The citizen committee promoting the convening of a National Constituent Assembly in Colombia announced the suspension of its signature-gathering campaign and the withdrawal of the initiative, in a move that comes during the final stretch of the presidential race and could benefit ruling-party candidate Iván Cepeda’s efforts to attract centrist voters ahead of the June 21 runoff election.

The decision was announced June 4 in a statement signed by Armando Wouriyu Valbuena, spokesperson for the committee leading the initiative, who said the measure resulted from a “process of collective reflection on the national situation and the political moment the country is experiencing.”

President Gustavo Petro publicly supported the decision.

“I support the decision made by the citizen committee for the National Constituent Assembly to suspend the signature-gathering process,” Petro wrote on X.

The president added that “the constituent assembly had no objective other than improving the living conditions of the Colombian people and finally guaranteeing their fundamental rights.”

The proposal had initially been included among political initiatives associated with the ruling coalition and appeared in preliminary versions of the government platform of Iván Cepeda, the Pacto Histórico candidate who will face far-right contender Abelardo de la Espriella in the presidential runoff.

The decision to withdraw the initiative comes as Cepeda’s campaign seeks to expand its electoral support among moderate and independent voters, many of whom have viewed the prospect of constitutional reform with caution and, in some cases, concern.

A recurring idea in Colombian politics

Although the proposal has recently been associated with President Petro and left-wing sectors, the idea of convening a Constituent Assembly has been supported at different times by political leaders from nearly every corner of Colombia’s political spectrum.

Petro himself promoted the idea during the 2022 presidential campaign but later moderated his position after signing a public commitment encouraged by political figures including Claudia López and Antanas Mockus. In that agreement, he pledged not to pursue constitutional changes of that nature during his presidency.

The event became known nationally because Petro signed the so-called “12 Commandments” on a marble plaque, a symbolic gesture that helped build a broad political consensus and secure the support needed to win the presidency.

The debate over constitutional reform, however, predates Petro by decades.

One of the most notable examples involves former President Álvaro Uribe, who today ranks among the most vocal opponents of a constituent assembly promoted by the current administration.

During his presidency, a constitutional amendment allowed immediate presidential reelection. Later, after Colombia’s Constitutional Court and various political sectors blocked some of his initiatives, Uribe proposed a Constituent Assembly focused on reforming the judicial branch.

In 2012, during a forum in Washington, he argued that a constituent assembly limited to judicial reform could respond to public demands at the time.

Three years later, in 2015, and now from the opposition, Uribe again proposed a constituent assembly restricted to reviewing the peace accords negotiated between the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, with the aim of modifying aspects of the process.

In 2020, several lawmakers aligned with Uribismo, including Paloma Valencia, who recently finished third in the first round of the presidential election, again proposed a constituent assembly to reform the judicial system and review aspects related to the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, or JEP.

The proposal came after Colombia’s Supreme Court ordered Uribe’s preventive detention as part of an investigation into alleged witness tampering, a case that originated from complaints filed by current presidential candidate Iván Cepeda.

De la Espriella also supported the idea in the past

The concept of a constituent assembly has not been foreign to Abelardo de la Espriella, the current far-right presidential candidate.

During a 2017 interview on the local program Semblanzas con Toño Sánchez Jr., De la Espriella defended convening a Constituent Assembly to reform sectors such as justice and health care, while redefining structural aspects of the Colombian state.

“What must be promoted is the elimination of that (…) through a new strong-handed government that repeals that farce by decree and convenes, through the most expeditious legal means, a Constituent Assembly that reforms justice, reforms health care and lays the foundations for a more equitable system for those who are less favored within society,” he said, referring to the elections held that year, which were ultimately won by Iván Duque of the Centro Democrático party.

During the 2026 presidential campaign, however, De la Espriella adopted a completely different position and declared himself firmly opposed to a constituent assembly, associating the proposal with the political left and with Cepeda, his opponent in the runoff.

At a campaign-closing rally in Medellín before the first round of voting, he argued that Colombia’s Constitution should be defended “with tooth and nail” and questioned any attempt to modify it through a constituent assembly promoted by the government.

Why does a constituent assembly remain so controversial?

The controversy surrounding a Constituent Assembly is not solely a matter of who proposes it. It is also linked to the place occupied by the 1991 Constitution in Colombia’s political history.

The current Constitution emerged from a citizen movement known as the “Seventh Ballot,” (Séptima Papeleta) a mobilization that brought together people from different ideological backgrounds to replace the Constitution of 1886.

The current Constitution emerged from a citizen movement known as the “Seventh Ballot,” (Séptima Papeleta) a mobilization that brought together people from different ideological backgrounds to replace the Constitution of 1886.

For many Colombians, the process represents one of the most important moments of democratic consensus in the country’s recent history.

As a result, any effort to amend it tends to generate strong reactions, both in support and in opposition.

In addition, political leaders from different ideological traditions have often turned to the idea of a constituent assembly during periods of high popularity or when they encounter institutional obstacles to advancing particular reforms. This has contributed to a perception that the mechanism can be used to alter rules that certain political sectors find inconvenient.

The intense political polarization that has characterized Colombia since the early 2000s has also complicated efforts to build broad consensus around constitutional reform. The first round of the presidential election once again reflected that division, with less than a 3% gap separating the two leading candidates.

A debate likely to continue

Although the initiative has been withdrawn for now, the debate is far from over.

Colombian law establishes a complex procedure for convening a Constituent Assembly, requiring citizen participation, congressional involvement and approval by a significant number of voters at the ballot box. Under the current electoral roll, that threshold would exceed 12 million votes.

In a deeply fragmented political environment, achieving that level of consensus appears difficult in the short term. Yet recent history demonstrates that the idea periodically resurfaces across the ideological spectrum whenever political conditions change.

For that reason, even after the suspension of the current signature-gathering effort, discussion of a possible constitutional reform is likely to remain part of Colombia’s political debate, regardless of who wins the presidency on June 21 and who ultimately leads the opposition to the next government.

Two men. Both running to be the next president of Colombia. Both swear they are tough, that they are clean, that they are the answer to a country that is exhausted. And both of them have a problem with the company they keep.

One is a defense lawyer who built his career representing mobsters, paramilitaries, and at least one alleged front man for the Maduro regime — and he tells you those relationships were strictly professional. The other fought to spring a FARC commander out of a maximum-security holding cell — and he tells you that relationship was strictly professional too. One says, in effect, “I only knew the narco because I was his attorney.” The other says, “I only knew the guerrilla because I was a peace negotiator.” Same sentence, opposite ends of the political spectrum. It is the strangest mirror in Colombian politics.

This Sunday, June 21, Colombians return to the polls for the runoff. In the first round on May 31, the right’s Abelardo de la Espriella came first with about 43.7 percent. The left’s Iván Cepeda came second with about 40.9 percent. No one else is left. Whoever wins walks into the Casa de Nariño on August 7.

What follows is an analysis, not an endorsement. I am pro-business, anti-crime, and anti-communist, and I am not Colombian, so I will not presume to tell Colombians how to vote. What I can do is lay out who these two men are, where they came from, and the honest pros and cons of each — because both carry serious problems, and readers with capital, operations, or ties in Colombia deserve them laid out straight. Much of the biographical reporting here draws on the long-form profiles published by La Silla Vacía, among the best political journalism in the country, and on Finance Colombia‘s own coverage of the race.

Who is Abelardo de la Espriella?

Start with de la Espriella, since he holds a slight polling lead. His campaign events are not subtle: the lights go yellow, blue, and red, footage of tigers plays on the screens, smoke machines fire, the national anthem swells, and out he comes flanked by bodyguards in a bulletproof vest, declaring, “Here is your tiger, roaring and biting.” The tiger is his symbol — claw, territory, attack — and the crowd chant is ponle la raya al tigre, “put the stripe on the tiger.” It is a show, and he runs it the same way every time, with discipline.

According to La Silla Vacía’s profile, Abelardo was born in Bogotá in 1978 and grew up in Sahagún and Montería, in Córdoba on the Caribbean side. His mother calls the family riquitos de pueblo — “small-town rich.” A respected name and political connections, but not the rosca, the Bogotá elite, and not one of the great national fortunes. His father was a Liberal Party congressman and an early backer of Álvaro Uribe in Córdoba in 2001; when Uribe reached the presidency, he made the elder De la Espriella a notary. That is where the long relationship between the De la Espriella and Uribe families begins.

From childhood, Abelardo wanted to be seen. By his family’s account he sang opera in the bathroom, had a children’s radio program his father arranged, got himself onto regional television as a teenager, and promised his grandmother a limousine in Miami. He studied law at the Sergio Arboleda University in Bogotá — not an academic powerhouse, but a real breeding ground for the Colombian right — and hustled the whole way through, selling whiskey, perfume, clothing, and emeralds on consignment. The man has always been building a legend about himself.

Here is the part he does not lead with on stage. De la Espriella made his name as a defense lawyer, and not for choirboys. His client list reads like a rogues’ gallery: politicians tied to paramilitary groups, the Nule brothers of the carrusel de contratos contracting scandal in Bogotá, the pyramid-scheme operator David Murcia of DMG, the disgraced Constitutional Court magistrate Jorge Pretelt, and — the big one — Álex Saab, the man the United States accused of being a front man for Nicolás Maduro. Early in his career, at 26, he did legal and public-relations work around the paramilitary demobilization at Santa Fe de Ralito through an NGO he ran. His childhood friend from Córdoba is Salvatore Mancuso, the paramilitary chief.

He will tell you — and it is a legitimate argument — that every defendant has a right to counsel, and that defending an unpopular client is not the same as committing the client’s crimes. Fair enough. We will return to it.

After the lawyering came the brand. He launched a rum called Ron Defensor, “the Defender,” with the vallenato star Silvestre Dangond. He launched a clothing line, released music, wrote books, went through an atheist phase, and then, roughly six years ago, underwent a very public religious conversion. Now he is the “God and family” candidate who calls himself “the Cyrus of Colombia.” By his own design he is a sybarite: Italian suits every year, a Miami mansion valued north of $5 million USD, a private plane, the whole production.

Three facts to keep in your carriel for later. First, he has never held elected office; he ran for a Bogotá council seat as a student in the 1990s, lost, and stayed out of electoral politics for nearly thirty years. Second, he holds three citizenships — American, Italian, and Colombian. Third, his running mate is José Manuel Restrepo, a name that returns in a big way when we reach the pros.

“The ‘tough on crime’ candidate has spent his career defending criminals, and the ‘human rights’ candidate stays silent on half the human rights abuses in his own backyard.” — Loren Moss, Finance Colombia

Who is Iván Cepeda?

If de la Espriella’s story is about a man who wanted to be seen, Cepeda’s is about a man shaped by a death.

On August 9, 1994, a young Iván Cepeda took a bus to Javeriana University, where he taught philosophy, after letting his father leave the house first. On the way he came upon ambulances, police cars, and a crowd around a bullet-riddled car. It was his father’s car. Manuel Cepeda, a senator for the Unión Patriótica, had just been assassinated.

The detail that explains Iván Cepeda is what he did next. He did not collapse over the body. He pulled from his jacket a column his father had written about another murdered activist, crossed the street to tell his wife, and then turned and spoke to journalists — composed, on message, calling on the president and the courts to act. “When my father was murdered,” he later said, “I already knew how I should act, what I should say.” He turned private grief into public, political language. La Silla Vacía describes his entire method of politics as organized around the truth of the victims, and that is exactly right.

Cepeda was born in 1962, while his father was in prison for interviewing a survivor of the army’s bombing of Marquetalia, the peasant enclave that became the founding myth of the FARC. His parents, Manuel Cepeda and Yira Castro, were journalists, communists, and revolutionaries; politics was the air the household breathed. At 13 he was in the Communist Youth. At 17, after his mother’s death, his father sent him to study philosophy in Sofia, Bulgaria. He returned in 1987, by his own account disillusioned with Soviet Marxism and the privilege he had seen inside the party there.

Abelardo de la Espriella is a millionaire defense attorney, singer & rum impresario. (photo: Twitter screencapture)

His father’s assassination was the turning point. The Unión Patriótica — a party born of a peace process, a vehicle for the FARC and the Communist Party to enter electoral politics — was then systematically exterminated, with thousands of members killed. Cepeda channeled all of it. He created the Manuel Cepeda Foundation, built memorial galleries with families of the disappeared, and founded MOVICE, the Movement of Victims of State Crimes. He pursued his father’s case until the Colombian state was held responsible and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights condemned the country.

Then he found his great adversary: Álvaro Uribe. For Cepeda, Uribe symbolizes the establishment he believes must confess its responsibility for paramilitarism and the killing of the left. He spent years pursuing Uribe — prison visits to extradited paramilitaries in the United States, the 2014 debate in Congress — and that work ultimately produced the witness-tampering case that put the former president on trial. Cepeda became, as La Silla Vacía puts it, the leftist who managed to put Uribe in the dock. That is the engine of his political career.

He reached Congress in 2010, famously arriving with a bucket, broom, and mop, promising to clean up a legislature stained by parapolítica — the scandal of lawmakers who colluded with paramilitary groups. He has been there ever since, four terms, mostly on the Second Committee, which handles military promotions, security, and foreign relations. The crucial point about his experience, and I will come back to it, is that he has never governed anything — no city, department, ministry, or large budget. His arena has been Congress as a moral and judicial forum. He was also the principal intellectual architect of Petro’s Paz Total, “Total Peace”; he coined the term.

His running mate is Aida Quilcué, an indigenous Nasa leader and senator who is herself a victim of state violence — her husband was killed by the military as they returned from a minga. One more thing matters because it is human and real: Cepeda is in fragile health. He has beaten cancer twice — colon cancer in 2018, liver cancer treated in 2022 — and people who have worked with him describe a worn body and an iron will. He is intellectually serious, sober, and predictable, the opposite of Petro’s chaos. Whatever you make of his politics, he is no lightweight.

The case for Abelardo de la Espriella

Let me make the genuine case for de la Espriella, as I see it.

He promises to be tough on crime — on the organized armed groups and on ordinary street crime alike. After four years in which armed groups roughly doubled in size under Total Peace, many Colombians are hungry for exactly that, and I understand why. He is pro-business and pro-investment, foreign and domestic, and he has built his whole pitch on the idea that prosperity comes from the private sector rather than the state. He is pro-US and promises to repair the relationship with Washington that frayed under Petro; he is, in fact, a US citizen himself, which tells you which direction he faces.

On the economy, I think he would restore investor confidence and likely work to repair Colombia’s diminished credit rating, which matters enormously for what the country pays to borrow. He supports lower taxes, which is a good thing when paired with genuine fiscal prudence — that is the caveat, but the instinct is right.

The strongest item on his ticket, for me, is his running mate, José Manuel Restrepo. Restrepo served as both Minister of Commerce and Finance Minister in Iván Duque’s cabinet and did the job well, even when Duque did not. He has few critics and brings a level of intellectual seriousness and economic credibility that the top of the ticket does not project on its own. A credible technocrat one heartbeat from the presidency is a real asset.

He wants to shrink the bureaucracy. Colombia’s is not as bloated as some in Latin America, but it can be streamlined — and the bigger problem than handing out sinecures is mermelada, the practice of spreading money through useless government contracts to friends and supporters. If he genuinely goes after that, good. He is also plainly intelligent; a successful defense attorney knows jurisprudence and procedure cold.

Two of his ideas deserve particular credit. He says he wants to promote home ownership for people of modest means, and El País reports a plan for below-market thirty-year mortgages. If that is real and it works, it is a genuinely good idea. The Peruvian author Hernando de Soto, in The Mystery of Capital, explains how broad asset ownership by ordinary people is what formalizes an economy and drives real progress: when you own assets, you can extract value from them, pass them to your descendants, and build lasting wealth. And on health care, he promises to fix the EPS system with financial oversight to root out corruption, rather than blow it up. That is far better than moving to a single-payer government scheme, which I think would be disastrous. The state has not shown the organizational competence to run one. Consider that Petro placed Daniel Quintero, the indicted former mayor of Medellín, in a role overseeing the EPS — and Quintero is accused of looting the city’s coffers. A couple of insolvent EPS providers is a manageable problem; a national government that cannot pay providers and collapses the whole system is not. Patching beats nationalizing.

He supports performance evaluations for teachers, which is reasonable even if FECODE will oppose it, and he wants to expand internet connectivity into rural and underserved regions, which is critical in a country with such a wide gap between rural and urban, rich and poor. Connectivity means opportunity. That is a real list — a coherent pro-growth, pro-security program. Now the other side.

The case against Abelardo de la Espriella

There is a lot here. Start with the Bukele worship. De la Espriella is an open admirer of El Salvador’s president, Nayib Bukele. Bukele has unquestionably cut crime, but he also shows clear authoritarian tendencies and no sign of willingly leaving power. More to the point, Bukele is no friend to a free press, and de la Espriella is notoriously thin-skinned: he uses the courts to file SLAPPs — Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation — designed to force critics to burn money and time on their defense. Even meritless, such suits can bankrupt a person or consume so much of their time they cannot do their job. This is not hypothetical. La Silla Vacía documented dozens of civil suits and criminal complaints against journalists, several of whom admit to censoring themselves. That should worry anyone who cares about press freedom.

He may also turn out to be soft on crime — especially organized crime — which sounds backwards for the “iron fist” candidate until you look at his career. He built it defending mobsters, paracos, and the corrupt: the Nule family, Álex Saab. He is childhood friends with the paramilitary chief Salvatore Mancuso. And he has been linked to a paramilitary known as “Boliche,” Jorge Luís Hernández Villazón, on trial in the United States for narcotrafficking. De la Espriella denies any connection with Boliche and says he knows him only through his work as a defense attorney. Fine — but it is a fair question how tough he will really be on his friends and former clients. That is not a cheap shot; it is a reasonable thing to want answered.

I also do not see a plan for the poor. I have looked, and I find nothing in his platform that signals a comprehensive plan — or much compassion — for the underprivileged and those without access to opportunity in the remote areas: the Pacific coast, the rural zones, the Atlantic coast. Perhaps one exists and I have missed it, but if so, where is it?

He seems inconsistent. This is a man who craves attention — a recording artist, a clothing line, a rum called “Defensor” — who then suddenly finds Jesus and becomes the “God and family” candidate. Maybe it is sincere. Forgive me for being skeptical of a conversion that lines up so neatly with a presidential run.

On the peace process, he has pledged not to implement the 2016 accords that won former President Juan Manuel Santos the Nobel Peace Prize. To be fair, the last two administrations did a poor job implementing them too. But my concern is simple: the people who genuinely laid down their arms need protection. You do not want to teach the next generation that demobilizing gets you killed. He also wants to end the Jurisdicción Especial de Paz, the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, arguing it is a political tool that does not deliver real justice. I do not know the JEP well enough to rule on that flatly, but I am skeptical of the claim; my sense is that it is doing some genuine good and should be reformed rather than scrapped.

Colombia 2026 1st round top two (Graphic: Sofi Imfeld for Finance Colombia)

Then there is the absence of a track record. He has never held any office, so there is nothing to go on. Does he become a statesman or a caudillo wannabe? We do not know, and that uncertainty is itself a cost. Finally, the persona. His public identity strikes me as a bit of a gomelo — Colombian slang for a stuck-up rich kid. People often cultivate a public character that has little to do with who they really are, so perhaps the private Abelardo is a prince. But he is asking voters to choose the public one, and the public one rubs me the wrong way.

The case for Iván Cepeda

Now the honest case for Cepeda. He will very likely put real attention on the marginalized and the forgotten parts of the country, and the map backs this up: in the first round he carried the entire Pacific coast, the forested borders with Ecuador, Peru, and Brazil, and most of the Atlantic provinces — the exception being Antioquia, whose population concentrates far to the south around Medellín. Much of that Atlantic coast, outside Barranquilla and the touristy parts of Cartagena, has suffered generations of corruption and chronic underinvestment. Someone paying attention to those places is not a bad thing.

He is consistent and predictable. He has a long career and a coherent, stable ideology. I may disagree with that ideology — you will hear about it in the cons — but no one can call the man unpredictable. You know what you are getting, and in politics that is worth something.

He would try to actually implement Santos’s 2016 peace accords. The pact has real flaws and lacked genuine commitment from the current and previous administrations, but it did demobilize thousands of fighters who are no longer in the bush kidnapping and bombing people. Pushing to finish that work honestly has value.

And to be fair, he is clearly more competent than the ally currently in office. He is more intelligent and more disciplined than Gustavo Petro. Consider how Petro has governed: unable to push through much of his agenda, running the Casa de Nariño like a reality show, cycling more than sixty ministers through nineteen ministries in under four years. How do you accomplish anything while swapping in a new minister roughly every three weeks? I do not think a Cepeda administration would bring the same chaos and palace intrigue. And he would command the largest bloc of support in Congress, so he would be more effective at moving his agenda; he knows how the machinery works. Credit where it is due — he does not stand up in cabinet meetings inventing his own physics. That is a low bar, but Petro keeps walking under it and Cepeda clears it.

Finally, he has a real, lifelong commitment to the victims of violence in Colombia. Whatever else you say about him, that commitment is genuine and it is the through-line of his entire life. That counts.

The case against Iván Cepeda

Iván Cepeda is a senator, former member of the Communist Youth, educated in Bulgaria during the Soviet era, and key player in the negotiation with armed guerilla groups. (photo: Colombian Senate)

And there are many cons. The first is the mirror I opened with: he has shady friends too. He was close to the Chavista senator Piedad Córdoba. Just as de la Espriella calls his contacts with Boliche purely professional, Cepeda says his ties to the FARC commander Raúl Reyes were purely those of a peace negotiator. But Cepeda went further. When the FARC commander Jesús Santrich was locked up and ready to be extradited to the United States on drug-trafficking charges, Cepeda worked fiercely to get him released from the Fiscalía‘s Bunker. Once out, Santrich fled into Venezuela and restarted the Segunda Marquetalia, a FARC dissident network. And here is the part that lands like a gut punch a year later: that same Segunda Marquetalia is the group Colombian prosecutors have now linked to the assassination of presidential candidate and senator Miguel Uribe Turbay, who was shot in Bogotá in June 2025 and died that August. I want to be careful and fair — that is an attribution by the Fiscalía, and serious analysts at Insight Crime have noted the public evidence is thin, so it should not be treated as settled fact. But the chain — Cepeda helps free Santrich, Santrich restarts the Segunda Marquetalia, the Segunda Marquetalia is tied to a magnicidio — is a heavy thing to carry into a presidential race.

Second, he is soft on the guerrillas, broadly. He has a proven record of leniency toward the FARC, the ELN, and armed groups generally, and he is an architect of Petro’s failed Total Peace. Under that nurturing approach those groups have flourished, and I think they would keep flourishing under a Cepeda administration. He seems to see them more as victims of state violence than as the kidnappers, narcotraffickers, extortionists, and terrorists that they are. La Silla Vacía’s own reporting — and they are not a right-wing outlet — concluded that Cepeda bears real political responsibility for the failure of Total Peace, having pushed a negotiation model that was too ambitious, legally ambiguous, and weak before armed groups. When the violence comes from the state, Cepeda sees structure and systemic responsibility; when it comes from the guerrillas, he tends to see context and a chance for peace. That blind spot defines him.

Former 2022 presidential candidate Rodolfo Hernandez (photo: candidate’s website)

Third is his health and his running mate, which is delicate but real. Cepeda has had cancer twice. The late Rodolfo Hernández, who lost to Petro in 2022, died in 2024 of cancer after also having had liver and colon cancer, so the risk is not hypothetical. If Cepeda did not finish his term, Aida Quilcué would take over, and her career — as an indigenous Nasa leader, minga organizer, and senator — has centered on those issues rather than monetary policy, foreign affairs, or national security, which makes her approach to them a genuine unknown. People also doubted Francia Márquez, and she turned out to be the articulate, level-headed one beside Petro’s wilder talk, so I will say nothing against Quilcué as a person. But a possible succession to a medically fragile president is an inarguable risk, and it would be foolish to pretend otherwise.

Fourth, I cannot imagine investor confidence improving under a Cepeda presidency. A data point worth chewing on: the peso is currently strong. Part of that is the dollar’s broad global weakness, but part of it, in my read, is the market reacting to the strong polling of Cepeda’s opponent. Markets vote too, and they are nervous about the left.

Fifth, the father — and I want to be fair here. You cannot reliably judge a son by his father; my own father was a politician, and as an adult I spent most of my life in the party opposite his, with a great relationship and very different philosophies. So I will not convict Iván Cepeda for his father’s beliefs. The difference is that Cepeda does seem broadly aligned with them. His father was secretary general of the Colombian Communist Party, Iván studied in Soviet Bulgaria, and though he says he grew disillusioned with the hypocrisy of Soviet communism, he still appears committed to a far-left ideology. If that is your cup of tea, count it a plus; I have never been fond of Marx or Engels.

Sixth is crop substitution, and this one deserves a direct conversation. On paper it sounds marvelous: rather than spray coca with herbicides that wreck the environment and people’s health, offer farmers a legal alternative and a path out. If it worked the way it is drawn up, I would back it one hundred percent. The problem is the gap between the brochure and the dirt road — and that gap is built on a premise that simply is not true on the ground: the premise that the campesino is a free actor who chooses to grow coca and could, if persuaded, choose to grow something else.

In much of rural Colombia, the small farmer does not get to volunteer. Where the FARC dissidents and the ELN hold territory, the armed group tells the farmer he will cultivate coca, do the manual labor of harvesting it, and sell the leaf or paste to the group at a price the group sets — under penalty of death. Refuse, and the farmer is driven off his land or simply killed. This is not a lifestyle preference; it is coercion at gunpoint. The reporting bears out the broader pattern. Finance Colombia’s coverage, drawn from InSight Crime, documents how the power vacuum left by the FARC’s 2016 demobilization was filled by the ELN, the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces, and FARC dissidents fighting for control of coca zones, and how the state’s failure to deliver on substitution let armed groups fill the vacuum and tighten their grip. The human cost is staggering: after families signed substitution agreements, the murder rate of supportive social leaders rose by 546 percent, according to a study cited by InSight Crime, and only about 5 percent of the program’s 2023 budget was actually executed. You cannot ask a farmer to switch crops when the entity controlling his life and his land is not the government but a guerrilla faction that has already told him what he will plant.

That is why this is not a matter of asking farmers nicely to grow coffee or cacao. It is not their choice. Security has to come first. Crop substitution can only work where the state — not the guerrillas — holds the territory and can guarantee a farmer’s safety when he says no to coca. The armed groups must be displaced before substitution has any chance, and any candidate who treats substitution as a soft alternative to security has the sequence backwards. That is the simple truth of it, and it is the heart of my concern with the Total Peace approach Cepeda helped design.

Seventh, he wants to expand the state’s role across the board, including continuing Petro’s effort to take over the health sector. Before the pandemic, Colombia had one of the best reputations in the world for health-care quality. Is it unequal? Yes — care in an isolated hamlet does not match Cali or Medellín, and the south of Bogotá does not match the north. Then let the government build clinics and hospitals where they are missing. There is no reason to take over the parts of the private system that work in order to do that, unless one objects on ideology to doctors and dentists existing as small businesspeople. That is ideology, not health policy.

Eighth, if Cepeda wins he may well protect Daniel Quintero, the former mayor of Medellín under indictment on more than forty counts of corruption. That kind of debt-collection worries me. And ninth, the selective conscience. Cepeda is a former member of the Communist Youth — a plus if you are a communist, unsettling if you are not. The FARC and ELN are also communist groups; one wonders whether that is the root of his apparent sympathy. He casts himself as a human rights defender yet stays conspicuously silent on the abuses of the Chavista regime in Venezuela. La Silla Vacía documented this in detail: roughly a decade of avoiding criticism of Maduro’s repression, fraudulent elections, and alliances with Colombian guerrillas. Cepeda notices human rights violations committed by people he dislikes while exempting bad actors he is closer to, provided they are communist or socialist. The record on that is fairly clear.

So where does that leave us?

Two men. One built his life on being seen — a brilliant, theatrical defense lawyer for the powerful and the accused, now promising an iron fist while surrounding himself with at least one genuinely serious technocrat in José Manuel Restrepo. The other built his life on a single tragedy — a disciplined, consistent, ideologically committed man of the left who has fought for victims for thirty years, and who carries a blind spot the size of a guerrilla encampment.

Here is the paradox I cannot get past: the “tough on crime” candidate has spent his career defending criminals, and the “human rights” candidate stays silent on half the human rights abuses in his own backyard. Each is, in some way, the very thing he claims to oppose. This is not a runoff between an angel and a devil. It is a runoff between two men who each ask voters to trust that their inconvenient friendships were strictly professional.

I am uneasy about both candidacies, for very different reasons, and I am doing what I said I would: laying it out and handing it to the reader. For deeper background, see Finance Colombia’s earlier survey of how the leading candidates draw divergent maps for foreign capital, security, and the rule of law, its reporting on what is behind Colombia’s increased violence, and its account of the final push of the Total Peace policy. The runoff is Sunday, June 21, and the winner is inaugurated August 7.

Colombia’s first-round presidential election, held Sunday, May 31, 2026, produced a result that crystallizes the country’s political exhaustion with both the governing left and the traditional right. Criminal defense attorney and political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella placed first with more than 10.3 million votes. Leftist Senator Iván Cepeda, a close ally of outgoing President Gustavo Petro and the lead architect of the administration’s Paz Total peace policy, finished second with just under 9.7 million votes. The two will face each other in a runoff election on June 21.

Senator Paloma Valencia, the candidate backed by former President Álvaro Uribe and the standard-bearer of his Uribismo movement, placed a distant third, receiving less than 7% of the vote — fewer than 1.7 million ballots. Former Medellín mayor and Antioquia governor Sergio Fajardo received just over one million votes, while former Bogotá mayor Claudia López finished below 1%, with approximately 225,000 votes. The remaining minor candidates combined for just over 1% of the total.

Under Colombia’s electoral system, the top two finishers advance to a runoff if no candidate surpasses 50% in the first round. The June 21 vote will determine who assumes the presidency on August 7.

Click above to watch the video!

The Candidates: Background and Context

Abelardo de la Espriella, 47, has never held elected office. He built a national profile over more than two decades as a high-profile defense attorney, founding De La Espriella Lawyers in 2002, with offices in Colombia and the United States. His client roster has included controversial figures: he represented Alex Saab, a Colombian-born businessman who became a close associate of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and was implicated in a scheme to launder proceeds from Venezuela’s food-assistance program, the Comité Local de Abastecimiento y Producción (CLAP). Saab was extradited to the United States, convicted, and later granted clemency before being re-arrested in Venezuela in early 2026. De la Espriella also represented members of the Nule family in connection with the Carrusel de Contratos — a major contracting scandal tied to infrastructure works at Bogotá’s El Dorado airport corridor. He has additionally been reported to have represented individuals linked to organized crime.

De la Espriella has drawn comparisons to figures such as US President Donald Trump and El Salvador’s Nayib Bukele. His campaign has centered on hard-line security policy, including proposals for large-scale incarceration, expanded military operations against armed groups, and the rejection of negotiations with guerrilla organizations. He is reported to hold Italian and US citizenship in addition to his Colombian nationality, and is said to own property in Florida.

In a notable departure from his defense work, de la Espriella took the side of a victim in a high-profile acid-attack case, acting as a private prosecutor to secure a stronger sentence for the perpetrator — an episode that raised his public profile beyond the defense bar.

Iván Cepeda, 63, enters the runoff as the consolidated candidate of the Colombian left and Petro’s Pacto Histórico coalition. He is the primary legislative architect of Paz Total, the Petro administration’s policy of negotiating simultaneously with multiple armed actors, including the ELN and FARC dissident factions. Cepeda’s family background includes deep ties to the Colombian left: his father was secretary general of the Communist Party, and was assassinated. Cepeda himself studied in communist Bulgaria during the soviet era. The two finalists have an established legal and political history: Uribe attempted to bring criminal charges against Cepeda while both served in the Senate, but the Supreme Court determined that Uribe had fabricated the accusations and attempted to bribe witnesses — a case that resulted in Uribe’s criminal conviction.

“If nothing changes, Abelardo wins.” — Loren Moss, Finance Colombia

The Electoral Map

The geographic distribution of the vote reflects deep regional divisions. Cepeda carried Bogotá, which has trended left for years, particularly in lower-income districts on the city’s south and west sides. Antioquia — historically the heartland of Uribismo and home to Medellín, the country’s second-largest city — voted more than two to one for de la Espriella, a result that signals the weakening grip of Uribe’s movement even in its traditional stronghold.

The heart of coffee-growing country — the departments of Caldas, Risaralda, and Quindío also went to de la Espriella. Caquetá, a sparsely populated department in southern Colombia that has suffered sustained guerrilla violence from both the ELN and FARC dissident groups, voted for de la Espriella as well, a result we may interpret as a direct rejection of Petro and Cepeda’s Paz Total.

Cepeda carried Colombia’s Pacific coast, including the chronically neglected department of Chocó, as well as the sparsely populated Amazonas and Putumayo departments bordering Peru and Brazil, and the northern Caribbean coast. The Caribbean coast result is notable, as the region has historically suffered from underdevelopment, infrastructure deficits, and significant income inequality. Norte de Santander with its Catatumbo region on the Venezuelan border and experiencing severe armed-group activity — voted for de la Espriella, a result consistent with public exhaustion over security policy.

The Political Context: From Uribe to Petro and Beyond

Colombia’s current political trajectory is rooted in decisions made across the past two decades. President Uribe served two terms in the early 2000s and, together with then-Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos, mounted a sustained military campaign against the FARC that significantly weakened the insurgency. Santos later broke from Uribe after assuming the presidency, governing independently and ultimately negotiating a peace agreement with the FARC — a deal that Uribe actively opposed. A plebiscite on the accord failed, but Santos used legislative maneuvering to implement it anyway.

Colombia 2026 1st round top two (Graphic: Sofi Imfeld for Finance Colombia)

Uribe’s next handpicked candidate, Iván Duque, won the 2018 election but finished his term with approximately 30% approval. Members of his own party publicly distanced themselves from him — Senator María Fernanda Cabal, a staunch Uribista, called Duque a “mamerto” (leftist idiot) while he was still in office. Under his administration, indicators on crime and guerrilla activity worsened, and armed groups including the ELN rebuilt operational capacity that had been degraded under Uribe and Santos.

Petro’s administration has not met initial fears of a Venezuelan-style democratic breakdown: Congress has largely blocked the most radical components of his agenda, including attempts to nationalize the private pension system and convert the healthcare system to a single-payer model. However, crime has increased, armed groups have expanded their operational footprints, and the security situation in several regions has worsened. Paz Total is widely seen as having produced few tangible results.

Uribe himself was convicted of witness tampering and attempted bribery in the case he had brought against Cepeda. Though released from house arrest after conviction, the judges who authorized his release are now reportedly under investigation for judicial corruption. Valencia’s poor performance in the first round — despite being Uribe’s chosen standard-bearer — suggests that Uribismo as a political force is waning, with its core constituency aging and new generations of voters disengaged from the Uribe legacy.

What to Expect Before June 21

Both campaigns will intensify mobilization efforts over the coming three weeks. Cepeda’s movement — Colombia Humana and the broader Pacto Histórico coalition — has historically relied on organized mobilizations, including indigenous community-led mingas, labor unions, and allied social movements. Cepeda’s running mate Senator Aida Quilcué is an indigenous activist, a choice expected to energize those constituencies. FECODE, the Federación Colombiana de Trabajadores de la Educación (Colombia’s main teachers’ federation), is expected to align officially with Cepeda, though individual teachers may not follow union leadership in their voting choices.

On the right, Paloma Valencia issued a public endorsement of de la Espriella immediately following the first-round results. Business community organizations, including ANDI (the Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia) and Fenalco (the Federación Nacional de Comerciantes), do not formally endorse candidates, but their members are widely understood to favor a government that supports private enterprise and market-oriented policy. De la Espriella holds no congressional constituency, meaning whichever candidate wins will face the same dynamic Petro encountered: a fragmented Congress that is likely to act as a check on executive authority.

The question of centrist voter alignment remains open. Fajardo and López are not expected to formally endorse either finalist, and the direction of their combined approximately 1.2 million votes is uncertain.

Winners and Losers by Sector

For international investors and executives operating in Colombia, the policy differences between the two candidates are substantive across several key sectors.

Petroleum and Natural Gas: De la Espriella has stated unequivocally that he will restart petroleum exploration and licensing, which the Petro administration blocked. Ecopetrol S.A. (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL), Colombia’s state-controlled oil company, which also holds producing assets in the US Permian Basin and Gulf of Mexico, has operated under a government that halted new drilling permits. The consequences have included a decline in future production capacity at a time when global oil prices have risen due to Middle East tensions. Colombia has been forced to import natural gas at elevated prices to meet existing domestic demand — including from transportation fleets that were converted to natural gas under government incentive programs. Cepeda would be expected to continue or deepen current restrictions on fossil fuel expansion.

Healthcare: The Petro-Cepeda platform favors a government single-payer model. The administration has already taken over several Entidades Promotoras de Salud (EPS) — Colombia’s managed-care intermediaries — placing the healthcare system in legal and financial uncertainty. Private clinics, hospitals, and physicians who wish to operate outside a government-controlled framework would benefit from a de la Espriella administration. Cepeda’s healthcare agenda would accelerate the shift toward government-managed care.

BPO, Tech, and Call Centers: The BPO sector — which provides large volumes of formal employment, particularly in Medellín, Bogotá, Cali, and Barranquilla — was significantly affected by Petro-era minimum wage increases of 16% and 23% in successive years. These increases created contract renegotiation pressures with international clients, some of whom have shifted or considered shifting operations to competing jurisdictions including Honduras, Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Guatemala. At the CX Summit, the industry’s main annual event held in Cartagena, the son of Álvaro Uribe appeared as an invited keynote speaker — a gesture that could be interpreted within the industry as an implicit signal of political alignment. A de la Espriella government, with its orientation toward labor market deregulation and reduced regulatory burden, would be viewed more favorably by this sector. Current Colombian labor law prohibits part-time employment contracts and places significant restrictions on dual employment, making workforce flexibility difficult for businesses that operate outside traditional 40-hour weekly structures.

Mining: The Petro administration has been less aggressive toward mining than toward petroleum, but sector participants expect a more permissive regulatory environment under de la Espriella, and continued constraints under Cepeda.

Security and Tourism: Both candidates have stated support for tourism promotion, but the sector’s trajectory is more directly linked to security conditions. Under current policies, several regions that were accessible to domestic and international travelers several years ago have experienced increased armed-group activity, effectively closing them to tourism. A de la Espriella administration is expected to pursue a more aggressive military posture toward the ELN and FARC dissident factions; a Cepeda government would likely continue dialogue-first approaches. The outcome will directly affect which parts of Colombia’s territory remain accessible to investment and tourism.

Foreign Relations: A de la Espriella government is expected to restore a broadly cooperative relationship with the United States, which deteriorated under Petro following several high-profile diplomatic incidents. De la Espriella has expressed admiration for US President Donald Trump, and reports indicate he holds US citizenship and owns property in Florida. Relations with Ecuador, which have been strained by mutual tariff escalations between Petro and Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa, would be expected to normalize. Relations with Venezuela under Cepeda would likely continue along the current allied trajectory, while a de la Espriella government would be expected to take a more critical posture toward Caracas. China and Russia would find a more receptive diplomatic environment under Cepeda, and a cooler one under de la Espriella.

The Poor and Informal Workers: Cepeda’s campaign argues that minimum wage increases and expanded state services benefit lower-income Colombians. Critics counter that elevated formal labor costs have pushed more employment into the informal sector — which currently accounts for approximately half the Colombian workforce — depriving those workers of pension contributions, health benefits, and job security. De la Espriella’s platform, which emphasizes business formation, security, and labor market deregulation, would be presented as generating more formal-sector job creation. The actual distributional effects of either approach remain contested.

The Outlook

Assuming current polling trends hold and Uribista voters consolidate behind de la Espriella as expected following Valencia’s endorsement, de la Espriella enters the runoff as the frontrunner. Cepeda’s path to victory depends on driving high turnout among his base, securing support from centrist voters who did not vote for either finalist in the first round, and potentially benefiting from any missteps by de la Espriella in the final three weeks of campaigning.

The first-round results produced no major electoral violence. The ELN announced a temporary halt to armed actions during the voting period. Authorities detained some individuals reportedly attempting to purchase votes in rural areas, but no large-scale incidents were recorded.

The incoming president will face a Congress with no natural majority aligned to the executive, a healthcare system in partial administrative disarray, a petroleum sector whose future production trajectory is in question, and regions where state presence remains contested by armed groups. The June 21 runoff will determine which vision — market-oriented restructuring or continuation of the Petro project — Colombia pursues for the next four years.

An explosive attack on the Pan-American Highway near the municipality of Cajibío, in Colombia’s Cauca department, left at least 21 people dead and 56 injured, Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez Suárez confirmed.

The attack occurred Saturday, April 25, on one of the main roads in the country’s southwest, an area historically affected by the presence of illegal armed groups.

The minister attributed the attack to alias “Marlon,” described as one of the most wanted leaders in the region, “for whom we are offering a reward of up to $1.4 million USD,” he said.

According to local media reports cited by El Tiempo, “the attack was initially intended to target army troops. However, a change in military plans reportedly led to the explosive being detonated while civilians were passing through the area.”

The impact of the attack was significant. Spain’s El País reported “that the explosion created a large crater, left the road covered in debris, and forced rescue operations that lasted several hours due to difficult access conditions.”

Aerial view of the crater caused by the explosion on the Pan-American Highway. Photo courtesy of Colombia’s Ministry of Defense.

Cauca Governor Octavio Guzmán described the incident as one of the most serious attacks in the region in decades. “What happened on April 25 constitutes the most brutal and ruthless attack against civilians in decades,” he said.

The attack comes amid a resurgence of violence in southwestern Colombia, where illegal armed groups linked to drug trafficking, illegal mining and other illicit economies operate. Authorities continue operations in the area as investigations proceed to clarify the circumstances of the attack and determine responsibility.

According to reports by BBC Mundo, alias “Marlon” is a dissident FARC leader identified as Iván Jacobo Idrobo Arredondo, “the alleged head of the Jaime Martínez structure, part of the Estado Mayor Central (EMC),” one of the country’s most powerful illegal armed groups.

Operations and arrests

As part of response operations, the National Police reported the capture of José Alex Bitoco, alias “David” or “Mi Pez,” identified as the leader of the Dagoberto Ramos structure, another illegal armed faction, who is believed to have acted under orders from alias “Marlon”.

National Police Director Gen. William Rincón Zambrano said the detainee “will have to answer for the wave of terrorist activity” and linked him directly to the attack, stating that “he is responsible for what happened on April 25 in the El Túnel sector on the Pan-American Highway.”

The Defense Ministry reiterated that alias “Marlon” remains a priority target. “He is a high-value target, and we are searching for him with all the capabilities of the state. We have deployed a dedicated intelligence task force to locate him,” Sánchez said, confirming a reward of up to $1.4 million USD for information leading to his capture.

Context: criticism of “Paz Total” policy (Total Peace)

The attack comes amid growing security deterioration in Colombia, intensifying criticism of President Gustavo Petro’s “Total Peace” policy. The Ideas for Peace Foundation (FIP) has warned of a possible failure of the strategy, noting that “less than four months before the end of the government, the lack of progress in peace negotiations and the deterioration of security have become one of the main points of criticism of the Petro administration.”

According to the think tank, during the current administration “the number of disputed territories between illegal actors has nearly doubled, and the number of members in these structures has increased by 85%: they now total more than 27,000 members, including armed individuals and support networks.”

This figure not only represents a significant increase but also places the country at levels similar to, and even higher than, those seen before the peace process with the FARC began. Between 2011 and 2012, the estimate stood at around 26,800 members, compared with 14,600 at the end of Iván Duque’s administration in 2022.

The recent increase has also been rapid. According to the FIP, armed groups grew by 23.5% over the past year (from December 2024 to December 2025), reflecting a swift reconfiguration of these structures. At the same time, violence has intensified. Analysts such as Professor Karol Solís Menco note that over the weekend of April 25–26 alone, “26 terrorist attacks of varying magnitude” were recorded across the country.

Political analysis outlets point to a structural dynamic. According to La Silla Vacía, “Cauca is not experiencing an isolated event, but rather a phase of intensifying territorialized violence, marked by fragmentation among armed actors and a type of violence capable of producing national-level impacts.”

In this context, FARC dissident groups have once again taken center stage in the conflict. “Once again, attention is turning to FARC dissidents. Every attack, every gas cylinder bomb, every assault in Valle and Cauca ends with the same name on the table: the Jaime Martínez structure, one of the strongest groups of Iván Mordisco’s Estado Mayor Central,” El País reported.

Violence indicators also reflect sustained deterioration. “In the first four months of 2026, Colombia has already recorded 48 massacres, with 229 victims, most of them civilians, according to Indepaz. It is the highest figure in the past decade. With these numbers, which represent only a partial picture of the country’s violence, this election year is shaping up to be the most violent since the 2016 peace agreement with the now-defunct FARC guerrilla group,” the same outlet reported.

Cauca, where the attack took place, is considered one of the most sensitive regions. “Cauca is particularly complex because it combines multiple layers of conflict: the historic presence of Indigenous, peasant and Afro-descendant communities; illicit economies; Pacific corridors; disputes over drug trafficking routes; control of the Pan-American Highway; and the presence of FARC dissidents, particularly structures linked to Iván Mordisco,” El País said.

Experts agree that part of the difficulty lies in the design and implementation of the government’s strategy. “Early implementation was a valuable innovation in intent, but it failed to ensure minimum conditions of verification and institutional coherence,” said analyst Germán Valencia of the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Pares).

Taken together, these factors have led various sectors to conclude that the “Total Peace” policy faces serious structural limitations amid a scenario of armed fragmentation and territorial expansion by illegal groups.

On March 8, Colombia elected the Congress that will exercise legislative authority during the 2026–2030 term. From more than 3,200 candidates, voters chose the 102 senators (upper house) and 182 members of the House of Representatives (lower house) who will make up the country’s legislative branch.

According to preliminary reports from the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (RNEC), with 98.4% of polling stations counted, equivalent to 19,220,365 votes tallied, the new Congress has been defined electorally, however, it should be noted that these seat projections correspond to the official preliminary count, which still must go through several formal procedures before the final results are certified.

How the Senate Race is Shaping Up?

The Pacto Histórico, the party of current President Gustavo Petro, obtained around 22% of the vote (4,402,601), which would allow it to increase its representation from 20 senators in the current legislature to approximately 25 seats in the next term.

In second place is the Centro Democrático, the party of former President Álvaro Uribe, with about 15% of the vote (3,020,459), potentially increasing its representation from 13 to 17 seats.

The Partido Liberal would rank third with 13 seats (2,268,658 votes). It would be followed by the Alianza por Colombia, led by the Green Party, with 10 seats (1,899,096 votes), and the Partido Conservador, also with 10 seats (1,859,493 votes).

Other wins in the Senate include Party of La U (9 seats), Cambio Radical (7), the Ahora Colombia coalition (5), which backs presidential candidate Sergio Fajardo, and Salvación Nacional (4), the movement of presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella. The two remaining seats correspond to the special indigenous constituency.

In terms of losses in representation, the Partido Conservador would be the most affected, losing five of its current 15 seats. Cambio Radical would lose four, the Greens three, La U two, while Liberals and Ahora Colombia would each lose one seat.

Among the prominent figures who would be left out of the new Senate is former President Álvaro Uribe, who occupied position number 25 on his party’s list and would not obtain a seat if the Centro Democrático secures only 17 seats. Green Party senator Angélica Lozano, known for promoting legislation related to transparency, would also lose her seat.

Likewise, movements such as the coalition that supported Juan Daniel Oviedo and the Partido Oxígeno, led by former presidential candidate Ingrid Betancourt, who was kidnapped for years by the now-defunct FARC guerrilla group, would fail to surpass the minimum threshold required to obtain Senate representation (3% of the total vote).

On the other hand, the performance of the Salvación Nacional movement, led by presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella, stands out. In its first participation in a congressional election, the party would surpass the electoral threshold and secure four senators.

What About the House of Representatives?

The allocation of seats in the House of Representatives follows a different process from that of the Senate, making it difficult to project the final distribution in the early stages of the vote count.

This is because the calculation is conducted department by department, once the RNEC determines the seat allocation formula and electoral quotient in each of the 32 States and the Capital District of Bogotá.

According to report number 45 from the RNEC, with 99.03% of votes counted, the main parties have obtained the following preliminary nationwide results:

• Centro Democrático: 2,551,706 votes.
• Partido Liberal: 2,101,877 votes.
• Partido Conservador: 1,967,996 votes.
• La U: 1,044,778 votes.
• Pacto Histórico: 913,990 votes.
• Cambio Radical: 803,721 votes.
• Alianza Verde: 654,071 votes.
• Salvación Nacional: 436,365 votes.

Because the House of Representatives elections involve parties, movements, and coalitions with strong local and regional influence, several smaller political organizations are expected to win seats, as they must surpass regional thresholds rather than a national one.

The Highlight: a Fragmented Congress that Will Require Coalitions

With the preliminary distribution of seats in both the Senate and the House of Representatives, projections suggest that Colombia’s next president will need to govern through legislative coalitions, as has occurred under President Gustavo Petro and his predecessors.

Presidential candidates Iván Cepeda, of the Pacto Histórico, and Paloma Valencia, of the Centro Democrático, would begin the next political phase with the largest congressional blocs, although neither would have enough seats to govern alone.

Traditional parties such as the Liberal, Conservador, Cambio Radical, and La U, which together could account for more than 40% of the new congress, have not yet decided which presidential candidate they will support, a situation similar to what occurred in the previous election. These parties could therefore become kingmakers, capable of facilitating, or blocking, governability depending on the alliances and coalitions they choose to form.

For that reason, the coming weeks are expected to be marked by intense political negotiations, as presidential contenders attempt to build alliances that would allow them to secure legislative support.

For candidates such as Sergio Fajardo, whose Ahora Colombia coalition would obtain only five senators, or Abelardo de la Espriella, whose Salvación Nacional movement would have four, the challenge will be significantly greater.

Above photo: Polling station during Colombia’s congressional elections. Photo courtesy of the Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever,” second-in-command of the Second Marquetalia (Segunda Marquetalia), was allegedly killed in an August 5 ambush in the southern reaches of the Colombia-Venezuela border, according to a statement from the group. The Second Marquetalia is a dissident group of former fighters from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia — FARC), also known as the ex-FARC Mafia.

The statement accused the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional — ELN) of carrying out the attack using explosives and said it also claimed the lives of four other fighters. However, Colombian authorities have so far been unable to independently verify the claims.

*Sierra Sabogal’s death, which occurred during an ELN attack near the Colombia-Venezuela border, was confirmed on August 11 by Colombia’s Defense Minister, Pedro Sánchez.

The Second Marquetalia accused “Pedro Pablo” or “Copete,” commander of the José Daniel Pérez Carrero Front of the ELN’s Eastern War Front, of orchestrating the ambush. He allegedly invited high-ranking members of the Second Marquetalia to a meeting to lure them into the ambush.

“The ELN acted with malice and treachery. They carried out premeditated simultaneous attacks on other Second Marquetalia units located in the region,” the group said in the statement.

The killing is linked to a series of recent armed confrontations between the ELN and Second Marquetalia in the municipality of Maroa in Venezuela’s Amazonas state, which local sources began reporting to InSight Crime on August 3. The battles between both groups, according to those reports, took place along the border with the Colombian department of Guainia.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro confirmed the armed confrontation between the guerrilla groups. “The ELN has entered into war with the Second Marquetalia and their conflict extends into Venezuela, where they have already killed people,” the president said in a post on X.

SEE ALSO: Major Criminal Powers Dispute Key Corridors in Colombia

Before this fighting, both the ELN’s Eastern War Front and the dissident Acacio Medina Front, an ally of the Second Marquetalia, had maintained certain financial arrangements and territorial divisions along this part of the border. This allowed them each to manage the area and oversee illegal mining in Amazonas, as well as the drug trafficking routes that cut through this area.

Zarco Aldinever had been in the crosshairs of Colombian authorities. They accused him of being one of the main suspects behind the June shooting of Senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in the capital city of Bogotá.

The breaking down of the guerrilla alliance in this strategic border region may lead to further military advances from the ELN and spark a new conflict with major implications for both Colombia and Venezuela.

After Hugo Chávez became Venezuela’s president in 1999, he welcomed many FARC commanders into the country who went on to establish operations in several border states. However, when President Nicolás Maduro rose to power in 2013, he established more favorable relations with the ELN. With the tacit support of his regime, the ELN began to expand its operations across the border, eventually displacing some of the dissident FARC factions still there.

The latest flare-up between the ELN and ex-FARC Mafia comes about eight months after the start of another conflict between the guerrilla groups. In January 2025, the ELN launched a violent assault on the ex-FARC’s 33rd Front in the contested Catatumbo region, which is one of the world’s top cocaine-producing areas.

SEE ALSO: Colombia’s Peace Efforts Spark Criminal Disputes and Divisions

With the ELN also controlling key territory on the Venezuelan side in the state of Zulia, this cemented the guerrilla group as the top armed actor on the northern part of the border, granting them access to drug trafficking routes leading to dispatch points in Venezuela.

The ELN’s latest confrontation with the Second Marquetalia in the south suggests this may be the next key battleground for control of the border.

Unlike prior fighting, this conflict may develop more on the Venezuelan side. That is largely because the ex-FARC Mafia’s Acacio Medina Front has more military capacity on that side and can rely on more than a decade of experience operating there. Illegal mining in Amazonas and the drug trafficking corridors near Brazil represent hugely important financial resources for both groups, making it unlikely that either will cede control without a fight.

There is also the risk that the confrontation could expand further north into Venezuela’s Apure state, which borders the Colombian departments of Arauca and Vichada. The Second Marquetalia maintains a strong presence there, particularly in the town of Elorza in the municipality of Rómulo Gallegos. This has long been the preferred place for ex-FARC commanders to operate, and they have taken over ranches and set up camps in the region.

The alleged killing of Zarco Aldinever would add him to a growing list of FARC dissidents killed in Venezuela. Other infamous commanders killed there include Miguel Botache Santanilla, alias “Gentil Duarte,” Seuxis Pausías Hernández Solarte, alias “Jesús Santrich,” Hernán Darío Velásquez Saldarriaga, alias “El Paisa,” and Henry Castellanos Garzón, alias “Romaña.” The Second Marquetalia’s top leader, Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” was also gravely injured in Venezuela.

This article, written by the Venezuela Investigative Unit, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

In a written statement, Trump said:

“In Colombia, coca cultivation and cocaine production have surged to all-time records under President Gustavo Petro, and his failed attempts to seek accommodations with narco-terrorist groups only exacerbated the crisis.  Under President Petro’s leadership, coca cultivation and cocaine production have reached record highs while Colombia’s government failed to meet even its own vastly reduced coca eradication goals, undermining years of mutually beneficial cooperation between our two countries against narco-terrorists.  For this reason, I have designated Colombia as having failed demonstrably to meet its drug control obligations. Colombia’s security institutions and municipal authorities continue to show skill and courage in confronting terrorist and criminal groups, and the United States values the service and sacrifice of their dedicated public servants across all levels of government.  The failure of Colombia to meet its drug control obligations over the past year rests solely with its political leadership.  I will consider changing this designation if Colombia’s government takes more aggressive action to eradicate coca and reduce cocaine production and trafficking, as well as hold those producing, trafficking, and benefiting from the production of cocaine responsible, including through improved cooperation with the United States to bring the leaders of Colombian criminal organizations to justice.”

The US State Department on social media directly blamed Gustavo Petro for the failures, but also noted that the US government issued a 1-year waiver, meaning bilateral cooperation, and almost half a billion USD in security and antinarcotics aid to Colombia will not end immediately. One year from now, Colombia will have a new president, as Petro’s term comes to an end August 7^th, 2026.

The decertification puts half a billion dollars of US security aid to Colombia at risk. Mafia & insurgent groups have flourished during the government of Gustavo Petro.

“Under Petro’s misguided leadership, coca cultivation & cocaine production in Colombia has increased to historic levels…President Trump “has determined that the Colombian government failed to uphold its drug control obligations, but he has issued a waiver so critical US cooperation, including on counter-narcotics, can continue. Results matter – we must see progress and it must be soon!” the State Department tweeted.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro ran on a presidential campaign promising “total peace” and pledging programs that would replace coca production with other food crops, increasing Colombia’s agricultural exports. What has happened, however, is the reverse. Narco-insurgent groups such as FARC dissident mafias, communist rebels ELN, and the Clan del Golfo (Gulf Clan) mafia are all resurgent and taking over territory from government control. Over the weekend, narco-insurgents bombed an electrical tower in Medellin, and this just a few weeks after a massive truck bomb killed over 19 in Cali, Colombia’s third largest city. Under the Petro administration, cocaine production has surpassed levels seen during the days of the cartels and Pablo Escobar.

Petro, a former member of the M-19 guerilla group himself, has made statements defending cocaine, calling it “no worse than whisky,” and in April, his own former foreign minister Alvaro Leyva publicly accused him of being a drug addict.

“It was in Paris where I was able to confirm that you had a problem with drug addiction. But what could I do? Surely, I was not up to the task. I should have reached out, helped, intervened. I carry the regret of not having tried to lend a hand. The truth is, you never recovered. That is the reality,” said Leyva.

A defiant Gustavo Petro refused to accept any responsibility and said that the Trump administration’s decision demonstrates that US policy has failed.

Petro’s own Interior Minister, Armando Benedetti, is an admitted recovering drug addict.

Last night, a defiant Petro blamed the US and defended his administration’s efforts, saying that the move would end Colombia’s dependence on the United States, and cited the government’s recent cocaine seizures, without mentioning the skyrocketing production during his Council of Ministers meeting.

“You begin with a factual lie. Coca crop growth has occurred during (Iván) Duque’s administration, and with forced fumigation. It is U.S. policy that has failed. To reduce coca leaf cultivation, what is needed is not glyphosate dropped from airplanes, but a decrease in demand for cocaine, primarily from the U.S. and Europe,” said Petro in response to the US State Department statement.

Former Colombian President Ernesto Samper, whose administration also experienced decertification, and whose 1994 campaign was partially financed by the Cali Cartel drug lords, assured that decertification was “not the end of the world.” The former president added that “we must once again demand that consumer countries like the United States and many in Europe fulfill their commitment to reducing drug demand, precisely at a time when consumption of plant-based drugs has declined and the devastating effects of synthetic drugs like fentanyl and other narcotics we don’t produce are being felt.”

Samper stated that the decision to decertify Colombia in its fight against drugs “is illegal, political, and regressive.” He explained that it is “illegal because no country is authorized to impose unilateral sanctions on another country or its nationals. Only the United Nations can do so under established circumstances and in justified cases of necessity,” and it is political “because it has always been used to punish countries considered “enemies” of the United States. The worst right-wing dictatorships have benefited from the non-application of decertification, while our country, which has paid high human and institutional costs, is decertified every time the Colombian government appears as an “enemy” of the United States government.”

Paisa politicians blame Petro

Not all Colombian politicians are defending Petro. Medellín’s mayor Federico “Fico” Gutierrez, who returned from the US on his own diplomatic missive to meet with US officials  in direct defiance of Petro’s orders not to go, issued a statement damning the Colombian President:

“Colombia is being decertified by the United States in the fight against drugs. It was to be expected. Petro sided with the worst criminals. They are the only ones who have won under this disastrous government. During our visit to Washington last week, our position was to ask that Colombia not be decertified. And if it were to happen, we asked that support for our public forces in the fight against drug trafficking not be withheld, nor that the trade on which millions of jobs depend in Medellín and throughout Colombia be affected. Indeed, our agenda in Washington was successful in defending Colombia. Although Colombia is decertified, it leaves the door open for support for our public forces and expressly highlights the recognition that the United States gives to our public forces and mayors: *“Colombia’s security institutions and municipal authorities continue to demonstrate skill and courage in confronting terrorist and criminal groups, and the United States values ​​the service and sacrifice of its dedicated public servants at all levels of government.”* (see photo) In the midst of all this, we would have solutions as a country. But seeing Petro’s absurd statements, his intention is for Colombia to lose this opportunity and for us to be plunged into chaos. It is very evident that this is what he wants and has sought all along: to be left alone and remain in power. All the more reason we remain steadfast in the defense of Colombia and our people. We pull Colombia forward from the regions.” (below video)

Colombia es descertificada por Estados Unidos en la lucha contra las drogas. Era de esperarse. Petro se puso fue del lado de los peores criminales. Son los únicos que han ganado con este nefasto gobierno.
En nuestra visita a Washington de la semana pasada, nuestra posición fue… pic.twitter.com/2qEIBTpTGU

— Fico Gutiérrez (@FicoGutierrez) September 16, 2025

The Governor of Antioquia, Andrés Julián Rendón, also had a scathing rebuke for his own president. Antioquia is the Colombian department where Medellín is capital and is home to much of Colombia’s economic activity. Rendón tweeted:

“Regarding the decertification of Colombia, the Government of @petrogustavo – It’s a snapshot of the failure of “total peace,” of temporizing with criminals, of dealing with them in a friendly way while they destroy the country and Colombians. – Now, the Petro government should stop playing the victim coming up with resentful, outdated, anti-US rhetoric. The President is reaping his own harvest of incompetence and failure: he sided with the criminals. The world and the US are paying him back. – Antioquia is the first victim: flooded in a sea of ​​cocaine by a weak government that ties up soldiers and police to prevent action. The criminals win, and we Antioqueños lose. Drugs, drugs, and more drugs to poison our youth and to enrich and strengthen the criminals. – Aerial spraying was the most successful tool in the past: effective in eradication, it protected our soldiers and police. It must be reactivated. Tomorrow will be too late! It’s been proven: more cocaine seizures are not proof of greater effectiveness in the fight against drug trafficking; rather, they are the ultimate proof of a historic peak in production. We’ve gone back more than 20 years, but fortunately, this government has only months left. In Antioquia, despite intimidation and judicial persecution, we will continue working to defend the interests of my fellow citizens, adhering to the Constitution and appealing to the courage of soldiers and police. In our government, we understand peace as the rule of law, security, justice, and social opportunity. We will remain there, even if our lives and freedom are at risk.

Sobre la decertificación a Colombia, al Gobierno de @petrogustavo:

– Es una radiografía del fracaso de la paz total, de contemporizar con criminales, de tratarlos por las buenas mientras acaban con el país y los colombianos.

– Ahora que el Gobierno Petro no se haga la víctima… pic.twitter.com/OygRV29NER

— Andrés Julián (@AndresJRendonC) September 16, 2025

Business calls for cooler heads to prevail

Amcham Colombia, the binational Colombian-American chamber of commerce based in Bogotá and made up of both Colombian and US businesses involved in bilateral trade, issued a statement lamenting the decision, while also calling for the Colombian President to do more to save the relationship.

“AmCham Colombia firmly and respectfully calls on the National Government to urgently present and implement a roadmap with achievable and verifiable goals that demonstrate political will and substantial improvements in crop eradication, production and trafficking reduction, judicial cooperation, and the financial dismantling of criminal organizations. Only then can the country request reconsideration of the designation in the next cycle and maintain assistance within the national interest of the United States.

Respectfully, AmCham Colombia invites the United States Government to recognize the progress in interdiction and seizures and to consider announcing the resumption of spraying when appropriate and under the safeguards of the Constitutional Court, complemented by alternative development and a comprehensive state presence. These signals should contribute to avoiding measures that affect trade, tourism, and investment between the two countries.”

🇺🇲🇨🇴 #Descertificación con interés nacional@AmChamCol hace un llamado firme y respetuoso al Gobierno Nacional para presentar y ejecutar con urgencia una hoja de ruta con metas alcanzables y verificables que evidencie voluntad política y una mejora sustancial en: erradicación… pic.twitter.com/qDer8SKYFl

— Maria Claudia Lacouture (@mclacouture) September 16, 2025

Above image: Gustavo Petro during his council of ministers meeting where he defended his administration and blamed Trump for his country’s decertification. Photo credit: Ovidio González – Presidencyof The Republic

The 15-year-old who shot Uribe on June 7 in Bogotá has been sentenced to seven years in a juvenile detention center for attempted homicide, the Attorney General’s Office reported on August 27.

The teenager pleaded guilty before Uribe died of his injuries on August 11, which prevented prosecutors from upgrading the charge to homicide, since Colombian law prohibits changes to charges once a formal accusation is filed against a minor. Five adults have also been arrested in connection with the case.

Authorities have suggested that the Second Marquetalia, a dissident faction of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), could have had a hand in Uribe’s killing, but have yet to present concrete evidence. National Police Director Carlos Fernando Triana first suggested a connection to the group in July, and Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez Suárez repeated the claim in August after Uribe’s death.

SEE ALSO: Colombia-Venezuela Border Killing Hints at Growing Guerrilla Conflict

The link to the group is vague, and via one of the five people arrested in connection with Uribe’s murder.

That’s Elder José Arteaga Hernández, alias “El Costeño,” who allegedly began working as a hired assassin after meeting a former FARC fighter known as “Daniel” in prison in 2019, according to police sources cited by Colombian newspaper El Espectador.

Daniel, once a member of the Teófilo Forero Mobile Column, an elite FARC unit behind some of the group’s most notorious attacks, has reportedly been helping rebuild the column within the Second Marquetalia in southern Huila and northern Caquetá, according to Colombian newspaper El Colombiano. Therefore, he would serve as a potential bridge between the Second Marquetalia and the Uribe assassination.

Two other suspects currently in custody also appear tied to Caquetá, where the Teófilo Forero Column is allegedly reorganizing. Katerine Andrea Martínez Martínez, alias “Gabriela,” who supplied the minor with the weapon to shoot Uribe, was arrested in Florencia in June, while Carlos Eduardo Mora González has faced an arms trafficking case before a Florencia court since 2024.

Nearly three months after the shooting of Turbay, investigators have yet to clarify who ordered the crime. The arrests point to a network of low- and mid-level operatives with ties to FARC dissident circles, but no clear political motive has emerged.

However, the available evidence suggests the focus on the Second Marquetalia may be misplaced. Once a feared rebel faction, the group is now among Colombia’s weakest armed organizations, having had its leadership decimated over the past five years.

Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” the group’s leader, was seriously injured in a 2022 attack, prompting repeated reports of his death. He resurfaced in 2024 through a video and later a public appearance, confirming he was alive, though widely believed to be in poor health.

Other senior figures have also been eliminated. Seuxis Pausías Hernández Solarte, alias “Jesús Santrich,” who co-founded the Second Marquetalia with Márquez after rejecting the 2016 peace deal, was killed in 2021. That same year, commanders Hernán Darío Velásquez, alias “El Paisa,” and Henry Castellanos Garzón, alias “Romaña,” were killed in Venezuela’s Apure state. Most recently, in August 2025, José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever,” one of Márquez’s key lieutenants, was also killed in Venezuela.

SEE ALSO: Who Was Behind the Attempted Hit on a Colombian Presidential Hopeful?

As well as these losses, the Second Marquetalia suffered a major rift in November 2024. The Border Command (Comandos de la Frontera – CDF) and the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico – CGP), two of its most influential factions operating in Nariño and Putumayo, announced they were breaking away after disagreements over the group’s stance in peace talks with the government.

Given the group’s fragile internal state and mounting competition from rival criminal actors, authorities have yet to present evidence of any clear motive for the Second Marquetalia to order such an assassination.

Nonetheless, the lack of clarity about the attack underscores the risks heading into Colombia’s elections next year. Uribe’s assassination sets a precedent that could embolden other armed groups to use targeted political violence as leverage. With organized crime interests tied to the continuation of peace talks and possible judicial benefits stemming from negotiations, the next electoral cycle may see criminal actors intervening more directly in politics through violence.

This article, written by Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

FARC dissidents downed an electricity pylon near Medellín in what the governor described as a terrorist attack on Antioquia. No Colombia – Antioquia. Subtly and indirectly, the blame was pointed in Petro’s direction amidst the continued whiff of federalism. Medellín Mayor Fico Gutierrez was nowhere to be seen as he was busy in Washington trying to score points versus Gustavo Petro, having already been told not to go.

Perhaps the real tragedy is that a steel pylon makes more headlines than any of the 140 social leaders assassinated thus far in 2025 – on course for an annual record. Unfortunately, there is little political capital to be found in such tragedies.

Fedesarrollo reported a surprise drop in August consumer confidence to -2.4%. Arguably, stubborn inflation will prevent rate cuts, but overall, it doesn’t jive with packed-out shopping malls, booming vehicle sales, and increasing domestic demand, which is driving imports upwards.

We have been hearing for the longest time, from the opposition, of course, that Colombia is an investment pariah; that may be true, but this week it is struggling to stack up. The Ministerio de Hacienda completed the largest bond issue (€4.1 billion EUR) in the country’s history, but perhaps the real headlines were the total demand of €25.4 billion EUR. What could drive such madness amongst the international investment community? It could be a GDP estimate of 2.6% or record low unemployment, perhaps even the stock market, which is up 50% in dollar terms YTD and hit a record high this week. Or perhaps it is that the EMBI country’s risk levels have been at their lowest level since 2021?

What you don’t want to listen to is those who will claim that all the above is because Petro only has a year left in power. No one has a clue what will happen in June 2026, and the current lineup of presidential candidates is a rogues’ gallery of the failed and self-interested.

The 2026 budget debate was suspended for lack of quorum. Colombian politicians are as irresponsible as ever. If you are against the proposed $557 billion COP budget, then turn up, do your job, and debate it for the sake of the country. Above all, the government doesn’t have the votes to pass it if debated conventionally. The risk now is that it will be passed by decree. If it does, the blame doesn’t lie with the government, and the opposition shouldn’t come crying in 2026.

Also in Congress, Ministerio de Hacienda, German Avila was discussing a 40% haircut to the tax reform, wholly predictable; however, how that might be impacted by the above budget situation is tough to call.

Enough for today, have a wonderful end to the week.

My regards.

Roops.

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FARC dissidents arrested in Putumayo, Peru during Operation Armageddon. Photo credit: Ministerio de Defensa del Perú/Wikipedia.

The situation escalated after an anti-insurgent operation by the military against a dissident faction of the former FARC, known as the Bloque Móvil Martín Villa. During the confrontation, local shopkeeper Ramiro Antonio Correa was killed under disputed circumstances, leading to outrage from residents who subsequently surrounded and detained the soldiers involved, demanding an explanation.

Conflicting Accounts of a Civilian Death

According to testimony from residents, the military operation began around 11:40 a.m. on Sunday. Correa was working in his store, “Las Gaviotas,” which a community member described as “a warehouse where groceries, sodas, and beers are sold.” When the firefight erupted between the army and dissident forces, Correa and seven other farmworkers sought refuge in a nearby house.

Residents allege that after the combat subsided, soldiers entered the house where the group was sheltering and ordered them to return to the store. It was then, they claim, that Correa was killed.

“Mr. Ramiro was the last one to enter of those who were there. Someone shot him. They killed him,” a local woman stated. “We are outraged because they killed him and, on top of that, they wanted to pass him off as a guerrilla. According to them, there were no dead civilians, but it turns out there was: it was him.”

The military also reported that the soldiers were being intimidated by drones, allegedly carrying explosives.

The community’s anger was further fueled when official reports of the operation did not initially account for a civilian death. The Ministry of Defense, led by Minister Pedro Sánchez, first announced the operation as a success, reporting that Willinton Vanegas Leyva, alias “Dumar,” a leader of the dissident group, and nine other combatants had been killed. Community members insist that Correa was wrongly included in that count.

The Attorney General’s Office (Fiscalía) is now investigating the death, according to a statement from the Military Forces Command.

Government Response and Mediation Efforts

In response to the soldiers’ detention, the government has asserted that the community is being manipulated by armed groups. Minister Sánchez claimed the action was instigated under coercion from alias “Yimmi Martínez,” another local FARC dissident leader. A separate official source attributed the order to an alias “Jimmy Parra,” a commander in the FARC’s Central General Staff (EMC).

Meanwhile, a high-level delegation has arrived in the area to negotiate the soldiers’ release. The group includes representatives from the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, the Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia (Defensoría del Pueblo), the Inspector General’s Office, and the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process (MAPP-OEA). The military high command, including Admiral Francisco Cubides, commander of the Military Forces, is on-site to lead the negotiations.

The government has also prepared a “Plan B,” deploying reinforcements from the Marines, Army Special Forces, and the National Police’s Dialogue and Order Maintenance Unit (UNDMO) to the region in case a negotiated release is not achieved.

Admiral Cubides confirmed that the detained soldiers have their campaign rations and are hydrated, but described a tense environment where they were kept awake by bonfires lit around their position. The military also reported that the soldiers were being intimidated by drones, allegedly carrying explosives.

Johnny Casanova, the mayor of El Retorno, has called for a thorough investigation and urged officials to listen to the community’s version of events.

“We know that serious human rights violations have occurred, resulting in the regrettable loss of human life and affecting peasant and indigenous families in the region,” Mayor Casanova said in a dialogue with local radio station Marandua Stereo.

A statement from the Corps of Retired Generals and Admirals condemned the soldiers’ detention as a “direct attack on the State and its institutions” and called for the government to establish clear protocols to prevent such events. As of Wednesday morning, the soldiers remain held by the community, and negotiations for their release are ongoing.

Colombian soldiers. Photo credit: Alejoturola from Pixabay.