Colombia’s Ministerio de Defensa Nacional (Ministry of National Defense) lifted the decade-long general suspension on firearm-carry permits on September 8, 2026, through Decree 1368 of 2026, signed under the authority of President Abelardo de la Espriella. The decree took effect September 9, the day after its publication in the Diario Oficial (Official Gazette), and restores the ability of citizens who already hold a valid porte de armas (carry) permit to move through Colombian territory with their weapon, without the special individual authorization the suspension had required since 2015.

The suspension traces to Decree 2515 of December 24, 2015, issued under then-President Juan Manuel Santos, and was renewed by successive governments — including those of Iván Duque and Gustavo Petro — for nearly 11 years before de la Espriella’s decree ended it. Finance Colombia reported on the decree’s signing and the political reaction to it on September 8. What follows is a closer look at what the decree actually changes in the permitting system, who qualifies to carry a firearm under it, and how Colombian doctrine on ownership, carrying and self-defense compares with the framework used in the United States.

What the decree does, and explicitly does not do.

Decree 1368 is narrow by its own terms. Article 1 instructs Colombia’s military authorities to lift the general suspension nationwide. Article 2 states plainly that doing so “no crea nuevos derechos, no autoriza el libre porte de armas de fuego, ni modifica los requisitos legales, condiciones, restricciones y controles previstos” in Decree-Law 2535 of 1993 — it creates no new rights, does not authorize the free carrying of firearms, and does not alter the legal requirements, conditions, restrictions or controls already in force. What changes is procedural: permit holders no longer need the special, individual authorization the suspension had layered on top of an otherwise valid permit.

That narrow framing reflects Colombia’s underlying constitutional structure. Article 223 of the Constitution establishes a state monopoly over weapons, munitions and explosives and specifies that no one may possess or carry them without authorization from the competent authority. Decree-Law 2535 of 1993 — the framework law both decrees invoke — states in Article 3 that private citizens may possess or carry weapons only “de manera excepcional” (exceptionally), through a permit issued under the “potestad discrecional” (discretionary power) of the competent authority. Colombia’s Constitutional Court upheld that discretionary framework in Sentencia C-031 of February 2, 1995, and separately upheld the government’s authority to impose a general suspension in Sentencia C-867 of November 3, 2010; the preamble to Decree 1368 cites both rulings.

Ownership, carrying and use are three separate permissions.

Colombian law does not treat buying, keeping, carrying and using a firearm as a single bundle of rights that comes with ownership. Decree 2535 draws a sharp line between two base categories. Article 16 defines tenencia (possession) as keeping the weapon and its ammunition inside the specific property registered on the permit, for personal defense; the permit authorizes use of the weapon only within that property. Article 17 defines porte (carry) as the act of carrying the weapon, or keeping it within reach, for personal defense, under a separate permit issued by the competent authority.

Retired Major General Fernando Murillo Orrego, who directed the National Police‘s Dirección de Investigación Criminal e Interpol (Directorate of Criminal Investigation and Interpol, or DIJIN) from 2020 to 2022, described the practical difference in a broadcast interview the day the decree was signed: tenencia is bought from the state and kept in one place — a residence, a business, a farm, a store — and cannot be transported in a vehicle or carried on one’s person, while porte is acquired specifically so the weapon can accompany the holder through their personal or work activity.

A third, narrower category complicates the ownership-equals-use assumption further. Article 9 of Decree 2535 allows restricted-use weapons to be authorized to cash-transport companies, corporate security departments and specialized security services, subject to the Superintendencia de Vigilancia y Seguridad Privada (Superintendency of Private Security and Surveillance). An employee issued a firearm under one of those institutional permits can hold and carry it on the job without being authorized to use it for their own personal defense — the permit belongs to the employer’s security function, not the individual. Murillo pointed to that gap directly, calling Colombia “the only country” where a weapon can be sold to someone legally who still cannot use it for their own personal protection, because the permit is tied to their employer’s business activity rather than to them as an individual.

This article is informational only, and does not constitute legal advice. Seek guidance from competent experts and authorities!

Who can apply, and what the process requires.

Under Decree 2535 and the rules the Departamento Control Comercio de Armas, Municiones y Explosivos (Department for the Commercial Control of Arms, Munitions and Explosives, or DCCAE) applies today, an applicant for an individual carry permit must be a Colombian citizen at least 25 years old, according to recent reporting from El Colombiano and Infobae. Article 33 of the decree requires the applicant’s cédula de ciudadanía (citizenship card), a judicial background certificate, and a medical certificate of psychophysical fitness; Article 34 additionally requires the applicant to justify the necessity of carrying a weapon for their own defense and physical integrity. In practice, DCCAE also requires a certified firearms-handling course.

General Murillo, describing the same vetting process, told interviewers the requirements come down to a psychological examination, personal references and a clean judicial record, all reviewed by a committee rather than decided by a single official. Meeting every requirement does not guarantee approval — Article 34’s “necesidad” (necessity) standard leaves the final decision to the discretion of the military authority. Permits are not issued for a uniform term: Murillo said validity runs one, three or 10 years depending on the type of firearm involved.

Renewing a lapsed permit:

Citizens whose permits had already expired can revalidate them through the DCCAE’s online platform, which the department’s own site identifies as SIAEM 2.0 (Sistema de Información de Armas, Explosivos y Municiones, or the Weapons, Explosives and Munitions Information System), reachable through the department’s 36 regional seccionales (branch offices). A spokesperson for the department said in a video statement that the platform runs verifications against the National Police, INTERPOL, the Fiscalía General de la Nación (Attorney General’s Office) and the DCCAE itself, under Law 2535 of 1993.

DCCAE’s published fee schedule sets a graduated fine for late revalidation of a carry permit: one-quarter of a month’s minimum wage for a renewal filed within 45 days of expiration, half a month’s minimum wage between 46 and 90 days, and a full month’s minimum wage — $1,750,905 COP at 2026 rates — beyond 90 days. The department spokesperson’s own public description on camera was less precise, describing a flat fine equal to one month’s minimum wage for any permit expired more than 30 days; the published schedule on the department’s site is the more current and specific figure.

What the decree does not revive:

Article 6 of Decree 1368 excludes several categories of permit holders from the benefit of the lifted suspension. Carrying remains prohibited where:

• the permit has expired;
• the permit was individually suspended;
• the permit was canceled or revoked;
• the weapon has been seized or is subject to a judicial or administrative measure;
• a legal or judicial prohibition applies; or
• the permit authorizes only tenencia and not porte.

Article 7 preserves, without change, the inspection, control and seizure powers of the National Police and other competent authorities. Carrying a firearm without a currently valid permit remains porte ilegal (illegal carrying), a criminal offense, regardless of the general suspension being lifted.

Where non-citizens and permanent residents stand

Neither Decree 1368 nor Decree 2535 sets out a distinct application path for foreign nationals who hold Colombian residency. The requirement in Article 33 is specifically for a cédula de ciudadanía — the identity document issued to Colombian nationals, whether by birth or naturalization — rather than the cédula de extranjería issued to foreign residents. The only foreigner-specific provisions identified in Decree 2535 concern accredited diplomatic personnel, a separate and narrower category under Article 29. Neither decree, nor the coverage of Decree 1368 reviewed for this article, documents an equivalent civilian route for a foreign permanent resident.

This is a reading of what the published regulation does and does not say, not legal advice. A foreign national or permanent resident weighing a firearm permit in Colombia should raise the question directly with the DCCAE rather than rely on this or any other secondary account.

How Colombian doctrine diverges from the US framework

The contrast with the United States is structural, not just procedural. The US Supreme Court has treated the Second Amendment, since District of Columbia v. Heller in 2008, as protecting an individual right to keep and bear arms for self-defense, a right the Court incorporated against state and local governments in McDonald v. City of Chicago in 2010. In 2022, New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen extended that right to carrying a firearm outside the home and replaced the balancing tests lower courts had used with a historical-tradition standard, pushing most US states toward “shall-issue” or permitless carry regimes in which an applicant who meets objective, listed criteria is entitled to a permit.

Colombia has no analogous individual constitutional right to test a permit denial against. Article 223’s state monopoly, and Decree 2535’s framing of civilian possession and carrying as an exceptional grant made at the “discretionary power” of the military authority, mean that even an applicant who satisfies every documentary requirement is not entitled to a permit as a matter of right — the Constitutional Court upheld exactly that discretion in Sentencia C-031 of 1995. A valid Colombian carry permit is a conditional, revocable authorization, not a constitutional entitlement.

General Murillo framed the policy in terms of shared responsibility rather than individual right, telling interviewers that Colombians bear a corresponsabilidad (shared responsibility) for their own protection alongside the state, and that a citizen’s legal access to a firearm can itself deter criminals who know it exists.

“The mere fact that today’s ordinary criminal knows there are citizens who legally carry firearms is a deterrent against all the violent acts we are seeing.”

Retired Maj. Gen. Fernando Murillo Orrego, former director, DIJIN

That view is contested inside Colombia: former President Gustavo Petro criticized the decree in terms Finance Colombia reported on September 8, and Colombian security analysts remain divided on whether broader carrying reduces or increases armed violence. This article takes no position on that policy question; it describes what the regulation itself permits.

Carrying, using and Colombia’s “legítima defensa” doctrine

Colombia’s Penal Code (Law 599 of 2000) recognizes legítima defensa (self-defense) in Article 32, numeral 6, as a ground for the absence of criminal responsibility when a person acts to defend a right of their own or of another against an actual or imminent unjust aggression, using proportionate means. Colombian criminal attorney Javier Arévalo, speaking alongside host Felipe “Pipe” Caballero in a recorded legal discussion of the decree, addressed a scenario the new rules raise directly: if a person disarms an attacker and uses that weapon to repel the attack, Arévalo said, that does not by itself amount to illegal weapons carrying, because illegal carrying requires the voluntary, conscious decision to take up and carry a firearm in public without authorization — not merely the act of taking a weapon away from an aggressor in self-defense.

Arévalo was more cautious about firearms used to defend property alone. Shooting someone who breaks a car window to steal a bag, he said, would generally read as disproportionate; a firearm response becomes more legally defensible, in his account, only where the aggression also threatens the victim’s life or physical integrity, not merely their belongings. He also confirmed that legítima defensa extends to defending a third party, including a stranger, once the threat is real or imminent — but drew a firm line against citizens capturing a suspect and then assaulting or torturing them instead of turning them over to police, which he described as a separate, more serious offense than the original crime.

That proportionality-driven, case-by-case standard has no exact equivalent in Colombian statute to the “stand your ground” or expanded castle-doctrine laws adopted in some US states, which remove a legal duty to retreat before using force in self-defense in specified circumstances. Colombian doctrine keeps the proportionality analysis in place regardless of where the confrontation occurs, and Article 7 of Decree 1368 leaves Colombian police with full authority to stop, inspect and seize weapons independent of whether the carrier’s underlying permit is valid.

Above photo © Loren Moss