Barring any post-election drama, President-elect de la Espriella will take over a very divided country, and if he is smart, he will understand that he was the first choice of only a minority of the electorate. He will have a choice. He can govern for the small hard core, or he can be a conciliator.

Colombia has a nasty history of political violence, going back to the country’s founding. The person most Colombians see as the founder of the nation, Colombia’s George Washington figure, Simón Bolívar, barely escaped with his life during what was known as the Septembrine Conspiracy, which was born out of a conflict in visions for the new country. For most of the country’s history, the hostility between the Conservatives and the Liberals, the two primary political parties for most of Colombia’s history, manifested itself with bullets every bit as much as with ballots. Even though Colombia has, for almost all of its history, been a real democracy; the country has had only one military strongman dictator, and even he tried to be something of a reformer; violence has always had a hand in politics.

“With less than half the vote, the only mandate he holds is for an inclusive, conciliatory approach.” — Loren Moss, Finance Colombia

I once was at a talk in Medellín, years ago, where the businessman Chris Daes was asked, “When will Colombia advance?” “When we learn to stop hating each other,” he said.

Last night, after the election results were announced, police stations in Kennedy and Bosa, low-income neighborhoods in the southwest of Bogotá, were attacked. Why? The police hadn’t done anything. Riot police were called out to Puerto Rellena in Cali after roads were blocked by Cepeda supporters. In Medellín, some supporters of the president-elect turned up with bats and clubs outside Plaza Mayor, one of the city’s main public squares, probably supporters of de la Espriella, and let me emphasize that this is my guess, but no violence was reported.

Outgoing President Gustavo Petro called for calm, but also complained about US President Donald Trump’s open support of de la Espriella, forgetting that just months ago he was in the US and called for the US military to turn against its own government. Petro and the losing candidate, Senator Iván Cepeda, have said that while they acknowledge the preliminary vote count, they will not concede until an official final count, and they are calling for a scrutiny of the ballots.

So what happened here?

Three weeks ago, Colombia held the first round of presidential voting. The early favorite, Paloma Valencia of the right-wing establishment Centro Democrático party, backed by former president Álvaro Uribe, came in third, behind the right-wing outsider Abelardo de la Espriella and the ally of outgoing president Gustavo Petro, Senator Iván Cepeda of the leftist Pacto Histórico (Historic Pact). In Colombia there is an open first round, which can field many candidates, but the top two vote-getters advance to a final round unless one candidate clears 50% plus one.

Most people thought Cepeda would come in first with a unified left, but de la Espriella came in first, Cepeda second, and Valencia third. My take on this is very clear: Colombians were saying that they reject Gustavo Petro’s collectivist socialist experiment, but that they also reject Álvaro Uribe as the flag-bearer for the right. A sort of “we don’t like them, but we don’t like you either.”

So what happened in the past three weeks? Exactly what I expected. The outgoing president’s political machine moved to mass mobilization: get the buses out, get the affinity groups, such as indigenous leaders and unions, to mobilize. Something interesting happened: a government worker I know in immigration was told, and convinced, that she would lose her job if de la Espriella won. Her union told her this, of course. Cepeda and Petro’s movement has counted on its ability to mobilize people through group affiliation, working through organized structures to get out the vote. It was very effective, but not quite enough.

On the other hand, the split vote between Paloma Valencia and Abelardo de la Espriella came together, sort of, but not in a coordinated fashion. There was no real way to mobilize lukewarm people who were not already behind one of those two candidates. The business community had largely already opposed the Petro-Cepeda project, but it does not have the same mobilization machinery in place.

There will be time for a lot more journalism on this, but I want to get this initial reporting out quickly. Beyond that dynamic, what other factors came into play? Several:

• The outgoing president ran his administration like a game of thrones, or some kind of reality show. On average, he was bringing in a new cabinet minister every three weeks. It was nonstop drama and intrigue, and Cepeda’s message of “stay the course” ran up against that.
• Then there was the treatment of Vice President Francia Márquez. Petro used her to try to win the Afro-Colombian vote, but once they were elected, they tried to sideline her and treat her as a token. She rebelled against that and has called out her own administration for its corruption and racism. Over the past four years, Márquez has actually seemed more serious than Petro, who has a habit of crazy talk. By picking Aída Quilcué, Cepeda made it look like more of the same, and, fair or not, it made Quilcué look like a token candidate. Maybe it isn’t fair, but you can blame the Petro administration for creating that environment.
• Uribe’s first candidate choice, Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay (no relation), was assassinated on the orders of, according to Gustavo Petro’s own attorney general, the Segunda Marquetalia, a FARC dissident structure co-founded by Jesús Santrich, who was on his way to being extradited to the United States until that was allegedly blocked by Iván Cepeda’s efforts. Whether or not it is fair, for a lot of people in Colombia this is emblematic of Cepeda’s nurturing approach to the guerrilla groups, which have been growing stronger under the Pacto Histórico’s dialogue-first approach.
• The current administration is stained with several corruption scandals: the UNGRD scandal, in which money meant to bring water to poor, isolated families in the deserts of La Guajira was robbed for a political bribery fund; the ongoing scandals around Ricardo Roa and state petroleum company Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC), where Roa has been charged over alleged campaign-spending violations; the fiasco over the printing of Colombian passports; and a move that really angered the paisas (people of Antioquia and Medellín), the appointment of indicted former mayor Daniel Quintero to a government position supervising the finances of the country’s health system. Here you have a man with something like 40 counts of indictment for corruption, though let me be clear, he has not been convicted yet, and you appoint him to supervise the finances of the country’s primary health system? Usually when people are facing charges, they say something like “I am innocent, but I will resign to focus on clearing my name.” This one went full steam ahead. That undoubtedly cost votes among those who prioritize clean government.
• Cepeda’s running mate, Aída Quilcué, who never went to college, accused graduates of Colombia’s best universities of having “only learned to steal the people’s money.” She tried to walk that back after her statement blew up, but the damage was done. She was clearly attacking people who attended private universities in Colombia, many of which have no elite pretensions and specialize in educating low-income students.

What do I think will happen?

Assuming the vote count is not overturned, de la Espriella will take over the executive branch with no political machinery in Congress, so he will have to negotiate to get anything done. This is not a situation like El Salvador or Venezuela, where you come in and take over the whole government. To its credit, Colombia has strong institutions. Had Cepeda won, he would have come in with the largest bloc of legislators in Congress and might have found it relatively easy to push through his agenda. With de la Espriella, not so much, and I think this is a good thing. Personally, I like divided government as a concept, because it encourages moderation, consensus, and negotiation.

I expect the guerrilla groups to try to seize the initiative, and I expect their violence to increase in the short term as they try to assert their authority. Longer term, I think they are worse off, and they know the military will be after them soon, so they will make what hay they can while the sun shines. Expect them to try to “punish” the country for electing the candidate most hostile to them, a pattern that has already mocked the outgoing government’s “Total Peace” strategy.

Outgoing President Gustavo Petro will not shut up once out of office. He will become a full-time presence on social media and make as much noise as possible in opposition to the incoming administration. Unlike former President Juan Manuel Santos, Petro will be more like Álvaro Uribe, who has remained addicted to the spotlight, to influence, and to the thrill of power. In places where there is a tradition of former presidents ceding the spotlight, he won’t follow it. Petro will take every opportunity to travel around the world and throughout Colombia to speak, as he is entitled to, and to fashion for himself the role of dear father of the oppressed.

Petro and Cepeda and their movement will, if not explicitly then tacitly, reactivate the primera línea (front line), the aggressive activist youth street movement, not a formal organization, that mobilizes, sometimes peacefully and sometimes violently, against whoever opposes the Pacto Histórico. Last night we already saw violence in the low-income areas of Bogotá, and we saw riot police called out in Cali. It is not always that someone gives an order to go out and protest, even though there have been accusations of exactly that, for example against Petro ally and senator Gustavo Bolívar.

Colombian law says the runner-up in the presidential election gets a seat in the Senate, so Cepeda will return to the Senate, where he will lead the opposition. He already has a bloc of some 30 legislators behind him and is a Senate veteran, so he will be a very powerful voice.

What do I hope will happen?

I hope de la Espriella will have a plan to lift up the poor and the marginalized, and Colombia has plenty. He says he will govern for all the people, and I hope so. This was a very polarized election. People who feel excluded from opportunity largely voted for Cepeda and now feel they have lost. De la Espriella has a window of opportunity to do what he said in his election-night speech and govern for all Colombians. I hope he understands that, with less than 50% of the vote, the only mandate he has is for an inclusive, conciliatory approach.

His administration is inheriting a fiscal mess, as the current government has run up the debt. I hope that, along with Vice President-elect José Manuel Restrepo, they can properly manage this and navigate Colombia’s economy through rough times. Because the government will need to find dollars to make these debt payments, the peso will eventually fall, unless the US does something stupid to wreck its own currency. The opposition will try to blame the new administration for this, even though they planted the seeds for these fiscal weeds that will soon sprout.

I hope Colombia becomes safer for Colombians, and that the guerrilla groups, the mafias, and the drug traffickers shrink. It may be utopian to think they will be eliminated in four years, but my hope is that Colombia becomes safer, especially for poor Colombians, who are by far the primary victims of these groups. In recent years, unlike in the old days, the rich have been largely insulated from the depredations of guerrillas and extortionists, but the poor continue to suffer. So I hope de la Espriella goes after these groups, but in a way that respects and protects human rights, something Uribe failed to do during his time in power, leading to many innocent people becoming victims not just of the guerrillas, but of state violence. I sincerely hope, and will be watching closely, that the state becomes a protector of the poor rather than a victimizer of them. Many poor Colombians suffered under Uribe’s watch, and many continue to suffer under the current Petro government, which has simply not protected them from the depredations of groups like the ELN, the Clan del Golfo, and the FARC dissidents.

People to watch

• Armando Benedetti. The interior minister has been Petro’s consigliere, but he also seems to hold some kind of strange power over Petro. The US government, or in other words Donald Trump, placed him on the Clinton List, which will complicate his life personally and professionally once he is out of office.
• Daniel Quintero. The former Medellín mayor is already battling serious corruption charges, and while he found a friend in Gustavo Petro, that protection will no longer be there. There will be no place for him in the incoming government, and he still has to face all these charges. With no power to protect his allies, many of them also indicted, will they turn on him and spill the frijoles?
• Álvaro Uribe. No doubt pleased, he didn’t get his first choice, which was his own candidate, but he and de la Espriella clearly share a fondness, and their families go way back. De la Espriella’s father was a Liberal Party supporter of Uribe, and Uribe rewarded him with a juicy notary appointment decades ago.

A win for the business sector

Objectively, this is a win for the business sector. Business groups like Fenalco and ANDI have expressed their support for de la Espriella, and he has expressed his explicit support for the petroleum and mining sectors. I just don’t see any major businesses or trade groups that came out in support of Cepeda. Certainly Cepeda and Petro have support from individual businesspeople, but as organized industry groups, I just haven’t seen it anywhere.

Anecdotes

The polls closed barely twelve hours ago, and overnight I tried to gather the opinions of a few people. This is not a scientific poll, and to be clear and fair, Finance Colombia is a business-oriented publication, and I simply know a lot more businesspeople and entrepreneurs than I know community organizers and militant activists. So this is not any kind of objective sample; it is simply personal feedback gathered the very night of the election:

• A member of the Wayúu community in La Guajira told me they went for Cepeda, so they are not pleased.
• In a split family, both spouses professionals from humble backgrounds, the husband, a labor lawyer who contracts with the government, went for Cepeda, but his wife, a middle manager at a bank, went for de la Espriella.
• A psychologist who originally voted for Sergio Fajardo in the first round told me she voted blank, because she saw both candidates as extremists, a left-wing extremist versus a right-wing extremist, and she was disgusted at her country’s polarization.
• A police officer commented to me, “Better this loco than the other loco,” meaning he would take de la Espriella but considered both of them crazy. I think this is a common sentiment; it was not an endorsement of one so much as thinking the other was the worse option.
• A domestic worker told me she voted for de la Espriella, hoping he will take action against rising crime and violence.
• There were pro-Cepeda protests and some street violence in the mostly poor southwest of Bogotá, but there were celebrations in parts of the north of the city, and in the high-income El Poblado area of Medellín the celebrations looked like Colombia had just won the World Cup. Even where I live, in a rural area about an hour from Medellín, you could hear spontaneous car parades and firecrackers all through the night.
• Small businesspeople and Colombian investors I know have, to a person, been celebrating.

The most important takeaway, and something Colombians should be proud of, is that they have just held a peaceful, free, and fair election. Not every country can do that. A lot of hard work remains, and a lot can still go wrong. Count on Finance Colombia to bring you timely updates and analysis.

Colombia’s first-round presidential election, held Sunday, May 31, 2026, produced a result that crystallizes the country’s political exhaustion with both the governing left and the traditional right. Criminal defense attorney and political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella placed first with more than 10.3 million votes. Leftist Senator Iván Cepeda, a close ally of outgoing President Gustavo Petro and the lead architect of the administration’s Paz Total peace policy, finished second with just under 9.7 million votes. The two will face each other in a runoff election on June 21.

Senator Paloma Valencia, the candidate backed by former President Álvaro Uribe and the standard-bearer of his Uribismo movement, placed a distant third, receiving less than 7% of the vote — fewer than 1.7 million ballots. Former Medellín mayor and Antioquia governor Sergio Fajardo received just over one million votes, while former Bogotá mayor Claudia López finished below 1%, with approximately 225,000 votes. The remaining minor candidates combined for just over 1% of the total.

Under Colombia’s electoral system, the top two finishers advance to a runoff if no candidate surpasses 50% in the first round. The June 21 vote will determine who assumes the presidency on August 7.

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The Candidates: Background and Context

Abelardo de la Espriella, 47, has never held elected office. He built a national profile over more than two decades as a high-profile defense attorney, founding De La Espriella Lawyers in 2002, with offices in Colombia and the United States. His client roster has included controversial figures: he represented Alex Saab, a Colombian-born businessman who became a close associate of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and was implicated in a scheme to launder proceeds from Venezuela’s food-assistance program, the Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción (CLAP). Saab was extradited to the United States, convicted, and later granted clemency before being re-arrested in Venezuela in early 2026. De la Espriella also represented members of the Nule family in connection with the Carrusel de Contratos — a major contracting scandal tied to infrastructure works at Bogotá’s El Dorado airport corridor. He has additionally been reported to have represented individuals linked to organized crime.

De la Espriella has drawn comparisons to figures such as US President Donald Trump and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. His campaign has centered on hard-line security policy, including proposals for large-scale incarceration, expanded military operations against armed groups, and the rejection of negotiations with guerrilla organizations. He is reported to hold Italian and US citizenship in addition to his Colombian nationality, and is said to own property in Florida.

In a notable departure from his defense work, de la Espriella took the side of a victim in a high-profile acid-attack case, acting as a private prosecutor to secure a stronger sentence for the perpetrator — an episode that raised his public profile beyond the defense bar.

Iván Cepeda, 63, enters the runoff as the consolidated candidate of the Colombian left and Petro’s Pacto Histórico coalition. He is the primary legislative architect of Paz Total, the Petro administration’s policy of negotiating simultaneously with multiple armed actors, including the ELN and FARC dissident factions. Cepeda’s family background includes deep ties to the Colombian left: his father was secretary general of the Communist Party, and was assassinated. Cepeda himself studied in communist Bulgaria during the soviet era. The two finalists have an established legal and political history: Uribe attempted to bring criminal charges against Cepeda while both served in the Senate, but the Supreme Court determined that Uribe had fabricated the accusations and attempted to bribe witnesses — a case that resulted in Uribe’s criminal conviction.

“If nothing changes, Abelardo wins.” — Loren Moss, Finance Colombia

The Electoral Map

The geographic distribution of the vote reflects deep regional divisions. Cepeda carried Bogotá, which has trended left for years, particularly in lower-income districts on the city’s south and west sides. Antioquia — historically the heartland of Uribismo and home to Medellín, the country’s second-largest city — voted more than two to one for de la Espriella, a result that signals the weakening grip of Uribe’s movement even in its traditional stronghold.

The heart of coffee-growing country — the departments of Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío also went to de la Espriella. Caquetá, a sparsely populated department in southern Colombia that has suffered sustained guerrilla violence from both the ELN and FARC dissident groups, voted for de la Espriella as well, a result we may interpret as a direct rejection of Petro and Cepeda’s Paz Total.

Cepeda carried Colombia’s Pacific coast, including the chronically neglected department of Chocó, as well as the sparsely populated Amazonas and Putumayo departments bordering Peru and Brazil, and the northern Caribbean coast. The Caribbean coast result is notable, as the region has historically suffered from underdevelopment, infrastructure deficits, and significant income inequality. Norte de Santander with its Catatumbo region on the Venezuelan border and experiencing severe armed-group activity — voted for de la Espriella, a result consistent with public exhaustion over security policy.

The Political Context: From Uribe to Petro and Beyond

Colombia’s current political trajectory is rooted in decisions made across the past two decades. President Uribe served two terms in the early 2000s and, together with then-Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, mounted a sustained military campaign against the FARC that significantly weakened the insurgency. Santos later broke from Uribe after assuming the presidency, governing independently and ultimately negotiating a peace agreement with the FARC — a deal that Uribe actively opposed. A plebiscite on the accord failed, but Santos used legislative maneuvering to implement it anyway.

Colombia 2026 1st round top two (Graphic: Sofi Imfeld for Finance Colombia)

Uribe’s next handpicked candidate, Iván Duque, won the 2018 election but finished his term with approximately 30% approval. Members of his own party publicly distanced themselves from him — Senator María Fernanda Cabal, a staunch Uribista, called Duque a “mamerto” (leftist idiot) while he was still in office. Under his administration, indicators on crime and guerrilla activity worsened, and armed groups including the ELN rebuilt operational capacity that had been degraded under Uribe and Santos.

Petro’s administration has not met initial fears of a Venezuelan-style democratic breakdown: Congress has largely blocked the most radical components of his agenda, including attempts to nationalize the private pension system and convert the healthcare system to a single-payer model. However, crime has increased, armed groups have expanded their operational footprints, and the security situation in several regions has worsened. Paz Total is widely seen as having produced few tangible results.

Uribe himself was convicted of witness tampering and attempted bribery in the case he had brought against Cepeda. Though released from house arrest after conviction, the judges who authorized his release are now reportedly under investigation for judicial corruption. Valencia’s poor performance in the first round — despite being Uribe’s chosen standard-bearer — suggests that Uribismo as a political force is waning, with its core constituency aging and new generations of voters disengaged from the Uribe legacy.

What to Expect Before June 21

Both campaigns will intensify mobilization efforts over the coming three weeks. Cepeda’s movement — Colombia Humana and the broader Pacto Histórico coalition — has historically relied on organized mobilizations, including indigenous community-led mingas, labor unions, and allied social movements. Cepeda’s running mate Senator Aida Quilcué is an indigenous activist, a choice expected to energize those constituencies. FECODE, the Federación Colombiana de Trabajadores de la Educación (Colombia’s main teachers’ federation), is expected to align officially with Cepeda, though individual teachers may not follow union leadership in their voting choices.

On the right, Paloma Valencia issued a public endorsement of de la Espriella immediately following the first-round results. Business community organizations, including ANDI (the Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia) and Fenalco (the Federación Nacional de Comerciantes), do not formally endorse candidates, but their members are widely understood to favor a government that supports private enterprise and market-oriented policy. De la Espriella holds no congressional constituency, meaning whichever candidate wins will face the same dynamic Petro encountered: a fragmented Congress that is likely to act as a check on executive authority.

The question of centrist voter alignment remains open. Fajardo and López are not expected to formally endorse either finalist, and the direction of their combined approximately 1.2 million votes is uncertain.

Winners and Losers by Sector

For international investors and executives operating in Colombia, the policy differences between the two candidates are substantive across several key sectors.

Petroleum and Natural Gas: De la Espriella has stated unequivocally that he will restart petroleum exploration and licensing, which the Petro administration blocked. Ecopetrol S.A. (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL), Colombia’s state-controlled oil company, which also holds producing assets in the US Permian Basin and Gulf of Mexico, has operated under a government that halted new drilling permits. The consequences have included a decline in future production capacity at a time when global oil prices have risen due to Middle East tensions. Colombia has been forced to import natural gas at elevated prices to meet existing domestic demand — including from transportation fleets that were converted to natural gas under government incentive programs. Cepeda would be expected to continue or deepen current restrictions on fossil fuel expansion.

Healthcare: The Petro-Cepeda platform favors a government single-payer model. The administration has already taken over several Entidades Promotoras de Salud (EPS) — Colombia’s managed-care intermediaries — placing the healthcare system in legal and financial uncertainty. Private clinics, hospitals, and physicians who wish to operate outside a government-controlled framework would benefit from a de la Espriella administration. Cepeda’s healthcare agenda would accelerate the shift toward government-managed care.

BPO, Tech, and Call Centers: The BPO sector — which provides large volumes of formal employment, particularly in Medellín, Bogotá, Cali, and Barranquilla — was significantly affected by Petro-era minimum wage increases of 16% and 23% in successive years. These increases created contract renegotiation pressures with international clients, some of whom have shifted or considered shifting operations to competing jurisdictions including Honduras, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Guatemala. At the CX Summit, the industry’s main annual event held in Cartagena, the son of Álvaro Uribe appeared as an invited keynote speaker — a gesture that could be interpreted within the industry as an implicit signal of political alignment. A de la Espriella government, with its orientation toward labor market deregulation and reduced regulatory burden, would be viewed more favorably by this sector. Current Colombian labor law prohibits part-time employment contracts and places significant restrictions on dual employment, making workforce flexibility difficult for businesses that operate outside traditional 40-hour weekly structures.

Mining: The Petro administration has been less aggressive toward mining than toward petroleum, but sector participants expect a more permissive regulatory environment under de la Espriella, and continued constraints under Cepeda.

Security and Tourism: Both candidates have stated support for tourism promotion, but the sector’s trajectory is more directly linked to security conditions. Under current policies, several regions that were accessible to domestic and international travelers several years ago have experienced increased armed-group activity, effectively closing them to tourism. A de la Espriella administration is expected to pursue a more aggressive military posture toward the ELN and FARC dissident factions; a Cepeda government would likely continue dialogue-first approaches. The outcome will directly affect which parts of Colombia’s territory remain accessible to investment and tourism.

Foreign Relations: A de la Espriella government is expected to restore a broadly cooperative relationship with the United States, which deteriorated under Petro following several high-profile diplomatic incidents. De la Espriella has expressed admiration for US President Donald Trump, and reports indicate he holds US citizenship and owns property in Florida. Relations with Ecuador, which have been strained by mutual tariff escalations between Petro and Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, would be expected to normalize. Relations with Venezuela under Cepeda would likely continue along the current allied trajectory, while a de la Espriella government would be expected to take a more critical posture toward Caracas. China and Russia would find a more receptive diplomatic environment under Cepeda, and a cooler one under de la Espriella.

The Poor and Informal Workers: Cepeda’s campaign argues that minimum wage increases and expanded state services benefit lower-income Colombians. Critics counter that elevated formal labor costs have pushed more employment into the informal sector — which currently accounts for approximately half the Colombian workforce — depriving those workers of pension contributions, health benefits, and job security. De la Espriella’s platform, which emphasizes business formation, security, and labor market deregulation, would be presented as generating more formal-sector job creation. The actual distributional effects of either approach remain contested.

The Outlook

Assuming current polling trends hold and Uribista voters consolidate behind de la Espriella as expected following Valencia’s endorsement, de la Espriella enters the runoff as the frontrunner. Cepeda’s path to victory depends on driving high turnout among his base, securing support from centrist voters who did not vote for either finalist in the first round, and potentially benefiting from any missteps by de la Espriella in the final three weeks of campaigning.

The first-round results produced no major electoral violence. The ELN announced a temporary halt to armed actions during the voting period. Authorities detained some individuals reportedly attempting to purchase votes in rural areas, but no large-scale incidents were recorded.

The incoming president will face a Congress with no natural majority aligned to the executive, a healthcare system in partial administrative disarray, a petroleum sector whose future production trajectory is in question, and regions where state presence remains contested by armed groups. The June 21 runoff will determine which vision — market-oriented restructuring or continuation of the Petro project — Colombia pursues for the next four years.

Colombians delivered a pointed rebuke to their political establishment on Sunday, May 31, sending two candidates from outside the country’s traditional parties into a June 21 presidential runoff. With nearly all polling stations reporting, conservative outsider Abelardo de la Espriella led the first round with 10,361,499 votes, or 43.74%, ahead of leftist senator Iván Cepeda, who took 9,688,361 votes, or 40.9%, according to the Registraduría Nacional. More than 23 million Colombians cast ballots, a turnout of roughly 56%.

The rest of the field trailed far behind. Paloma Valencia of the Centro Democrático — the party of former president Álvaro Uribe — finished third with about 6.9% and fewer than 1.7 million votes, a disappointment for a candidate once seen as a strong contender. Former Medellín mayor and Antioquia governor Sergio Fajardo took roughly 4.26%, just over a million votes, and former Bogotá mayor Claudia López drew less than 1%, around 225,000 votes. The remaining minor candidates together accounted for about 1%.

The outcome underscored fatigue with both of the poles that have defined Colombian politics for two decades. On the right, the movement known as Uribismo — built around Uribe, president from 2002 to 2010 — failed to resonate beyond its aging base. Uribe was convicted at first instance in 2025 on charges of witness tampering and procedural fraud and sentenced to house arrest, becoming the first former Colombian president to be criminally convicted, before a Bogotá appeals court overturned the verdict and absolved him in October 2025. His last hand-picked candidate, Iván Duque, left office in 2022 with approval ratings near 30%, and Valencia’s weak showing suggested the Uribista brand no longer commands a national majority.

“People are tired of the same old. They want a different direction — not more of Petro’s approach, and not more nostalgia for Uribe.” — Loren Moss, Finance Colombia

On the left, President Gustavo Petro’s flagship security policy, Paz Total, has drawn sharp criticism. The initiative, which Cepeda helped shape in Congress, sought to negotiate with armed groups, but rising homicides, the expansion of guerrilla factions such as the ELN and FARC dissidents, and the entrenchment of organized crime have undercut that promise.

The first-round map reflected the discontent. De la Espriella carried Antioquia, the historic heartland of Uribismo, with about 54%, along with the coffee region, while Cepeda won Bogotá — roughly 1.7 million votes to 1.5 million — as well as much of the Caribbean coast and the Pacific, where he exceeded 75% in Chocó. Notably, Caquetá, sparsely populated and scarred by guerrilla violence, broke for De la Espriella, a result that reads as a demand for a tougher security posture rather than continued negotiation.

De la Espriella, who has never held elected office, built his profile as a prominent defense attorney whose clients included Alex Saab, the Colombian businessman accused of acting as a financial front man for Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro. He campaigns as an admirer of US President Donald Trump and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele, promising a hard line on crime, a smaller state, and renewed private investment. Cepeda, a veteran human rights advocate and senator for the Pacto Histórico, is Petro’s chosen successor; his running mate is Aída Quilcué, a Nasa indigenous leader and senator from Cauca.

The runoff is already reshaping alliances. Valencia and the Uribe camp moved quickly to endorse De la Espriella, consolidating the right behind him, while the center — Fajardo and López — has yet to commit and may decline to back either finalist. Cepeda’s coalition is expected to mount large-scale voter mobilizations. Whoever prevails will govern without a legislative majority: neither finalist controls a bloc in Congress, which is therefore likely to remain a strong check on executive power, as it has been for much of Petro’s term.

For business and investors, the contrast is stark. Major gremios such as the ANDI and Fenalco do not formally endorse candidates, but a De la Espriella government would be expected to favor private enterprise, restart the oil and gas licensing that Petro suspended — a priority for state-controlled Ecopetrol and for the foreign exchange Colombia draws from crude — and keep a market-friendly stance toward the mining, technology, and business-process outsourcing sectors. A Cepeda administration would likely continue Petro’s freeze on new hydrocarbon exploration and his push toward a more state-run health system. That overhaul is now led by Health Superintendent Daniel Quintero, the former mayor of Medellín, who himself faces more than 40 criminal and disciplinary investigations stemming from his time in office. On foreign policy, De la Espriella would probably restore warmer relations with Washington, while Cepeda would maintain closer ties with the region’s left.

Security will shadow both the campaign and the country’s economic recovery, since a deteriorating safety picture in parts of Colombia threatens tourism and investment alike. The first round passed without major electoral violence, and even the ELN pledged a pause in hostilities during voting. Colombians return to the polls on June 21.

Two decades of fiscal data show that Colombia’s gross general government debt has moved through four distinct macroeconomic phases, ending the current cycle at a level that is materially higher than its pre-pandemic baseline. Persistent annual fiscal deficits, currency volatility, an emergency spending shock and weaker-than-projected tax revenues have combined to push the ratio of public debt to gross domestic product from the mid-30s percent range in the mid-2000s to a band of roughly 60 to 62 percent at the start of 2026, according to figures published by the Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público and the Banco de la República.

The shift carries direct implications for sovereign bondholders, multinationals operating in Colombia and any investor pricing country risk in the Andean region. All three major rating agencies — S&P Global Ratings, Moody’s Ratings and Fitch Ratings — now place Colombia in speculative-grade, or junk, territory, with consecutive downgrades through 2025 and into early 2026.

“The activation of the escape clause confirms that the deterioration observed in 2024 will not be corrected in 2025.” — Renzo Merino, sovereign analyst, Moody’s Ratings

The commodity cushion: 2006 to 2014

During the global commodity supercycle, Colombia benefited from sustained gross domestic product growth and steady government revenue. Hydrocarbon and mining receipts — channeled through Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) and the broader extractive sector — supplied a substantial share of national tax intake. The debt-to-GDP ratio remained relatively stable during this period, generally hovering between 34 and 38 percent. Even with chronic primary deficits, nominal growth in the denominator absorbed new borrowing, masking the underlying structural imbalance that the Comité Autónomo de la Regla Fiscal (CARF) would later flag as the persistent driver of fiscal stress.

The currency and revenue shock: 2014 to 2019

The mechanics of the ratio changed sharply when Brent crude prices collapsed in late 2014. Reduced hydrocarbon royalties widened the fiscal gap just as the Colombian peso depreciated against the US dollar. Because a significant share of Colombia’s sovereign liabilities is denominated in foreign currency, the peso’s slide automatically inflated the local-currency value of outstanding external debt when measured against domestic GDP. The combined effect — wider deficits funded by new borrowing, plus a valuation effect on existing dollar-denominated obligations — pushed the ratio steadily higher through the late 2010s.

The structural revenue weakness that surfaced during this period has remained a recurring theme in subsequent fiscal assessments from Fedesarrollo and the Pontificia Universidad Javeriana Observatorio Fiscal, both of which have noted that successive tax reforms failed to fully close the gap between commitments and ordinary income.

The pandemic ceiling: 2020

The combination of emergency social spending under the Ingreso Solidario program, expanded health outlays and a sharp contraction in nominal GDP drove the ratio to a historic peak above 65 percent in 2020. The Ministerio de Hacienda reports the all-time high at 65.3 percent of GDP that year. The government activated the escape clause of the regla fiscal — Colombia’s fiscal rule, codified in Law 1473 of 2011 and modified by Law 2155 of 2021 — to accommodate the spending response, suspending the rule for 2020 and 2021.

That episode also triggered the first sovereign downgrade cycle: S&P Global Ratings cut Colombia’s long-term foreign currency rating to BB+ from BBB- in May 2021 after the administration of then-president Iván Duque withdrew a tax reform bill following street protests, costing the country its investment-grade status with that agency.

The new baseline: 2023 to 2026

Strong post-pandemic nominal growth briefly pulled the debt ratio down toward 57 percent in 2023. The decline did not hold. Structural spending pressures, elevated international interest rates and tax collections below budgeted projections pushed the ratio back up, establishing a new operating band around 60 to 62 percent of GDP. The Ministerio de Hacienda reported government debt to GDP at 61.3 percent for 2024.

The administration of President Gustavo Petro and Finance Minister Germán Ávila Plazas activated the regla fiscal escape clause for a second time in June 2025, with the Consejo Superior de Política Fiscal (Confis) approving a three-year suspension covering 2025 through 2027. The decision came despite an unfavorable technical opinion from the Comité Autónomo de la Regla Fiscal, which concluded that legal conditions for activating the clause were not met outside of a national emergency. The clause had previously been invoked only during the COVID-19 pandemic.

According to the Marco Fiscal de Mediano Plazo (MFMP) presented by the Ministerio de Hacienda, net public debt to GDP is projected to rise from 53 percent in 2023 to 61.3 percent in 2025 and approximately 63 percent in 2026. The fiscal deficit for 2025 was initially projected at 7.1 percent of GDP and later revised to roughly 6.2 percent of GDP, with the administration targeting a deficit below 6 percent of GDP for 2026.

Debt service consumes a larger share of the budget

The cost of servicing this debt has reshaped the structure of the national budget. The 2026 draft budget presented by Minister Ávila totals $557 trillion COP, equivalent to roughly $134.7 billion USD, and represents 28.9 percent of GDP. Of that, debt servicing costs are projected at $102.5 trillion COP, or 5.3 percent of GDP, down from 6.2 percent of GDP in 2025.

The figures published by the Ministerio de Hacienda for domestic debt service in 2026 are higher when measured against tax intake alone: of an estimated $130 trillion COP in domestic debt service, $79 trillion COP corresponds to principal that can be rolled over through new issuances, while $51 trillion COP represents interest payments funded directly from the budget. Against projected tax revenue of approximately $300 trillion COP, that implies roughly one in every three pesos collected by the central government is allocated to interest on existing debt.

Rating agencies reprice the sovereign

The rating cycle has accelerated alongside the fiscal trajectory. Moody’s Ratings downgraded Colombia to Baa3 and subsequently into junk territory in 2025, citing the suspension of the fiscal rule. S&P Global Ratings issued a further downgrade in April 2026, its second cut in less than a year, on the same persistent deficit and debt concerns. Fitch Ratings also moved Colombia deeper into speculative grade in December 2025.

The Banco de la República reported external debt — combining public and private liabilities — at $238.7 billion USD at the close of November 2025, equivalent to 54.8 percent of GDP, an increase of $15.8 billion USD from January of the same year. The Colombian economy is currently valued at approximately $435 billion USD.

What investors are watching next

The Comité Autónomo de la Regla Fiscal has stated in its most recent reports to Congress that the 2025 primary balance target was missed by a wide margin even after the escape clause was activated, and that incoming projections for 2026 raise the bar for any return to the original fiscal rule by 2028. Business groups including Fenalco and the Consejo Gremial Nacional have publicly opposed the suspension and signaled potential legal challenges.

The 2026 financing plan disclosed by the Ministerio de Hacienda includes approximately $4.6 billion USD in global bond issuances, primarily to refinance a one-year Swiss-franc Total Return Swap operation valued at roughly $9.3 billion USD. The ministry has stated that the issuance does not constitute net new external debt. Updated debt and deficit targets are scheduled for release in the next iteration of the Plan Financiero.

For executives operating in Colombia or evaluating new investment, the baseline shift from a mid-30s to a low-60s debt-to-GDP environment alters several variables simultaneously: peso volatility tied to refinancing cycles, the trajectory of corporate tax policy as Congress weighs successive reform proposals, and the path of domestic interest rates set by the Banco de la República as it manages inflation alongside elevated sovereign funding costs. Detailed historical and forward-looking debt data is published by the Investor Relations Colombia office of the Ministerio de Hacienda.

Colombia’s General Government Debt-to-GDP Ratio (2006-2026) (image: Google)

The Colombian Council of State has issued a provisional suspension of the government decree that established a 23% increase in the national minimum wage for 2026. The judicial decision halts the implementation of the adjustment, which had set the monthly salary at $1,750,905 COP plus a transportation assistance allowance, totaling approximately $2,000,000 COP.

The suspension follows several legal challenges arguing that the administration of President Gustavo Petro exceeded its authority by setting an increase significantly higher than the 5.1% inflation rate recorded in 2025. The court found reasonable doubt regarding whether the executive branch adhered to the technical criteria mandated by Law 278 of 1996, which requires adjustments to be based on inflation, productivity, and economic growth.

Immediate Regulatory Timeline and Compliance

The high court has granted the Ministry of Labor an eight-day window to issue a new provisional decree. During this period, employers are instructed to maintain current payment levels until the new administrative act is published.

Legal experts emphasize that the ruling does not have retroactive effects. Juan Pablo López, managing partner at López & Asociados, told daily El Tiempo that payments made between January 1 and the issuance of the new decree remain valid. Companies are legally prohibited from discounting or requesting the return of the additional 23% already paid to employees for January and the first half of February.

Vicente Umaña, partner at Posse Herrera Ruiz, clarified to the same publication that while payments currently due must honor the 23% increase, the forthcoming decree will likely establish a lower rate. This adjustment will subsequently impact other costs indexed to the minimum wage, including administration fees, fines, and transport costs.

Economic and Labor Market Projections

The initial 23% hike sparked concerns among economic think tanks regarding formal employment and inflation. Fedesarrollo published an analysis suggesting that such an increase could lead to the loss of up to 600,000 formal jobs and a three-percentage-point rise in labor informality.

Economic researchers at Bancolombia (BVC: BCOLOMBIA, NYSE: CIB) estimated potential job losses could reach 734,000. Their data highlights specific sectors at risk:

• Professional activities: 390,537 jobs
• Commerce: 71,917 jobs
• Construction: 54,537 jobs
• Manufacturing: 42,774 jobs

According to Medellín-based El Colombiano, Camilo Cuervo, partner at Holland & Knight, noted that the Council of State’s language suggests the original decree may not survive a final merits review. Luis Fernando Mejía, CEO of Lumen Economic Intelligence, indicated that the suspension could serve to stabilize price escalations observed in early 2026.

Business Community and Government Reactions

The National Federation of Merchants (FENALCO) and the National Business Association of Colombia (ANDI) have addressed the ruling. Jaime Alberto Cabal, president of FENALCO, described the suspension as a necessary correction to an adjustment that did not reflect economic realities. Bruce Mac Master, president of ANDI, stated that the ruling establishes important jurisprudence for technical responsibility in wage setting.

Mauricio Montealegre, partner at Pérez-Llorca Gómez-Pinzón, observed that while the government could theoretically attempt to justify the same figure in a new decree, the president has called for a new concertation table to align with the court’s criteria.

Guidance for Employers

Business owners and human resources departments operating in Colombia should consider the following steps:

• Maintain Current Payroll: Continue paying the 1,750,905 COP base salary until the new decree is officially published in the government gazette.
• Avoid Retroactive Deductions: Ensure that no attempts are made to recoup the 23% increase already paid to staff for previous periods.
• Monitor the New Decree: Prepare for a mid-month adjustment in the second half of February, as the new rate will apply immediately upon publication.
• Contractual Review: Assess contracts and service agreements tied to the minimum wage to prepare for downward adjustments in indexed costs if the new rate is lower.

Photo © Loren Moss

The project is the result of collaborative efforts between the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism, Fontur, Fenalco, the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce, and the Externado University of Colombia. MICE tourism boosts the local economy by attracting corporate, academic, and institutional visitors who participate in high-impact events, generating employment, and consumer spending, and increasing the destination’s reputation.

“Meeting tourism not only boosts the local economy, it also presents us to the world as a prepared, diverse, and sustainable country. Bogotá has everything it needs to consolidate itself as the epicenter of major events,” stated Diana Marcela Morales, minister of commerce, industry, and tourism.

Of the 56 tourism service providers who participated, 28 completed the Diploma in Comprehensive Event Management, aimed at officials and collaborators of companies and MSMEs in the tourism sector. During 120 hours of in-person training, provided by the Externado de Colombia University and the Meeting Professionals International (MPI) organization, attendees were trained in legal and financial aspects, event modalities, social responsibility, operations, evaluation, and sustainability. As an added value, they obtained the international “Meeting Essentials” certification.

Additionally, 28 other providers completed the Sustainable Event Management Course, which allowed them to strengthen their skills in responsible practices and learn strategies to mitigate the environmental impact of organizing meetings, conferences, fairs, and other events. This comprehensive approach provided them with tools to combine competitiveness with sustainability.

The project had an investment of $1.066 billion USD, 77% co-financed by the ministry through Fontur. This training provided specialized knowledge in sustainability, innovation, and new technologies applied to MICE tourism, to improve the job skills of stakeholders in the sector’s value chain.

As part of this training program, the MICE Congress was held during the second half of 2024, an academic event that brought together more than 400 national and international attendees, who shared innovative practices and policies to strengthen the events industry in Colombia.

These results were possible thanks to the institutional coordination between the public and private sectors and academia, in a joint effort to consolidate Bogotá as one of the leading MICE tourism destinations in Latin America.

MICE tourism—Meetings, Incentives, Conventions, and Exhibitions—is a specialized type of tourism that encompasses meetings, incentives, congresses, and exhibitions. Photo credit: MINCIT.

President Petro’s visit aimed to reinforce diplomatic ties, attract investment, and strengthen Colombia’s position in areas such as sustainable development, technological cooperation, and global trade. Central to this agenda was the signing of a memorandum of understanding (MoU) regarding Colombia’s adherence to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a.k.a. the New Silk Road, which seeks to enhance global connectivity through investments in transport, energy, and telecommunications infrastructure.

While the MoU does not yet formalize Colombia’s full integration into the BRI, the move raised concerns among some domestic sectors. Through a press release, Fenalco, the national federation of merchants, pointed out that “global trade is not a zero-sum game. It’s not about substituting one market for another, nor about generating unnecessary tensions with our main allies. The United States remains our fundamental strategic partner (…). Trade and diplomatic decisions must be made with a long-term vision, defending the economic and social well-being of all Colombians.” Bruce MacMaster, President of the National Business Association of Colombia, ANDI, claimed via X: “Does Colombia want to do this now? In exchange for what? What justification is there from the perspective of our current international strategy? How does it affect our relationship with our trading partners, who buy most of our exports? I hope these factors are taken into account when discussing or considering the issue.”

The ‘strategic partner’ both organizations were referring to is Colombia’s largest business partner, the US, which also was not indifferent to the matter. “The U.S. will strongly oppose recent projects and upcoming disbursements by the Inter-American Development Bank and other IFIs for Chinese state-owned and controlled companies in Colombia (and other BRI countries in the region). These projects endanger the region’s safety and security. American tax dollars SHOULD NOT be used in any way by international organizations to subsidize Chinese companies in our hemisphere,” the Department of State’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs announced via X, shortly after the MoU was signed.

As part of the agenda in China, Colombia also submitted its application to join the New Development Bank (NDB,) an institution founded by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) to finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging economies. With the application, Petro’s government committed to purchasing $512 million USD in shares of the bank. Colombia is working on this new partnership to fund large-scale infrastructure projects, including a proposed rail network connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

President Petro and his delegation held several high-profile meetings during their time in China. In Beijing, they met with executives from China Energy (SZSE:000966) and Foton (SS:600166), exploring opportunities in the energy transition and renewable energy sectors. In Shanghai, they visited the headquarters of BYD (OTCPK:BYDDF), leading global player in electric vehicles and green transportation. Discussions focused on sustainable mobility, investment possibilities in Colombia, and technology transfer.

The visit also emphasized academic and scientific diplomacy. Petro met with Shanghai Mayor Gong Zheng. They discussed commercial cooperation, artificial intelligence, sustainable urban development, and education.

Through the Colombian Ministry of Education, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed with three prominent Chinese universities—Beihang University, Tianjin University, and South China Agricultural University. The agreements aim to “foster academic, scientific, and cultural exchange”, according to the Colombian government press release.

Some critics argue that aligning too closely with China could jeopardize Colombia’s trade relations with the US. Moreover, skepticism remains regarding the long-term implications of joining large-scale Chinese-led initiatives, particularly given concerns around debt, transparency, and sovereignty. As Francisco Santos, Colombia’s former Vice President, told Finance Colombia, “China doesn’t give anything away: it demands political loyalty, charges high prices, and exerts unscrupulous pressure. Countries like Ecuador, Venezuela, and Sri Lanka are mired in debt impossible to be paid, blatant corruption, and loss of sovereignty. Is this the future Petro wants for Colombia? Signing a deal with China isn’t progress; it’s mortgaging the country in exchange for shady favors. This isn’t a strategic shift; it’s a leap into the void driven by the most controversial government in our recent history.”

Headline photo: Chinese President Xi Jinping and Colombian President Gustavo Petro. (Photo: Presidencia de Colombia)

While there is general consensus that labor reform in Colombia is necessary, disagreements persist over how to balance the interests of businesses, workers, and lawmakers responsible for enacting these changes. The government argues that the proposed reform aims to restore labor rights and enhance job stability, with a particular emphasis on promoting indefinite-term contracts.

Bruce MacMaster, President of the National Business Association of Colombia, ANDI, claims that President Petro’s government of failing to comply with the international agreements to which Colombia has signed, since two years have passed without holding a labor consultation. “We went to the International Labour Organization (ILO) to formally denounce the Colombian government for not advancing the consultation that should have been done by constitutional obligation and by the international agreements it has signed,” MacMaster told broadcasting network Caracol Radio.

One of the most debated aspects of the proposal includes changes to work hours and compensation. The bill proposed shifting the start of night shifts from 9:00 PM to 7:00 PM, which would require employers to pay a 25% surcharge for work beyond that hour. Additionally, compensation for work on mandatory rest days and holidays would rise from 75% to 100%.

Business leaders have voiced strong opposition to these provisions, arguing that they would lead to significantly higher labor costs and reduced productivity. Jaime Alberto Cabal, President of Fenalco, the national federation of merchants, stated that many small and medium-sized enterprises narrowly avoided a 30% increase in labor costs due to the bill’s rejection. “For the sake of Colombian workers, the unemployed, the informal sector, and small and medium-sized businesses, it is necessary to think carefully before approving a labor reform that is harmful to Colombia’s interests,” he said on a video shared on social media.

Alfonso Cuitiva, president of the board of directors of the Colombian Association of Retail Drugstore Owners (Asocoldro), noted that while the union agrees with improving workers’ conditions, it is also important to boost the entire productive sector, including microentrepreneurs, who are numerous in this country. “In fact, microentrepreneurs in this country generate more than 60% of employment. Small and medium-sized enterprises, together, generates almost 90% of employment in this country, and this is the sector most impacted by the labor reform,” Cuitiva said to Medellín newspaper El Colombiano.

Labor unions and social organizations, however, have fiercely condemned the Senate’s decision. The Comando Nacional Unitario, that gather Colombia’s major labor unions and pensioners’ confederations, called for a national mobilization on March 18th to demand that Congress “prioritize workers’ rights over business interests”.

Union leaders argue that the labor reform was an essential step toward social justice, aimed at reversing labor policies implemented through Law 50 of 1990 and Law 789 of 2002 under former President Álvaro Uribe. These laws, they contend, eroded job stability and social security protections. For labor activists, the rejection of the reform represents a victory for neoliberal policies that have perpetuated inequality and precarious employment conditions.

While officials aligned with President Petro are promoting mobilization in favor of the reform, other officials have shown their disengagement with these actions.

“On Tuesday, March 18th, Medellín’s public servants will work normally. We will not shut down educational institutions, health services or any other public institution. (…) May the economy continue to grow. May thousands of good-quality, well-paying jobs continue to be generated. There is no better social policy than job creation,” stated Medellin’s Mayor Federico Gutiérrez on X.

As the debate over labor reform continues, the divide between the government, business sector, and labor movements highlights the complexity of enacting meaningful changes in Colombia’s labor laws. Whether through legislative efforts or a public referendum, the issue remains a critical test for Petro’s administration and agenda.

Headline photo: Newly appointed Minister of Culture, Yannai Kadamani Fonrodona (third from the left in the front row), shared a video on her personal social media, calling for participation in the March 18 protests in support of the government and the labor reform. (Photo: X / @KadamaniYannai)

Unfortunately, they were likely even more perturbed at what they were watching, amidst yet another cabinet reshuffle and an increasing lack of direction. The 2026 elections are now on the horizon and the political jockeying is under way.

Petro’s 18-month countdown to-do list is littered with impossible and improbable items. Top of that list is ‘Total Peace’ – as events in Catatumbo have demonstrated, it isn’t going to happen. Guerrillas to both the right and left (in fact, do they any longer have an ideology?) are shipping ever more cocaine and are willing to trade body bags to get their way.

In terms of the reform process, it was always going to be a big ask. He should always have stuck with a couple of items, education and the political system being the most important, and tried to hang his legacy on those. He attempted to reform everything and is going to badly underexecute.

The migrant dispute with the US has already passed, and personally, I think there is value to demanding dignity in the face of a bully, others think it was a step too far. That said, the whole of the Colombian economy needs to try and pivot away from the US market.

This week we saw export data from Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística – DANE Colombia for December. There was a 0.6% increase YoY for the month, but the 2024 total was down 0.5%. Commodities dragged whilst coffee and manufactured goods fared better.

Last week we saw January vehicle sales rise 24.3% and now ANDI – Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia and FENALCO are estimating a full-year increase of 9.4% to 220,000.

We will have January CPI with an expectation of another drop to 5.12% (from 5.20% in December) – this will be a move towards Fedesarrollo‘s YE estimate of 4.18%. Despite a somewhat chaotic picture locally, the Peso had a stable week ($4175) as the fears over a trade dispute with the US eased somewhat.

Have a great day.

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Headline Image: Coffee farmer. Photo credit: HunterProducciones from Pixabay.