Medellín Mayor Federico Gutiérrez is preparing to take additional information to U.S. authorities as his administration investigates whether money allegedly diverted through corruption during the city’s previous government was moved through Panama and into the United States.

Gutiérrez said he has already provided evidence to U.S. government agencies and plans to deliver more information during an upcoming visit to the United States. The mayor says the material could help authorities trace the alleged movement of funds and identify people who may have benefited.

The allegations concern the 2020-2023 administration of former Medellín Mayor Daniel Quintero. They remain allegations, with responsibility for determining criminal liability resting with Colombian and U.S. authorities.

Alleged money trail leads beyond Colombia

The latest development follows a July 27 update from the Medellín government, which said investigations into alleged corruption during the previous administration had reached 666 findings, 165 more than the 501 previously identified.

According to the city, prosecutors and other authorities have collected more than 13,000 pieces of evidence and 157 witness statements and have conducted 97 expert assessments. The cases have so far resulted in 55 people being formally charged, three arrests, one conviction and 25 asset-forfeiture measures.

Gutiérrez has now placed particular emphasis on tracing what allegedly happened to money after it left Colombia.

The mayor said there is information about alleged business partners and nominees, including people who are reportedly living in Miami. He said the evidence provided to U.S. agencies is intended to help trace a potential route from Colombia to Panama and then to the United States.

If confirmed, an international financial trail could expand the investigation beyond Medellín and require cooperation from authorities in other jurisdictions.

Investigation covers multiple public entities

The corruption investigations extend across several Medellín institutions and public contracts.

The city has cited alleged irregularities involving Afinia, EPM’s Caribbean subsidiary, the Metropolitan Area of the Aburrá Valley, Metroparques, the Institute of Sports and Recreation, Buen Comienzo and the maintenance of Parque de las Aguas, among others.

Gutiérrez’s administration says potentially directed contracting during the 2020-2023 period exceeded COP 1 trillion.

One investigation cited by the city concerns the alleged sale of the management position at Afinia. According to information presented by the administration, a witness alleged that the position was negotiated for $8 million in exchange for influence over company contracting. The case includes alleged international connections that are being examined by authorities.

Other investigations involve alleged contract steering, inflated costs and the improper use of public resources.

Quintero rejects the allegations

The accusations have also intensified the political confrontation between Gutiérrez and Quintero.

Gutiérrez has attributed the alleged corruption findings to the previous administration, while Quintero has rejected the accusations and accused his successor of using the Medellín mayor’s office to pursue political attacks.

The distinction between allegations and established judicial findings remains important as the cases continue through Colombia’s justice system.

U.S. cooperation could determine where funds went

The planned engagement with U.S. authorities could become a significant next step if investigators are able to verify the alleged international financial trail.

Gutiérrez said the information could ultimately contribute to legal proceedings against people allegedly involved in the schemes, including potential extradition requests. However, no U.S. authority has publicly established that illicit Colombian funds entered the United States based on the allegations described by the mayor.

For now, the alleged movement of corruption proceeds into the United States remains an investigative lead. The next stage will be determining whether Colombian and U.S. authorities can independently establish the origin, movement and destination of the funds.

(Headline photo: Medellin’s mayor, Federico Gutiérrez. (Photo by John Acosta via Wikimedia Commons)

Three days after the ceremony, a magnitude 7.4 earthquake hit western Colombia and rewrote the agenda entirely. The inheritance came first, though, and it is the reason he is president at all.

The numbers that elected him

The Centro de Paz y Seguridad (Center for Peace and Security) at Universidad Externado counted 40,663 homicides in Colombia between August 2022 and August 2025 — Gustavo Petro’s first three years in office — an annual average of 13,554. Over the equivalent stretch under Iván Duque, the figure was 37,795, averaging 12,598 a year, and under Juan Manuel Santos it was 36,646, averaging 12,215. El Tiempo published the center’s findings in December 2025.

Under Paz Total (Total Peace), the policy that opened simultaneous negotiations with practically every armed and criminal structure in the country, those structures grew. Infobae reported a military intelligence count showing membership rising from 15,120 in December 2022 to 25,278 by July 2025, an increase of 10,158, concentrated in the Nariño Pacific, Catatumbo, Cauca, Bajo Cauca Antioqueño and Arauca — zones, in Infobae’s words, of weak institutional presence. The Fundación Ideas para la Paz (Ideas for Peace Foundation), working from the same count, puts 48 percent of that total under arms and the remaining 52 percent in support networks. By July 2026 the figure had reached 28,802, a 90 percent increase across the Petro years, according to El Colombiano. That is not an interpretation of the policy; it is the count.

The sharpest version of that failure, for a business, is extortion. Ministry of Defense data reviewed by La FM shows 2,914 extortion complaints filed in the first three months of 2026, the highest quarterly figure in 10 years. Gen. William Rincón, director of the National Police, told La FM that more complaints do not automatically mean more crimes, and put the year-over-year increase at 13.1 percent for the same period. La FM identifies merchants, shopkeepers, cattlemen and small business owners as the standing victims of that economy.

A mandate Medellín paid for

De la Espriella won the June 21, 2026, runoff with 12,959,542 votes against 12,708,712 for Iván Cepeda — a margin of 250,830 votes, which El Tiempo put at 0.96 percentage points of all ballots cast, blank and null included, in the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (National Civil Registry) preliminary count. MercoPress called it the narrowest margin in a Colombian runoff in 32 years. In the same El Tiempo breakdown, Medellín gave him 819,285 votes against 421,839 for Cepeda — a net margin of about 397,000, larger than the entire national margin, out of a single metropolitan area. Bogotá went the other way, 2,235,514 to 1,933,243. World Population Review puts Bogotá at roughly 7.9 million against 2.5 million for Medellín, so the smaller city delivered the decisive block. Take Medellín out of the arithmetic and Abelardo de la Espriella is not the president of Colombia.

Click above to watch the video!

That is arithmetic, not commentary, and Medellín knows it. The city will expect a return, and an itemized one: the international airport expansion, highway concessions, hard security and continued support for the business climate that made it a destination for nearshoring and technology investment. That is the first political claim on the new government, and it arrives ahead of everything else in the program.

The inauguration was supposed to happen somewhere else. De la Espriella wanted to be sworn in at a military garrison in Popayán, and the Senate approved moving Congress to Cauca for it. Petro killed that on July 24, 2026: “I give no permission to any garrison or military establishment to make itself ready for the swearing-in of any official of the civil power in Colombia,” he said, in a statement carried by El Colombiano that extended to the Army, the Navy and the National Police. La Silla Vacía traced what followed: the House approved the switch to Cali 117 to 7 on July 28, the Senate followed on July 29 by 58 to 30 with 15 abstentions, and de la Espriella’s team cited volcanic activity around Popayán, whose Guillermo León Valencia airport had been shut more than a third of the preceding 20 days. Pacto Histórico (Historic Pact) lost its own blocking motion 114 to 6 and then announced it would not attend the ceremony at all. Per MercoPress, Congress convened at Universidad Santiago de Cali’s arena, Senate President Honorio Henríquez placed the presidential sash on him, and de la Espriella then moved to the Pichincha Battalion, where he spoke to armed forces and police commanders for more than an hour. The same report lists King Felipe VI of Spain among the attendees, along with Javier Milei of Argentina, Daniel Noboa of Ecuador, Santiago Peña of Paraguay and José Raúl Mulino of Panama, with José Antonio Kast of Chile there for bilateral meetings on the sidelines, and records Cepeda ending the day by announcing a shadow cabinet.

Worth noting, because it complicates the symbolism: Cali voted against him, 682,166 to 443,047, and so did Barranquilla, 375,178 to 309,652 — the city he wants recognized as an alternate capital. That designation is not ordinary legislation. Infobae laid out the route: Article 322 of the Constitution makes Bogotá the sole capital and Capital District, so recognizing Barranquilla requires an acto legislativo (constitutional amendment) — eight debates across two rounds, against the four an ordinary law needs. “The forgetting is over, the neglect is over, the centralist abandonment is over,” de la Espriella said in announcing it, per Semana. He has cast it as a break with Rafael Núñez: “A hundred and forty years ago Colombia did not have a president from the Caribbean. The last was President Núñez. But I am not going to make Núñez’s mistake. I am not going to defend the centralism that President Núñez defended. I am going to defend decentralization,” he said, in remarks reported by Infobae. The physical seat is already going up: El Heraldo reported that the Army’s Second Brigade at the Batallón Paraíso will house it, with the Atlántico governor’s office under Eduardo Verano executing the works. El Tiempo counts three regional seats in all: Barranquilla, plus the Centro Cultural de Cali, offered by Mayor Alejandro Eder and plaqued as an alternate presidential seat, and Medellín’s Palacio de la Cultura Rafael Uribe Uribe. In Bogotá itself the presidency moves to the Palacio de San Carlos, which currently houses the Foreign Ministry, while the Casa de Nariño becomes a museum open to the public.

His diagnosis is sound, and the problem is older than any of us: power in Colombia has been concentrated in the capital since independence, and the coast, the Pacific, the plains and the south have paid for it. Whether this becomes an actual redistribution of investment and institutional capacity, or a series of well-photographed ceremonies in cities that did not vote for him, will take a year or more to read.

A mandate without a legislature

The Consejo Nacional Electoral (National Electoral Council) granted legal status to de la Espriella’s Defensores de la Patria (Defenders of the Homeland) on August 3, 2026 — six magistrates in favor, one against and two absent — on the strength of the 12,960,166 votes certified to the ticket in the final scrutiny — 624 more than the preliminary count above — or 49.66 percent, nearly 14 times the 3 percent threshold the law requires, as Infobae reported. He was inaugurated four days later. The party holds no seats in either chamber; Infobae puts its first electoral outing at the regional elections of October 2027, and the next congressional cycle is March 2030.

The Congress he has to work with was elected on March 8, 2026, and seated on July 20, 2026. El País of Cali reported Pacto Histórico rising from the 20 Senate seats it won in 2022 to 25, and Centro Democrático (Democratic Center) from 13 to 17. In the House, La República counted 183 seats, with Pacto Histórico again the largest bloc at 41, Centro Democrático second at 30 and the Partido Liberal (Liberal Party) at 24, one Cundinamarca seat still disputed. The largest single bloc in both chambers belongs to the coalition he just defeated.

That matters more than the usual first-100-days handicapping, because the marquee items all need a legislature. Abolishing the Instituto Nacional Penitenciario y Carcelario (National Penitentiary and Prison Institute), or INPEC, would require statutory change and a redefinition of the state’s role in prison administration. The alternate capital requires a constitutional amendment. So would eliminating the Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz (Special Jurisdiction for Peace), or JEP, a tribunal created by constitutional amendment under the 2016 peace accord. What a president can do alone is issue decrees and direct the security forces, and that is what week one consisted of.

The traditional right cannot rescue him, because it is coming apart at exactly the moment he needs it. Centro Democrático’s candidate, Paloma Valencia, won the right-wing inter-party consultation in March 2026 with more than 3 million votes and had been polling near 20 percent going into the May 31, 2026, first round. A Guarumo poll published by El Tiempo had her at 19.9 percent in March 2026, up from 6.9 percent in January. She finished the May 31 first round with 1,639,668 votes, 6.92 percent, behind de la Espriella’s 43.74 percent and Cepeda’s 40.90 percent, per El Espectador’s tally of the Registraduría count — ending roughly where she had started the year. A party founded in 2013 to be the wall against the Colombian left finished third, behind both the man who beat it and the left coalition it exists to stop.

María Fernanda Cabal left the party in January 2026 along with her husband, José Félix Lafaurie, who heads the Federación Colombiana de Ganaderos (Colombian Federation of Cattle Ranchers), telling Infobae that the internal process which selected Valencia over her was irregular. In August 2026, she went further and filed for an escisión (a formal legal split) of the party. “No party can survive when it renounces the ideas that gave it origin,” she wrote, in remarks also carried by Infobae. Valencia, for her part, told a meeting in Antioquia that “we have to understand very clearly what party we are in. This is not a right-wing party.”

Álvaro Uribe’s own legal position complicates the popular version of this story. Judge Sandra Liliana Heredia sentenced him on August 1, 2025, to 12 years of house detention and a fine of $3.444 billion COP for procedural fraud and bribery in a criminal proceeding, the first former Colombian president convicted by the ordinary courts after waiving his congressional privilege in 2020. “The damage was colossal,” she said, as El Espectador reported. The Tribunal Superior de Bogotá (Bogotá Superior Court) acquitted him on October 21, 2025, finding he had committed neither offense. Infobae reported that the court held the interceptions of Uribe’s calls with his attorney Diego Cadena to be illegal and threw them out, and found contradictions and personal motives in the accounts of the former paramilitaries whose testimony carried the case. The Fiscalía General de la Nación (Attorney General’s Office) and the accredited victims filed cassation appeals with the Corte Suprema de Justicia (Supreme Court of Justice) on January 13, 2026, as Infobae reported, and Infobae also reported the court halting the proceeding in February 2026 over a recusal motion against one of its magistrates. Convicted, then un-convicted, with the final word still pending.

Regardless of how that ends, the political cost has landed. Centro Democrático was built around Uribe’s personal ability to anoint a candidate and deliver the votes behind them, and the legal fight, his age and the unpopularity of the Duque administration have drained that ability. The loyalists still worship the man, but his base is aging along with him and that circle is visibly shrinking. Younger conservatives who were not around to admire his successes against the guerrillas went a different direction this cycle, in some respects further right than Uribe and his movement.

“The peace commissioner’s office is finished, because there will be no more false peace processes in my government.” — Abelardo de la Espriella, president of Colombia

The program, and what it will cost

On his first day, de la Espriella signed the decree creating the Bloque de Defensa para la Seguridad Urbana (Urban Security Defense Block), which he had announced on July 5, 2026, while convening the mayors of Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla and Bucaramanga. “To issue effective measures matched to the needs of the worst-affected cities, I am convening the mayors of Bogotá, Medellín, Cali, Barranquilla and Bucaramanga so that, starting from their needs, we can create the largest urban security operation in Colombia,” he said, in remarks reported by El Tiempo. Bogotá Mayor Carlos Galán backed it in the same account: “the country needs to redefine its criminal policy. Far from rewarding criminal gangs, we must punish them. Anyone who commits a violent crime or reoffends in criminal conduct that harms the lives of others belongs in prison, not on the streets.” Medellín Mayor Federico Gutiérrez answered, in a post carried by El Heraldo, “We are ready, President Abelardo de la Espriella… The only ones who should feel afraid are the criminals.” His inauguration address added a tax reform aimed at evasion, elimination of the wealth tax, publication of an official list of narco-terrorist organizations, coca eradication and financial inclusion for informal workers, according to MercoPress.

The centerpiece of the longer program is a set of maximum-security megacárceles (mega-prisons) modeled on the Terrorism Confinement Center, or CECOT, built by Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele. Speaking to Caracol Radio in March 2026, in an interview Infobae wrote up, he described “ten mega-prisons in the middle of nowhere, where not even the signal of the Holy Cross gets in,” to be built with private capital in exchange for concessions of “fifty, seventy, eighty years, whatever it takes,” and confirmed the Bukele model when asked directly. On INPEC he was blunter: “INPEC is a cancer for Colombian justice and for Colombian society. It has to be taken out.” The number is not settled — El Tiempo’s summary of his 10 governing pillars put it at seven. A senior Salvadoran government official said Bukele’s administration is willing to advise Colombia on the build, in an interview with Semana reported by Chicanoticias. Medellín is not waiting: Gutiérrez has announced a high-security facility for more than 1,300 inmates, financed with public and private funds, guarded by its own dedicated force rather than INPEC officers, and expected to open in 2027, according to AFP reporting carried by France 24.

The baseline is genuinely bad. A Contraloría (Comptroller General) review running to 306 findings, reported by El Tiempo, puts overcrowding at 27.1 percent at the close of March 2026, against 19.9 percent in February 2022. Installed capacity rose by 378 beds in four years, from 80,647 to 81,025, while the inmate population grew by 6,246, from 96,703 to 102,949. El Tiempo puts the guard shortfall at up to 12,000, even as the custody corps itself grew from 12,715 to 14,142 officers. The economics are the harder problem. La Nación of Neiva estimates each facility at more than $1 trillion COP and three to four years to build, and cites the Universidad de los Andes security and drugs research center noting that five earlier national planning-council prison-infrastructure plans rarely executed more than 20 percent of their targets, while the combined budget of INPEC and the prison services agency USPEC went from $1.6 trillion COP to more than $4 trillion COP between 2015 and 2025 without improving recidivism.

Colombia does not bring a strong balance sheet to that negotiation. The Finance Ministry’s own investor relations office lists S&P Global Ratings at BB- in foreign currency with a stable outlook as of April 2026, Fitch Ratings at BB stable as of December 2025, and Moody’s Ratings at Baa3 stable as of June 2025 — two of the three agencies below investment grade, with Moody’s alone still holding the sovereign at its lowest investment-grade notch. The April cut was Colombia’s fourth on S&P’s scale since 2020, El Espectador reported, quoting José Ignacio López of the financial research institute ANIF that the country “keeps moving away from investment grade.” A government proposing a mega-prison program on that scale, a national urban security surge and the elimination of the wealth tax, from that starting point, will be judged on sequencing rather than on ambition.

Then the ground moved

At 7:34 a.m. on Monday, August 10, 2026, a magnitude 7.4 earthquake struck western Colombia, centered on San José del Palmar in Chocó, a community of 4,800 people about 400 kilometers west of Bogotá. Al Jazeera, reporting with AP and Reuters, sourced the epicenter to the United States Geological Survey and put the toll at 250 dead or more by August 11, with more than 2,700 people reported missing on citizen-run websites and about 1,600 buildings damaged or destroyed. Several upper floors of Cali’s Hospital Universitario del Valle collapsed, including pediatric wards, with roughly 600 patients treated in a street full of rubble; hospital director Irne Torres Castro described the scene to Caracol television. The same report cites the Servicio Geológico Colombiano (Colombian Geological Service) recording 21 aftershocks by late Monday, and quotes Camila Gómez, deputy director of programs for Colombia and Venezuela at the International Rescue Committee, calling it the largest earthquake Colombia has experienced in two decades.

Imágenes desgarradoras del terremoto en Pereira muestra como se les viene encima la casita a esta familia. Pensando más en lo material que en sus vidas, pero nadie sabe cuánto costó conseguirlo. #terremoto #temblor pic.twitter.com/i7gqeZmy5B

— Don Ramon (@RuedaJohnn37191) August 15, 2026

Per that same account, de la Espriella declared a national state of emergency, mobilized what he called “the entire military and police apparatus,” traveled to Quibdó and to Cali, and promised rental subsidies for people whose homes were damaged. Curfews went up in Cali, Armenia and Manizales; hospitals in five cities went to red alert; airports at Pereira, Manizales, Quibdó, Armenia, Cartago and Buenaventura suspended operations for structural inspection. “Chocó will never again be the land of the forgotten,” he said in Quibdó. MercoPress reported his appointment of geological engineer David Suárez Tamayo to head the Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (National Disaster Risk Management Unit).

That Quibdó sentence is the decentralization argument, delivered under conditions nobody would have chosen. Counting the departments behind the cities named above — Chocó, Valle del Cauca, Risaralda, Quindío and Caldas — the quake hit the exact periphery the alternate-capital project is nominally about, and it hit the department where he had been sworn in three days earlier. It is also the first hard test of a government whose organizing promise is that the state can show up where it never has. On the early evidence, the machinery is being learned in real time. Colombia requested supplies but not foreign rescue personnel, despite offers from at least six countries, issuing a diplomatic note on August 11, 2026, that MercoPress noted does not formally amount to an international appeal. The same report has Bukele making Colombia’s position public before Bogotá did, and quotes international relations scholar Sandra Borda saying “the government is learning on the go how the mechanism works,” and that cities cannot channel aid directly. The posture shifted within days. By August 15, in the same El Tiempo report that carried his call with Trump, the Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (National Disaster Risk Management Unit), or UNGRD, had begun formalizing requests for specialized teams from the United States, El Salvador, Ecuador and Israel, and de la Espriella had thanked Benjamin Netanyahu by telephone for the Israeli search-and-rescue crews.

🔴Se conocen impactantes imágenes del momento exacto en el que colapsó una edificación en la entrada del Centro del Comercio, en la ciudad de Pereira, durante el terremoto de 7,4 que se registró en Colombia el pasado 10 de agosto.

Las grabaciones muestran la caída de fragmentos… pic.twitter.com/oNZGvdbCJC

— EL TIEMPO (@ELTIEMPO) August 14, 2026

For the fiscal picture above, the quake is not a footnote. Reconstruction across those five departments now competes directly with prison concessions and an urban security surge for the same constrained peso. That belongs in any risk model built on the strength of the new security program.

Washington promises a billion dollars, and raises the tariff

The external position moved faster than anything domestic. On inauguration day, the US State Department released a statement titled “A New Era in US-Colombia Relations”, announcing that Washington, in coordination with Congress, intends to provide $1 billion USD as part of a security package supporting the new administration. El Tiempo noted the money is not approved: the statement says only that Washington will work with Congress to assemble it. The reversal it implies is still steep. US assistance to Colombia, which once ran at about $400 million USD a year, fell to roughly $187 million USD during the first year of Trump’s second term, according to a report to the US Congress cited by Infobae — a cut made in Washington, not in Bogotá, during a period of open dispute over drug policy. In 2025, the United States declined to certify Colombia’s counternarcotics performance for the first time since 1997, with a national-interest waiver that withheld the harshest consequences.

MercoPress reported that acting Attorney General Todd Blanche led the US delegation to the inauguration, with Office of National Drug Control Policy director Sara Carter and the vice president’s national security adviser, Cliff Sims; Donald Trump, JD Vance and Marco Rubio did not travel. The same State Department statement folded Colombia into Escudo de las Américas (Shield of the Americas), a regional security initiative backed by the Trump administration. De la Espriella had already placed its Colombian seat in Medellín, announcing on July 22, 2026, that the headquarters would go there “because this is where the head of the serpent of drug trafficking and organized crime is,” in remarks reported by Portafolio — a strategic choice, and also a second payment on the electoral debt described earlier.

Five days after the inauguration that relationship acquired a considerably harder edge. At an Escudo de las Américas meeting in Panama on August 12, 2026, US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said the new Colombian government had asked Washington to join its fight against narcoterrorism, “authorizing joint military operations to destroy the terrorists and the terror networks,” and named Colombia the 19th member of the Coalition Against the Cartels of the Americas. El Universal of Cartagena reported the announcement, and Vanguardia and El Tiempo both described what was authorized as joint military operations inside Colombia. That is a different proposition from an assistance package. Aid is a budget line Washington can adjust; foreign forces operating alongside Colombian ones inside Colombia is a sovereignty question, and it was settled in the first week of a presidency that commands no bloc in Congress. Whether that arrangement stays executive or ends up before the legislature is among the most consequential open questions he leaves himself.

The billion-dollar headline needs one piece of context that did not make the statement. CBS News reported that at the end of July 2026, roughly a week before the “new era” release, the United States raised its general tariff on Colombian imports from 10 percent to 12.5 percent, with exceptions including coffee and oil. After the earthquake, de la Espriella’s first substantive ask of Trump was to undo it. He told El Tiempo that the 10-minute call was “very friendly and cordial,” that he had asked Trump to consider a temporary suspension “to relieve our businesspeople, who are facing very difficult times because of the effects of the earthquake,” and that he had described the task ahead as rebuilding Colombia “in the middle of the economic situation — so difficult, so apocalyptic — that I inherited.” CBS News put the accompanying US assistance at $26.5 million USD, up from the $15.5 million USD announced on the day of the quake.

In his victory speech in Barranquilla, covered at the time by Finance Colombia, he framed the shift as Colombia returning to its place among the free nations, as a serious partner and a loyal ally rather than a dependent one. A relationship in which the ally sets your tariff rate and you ask for relief by telephone is a workable relationship. Whether it stays reciprocal, or curdles into dependency on whichever administration holds the White House, is a fair question over four years, and it is worth asking no matter who is in Washington.

Troublesome tendencies in Abelardo’s background

Between 2008 and 2019, de la Espriella filed 109 criminal complaints for defamation and slander against journalists, reporters and other citizens, according to Fiscalía figures provided to the Fundación para la Libertad de Prensa (Foundation for Press Freedom), or FLIP. Most were archived, withdrawn or went nowhere, which is precisely FLIP’s point about them: the organization argues that the effect of repeated recourse to lawsuits, injunctions, rectification demands and platform complaints is measured not in convictions but in legal costs, attrition and self-censorship.

Ahead of the runoff, FLIP and the International Federation for Human Rights issued a joint statement describing a pattern of attacks against the press, and FLIP’s own June 18, 2026, statement characterized it as “public disparagement, accusations of alleged political agendas, judicial harassment of journalists, baseless challenges to editorial independence, and actions aimed at undermining journalism on matters of public interest related to his candidacy.” The same LatAm Journalism Review summary records de la Espriella’s answer, that it is necessary to “set limits on journalists who believe they are untouchable.” He now says that with the machinery of the state behind him rather than a private lawyer’s caseload. Whether he has matured on this point, or simply acquired better tools, is one of the first real tests of the term.

In July 2026, he announced the closure of the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace along with the presidential offices for National Reconciliation and for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, folding their functions into the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Defense ministries on the argument that those competencies already sit there and the offices duplicate them. “The peace commissioner’s office is finished, because there will be no more false peace processes in my government,” he said, as El Tiempo reported. The Unit for Implementation of the Final Agreement goes with them, its responsibilities passing to a new National Security Commissioner — the postconflict brief absorbed into a security structure. Infobae put the scope at 229 positions cut from the Presidency as of August 7, 2026, for a projected annual saving of $10 billion COP. Winding down a negotiating strategy that failed on the numbers above is a defensible decision. El Tiempo’s reading of the rest is the part worth sitting with: the move dismantles the two offices that tracked state human rights policy and compliance with Colombia’s international commitments, and leaves those subjects with no unit reporting directly to the president.

The prison model carries the same risk in another form. The attraction of Bukele’s system, in de la Espriella’s own telling, is the collapse in gang violence that followed it. What it also produced is documented: Amnesty International found that four years into El Salvador’s state of emergency more than 90,000 people had been detained and at least 470 had died in state custody, in a report titled «Seguridad» sin derechos (“Security” Without Rights) built on six documentation visits between May 2022 and January 2025, 109 interviews and direct examination of more than 80 individual cases. The organization argues the pattern could amount to crimes against humanity. Whether Colombia’s version imports the first result without the second is unknown, because the program does not exist yet. It belongs near the top of the watch list for the coming year, and not only on financial grounds.

What to watch

In the Barranquilla victory speech quoted earlier, de la Espriella struck a different note than his record suggests: no victors and no vanquished, no retaliation, no persecution, rights respected even for those who did not vote for him. With a margin under 1 percentage point, a party four days old at inauguration and no bloc in Congress, that posture is arithmetic before it is generosity. It is also the only version of this presidency with a chance of surviving past a single term.

The collapse documented here fell hardest on low-income Colombians in the cities and the countryside — the people without private security, who cannot simply avoid a dangerous neighborhood. If the crackdown that began under the urban security decree goes after the armed structures themselves rather than the poorest people living next to them, the homicide and extortion trends can reverse. If it does not, the country trades one set of victims for another and buys a human rights problem on top of a security problem.

Five markers will tell the story faster than any speech. Whether quarterly extortion and homicide figures move, and in which municipalities. Whether financing for the prison program appears as an actual budget line rather than a concession announcement, now that reconstruction has a prior claim on it. Whether the Corte Suprema rules on Uribe, and what that does to what is left of Centro Democrático. Whether the alternate-capital amendment survives even the first of its eight debates. And whether any rating agency moves an outlook on the strength of the new fiscal posture, or against it on the cost of the quake.

The armed groups tested every recent transition in Colombia early, and there is no reason to expect this one to be different. The FARC dissident structures and the National Liberation Army, or ELN, will test the response, and the way this administration answers that first test — in Cauca, in Catatumbo, in the Bajo Cauca — will tell you more about the next four years than the first 100 days of decrees.

Migración Colombia denied entry to an American known on social media as Casey Red Beard at Aeropuerto Internacional El Dorado in Bogotá on Saturday, May 23, returning him on an immediate flight to Miami after officials confirmed prior alerts linking him to the alleged promotion of sex tourism and private gatherings in Medellín. The traveler has been barred from entering Colombia for 10 years.

The decision drew on existing anotaciones registered by the agency’s Regional Antioquia-Chocó office, derived from public denouncements made in earlier years. According to Migración Colombia, the man had used social media to promote private gatherings in apartments in Medellín aimed at foreign visitors, marketed under the name Programa de Inmersión en Medellín. The agency described packages priced in US dollars that included private dinners, exclusive parties, excursions, and food and transport for women attending the events.

A message attributed by Migración Colombia to the organizers of the parties read: “Mis clientes son millonarios y me pagan muy bien para lanzar fiestas donde solo haya chicas educadas (…) ellos no quieren conocer las chicas que están en el Lleras a las 2 a.m.” (“My clients are millionaires and they pay me very well to throw parties where there are only educated girls (…) they don’t want to meet the girls who are at Lleras at 2 a.m.”)

“In several posts, he brags that his “white advantage” helps him attract Latin American women and urges men to get their passports.” – Jessica Van Meir in The Baffler #77, January 2025

Statements from Bogotá and Medellín

The Director General of Migración Colombia, Gloria Esperanza Arriero, said the agency “no solo tiene rigor en el control migratorio, sino también capacidad en las verificaciones y en la toma de decisiones para combatir la trata de personas y la explotación sexual de niños, niñas y adolescentes con todos los elementos posibles” (“not only enforces migration controls rigorously, but also has the verification and decision-making capacity to combat human trafficking and the sexual exploitation of children and adolescents with every available element”). Arriero added that the agency would continue strengthening control mechanisms to prevent the entry of persons it determines pose risks to communities.

The Mayor of Medellín, Federico Gutiérrez, addressed the case on his X account: “Otro más. Go Home‼️ Un estadounidense conocido en redes sociales como Casey Red Beard llegó a Bogotá en un vuelo desde Miami y fue devuelto a su país por Migración Colombia, luego de confirmarse que estaba en la lista Alertas Medellín, por promoción explícita de turismo con fines de explotación sexual, organizando fiestas en apartamentos de la ciudad.” (“Another one. Go Home‼️ An American known on social media as Casey Red Beard arrived in Bogotá on a flight from Miami and was returned to his country by Migración Colombia, after it was confirmed he was on the Alertas Medellín list for the explicit promotion of tourism for the purposes of sexual exploitation, organizing parties in apartments in the city.”)

“Let it be clear: there is no place here for foreigners who come to promote disorder and skirt the law.”— Federico Gutiérrez, Mayor of Medellín

The Alertas Medellín list cited by Gutiérrez is a municipal mechanism maintained by the Alcaldía de Medellín that flags foreign nationals associated with criminal activity, security risks, or conduct authorities consider incompatible with public coexistence. The list is shared with Migración Colombia for use at points of entry.

Identifying the Subject

Authorities publicly identified the man only by his social-media handle, Casey Red Beard, and the affiliated X account @RedBeardRants1. The individual operating under the handle is Casey Brown, an American previously identified by name in a January 2025 essay in The Baffler by journalist Jessica Van Meir, who described him as “a self-proclaimed red-pilled dating coach” who advertised “gringo parties” in Medellín “for American tourists to meet Colombian women.” Van Meir cited a 2023 report in the Colombian feminist outlet Manifiesta alleging that Red Beard and an accomplice had engaged in sex trafficking. A LinkedIn profile consistent with the same identification also presents him under the name Casey Brown. Migración Colombia has not commented on legal-name identification.

Self-Styled ‘Red-Pilled’ Dating Coach

The public profile cultivated by the subject sits squarely within the so-called “red pill” or “manosphere” online community — a network of self-styled male-dating influencers whose best-known international figure is the British-American social-media personality Andrew Tate, currently under indictment in Romania on charges including human trafficking and rape. On his YouTube channel, which operates under the handle @redbeardrants, and in his publicly indexed marketing materials, Red Beard describes his stated mission as one to “destroy loneliness in men” and promotes a method built around mass online-dating outreach, paid virtual assistants, and copy-paste messaging “funnels.” His published guidance to clients includes an explicit recommendation to “leave the west (USA, Canada, UK, etc.). Go to a more favorable dating market like Eastern Europe, South America, Asia, etc. where the women are more feminine, beautiful, cooperative, and easier to obtain.” His listed past collaborations include Myron Gaines and the Fresh and Fit Podcast, a manosphere-adjacent program in the same broader subculture.

Investigators reviewing his social-media output cited the same framing in their internal alerts. Beyond the “chicas educadas” message attributed to the organizers by Migración Colombia, the agency noted that Red Beard’s published content has historically marketed Medellín itself as the destination commodity, with the city’s Parque Lleras nightlife district and surrounding El Poblado sector positioned as the operational base for his promoted experiences.

Mayor’s Office Has Made Vice and Sex Tourism a Signature Enforcement Priority

Federico Gutiérrez has positioned the protection of women and children from sexual exploitation as a defining priority of his second, non-consecutive mayoral term, treating the suppression of vice tourism as both a public-safety obligation and a city-brand imperative. The May 23 Casey Red Beard inadmission fits a sustained two-year enforcement push that began in his first weeks back in office in early 2024. Within weeks of taking office, the administration imposed a curfew restricting unaccompanied minors from designated zones — including La 33, La Candelaria, and the Corredor de la 70 — to combat commercial sexual exploitation of children. In April 2024 the mayor used emergency powers to outlaw prostitution in the El Poblado sector, including the Parque Lleras zone, and authorities sealed a guesthouse called Gotham marketed through Airbnb on grounds related to alleged organized criminal activity, with extinción de dominio (asset forfeiture) proceedings sought against the property.

The enforcement push has been backed by explicit US support. In April 2024 the US Ambassador to Colombia, Francisco Palmieri, met with Gutiérrez in Bogotá and pledged the “total cooperation of the US government and its resources” to support Colombian law enforcement against sexual exploitation and human trafficking, including the extradition of US citizens to Colombia where applicable. A bilateral operational pattern was already visible in March 2024, when two US citizens were arrested for the sexual exploitation of minors in Colombia following coordinated raids. Subsequent arrests in August 2024 involved direct coordination with the US Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) on a transnational case involving a Mexican operator and routes through El Poblado, Belén, Cancún, and Mérida.

Municipal prevention has run alongside enforcement and has been framed around the protection of minors and women in conditions of economic vulnerability. The Secretary of Security and Coexistence of Medellín, Manuel Villa Mejía, has overseen periodic mega-operativos involving more than 300 agents drawn from the Policía Nacional, the army, Migración Colombia, and municipal agencies, targeting establishments and accommodations linked to alleged exploitation. In October 2025 the Alcaldía launched training for owners and administrators of tourist accommodations in coordination with Fundación Renacer, a Colombian non-governmental organization specializing in the prevention of commercial sexual exploitation of children. City-government figures from October 2024 reported a 160% increase in arrests for sexual violence against minors and 22,000 calls to the city’s 123 emergency line for child and adolescent protection requests during that year, even as overall foreign tourist arrivals rose 26% — a data pairing the Alcaldía has used to argue that brand recovery and enforcement are complementary rather than competing objectives.

The broader foreigner-safety beat in Medellín has continued to draw international attention. In March 2026, the death of an American Airlines (NASDAQ: AAL) flight attendant in Antioquia following her disappearance focused renewed attention on escopolamina-related crime targeting foreigners and locals in the city.

Otro más. Go Home‼️

Un estadounidense conocido en redes sociales como Casey Red Beard llegó a Bogotá en un vuelo desde Miami y fue devuelto a su país por Migración Colombia, luego de confirmarse que estaba en la lista Alertas Medellín, por promoción explícita de turismo con… https://t.co/EWBfr9qwdK

— Fico Gutiérrez (@FicoGutierrez) May 23, 2026

Enforcement Numbers for 2026

In what has elapsed of 2026, Migración Colombia has inadmitted approximately 90 foreign nationals nationwide for risks associated with sexual exploitation and conduct linked to trata de personas (human trafficking), a figure already approaching the 110 cases recorded for all of 2025. In Medellín alone, more than 60 inadmission procedures have been carried out so far this year, compared to 80 for all of 2025. The agency’s Regional Antioquia-Chocó office accounts for 63 of the 2026 cases.

Broader expulsion and deportation activity is running at a pace comparable to the previous year. Through May 23, the agency reported 310 expulsions or deportations of foreign citizens in 2026, comprising 157 deportations and 153 expulsions, compared to 1,652 cases recorded during all of 2025. Deportations were concentrated in the agency’s Nariño, Oriente, Atlántico, Eje Cafetero, Antioquia, and Andina regional offices, while expulsions were most frequent in Oriente, Andina, Antioquia, Nariño, and at the El Dorado station.

According to Arriero, expulsion and deportation decisions are taken in accordance with the Constitución Política de Colombia and applicable law, with due-process considerations, and respond to immigration violations, threats to public order or national security, judicial orders, and requirements from international organizations including the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). Migración Colombia retains discretionary authority under Decreto 2136 de 2021 to deny entry to or order the return of foreign citizens it determines pose risks to national security or public order.

Pattern of Recent Cases

The Casey Red Beard inadmission follows several high-profile expulsions earlier in 2026. In April, Migración Colombia expelled Steve Newland, a US citizen and social media operator known as “Chill Capo,” accused of promoting party experiences with alleged ties to sexual exploitation and of publishing content advising visitors on how to evade migration controls. The same month, the agency expelled Samuel McVey, a former teacher from New Rochelle, New York, following incidents at schools in the eastern Antioquia municipality of Rionegro and in the Las Palmas sector of Medellín. Migración Colombia also detected and again removed Russian citizen George Laevsky after he attempted to re-enter the country following an April expulsion linked to repeated disturbances at an apartment in the El Poblado sector.

Colombian authorities have framed the escalating enforcement as targeting precisely the use of social media and digital platforms to market tourism packages that allegedly conceal sexual exploitation, with women in conditions of economic vulnerability described as the principal victims. The agency has previously stated that prevention of Explotación Sexual Comercial de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes (ESCNNA) is a particular priority, citing cooperation with international intelligence agencies and the Angel Watch program, which has resulted in more than 470 entry denials since 2016 for reasons associated with sexual offenses.

A federal jury in the Southern District of Florida convicted Ramon Arellano Sandoval, 65, of Antioch, Tennessee, on charges of attempted sex trafficking of a minor and attempted production of child sexual abuse material involving a 14-year-old victim residing in Medellín, Colombia. A US federal district judge subsequently sentenced Arellano Sandoval to 30 years in federal prison, according to Alcaldía de Medellín Mayor Federico “Fico” Gutiérrez, who confirmed the sentence on May 21, 2026.

The case, prosecuted by the US Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida under case number 24-cr-20519, represents the tenth conviction obtained under a joint US-Colombia enforcement initiative targeting foreign nationals who travel to Medellín to sexually exploit minors. Three other US citizens previously sentenced in connection with the program include Stefan Correa and Manuel Poceiro, who each received life sentences, and Mohamed Anaswed, who received 21 years in federal prison.

According to court records and evidence presented at the February 24 trial, Arellano Sandoval exchanged thousands of text and video messages with the victim, who was 14 years old at the time, and who lived in a rural area near Medellín. Prosecutors presented evidence that the defendant knew the victim’s age, repeatedly solicited sexually explicit videos from her, directed her to produce illicit material in exchange for electronic payments, and traveled to Colombia to engage in commercial sex with her.

“The evidence showed that this defendant pressured a child to create sexually explicit videos and even traveled overseas to abuse her. That conduct is predatory, criminal, and intolerable.” — Jason A. Reding Quiñones, US Attorney, Southern District of Florida

The jury found Arellano Sandoval guilty of attempted sex trafficking of a minor, which carries a maximum sentence of life in federal prison, and attempted production of visual depictions of the sexual exploitation of a minor, which carries a maximum sentence of 30 years.

“The jury’s verdict delivered justice for a 14-year-old victim who was targeted and exploited by a 65-year-old man who knew exactly what he was doing,” said US Attorney Jason A. Reding Quiñones for the Southern District of Florida. “The evidence showed that this defendant pressured a child to create sexually explicit videos and even traveled overseas to abuse her.”

The investigation was conducted by Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Miami under Special Agent in Charge José R. Figueroa, with operational support from HSI Colombia. Assistant US Attorneys Tim Farina and Camille Smith handled the prosecution. On the Colombian side, the arrest and evidence collection involved the Alcaldía de Medellín, the Policía Nacional through its Dirección de Protección y Servicios Especiales (DIPRO), the Fiscalía General de la Nación, and Migración Colombia.

“La justicia no tiene fronteras cuando se trata de proteger a nuestros niños, niñas y adolescentes,” Gutiérrez wrote on his X account, referring to cross-border judicial cooperation in cases involving the exploitation of minors. The mayor indicated the administration would continue pursuing similar prosecutions, stating that any foreign national traveling to Medellín to exploit minors would be pursued until obtaining a conviction, including in their country of origin.

‼️La justicia no tiene fronteras cuando se trata de proteger a nuestros niños, niñas y adolescentes.🚨Otro condenado más.

Ramón Arellano Sandoval, de 65 años de Estados Unidos, fue sentenciado a 30 años en prisión federal de ese país, por los delitos de intento de explotación… pic.twitter.com/mepkNuOURX

— Fico Gutiérrez (@FicoGutierrez) May 21, 2026

The Arellano Sandoval case follows a similar prosecution earlier in 2026 against Michael Jaime Inofuentes, also a US citizen, who was sentenced by the US District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to 18 years in federal prison. Court evidence in that case established that Inofuentes sexually abused a 15-year-old in Medellín and paid for encounters in hotels, resulting in a pregnancy in early 2024. The investigation, triggered by a complaint from the victim’s mother to Colombian authorities, led to Inofuentes’s arrest in Miami. Prosecutors introduced WhatsApp conversations, financial transfers, and the defendant’s own admissions, which included statements that he had fathered other children in Colombia under similar circumstances. Related court documents and additional case information are available through the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida at www.flsd.uscourts.gov and through the PACER system at pacer.flsd.uscourts.gov under case number 24-cr-20519.

Migración Colombia, Colombia’s immigration agency, has executed the expulsion of two US citizens from Medellín following separate investigations into activities deemed a risk to public security and peaceful coexistence. The administrative measures targeted Steve Newland, a digital content creator known as “Chill Capo,” and Samuel McVey, a former teacher from New York. Both individuals were transported to the Aeropuerto Internacional José María Córdova in Rionegro and placed on a flight to Miami, Florida.

Definition of “Capo” according to Google.

The actions come amid a broader strategy by the Colombian government to address concerns regarding sex tourism and the presence of foreign nationals with outstanding legal issues in their home countries. According to Paola Salazar, the Regional Director of Migración Colombia, the agency has adopted a stricter posture to ensure that Colombia is not utilized as a refuge for individuals linked to fraudulent or illicit activities.

The Case of Steve “Chill Capo”Newland

Steve Newland, a 42-year-old US citizen born in Willingboro, New Jersey, had been residing in Medellín since 2022. Operating under the digital brand “Chill Capo,” Newland promoted luxury lifestyle experiences and nightlife events. However, an investigation by Migración Colombia determined that Newland used his digital platforms to promote encounters with alleged purposes of sexual exploitation.

“Lo están esperando y lo capturan, (they are waiting for them and they will capture them)” stated Federico Gutiérrez, the Mayor of Medellín, referring to the coordination with US authorities regarding the return of the individuals.

The agency reported that Newland’s content included advice on how to evade immigration controls at the airport, such as using false medical certificates or simulating injuries to bypass rigorous inspections. His publications also mentioned accommodations linked to historical criminal figures, specifically the penthouses de Pablo Escobar, and provided instructions on how to avoid being targeted with escopolamina during social outings. Following the investigation, authorities confirmed Newland was in an irregular migration status. He has been banned from reentering Colombia for a minimum of five years.

Newland has publicly denied the allegations via his social media channels. He asserted that his primary objective was to educate visitors on safety and help them avoid dangerous situations. Newland claimed that his events were legal, safe, and conducted in collaboration with established Colombian businesses in the Parque Lleras district. He further contended that his visa had been renewed multiple times since 2022, suggesting that any illegal activity would have prevented such renewals. Newland challenged authorities to present specific evidence or identify victims related to the claims of exploitation.

🔴 #Noticia | Influenciador estadounidense que promovía turismo con fines de explotación sexual en Medellín, fue deportado por Migración Colombia.
El extranjero no podrá ingresar al país en los próximos cinco años, luego de este tiempo tendrá que solicitar una visa. pic.twitter.com/9QhZKJ7C8X

— Migración Colombia (@MigracionCol) April 11, 2026

Samuel McVey: School Incidents and US Warrants

On LinkedIn, McVey claims to have a new private school in Llanogrande, Antioquia, that embraces “leaders of drug cartels and paramilitaries” among others.

In a separate incident, 46-year-old Samuel McVey, who was fired as a primary school teacher but styles himself as “Chief Executive Officer @ McVey International Group” on LinkedIn, was expelled following a series of disturbances at educational institutions in the Valle de Aburrá (Metro Medellín) and the city’s eastern Antioquia bedroom community of Rionegro. On April 8, 2026, McVey reportedly entered at least three schools in the wealthy Las Palmas sector of Medellín, where he allegedly initiated confrontations and made threats against staff and students. He subsequently traveled to Rionegro, where he attempted to gain entry to the Colegio Monteluna in Llanogrande by posing as an English language instructor.

When denied access, McVey reportedly directed threats toward students, prompting school officials to contact the Policía Nacional. He was apprehended by units from the Estación Llanogrande near a local strip mall. Manuel Villa Mejía, the Secretary of Security and Coexistence of Medellín, described McVey as a risk to the community and confirmed that the individual was in a state of high agitation upon his detention.

Investigation into McVey’s background revealed that he is a fugitive from New Rochelle, New York. In the United States, McVey faces charges of aggravated harassment in the second degree, a misdemeanor. The charges stem from an investigation by the New Rochelle Police Department involving threats made against Dr. Corey W. Reynolds, the Superintendent of the City School District of New Rochelle. McVey, a former Spanish teacher at Isaac E. Young Middle School, was terminated in early 2026. New Rochelle authorities had issued two bench warrants for his arrest after he failed to appear for court proceedings on March 26 and April 1, 2026.

Despite the outstanding warrants, the New Rochelle Police Department noted that they do not typically extradite individuals for misdemeanor offenses. Consequently, Colombian authorities processed his departure as an immediate expulsion based on his conduct within Colombia. McVey has been prohibited from entering Colombia for ten years.

Regional Enforcement Trends and Peak Travel Season Operations

The expulsions of Newland and McVey come after a larger enforcement effort during the 2026 Semana Santa (Easter Week) season. Migración Colombia reported that enhanced controls at airports and land borders resulted in the detection of numerous foreign nationals with irregular status or criminal backgrounds.

Specific cases identified by the agency during this period include:

• In Leticia, Amazonas, a Peruvian citizen was detained at a hotel; the individual was the subject of an Interpol Red Notice for alleged crimes against public health.
• In Ibagué, a Venezuelan citizen wanted by Peruvian authorities under an Interpol Red Notice for aggravated theft was arrested in a joint operation with the Policía Nacional.
• In Facatativá, another Venezuelan national was apprehended for an Interpol Red Notice involving charges of human trafficking for sexual exploitation and membership in criminal organizations.
• In Bogotá, two Dominican citizens were expelled after attempting to fraudulently obtain Colombian passports to travel to Europe.
• At the Aeropuerto Internacional José María Córdova, a man and a woman from the Dominican Republic were intercepted while attempting to travel to Peru and Argentina using fraudulent Colombian documentation.
  

  Inadmitted (photo courtesy Migración Colombia)

Statistical Overview of Inadmissibility in 2026

In the first quarter of 2026, Migración Colombia has denied entry to over 600 foreign nationals. The primary reasons for inadmissibility include state sovereignty and security risks (153 cases), lack of required visas (133 cases), and insufficient documentation (104 cases). Additionally, 89 individuals were rejected for providing false information during immigration interviews, while 34 had documented criminal records.

The agency also noted a specific focus on preventing the Explotación Sexual Comercial de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes (ESCNNA). Through cooperation with international intelligence agencies and the Angel Watch platform, 471 individuals have been denied entry since 2016 for reasons associated with sexual offenses. At the Rionegro terminal alone, 31 inadmissibility cases have been recorded so far in 2026 related to potential sex tourism risks.

The Director General of Migración Colombia, Gloria Esperanza Arriero, emphasized that while the country remains open to international travel and investment, visitors are required to comply with the Constitución Política de Colombia and national laws. Under Decreto 2136 de 2021, the immigration authority maintains the power to deny entry or order the immediate return of any foreign citizen who poses a risk to national security or public order.

The main nationalities of those denied entry in early 2026 include citizens from the United States (76), the Dominican Republic (64), Ecuador (55), and Venezuela (52).

Montage of deportees Samuel McVey and Steven “Chill Capo” Newland

Video footage courtesy Migración Colombia

The History Channel is scheduled to premiere a new documentary titled Parceros on April 29, 2026. The 43-minute production, developed in collaboration with the Alcaldía de Medellín, examines the social challenges facing youth in the city’s communes and the state-led initiatives designed to mitigate the influence of criminal structures.

The documentary focuses on the Parceros program, an initiative managed by the Secretaría de Seguridad y Convivencia of Medellín. The program provides psychosocial support, academic training, and employment pathways for children, adolescents, and young adults at risk of recruitment by organized crime. According to municipal data, approximately 350 criminal groups operate within Medellín, involving an estimated 6,000 to 12,000 individuals. The program has served over 9,000 participants between 2024 and 2025, with a target of reaching 15,000 individuals by the end of the current four-year term.

“When the public sector works hand in hand with social organizations and media with global reach, the impact is multiplied.” — Federico Gutiérrez, Mayor of Medellín.

Federico Gutiérrez, the Mayor of Medellín, stated that the partnership with international media outlets aims to increase the visibility of the city’s social transformation. He noted that the collaboration between the public sector and global organizations facilitates a broader impact for regional infrastructure and social programs. The documentary features Argentine actor and producer Michel Brown, who serves as the primary narrator and interacts with participants to document their transition from informal or illegal activities toward stable employment and entrepreneurship.

The production follows the individual trajectories of three participants: Marcela, Alejandro, and Juan Sebastian. These accounts detail the transition from situations involving homelessness, illegal activities, and exploitation toward roles in municipal security management, private business ownership, and the local tourism sector. Paulina Patiño, director of the Parceros program, indicated that the initiative focuses on building human capital and providing alternatives to the economic incentives offered by local criminal organizations.

Produced by A+E Networks (NYSE: DIS) in association with Loso Producciones and co-produced by Lulo Films, the project reflects a trend of utilizing high-production-value media to document ESG-related social investments in Latin America. Cesar Sabroso, Senior VP of Marketing at A+E Networks Latin America, emphasized the company’s objective to distribute these narratives across the region to highlight successful intervention models.

Medellín continues to be a focal point for international observers due to its ongoing social transformation and its status as a hub for the global creative economy. The documentary intends to provide a technical look at how targeted social spending and public-private partnerships can alter the demographic trajectory of urban centers in Colombia and the broader US interest area.

Headline photo of Medellín’s Comuna 13 (photo © Loren Moss)

Gutiérrez Molina, a Salvadoran-American national who lived in Texas, arrived in Medellín on a commercial flight via José María Córdova International Airport. He was last seen alive on Sunday, March 22, after visiting commercial establishments in the El Poblado neighborhood. Investigations by the Secretaría de Seguridad y Convivencia suggest the victim was targeted by criminals using scopolamine, a sedative that can be used to incapacitate victims for robbery. According to witness statements, Gutiérrez Molina and another flight attendant were approached at a nightclub by individuals who lured them to another venue in Itaguí, a southwestern suburb of Medellín. While the companion flight attendant was able to make it back to her hotel, ill and disoriented, Gutiérrez Molina remained missing for five days.

“We have very clear leads on those responsible,” stated Mayor Federico Gutiérrez. “I have requested that justice be served and that the perpetrators be sought for extradition to the United States if necessary.”

The body was spotted by residents of Puente Iglesias floating in the Río Piedra ravine. The Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias Forenses is currently conducting formal identification and an autopsy in Medellín. Mayor Gutiérrez reported that he has personally informed the victim’s father, the US Ambassador to Colombia, and the Consul General at the US Embassy in Bogotá regarding the development. The mayor stated that investigators have identified alleged perpetrators and expressed his intent to seek their extradition to the US.

‼️Tengo que dar una triste noticia.
Desde el pasado Domingo, estamos en la búsqueda de Eric Gutiérrez un ciudadano Estadounidense que se encuentra desaparecido.
Lamentablemente acaba de ser encontrado un cuerpo sin vida, entre el municipio de Jericó y Puente Iglesias.
Existe…

— Fico Gutiérrez (@FicoGutierrez) March 27, 2026

This problem is not new. Criminals have been using scopolamine to prey on both Colombians and foreigners for years. Just last week, the Alcaldía de Medellín (Medellín Mayor’s Office) announced the capture of two women, aged 19 and 34, accused of drugging and robbing foreigners in Parque Lleras. The Policía Nacional and the Fiscalía General de la Nación  (Colombia Attorney General’s Office) conducted raids in the Caicedo and Villa Hermosa neighborhoods to dismantle the operation. The suspects reportedly offered escort services as a facade to move victims to tourist accommodations, where they administered benzodiazepines such as clonazepam to facilitate the theft of high-value belongings and cash.

Manuel Villa Mejía, Secretary of Security and Convivencia, stated that the captured women had extensive judicial records for aggravated robbery. During the operations, authorities seized mobile devices, identification documents belonging to other women, and a firearm. Villa Mejía emphasized that the city is utilizing intelligence and focused operations to close pathways for those who instrumentalize tourism for criminal purposes. These actions are part of a broader strategy to weaken the financial operations of networks that continue to target international visitors in El Poblado.

Finance Colombia has also reported on the capture of the Queen of Scopolamine, who led a network dedicated to drugging and robbing tourists in Parque Lleras. Despite prior law enforcement successes against structures like Las Barbies and The Ghetto, predatory crime remains a concern for the international investment community and business travelers.

Also read: Don’t Be A Victim! Six Rules For Safety When Visiting Colombia

photo of Mr. Gutierrez from social media

In this exclusive interview, Loren Moss, Executive Editor of Finance Colombia, speaks with Cristina Zambrano Restrepo, the Executive Director of ACI Medellín. They discuss how the city nearly tripled its investment attraction over the past year, reaching over $400 million USD, and the strategies used to reassure international investors during a complex electoral landscape in Colombia.

Finance Colombia: I’m here with Cristina Zambrano Restrepo, the Executive Director of ACI Medellín. It’s always a pleasure to be with you. Thank you for the invitation. I know you’re extremely busy, so thank you for making the time to speak with Finance Colombia. How have you been?

Cristina Zambrano Restrepo: Very well, thank you very much. Truly happy to be here with you. Thank you for accepting this invitation. Without a doubt, we work to bring good and positive news to this city, and thank you for being here and for sharing and conveying all of these good things.

Finance Colombia: Yes, today you talked about the successes that ACI Medellín and the city have had this year in attracting investment. Tell us a bit about some of those successes. I think it’s going to be another large business hotel, and tell us a little about how you’ve kept busy.

Cristina Zambrano Restrepo: Of course. A major focus for us is job creation through investment attraction. So, what did we achieve this year? We went from USD 150 million generated last year to more than USD 400 million this year. As I’ve mentioned, this is reflected in the creation of more than 11,500 formal, high-quality jobs generated by this investment attraction. We have major allies and players here, such as Renault-Sofasa, Rivana Business Park, SoftServe, and POMA. A great deal of companies, some already established, others newly arriving in the region. TaskUs too, which is also extremely important and has made major commitments to us. These are the companies that manage to generate that employment.

Finance Colombia: Excellent, that’s fascinating. I have a history with Colombia of about 20 years, and here in Medellín of about 11 years, and it’s truly wonderful to see how the city has grown—not only in population, but in investment and innovation. However, we’re living in a time of high uncertainty around the world—not just in Colombia, not just in the United States, but globally. Especially when we talk about the sector, not in general terms, but politically and economically. Has this made attracting investment more difficult or more challenging over the past year? How has this affected efforts to attract FDI, like, foreign investment, and what strategies have you used to overcome this challenge?

Cristina Zambrano Restrepo: Here, clearly, the political landscape affects and directly impacts confidence, right? The stability of a region, how we present ourselves to the world and to those very large capital investments, showing that we are a stable region, that we believe in them, and that we will support them. So, what strategies do we have? Without a doubt, it has been very challenging. We would like, for example, to be able to offer a range of benefits, extensions, fast-track processes in permitting and such, but in that sense we depend heavily on the national government. But we don’t stop there. We work from the regional level and have a firm commitment locally, focusing on what we ourselves can support, contribute, and manage from this area, the private sector. Which also helped sustain the region during the previous administration, and the academic sector, all the universities, and that ecosystem, which have been fundamental. And now the public sector as well, we are all working together specifically from this region to demonstrate that we are a region that inspires confidence, offers stability, and has all the right conditions for investment to continue to arrive.

Finance Colombia: One thing you’ve mentioned that’s very important, and something Medellín is known for, is the collaboration between the private and public sectors. In many other places, without naming names, it’s an endless war. But in Medellín it has always felt like it’s everybody. That’s why Medellín has always had the Metro and continues to have major projects here, because the private sector has a strong sense of civic ownership. People talk about the GEA, but from a foreign perspective, what I’ve seen is that companies like Grupo Argos, SURA, Bancolombia, and more recently Nutresa, and many smaller ones that aren’t international names, have a sense of belonging and work hand in hand with the government. Speaking of that, for example, Mayor Federico Gutiérrez has traveled to the United States and other places to maintain those good relationships, despite what may be happening in Bogotá or at the Casa de Nariño. What is the importance of the efforts made by the metropolitan government and the city government of Medellín, not only at the ACI level, but also at the level of Alpujarra? How important is this in maintaining a long-term course so that foreign investors continue to see Medellín as a destination, no matter how much may be happening 400 kilometers away?

“We went from USD 150 million generated last year to more than USD 400 million this year… reflected in the creation of more than 11,500 formal, high-quality jobs.” — Cristina Zambrano Restrepo

Cristina Zambrano Restrepo: I think what you’re pointing out is fundamental, and it’s specifically how we’ve achieved this model in Medellín. In a way, when we go out into the world and explain how we work hand in hand, as you said, there are cities and countries that react like, “Why do we need to sit at the same table? I’m very clear about my purpose, and you’re very clear about yours.” Here, the real history of what this city lived through 40 years ago made all of us sit at the same table, and we realized that the efforts of the three actors are always aligned toward the same goals. What always matters to us is citizens’ well-being, quality of life, economic and social development, many things. So when we were going through our hardest moments, we managed to set aside egos, agendas, and competing visions. We sat down, we talked, and we’ve continued to work under that model ever since.

As for what’s happening and what lies ahead in the future: clearly, having a political leader like Federico Gutiérrez, with those strategies and international connections, matters greatly. Countries trust leaders who have demonstrated stability and very clear commitments throughout their governing trajectory, and that’s what our mayor has done. Because of that, they continue to seek us out as a region and want to work with us as a region. As we were just discussing, the investment world is very accustomed to government cycles, more than people might think. They know how to manage political and public-sector issues and how to make bold bets at certain moments. We work on this, and together with the mayor we focus on those countries where we need them to keep believing in us and trusting us. The United States is Colombia’s partner par excellence, that is not going to change. It is the largest market in the world. So the mayor’s strategy of being very close to that government, of working with a binational chamber like AmCham Colombia, which always helps us continue attracting investment and fostering exchanges, is exactly how we work hand in hand.

Finance Colombia: Well, you’ve been very generous with your time. Just two more questions. One is that in the United States, we have a saying: “Nothing happens before the elections.” That big companies are always waiting to see what’s going to happen, what’s going to unfold. Is it the same here in Colombia? I know in Colombia, even more than in the U.S., there’s a law—well, speaking of public contracting, where nothing can really happen. But aside from that, not talking about selling food to a school or something like that—do investors or multinational companies see this as a challenge? Are they ready to sign contracts, or are they waiting to see what happens?

Cristina Zambrano Restrepo: Of course, without a doubt it’s a challenge. And it’s not a minor one. It’s a challenge that forces us to work even harder to demonstrate, from the regional level, just how stable we can continue to be so that investment keeps coming. There are many companies that make their decisions regardless of the electoral period we’re in, largely because, as I mentioned, they know how to manage political risk. But there are certainly many others that are on pause, waiting to see what happens in the upcoming elections. So yes, in that sense, it does present significant challenges. Even so, we are still projecting USD 400 million for next year despite the elections, and we continue to work toward and commit to that goal. And regarding what you mentioned about contracting, specifically public-sector contracting; a city cannot come to a halt just because there is a law on guarantees, right? All of that is already anticipated. Contracts need to be signed and put in motion ahead of time. Everyone here knows how to operate during a six-month guarantees-law period, so everything has to keep moving and functioning.

Finance Colombia: The last question, I’ve known ACI, even from before I was living in Colombia. I’ve now been in Colombia for 12 years, and I’ve known Juan since I was living in Miami. They were always calling me, saying, “Look, come see what we have in Medellín. Come, let us show you something beautiful we have, or an investment opportunity here.” And that was truly a big part of why, when I was living in Bogotá, I decided to move to Medellín. It was exactly like that, maybe not as a major investor, but that attitude, that paisa pride.

Cristina Zambrano Restrepo: Paisa pride, yes, I was just going to say.

Finance Colombia: Exactly, exactly. Like my wife, who’s paisa, when we’re abroad and someone asks her, “Are you Colombian?” she says, “I’m paisa.”

Cristina Zambrano Restrepo: More than Colombian, I’m paisa.

Finance Colombia: What is the “secret hogao” of ACI Medellín? Because regardless of the government in power, regardless of what happens under your leadership, and even looking at the long term, what is the secret sauce behind the success ACI has had as an investment promotion agency? You have a strong global reputation in the FDI space, Foreign Direct Investment. You, as director, as someone who knows how the internal plumbing works, what is the key to the success ACI has achieved?

Cristina Zambrano Restrepo: Well, I think without a doubt it’s our long-term planning. It’s a vision we have for the city, a vision for the territory—a clearly defined commitment. Every time we come in, there’s no need to reinvent things; we need to keep working on what already works. We have a technical team, and this is something I really want to highlight: this is a highly technical organization. While it does, of course, depend on electoral and government cycles, it has a well-trained staff that has been working in these areas for many years, and thanks to them we’ve been able to maintain the stability this institution has. So I would emphasize that, in addition to what you mentioned about paisa pride—which is an identity that characterizes all of us from Medellín. We truly like to see our city doing well; we fight for it, we defend it, we work for it. That paisa pride ensures that everyone who passes through this institution clearly understands the vision and works toward it, regardless of how long they remain here.

Finance Colombia: Yes, it’s true—you have a world-class team, so I know they make your job much easier. Thank you very much for your time; it’s always an honor to see you and to speak with you, and know you can always count on Finance Colombia for anything.

Cristina Zambrano Restrepo: Thank you as well, truly, for being here and for always supporting ACI Medellín. Indeed, you and Finance Colombia have been great partners for us in continuing to share and convey all the news that’s happening.

Finance Colombia: We will, thank you.

Investment capital was primarily concentrated in the technology, creative industries, infrastructure, and commerce sectors. Major sources of this investment included the United States, Colombia, Brazil, and France. To promote further capital attraction, ACI Medellín hosted two investment rounds: one focused on traditional sectors such as agribusiness, energy, health, infrastructure, and technology; and a second round concentrated on the audiovisual sector, executed in partnership with the Film Commission of the Medellín City Hall. These efforts were supported by collaborations with the Mesa de Inversión de Antioquia and the Medellín Chamber of Commerce for Antioquia.

Several companies announced new investments or reinvestments in the city, including Renault Sofasa, TaskUs (NASDAQ: TASK), iQor, Accenture (NYSE: ACN), Poma, Rivana Business Park, Softserve, and DHL (XETRA: DPW).

Medellín went from $3 million USD in international cooperation in 2024 to a projected $8 million USD  with projects in the process of closure before the end of the year.

Cooperation Funding and Global Network Engagement

The city also reported a projected increase in international cooperation funds, with management expecting to close 2025 with nearly $8 million USD in projects, up from $3 million USD managed in 2024. This growth was partially driven by alliances with philanthropic organizations.

ACI Medellín collaborated with several key foundations to support social and environmental initiatives outlined in the city’s Development Plan. Noteworthy projects include a partnership with The Carter Center, which provided $50,000 USD and technical assistance to the Secretary of Women’s “Informando a las Mujeres, Transformando Vidas” project, aimed at strengthening gender-focused communication strategies for women caregivers. Other philanthropic entities involved in supporting various projects include Bloomberg Philanthropies, the Hilton Foundation, and Sparkassen Stiftung from Germany.

Medellín maintained its engagement in global city networks to advance sustainable development objectives. From 2024 to 2025, the city participated actively in platforms such as C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group, Mercociudades, CIDEU, and Metropolis. This participation led to the receipt of cooperation grants, training scholarships for municipal staff, and technical assistance for specific projects, such as Primavera Norte, which received support through the C40 and GIZ networks. As a member of the C40 Steering Committee, Mayor Federico Gutiérrez participated in global network activities, during which projects like the Corredores Verdes program, which the city credits with contributing to a 2 °C reduction in urban temperature, were presented.

Medellín Mayor Federico Gutierrez (photo courtesy of the mayor’s office)

Recognition and Diaspora Strategy

In recognition of its social policies, the city’s School Feeding Program (Comedores Escolares) received the Milan Urban Food Policy Pact award in the Social and Economic Equity category. Medellín was one of six cities selected from 173 applicants globally, and the award included a financial contribution of €20,000 EUR. The award recognized the program’s integrated strategy, which focuses on providing nutritional food for children, strengthening food security, and supporting purchases from local producers.

Additionally, the Sos Paisa Network was relaunched in 2025. The initiative focuses on connecting the Antioquian diaspora with opportunities in Medellín, specifically aligning their knowledge with local Science, Technology, and Innovation (CTI) projects. This renewal effort aims to leverage the global scientific and academic diaspora for local development.

According to Cristina Zambrano, Executive Director of ACI Medellín, the figures confirm a growing international engagement. The executive noted that from 2008 through 2025, the agency has managed $4.084 billion USD in foreign direct investment, generating an estimated 44,000 jobs in the Aburrá Valley, in addition to $134 million USD in international cooperation.

Colombia’s rejection rate is now comparable to China’s, which stood at 25.37% for the same period. Within South America, Colombia’s rate was exceeded only by Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador, each reporting denial rates above 35%. In contrast, Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil reported significantly lower refusal rates, ranging from approximately 5% to 15%.

The adjusted refusal rate accounts for multiple applications by the same individual and excludes cases where initial refusals were later overcome through additional documentation or appeals.

From Visa Waiver Talks to Rejection Spike

The current visa rejection rate stands in stark contrast to the diplomatic trajectory under former Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos. In 2014, Santos publicly stated that the United States had initiated a process to eliminate visa requirements for Colombian citizens traveling for tourism and short-term business. The announcement was made during a press conference in New York, where Santos said, “We are working with the US government to remove the visa requirement for Colombians.”

That process has since collapsed. No formal visa waiver agreement was reached, and under subsequent administrations, visa conditions have deteriorated significantly.

The increase in Colombia’s visa rejection rate coincides with a series of diplomatic incidents between Bogotá and Washington. In January 2025, Colombian President Gustavo Petro revoked authorization for US repatriation flights carrying deported Colombian nationals. The reversal came hours after Petro initially welcomed the flights via social media, only to later delete the post and issue a statement denying entry to the aircraft. Petro cited concerns over the treatment of deportees, stating, “The United States cannot treat Colombian migrants as criminals.”

The US government responded by suspending visa services at its embassy in Bogotá, effective January 27, 2025 until Petro backed down, which he did immediately. According to Finance Colombia, the suspension was part of a broader set of retaliatory measures announced by then-President Donald Trump, which included:

• 50% tariffs on Colombian exports.
• Visa revocations for government officials.
• Travel bans targeting Petro administration affiliates.
• Enhanced customs inspections of Colombian cargo and nationals.

The diplomatic rift drew criticism from Colombian regional leaders. Medellín Mayor Federico Gutiérrez and Antioquia Governor Andrés Julián Rendón publicly denounced Petro’s actions, warning of economic repercussions and calling for direct engagement with US counterparts.

In May 2024, the US imposed visa restrictions on executives of Colombian transportation companies accused of facilitating unauthorized migration by sea. The State Department stated that these companies “prey on vulnerable irregular migrants” and operate services “designed primarily to facilitate irregular migration to the United States.”

While the US government has not officially linked the rise in visa denials to these diplomatic and migration-related events, the timing and scale of the increase suggest that political tensions are influencing consular decisions.

Outlook

The elevated rejection rate could impact Colombian tourism, business travel, and bilateral cooperation. With visa services only recently reinstated following Petro’s capitulation to US demands, it remains unclear whether the rate will stabilize or continue to rise amid ongoing political volatility and economic uncertainty.

US Department of State. Photo credit: US Department of State/Facebook.