She was released from her duties at DAPRE on January 20, when the government announced Jorge Rojas, previously deputy foreign minister, would be the new head of this office. The office of the Presidency announced her appointment as the new Foreign Minister the next day. Her responsibilities will officially begin on February 1st, but she is already working with the outgoing Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo to facilitate a smooth transition.

Murillo resigned in time to meet the legal requirements to run for political office in the next presidential election.

Murillo who has been dealing with exigencies like the passport printing contract scandal that removed former Foreign Minister Alvaro Leyva, the tense relations with Israel after the Gaza Strip conflict began, and the decisions of the UK and Germany to reimpose visa obligations for Colombians due to abuses of the asylum process, resigned and will leave office next Friday—ostensibly to return to academia. It should be noted however, that Murillo, a former presidential candidate who ran against Petro, resigned in time to meet the legal requirements to run for political office in the next presidential election.

Sarabia has been an important figure in Petro’s government for the last two years serving as a key communication link between ministers and the president. Her position as Petro’s right hand of the President put her into the public eye in May 2023 when a bag with a large amount of money disappeared from her residence. She accused her domestic employee, Merelbys Meza, of taking the money and allegedly forced her to take a polygraph test, This is an open investigation that precipitated her removal from government for seven months, until she returned as the head of the DAPRE.

Her new position will come with some challenges. One of the first tasks she will have is to address the situation created the past Sunday between Petro and the United States President Donald Trump, after Petro denied the entry of two flights bringing back deportees from the US. The initial response from Washington was a package of sanctions against Colombian officials and increasing the tariffs to 50% for Colombian exports, Later the same day, the sanctions were reversed after Petro agreed to Trump’s demands, however, Sarabia will have to carefully manage the diplomatic fallout from the crisis.

Sarabia will also focus her attention on the relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean, as President Petro proposes a unified position from the region against the political decisions made by Washington.

Headline photo: DAPRE Director Laura Sarabia is appointed as new Colombian Chancellor (Source: DAPRE official website)

The senator said that two separate examinations confirmed the early state cancer, the first one March 2^nd in Cuba. Petro returned to Colombia for a second opinion which concurred with the diagnosis.

The far-left senator ran unsuccessfully for president in the 2018 Colombian elections but lost in the runoff to current president Ivan Duque. Born in a small-town in Colombia’s northern coastal plains, the senator in his youth joined the M-19 Marxist armed revolutionary movement. Captured in the 1980s, Petro served prison time until a peace accord was signed with the M-19 rebels.

The victims have been identified as Laura Flórez, Henry Martínez, and Camilo Tirado.

Another three were injured, according to local media, in an armed attack that is thought to have been carried out around 2:00 am in the in the department of Antioquia by former Marxist guerrillas who splintered from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) following the peace deal the faction reached with the Colombian government in 2016.

Authorities have suggested that the attackers may have been connected to what is known as the 36th front of dissident rebels.

“Initial indications are that the attack was carried out by a dissident group of ex-FARC members,” said Continental Gold in a statement.

Initially, a relatively small number of FARC combatants split with the group’s primary leadership that agreed to demobilize and disarm. But with the peace deal implementation moving slowly, this total has increased, and it is feared that more and more ex-guerrillas are returning to the rural areas to take up arms.

Medellín-based research and analysis group Insight Crime has estimated that there may now be up to 2,800 dissidents.

Continental Gold, which has its principal gold mining operation in the central Colombian town of Buriticá, said that the attack occurred near its Berlin mining project in the village of Ochalí, located in the municipality of Yaramul.

“This is unrelated to the Buriticá project as it is located over eight hours away by road,” said the Toronto-based company. It added that “the company is fully cooperating with authorities and is working with the families affected.”

The tragedy follows the killing of a mining engineer working for Continental Gold earlier this month, who was left dead after his vehicle was attacked in Buriticá. Another man who was also in the vehicle was injured.

Representatives of various industry and business organizations have condemned the violence, including the Ministry of Mines and Energy, the governmental department that governs the extractive sector.

“We condemn the attack on the geologists of Continental Gold,” stated Carolina Rojas Hayes, vice-minister of mines, on Twitter last night. “We stand with the officials who were injured. These attacks against the mining sector are against the entire country.”

This morning during a public appearance, Colombian President Iván Duque addressed the incident in a speech and on Twitter.

“We pay homage, on behalf of all Colombians, to the three geologists who, unjustly and in the most despicable way, were victims of a criminal act,” he stated. “Our condolences to the families and friends of Laura Flórez, Camilo Tirado, and Henry Martínez.”

Chief peace negotiator for the Colombian government, Humberto de la Calle (right), shakes hands with FARC representative Iván Márquez in Havana, Cuba, to signify that a peace deal has been reached. (Photo credit: Presidencia de la República)

The FARC political party appears in disarray as it celebrates its first birthday, and the internal fracture rocking the political movement one year after its inauguration could seriously damage the ongoing implementation of peace.

Concern is growing over the absence of several top leaders of the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force (Fuerza Alternativa Revolucionaria del Común – FARC), Colombia’s El País reported on September 3, a day after the political party, held its second-ever national congress.

Dozens were absent from the three-day summit, but the no-show of the party’s second-in-command Luciano Marín Arango, who still goes by his nom de guerre “Iván Márquez”, and two emblematic figures of the former guerrilla group, Hernán Darío Velásquez, most commonly known as “El Paisa,” and Henry Castellanos, alias “Romaña”, were particularly noticed and could spell serious trouble for the FARC.

Where are the Missing FARC Leaders?

Following the arrest of his close ally Seuxis Paucis Hernández Solarte, alias “Jesús Santrich,” in early April on drug trafficking charges, Iván Márquez left Bogotá for the Miravalle rural area of the southeastern Caquetá department where El Paísa was overseeing the reintegration process of some 150 demobilized guerrilla fighters.

But the location of Márquez, one of the key negotiators of the peace agreement, is now unknown, as is that of El Paísa, and efforts by authorities to locate the two men have, so far, been unsuccessful. Authorities even suspect that the former guerrilla negotiator may have left for Venezuela, according to El Espectador.

Romaña, meanwhile, a well-respected leader figure among former rebel ranks, has reportedly left the central Meta department where he coordinated the rehabilitation of 350 former fighters, according to El Tiempo.

Why the Radio Silence?

One explanation for Márquez falling off the radar is that the former FARC leader fears being arrested like Santrich and potentially extradited to the United States. This hypothesis stems largely from the fact that Márquez’s nephew, Marlon Marín, who is accused of being involved in Santrich’s alleged drug scheme, is now a protected witness for the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

But the proximity of Márquez’s last known location with areas where FARC dissidents operate, and rumors of his possible flight to Venezuela where infamous dissident leader Géner García Molina, alias “Jhon 40,” is apparently hiding out, suggest the more concerning possibility. That is, that Márquez and El Paisa are in contact with the ex-FARC mafia — emerging but powerful criminal organizations formed by former FARC guerrillas — in the Eastern Plains or the Norte de Santander department bordering Venezuela, and are weighing out their options.

What are the Implications for the FARC Political Experiment?

The prolonged absence of these leading figures is a sign of the internal fracture within the FARC party that has grown since Santrich’s arrest. Although ideological differences between Márquez and the FARC President Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri, known by his nom de guerre “Timochenko,” were clear from day one, Santrich’s capture has seemingly broadened the rift between the two men, with Márquez appearing at the helm of a politically more radical faction of the party.

But Márquez’ absence from the national congress and his radio silence, just one month after refusing to take his senatorial seat in Congress in July, casts serious doubt as to the leader’s actual commitment to the party, and many fear that Márquez may already have abandoned ship to join the dissidence.

Such a development would seriously weaken the FARC political party and further jeopardize its credibility among members to ensure the implementation of the peace agreement, at a time when many demobilized fighters are already afraid that newly-elected President Iván Duque will break his predecessor’s peace promises.

What are the Risks for the Peace Process?

If Márquez and other leaders were to join the ex-FARC mafia, there is a real risk that other demobilized fighters would follow their lead and swell the ranks of these groups.

Without a united leadership, the party can hardly reassure demobilized fighters already critical of the government’s failures to comply with the accords, raising the question of how long a fragmented FARC party can hold its ranks together.

This analysis article, written by Tristan Clavel, was originally published on September 4 by Insight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America.

Peace negotiations between Colombia’s government and the ELN rebel group have reached their most precarious moment since they began last year. A wave of violence recently spurred Ecuador to back out as guarantor of the discussions. And concerns over the implementation of a 2016 peace deal with the ELN’s guerrilla cousins, the FARC, have hurt the group’s confidence in the ongoing talks. InSight Crime spoke with ELN members and residents of communities where the group operates in order to get a sense of where the shaky process might be headed.

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In a secluded part of the impoverished department of Chocó in western Colombia, a guerrilla fighter cleans her weapon with pride.

“I joined the guerrilla six years ago,” says the woman, who goes by the alias “Yomira.”

“I joined to fight for the people,” she adds. “Because the truth is the people are done for. It makes me happy to join the fight.”

“With the [FARC] peace process, we expected schools and hospitals to be built. But all we got is more violence.” – community leader from Cabecera

Yomira belongs to the powerful Western War Front of the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), which patrols the jungles of Chocó.

There is a strict routine for those within the ELN’s ranks. The day begins with a 6 a.m. inspection, which is followed by classes in current affairs, Marxist ideology and explosives training. The afternoon is devoted to military exercise. The day ends at 6 p.m. with another inspection and singing of the ELN anthem, which includes a repetition of the lyrics “Not one step back! Liberation or death!”

Residents of the town of Santa Maria de la Loma de Bicordó express reluctant sympathy for the guerrillas’ cause, as well as deep-rooted fear.

“We’re poor and so these guys are the only ones who can help us. But we know they’re not our real friends,” one resident told InSight Crime. “I have a young son. I’m terrified they’ll take him and make him fight.”

There are no more than 100 people in this village. There’s no running water, and electricity is rationed. It comes on only for a few hours in the evening.

While the town is mired in poverty, the San Juan river upon which it sits is a key part of a multibillion-dollar industry. The vast waterway is a strategic route for drug traffickers, linking coca production zones to the Pacific coast from where shipments of cocaine are dispatched to international markets.

The Urabeños, a powerful crime group formed by ex-paramilitary forces, controls the northern part of the San Juan river. The group’s Pacific Bloc keeps a permanent armed guard in the town of Dipurdú, just downstream from the river’s source. The camouflage and rifles of the Urabeños members are visible from passing vessels.

The central section of the river belongs to the ELN. But in the southern delta, where the river empties into the Pacific Ocean, the ELN and Urabeños are fighting for control of territory previously controlled by the largely demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC).

Caught in the crossfire are the riverside communities.

“With the [FARC] peace process, we expected schools and hospitals to be built. But all we got is more violence,” said a community leader from Cabecera, who asked not to be named.

Residents’ experiences with the aftermath of the 2016 FARC peace deal have not engendered confidence about the potential of talks with the ELN.

“If peace with the FARC brought us more war, what will peace with the ELN bring us? Forget it!”

Revolutionaries vs. Reality

The ELN’s engagement in peace talks with the government suggests a willingness to eventually lay down arms. But some leaders are wary of conceding too much to the government.

An officer of the Western War Front who uses the alias “Estasio” believes the FARC negotiated a bad deal.

“They sold out on everything they believed in. The government has made a fool of them,” he said. “We won’t fall for that.”

Inspired by the Cuban revolution and the Liberation Theology promoted by some Catholic priests in the 1960s, the ELN says it is fighting for radical social reform.

“We’ve told the government before,” said a Western War Front commander who uses the alias “Uriel.” “If they want to get rid of the guerrilla, then they need to get rid of the reasons for which we exist.”

Uriel says government negotiators are rushing through the official agenda without full consideration.

“They want to jump to the last points, forgetting the first, which is for us the most important,” he said.

The first topic for discussion is perhaps the most controversial of the six on the agenda. It revolves around “peacebuilding,” which the guerrillas interpret as a process of social reform.

“The ELN has repeatedly said that for them peace involves deep change. The question is how far is the government willing to go,” said Luis Celis, a former guerrilla turned peace advocate.

Estasio, the officer with the Western War Front, says he’s in the struggle for the long run.

“I’m ready to give up my arms and pay my sentence if we can achieve the change we’re fighting for,” he said, clutching his rifle. “But I’m a realist. It won’t happen yet, not with these negotiations.”

There appears little appetite for compromise. Critics are therefore suspicious. There is a concern that some elements of the ELN are prioritizing their criminal interests. The lucrative drug trafficking and illegal gold mining networks in Chocó may be hard to abandon.

Peace Talks as a ‘Test’

Uriel, the ELN commander, describes the peace negotiations as a “test.”

“We’ve told the government before. If they want to get rid of the guerrilla, then they need to get rid of the reasons for which we exist.” – Uriel, a Western War Front commander

“We are analyzing the intention of the government to see if it’s genuine,” he said. “For now, with the implementation of the agreements made in Havana with the FARC, we see that it’s not. This does not give us hope. The government is not living up to our expectations.”

The Western War Front has voiced outspoken opposition to what they call a “neoliberal peace,” which it says would focus on “the silencing of weapons” and not social change. This has led to accusations of dissent within the ELN, but the guerrilla group is not a vertical structure. Each of its eight fronts is autonomous, complicating efforts to make unified decisions about the peace talks.

The Western War Front is the only one of the eight fronts not to have a seat at the negotiating table. But Uriel denies there is division within the ELN. He says internal differences have been misinterpreted and exaggerated by the media.

Celis, the fighter turned peace advocate, also warned against overplaying disagreement.

“It is too early to talk about dissent,” he said. “The negotiations are about exploration. There’s no deal on the table yet so there are bound to be varying opinions.”

Beyond a Ceasefire

The ELN announced a five-day unilateral ceasefire for the first round of Colombia’s presidential election, which took place in late May. The announcement came on the heels of the fifth round of peace dialogues, which kicked off on May 10 in Havana, Cuba. (Ecuador, the original guarantor for the talks, ended its role as host country in April after a wave of violence linked to the ELN there.)

The Colombian government has made it clear that it would prefer a permanent, bilateral ceasefire, but this will be much harder for the ELN negotiators to sell to their rank and file without any concessions from the government.

The commanders of the Western War Front say they want definitive proof of the state’s commitment to a peace that extends beyond a ceasefire and demobilization. They are adamant they want pledges on social reform and structural overhaul.

In the makeshift camp on the banks of the San Juan River, the insurgents gather for their weekly radio conference. It is a chance for the various blocs that make up the Western War Front to discuss strategy, and there is only one message. Through the hiss of the interference, the airwaves carry a bleak directive: “We have no interest in a political solution. We are absolutely not interested in demobilization.”

Uriel is adamant the Western War Front will not change its stance. “If all the enemy wants is to demobilize use, then we are wasting our time,” he says.

It gives cause for pessimism, both inside and outside the ranks of the ELN. “The future has to be about war, not peace,” says Estacio. “Our fight will continue. It must continue.”

This article, written by Mathew Charles, was originally published by Insight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America.

Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos celebrates the beginnings of peace with FARC commander Rodrigo Londoño Echeverri, aka, Timochenko. (Credit: Presidencia de la República / Juan David Tena. SIG)

The former rebels of what was once Latin America’s oldest insurgency, the FARC, continually claimed to have barely any money. And while they did have a lot of expenses, they also have traditionally sat astride territories that generate well over $1 billion USD in criminal revenue every year. This last installment on the FARC‘s riches attempts to quantify the lucrative economies they used to control — ones that Colombia‘s other criminal actors now wish to possess.

The finances of the now-demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have historically been built on three pillars: the drug trade, kidnapping, and extortion. In 2012, as a precondition for peace talks with the Colombian government, the FARC abandoned kidnapping, but the shortfall in rebel income was made up with more involvement in illegal gold mining, as gold prices spiked in 2011, and the mining sector grew exponentially.

The following are InSight Crime estimates of the FARC‘s riches for 2015-2016, the last period in which the guerrillas were active as an organization.

Drug Trafficking

While the FARC always denied direct involvement in drug trafficking, it has been the financial bedrock of their revolution. The growth of the FARC and the growth of coca crops in Colombia during the 1990s and into the 2000s follow remarkably parallel lines. It is the cocaine trade, in which the FARC came to be perhaps the single most important players in the world, that provides the biggest criminal booty for other illegal actors today.

Before disarming, the FARC held control of around 70% of Colombia’s coca crops, the raw material for cocaine.

The rebels admit to charging a tax on coca growers and coca base production, called the gramaje. These taxes netted the rebels about $150 USD per kilogram of coca base. According to the rather conservative estimates of cocaine production by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) for 2015, Colombia produced 646,000 kilograms of cocaine every year. (A decent chemist can get a kilogram of crystalized cocaine from a kilogram of quality coca base.)

That means that if the FARC controlled 70% of drug crops, then they could charge taxes on 452,000 kilograms of coca base which, at $150 USD a kilogram in gramaje, would have made them around $67.9 million USD a year.

On the other hand, the potential earnings for cocaine, which is worth around $2,500 USD a kilogram in Colombia, would be $1.13 billion USD on those 452,000 kilograms. Yet the FARC did not process much of the coca base into cocaine; most of that work is done by groups known as bandas criminales (criminal bands) or BACRIM for short. InSight Crime has tracked but seven FARC units, or “fronts” as they are known, involved in the cocaine trade (the 33rd, 10th, 16th, 48th, 29th, 30th, and 57th Fronts).

These fronts also moved drugs across borders into neighboring Panama, Venezuela, Brazil, and Ecuador. It is not unreasonable to think that the FARC were processing 15% of the coca base passing through their hands into cocaine and selling it for $2,500 USD per kilogram. In sum, that would have netted them $169.5 million USD a year.

The FARC also charged taxes for drug shipments passing through their territory, the drug laboratories they protected and every drug-laden plane leaving their zones of influence. These earnings likely generated at least $30 million USD a year.

If one adds the money from the gramaje ($67.9 million USD) to estimated earnings on cocaine production ($169.5 million USD) and other “taxes” on the drug trade ($30 million USD), the FARC would have been earning $267 million USD a year from the cocaine trade. The sums are rough, but InSight Crime has spoken to a broad range of experts on the drug trade who believe that this figure is actually on the low side.

But the FARC were not just involved in the cocaine trade. There are also significant opium poppy crops in their traditional areas of influence. The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimates that Colombia produces up to two tons of heroin every year. Unlike Mexican brown “tar” heroin, which traditionally has been around 40% pure, Colombian heroin undergoes sophisticated processing and reaches purity in excess of 90%. Each kilogram of Colombian heroin is worth up to $100,000 USD in the United States, meaning that the market is worth up to $200 million USD.

While the system of “taxes” by the illegal actors on heroin is not as standardized as those levied on cocaine, sources in Tolima, where poppy is grown, told InSight Crime that rebel taxes were levied on fields of poppy or opium gum harvested. Looking at the map of FARC territory and poppy crops, it would be odd if the FARC were not profiting from this industry as well, at least in the range of $5 million USD a year.

In the last decade, the FARC also became involved in the marijuana business in the department of Cauca. The 6th Front and the Jacobo Arenas Mobile Column have established a near monopoly over marijuana production in the Cauca highlands. Here, the country’s highest quality marijuana, known as “creepy,” is produced. A hectare of marijuana can produce 2,000 kilograms of the drug a year. A kilogram of high-quality marijuana is worth an average of $170 USD.

There are no reliable statistics for the number of hectares under cultivation, but sources in Cauca told InSight Crime it was likely in excess of 1,000 hectares. By our rough estimates, 1,000 hectares producing 2,000 kilograms at a price of $170 USD a kilogram could generate over $300 million USD a year. It would be surprising if the FARC were not getting $30 million USD from these and other marijuana plantations in their areas of influence.

The FARC have been extremely inefficient in their handling of the drug trade. The ruling body, the Secretariat, has always kept its distance from drug trafficking on political grounds and devolved responsibility to individual fronts. So the trade has never been centrally controlled, nor the potential profits maximized. If, however, these crops and this territory were taken over by the BACRIM, which are extremely efficient at maximizing profit, they could generate over $1.2 billion USD a year in earnings.

Extortion

After the drug trade, extortion has been the second most extensive and lucrative criminal economy run by the FARC. Again, estimates of potential earnings are hard to obtain as few victims report the activity. However, InSight Crime has managed to put together some figures from on-the-ground research.

Reports from many different parts of the country show that the FARC would charge ranchers a “tax” of $3.50 USD (10,000 Colombian pesos) per head of cattle per year. To give an idea of potential earnings, in the FARC-dominated department of Caquetá, where extortion is widespread, in 2014 there were 1,294,718 head of cattle registered. This could have generated an annual income of $4.5 million USD for the guerrillas.

Almost all businesses in FARC areas had to pay extortion. Transport companies were particularly vulnerable, paying between $10 USD and $70 USD per vehicle per month, but everything from oil companies to small shops also paid. Any public contracts to build roads, bridges or sewage infrastructure usually have to hand over between 10%-15% of the contract value to be allowed to work undisturbed in FARC areas.

Field research in the region known as Bajo Cauca (which sits astride both Antioquia and Córdoba departments) — where the FARC, the BACRIM and the country’s last remaining rebel group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), have been present — revealed that there were fixed rates of extortion. The small businesses paid between $24 USD (70,000 pesos) and $278 USD (800,000 pesos) a month, depending on their turnover. Medium businesses would pay between $350 USD (1 million pesos) and over $1,000 USD (3 million pesos) per month. Big businesses could pay up to $10,000 USD (30 million pesos) a month.

In the Bajo Cauca municipality of Tarazá, with 623 registered businesses, the total extortion value was believed to be just under $100,000 USD a month. Now, Tarazá is a municipality with a large number of businesses, while most municipalities where the FARC were present are rural and poor. But if the FARC had a presence in 265 municipalities of the country, and each one had generated even a quarter of that sum — roughly $25,000 USD a month — then their potential earnings from extortion could have exceeded $75 million USD a year ($25,000 USD x 12 months x 256 municipalities = $76.8 million USD).

From Kidnapping to Gold Mining

The guerrillas abandoned the practice of kidnapping in 2012, a criminal trade which earned them up to $300 million USD year at the height of the kidnapping plague in 2002. Nevertheless, this income was replaced by extorting the booming illegal gold mining sector, which grew enormously in 2010 as prices moved from $1,200 USD per ounce to over $1,800 USD by 2011.

Here again the FARC were systematic in their system of extortion. They charged for dredges and heavy machinery to move into their areas, up to $7,000 USD for the biggest diggers. For each machine, the owner paid a monthly tax of between $1,000 USD and $4,000 USD, depending on the amount of gold extracted. In nine municipalities of the aforementioned Bajo Cauca, InSight Crime registered over 1,000 diggers in operation in 2012, generating a monthly income averaging $3 million USD, or upwards of $36 million USD per year.

While this did not all go to the FARC, it gives a glimpse of their potential earnings from the gold industry in a single zone. Also in Bajo Cauca, there was evidence of artisanal miners, who work without heavy equipment, paying extortion fees of between $25 USD and $250 USD a month, depending on the amount of gold they each extracted.

Accurate figures for illegal gold production are hard to come by, although gold exports from Colombia are in excess of $2 billion USD a year and some 80% of that is illegally extracted. A mere 12% of gold extracted in the country is done in a fully legal way, according to the Colombian Mining Association (ACM).

It is not only gold mining from which the FARC drew earnings. There is evidence of the FARC taxing coal, silver, tungsten, and coltan. It is not surprising to find that the presence of illegal mining operations coincides with that of the rebels and the BACRIM. (See map above.)

Again, crude estimates, confirmed by official sources who spoke to InSight Crime anonymously, place FARC earnings from the mining sector at roughly $200 million USD a year.

If one adds all of these criminal economies together, the FARC could have earned $580 million USD in 2015. However, we believe that the movement itself received perhaps $300 million USD a year, most of which was plowed into national and international operating expenses. A good portion of the rest was pocketed by individual FARC commanders all the way up the chain. With commanders systematically robbing the guerrilla army for years, it is of little surprise that several factions have refused to give it all up and retire quietly from the business.

This article was written by Jeffrey McDermott and originally published by InSight Crime this fall. It is the final entry of a three-part series on the FARC‘s wealth and criminal economies. You can click to read the first and second articles. This article has been republished with permission.

The two sides, which have been formally negotiating since February in the Ecuadorian capital Quito, had stepped up the urgency to reach an agreement in the lead up to this week’s historic visit to Colombia by Pope Francis.

Colombia is abuzz in the lead up to the papal visit, with vendors in Bogotá selling hats, shirts, and more to celebrate the occasion. (Credit: Jared Wade)

The ceasefire will officially begin on October 1, President Juan Manuel Santos said today in an address, and last for a period of 102 days until January 9. After that point, the truce “will be renewed to the extent that it is fulfilled and the negotiations on other points advance.”

The ceasefire includes a pledge by the ELN to stop kidnapping, attacking pipelines, and committing “other hostilities against citizens,” stressed the president.

A new round of talks will begin in Quito on October 24, and throughout the ceasefire a group — including members of the government, ELN, United Nations and the Catholic Church — will “work with the dual purpose of preventing and reporting any incident,” said the government in a statement.

The United Nations, in a statement, praised today’s agreement as another “concrete step” forward to create confidence in Colombia’s peace process and support human rights. It said that Colombian citizens who directly suffer under violence will be the principal beneficiaries of the ceasefire.

The ELN was founded in 1964 with support from Catholic priests and has been a primary belligerent force in an internal conflict that dates back more than a half-century. It is believed to have upwards of 2,000 active members and has continued to abduct citizens even during peace talks.

Earlier this year, it took two Dutch journalists hostage. Just this week, group members also took credit for killing a hostage in April who they had abducted in late 2016.

“The pope arrives at a unique moment in our history, when we turn the page on an absurd conflict and look forward to the future,” said Santos.

The head of the Catholic Church will arrive in Colombia for the first time in more than three decades on Wednesday, September 6. Pope Francis, who has been a vital voice in promoting peace and overcoming old wounds in Latin America, suggested last year that he would visit the country if it was able to reach peace with the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia).

The end of the conflict with FARC, reached by a controversial peace agreement that was initially voted down by the public at a ballot box, was further cemented last week. The former guerrillas, who handed over their weapons to United Nations officials earlier this summer, officially transitioned their group under new leadership into a political party, the Common Alternative Revolutionary Force (FARC).

With FARC disbanded as an armed group and ELN at least temporarily pledging to avoid violence, Pope Francis plans to call for reconciliation during his five-day visit to a country that has been living through conflict for the majority of the 80-year-old’s life.

According to the Vatican — during stops in Cartagena, Medellín, Villavicencio, and Bogotá — the pope will focus his prayers and addresses on the following themes: “Builders of Peace, Promoters of Life,” “Reconciliation with God, Among Colombians and with Nature,” “The Christian Vocation and Apostolate,” and “The Dignity of People and Human Rights.”