays the foundations for a more equitable system for those who are less favored within society,” he said, referring to the elections held that year, which were ultimately won by Iván Duque of the Centro Democrático party.

During the 2026 presidential campaign, however, De la Espriella adopted a completely different position and declared himself firmly opposed to a constituent assembly, associating the proposal with the political left and with Cepeda, his opponent in the runoff.

At a campaign-closing rally in Medellín before the first round of voting, he argued that Colombia’s Constitution should be defended “with tooth and nail” and questioned any attempt to modify it through a constituent assembly promoted by the government.

Why does a constituent assembly remain so controversial?

The controversy surrounding a Constituent Assembly is not solely a matter of who proposes it. It is also linked to the place occupied by the 1991 Constitution in Colombia’s political history.

The current Constitution emerged from a citizen movement known as the “Seventh Ballot,” (Séptima Papeleta) a mobilization that brought together people from different ideological backgrounds to replace the Constitution of 1886.

The current Constitution emerged from a citizen movement known as the “Seventh Ballot,” (Séptima Papeleta) a mobilization that brought together people from different ideological backgrounds to replace the Constitution of 1886.

For many Colombians, the process represents one of the most important moments of democratic consensus in the country’s recent history.

As a result, any effort to amend it tends to generate strong reactions, both in support and in opposition.

In addition, political leaders from different ideological traditions have often turned to the idea of a constituent assembly during periods of high popularity or when they encounter institutional obstacles to advancing particular reforms. This has contributed to a perception that the mechanism can be used to alter rules that certain political sectors find inconvenient.

The intense political polarization that has characterized Colombia since the early 2000s has also complicated efforts to build broad consensus around constitutional reform. The first round of the presidential election once again reflected that division, with less than a 3% gap separating the two leading candidates.

A debate likely to continue

Although the initiative has been withdrawn for now, the debate is far from over.

Colombian law establishes a complex procedure for convening a Constituent Assembly, requiring citizen participation, congressional involvement and approval by a significant number of voters at the ballot box. Under the current electoral roll, that threshold would exceed 12 million votes.

In a deeply fragmented political environment, achieving that level of consensus appears difficult in the short term. Yet recent history demonstrates that the idea periodically resurfaces across the ideological spectrum whenever political conditions change.

For that reason, even after the suspension of the current signature-gathering effort, discussion of a possible constitutional reform is likely to remain part of Colombia’s political debate, regardless of who wins the presidency on June 21 and who ultimately leads the opposition to the next government.

Two men. Both running to be the next president of Colombia. Both swear they are tough, that they are clean, that they are the answer to a country that is exhausted. And both of them have a problem with the company they keep.

One is a defense lawyer who built his career representing mobsters, paramilitaries, and at least one alleged front man for the Maduro regime — and he tells you those relationships were strictly professional. The other fought to spring a FARC commander out of a maximum-security holding cell — and he tells you that relationship was strictly professional too. One says, in effect, “I only knew the narco because I was his attorney.” The other says, “I only knew the guerrilla because I was a peace negotiator.” Same sentence, opposite ends of the political spectrum. It is the strangest mirror in Colombian politics.

This Sunday, June 21, Colombians return to the polls for the runoff. In the first round on May 31, the right’s Abelardo de la Espriella came first with about 43.7 percent. The left’s Iván Cepeda came second with about 40.9 percent. No one else is left. Whoever wins walks into the Casa de Nariño on August 7.

What follows is an analysis, not an endorsement. I am pro-business, anti-crime, and anti-communist, and I am not Colombian, so I will not presume to tell Colombians how to vote. What I can do is lay out who these two men are, where they came from, and the honest pros and cons of each — because both carry serious problems, and readers with capital, operations, or ties in Colombia deserve them laid out straight. Much of the biographical reporting here draws on the long-form profiles published by La Silla Vacía, among the best political journalism in the country, and on Finance Colombia‘s own coverage of the race.

Who is Abelardo de la Espriella?

Start with de la Espriella, since he holds a slight polling lead. His campaign events are not subtle: the lights go yellow, blue, and red, footage of tigers plays on the screens, smoke machines fire, the national anthem swells, and out he comes flanked by bodyguards in a bulletproof vest, declaring, “Here is your tiger, roaring and biting.” The tiger is his symbol — claw, territory, attack — and the crowd chant is ponle la raya al tigre, “put the stripe on the tiger.” It is a show, and he runs it the same way every time, with discipline.

According to La Silla Vacía’s profile, Abelardo was born in Bogotá in 1978 and grew up in Sahagún and Montería, in Córdoba on the Caribbean side. His mother calls the family riquitos de pueblo — “small-town rich.” A respected name and political connections, but not the rosca, the Bogotá elite, and not one of the great national fortunes. His father was a Liberal Party congressman and an early backer of Álvaro Uribe in Córdoba in 2001; when Uribe reached the presidency, he made the elder De la Espriella a notary. That is where the long relationship between the De la Espriella and Uribe families begins.

From childhood, Abelardo wanted to be seen. By his family’s account he sang opera in the bathroom, had a children’s radio program his father arranged, got himself onto regional television as a teenager, and promised his grandmother a limousine in Miami. He studied law at the Sergio Arboleda University in Bogotá — not an academic powerhouse, but a real breeding ground for the Colombian right — and hustled the whole way through, selling whiskey, perfume, clothing, and emeralds on consignment. The man has always been building a legend about himself.

Here is the part he does not lead with on stage. De la Espriella made his name as a defense lawyer, and not for choirboys. His client list reads like a rogues’ gallery: politicians tied to paramilitary groups, the Nule brothers of the carrusel de contratos contracting scandal in Bogotá, the pyramid-scheme operator David Murcia of DMG, the disgraced Constitutional Court magistrate Jorge Pretelt, and — the big one — Álex Saab, the man the United States accused of being a front man for Nicolás Maduro. Early in his career, at 26, he did legal and public-relations work around the paramilitary demobilization at Santa Fe de Ralito through an NGO he ran. His childhood friend from Córdoba is Salvatore Mancuso, the paramilitary chief.

He will tell you — and it is a legitimate argument — that every defendant has a right to counsel, and that defending an unpopular client is not the same as committing the client’s crimes. Fair enough. We will return to it.

After the lawyering came the brand. He launched a rum called Ron Defensor, “the Defender,” with the vallenato star Silvestre Dangond. He launched a clothing line, released music, wrote books, went through an atheist phase, and then, roughly six years ago, underwent a very public religious conversion. Now he is the “God and family” candidate who calls himself “the Cyrus of Colombia.” By his own design he is a sybarite: Italian suits every year, a Miami mansion valued north of $5 million USD, a private plane, the whole production.

Three facts to keep in your carriel for later. First, he has never held elected office; he ran for a Bogotá council seat as a student in the 1990s, lost, and stayed out of electoral politics for nearly thirty years. Second, he holds three citizenships — American, Italian, and Colombian. Third, his running mate is José Manuel Restrepo, a name that returns in a big way when we reach the pros.

“The ‘tough on crime’ candidate has spent his career defending criminals, and the ‘human rights’ candidate stays silent on half the human rights abuses in his own backyard.” — Loren Moss, Finance Colombia

Who is Iván Cepeda?

If de la Espriella’s story is about a man who wanted to be seen, Cepeda’s is about a man shaped by a death.

On August 9, 1994, a young Iván Cepeda took a bus to Javeriana University, where he taught philosophy, after letting his father leave the house first. On the way he came upon ambulances, police cars, and a crowd around a bullet-riddled car. It was his father’s car. Manuel Cepeda, a senator for the Unión Patriótica, had just been assassinated.

The detail that explains Iván Cepeda is what he did next. He did not collapse over the body. He pulled from his jacket a column his father had written about another murdered activist, crossed the street to tell his wife, and then turned and spoke to journalists — composed, on message, calling on the president and the courts to act. “When my father was murdered,” he later said, “I already knew how I should act, what I should say.” He turned private grief into public, political language. La Silla Vacía describes his entire method of politics as organized around the truth of the victims, and that is exactly right.

Cepeda was born in 1962, while his father was in prison for interviewing a survivor of the army’s bombing of Marquetalia, the peasant enclave that became the founding myth of the FARC. His parents, Manuel Cepeda and Yira Castro, were journalists, communists, and revolutionaries; politics was the air the household breathed. At 13 he was in the Communist Youth. At 17, after his mother’s death, his father sent him to study philosophy in Sofia, Bulgaria. He returned in 1987, by his own account disillusioned with Soviet Marxism and the privilege he had seen inside the party there.

Abelardo de la Espriella is a millionaire defense attorney, singer & rum impresario. (photo: Twitter screencapture)

His father’s assassination was the turning point. The Unión Patriótica — a party born of a peace process, a vehicle for the FARC and the Communist Party to enter electoral politics — was then systematically exterminated, with thousands of members killed. Cepeda channeled all of it. He created the Manuel Cepeda Foundation, built memorial galleries with families of the disappeared, and founded MOVICE, the Movement of Victims of State Crimes. He pursued his father’s case until the Colombian state was held responsible and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights condemned the country.

Then he found his great adversary: Álvaro Uribe. For Cepeda, Uribe symbolizes the establishment he believes must confess its responsibility for paramilitarism and the killing of the left. He spent years pursuing Uribe — prison visits to extradited paramilitaries in the United States, the 2014 debate in Congress — and that work ultimately produced the witness-tampering case that put the former president on trial. Cepeda became, as La Silla Vacía puts it, the leftist who managed to put Uribe in the dock. That is the engine of his political career.

He reached Congress in 2010, famously arriving with a bucket, broom, and mop, promising to clean up a legislature stained by parapolítica — the scandal of lawmakers who colluded with paramilitary groups. He has been there ever since, four terms, mostly on the Second Committee, which handles military promotions, security, and foreign relations. The crucial point about his experience, and I will come back to it, is that he has never governed anything — no city, department, ministry, or large budget. His arena has been Congress as a moral and judicial forum. He was also the principal intellectual architect of Petro’s Paz Total, “Total Peace”; he coined the term.

His running mate is Aida Quilcué, an indigenous Nasa leader and senator who is herself a victim of state violence — her husband was killed by the military as they returned from a minga. One more thing matters because it is human and real: Cepeda is in fragile health. He has beaten cancer twice — colon cancer in 2018, liver cancer treated in 2022 — and people who have worked with him describe a worn body and an iron will. He is intellectually serious, sober, and predictable, the opposite of Petro’s chaos. Whatever you make of his politics, he is no lightweight.

The case for Abelardo de la Espriella

Let me make the genuine case for de la Espriella, as I see it.

He promises to be tough on crime — on the organized armed groups and on ordinary street crime alike. After four years in which armed groups roughly doubled in size under Total Peace, many Colombians are hungry for exactly that, and I understand why. He is pro-business and pro-investment, foreign and domestic, and he has built his whole pitch on the idea that prosperity comes from the private sector rather than the state. He is pro-US and promises to repair the relationship with Washington that frayed under Petro; he is, in fact, a US citizen himself, which tells you which direction he faces.

On the economy, I think he would restore investor confidence and likely work to repair Colombia’s diminished credit rating, which matters enormously for what the country pays to borrow. He supports lower taxes, which is a good thing when paired with genuine fiscal prudence — that is the caveat, but the instinct is right.

The strongest item on his ticket, for me, is his running mate, José Manuel Restrepo. Restrepo served as both Minister of Commerce and Finance Minister in Iván Duque’s cabinet and did the job well, even when Duque did not. He has few critics and brings a level of intellectual seriousness and economic credibility that the top of the ticket does not project on its own. A credible technocrat one heartbeat from the presidency is a real asset.

He wants to shrink the bureaucracy. Colombia’s is not as bloated as some in Latin America, but it can be streamlined — and the bigger problem than handing out sinecures is mermelada, the practice of spreading money through useless government contracts to friends and supporters. If he genuinely goes after that, good. He is also plainly intelligent; a successful defense attorney knows jurisprudence and procedure cold.

Two of his ideas deserve particular credit. He says he wants to promote home ownership for people of modest means, and El País reports a plan for below-market thirty-year mortgages. If that is real and it works, it is a genuinely good idea. The Peruvian author Hernando de Soto, in The Mystery of Capital, explains how broad asset ownership by ordinary people is what formalizes an economy and drives real progress: when you own assets, you can extract value from them, pass them to your descendants, and build lasting wealth. And on health care, he promises to fix the EPS system with financial oversight to root out corruption, rather than blow it up. That is far better than moving to a single-payer government scheme, which I think would be disastrous. The state has not shown the organizational competence to run one. Consider that Petro placed Daniel Quintero, the indicted former mayor of Medellín, in a role overseeing the EPS — and Quintero is accused of looting the city’s coffers. A couple of insolvent EPS providers is a manageable problem; a national government that cannot pay providers and collapses the whole system is not. Patching beats nationalizing.

He supports performance evaluations for teachers, which is reasonable even if FECODE will oppose it, and he wants to expand internet connectivity into rural and underserved regions, which is critical in a country with such a wide gap between rural and urban, rich and poor. Connectivity means opportunity. That is a real list — a coherent pro-growth, pro-security program. Now the other side.

The case against Abelardo de la Espriella

There is a lot here. Start with the Bukele worship. De la Espriella is an open admirer of El Salvador’s president, Nayib Bukele. Bukele has unquestionably cut crime, but he also shows clear authoritarian tendencies and no sign of willingly leaving power. More to the point, Bukele is no friend to a free press, and de la Espriella is notoriously thin-skinned: he uses the courts to file SLAPPs — Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation — designed to force critics to burn money and time on their defense. Even meritless, such suits can bankrupt a person or consume so much of their time they cannot do their job. This is not hypothetical. La Silla Vacía documented dozens of civil suits and criminal complaints against journalists, several of whom admit to censoring themselves. That should worry anyone who cares about press freedom.

He may also turn out to be soft on crime — especially organized crime — which sounds backwards for the “iron fist” candidate until you look at his career. He built it defending mobsters, paracos, and the corrupt: the Nule family, Álex Saab. He is childhood friends with the paramilitary chief Salvatore Mancuso. And he has been linked to a paramilitary known as “Boliche,” Jorge Luís Hernández Villazón, on trial in the United States for narcotrafficking. De la Espriella denies any connection with Boliche and says he knows him only through his work as a defense attorney. Fine — but it is a fair question how tough he will really be on his friends and former clients. That is not a cheap shot; it is a reasonable thing to want answered.

I also do not see a plan for the poor. I have looked, and I find nothing in his platform that signals a comprehensive plan — or much compassion — for the underprivileged and those without access to opportunity in the remote areas: the Pacific coast, the rural zones, the Atlantic coast. Perhaps one exists and I have missed it, but if so, where is it?

He seems inconsistent. This is a man who craves attention — a recording artist, a clothing line, a rum called “Defensor” — who then suddenly finds Jesus and becomes the “God and family” candidate. Maybe it is sincere. Forgive me for being skeptical of a conversion that lines up so neatly with a presidential run.

On the peace process, he has pledged not to implement the 2016 accords that won former President Juan Manuel Santos the Nobel Peace Prize. To be fair, the last two administrations did a poor job implementing them too. But my concern is simple: the people who genuinely laid down their arms need protection. You do not want to teach the next generation that demobilizing gets you killed. He also wants to end the Jurisdicción Especial de Paz, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, arguing it is a political tool that does not deliver real justice. I do not know the JEP well enough to rule on that flatly, but I am skeptical of the claim; my sense is that it is doing some genuine good and should be reformed rather than scrapped.

Colombia 2026 1st round top two (Graphic: Sofi Imfeld for Finance Colombia)

Then there is the absence of a track record. He has never held any office, so there is nothing to go on. Does he become a statesman or a caudillo wannabe? We do not know, and that uncertainty is itself a cost. Finally, the persona. His public identity strikes me as a bit of a gomelo — Colombian slang for a stuck-up rich kid. People often cultivate a public character that has little to do with who they really are, so perhaps the private Abelardo is a prince. But he is asking voters to choose the public one, and the public one rubs me the wrong way.

The case for Iván Cepeda

Now the honest case for Cepeda. He will very likely put real attention on the marginalized and the forgotten parts of the country, and the map backs this up: in the first round he carried the entire Pacific coast, the forested borders with Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil, and most of the Atlantic provinces — the exception being Antioquia, whose population concentrates far to the south around Medellín. Much of that Atlantic coast, outside Barranquilla and the touristy parts of Cartagena, has suffered generations of corruption and chronic underinvestment. Someone paying attention to those places is not a bad thing.

He is consistent and predictable. He has a long career and a coherent, stable ideology. I may disagree with that ideology — you will hear about it in the cons — but no one can call the man unpredictable. You know what you are getting, and in politics that is worth something.

He would try to actually implement Santos’s 2016 peace accords. The pact has real flaws and lacked genuine commitment from the current and previous administrations, but it did demobilize thousands of fighters who are no longer in the bush kidnapping and bombing people. Pushing to finish that work honestly has value.

And to be fair, he is clearly more competent than the ally currently in office. He is more intelligent and more disciplined than Gustavo Petro. Consider how Petro has governed: unable to push through much of his agenda, running the Casa de Nariño like a reality show, cycling more than sixty ministers through nineteen ministries in under four years. How do you accomplish anything while swapping in a new minister roughly every three weeks? I do not think a Cepeda administration would bring the same chaos and palace intrigue. And he would command the largest bloc of support in Congress, so he would be more effective at moving his agenda; he knows how the machinery works. Credit where it is due — he does not stand up in cabinet meetings inventing his own physics. That is a low bar, but Petro keeps walking under it and Cepeda clears it.

Finally, he has a real, lifelong commitment to the victims of violence in Colombia. Whatever else you say about him, that commitment is genuine and it is the through-line of his entire life. That counts.

The case against Iván Cepeda

Iván Cepeda is a senator, former member of the Communist Youth, educated in Bulgaria during the Soviet era, and key player in the negotiation with armed guerilla groups. (photo: Colombian Senate)

And there are many cons. The first is the mirror I opened with: he has shady friends too. He was close to the Chavista senator Piedad Córdoba. Just as de la Espriella calls his contacts with Boliche purely professional, Cepeda says his ties to the FARC commander Raúl Reyes were purely those of a peace negotiator. But Cepeda went further. When the FARC commander Jesús Santrich was locked up and ready to be extradited to the United States on drug-trafficking charges, Cepeda worked fiercely to get him released from the Fiscalía‘s Bunker. Once out, Santrich fled into Venezuela and restarted the Segunda Marquetalia, a FARC dissident network. And here is the part that lands like a gut punch a year later: that same Segunda Marquetalia is the group Colombian prosecutors have now linked to the assassination of presidential candidate and senator Miguel Uribe Turbay, who was shot in Bogotá in June 2025 and died that August. I want to be careful and fair — that is an attribution by the Fiscalía, and serious analysts at Insight Crime have noted the public evidence is thin, so it should not be treated as settled fact. But the chain — Cepeda helps free Santrich, Santrich restarts the Segunda Marquetalia, the Segunda Marquetalia is tied to a magnicidio — is a heavy thing to carry into a presidential race.

Second, he is soft on the guerrillas, broadly. He has a proven record of leniency toward the FARC, the ELN, and armed groups generally, and he is an architect of Petro’s failed Total Peace. Under that nurturing approach those groups have flourished, and I think they would keep flourishing under a Cepeda administration. He seems to see them more as victims of state violence than as the kidnappers, narcotraffickers, extortionists, and terrorists that they are. La Silla Vacía’s own reporting — and they are not a right-wing outlet — concluded that Cepeda bears real political responsibility for the failure of Total Peace, having pushed a negotiation model that was too ambitious, legally ambiguous, and weak before armed groups. When the violence comes from the state, Cepeda sees structure and systemic responsibility; when it comes from the guerrillas, he tends to see context and a chance for peace. That blind spot defines him.

Former 2022 presidential candidate Rodolfo Hernandez (photo: candidate’s website)

Third is his health and his running mate, which is delicate but real. Cepeda has had cancer twice. The late Rodolfo Hernández, who lost to Petro in 2022, died in 2024 of cancer after also having had liver and colon cancer, so the risk is not hypothetical. If Cepeda did not finish his term, Aida Quilcué would take over, and her career — as an indigenous Nasa leader, minga organizer, and senator — has centered on those issues rather than monetary policy, foreign affairs, or national security, which makes her approach to them a genuine unknown. People also doubted Francia Márquez, and she turned out to be the articulate, level-headed one beside Petro’s wilder talk, so I will say nothing against Quilcué as a person. But a possible succession to a medically fragile president is an inarguable risk, and it would be foolish to pretend otherwise.

Fourth, I cannot imagine investor confidence improving under a Cepeda presidency. A data point worth chewing on: the peso is currently strong. Part of that is the dollar’s broad global weakness, but part of it, in my read, is the market reacting to the strong polling of Cepeda’s opponent. Markets vote too, and they are nervous about the left.

Fifth, the father — and I want to be fair here. You cannot reliably judge a son by his father; my own father was a politician, and as an adult I spent most of my life in the party opposite his, with a great relationship and very different philosophies. So I will not convict Iván Cepeda for his father’s beliefs. The difference is that Cepeda does seem broadly aligned with them. His father was secretary general of the Colombian Communist Party, Iván studied in Soviet Bulgaria, and though he says he grew disillusioned with the hypocrisy of Soviet communism, he still appears committed to a far-left ideology. If that is your cup of tea, count it a plus; I have never been fond of Marx or Engels.

Sixth is crop substitution, and this one deserves a direct conversation. On paper it sounds marvelous: rather than spray coca with herbicides that wreck the environment and people’s health, offer farmers a legal alternative and a path out. If it worked the way it is drawn up, I would back it one hundred percent. The problem is the gap between the brochure and the dirt road — and that gap is built on a premise that simply is not true on the ground: the premise that the campesino is a free actor who chooses to grow coca and could, if persuaded, choose to grow something else.

In much of rural Colombia, the small farmer does not get to volunteer. Where the FARC dissidents and the ELN hold territory, the armed group tells the farmer he will cultivate coca, do the manual labor of harvesting it, and sell the leaf or paste to the group at a price the group sets — under penalty of death. Refuse, and the farmer is driven off his land or simply killed. This is not a lifestyle preference; it is coercion at gunpoint. The reporting bears out the broader pattern. Finance Colombia’s coverage, drawn from InSight Crime, documents how the power vacuum left by the FARC’s 2016 demobilization was filled by the ELN, the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces, and FARC dissidents fighting for control of coca zones, and how the state’s failure to deliver on substitution let armed groups fill the vacuum and tighten their grip. The human cost is staggering: after families signed substitution agreements, the murder rate of supportive social leaders rose by 546 percent, according to a study cited by InSight Crime, and only about 5 percent of the program’s 2023 budget was actually executed. You cannot ask a farmer to switch crops when the entity controlling his life and his land is not the government but a guerrilla faction that has already told him what he will plant.

That is why this is not a matter of asking farmers nicely to grow coffee or cacao. It is not their choice. Security has to come first. Crop substitution can only work where the state — not the guerrillas — holds the territory and can guarantee a farmer’s safety when he says no to coca. The armed groups must be displaced before substitution has any chance, and any candidate who treats substitution as a soft alternative to security has the sequence backwards. That is the simple truth of it, and it is the heart of my concern with the Total Peace approach Cepeda helped design.

Seventh, he wants to expand the state’s role across the board, including continuing Petro’s effort to take over the health sector. Before the pandemic, Colombia had one of the best reputations in the world for health-care quality. Is it unequal? Yes — care in an isolated hamlet does not match Cali or Medellín, and the south of Bogotá does not match the north. Then let the government build clinics and hospitals where they are missing. There is no reason to take over the parts of the private system that work in order to do that, unless one objects on ideology to doctors and dentists existing as small businesspeople. That is ideology, not health policy.

Eighth, if Cepeda wins he may well protect Daniel Quintero, the former mayor of Medellín under indictment on more than forty counts of corruption. That kind of debt-collection worries me. And ninth, the selective conscience. Cepeda is a former member of the Communist Youth — a plus if you are a communist, unsettling if you are not. The FARC and ELN are also communist groups; one wonders whether that is the root of his apparent sympathy. He casts himself as a human rights defender yet stays conspicuously silent on the abuses of the Chavista regime in Venezuela. La Silla Vacía documented this in detail: roughly a decade of avoiding criticism of Maduro’s repression, fraudulent elections, and alliances with Colombian guerrillas. Cepeda notices human rights violations committed by people he dislikes while exempting bad actors he is closer to, provided they are communist or socialist. The record on that is fairly clear.

So where does that leave us?

Two men. One built his life on being seen — a brilliant, theatrical defense lawyer for the powerful and the accused, now promising an iron fist while surrounding himself with at least one genuinely serious technocrat in José Manuel Restrepo. The other built his life on a single tragedy — a disciplined, consistent, ideologically committed man of the left who has fought for victims for thirty years, and who carries a blind spot the size of a guerrilla encampment.

Here is the paradox I cannot get past: the “tough on crime” candidate has spent his career defending criminals, and the “human rights” candidate stays silent on half the human rights abuses in his own backyard. Each is, in some way, the very thing he claims to oppose. This is not a runoff between an angel and a devil. It is a runoff between two men who each ask voters to trust that their inconvenient friendships were strictly professional.

I am uneasy about both candidacies, for very different reasons, and I am doing what I said I would: laying it out and handing it to the reader. For deeper background, see Finance Colombia’s earlier survey of how the leading candidates draw divergent maps for foreign capital, security, and the rule of law, its reporting on what is behind Colombia’s increased violence, and its account of the final push of the Total Peace policy. The runoff is Sunday, June 21, and the winner is inaugurated August 7.

The difference between the two candidates was 673,125 votes, equivalent to 2.84% of the total, a relatively narrow margin that points to a closely contested runoff in a highly polarized political environment.

For De la Espriella, the election marks an unprecedented moment in recent Colombian political history: it is the first time a far-right candidacy has reached a presidential runoff with a realistic chance of winning the presidency. For Cepeda, the race represents an opportunity to continue the political project launched by President Gustavo Petro, the first democratically elected left-wing president in Colombia’s history.

A system designed to limit presidential power

Colombia now finds itself divided between two political visions that appear difficult to reconcile. Regardless of who wins, the next administration is likely to face a period marked by political division, social mobilization and sustained confrontation, reflecting the concentration of support behind two ideologically opposed movements.

Beyond ideological differences, however, the key question for markets, institutions and the international community is how governability would function under either scenario.

Colombia operates under one of Latin America’s most stable institutional frameworks, built on a system of checks and balances among the executive, legislative and judicial branches. This structure has allowed for political alternation, regular elections and the absence of prolonged institutional breakdowns throughout the country’s contemporary history.

In that context, neither candidate has a clear path to implementing major structural reforms without building broad political agreements.

De la Espriella would begin with legislative disadvantages

De la Espriella enters the runoff as the frontrunner after winning the first round, but he faces a significant legislative constraint. His political movement, Salvación Nacional, secured only three seats in the Senate and one seat in the House of Representatives, a level of representation insufficient to pass major reforms without broad congressional coalitions.

Colombia’s Congress consists of 103 senators and 183 representatives. Depending on the type of legislation, bills require simple majorities, absolute majorities or, in the case of constitutional amendments, support equivalent to two-thirds of both chambers.

Given that reality, a De la Espriella administration would depend heavily on alliances with other political forces. His first major endorsement came from Centro Democrático, the party of former President Álvaro Uribe, which holds 46 congressional seats (17 in the Senate and 29 in the House).

He could also seek agreements with conservative parties such as the Conservative Party (29 seats), Cambio Radical (19) and the Party of La U (19).

Even so, legislative arithmetic suggests that each reform would require separate negotiations and continuous political bargaining, including with smaller parties, potentially increasing political costs for the executive branch, as has occurred under Petro’s administration.

Even so, legislative arithmetic suggests that each reform would require separate negotiations and continuous political bargaining, including with smaller parties, potentially increasing political costs for the executive branch, as has occurred under Petro’s administration.

De la Espriella remains far from the numbers needed to secure congressional majorities. As a result, he could seek to appeal directly to voters through referendums or popular consultations. However, such mechanisms involve lengthy procedures and have not always been successful because of participation thresholds and voting requirements.

Examples include former President Juan Manuel Santos’ 2016 peace plebiscite, which reached the participation threshold but was rejected by voters, the 2018 anti-corruption consultation, which failed to obtain enough votes to enact legislation, and former President Álvaro Uribe’s 2003 referendum proposal aimed at reducing the size of the state. For those reasons, this route appears difficult to pursue successfully.

Cepeda would have a broader legislative base

Cepeda’s situation would be different, though not necessarily easier, since he also lacks an outright congressional majority.

In fact, reaching the runoff already represents a significant achievement given that he finished second in the first round. A similar situation occurred in 2014, when Juan Manuel Santos overcame a first-round deficit through multiple political alliances and a campaign centered on national unity around the peace process.

Cepeda is backed by the Pacto Histórico coalition, which emerged as the largest political force in the new Congress with 64 seats across both chambers. Additional support could come from center-left groups such as Alianza por Colombia (20 seats), representatives elected through the Special Peace Constituencies (16 seats), and other smaller progressive parties.

Although that configuration would bring him closer to legislative majorities, it would still fall short of guaranteeing automatic approval of complex reforms.

Petro’s administration offers a useful precedent. Through temporary political agreements, it managed to pass several significant initiatives, including labor reform measures, peace-related policies and a tax reform package. However, it struggled to advance more ambitious projects, including healthcare reform, agrarian and land policies, and the consolidation of the Ministry of Equality.

Cepeda would also inherit part of the political burden associated with the current administration, particularly on issues related to security, public health and economic management.

Proposals such as a future constituent assembly, an initiative championed by Petro, have already generated opposition among political rivals and segments of the electorate, potentially creating additional challenges for a Cepeda administration.

Under either scenario, the next president will need an Interior Minister capable of navigating Congress and building multiple legislative agreements for each major policy initiative.

Colombia’s first-round presidential election, held Sunday, May 31, 2026, produced a result that crystallizes the country’s political exhaustion with both the governing left and the traditional right. Criminal defense attorney and political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella placed first with more than 10.3 million votes. Leftist Senator Iván Cepeda, a close ally of outgoing President Gustavo Petro and the lead architect of the administration’s Paz Total peace policy, finished second with just under 9.7 million votes. The two will face each other in a runoff election on June 21.

Senator Paloma Valencia, the candidate backed by former President Álvaro Uribe and the standard-bearer of his Uribismo movement, placed a distant third, receiving less than 7% of the vote — fewer than 1.7 million ballots. Former Medellín mayor and Antioquia governor Sergio Fajardo received just over one million votes, while former Bogotá mayor Claudia López finished below 1%, with approximately 225,000 votes. The remaining minor candidates combined for just over 1% of the total.

Under Colombia’s electoral system, the top two finishers advance to a runoff if no candidate surpasses 50% in the first round. The June 21 vote will determine who assumes the presidency on August 7.

Click above to watch the video!

The Candidates: Background and Context

Abelardo de la Espriella, 47, has never held elected office. He built a national profile over more than two decades as a high-profile defense attorney, founding De La Espriella Lawyers in 2002, with offices in Colombia and the United States. His client roster has included controversial figures: he represented Alex Saab, a Colombian-born businessman who became a close associate of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and was implicated in a scheme to launder proceeds from Venezuela’s food-assistance program, the Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción (CLAP). Saab was extradited to the United States, convicted, and later granted clemency before being re-arrested in Venezuela in early 2026. De la Espriella also represented members of the Nule family in connection with the Carrusel de Contratos — a major contracting scandal tied to infrastructure works at Bogotá’s El Dorado airport corridor. He has additionally been reported to have represented individuals linked to organized crime.

De la Espriella has drawn comparisons to figures such as US President Donald Trump and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. His campaign has centered on hard-line security policy, including proposals for large-scale incarceration, expanded military operations against armed groups, and the rejection of negotiations with guerrilla organizations. He is reported to hold Italian and US citizenship in addition to his Colombian nationality, and is said to own property in Florida.

In a notable departure from his defense work, de la Espriella took the side of a victim in a high-profile acid-attack case, acting as a private prosecutor to secure a stronger sentence for the perpetrator — an episode that raised his public profile beyond the defense bar.

Iván Cepeda, 63, enters the runoff as the consolidated candidate of the Colombian left and Petro’s Pacto Histórico coalition. He is the primary legislative architect of Paz Total, the Petro administration’s policy of negotiating simultaneously with multiple armed actors, including the ELN and FARC dissident factions. Cepeda’s family background includes deep ties to the Colombian left: his father was secretary general of the Communist Party, and was assassinated. Cepeda himself studied in communist Bulgaria during the soviet era. The two finalists have an established legal and political history: Uribe attempted to bring criminal charges against Cepeda while both served in the Senate, but the Supreme Court determined that Uribe had fabricated the accusations and attempted to bribe witnesses — a case that resulted in Uribe’s criminal conviction.

“If nothing changes, Abelardo wins.” — Loren Moss, Finance Colombia

The Electoral Map

The geographic distribution of the vote reflects deep regional divisions. Cepeda carried Bogotá, which has trended left for years, particularly in lower-income districts on the city’s south and west sides. Antioquia — historically the heartland of Uribismo and home to Medellín, the country’s second-largest city — voted more than two to one for de la Espriella, a result that signals the weakening grip of Uribe’s movement even in its traditional stronghold.

The heart of coffee-growing country — the departments of Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío also went to de la Espriella. Caquetá, a sparsely populated department in southern Colombia that has suffered sustained guerrilla violence from both the ELN and FARC dissident groups, voted for de la Espriella as well, a result we may interpret as a direct rejection of Petro and Cepeda’s Paz Total.

Cepeda carried Colombia’s Pacific coast, including the chronically neglected department of Chocó, as well as the sparsely populated Amazonas and Putumayo departments bordering Peru and Brazil, and the northern Caribbean coast. The Caribbean coast result is notable, as the region has historically suffered from underdevelopment, infrastructure deficits, and significant income inequality. Norte de Santander with its Catatumbo region on the Venezuelan border and experiencing severe armed-group activity — voted for de la Espriella, a result consistent with public exhaustion over security policy.

The Political Context: From Uribe to Petro and Beyond

Colombia’s current political trajectory is rooted in decisions made across the past two decades. President Uribe served two terms in the early 2000s and, together with then-Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, mounted a sustained military campaign against the FARC that significantly weakened the insurgency. Santos later broke from Uribe after assuming the presidency, governing independently and ultimately negotiating a peace agreement with the FARC — a deal that Uribe actively opposed. A plebiscite on the accord failed, but Santos used legislative maneuvering to implement it anyway.

Colombia 2026 1st round top two (Graphic: Sofi Imfeld for Finance Colombia)

Uribe’s next handpicked candidate, Iván Duque, won the 2018 election but finished his term with approximately 30% approval. Members of his own party publicly distanced themselves from him — Senator María Fernanda Cabal, a staunch Uribista, called Duque a “mamerto” (leftist idiot) while he was still in office. Under his administration, indicators on crime and guerrilla activity worsened, and armed groups including the ELN rebuilt operational capacity that had been degraded under Uribe and Santos.

Petro’s administration has not met initial fears of a Venezuelan-style democratic breakdown: Congress has largely blocked the most radical components of his agenda, including attempts to nationalize the private pension system and convert the healthcare system to a single-payer model. However, crime has increased, armed groups have expanded their operational footprints, and the security situation in several regions has worsened. Paz Total is widely seen as having produced few tangible results.

Uribe himself was convicted of witness tampering and attempted bribery in the case he had brought against Cepeda. Though released from house arrest after conviction, the judges who authorized his release are now reportedly under investigation for judicial corruption. Valencia’s poor performance in the first round — despite being Uribe’s chosen standard-bearer — suggests that Uribismo as a political force is waning, with its core constituency aging and new generations of voters disengaged from the Uribe legacy.

What to Expect Before June 21

Both campaigns will intensify mobilization efforts over the coming three weeks. Cepeda’s movement — Colombia Humana and the broader Pacto Histórico coalition — has historically relied on organized mobilizations, including indigenous community-led mingas, labor unions, and allied social movements. Cepeda’s running mate Senator Aida Quilcué is an indigenous activist, a choice expected to energize those constituencies. FECODE, the Federación Colombiana de Trabajadores de la Educación (Colombia’s main teachers’ federation), is expected to align officially with Cepeda, though individual teachers may not follow union leadership in their voting choices.

On the right, Paloma Valencia issued a public endorsement of de la Espriella immediately following the first-round results. Business community organizations, including ANDI (the Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia) and Fenalco (the Federación Nacional de Comerciantes), do not formally endorse candidates, but their members are widely understood to favor a government that supports private enterprise and market-oriented policy. De la Espriella holds no congressional constituency, meaning whichever candidate wins will face the same dynamic Petro encountered: a fragmented Congress that is likely to act as a check on executive authority.

The question of centrist voter alignment remains open. Fajardo and López are not expected to formally endorse either finalist, and the direction of their combined approximately 1.2 million votes is uncertain.

Winners and Losers by Sector

For international investors and executives operating in Colombia, the policy differences between the two candidates are substantive across several key sectors.

Petroleum and Natural Gas: De la Espriella has stated unequivocally that he will restart petroleum exploration and licensing, which the Petro administration blocked. Ecopetrol S.A. (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL), Colombia’s state-controlled oil company, which also holds producing assets in the US Permian Basin and Gulf of Mexico, has operated under a government that halted new drilling permits. The consequences have included a decline in future production capacity at a time when global oil prices have risen due to Middle East tensions. Colombia has been forced to import natural gas at elevated prices to meet existing domestic demand — including from transportation fleets that were converted to natural gas under government incentive programs. Cepeda would be expected to continue or deepen current restrictions on fossil fuel expansion.

Healthcare: The Petro-Cepeda platform favors a government single-payer model. The administration has already taken over several Entidades Promotoras de Salud (EPS) — Colombia’s managed-care intermediaries — placing the healthcare system in legal and financial uncertainty. Private clinics, hospitals, and physicians who wish to operate outside a government-controlled framework would benefit from a de la Espriella administration. Cepeda’s healthcare agenda would accelerate the shift toward government-managed care.

BPO, Tech, and Call Centers: The BPO sector — which provides large volumes of formal employment, particularly in Medellín, Bogotá, Cali, and Barranquilla — was significantly affected by Petro-era minimum wage increases of 16% and 23% in successive years. These increases created contract renegotiation pressures with international clients, some of whom have shifted or considered shifting operations to competing jurisdictions including Honduras, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Guatemala. At the CX Summit, the industry’s main annual event held in Cartagena, the son of Álvaro Uribe appeared as an invited keynote speaker — a gesture that could be interpreted within the industry as an implicit signal of political alignment. A de la Espriella government, with its orientation toward labor market deregulation and reduced regulatory burden, would be viewed more favorably by this sector. Current Colombian labor law prohibits part-time employment contracts and places significant restrictions on dual employment, making workforce flexibility difficult for businesses that operate outside traditional 40-hour weekly structures.

Mining: The Petro administration has been less aggressive toward mining than toward petroleum, but sector participants expect a more permissive regulatory environment under de la Espriella, and continued constraints under Cepeda.

Security and Tourism: Both candidates have stated support for tourism promotion, but the sector’s trajectory is more directly linked to security conditions. Under current policies, several regions that were accessible to domestic and international travelers several years ago have experienced increased armed-group activity, effectively closing them to tourism. A de la Espriella administration is expected to pursue a more aggressive military posture toward the ELN and FARC dissident factions; a Cepeda government would likely continue dialogue-first approaches. The outcome will directly affect which parts of Colombia’s territory remain accessible to investment and tourism.

Foreign Relations: A de la Espriella government is expected to restore a broadly cooperative relationship with the United States, which deteriorated under Petro following several high-profile diplomatic incidents. De la Espriella has expressed admiration for US President Donald Trump, and reports indicate he holds US citizenship and owns property in Florida. Relations with Ecuador, which have been strained by mutual tariff escalations between Petro and Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, would be expected to normalize. Relations with Venezuela under Cepeda would likely continue along the current allied trajectory, while a de la Espriella government would be expected to take a more critical posture toward Caracas. China and Russia would find a more receptive diplomatic environment under Cepeda, and a cooler one under de la Espriella.

The Poor and Informal Workers: Cepeda’s campaign argues that minimum wage increases and expanded state services benefit lower-income Colombians. Critics counter that elevated formal labor costs have pushed more employment into the informal sector — which currently accounts for approximately half the Colombian workforce — depriving those workers of pension contributions, health benefits, and job security. De la Espriella’s platform, which emphasizes business formation, security, and labor market deregulation, would be presented as generating more formal-sector job creation. The actual distributional effects of either approach remain contested.

The Outlook

Assuming current polling trends hold and Uribista voters consolidate behind de la Espriella as expected following Valencia’s endorsement, de la Espriella enters the runoff as the frontrunner. Cepeda’s path to victory depends on driving high turnout among his base, securing support from centrist voters who did not vote for either finalist in the first round, and potentially benefiting from any missteps by de la Espriella in the final three weeks of campaigning.

The first-round results produced no major electoral violence. The ELN announced a temporary halt to armed actions during the voting period. Authorities detained some individuals reportedly attempting to purchase votes in rural areas, but no large-scale incidents were recorded.

The incoming president will face a Congress with no natural majority aligned to the executive, a healthcare system in partial administrative disarray, a petroleum sector whose future production trajectory is in question, and regions where state presence remains contested by armed groups. The June 21 runoff will determine which vision — market-oriented restructuring or continuation of the Petro project — Colombia pursues for the next four years.

Colombia’s rejection rate is now comparable to China’s, which stood at 25.37% for the same period. Within South America, Colombia’s rate was exceeded only by Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador, each reporting denial rates above 35%. In contrast, Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil reported significantly lower refusal rates, ranging from approximately 5% to 15%.

The adjusted refusal rate accounts for multiple applications by the same individual and excludes cases where initial refusals were later overcome through additional documentation or appeals.

From Visa Waiver Talks to Rejection Spike

The current visa rejection rate stands in stark contrast to the diplomatic trajectory under former Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos. In 2014, Santos publicly stated that the United States had initiated a process to eliminate visa requirements for Colombian citizens traveling for tourism and short-term business. The announcement was made during a press conference in New York, where Santos said, “We are working with the US government to remove the visa requirement for Colombians.”

That process has since collapsed. No formal visa waiver agreement was reached, and under subsequent administrations, visa conditions have deteriorated significantly.

The increase in Colombia’s visa rejection rate coincides with a series of diplomatic incidents between Bogotá and Washington. In January 2025, Colombian President Gustavo Petro revoked authorization for US repatriation flights carrying deported Colombian nationals. The reversal came hours after Petro initially welcomed the flights via social media, only to later delete the post and issue a statement denying entry to the aircraft. Petro cited concerns over the treatment of deportees, stating, “The United States cannot treat Colombian migrants as criminals.”

The US government responded by suspending visa services at its embassy in Bogotá, effective January 27, 2025 until Petro backed down, which he did immediately. According to Finance Colombia, the suspension was part of a broader set of retaliatory measures announced by then-President Donald Trump, which included:

• 50% tariffs on Colombian exports.
• Visa revocations for government officials.
• Travel bans targeting Petro administration affiliates.
• Enhanced customs inspections of Colombian cargo and nationals.

The diplomatic rift drew criticism from Colombian regional leaders. Medellín Mayor Federico Gutiérrez and Antioquia Governor Andrés Julián Rendón publicly denounced Petro’s actions, warning of economic repercussions and calling for direct engagement with US counterparts.

In May 2024, the US imposed visa restrictions on executives of Colombian transportation companies accused of facilitating unauthorized migration by sea. The State Department stated that these companies “prey on vulnerable irregular migrants” and operate services “designed primarily to facilitate irregular migration to the United States.”

While the US government has not officially linked the rise in visa denials to these diplomatic and migration-related events, the timing and scale of the increase suggest that political tensions are influencing consular decisions.

Outlook

The elevated rejection rate could impact Colombian tourism, business travel, and bilateral cooperation. With visa services only recently reinstated following Petro’s capitulation to US demands, it remains unclear whether the rate will stabilize or continue to rise amid ongoing political volatility and economic uncertainty.

US Department of State. Photo credit: US Department of State/Facebook.

The tax reform ($4.5 billion USD) is due to be presented (dens of iniquity such as gambling, tobacco, alcohol, and the church are included) and will form an important component of the $149 billion USD total budget, albeit that the opposition is looking to trim it by over $10 billion USD, including the tax reform component. In short, the environment is hostile. The budget is seen as excessive by many, but of course, that depends on your political ideology. Those in government are looking to improve the lives of millions in Colombia who are the forgotten class, Orwell’s proletariat if you like, and that isn’t cheap. One problem, of course, is money; Colombia doesn’t have enough of it. The other is the March legislative elections, which means that the current congress is not going to vote for Christmas.

Taxes are an ongoing theme. Whilst they are set to hit a record collection of $70 billion USD, up 15% YoY, that is still almost $5 billion USD below the budget, and therein lies the problem. The DIAN is still working on thousands of overdue payments, and we are already discussing the 2026 reform. For those wondering why Gustavo Petro is undertaking a second tax reform, both Iván Duque and Juan Manuel Santos did the same.

For those at the back who are still wondering why, the Colombian tax system is broken. It doesn’t work, is open to abuse, is unfair, and invites evasion, especially by the elite.

Asobancaria was upstanding this week and also discussed the deficit issues, but they also emphasized four positive aspects of the economy. Lower inflation, which hits 4%, will trigger lower rates. Higher confidence—this week, Fedesarrollo reported improved industrial and retail levels for July to accompany the already reported consumer data. Lower unemployment and gradually improving investment levels.

Finally, are we seeing an oil romance? Canacol Energy Ltd has been the last Canadian standing for many a year; few understand why it wasn’t snapped up much earlier, given its natural gas assets. But the press is reporting that Ecopetrol is flirting with Canacol, whose stock price erupted on Thursday – whether it is a JV or equity purchase, I hope my old chum Charles drives a fearsome bargain after so many years supporting Colombia.

Have a wonderful Friday.

My regards.

Roops.

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Capitolio Nacional (Photo: Oficina de Información y Prensa Cámara de Representantes)

The initiative’s blockage caused outrage among Petro, his supporters, such as his Minister of The Interior, Armando Benedetti, some labor unions and segments of the public, but also relief among much of his political opposition, almost all of the organized business community, and even many activists and academics who claim that the initiative would worsen Colombia’s serious problem of informal employment.

According to Bogotá think-tank, Instituto de Ciencia Politica Hernán Echavarría Olózaga, the initiative “imposes formalization requirements that hinder microbusinesses and small enterprise access to the formal market, perpetuation of labor informality, already at 55.2%,” according to government statistics, while the elimination of “temporary and seasonal contracts limits the ability of sectors such as construction and services to adapt to market needs.”

Petro’s failed labor reform would have among other new rules, demanded paid time off for women experiencing menstruation.

“We urge the Senate to rethink the structural elements of the Labor Reform to take into account the disincentives to formalization, transaction costs, and citizens’ freedom to participate in the labor market. The debate must take into account that the business community is made up of more than 93% MSMEs, as well as the economic reality the country is experiencing due to political decisions. The true precariousness of employment is condemning people to informality,” added Carlos Augusto Chacón, executive director of the think tank.

Petro & Comrades Left Outraged

While many were breathing a sigh of relief, Petro and his political team were left fuming. Minister of the Interior and Petro’s primary political fixer Armando Benedetti accused the Senate President Efraín Cépeda of fraud, and threatened criminal charges, repeatedly calling him and others who disagreed with the president “malandrines” (scoundrels).

La ira es súper dañina para la presión arteriaaajajajajajajaja pic.twitter.com/qOlzodZYGy

— Miller Soto (@millersoto) May 14, 2025

“The elections were stolen, there was fraud, and they completely damaged everything related to labor rights for the working class. Poor workers. Here in this country, people don’t have a decent salary or decent jobs because of the congressmen. I think they have to appeal and see what happens in the Senate of the Republic because there was fraud there, there was an appeal, and they have to vote again,” said Benedetti in a hallway after leaving the senate chamber where he lost his composure, grabbing papers from others and pounding his fists on the bench.

Petro, who spent the last week in China committing Colombia to the country’s “Belt and Road” initiative, also denounced the senate, accusing them for fraud, apparently for voting against his wishes. After doing so two weeks ago, he called on his supporters to take to the streets On Twitter/X he said:

The referendum didn’t fail. It was scuttled by fraud, as on April 19, 1970. Senator Efrain Cepeda, knowing that the votes that gave him a majority were coming in, closed the voting process. We are facing fraud, and the people must decide. I immediately propose a meeting of the labor unions, the peasant coordination, the community action boards, the neighborhood youth committees, and the indigenous movement to take the next step. The order as president of the Republic of Colombia is that, at this time, the public forces must not use their force against the people. Their presence must be sufficient to protect the buildings of the institutions and guarantee peaceful coexistence among the citizens. Preserve peace and joy. Now it is up to the coordination of the popular movement to take the next steps, in accordance with the Constitution. The people cannot be silenced by deception. I am ready for whatever the people decide. Efraín Cepeda made the worst mistake that could possibly be made in Colombia: using fraud.

No se hundió la consulta popular. La hundieron con fraude, como en un 19 de abril de 1970.

El senador Efrain Cepeda sabedor que ingresaban los votos que la hacían mayoría, cerró la votación.

Estamos ante un fraude y el pueblo debe decidir.

Peopongo de inmediato la reunión de… https://t.co/oA1iwd3TbC

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) May 14, 2025

Former Finance Ministers Applaud The Senate

Former Finance Minister under the centrist Juan Manuel Santos administration, Mauricio Cárdenas said that he “Celebrates the Senate’s decision to say ‘no’ to the referendum. It’s the responsible decision; the Senate did a great job.”

Cárdenas also said that holding Petro’s referendum meant “throwing 750 billion pesos into the trash (cost of holding the referendum) when the country needs them to support young students who have had their Icetex loan subsidies cut off.” Icetex is a student loan program in Colombia that under Petro’s administration, despite his campaign promise of making university affordable or free, is facing a funding crisis and cannot meet student loan obligations, cutting off access to attendance.

Former Finance Minister José Manuel Restrepo also admonished Petro for his polemic statements this afternoon, saying “don’t put democracy at risk, and instead respect the institutions and their decisions. That is acting like a true democrat and a symbol of national unity.”

The Changes Petro’s Labor Reform Would Have Demanded

The key provisions of Petro’s labor reform are the following, with light analysis added by Finance Colombia. Colombia already has a somewhat restrictive labor regime, making formal employment very expensive, and keeping millions stuck in informal employment. For example, part-time and hourly employment is forbidden by law in most cases in Colombia, so a university student could not—formally, at least—work his or her way through college by working the dinner shift as a waiter. Colombian law currently requires employers to buy clothing for workers under a certain income threshold (double minimum wage), even if there is no dress requirement. This is a relic from the time when most workers were either agricultural or industrial. President Gustavo Petro’s referendum proposes the following:

1. Limit the normal workday to 8 hours between 6am and 6pm only.
2. Double pay for work on Sunday and holidays.
3. Preferential rates and incentives for micro, small and medium businesses, no details on what these rates or incentives may be, or who qualifies.
4. In addition to medical leave already covered by law, female workers would be given paid time off for menstrual periods.
5. 2 of every100 employees must be disabled, apparently with no exception for high risk, high agility jobs such as construction, agriculture. or mining.
6. Mandatory employment for college and trade school interns – obligation on the employer, not the students.
7. Mandatory social security and health coverage for delivery freelancers, such as ÜberEats, Rappi, DiDI, InDrive, etc.
8. A new labor regulatory regime for agricultural workers, no details given.
9. Eliminating outsourcing via union contracts that violate existing, or these new regimens.
10. Eliminate freelance or contractual employment for athletes, journalists, drivers, domestic workers, and babysitters – for example, the common practice of hiring freelance journalists, or paying athletes for participating in a competition would be forbidden. They must become traditional, long-term employees, as temporary contracts appear to be forbidden under the next provision:
11. Indefinite (open-ended) contracts would become the rule, so no temporary, or term contracts, such as to finish a construction project, or harvest seasonal agriculture.
12. Creation of an additional pension fund, beyond the existing, mandatory government pension scheme, for agricultural workers.
    

    Official government pamphlet promoting the referendum, with its twelve proposals.

The discoveries made in the region in 2017 represented, at the time, some of the country’s most promising natural gas discoveries. Former president Juan Manuel Santos and Juan Carlos Echeverry, president of Ecopetrol (Colombian state-controlled petroleum company and Shell’s partner in this venture), made the announcement and labeled them the most significant gas finds in nearly three decades, with early estimates pointing to more than 3 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas, exceeding the country’s proven reserves at the time.

However, enthusiasm faded due to logistical and economic hurdles. Transporting the gas from deep water wells to shore requires costly infrastructure, including a long-distance undersea pipeline and onshore processing facilities. Industry sources referred by the Latin-American news website Infobae pointed out that the scale of investment needed does not justify the currently confirmed volume of gas. Bureaucratic procedures and insecurity were other reasons that could have led to the decision.

Ecopetrol has confirmed in a press release in response to Shell’s decision that despite this setback, they are working on a plan to ensure the continuity of these projects without the British company’s investment. The company also confirmed it is actively seeking options to connect future production and distribution of gas to Colombia’s National Transportation System.

Adding to the realignment, Shell is also considering selling other Colombian assets, including its stake in the offshore block COL-3, co-owned with Noble Energy (now part of Chevron). While Shell will retain its fuel distribution and lubricant businesses in Colombia, the move marks a broader retreat from exploration and production operations in the country.

Shell’s departure is not an isolated case. Over the past five years, other major oil and gas companies—Chevron, Repsol, ConocoPhillips, Cepsa, and ExxonMobil—have either scaled back or exited their exploration or production operations with oil or gas in Colombia. Many of these exits were linked to regulatory uncertainty, challenges in project viability, and shifting corporate priorities toward lower-risk or more profitable regions.

Reactions have been swift. According to La República, over the last decade Colombia had an almost 50% decrease in gas production: while there were 329 contracts in 2015 that yielded a production of 5,048 million cubic feet per day, between January and February, by the same period in 2025, the number of contracts had dropped to 277, with a production of 2,608.1 million cubic feet per day; as per data from the National Hydrocarbons Agency.

“That a company as important as Shell is withdrawing from Colombia’s offshore gas activities; that foreign investment in hydrocarbons has fallen 30% in the last year; that the development of the Sirius project (the most promising ever found offshore) is subject to the absurd requirement of 116 prior consultations before its gas molecules can reach land; that domestic gas production has fallen to its lowest level in 10 years; that 130 exploratory wells were drilled in 2012, while only 27 will be drilled in 2024…. None of this is a coincidence; it is the result of a deliberate policy by the Petro administration to end the country’s gas self-sufficiency, which we Colombians have already begun to pay for with expensive imports,” Juan Camilo Restrepo, Former Deputy Finance Minister, stated on X.

However, optimism still remains for the Sirius project—an initiative led by Petrobras and Ecopetrol in the same region. Discovered in 2024, Sirius is touted as the most promising gas find in Colombia’s deepwater history, with production expected to begin in 2029. Industry analysts now view Sirius as the country’s best bet for restoring long-term energy self-sufficiency, even if its development has not been without its hurdles.

Photo: Colombian Attorney General Francisco Barbosa Delgado speaks to the press after the resolution was announced. (Credit: Fiscalía)

According to the US Department of Justice (DOJ), which announced the resolution of the charges earlier this month, Corficolombiana “conspired” with disgraced Brazilian construction giant Odebrecht to make illicit payments of more than $23 million USD to win favor with Colombian officials involved in the Ruta del Sol 2 highway project.

Specifically, between 2012 and 2015, the two firms were attempting to win a contract to build a 328-mile stretch of this major roadway that would be built in the northeast department of Norte de Santander, revealed the US investigators.

Resolving the Odebrecht Investigation

In resolving the investigation, the financial group acknowledged, as a whole, having carried out illicit actions in conjunction with Odebrecht, and Corficolombiana agreed to withdraw its appeals against charges from Colombia’s Superintendence of Industry and Commerce (SIC). It also committed to continue collaborating with both US and Colombian authorities for the next three years in their fight against corruption and economic malpractices.  

Additionally, the DOJ agreed to substantially reduce the initial fine of $40 million USD that had previously been sought, per reports.

Grupo Aval released a press statement highlighting that it was not the subject of the US DOJ charges, nor accusations from the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), while noting that the resolution focused on “actions taken by a former Corficolombiana executive” and that both it and Corficolombiana have been working to improve controls since the revelation.

“The DOJ and SEC recognized Corficolombiana’s and Grupo Aval’s extensive cooperation with the investigations and that, in the many years since the events occurred, Corficolombiana and Grupo Aval have enhanced their compliance programs and internal controls,” stated Grupo Aval.

It added that, “Corficolombiana and Grupo Aval consider this painful chapter closed, insisting on their commitment to the highest ethical standards and the continuous strengthening of their control environment.”

The Rotten Tentacles of Odebrecht Spread Wider

On the heels of the Grupo Aval settlement, Colombian Attorney General Francisco Barbosa announced from Washington that Luis Fernando Andrade, former head of the National Infrastructure Agency (ANI), had been indicted, along with 33 past and present government officials plus dozens more individuals, for their role in the Odebrecht scandal.

These two major developments represent just the latest in a near-decade-long scandal that has rocked the entire hemisphere.

Since its illicit activities came to light last decade, the scope and reach of Odebrecht’s corruption has only continued to be uncovered. The Brazil-based conglomerate, which has arms in sectors from construction and infrastructure to real estate and transportation, paid some $788 million USD in kickbacks for more than 100 public construction projects in 11 Latin American countries, as well as in Angola and Mozambique in Africa, according to official figures compiled by German outlet Deutsche Welle.

The enormity and duration of the scandal has only exacerbated the entire region’s outrage against corruption, which costs Latin America around $140 billion USD each year — or some 3% of regional gross domestic product (GDP) — according to Global Financial Integrity, a specialized consulting firm.

The Ongoing Political Fallout in Colombia

Beyond the national anger toward corporate sector corruption, in Colombia, Odebrecht illegal activities have stained some of the highest-ranking politicians, including the 2014 campaigns of both former President Juan Manuel Santos and the candidate he defeated, Óscar Iván Zuluaga, who currently faces criminal charges before the court.

Despite Santos not being implicated by the House of Representatives’ accusation committee, by a vote of six to three, the Procuraduría recently disqualified Roberto Prieto, the manager of his 2014 campaign, from holding office or contracting with the state for 12 years due to charges that he submitted false reports to the National Electoral Council (CNE) about contributions from the Brazilian multinational Odebrecht.

The attorney general also last month indicted former Zuluaga, the hand-picked candidate of powerful former President Álvaro Uribe, for falsifying a private document, procedural fraud, and illicit enrichment of individuals.

While former attorney general Nestor Humberto Martínez has not faced justice, his reputation has been greatly stained as then-head of the nation’s prosecution arm — in addition to his former ties to Grupo Aval. In response to the recent settlement announcement, Colombian President Gustavo Petro publicly chastised his political rival Martínez and described his ties with the Grupo Aval as an “incestuous relationship” that in the end “prevented a transparent trial in the case and the discovery of those bribed, who are currently senior political leaders.”

• Colombian Air Force training crash leaves one dead, Lieutenant Colonel Mario Andrés Espinosa Gonzales. An investigation is underway.
• After being cashiered by President Petro, his former campaign manager and Ambassador to Venezuela Armando Benedetti returns to his post, despite the ongoing scandal involving him and former Chief of Staff Laura Sanabria. For background, see this article: https://www.financecolombia.com/fast-moving-colombian-scandal-may-threaten-the-presidency-of-gustavo-petro/
• Colombian prosecutors are charging former campaign aspirant and Alvaro Uribe acolyte Ivan Zuluaga and his son with receiving over $1.6 million USD in illegal campaign money from Odebrecht. The Brazilian Lava Hato scandal continues to ensnare culprits throughout The Americas even years after it launched. For more details see this article: https://www.financecolombia.com/oscar-zuluaga-charged-with-fraud-in-campaign-finance-fallout-from-odebrecht-scandal/ and for background on when the Odebrecht scandal reached the campaign of former President Juan Manuel Santos who defeated Zuluaga, see https://www.financecolombia.com/colombian-president-santos-apologizes-for-odebrecht-campaign-fund/

Moment Colombian Air Force Super Tucano suffers fatal incident (video may be disturbing):

Momento exacto en el que dos aeronaves colisionan mientras realizaban un entrenamiento en ejercicio en Villavicencio pic.twitter.com/L8Q6FOLns6

— Mely Múnera (@MelyMunera) July 1, 2023