Two decades of fiscal data show that Colombia’s gross general government debt has moved through four distinct macroeconomic phases, ending the current cycle at a level that is materially higher than its pre-pandemic baseline. Persistent annual fiscal deficits, currency volatility, an emergency spending shock and weaker-than-projected tax revenues have combined to push the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product from the mid-30s percent range in the mid-2000s to a band of roughly 60 to 62 percent at the start of 2026, according to figures published by the Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público and the Banco de la República.

The shift carries direct implications for sovereign bondholders, multinationals operating in Colombia and any investor pricing country risk in the Andean region. All three major rating agencies — S&P Global Ratings, Moody’s Ratings and Fitch Ratings — now place Colombia in speculative-grade, or junk, territory, with consecutive downgrades through 2025 and into early 2026.

“The activation of the escape clause confirms that the deterioration observed in 2024 will not be corrected in 2025.” — Renzo Merino, sovereign analyst, Moody’s Ratings

The commodity cushion: 2006 to 2014

During the global commodity supercycle, Colombia benefited from sustained gross domestic product growth and steady government revenue. Hydrocarbon and mining receipts — channeled through Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) and the broader extractive sector — supplied a substantial share of national tax intake. The debt-to-GDP ratio remained relatively stable during this period, generally hovering between 34 and 38 percent. Even with chronic primary deficits, nominal growth in the denominator absorbed new borrowing, masking the underlying structural imbalance that the Comité Autónomo de la Regla Fiscal (CARF) would later flag as the persistent driver of fiscal stress.

The currency and revenue shock: 2014 to 2019

The mechanics of the ratio changed sharply when Brent crude prices collapsed in late 2014. Reduced hydrocarbon royalties widened the fiscal gap just as the Colombian peso depreciated against the US dollar. Because a significant share of Colombia’s sovereign liabilities is denominated in foreign currency, the peso’s slide automatically inflated the local-currency value of outstanding external debt when measured against domestic GDP. The combined effect — wider deficits funded by new borrowing, plus a valuation effect on existing dollar-denominated obligations — pushed the ratio steadily higher through the late 2010s.

The structural revenue weakness that surfaced during this period has remained a recurring theme in subsequent fiscal assessments from Fedesarrollo and the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana Observatorio Fiscal, both of which have noted that successive tax reforms failed to fully close the gap between commitments and ordinary income.

The pandemic ceiling: 2020

The combination of emergency social spending under the Ingreso Solidario program, expanded health outlays and a sharp contraction in nominal GDP drove the ratio to a historic peak above 65 percent in 2020. The Ministerio de Hacienda reports the all-time high at 65.3 percent of GDP that year. The government activated the escape clause of the regla fiscal — Colombia’s fiscal rule, codified in Law 1473 of 2011 and modified by Law 2155 of 2021 — to accommodate the spending response, suspending the rule for 2020 and 2021.

That episode also triggered the first sovereign downgrade cycle: S&P Global Ratings cut Colombia’s long-term foreign currency rating to BB+ from BBB- in May 2021 after the administration of then-president Iván Duque withdrew a tax reform bill following street protests, costing the country its investment-grade status with that agency.

The new baseline: 2023 to 2026

Strong post-pandemic nominal growth briefly pulled the debt ratio down toward 57 percent in 2023. The decline did not hold. Structural spending pressures, elevated international interest rates and tax collections below budgeted projections pushed the ratio back up, establishing a new operating band around 60 to 62 percent of GDP. The Ministerio de Hacienda reported government debt to GDP at 61.3 percent for 2024.

The administration of President Gustavo Petro and Finance Minister Germán Ávila Plazas activated the regla fiscal escape clause for a second time in June 2025, with the Consejo Superior de Política Fiscal (Confis) approving a three-year suspension covering 2025 through 2027. The decision came despite an unfavorable technical opinion from the Comité Autónomo de la Regla Fiscal, which concluded that legal conditions for activating the clause were not met outside of a national emergency. The clause had previously been invoked only during the COVID-19 pandemic.

According to the Marco Fiscal de Mediano Plazo (MFMP) presented by the Ministerio de Hacienda, net public debt to GDP is projected to rise from 53 percent in 2023 to 61.3 percent in 2025 and approximately 63 percent in 2026. The fiscal deficit for 2025 was initially projected at 7.1 percent of GDP and later revised to roughly 6.2 percent of GDP, with the administration targeting a deficit below 6 percent of GDP for 2026.

Debt service consumes a larger share of the budget

The cost of servicing this debt has reshaped the structure of the national budget. The 2026 draft budget presented by Minister Ávila totals $557 trillion COP, equivalent to roughly $134.7 billion USD, and represents 28.9 percent of GDP. Of that, debt servicing costs are projected at $102.5 trillion COP, or 5.3 percent of GDP, down from 6.2 percent of GDP in 2025.

The figures published by the Ministerio de Hacienda for domestic debt service in 2026 are higher when measured against tax intake alone: of an estimated $130 trillion COP in domestic debt service, $79 trillion COP corresponds to principal that can be rolled over through new issuances, while $51 trillion COP represents interest payments funded directly from the budget. Against projected tax revenue of approximately $300 trillion COP, that implies roughly one in every three pesos collected by the central government is allocated to interest on existing debt.

Rating agencies reprice the sovereign

The rating cycle has accelerated alongside the fiscal trajectory. Moody’s Ratings downgraded Colombia to Baa3 and subsequently into junk territory in 2025, citing the suspension of the fiscal rule. S&P Global Ratings issued a further downgrade in April 2026, its second cut in less than a year, on the same persistent deficit and debt concerns. Fitch Ratings also moved Colombia deeper into speculative grade in December 2025.

The Banco de la República reported external debt — combining public and private liabilities — at $238.7 billion USD at the close of November 2025, equivalent to 54.8 percent of GDP, an increase of $15.8 billion USD from January of the same year. The Colombian economy is currently valued at approximately $435 billion USD.

What investors are watching next

The Comité Autónomo de la Regla Fiscal has stated in its most recent reports to Congress that the 2025 primary balance target was missed by a wide margin even after the escape clause was activated, and that incoming projections for 2026 raise the bar for any return to the original fiscal rule by 2028. Business groups including Fenalco and the Consejo Gremial Nacional have publicly opposed the suspension and signaled potential legal challenges.

The 2026 financing plan disclosed by the Ministerio de Hacienda includes approximately $4.6 billion USD in global bond issuances, primarily to refinance a one-year Swiss-franc Total Return Swap operation valued at roughly $9.3 billion USD. The ministry has stated that the issuance does not constitute net new external debt. Updated debt and deficit targets are scheduled for release in the next iteration of the Plan Financiero.

For executives operating in Colombia or evaluating new investment, the baseline shift from a mid-30s to a low-60s debt-to-GDP environment alters several variables simultaneously: peso volatility tied to refinancing cycles, the trajectory of corporate tax policy as Congress weighs successive reform proposals, and the path of domestic interest rates set by the Banco de la República as it manages inflation alongside elevated sovereign funding costs. Detailed historical and forward-looking debt data is published by the Investor Relations Colombia office of the Ministerio de Hacienda.

Colombia’s General Government Debt-to-GDP Ratio (2006-2026) (image: Google)

This move, considered exceptional, provides the government with increased borrowing capacity. It allows the Ministry of Finance to bypass restrictions designed to maintain long-term fiscal sustainability. Finance Minister Germán Ávila is expected to provide a public explanation and present the arguments behind the decision.

The fiscal rule, adopted to control public debt and prevent overspending, has served since 2011 as a critical pillar for investor confidence and creditworthiness. Suspending it raises alarms among economists and former officials, who warn that the country may face higher borrowing costs and a possible downgrade from credit rating agencies, such as Moody’s, the only major credit rating agency still maintaining Colombia’s investment-grade status. In May, a top analyst from this agency said to Reuters that if a planned fiscal consolidation in Colombia fails to stabilize public debt and comply with fiscal rules, it could lead to a ratings downgrade for the country.

Analysts had previously warned that the government’s 2025 fiscal deficit target of 5.1% of GDP was unfeasible due to overly optimistic revenue forecasts and reluctance to cut spending. With this suspension, Corficolombiana (the largest financial services company in Colombia) now projects that the fiscal deficit could climb to 7.4% of GDP in 2025, with net public debt hitting a record high of 63% of GDP.

The last time Colombia suspended the fiscal rule was in 2021, during the COVID-19 crisis. That exceptional context justified increased borrowing to respond to the health and economic emergency. Critics argue that no such extraordinary event exists today to warrant this new suspension.

Former finance ministers have raised their concerns. José Manuel Restrepo emphasized via X that the fiscal rule is not a constraint but a safeguard that ensures responsible economic management. Breaking it, in his view, could trigger a chain reaction—rising debt costs, currency volatility, lost investor confidence, and ultimately, deep economic hardship. José Antonio Ocampo echoed these concerns, explaining to the Colombian economic-financial newspaper La República that with this move “access to the IMF’s flexible credit will be lost; the government had no intention of using it, but it shouldn’t be lost. It is given to countries that stand out for the strength of their macroeconomic fundamentals.”

“Suspending the fiscal rule is not only worrying, it also makes clear, once again, that the Petro government is pushing for the 2026 elections based on contracts, debt, and waste,” Mauricio Cárdenas pointed out via X.

The CONFIS meeting that preceded the decision involved key economic and fiscal authorities, including the finance minister, the director of the National Planning Department, and the heads of national treasury, credit, and taxation offices.

As the government prepares to present the new Medium-Term Fiscal Framework on June 13, analysts expect no major spending cuts to be announced. Instead, this suspension signals a departure from Colombia’s historical fiscal discretion, triggering concerns about the long-term credibility of Petro’s economic moves.

Headline photo: Colombia President Gustavo Petro (Gustavo Petro / X)

The analysts observed that outside of the current administration of President Gustavo Petro and his acolytes, there is a consensus that the fiscal rule was breached in 2024—a first since the measure’s establishment in 2011. They noted that this situation could pressure the exchange rate and inflation, limiting the Banco de la República‘s ability to ease monetary policy, hindering Colombia’s economic activity.

BofA also highlighted that Colombia’s revenues have fallen short of projections, increasing the need for public spending cuts. However, the bank expressed skepticism that Congress would endorse such measures due to potential political repercussions.

Colombian Peso. Photo credit: Jared Wade.

Finance Minister Ricardo Bonilla said this month that the government would present a bill to make the rule more flexible, in a package of measures aimed at boosting weak economic growth that is weighing on public finances. Real GDP growth slowed sharply to 0.6% last year following a strong post-pandemic rebound, and Fitch forecasts a modest 1.1% expansion in 2024. President Gustavo Petro has previously said the fiscal rule should accommodate counter-cyclical public spending.

Colombia’s ‘BB+’/Stable sovereign rating, affirmed on December 7, 2023, is constrained by fiscal challenges, high commodity dependence and structurally large current account deficits. Large fiscal deficits, an increasing public debt burden and the decline in fiscal policy credibility were factors in Colombia’s downgrade to below investment grade in July 2021.

Tax reforms were passed in November 2022, and high nominal GDP growth and peso appreciation supported deficit and debt reduction in 2023. But obstacles have arisen to consolidation. November’s Constitutional Court ruling on tax deductibility of oil and coal company royalties prompted the government to increase its 2024 central government deficit target to 5.3% of GDP in February’s Financing Plan, from 4.4%.

Fitch Ratings see risks to the revised target, for example, in securing Congressional approval for an arbitration system to speed up settlement of tax disputes. Budget rigidities limit the scope for spending cuts other than to capital expenditure, which could further weaken growth prospects.

The New York-based ratings agency also expect rising expenditure to meet some social demands, although prospects for Petro’s landmark pension and healthcare reforms are uncertain. In April, a Senate committee rejected a healthcare bill, although Petro says he will reintroduce healthcare reforms and may seek constitutional changes to implement them.

The Senate has passed a pensions bill that, if approved by the Chamber of Representatives by June 20, would take effect from July 2025. Allotted contributions up to a threshold of 2.3x the minimum wage would no longer go to individual accounts in private pension funds, but to the pay-as-you-go public pension fund and a new public savings fund.

The bill would prevent people moving existing pension assets from the private to the public system, which often pays wealthier workers higher benefits. By ending competition between the private and public systems, it would eliminate the implicit subsidy for wealthier workers that increases the public system’s long-term costs.

The bill creates a solidarity pillar for people three years beyond retirement age who are economically vulnerable or who are in dire poverty and do not qualify for a pension. The government estimates its initial cost at 0.3% of GDP. However, the absence of parametric reforms means the overall estimated pension liability would increase over time. Governments could be tempted to increase pensions and extend coverage, adding to fiscal pressures from a large structural central government deficit.

The public savings fund would be managed by the independent central bank of Colombia, which has contributed to the country’s record of macroeconomic stability. The impact on domestic funding markets depends on the fund’s investment guidelines. For example, a publicly run fund could boost government financing sources to the detriment of the private sector.

Lower house approval of the pensions bill is not certain and Fitch has not incorporated additional costs from healthcare and pension reforms into its fiscal forecasts. The rating agency’s baseline is for general government debt/GDP to rise to 56.3% in 2025, as forecast primary surpluses will not stabilize the ratio even as growth rises to 2.8% in 2025.

No detailed legislative proposal to amend the fiscal rule has emerged and it is unclear whether Congress would approve one. Without major changes in fiscal policy, medium-term central government deficits will be about 4.5% of GDP. This would not comply with the rule’s existing provisions.

Early in the week, focus was on Colombia’s first quarter GDP number (0.7%), which was above estimates. Industry (-5.9%) and commerce (-0.8%) continue to struggle, but the public sector (5.3%) and agriculture (5.5%) reported positive numbers. Construction (0.7%) finally rose, but the sector needs to offer much more in order to be the economic driver it should be.

The National Administrative Department of Statistics (DANE) also reported the latest real sector data for March, with manufacturing production (11.1%) and retail sales (5.6%) falling significantly once again. These compute with both the GDP and industrial activity data, not to mention Banco de la República’s continued stubbornness on reducing rates at the appropriate rhythm. The government has already stated that if the central bank doesn’t breathe life into the economy, it will via raising the debt ceiling — or putting some flex into the fiscal rule.

However, reacting to this, Fitch Ratings stated that tampering with the fiscal rule would only hinder the nation’s hopeful return to investment grade. They added that the same fiscal deficit was part of the reason that the administration of former President Iván Duque lost the investment grade in the first place.

Colombian David Velez has created a regional phenomena with Nubank, albeit he had to go to Brazil to do it, however his homeland has proven to be less welcoming. This week Velez spoke of the complicated regulatory environment in Colombian and the complications surrounding the banks plans to expand further.

Perhaps that is why he started in Brazil, a country that is light years ahead when it comes to its financial architecture and authorities that are far more enlightened when it comes to providing a more and efficient environment for clients.

Superfinanciera of Colombia is jurassic by comparison —  fearful of change — a fact borne out by its intransigence as Bolsa de Valores Colombian stock exchange has slowly died in front of our eyes, with the only recourse being to salvage itself via nuam exchange. Although, no doubt, Superfinanciera will have a say along the way.

As for the banking sector, it has been a high-cost oligopoly — for decades dominated by Bancolombia, BBVA, Grupo Aval and Banco Davivienda — with Asobancaria seemingly happy with the current situation. There is much chatter about open finance, etc. — but it will only happen on the terms of the current dominant players.

Colombia needs 10 neobanks, as well as a raft of other financial institutions, to both lower fees and improve client attention.

There is much chatter about startups and fintechs.

But most lack the size or expertise to compete with the big boys — and many will sink without trace.

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Photo: Colombian President Gustavo Petro speaking in the Leadership for Latin America session at the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting in Switzerland in January 2023. (Photo credit: World Economic Forum / Boris Baldinger)

Initially we saw Finance Minister Ricardo Bonilla lay the blame squarely on Banco de la República and its failure to lower rates over the past two months, thereby continuing their chokehold on the local economy. At this juncture, the government’s perspective is clearly the correct one — and it’s a perspective shared by the National Business Association of Colombia (ANDI), FENALCO and Asobancaria.

The last six months of macro data — ranging from retail sales to manufacturing production to new home sales to loan growth — have all pointed to a slowdown. But the central bank, or at least 5 of the 7 committee members, has ignored all calls to lower rates, an easing move that would send a positive signal to markets and the private sector at large.

By Thursday, the day after the GDP data was released, the government argument, in the form of statements from President Gustavo Petro, had pivoted.

This time, there was a call to adjust or remove the nation’s “fiscal rule,” a long-held policy that limits the level of public spending. The rationale being that, if the central bank wasn’t going to allow the private sector to refloat the economy, the public sector would have to be the driver. The Colombian peso, which had recently strengthened to below 4,000 to $1 USD, fell initially on the weaker GDP print — and then dropped further as the debate over the fiscal rule made its way into the press.

This may well be grandstanding on behalf of Petro in order to further highlight the failing of the central bank and to put further pressure on them to cut rates. But, in Colombia, some things are sacrosanct — and the fiscal rule is one of them. Years ago, when accompanying overseas funds to the Finance Ministry, foreigners were always impressed — even taken back! — that Colombia’s fiscal rule was not merely a guideline but in fact a cemented “rule.”

Petro is being told by the ANDI and Fedesarrollo that touching the fiscal rule would damage the country’s credibility, a fair observation. Ex-President Iván Duque said the same — but as the man who fumbled and lost Colombia’s investment grade rating, he sits in a glass house.

But, here, we have two pieces of hypocrisy.

1. Among those criticizing Petro is his former Finance Minister José Antonio Ocampo. Put simply, Ocampo is telling Petro to quit complaining about public spending and noting that the execution of the 2023 budget is way behind schedule. Instead of altering the fiscal rule, concentrate on what has already been approved.

2 Hypocrisy II lies with the federations Camacol Colombia and Fenalco, which, respectively, called for the government to subsidize social housing mortgages and to not reduce the Fuel Price Stabilization Fund (FEPC) fuel subsidy. Both of those measures create the same effect on the bottom line. Whether it is fiscal rule adjustment or subsidies, it all comes out of the same pocket.

Clearly, the fiscal rule shouldn’t be touched.

And it won’t be.

The central bank, though, needs to get busy in a hurry.

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Colombia has been paying nearly 40 trillion pesos annually in politically motivated gasoline subsidies.

Fuel prices are based on dollar-denominated petroleum prices, and last year, the Colombian peso plunged against the US dollar as the country elected its first far-left president, Gustavo Petro. Global supply-chain disruptions and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have added to the inflationary pressures that Colombia faces. Throughout Colombia, gasoline prices are now seen in a range between 11,100 to 11,300 pesos per gallon (roughly $2.40-2.40 per gallon).

Clearly this came too late to save the Investment Grade at S&P or Fitch due to the previous structure of the bill – a disaster for the country in both economic and social terms as Colombia ripped itself apart on the streets. But that is now in the past and Colombia needs to look forward. As Finance Minister Restrepo points out, the priority right now is for the country to regain its financial credibility which previous to the pandemic was one of the most admired across Latin America. The “line in the sand” fiscal rule has now gone but due to the measures taken there is the hope that the deficit will drop from the anticipated 8.6% in 2021 to 2.7% in 2026.

The hope now is that the country can put the tax reform, and the protests that accompanied them, behind it – it is a long shot that the ratings agencies will do anything in the near future, trust needs to be built and ahead of what will be a bitterly fought election – that will be tough.

The country’s recovery will depend on all manner of factors going forward. Life is firmly into the ‘new normal’ mode as we continue to adapt to COVID. There are still issues with vaccine supply and also the usual hard core who fear that the WHO is injecting 5G chips into their bodies but one of the biggest issues that remains is not ‘injection reluctance’ but ‘office reluctance’. Bogota remains a relative ghost town when the mom & pop businesses that sit on every street corner need the offices full in order for them to survive.

We saw consumer confidence disappoint last week; the hope is that Duque’s signature yesterday will help that situation. The propensity number to purchase housing, consumer durables and vehicles is still struggling however at least in that last category we are seeing some recovery. Through August a total of 53,852 vehicles were sold, an increase of 54% YoY and only down 5% versus 2019.

Rupert’s opinions & analysis as an independent expert contributor are his own and not necessarily those of Finance Colombia or the BVC.

These are still small acorns, but there is big pickup in electric and hybrid vehicles. Over 5,000  vehicles were sold during the first half of this year The government also appears set to remove the quota on how many such cars are subject  to the 5% import tariff as opposed to the standard 35%. Thus far there is a preference for hybrid due to the ongoing lack of electric infrastructure however this is slowly improving.

Another area which is still spluttering into life is internal tourism. According to the DANE in Q2 8.1% of the populous undertook a trip, in 2019 (2020 really isn’t a comparison) that number stood at 17.9%. To many this will be a surprise given that the airlines internally have seen one of the fastest recoveries in domestic travel.

The big dog as ever when it comes to the Peso, which continues to struggle despite inflows into the bond markets from overseas in August, is oil. Production is struggling to recover – in July it stood at 731,255 boepd , up 5.3% MoM however still down 0.5% from 12 months ago. This is something of a lost opportunity with Brent prices cresting $70 again with the oil bulls again speculating about $100 oil. This week we even saw the return of an oil scourge, the dynamiting of overland pipelines by terrorists. Ecopetrol doesn’t anticipate any severe disruption, but a very unwelcome development.

Still much to do…

That is about it for today – remember these are just themes that jump out at me – please refer to your local analyst, economist, salesperson or soothsayer for more details.

 My regards to all,

 Roops

A week or so ago I made mention of a post-Easter COVID spike, similar to that seen after Christmas, but there was really not need to wait, after deaths dropped below 100, they have already got themselves comfortably about that barrier once again and there are already some restrictions in place for the coming festival – but word is they are about to get tougher.

Not for the last time this morning I will use Chile as a benchmark – a country that has already surpassed the UK with its vaccination level (as a percentage of population) – is already locking down in order to avoid ‘vaccine complacency‘. Colombia has a bad dose itself of that complacency even though its vaccination program is moving very slowly in comparison. This is a high stakes game in terms of both lives and the very economic future of Colombia – at this juncture the Chilean model would be far preferable to follow that other regional peers, namely Brazil and Mexico, who appear to be making it up as they go along.

The Peso is under pressure and yesterday fell to 3680, passing through an important support level, traders do not see much support this side of 3800 – again the COVID situation is highlighted as one, not the only, reason.

The dollar is strong against many EM currencies however given the recovery of oil prices above the $60 level over recent months, it is disappointing to see the Peso still struggling. The Central Bank left rates at 1.75% last week, which should have helped somewhat, however still it slides. The committee also re-iterated their positive outlook for growth in 2021 with a 5.2% estimate – this is above both the FinMin and World Bank (who raised estimates yesterday) who are at 5%. Whilst it is one of the better growth rate estimates from WB with Brazil at 3% & Mexico at 4.5% it is still below Chile (5.5%) & Peru (8.1%) – these are competitive times in Latam and given the global competition for investment especially from Asia, Colombia is going to have to work hard for the money.

Rupert’s opinions & analysis as an independent expert contributor are his own and not necessarily those of Finance Colombia or the BVC.

Colombia’s COLCAP* is also struggling to attract investors despite the combination of weak YTD performance in Peso terms (-8.14%) and the Peso weakness which means for overseas investors that assets are very cheap. We have even been outperformed by Brazil (-3%) and Mexico (+8%) despite their indifferent COVID performance (I am being polite here) and modest growth outlook.

One of the reasons quite clearly is the fiscal situation – Colombia simply doesn’t have the deep pockets that Chile, Brazil and Mexico do, the reasons as to why is for another day, but that is the reality and there is a lot of ‘wait and see’ in terms of the tax reform and the fiscal rule. The ratings agencies are watching the government and investors are watching them. The tax bill is going through its ‘socialization’ process before being officially published – but soon we should have the full details. There has been plenty of leakage of items, VAT, wider tax base, less loopholes etc, but until we see what is presented in black and white, it is all speculation.

*Note yesterday the MSCI formally published their methodology for the new MSCI COLCAP index which will go live in a couple of months *

https://www.msci.com/our-solutions/indexes/index-profiles/market-cap-weighted/msci-colcap-indexes 

Tapping into this are the May 2022 elections. More and more column inches are being taken up with polls, interviews, speculation, and gossip as to who, might, might not, will, should and shouldn’t run next year. Amongst them are those, from both sides, who have criticized the reform, even before seeing it – as being a hammer that will crush the emerging middle class – this remains to be seen but if 60% of the reform gets approved the government will have done well. I am not sure who would play the Underwoods but the Colombian Congress will be a ‘House of Cards’ over the coming months.

But – it has to get done. Colombia’s much admired Fiscal Rule has been jettisoned for the next couple of years, it is an unfortunate casualty of COVID, and that is a shame as overseas investors on realizing it was a RULE not a GUIDELINE, were always impressed by the discipline that accompanied it. Hopefully, it will be back in place sooner rather than later.

Here I will be signing off for a few days, eating chocolate eggs and hoping that Colombians can maintain their discipline over the coming week in order to avoid the kind of lockdowns that are being implemented across much of Europe and the rest of the world. 

That is about it for today – remember these are just themes that jump out at me – please refer to your local analyst, economist, salesperson or soothsayer for more details.

My regards to all,

Roops