Gutiérrez’s communication highlights a public event held on June 21, 2025, in Medellín titled “A Pact for the Urban Peace of Medellín,” which was promoted by the Presidency of the Republic of Colombia. During the event, nine individuals identified as leaders of criminal organizations were brought onto a stage and presented as “peace spokespersons.”

The mayor’s letter notes that these individuals have firm convictions for various crimes, including homicide, narcotics trafficking, forced disappearance, and extortion. Among those present were Juan Carlos Mesa Vallejo, alias “Tom,” and Freyner Alfonso Ramírez García, alias “Pesebré,” both of whom are on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List maintained by the US Department of the Treasury‘s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).

Mi carta al FBI, DEA, Departamento de Estado de los Estados Unidos 🇺🇸 y Embajada 🇺🇸 sobre el “Tarimazo” de Petro en Medellín con los peores criminales. Algunos de ellos en el radar de los Estados Unidos por tráfico de drogas. Son 7 páginas. Adjunto 4. pic.twitter.com/K0ToeAFh6r

— Fico Gutiérrez (@FicoGutierrez) September 25, 2025

The letter also states that the release of these individuals from the Itagüí prison was not authorized by a judge. It further alleges that the release was requested by Senator Isabel Cristina Zuleta López of the Pacto Histórico political coalition. Senator Zuleta defended her actions in a statement to W Radio, asserting that it was “inexplicable” not to include the leaders of the criminal structures in a public dialogue about urban peace, as they had been recognized by the president for such talks.

Criminal Structures and Transnational Ties

The letter details the history of criminal organizations in Medellín, from the Medellín Cartel of the 1980s to modern-day groups. It names several prominent organized crime groups (G.D.O.s), including “El Mesa,” “Los Chatas,” “Pachelly,” and “La Terraza,” stating that they continue to operate international narcotics trafficking networks.
Gutiérrez’s letter alleges that these Colombian criminal structures have alliances with international organizations such as the Tren de Aragua, Cártel de Jalisco Nueva Generación, the Sinaloa Cartel (OTCMKTS: SRBAL), and the Albanian Mafia, among others.

Information Leak at the Attorney General’s Office

In his letter, Gutiérrez also raised concerns about alleged irregularities within the Colombian Attorney General’s Office. He claims that an investigation into Juan Pablo Taborda Samora, alias “Yordi,” and Daniel Muñoz Olaya, the son of criminal leader José Leonardo Muñoz Martínez, alias “Douglas,” was compromised. According to the letter, information regarding an impending arrest operation against Daniel Muñoz was allegedly leaked, preventing his capture. This alleged leak informed “Douglas” of the ongoing investigation against his son, allowing them to evade authorities.

Click on images to enlarge and view originals:

Letter from Mayor Federico Gutierrez to the US Government

The mayor states that there are 7 total pages, but he published only these four above, which appear to be redacted.

Page 1

Seal of the Mayor’s Office of Medellín

Mayor’s Office of Medellín District of Science, Technology, and Innovation

Medellín, July 02, 2025.

Respected

United States Department of State, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), US Embassy Bogotá.

Subject: Submission of relevant information regarding the critical security situation and transnational criminality in Medellín, Colombia.

I, Federico Gutiérrez Zuluaga, in my capacity as Mayor of the Special District of Science, Technology, and Innovation of Medellín, identified with NIT 890.905.211-1, respectfully address you to express profound institutional concern over recent events that, stemming from the national policy of the current Colombian Government, are allegedly favoring, directly and indirectly, criminal structures that have historically affected the security of both our city and that of its international allies, among them, the United States of America.

As is widely known by the international community, Medellín has a complex history linked to organized crime. Indeed, from the 1980s, when the Medellín Cartel dominated the global drug trade, to the present day, the city has been a strategic hub for transnational criminal activities. The criminal structures that mutated from a centralized model to fragmented yet interconnected networks, such as the self-styled “Oficina de Envigado” and the current Organized Crime Groups (hereinafter G.D.O.) and Organized Common Crime Groups (hereinafter G.D.C.O.), maintain a very high criminal capacity with international reach.

Today, the 10 G.D.O.s present in Medellín and the Aburrá Valley—among them “El Mesa,” “Los Chatas,” “Pachelly,” “La Terraza,” “Robledo,” and “La Sierra”—and G.D.C.O.s such as “San Pablo” and “La Oficina del Doce,” continue to operate international narcotics trafficking networks with destinations primarily in North America and Europe. These structures maintain active alliances with cartels such as the “Tren de Aragua”, “CJNG”, “Sinaloa Cartel”, “Albanian Mafia”, “Choneros”, “Lobos”, “Cartel de los Soles”, “Maras Salvatruchas”, “Ndrangheta”, “Camorra”, among others, which demonstrates the internationalization of their criminal activities.

Despite this grave and evident reality, the current National Government of Colombia, led by President Gustavo Petro Urrego, has promoted a policy that, under the discourse of “Total Peace,” has publicly legitimized criminal leaders with serious judicial records, many of whom are apparently still active in drug trafficking, exploitation of minors and adolescents, arms trafficking, human trafficking, and other illegal revenues of transnational interest.

Thus, on this past June 21, 2025, during the public event called “A Pact for the Urban Peace of Medellín,” which was promoted by the Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, nine (09) of the top leaders of these structures¹, among them individuals included on the OFAC (Office of Foreign Assets Control) List such as Juan Carlos Mesa Vallejo (alias “Tom”) and Freyner Alfonso Ramírez García (alias “Pesebré”), were displayed on stage as “peace spokespersons,” despite having firm convictions for atrocious crimes (such as homicide, narcotics trafficking, use of minors for the commission of crimes, forced disappearance, extortionate kidnapping, extortion, and criminal conspiracy, among other crimes of extreme gravity) and even though, apparently, they continue to control their criminal structures from the penitentiary center where they are imprisoned (particularly, in the Itagüí prison – Antioquia). This event was also attended by the Minister of Justice and Law (Eduardo Montealegre Lynett), the Minister of the Interior (Armando Alberto Benedetti Villaneda), the Minister of National Education (José Daniel Rojas Medellín), the Minister of Labor (Antonio Sanguino Páez), the Minister of Mines and Energy (Edwin Palma Egea), the Minister of Cultures, Arts and Knowledge of Colombia (Yannai Kadamani Fonrodona), Senators of the Republic Isabel Cristina Zuleta López and León Fredy Muñoz Lopera, Representatives to the Chamber for Antioquia Alex Xavier Flórez Hernández and Pedro Baracutao García Ospina, the Representative to the Chamber for Valle del Cauca Alfredo Mondragón Garzón, and the former mayor of Medellín, now charged by the Office of the Attorney General of the Nation for alleged acts of corruption, Daniel Quintero Calle, among others.

Now, this public act signified a grave institutional violation. This, since it was an act of re-victimization for the people affected by these criminal groups, who have seen their victimizers legitimized in a political setting, without authorization from a Judge of the Republic to leave their place of imprisonment, even though they all currently have a final conviction (and it is being served). Likewise, the departure from the prison was supported by a request from the Historic Pact senator, Isabel Zuleta Cristina Zuleta López.

The foregoing raises serious questions about the separation of powers, due process, and the principle of equality before the law, given that, under the current legal framework, there is no legal basis for reaching an agreement with criminal structures, which does not amount to a submission to justice.

Furthermore, the foregoing occurred in a complex context, not only local but also national. This is because there have apparently been undue leaks of sensitive information and possible undue pressure in high-impact processes, namely:

In events surrounding recent procedural actions carried out by the Attorney General’s Office in the country against members of the G.D.O. “La Terraza,” among them Mr. Juan Pablo Taborda Samora, known in criminal jargon as “Yordi” (the top leader and boss of hitmen for said organization), and against Daniel Muñoz Olaya, son of José Leonardo Muñoz Martínez (alias “Douglas”), arrest warrants were issued against them for different crimes which they apparently took part in to integrate said criminal organization, who, according to the Prosecutor’s Office, are involved in money laundering and illicit enrichment. However, despite details of this operation having been filtered by irregular third parties, which could have jeopardized the success of all the captures (apparently alerting the targets before the proceedings began), and compromising the security of the Judicial Police investigators and the designated prosecutor’s office itself.

Indeed, as was evidenced in an extraordinary security meeting held in the District of Medellín this past June 17, 2025 (which included the participation of the Unit Against Organized Crime of the Attorney General’s Office, the National Police, the National Army of Colombia, the Colombian Air Force, and representatives of state intelligence agencies) and in a meeting on June 19, 2025 aimed at conducting a presentation of the balance of operational results by the National Police, it was established that there was a leak of information hours before the operation, since alias “Douglas” had been informed of a respective investigative process against his son and that his capture would be imminent.

As a result of this situation, not only would the capture of Daniel Muñoz Olaya have been prevented (by evading the action of the public force at the time of the execution of the search with (Additional text appears to be missing beyond this point. The mayor states that there are 7 total pages, but he is making public these four, redacted. -Ed.)

FOOTNOTES:

1: In effect, these are José Leonardo Muñoz Martínez (alias Douglas), Juan Carlos Mesa Vallejo (alias Tom), Jorge de Jesús Vallejo Alarcón (alias Vallejo), Juan Camilo Rendón Castro (alias el Saya), Albert Henao Acevedo (alias Albert), Juan Fernando Álvarez (alias Juan XXIII), Walter Román Jiménez (alias el Tigre), Freyner Ramírez García (alias Pesebré), and Dayron Alberto Muñoz Torres (alias El Indio).
Footnote 2 appears to be redacted.

3: Copy of the official letter of transfer for the competence of relevant information filed on June 25, 2025, before the Attorney General’s Office by the Secretary of Security of the District of Science, Technology, and Innovation of Medellín.

4: Copy of the official letter of transfer of relevant information for the pertinent purposes and request for urgent and necessary protection measures filed on June 25, 2025, before the Attorney General’s Office.

5: Copy of a news article published on June 26, 2025, by Revista Semana.

6: World Drug Report 2025 by UNODC: Global instability aggravates the social, economic, and security impact of the global drug phenomenon, published on June 26, 2025, by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

7: Copy of the publication made on July 1, 2025, on the social network “X” by Caracol Radio.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Federico Andrés Gutiérrez Zuluaga, Mayor of Medellín.

President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace (Paz Total) policy, designed to negotiate agreements with the country’s main armed groups and criminal gangs, is struggling to make any headway as he passes the halfway point of his four-year administration. The negotiations have had profound effects on the criminal dynamics in the country.

SEE ALSO: What Is Behind Increased Violence in Colombia?

After initial progress in dialogue with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), talks collapsed in May last year when a faction of the group split off to pursue separate peace negotiations. The ELN’s extensive infrastructure and leadership in Venezuela, where Nicolás Maduro remains in power following a widely criticized election, has further undermined the chances of peace with the Marxist-Leninist rebel force.

Similarly, negotiations with dissidents of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) have faced significant setbacks. Fragmentation within these groups has sparked infighting, with splinter factions emerging from the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) and the Second Marquetalia, the two largest dissident factions. As a result, the government is engaging with only a small portion of each group.

The country’s most powerful drug-trafficking organization, the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), remains largely outside the Total Peace framework. Efforts have been stalled by the absence of a legal framework for negotiations and a potential peace deal. Similar legal obstacles have hindered progress in “urban peace laboratories” in cities like Buenaventura, Quibdó, and Medellín, where gangs dominate neighborhoods through drug trafficking and extortion rackets.

As Petro begins the third year of his presidency, InSight Crime reviews the key developments in Colombia’s peace dialogues and examines their criminal implications for 2025.

ELN

Initial progress with the ELN effectively unraveled as disputes with the government led to the collapse of negotiations.

In January last year, the Comuneros del Sur Front (Frente Comuneros del Sur – FCS), an ELN faction in southern Nariño, broke ranks, announcing plans to pursue separate “regional dialogue” with the government. Frustrated by the limited progress at the national level and growing threats from rival groups, the FCS sought a more localized approach. However, ELN top commander Eliecer Erlinto Chamorro, alias “Antonio García,” condemned these parallel dialogues as unauthorized and illegitimate.

SEE ALSO: Kidnappings Surge in Colombia Amid ELN Peace Negotiations

By May, the FCS formally severed ties with the ELN, emerging as a dissident faction of the guerrilla group. It quickly established dialogue with the government, advanced in peace talks, and even committed to a partial weapons handover, according to Carlos Augusto Erazo Murcia, head of the government’s negotiating team.

This was followed by the collapse of a bilateral ceasefire between the ELN and the government, which expired in August without renewal. After the ceasefire lapse, the ELN escalated hostilities by attacking a military base in Arauca in September, killing three soldiers. In response, the government suspended peace talks indefinitely.

The ELN and the government resumed talks on November 25, agreeing to reconvene in 2025 to reassess the dialogue process and explore the possibility of a renewed ceasefire.

The ELN also stands to benefit greatly from what was widely considered a stolen election in Venezuela, extending by another six years of Maduro’s time at the helm of the country. Venezuela remains a critical hub for the ELN, hosting much of its leadership and infrastructure.

Since the FARC’s demobilization in 2016, the ELN has expanded its presence in Venezuela and Colombia’s border departments, strengthening its operations through a symbiotic relationship with the Maduro regime. The group now controls entire sections of the border, managing smuggling and drug-trafficking corridors between the two countries, while maintaining corridors moving troops. Its influence spans eight of Venezuela’s 24 states, with significant income derived from controlling illegal mining and cocaine production zones.

With little interference and often support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—who depend on the income generated by these groups, particularly amid severe US sanctions—the ELN has solidified its presence along the 2,219 km border with Venezuela and uses this haven to project into Colombia. This growing entrenchment further undermines the Total Peace initiative.

Ex-FARC

Government dialogue with the EMC, the largest ex-FARC organization, has also splintered the group. In March, Petro suspended a bilateral ceasefire with the EMC in the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño due to ongoing violence against Indigenous communities. This decision deepened internal divisions within the EMC. Its leader, Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias “Iván Mordisco,” refused further negotiations until the ceasefire was reinstated, while another faction, led by Alexander Díaz, alias “Calarcá Córdoba,” opted to continue talks.

By April, the government expelled Mordisco’s faction from the peace talks, shifting its focus to negotiations exclusively with Calarcá’s bloc. In July, his group signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement, marking a tentative step forward. However, significant challenges remain: Calarcá’s faction has been accused of threatening demobilized FARC members in Caquetá, and in December, six soldiers were killed in a minefield allegedly planted by the group.

Mordisco’s wing, on the other hand, has intensified violent activities, particularly in Cauca, an important region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. By September, Cauca had recorded 466 violent incidents over 12 months, the most of any department during that period, with numbers continuing to rise through the end of 2024.

Meanwhile, the Second Marquetalia, a separate group of FARC dissidents led by Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” became the third major group to enter Total Peace negotiations in 2024. However, internal divisions also plagued this effort. In November, two key factions—the Border Command and the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico)—broke away, frustrated by Márquez’s leadership. They formed the National Bolivarian Army Coordinator (Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano), led by José Vicente Lesmes, alias “Walter Mendoza.”

AGC and Urban Groups

The AGC has been largely excluded from the Total Peace initiative thus far, but signs emerged in 2024 that Petro sought to change this. In July, he authorized dialogue with the group, signaling a potential shift in policy.

But significant obstacles remain. The government’s classification of the AGC as a high-impact organized crime group, rather than a political organization like the ELN or FARC dissidents, has become a sticking point in the negotiations. This designation precludes the AGC from seeking transitional justice terms, such as guarantees against extradition and amnesty, similar to those offered to the FARC in the 2016 peace agreement. Under Colombian law, high-impact organized crime groups are only eligible for limited judicial benefits, such as reduced sentences, making negotiations far less appealing for the AGC.

SEE ALSO: GameChangers 2023: The Cocaine Flash-to-Bang in 2024

Despite minor progress—such as the attorney general lifting arrest warrants for key AGC leaders—negotiations have yielded few tangible results. Tensions remain high: in December, the military bombed an AGC camp in northern Antioquia, underscoring the ongoing hostilities.

Moreover, skepticism about the AGC’s intentions persists. Some analysts suggest the group is using negotiations as a tactical maneuver to secure a bilateral ceasefire and reduce military pressure, rather than genuinely committing to demobilization. At the same time, its ongoing territorial expansion and dominance over key criminal economies fuel doubts about its willingness to disarm.

The absence of a legal framework for gang demobilization, or “transition to legality,” as it is officially termed, has also hindered progress in cities like Medellín, Quibdó, and Buenaventura.

Efforts to pass legislation to formalize a framework for gang demobilization have stalled in Colombia’s gridlocked congress, leaving urban peace efforts in limbo.

In Medellín, several gangs agreed to reduce violence following Petro’s 2022 election, resulting in a notable drop in homicide rates. In June 2023, Petro initiated a dialogue table with former gang leaders at Itagüí prison, but progress faltered in 2024.

In Quibdó, the gangs Los Mexicanos, Lokos Yam, and RPS began talks in August 2023, achieving significant milestones like a commitment to halt the extortion of teachers and health workers. But in September 2024, a ceasefire between the gangs collapsed, amidst incursions by the AGC into the city. In December, Petro authorized exploratory talks to include three additional groups—the Zetas, Cabí, and AGC—in the Quibdó table.

In Buenaventura, negotiations with the Spartans and Shottas—which together command over 1,700 members—have produced mixed results. The groups agreed to a truce in August 2023, significantly reducing violence throughout 2024. While tensions flared in March when the Spartans temporarily withdrew from the negotiations, they eventually returned to the table, and have renewed the ceasefire, currently set to last until February 2025.

Looking Forward

Several key factors will significantly influence peace negotiations in 2025.

First, the fragmentation of major groups within the Total Peace process highlights the challenges of negotiating with organizations that appear unified but are, in fact, loose coalitions of diverse factions. The Comuneros del Sur’s split from the ELN exposed the group’s limited control over its regional fronts. Similarly, the EMC’s divided leadership—between Mordisco and Calarcá—mirrors the internal tensions within the Second Marquetalia, where Iván Márquez has struggled to maintain cohesion among factions like the Border Command.

These fractures risk escalating violence as splinter groups vie for territorial control and factions excluded from peace talks increase attacks on government targets.

Since the EMC split, clashes between Mordisco’s and Calarcá’s factions have escalated in Putumayo, a key region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. Violence has also surged in other southwestern departments, such as Cauca. The deadly ELN attack on the military base could also foreshadow more violent confrontations between criminal groups and government forces, despite the relative lull achieved by ceasefires in 2024.

Second, the absence of widespread ceasefires with criminal groups has leveled the criminal playing field once again. Ceasefires maintained by the ELN and EMC in 2023 temporarily shifted criminal dynamics, allowing these groups to expand their territorial control, recruit new members, and focus on rival factions rather than government forces.

“We know [armed groups] have taken advantage of the ceasefire to try to increase their illegal control over the territory,” Colombia’s Minister of Defense said in a press conference in March 2024.

This reprieve boosted profits from drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion. In contrast, the AGC, excluded from ceasefire agreements, continued to face government offensives.

SEE ALSO: The Informants of Tibú: How the Colombian State Unleashed a Wave of Femicides

Currently, only the Calarcá dissidents and the FCS have active bilateral ceasefires with the government. The FCS, being relatively small, is unlikely to use the ceasefire for significant territorial expansion but will likely consolidate its holdings and defend against incoming EMC incursions into Nariño. Conversely, the Calarcá dissidents are better positioned to exploit their ceasefire to strengthen their presence in critical drug trafficking zones, particularly along the Amazonian border with Brazil and in parts of the Venezuelan frontier.

For groups like the Mordisco dissidents and the ELN, the absence of ceasefires means they will lose their distinct advantage as they compete for control over territories essential for drug trafficking, illegal mining, and other key revenue streams. However, the lack of ceasefires could give the AGC an edge.

Despite facing sustained military pressure, the AGC has expanded along the Pacific coast in Chocó, the Caribbean coast in Bolívar, Córdoba, and Cesar, and is encircling Catatumbo in Norte de Santander—one of Colombia’s most critical coca cultivation regions. With its criminal rivals now experiencing the same pressure it has endured, the AGC is poised to solidify and take even greater control as cocaine production explodes and gold prices approach record highs.

Third, Maduro’s dependence on Colombian criminal groups ensures that the ELN and Second Marquetalia will continue to strengthen their footholds in Venezuela and along Colombia’s border. With minimal interference—and often direct support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—both groups have entrenched themselves in the region, controlling key criminal economies such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and contraband smuggling.

With the prospect of six more years of protection under Maduro, these groups have little immediate incentive to engage in peace negotiations. Instead, they are well-positioned to expand their operations further.

This article, written by Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.