The situation escalated after an anti-insurgent operation by the military against a dissident faction of the former FARC, known as the Bloque Móvil Martín Villa. During the confrontation, local shopkeeper Ramiro Antonio Correa was killed under disputed circumstances, leading to outrage from residents who subsequently surrounded and detained the soldiers involved, demanding an explanation.

Conflicting Accounts of a Civilian Death

According to testimony from residents, the military operation began around 11:40 a.m. on Sunday. Correa was working in his store, “Las Gaviotas,” which a community member described as “a warehouse where groceries, sodas, and beers are sold.” When the firefight erupted between the army and dissident forces, Correa and seven other farmworkers sought refuge in a nearby house.

Residents allege that after the combat subsided, soldiers entered the house where the group was sheltering and ordered them to return to the store. It was then, they claim, that Correa was killed.

“Mr. Ramiro was the last one to enter of those who were there. Someone shot him. They killed him,” a local woman stated. “We are outraged because they killed him and, on top of that, they wanted to pass him off as a guerrilla. According to them, there were no dead civilians, but it turns out there was: it was him.”

The military also reported that the soldiers were being intimidated by drones, allegedly carrying explosives.

The community’s anger was further fueled when official reports of the operation did not initially account for a civilian death. The Ministry of Defense, led by Minister Pedro Sánchez, first announced the operation as a success, reporting that Willinton Vanegas Leyva, alias “Dumar,” a leader of the dissident group, and nine other combatants had been killed. Community members insist that Correa was wrongly included in that count.

The Attorney General’s Office (Fiscalía) is now investigating the death, according to a statement from the Military Forces Command.

Government Response and Mediation Efforts

In response to the soldiers’ detention, the government has asserted that the community is being manipulated by armed groups. Minister Sánchez claimed the action was instigated under coercion from alias “Yimmi Martínez,” another local FARC dissident leader. A separate official source attributed the order to an alias “Jimmy Parra,” a commander in the FARC’s Central General Staff (EMC).

Meanwhile, a high-level delegation has arrived in the area to negotiate the soldiers’ release. The group includes representatives from the UN Verification Mission in Colombia, the Ombudsman’s Office of Colombia (Defensoría del Pueblo), the Inspector General’s Office, and the OAS Mission to Support the Peace Process (MAPP-OEA). The military high command, including Admiral Francisco Cubides, commander of the Military Forces, is on-site to lead the negotiations.

The government has also prepared a “Plan B,” deploying reinforcements from the Marines, Army Special Forces, and the National Police’s Dialogue and Order Maintenance Unit (UNDMO) to the region in case a negotiated release is not achieved.

Admiral Cubides confirmed that the detained soldiers have their campaign rations and are hydrated, but described a tense environment where they were kept awake by bonfires lit around their position. The military also reported that the soldiers were being intimidated by drones, allegedly carrying explosives.

Johnny Casanova, the mayor of El Retorno, has called for a thorough investigation and urged officials to listen to the community’s version of events.

“We know that serious human rights violations have occurred, resulting in the regrettable loss of human life and affecting peasant and indigenous families in the region,” Mayor Casanova said in a dialogue with local radio station Marandua Stereo.

A statement from the Corps of Retired Generals and Admirals condemned the soldiers’ detention as a “direct attack on the State and its institutions” and called for the government to establish clear protocols to prevent such events. As of Wednesday morning, the soldiers remain held by the community, and negotiations for their release are ongoing.

Colombian soldiers. Photo credit: Alejoturola from Pixabay.

This grim reality was made evident in late January when the army seized more than 2,600 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including landmines belonging to the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) in Tibú, in the Catatumbo region. Just days earlier, authorities had confiscated 300 landmines in the same area from FARC dissidents. Roads, rural paths, and farms in the region have become impassable.

The increase in demining efforts, landmine seizures, and suspected minefields reported by Colombian authorities in 2024 underscores that, despite the historic decline in landmine use since the 2016 Peace Agreement, criminal groups in the country continue to deploy these devices in their territorial disputes.

Throughout 2024, Colombia’s Office of the High Commissioner for Peace reported 998 incidents related to anti-personnel mines (APMs) and unexploded ordnance (UXO), including demining activities, reports of suspected minefields, and the seizure of these devices, most of which were handmade.

These figures represent an over 11% increase compared to the previous year, which saw 896 incidents. The upward trend has continued since 2021, when 316 incidents were recorded, followed by 412 in 2022. Experts consulted by InSight Crime agree that no single factor explains this surge.

A staggering 94% of the reported incidents were related to demining operations. Increased military activity in strategic areas and greater accessibility to former conflict zones—once heavily mined during the war between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) and the state before the 2016 Peace Agreement—account for many of these cases. However, other areas remain inaccessible to both military and humanitarian demining operations due to the control exerted by armed groups.

In Cauca and Nariño, the number of incidents surpassed those recorded immediately after the Peace Agreement: 58 and 69 incidents, respectively, that year. A similar trend has been seen in other departments with lower historical mine activity, such as Guaviare, Casanare, Bolívar, and Cesar.

Although Colombia signed the Ottawa Treaty banning the use and destruction of anti-personnel mines in 1997, it wasn’t until 2016 that the country’s largest guerrilla group and primary user of landmines—the FARC—committed to demining efforts as part of their demobilization.

“In the years following the Peace Agreement, the impact of landmines had dropped dramatically. Now, we are seeing figures reminiscent of the early post-agreement period, with the added problem that today, civilians are more affected than military personnel,” said Camilo Serna, director of the Colombian Campaign Against Mines (Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas), in an interview with InSight Crime.

Below are the three main reasons why landmine use has resurged in Colombia.

1. Criminal Disputes

Military pressure and ongoing territorial disputes in an increasingly fragmented criminal landscape have led some armed groups to resume planting landmines.

In Arauca, bordering Venezuela, authorities reported 101 incidents, mostly in the municipalities of Arauquita and Puerto Rondón, where the ELN’s Eastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Oriental) and the FARC dissidents’ 10th and 28th Fronts operate.

In Cauca and Nariño, key departments for coca cultivation, cocaine production, and trafficking corridors to Ecuador, 142 and 318 incidents were recorded, respectively. Most incidents occurred in the municipalities of Argelia and Tumaco, where FARC dissident factions and the ELN are locked in violent battles for control of these illicit economies.

SEE ALSO: BACRIM Turn to Landmines in Colombia

“Today, armed groups are fighting each other and using landmines against one another. It is no longer a tactical tool primarily used against government troops moving through an area,” Serna explained.

In Catatumbo, a strategic border region with Venezuela, the ELN’s Northeastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Nororiental) has been clashing with the FARC dissidents’ 33rd Front since early January. Landmine use in this area has also prevented authorities from conducting demining operations for years.

According to Colombia’s Deputy Inspector General for Peace Agreement Monitoring, Javier Sarmiento, who has been tracking the humanitarian crisis in Catatumbo, the presence of landmines has made it impossible for over 50,000 displaced people to return home safely.

In other strategic regions for organized crime—such as Chocó, Cauca, and Arauca—increased military presence and demining operations have prompted armed groups to use more explosives to defend their territories.

2. The Fragmentation of FARC Dissidents

In 2024, Colombian authorities attributed 618 landmine-related incidents to the various dissident factions of the FARC. These figures, alongside those from 2023 (638 incidents), mark the highest landmine use by these groups since the Peace Agreement. Before then, FARC dissidents had never been linked to more than 222 such incidents in a single year.

The fragmentation of these groups—previously divided between the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and Segunda Marquetalia but now splintering even further—has fueled clashes where landmines are a key battlefield tactic.

The ELN, a long-time user of landmines, was responsible for 164 of the incidents recorded in 2024.

Beyond the ELN and FARC dissidents, other armed groups were responsible for 47 landmine-related incidents in 2024—the highest number ever recorded for this category.

SEE ALSO: Gaitanistas Landmines are Guerrilla Tactic from Colombia’s Dark Past

Among them, the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) stand out. Though they typically use direct armed force to exert control, their increasing involvement in landmine incidents suggests knowledge transfer. Following the FARC’s demobilization, some former guerrilla fighters were recruited by the AGC, bringing new tactics to the group’s military operations.

Disputed territories—where the ELN, FARC dissidents, and AGC are vying for control—are the main hotspots for landmine replanting in Colombia.

3. The Rise of IEDs

IEDs can be built using easily accessible materials, some of which have become more durable. Technological innovations, such as the use of PVC tubes, have extended the lifespan of these devices by better protecting the internal ignition mechanisms, which may include electronic triggers or more sophisticated pressure-activated systems.

“It is now extremely difficult to control because numerous groups and individuals know how to build both command-detonated improvised explosive devices and victim-activated landmines,” an anti-personnel mine expert told InSight Crime on the condition of anonymity for security reasons.

In the end, the combination of ongoing armed group conflicts, tactical knowledge transfer between the key former FARC factions at the heart of the conflict, and the ease of manufacturing these devices has severely hindered Colombia’s demining efforts.

This article, written by Beatriz Vicent Fernández, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace (Paz Total) policy, designed to negotiate agreements with the country’s main armed groups and criminal gangs, is struggling to make any headway as he passes the halfway point of his four-year administration. The negotiations have had profound effects on the criminal dynamics in the country.

SEE ALSO: What Is Behind Increased Violence in Colombia?

After initial progress in dialogue with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), talks collapsed in May last year when a faction of the group split off to pursue separate peace negotiations. The ELN’s extensive infrastructure and leadership in Venezuela, where Nicolás Maduro remains in power following a widely criticized election, has further undermined the chances of peace with the Marxist-Leninist rebel force.

Similarly, negotiations with dissidents of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) have faced significant setbacks. Fragmentation within these groups has sparked infighting, with splinter factions emerging from the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) and the Second Marquetalia, the two largest dissident factions. As a result, the government is engaging with only a small portion of each group.

The country’s most powerful drug-trafficking organization, the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), remains largely outside the Total Peace framework. Efforts have been stalled by the absence of a legal framework for negotiations and a potential peace deal. Similar legal obstacles have hindered progress in “urban peace laboratories” in cities like Buenaventura, Quibdó, and Medellín, where gangs dominate neighborhoods through drug trafficking and extortion rackets.

As Petro begins the third year of his presidency, InSight Crime reviews the key developments in Colombia’s peace dialogues and examines their criminal implications for 2025.

ELN

Initial progress with the ELN effectively unraveled as disputes with the government led to the collapse of negotiations.

In January last year, the Comuneros del Sur Front (Frente Comuneros del Sur – FCS), an ELN faction in southern Nariño, broke ranks, announcing plans to pursue separate “regional dialogue” with the government. Frustrated by the limited progress at the national level and growing threats from rival groups, the FCS sought a more localized approach. However, ELN top commander Eliecer Erlinto Chamorro, alias “Antonio García,” condemned these parallel dialogues as unauthorized and illegitimate.

SEE ALSO: Kidnappings Surge in Colombia Amid ELN Peace Negotiations

By May, the FCS formally severed ties with the ELN, emerging as a dissident faction of the guerrilla group. It quickly established dialogue with the government, advanced in peace talks, and even committed to a partial weapons handover, according to Carlos Augusto Erazo Murcia, head of the government’s negotiating team.

This was followed by the collapse of a bilateral ceasefire between the ELN and the government, which expired in August without renewal. After the ceasefire lapse, the ELN escalated hostilities by attacking a military base in Arauca in September, killing three soldiers. In response, the government suspended peace talks indefinitely.

The ELN and the government resumed talks on November 25, agreeing to reconvene in 2025 to reassess the dialogue process and explore the possibility of a renewed ceasefire.

The ELN also stands to benefit greatly from what was widely considered a stolen election in Venezuela, extending by another six years of Maduro’s time at the helm of the country. Venezuela remains a critical hub for the ELN, hosting much of its leadership and infrastructure.

Since the FARC’s demobilization in 2016, the ELN has expanded its presence in Venezuela and Colombia’s border departments, strengthening its operations through a symbiotic relationship with the Maduro regime. The group now controls entire sections of the border, managing smuggling and drug-trafficking corridors between the two countries, while maintaining corridors moving troops. Its influence spans eight of Venezuela’s 24 states, with significant income derived from controlling illegal mining and cocaine production zones.

With little interference and often support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—who depend on the income generated by these groups, particularly amid severe US sanctions—the ELN has solidified its presence along the 2,219 km border with Venezuela and uses this haven to project into Colombia. This growing entrenchment further undermines the Total Peace initiative.

Ex-FARC

Government dialogue with the EMC, the largest ex-FARC organization, has also splintered the group. In March, Petro suspended a bilateral ceasefire with the EMC in the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño due to ongoing violence against Indigenous communities. This decision deepened internal divisions within the EMC. Its leader, Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias “Iván Mordisco,” refused further negotiations until the ceasefire was reinstated, while another faction, led by Alexander Díaz, alias “Calarcá Córdoba,” opted to continue talks.

By April, the government expelled Mordisco’s faction from the peace talks, shifting its focus to negotiations exclusively with Calarcá’s bloc. In July, his group signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement, marking a tentative step forward. However, significant challenges remain: Calarcá’s faction has been accused of threatening demobilized FARC members in Caquetá, and in December, six soldiers were killed in a minefield allegedly planted by the group.

Mordisco’s wing, on the other hand, has intensified violent activities, particularly in Cauca, an important region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. By September, Cauca had recorded 466 violent incidents over 12 months, the most of any department during that period, with numbers continuing to rise through the end of 2024.

Meanwhile, the Second Marquetalia, a separate group of FARC dissidents led by Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” became the third major group to enter Total Peace negotiations in 2024. However, internal divisions also plagued this effort. In November, two key factions—the Border Command and the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico)—broke away, frustrated by Márquez’s leadership. They formed the National Bolivarian Army Coordinator (Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano), led by José Vicente Lesmes, alias “Walter Mendoza.”

AGC and Urban Groups

The AGC has been largely excluded from the Total Peace initiative thus far, but signs emerged in 2024 that Petro sought to change this. In July, he authorized dialogue with the group, signaling a potential shift in policy.

But significant obstacles remain. The government’s classification of the AGC as a high-impact organized crime group, rather than a political organization like the ELN or FARC dissidents, has become a sticking point in the negotiations. This designation precludes the AGC from seeking transitional justice terms, such as guarantees against extradition and amnesty, similar to those offered to the FARC in the 2016 peace agreement. Under Colombian law, high-impact organized crime groups are only eligible for limited judicial benefits, such as reduced sentences, making negotiations far less appealing for the AGC.

SEE ALSO: GameChangers 2023: The Cocaine Flash-to-Bang in 2024

Despite minor progress—such as the attorney general lifting arrest warrants for key AGC leaders—negotiations have yielded few tangible results. Tensions remain high: in December, the military bombed an AGC camp in northern Antioquia, underscoring the ongoing hostilities.

Moreover, skepticism about the AGC’s intentions persists. Some analysts suggest the group is using negotiations as a tactical maneuver to secure a bilateral ceasefire and reduce military pressure, rather than genuinely committing to demobilization. At the same time, its ongoing territorial expansion and dominance over key criminal economies fuel doubts about its willingness to disarm.

The absence of a legal framework for gang demobilization, or “transition to legality,” as it is officially termed, has also hindered progress in cities like Medellín, Quibdó, and Buenaventura.

Efforts to pass legislation to formalize a framework for gang demobilization have stalled in Colombia’s gridlocked congress, leaving urban peace efforts in limbo.

In Medellín, several gangs agreed to reduce violence following Petro’s 2022 election, resulting in a notable drop in homicide rates. In June 2023, Petro initiated a dialogue table with former gang leaders at Itagüí prison, but progress faltered in 2024.

In Quibdó, the gangs Los Mexicanos, Lokos Yam, and RPS began talks in August 2023, achieving significant milestones like a commitment to halt the extortion of teachers and health workers. But in September 2024, a ceasefire between the gangs collapsed, amidst incursions by the AGC into the city. In December, Petro authorized exploratory talks to include three additional groups—the Zetas, Cabí, and AGC—in the Quibdó table.

In Buenaventura, negotiations with the Spartans and Shottas—which together command over 1,700 members—have produced mixed results. The groups agreed to a truce in August 2023, significantly reducing violence throughout 2024. While tensions flared in March when the Spartans temporarily withdrew from the negotiations, they eventually returned to the table, and have renewed the ceasefire, currently set to last until February 2025.

Looking Forward

Several key factors will significantly influence peace negotiations in 2025.

First, the fragmentation of major groups within the Total Peace process highlights the challenges of negotiating with organizations that appear unified but are, in fact, loose coalitions of diverse factions. The Comuneros del Sur’s split from the ELN exposed the group’s limited control over its regional fronts. Similarly, the EMC’s divided leadership—between Mordisco and Calarcá—mirrors the internal tensions within the Second Marquetalia, where Iván Márquez has struggled to maintain cohesion among factions like the Border Command.

These fractures risk escalating violence as splinter groups vie for territorial control and factions excluded from peace talks increase attacks on government targets.

Since the EMC split, clashes between Mordisco’s and Calarcá’s factions have escalated in Putumayo, a key region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. Violence has also surged in other southwestern departments, such as Cauca. The deadly ELN attack on the military base could also foreshadow more violent confrontations between criminal groups and government forces, despite the relative lull achieved by ceasefires in 2024.

Second, the absence of widespread ceasefires with criminal groups has leveled the criminal playing field once again. Ceasefires maintained by the ELN and EMC in 2023 temporarily shifted criminal dynamics, allowing these groups to expand their territorial control, recruit new members, and focus on rival factions rather than government forces.

“We know [armed groups] have taken advantage of the ceasefire to try to increase their illegal control over the territory,” Colombia’s Minister of Defense said in a press conference in March 2024.

This reprieve boosted profits from drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion. In contrast, the AGC, excluded from ceasefire agreements, continued to face government offensives.

SEE ALSO: The Informants of Tibú: How the Colombian State Unleashed a Wave of Femicides

Currently, only the Calarcá dissidents and the FCS have active bilateral ceasefires with the government. The FCS, being relatively small, is unlikely to use the ceasefire for significant territorial expansion but will likely consolidate its holdings and defend against incoming EMC incursions into Nariño. Conversely, the Calarcá dissidents are better positioned to exploit their ceasefire to strengthen their presence in critical drug trafficking zones, particularly along the Amazonian border with Brazil and in parts of the Venezuelan frontier.

For groups like the Mordisco dissidents and the ELN, the absence of ceasefires means they will lose their distinct advantage as they compete for control over territories essential for drug trafficking, illegal mining, and other key revenue streams. However, the lack of ceasefires could give the AGC an edge.

Despite facing sustained military pressure, the AGC has expanded along the Pacific coast in Chocó, the Caribbean coast in Bolívar, Córdoba, and Cesar, and is encircling Catatumbo in Norte de Santander—one of Colombia’s most critical coca cultivation regions. With its criminal rivals now experiencing the same pressure it has endured, the AGC is poised to solidify and take even greater control as cocaine production explodes and gold prices approach record highs.

Third, Maduro’s dependence on Colombian criminal groups ensures that the ELN and Second Marquetalia will continue to strengthen their footholds in Venezuela and along Colombia’s border. With minimal interference—and often direct support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—both groups have entrenched themselves in the region, controlling key criminal economies such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and contraband smuggling.

With the prospect of six more years of protection under Maduro, these groups have little immediate incentive to engage in peace negotiations. Instead, they are well-positioned to expand their operations further.

This article, written by Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

Click on the above image to play the video.

Collective Mining keeps finding gold

First, some good news. Collective Mining (TSX: CNL, OTCQX: CNLMF, FSE: GG1), which is developing a gold mine down in the Caldas region in coffee country has five drill rigs operating at its Guayabales project, part of its 40 thousand meter drill program for this year. They are getting really encouraging results. This is the same team that developed Continental Gold and sold it to Zijin mining a few years ago for over a billion dollars. We published a more detailed update in Finance Colombia if you want to go over the numbers and assay results of this most recent update. I’m long on Continental because I believe in the team led by Ari Sussman.

Collective Mining Expands its Box Target Area with New High-Grade Samples; Drilling Continues

Petro threatens the private sector with “forced investments!”

President Gustavo Petro is once again terrifying investors, this time with an announcement that he plans to force private banks to loan money to projects and borrowers of his choosing. He said, and I translate:

 “I promised that we were going to present the measures to the congress of the republic to reactivate the economy which will consist, and I say it once and for all, in projects of law that generate FORCED INVESTMENT in the private financial system of Colombia destined to small, medium and large industry of agriculture and tourism in Colombia to reactivate the country.”

This is what Petro’s opponents warned about, and at least when it comes to intent, they were right. The question now is whether Colombia’s institutionalism can withstand more of his adventures. Statements and plans like this destroy investor confidence and scare away capital, just like what is happening with Ecopetrol.

“…and I say it once and for all, in projects of law that generate FORCED INVESTMENT in the private financial system of Colombia” – President Gustavo Petro

General Motors To Close Colombia Manufacturing Operations

Speaking of scaring away capital, General Motors is closing its Colmotores car factory after almost 70 years in Colombia. Now two years ago, GM said it was going to invest 50 million dollars to upgrade the factory to produce new models! What has changed? By the way, the Minister of Labor has told GM that they have to keep the workers employed even though the factory is closing, so we will see how that works out.

Alvaro Uribe is formally charged with witness tampering & bribery

Former President Alvaro Uribe, who in recent years has seen his once stellar legacy tarnished by a litany of revelations, is now formally charged with witness tampering in a drama that goes back to 2012. See the AP article here. https://apnews.com/article/colombia-alvaro-uribe-charges-witness-tampering-bd11a922142d000db1fcac178a1a147e

See also: Declassified US State Department Cables: “Uribe Almost Certainly Had Dealings With The Paramilitaries”

Bilateral harmony between Colombia & US leads to results

In some good news Colombia hosted a US State Department delegation last month for high level talks which led to several announcements. Foreign Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo, who actually was a US Citizen for a while, has announced that Colombians can now access almost 20 thousand United States non-agricultural work visas, and more than 1,000 summer job visas. We will do a write up on this both on Finance Colombia and Empleobilingue, the only source on the web for bilingual talent.

Colombia is going to open five new consulates in Phoenix, Dallas, Denver, Charlotte and Seattle. There are already 9 thousand Colombians studying in the US on Student Visas, and there is a family unification program already in effect between the two countries which has 6,000 current authorizations by the State Department.

The mammoth UNGRD scandal that threatens Petro

There is an ongoing scandal in the Petro Administration where the government paid the equivalent of $12 million US dollars for a fleet of water tanker trucks to supply water to citizens of La Guajira, the desert region on the Atlantic Coast near the Venezuelan border. Now, no water got to the residents of La Guajira, the trucks sat idle on a Colombian military base. But the money paid to a contractor by Colombia’s UNGRD (National Unit of Disaster Risk Management) was “allegedly” used to bribe Senate President Iván Name and Andrés Calle in the house of representatives to unblock opposition to Petro’s reform bills. According to Colombia’s comptroller, the Controller General (Contraloria), each tanker truck was purchased from the dealer, Kenworth de la Montaña, in Medellín, for about 600 million pesos, but then sold to the government for $1.2 billion pesos. This way they could launder money out for political purposes.

Former Deputy Director of the UNGRD, Sneyder Pinilla “prendió el ventilador-started the fan” (Colombian saying, like “when the shit hits the fan”) and accused former director of the UNGRD, Olmedo Lopez of using the UNGRD money through this conspiracy to pay the bribes, covering it up with this tanker truck contract, and that the payments were made at the direction of Petro’s Minister of the Interior, Luís Fernando Velasco, and the Councilor for the Regions, Sandra Ortiz, who was actually the bag man, or “bag woman.”

Now Olmedo López and Sneyder Pinilla are testifying and want immunity with Colombia’s attorney general, because they say that the tanker scandal is just the tip of the iceberg in a case that for Colombia, may be larger than the Odebrecht scandal.

According to these two, a political machine was put in place inside the Petro administration that would launder 380 billion pesos, or almost $100 million US dollars of “marmalade” or UNGRD funds into the hands of legislators and bureaucrats to bribe for passage of Petro’s reforms, all of which have failed so far, and to finance last October’s local elections, where again, Petro’s party and allies lost badly. Lopez says the tanker truck scandal just got discovered but according to him there is a whole infrastructure inside Petro’s government operating with this modality to bribe legislators and fund campaigns.

Now the scary thing is that the company that sold the trucks, Impoamericana Roger SAS was sold to Elmer Celis in 2019, and right before the contract for the tankers was being finalized, Celis was assassinated. So this scandal now has deadly implications.

Sura wants out of the EPS health system

Grupo Sura, the insurance and asset management giant has told the Colombian government that it plans to withdraw from the national EPS health insurance scheme. They are supposed to be meeting with the company to negotiate what happens.

Colombia wants the gold from a Spanish Galleón, so do Bolivians

In 1708 the Spanish galleon San José was sunk by the British during the War of Spanish Succession. in the Caribbean sea off the coast of Cartagena. The shipwreck was found in 2015 in about 600 meters, or 328 fathoms, or 2,000 feet of water, and Colombia is claiming it as its own and using the military to fend off any would-be treasure hunters. Last month, Colombia announced that it was launching a research and recovery project, aiming to prioritize the historical value of the wreck. There are complications though. The ship was Spanish, so Spain would need to renounce any sovereignty over the wreck. Spain considers the ship a graveyard that should not be molested out of respect for the dead.

Down in landlocked Bolivia, the Chicha, Caranga and Killaka people have filed claims with UNESCO saying that their enslaved ancestors extracted the treasure onboard from mines in what is now Bolivia, and have a right to share in whatever wealth is in the shipwreck.

This is going to be an interesting case. There is a treaty, the 2001 Convention on the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage. Spain is a signatory, so is bound by the treaty, but Colombia never ratified or signed it, so is not bound by it.

Colombia has (finally) outlawed bullfighting

The Colombian house of representatives has outlawed bullfighting, a 500 year old tradition of bovine torture inherited from the Spanish. There are still people who defend bullfighting. The bill is in reconciliation with the senate, and then goes to President Petro, who is sure to sign it into law.

Mafia guerilla groups flourishing, expanding under Petro’s “Total Peace” fiasco

Reuters is reporting that it got access to a secret report showing that all the major criminal mafias in Colombia expanded in 2023, making a mockery of President Petro’s “Total Peace” initiative. Those criminal organizations would be the Clan del Golfo, ELN, and the two former FARC groups Estado Mayor and Segunda Marquetalia. Petro ran his campaign promising “Total Peace” but these groups, three of the four are avowed communist guerillas, and the Clan Del Golfo a descendant of paramilitaries, just keep getting bigger. When is Petro going to start?

Reuters also reported on illegal road building in the Amazon rainforest, in some cases by these same groups, that the government is supposed to be stopping. For example, Chiribiquete, nobody is even allowed to go in there but there are at least 12 illegal roads built, according to Reuters!

These mafias, in this case it looks like the Estado Mayor – former FARC, is building these roads to conduct illegal activities in nature preserves, and the government is unwilling to do anything, or at least, so far it is not combatting the activity.

So that’s it for this week.

Remember to practice critical thinking

Stay mentally and physically active,

And above all, be kind to yourself and others.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro is being forced to confront the possibility that his flagship security policy, Total Peace (Paz Total), may only have partial peace in its sights.

National-level peace talks have broken down between the government and two of the armed groups in the most advanced stages of negotiations, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) and the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC). Petro’s negotiators are now engaging with individual blocs or fronts around the country, rather than solely dealing with the national leadership of the two groups.

The president’s Total Peace plan has sought to negotiate with armed groups and criminal gangs to achieve top-down demobilization similar to the process that saw the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Revolucionarias Armadas de Colombia — FARC) lay down its arms starting in 2017.

But Petro’s ambitious initiative has floundered since it started in late 2022. And now, internal divisions over the peace talks have sent the ELN and EMC into crisis mode, according to Otty Patino, Colombia’s High Commissioner for Peace (Alto Comisionado para la Paz), who leads the government’s peace negotiations.

ELN

The ELN’s national leaders temporarily suspended the group’s participation in the talks on April 11, enraged by a “regional dialogue” with the group’s Comuneros del Sur Front, which wants to expedite its demobilization process, according to a press release from the ELN delegation.

The ELN’s top commander, Antonio García, claimed in an interview with Spanish newspaper, Berria, that the national leadership did not authorize those separate discussions. Pablo Beltrán, leader of the ELN delegation to the peace talks, urged the government to specify the objectives and purpose of the “parallel negotiations,” while speaking to journalists in Caracas, Venezuela.

The government and the Comuneros del Sur Front had announced the talks in February. The decision was driven by the front’s worries about the threat posed by the EMC’s growing dominance and military strength in the southwestern department of Nariño, a cocaine production and trafficking hub that is the base of operations for the Comuneros del Sur.

Feeling the pressure of potential defeat, the front opted to enter an accelerated peace process after seeing no concrete results from the national-level negotiations.

The ELN’s national leaders later agreed to rejoin the negotiations, but the regional peace talks with the Comuneros del Sur will also continue and could cause more problems down the line. On April 27, government representatives in the ELN negotiations asked Petro to either continue dialogues with the ELN national leadership or with the Comuneros del Sur, as a double negotiation is not viable, according to a press release.

EMC

Internal divisions over the peace talks have also derailed the government’s negotiations with the national leadership of the EMC.

In March, Petro suspended a ceasefire with the EMC in Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño, in response to an attack that killed an Indigenous leader in Cauca. This sparked tensions within the EMC, with some blocs advocating for continuing dialogue and others unwilling to engage until a national ceasefire is reinstated.

At a meeting in Caquetá on April 5 between the government and the EMC, delegates agreed to continue peace talks, but representatives from EMC blocs in Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Arauca were notably absent, highlighting internal discord. Leaders of these absent blocs later released videos affirming loyalty to the EMC’s top commander, Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias “Iván Mordisco,” who has refused to continue in dialogues without a nationwide ceasefire.

Camilo González, the government’s chief negotiator with the EMC, has stated that negotiations would proceed only with the EMC factions willing to continue, namely the Jorge Suárez Briceño Bloc, the Magdalena Medio Bloc, and the Carolina Ramírez Front, despite the partial ceasefire suspension. These factions collectively represent approximately 40% of what was previously considered the EMC. In practice, the government has acknowledged that negotiating with this smaller portion of the group, whom Mordisco seems to have lost command over, is the most viable way forward.

InSight Crime Analysis

The breakdown in negotiations for each group has distinct roots, but both have led to a similar result: the government is ready to risk talks with the larger criminal organizations if they can secure regional-level victories with smaller factions willing to disarm.

Petro’s willingness to engage with the regional blocs of the EMC and with individual fronts in the case of the ELN signifies a change in the government’s approach to peace negotiations. It is a departure from the government’s previous notion of a centralized command structure within these armed groups, and an acknowledgment that neither Antonio García nor Iván Mordisco holds absolute control over the ELN or EMC, respectively.

The strategic shift may yield results. The Petro government has progressed rapidly in discussions with the Comuneros del Sur and has opted to sustain dialogues exclusively with the three factions of the EMC.

If the government achieves a successful and swift demobilization of the Comuneros del Sur, the process could serve as a blueprint for other talks around the country. Other individual fronts fearful of military defeat, or who are also frustrated by the lack of progress at the national level, may see a future in the regional approach.

Similarly, reaching an agreement with the remaining EMC fronts involved in peace talks would be a significant achievement. However, as approximately 60% of what was considered the EMC is now excluded from the process, the success will be only partial and will create a new cycle of dissidents from the peace process.

This regional approach also has its drawbacks. Achieving demobilization agreements with individual fronts or blocs of both the EMC or the ELN may bring localized security improvements, but would likely have less impact on Colombia’s overall internal conflict dynamics.

Additionally, negotiating with multiple fronts or blocs simultaneously requires the government to invest significantly more money and personnel. With resources spread thin, even piecemeal agreements may become harder to achieve.

Photo: “El Mocho” of the AGC is one high-profile arrest by the Colombian police. (Credit: Policía Nacional de Colombia)

One of Colombia’s biggest criminal groups is expanding its reach, threatening to disrupt the government’s peace processes with other armed groups, a recent report found.

The report published by the International Crisis Group in March describes how the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) has become the largest armed group not currently involved in formal negotiations under the banner of President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace (Paz Total) initiative. The report expressed concern that the AGC could interfere with and even sabotage other groups’ peace dialogues as they expand and fight for strategically valuable territory.

With about 9,000 members, the AGC is the largest group involved in drug trafficking in the country, earning additional income through arms trafficking, illegal mining, migrant smuggling, and extortion in many municipalities throughout Colombia’s Caribbean coast.

Petro has managed to start talks with some of the country’s other main criminal groups, including the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) and the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) of the ex-FARC mafia. Recently, Petro announced negotiations with the Second Marquetalia (Segunda Marquetalia), another group of FARC dissidents.

Shortly after the report was published, Petro opened the door for a “legal negotiation” with the AGC, which the group publicly accepted under the condition that negotiations are a political process, similar to other groups involved in Paz Total, as opposed to a “sometimiento a la justicia” (submission to justice), which would potentially involve harsher criminal penalties.

InSight Crime spoke with the report’s author, Elizabeth Dickinson, about the potential for peace talks with the AGC as well as some of the report’s main findings:

InSight Crime (IC): Do you think the AGC is genuinely interested in participating in these dialogues?

Elizabeth Dickinson: Yes. The AGC has a disadvantage compared to other groups, as they remain outside ceasefire agreements. For example, in Sur de Bolívar, where the EMC, ELN, and AGC are fighting one another, the military is only targeting the AGC. This strategic constraint on the battlefield is probably their greatest short-term incentive to come to the table.

Two longer-term objectives are also driving the group’s willingness to enter talks. First, there’s a strong desire for legitimacy, which comes with having a seat at the negotiating table with the government. This group fundamentally does not understand why it is the only major armed group in Colombia outside the peace process. And considering the level of control and sophistication they’ve obtained in recent years, the leadership has a chip on its shoulder for not being included in these talks.

The second objective is judicial leniency. Successful peace talks could involve potentially reduced sentences in exchange for providing truthful testimony. Congress will need to establish the specific terms of this arrangement, but this proposition holds particular interest for members of the organization who are interested in finding a way out of this situation of perpetual violence.

The lower-level fighters within the group — young guys aged 18 to 24, who often joined seeking job opportunities — feel that the reality they’ve encountered is not what they anticipated. It is not necessarily a very happy life to live in the ranks of this group, exposed to violence, in difficult environments, and away from home.

That said, some level of noncompliance or criminal interests will continue among the “mandos medios,” the mid-level commanders, who may not have the same incentives to participate in the peace process.

IC: The AGC has perfected the practice of “monetizing territorial control” by profiting off all economic activity, licit and illicit, in areas where they are the dominant actor.  Where is the group trying to expand its control and why? 

Elizabeth Dickinson: If you look at a map, you can understand precisely why they’re expanding where they’re expanding. I would point to three areas.

The first one is the Pacific coast. This group is ambitious to control both coastlines because if one drug trafficking route is down, the other route is open, and there are many different international markets accessible from various routes. They also think this will dramatically increase their political leverage. From their stronghold in Urabá, Antioquia, they have expanded south through Chocó. They are now in Bajo Calima, across the bay from Buenaventura, and they will likely continue into Valle de Cauca, where their expansion is motivated by control of fluvial routes and access to extortion revenues from a very lucrative industrial economy outside of Cali, in Tulua and Buga.

The second focus is mining areas in Bolívar, Antioquia, and Cesar. These are very obviously linked to gold mining, a very attractive product for all armed groups in Colombia, particularly with the market for coca a little bit out of whack. They are systematically pushing the ELN out of its strongholds in mining areas in these places.

The last area of expansion, based on their strategic positioning, seems to be Catatumbo, Norte de Santander, home to the highest concentrations of coca crops, coal mining, palm oil production, and the vast numbers of crossings on the Colombia/Venezuela border. If they were to achieve that, they would dominate the corridor from the Venezuelan border, across the entire Atlantic coast, all the way down to the Pacific coast, an enormous strategic prize.

IC: In the report, you quote one AGC commander saying he envisioned the organization “maintaining its structure and illicit business activities, but just making them less violent.” How is that reconcilable with what the government wants in the long term?

Elizabeth Dickinson: In the short term, all armed groups in Colombia want to continue their armed control and their businesses while reducing violence. Under the previous peace commissioner, the government’s priority was reducing violence and dealing with the territorial control aspect at a later stage.

But if we’re demobilizing a group with as much territorial control as the AGC and as many roots in the economy, the state must be prepared to address the vacuums left behind. And today, that’s simply not possible. In negotiations with the various criminal groups, the planning must start now — from a military perspective, from an institutional perspective, and a services perspective.

IC: The AGC is one of several groups that split off from the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC) when the coalition demobilized in 2006. What has made the AGC stronger and more resilient than other groups that emerged from that process, such as the Rastrojos?

Elizabeth Dickinson: To understand their expansion model, it is crucial to comprehend the organization’s structure. It comprises three branches: military, economic, and political. This structure goes down to the street level. In every town in AGC areas, the community can point to the guy who is the political head, the economic head, and so on. Their expansion involves building a social base, where they have a role in community organizations like the Community Action Boards (Juntas de Acción Comunal – JAC), and they control every aspect of the economy, with the threat of violence lingering in the background in case anyone doesn’t comply.

Another important factor was their relationship with the landowners. A portion of the political and economic classes prefer to live with this group rather than risk exposure to unknown actors, like the ELN, the EMC, or criminal organizations. Those landowner networks have been fundamental for this group’s survival because, in moments of economic scarcity, the landowners would step in and front AGC members’ salaries for a month or two while they got back on their feet.

The other thing that is quite different from groups like the Rastrojos or some urban gangs is that the AGC is not urban. This is a fundamentally rural organization. They have strategically chosen not to make cities their priority. This is not an organization inside Barranquilla. They’re sitting on the perimeter, letting the gangs in the city fight it out while they wait for a winner to decide who to work with. Existing mainly in the countryside has helped them avoid scrutiny and security operations.

IC: After the capture of Dairo Antonio Úsuga, alias “Otoniel,” in 2021, the group’s new leader, Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego, alias “Chiquito Malo,” has tightened his grip on the organization, according to the report. How has the group’s structure changed with this change of leadership?

Elizabeth Dickinson: One way this group expanded was through a franchising model, which is still part of the organization’s DNA. At a local level, commanders have autonomy over extortion and low-revenue criminal economies, bringing in money for their specific bloc or front. But the big games like drug trafficking and mining are run by the Estado Mayor (central command).

When Otoniel was captured, there were some questions about whether this organization would even stay together. So Chiquito Malo took an aggressive stance towards consolidation, sending several envoys across the region to negotiate with the different fronts and bring them all on board. He’s also replaced local and mid-level commanders across the region in cases where the envoys were not enough to get them on board with the structure.

IC: The market for coca leaves remains inconsistent throughout Colombia, with prices varying considerably by region. However, the report found prices in AGC territory remained stable. How has the AGC achieved this despite falling prices in areas controlled by other groups? 

Elizabeth Dickinson: There are a few hypotheses. The buyer relationship is the most powerful explanation of what’s happening in the market. The AGC has a consistent buyer relationship with international cartels, principally the Sinaloa Cartel on the Atlantic coast, but also with European organized crime. In a situation of oversupply, like we now have in Colombia, where there is too much coca, it’s a buyer’s market, and the buyers get to choose who they work with. And the AGC has essentially won that buyer’s market.

The AGC has a few advantages that make it the obvious candidate. First, its territories are consolidated. They are the only ones participating in drug trafficking in areas they control. So, when traffickers enter an AGC area to buy coca or organize a shipment, they’re not worried, for example, about which group controls the exit routes that specific day. By contrast, in Nariño, one trafficker might have to pay four different extortion fees because there are so many groups present.

The second advantage they have is transportation. The infrastructure on the Atlantic coast is vastly superior to that in southern Colombia. The Atlantic coast has the Troncal del Caribe highway, significant ports in Barranquilla and Cartagena, and developed fluvial routes.

Third, the AGC has been able to penetrate security forces at a local level — and it’s very much at the local level, not systematic. We are talking about an organization that can buy off specific police and military officials, making them very consistent suppliers.

Fourth, because they’re so successful in the cocaine business, they have tons of capital. If a shipment gets lost, the AGC will guarantee payment to the buyer. This also helps explain why coca prices have been stable because even if the market price has dropped, the AGC has the money to say, we’ll just pay our coca growers slightly more because it will keep us popular in these areas.

This interview has been edited for clarity and fluidity.

This article, produced by Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America.

On the morning of September 6, school was canceled at the José Maria Obando high school in Corinto, a small town in Cauca, Colombia. Instead of the typical bustling of 400 students chatting and filing into classrooms, there was only unsettling silence. When school employees arrived that morning, they found notebooks riddled with bullet holes scattered across empty classrooms. Chalkboards and hallway walls were pockmarked and scarred by the over 140 shots that police had fired into the building.

“You can see from the sprays of bullets —in the entire school, on the walls, in the stands — that it’s right in the line of fire,” an educational worker who asked not to be named told InSight Crime.

The school is located off the town square, directly between the police station and La Loma de la Cruz, a small hill one kilometer from the school. The night before, members of a local ex-FARC mafia faction targeted Corinto’s police station from atop the hill. The police returned fire.

No students were in the school, but a security guard was there, turning on the lights for the evening. Seeing movement inside the building, officers at the police station believed the attack was coming from the school. They began firing at the campus, piercing the walls, windows, and chalkboards with 146 bullets, according to reports from local media outlets.

The assault left the campus destroyed, a vivid example of how armed actors disrupt the lives of children across Colombia, drawing them into the violence from an early age. Throughout the country, criminal groups have long fought for control of drug crop production sites, trafficking routes, unauthorized mining zones, and other illegal economies, often catching locals in the crossfire. In their territories, these groups can act as de facto authorities, using threats and force to police movement, oversee commerce, enforce social rules, and demand “taxes” from residents.

For a tiny percentage of people in rural areas like Corinto, the violence swirling around them can lead them to participate in criminal activities. These criminal groups often represent one of the few economic opportunities, using the promise of wealth –or force, if necessary – to recruit youth into their ranks. These recruitment practices perpetuate violence by strengthening armed groups.

This is the cycle of violence that the government is hoping to break with its so-called Total Peace (Paz Total) policy, an ambitious, multi-pronged negotiation effort across the country, including Cauca.  And while the tragedy in Corinto is a singular incident, it is a microcosm of a broader crisis affecting children across the nation, undermining the government’s efforts.

The Lure of Illegality

Corinto children are, in a way, victims of circumstance. Situated at a crossroads connecting the departments of Tolima, Huila, Valle del Cauca, and Cauca, Corinto is a strategic location for criminal groups.

The dominant criminal group in the area is the Dagoberto Ramos Front, a faction of dissidents from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) guerrillas affiliated with the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC). The FARC was once Colombia’s oldest insurgency until signing a peace accord in 2016. Factions of these accords have since broken from the process, forming criminal groups.

Unlike their FARC predecessors, these dissident groups are no longer “fighting about ideology or rights; now they are focused on financial gains,” a resident of Corinto, who preferred to remain anonymous, told InSight Crime.

In addition to its strategic location, Corinto has a reputation for producing some of the world’s finest marijuana. Many families depend on marijuana and coca crops for their livelihoods, with children working on farms on weekends or when not attending school.

“They know how to harvest, dry, and process marijuana and coca because, unfortunately, it is their families’ way of life,” the local educational worker told InSight Crime.

Residents sell these illicit crops to armed groups, meaning a significant portion of the student population already has some association with criminal groups.

This creates a difficult challenge for educators.

Many students in Corinto do not see the value in education because the best way to earn a decent living that they can see is either producing crops or joining an armed group. Families can earn a teacher’s salary in just three days when crops are good, explained the source in the education sector.

Meanwhile, for those interested in pursuing higher education, the logistical and financial challenges make it extremely difficult.

“Many moms dream of [educating their children] and breaking free from this cycle, but it’s difficult. It involves a daily commute … which, with their income, is too much money.”

Child Recruitment

In addition to selling crops to armed groups, many families have members who have joined their ranks. As a result, children and teenagers often view these groups as role models.

“There are kids who sing the FARC’s songs, who love to watch them, who get excited when they hear a gunshot,” said the source in Corinto’s education sector. “They are excited by it because it has been their whole reality. They are 15- or 16-year-olds who don’t know any other reality.”

Criminal groups lure children with promises of weapons and money, taking advantage of their poverty and vulnerability. When that does not work, they can resort to force.

“Minors have long been forcibly recruited in these territories, but it has become even more obvious in the last two years. One of the most affected areas is the Tierra Adentro region [south of Corinto], where there are significant cases of forced recruitment of both boys and girls,” an Indigenous leader told InSight Crime.

In the last three years, at least 500 boys and girls have been recruited by armed groups in Cauca, according to statistics from the Association of Indigenous Councils of Northern Cauca (Asociación de Cabildos Indígenas del Norte de Cauca – ACIN), representatives of the organization told InSight Crime.

The process is systematic for the EMC-affiliated fronts in the department: the Dagoberto Ramos, Jaime Martínez, and Carlos Patiño, all under the command of the EMC. After recruiting the children, they take them to a training center in Toribío, another municipality in northern Cauca, a member of an international organization working in Cauca told InSight Crime. After months of training, they are assigned to one of the three dissident groups, depending on which front is in the greatest need of resources at the time, said the source.

The number of youngsters recruited by armed groups across Colombia has risen steadily since the 2016 peace accords with the FARC. The National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) — the country’s last remaining insurgency — has become the leading recruiter of minors, with 406 reported cases since 2016, while ex-FARC mafia groups have recruited 118, according to a study carried out by UNICEF and the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar – ICBF).

Still, the actual numbers of recruited children are likely far higher, which explains the difference between the number of reported cases in the study and the number of cases reported by ACIN. In Corinto, for example, parents and relatives have filed two or three cases of missing children each month in the past year. However, due to fear, most do not acknowledge that their children were forcibly taken — instead, families report them missing.  This contributes to a rising school dropout rate and means the cases are not counted towards the child recruitment statistics, said the source working in the education sector.

After establishing a ceasefire with the EMC that was supposed to last from January 1 to June 30, the government suspended the agreement in May after four Indigenous minors were recruited and killed in Putumayo by the Carolina Ramírez Front, a bloc under the command of the EMC.

In August, the international non-governmental organization Save the Children denounced the government’s ceasefire with the ELN because it did not prohibit the recruitment of girls and boys over 15.

‘A Human Shield‘

The day after the September attack on the José Maria Obando campus, dissidents bombed the police station. The school decided to suspend classes for two weeks. High schoolers were then relocated to the primary school campus, where they attend classes in the afternoon on a shorter schedule.

In the aftermath of the attacks, the school arranged a sit-in to bring attention to the danger the school’s location posed.

Just hours after the protest ended, a 16-year-old student in José Maria Obando, who had participated in the sit-in, was assassinated while riding his motorcycle through the neighboring municipality of Miranda.

The circumstances of his murder remain unclear, but his death serves as a tragic reminder of the cycle of violence children in Corinto and across Colombia continue to face in regions with the presence of armed groups.

The town has also pleaded with local departmental authorities to relocate the police station. More than 500 people live near the building, and its proximity to the school puts the children at risk.

But police officers are reluctant to move to a different location, worried they would be more vulnerable to attacks elsewhere, a Corinto resident said.

“Unfortunately, we, the community, are their shield,” said the resident. “We’re a human shield.”

This article, by Henry Shuldiner and Luisa Maria Acosta, was originally published by Insight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America.

After a week involving a high-profile kidnapping and alleged ceasefire violations by Colombia’s two largest armed groups, the future of President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace policy is in jeopardy.

Photo: President Gustavo Petro attending a meeting in Paris, France. (Credit: Presidencia de la República)

First, on October 28, members of the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) kidnapped the parents of Luis Díaz, a Colombian football star, at a gas station in Barrancas, La Guajira. The mother was quickly released, but the father, Luis Manuel Díaz, remains captive at the time of publication. [Editor’s note: He was released on November 9.]

The ELN’s Northern War Front (Frente de Guerra Norte), based in La Guajira, claimed responsibility for the abduction.

Then, on November 5, the ELN’s Western War Front (Frente de Guerra Occidental) declared an armed strike in Choco, claiming the Colombian military had violated the ceasefire by colluding with the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) in the region.

That same day, the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC), the largest faction of the ex-FARC mafia, a dissident group from the now demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), suspended peace talks with the government after just three weeks. A bilateral ceasefire remains in place.

The events capped a horrible turn for Petro’s Total Peace plan, which aims to end the country’s decades-long internal conflict by negotiating with armed and criminal groups. The plan was ambitious from the onset, but talks with the country’s two most important criminal groups, the ELN and the EMC, appear to be unraveling.

Kidnapping Plunges ELN Negotiations Into Crisis

The ELN’s kidnapping of Luis Manuel Díaz and the armed strike may have violated the group’s ceasefire with the government and raised concerns about its ability to adhere to any future peace agreements.

These violations leave the Colombian government in a precarious position as the ELN is Colombia’s largest armed group and is considered critical to the success of Total Peace. The ceasefire has been in place for almost a year and prohibits hostile actions between the ELN and Colombian security forces, while also strictly forbidding the ELN from taking hostages.

These incidents have underscored a longstanding concern surrounding ELN negotiations: The group’s decentralized command structure grants individual war fronts significant autonomy, leading to dissent, internal fragmentation, and seemingly rogue actions, such as the kidnapping of Díaz and the announcement of an armed strike.

The ELN has reportedly committed at least eleven potential violations of the ceasefire agreement between October 3 and November 3, according to the non-governmental organization Institute of Peace and Development Studies (Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz – Indepaz). But kidnapping has drawn international attention, increasing pressure for the government to establish a clear red line with the ELN.

Doubts About Ex-FARC Mafia’s Commitment to Peace

Negotiations between the Colombian government and the EMC have come to an abrupt halt just 20 days after establishing a ceasefire. On November 5, the EMC announced the government had failed to uphold its commitments agreed during negotiations, although the ceasefire would remain.

This breakdown came after a confrontation in the town of El Plateado in Argelia, in southern Cauca, a key drug trafficking hotspot under the control of the Carlos Patiño Front, which is part of the EMC. On October 26, it was reported that members of the Carlos Patiño Front were blocking the arrival of electoral materials ahead of local elections on October 29.

Their presence appears to have violated an agreement brokered with the government, under which the EMC troops would temporarily vacate the municipality during the elections and allow the army to make sure voting happened peacefully. Following the elections, the army was to withdraw. However, the army remained in El Plateado, leading to an alleged riot instigated by the Carlos Patiño Front, eventually leading to locals kidnapping, and later releasing, 20 members of the security forces.

The collapse of these talks has led to concerns among analysts that the EMC is using negotiations as a pretext to recruit more people and fortify its positions. After the collapse of two previous negotiations over the past year, the EMC expanded its influence in key areas.

The peace process with the EMC has also struggled due to a lack of monitoring, such as delays in establishing the monitoring and verification mechanism outlined in the ceasefire protocol. “[These agreements] can’t be done on the fly. You need to have everything ready for when the ceasefire comes into effect. These improvisations here show that this government didn’t have a strategic plan,” said Luis Fernando Trejos, a professor at Universidad del Norte and conflict analyst, told InSight Crime.

Negotiations Stalled Elsewhere

While talks with the ELN and the EMC are the largest roadblocks to Total Peace, other negotiations such as those in cities like Buenaventura and Medellín, also face significant challenges.

In Buenaventura, rival gangs, the Shottas and Espartanos, have tried to maintain ceasefires while talks progress. However, Colombia’s Congress has not approved the legal framework needed to allow negotiations with such criminal groups. In early October, members of Congress presented a bill aimed at amending the Justicia y Paz law, which facilitated the demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC) in 2006 to include newer gangs. Unfortunately, this move also faces stiff opposition in Congress, where the president’s party needs majorities.

The delay in establishing a legal framework also has significant implications for the potential resumption of negotiations with one of Colombia’s largest armed groups, the AGC. Peace talks with the AGC unraveled in March when the government accused the group of orchestrating an armed strike by miners in the Bajo Cauca region in northwestern Colombia.

Political and Public Stalemate

These strains are only further eroding political and public support for Total Peace.

Colombia’s regional elections, held on October 29, saw a slew of mayors and governors opposed to Petro’s government elected into office, further threatening support for Total Peace at the local level.

The events of the past year have also eroded public support for Petro’s flagship plan. From August 2022 to August 2023, polling showed the percentage of Colombians who approved of negotiations with armed groups had dropped from 76% to 59%, while those in favor of defeating these groups by military means climbed from 21% to 37%.

Even if the EMC and ELN talks soon continue, these may not be completed by the end of Petro’s current presidential term in 2026. The successful peace process with the FARC counted on far broader support and still took four years to complete. The responsibility for completing Total Peace may therefore well fall on a different government.

This article, by Henry Shuldiner and Lara Loaiza, was originally published by Insight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America.

Although Colombia’s regional elections, held on October 29, were more peaceful than those held four years ago, they showed that organized crime continues to be a severe threat to electoral proceedings.

Photo: Members of the Electoral Observation Mission (MOE), including director Alejandra Barrios, meeting in August before the elections. (Credit: MOE)

In these elections, Colombians voted for their local and departmental representatives, including mayors and governors, for the period 2024-2026. While the results were mixed, right-wing parties claimed several important victories, leaving President Gustavo Petro’s leftist government with few allies at the regional level.

This will likely influence the government’s Total Peace plan, which seeks to negotiate with armed groups across the country, as several prominent critics of this policy were elected.

While most of the elections took place without public disturbance, attacks on polling stations were reported in Norte de Santander, Cauca, and parts of the Caribbean coast.

InSight Crime presents three conclusions on the role organized crime played in these elections:

No Interference by Armed Groups on the Day

In 2023, the elections saw an absence of violence by criminal groups in the electoral scenario. Armed groups such as the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) of the ex-FARC Mafia, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) and the Gaitanista Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) were not behind any violent acts during the polls.

The government’s current ceasefires with the ELN and the EMC, achieved through Total Peace talks, as well as the patchy presence of the AGC, played an important part, according to Diego Rubiano, a senior analyst for the Electoral Observation Mission (Misión de Observación Electoral – MOE).

“Since 2014-2015, we always had an action by an armed actor. There was always the detonation of an explosive device or a frontal attack on a polling station. This year, we didn’t have a single incident,” he said.

The few disturbances at polling stations did not appear to have any links to armed groups.

The elections were canceled in some municipalities of the southern departments of Putumayo and Nariño due to the perceived risks of violent attacks. Other events also overshadowed proceedings. Supporters of a mayoral candidate in La Gamarra, Cesar, set fire to an electoral office building, killing one official, identified as Duperly Arévalo Carrascal. And in Argelia, Cauca, demonstrators angry with the voting results set fire to electoral materials.

Other irregularities were also registered. The amount of cash seized nationwide by authorities on the day for allegedly being used for electoral corruption skyrocketed by 289% over the last polls to reach 1.2 billion pesos ($300,000). The mayor of Yondó in Antioquia, Fabián Echavarría Rangel, was arrested after being caught with 150 million pesos ($37,000) in his van.

In addition, 389 people were arrested, 189 for judicial records and 35 for crimes such as the destruction of electoral material and obstructing the carrying out of the elections.

Political Violence Rose During Campaign

Although election day was calm, the previous months saw an increase in political violence.

According to the MOE, between October 29, 2022 and September 29, 2023, violence against political leaders increased by 92% compared to 2019, although violence against social leaders decreased by 15.6%. At least 28 political candidates were killed.

“There is a change in the strategy of political participation [of the armed groups],” Rubiano commented, adding that they are seeking to “take advantage of the electoral process.”

The MOE recorded 1,352 violent incidents related to armed groups over this period, an increase of 129% compared to the 2019 regional elections and 66% higher than during the 2022 presidential elections. For its part, between January and September 2023, the Ombudsman’s Office recorded at least 375 acts of violence, including threats, attacks and homicides, allegedly perpetrated by armed groups such as the ex-FARC mafia (56 acts), the AGC (54) and the ELN (44). Attacks on local authorities led to at least 12 mayors having to govern outside their municipalities from somewhere else due to threats from armed groups.

“This violence…occurs much more at the beginning of the electoral calendar, where we begin to see problems with registering people, complaints that [groups are extorting candidates] to let them campaign or to be able to mobilize,” said Mauricio Vela, coordinator of the MOE’s Political and Electoral Observatory of Democracy.

The departments of Cauca, Nariño, Valle del Cauca and Antioquia were the most affected by violence against political and social leaders.

Local Elections Remain Important to Organized Crime

Although the violence was not attributable to criminal groups, InSight Crime was able to collect testimonies in departments such as Norte de Santander, Chocó and Cauca that show the interference of these groups in the elections.

Criminal groups in the country continued to unduly influence elections by extorting candidates and telling local communities who to vote for.

“Every political actor has to go and talk to the guerrillas in order to be able to work, campaign and everything. They are very strict about buying votes,” a social leader in Guapi, Cauca, told InSight Crime before the elections.

In Hacarí, Norte de Santander, ELN members blocked voters for one mayoral candidate, and in Bolívar, alleged AGC members intimidated voters in the municipality of San Jacinto del Cauca, according to a statement from the Ombudsman’s Office.

For decades, municipal budgets have been a source of income for armed groups, who extort money from officials and contractors. In addition, Colombia’s current coca price crisis has forced the groups to further diversify their criminal portfolios, giving more weight to illicit economies such as extortion.

This article, by Lara Loaiza and Juan Diego Cárdenas, was originally published by Insight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America.

Rosario’s Rector José Manuel Restrepo Abondano: “I am convinced that the business sector and the private sector have to participate more actively in the generation of new knowledge.”

On the innovation front, the university won first place in EMC Corporation’s EMC Heritage Trust project, which will provide Rosario $15,000 USD to digitize 950 manuscripts in the university’s possession from the 17^th, 18^th, and 19^th centuries, including historically important papers from Spain’s King Phillip IV and King Carlos IV.

Considered an elite university within Colombia and abroad, Rosario manages to pursue both academic excellence as well as a societal mission. Finance Colombia’s executive editor Loren Moss was able to sit down with Universidad del Rosario’s Rector José Manuel Restrepo Abondano to gain his insights on Rosario’s role in Colombia’s society.

Finance Colombia: Tell me the history of Rosario. What makes Rosario unique?

José Manuel Restrepo: Maybe to start with, the university has the longest uninterrupted history in the country. Even before Colombia was a republic, because Rosario was created in 1653 when this was the “Nuevo Reino de Granada,” when it was a Spanish colony. And, it was also created with a very singular characteristic: the students were members of the board of directors of the university, which means that the governance rested with the students. Today this system still exists. The 15 best undergraduate students of the university elect the dean every 4 years and also elect the university’s board of directors that is called the ‘conciliatura’. This means that Rosario is a university where the student is truly the owner and protagonist of the university. The third characteristic is what I call the perfect combination between tradition and innovation, past and future. What does that mean? It means that there are roots that have been constructed during the course of history that are reflected in many facets of the country.

More than 30 presidents of the Republic have been educated at Rosario. No one else has that kind of record. Secondly, we actively participated in the botanical expedition, which was the first scientific expedition of its type that took place in this region of the world. And when I say directly I mean that our professors and students led this effort. We participated in the construction of the Republic, when the Republic of Colombia was created, with graduates that were fundamental participants of that moment in history. We participated in independence, we participated in the Constitution of 1991 and we are actively participating in the peace process and in the post-conflict initiatives. Those are only some examples of what our historic tradition has been. But simultaneously it is a university that is committed to research. Today, it is ranked between 5^th and 6^th place with respect to production of research in the country. It is an institution that it is also committed to being international with dual degree opportunities, with academic exchanges for students that are currently linked to the university. That also has been an effort with respect to innovation in pedagogic practices, because the future is not what we teach, but how we are going to teach it.

And that makes a difference. And the third thing is that the history of medicine in the country has also been linked to the history of the university. Rosario had Colombia’s first Faculty of Medicine.  1671 was when the first Faculty of Medicine of this country was established. Today the Faculty of Medicine has the biggest hospital in the Andean region. It is the hospital of Méderi, and it is our hospital. And the truth is that it has been recognized for being an institution that has been committed to social, political, legal and economic issues, and simultaneously with health matters, rehabilitation and human development.

Finance Colombia: Speaking about becoming international, what alliances do you have with other academic institutions or with the private sector?

José Manuel Restrepo: I am going to give to you some examples but most of the programs have a dual degree. Our undergraduate program in psychology has a dual degree with the University of Bologna, that is the oldest western university. Our law school has dual degree programs with The University of Paris, the Faculty of Economics has links with Tilburg University, dual degrees. Each program designs a strategy of internationalization that includes many chapters. One is how to attract students from abroad to come here. As of today, more than 170 foreign students are in Rosario for a period of time. How many students travel from here to abroad? How many teachers come from abroad? In the statistics of percentages of international professors we are in the top two of the country. Because we do look to attract international professors, which is also a way to capture better human talent for research activities.

Each semester we focus on a region of the world. Last semester we dedicated it to South Korea. So there were a bunch of activities, both curricular and extracurricular around, focused on South Korea as a theme so the students can live the experience as if they were in South Korea. Also through visits and international trips this effort is achieved. Through the practice of a second language and the commitment of the student to develop ability in a second language, classes being taught in a second language. And in general, let’s say to achieve that, the international culture permeates the academic activity. Through lectures. Through academic exchanges, through professors, etc.

Finance Colombia: Social inclusion is a theme here in Colombia that is very important. What are the programs and the initiatives that Rosario has in respect to that topic? Because it is my impression that Rosario has a reputation of being very…

José Manuel Restrepo: Elitist.

Finance Colombia: Yes, first thing people might think is that it must be very expensive, and that it is where only presidents’ children go to.

José Manuel Restrepo: Starting many years ago, the university has had a strategy, and the strategy is that education is not about admitting good people and graduating good people. That can be done by anybody. Better said, the bad one would be the professor that does not manage to give the student some added value. A student with good grades from school that also graduates from the university with good grades also is likely to not even need professors. His professors can be bad, either way he is going to make it. Our commitment is more with the added value. I know that I admit students in a very high proportion from median levels of the population, and also from low socioeconomic levels. Because of that, 20% of the students are on scholarship. Also because of that is that we allocate 18 billion pesos to a scholarship program. But the value that one should give as educators is to transform that student that is potentially good into an excellent one. That gap is what educating is. Any other thing is not to educate. Any other thing is simply to pass through a university.

With those ideas, and having discovered that value that we have had, we said: hey, we do have a commitment that can be extended to another part of the country’s population? And because of that we decided to get involved with programs of the national government such as “Ser Pilo Paga.” We admitted students that came from much more lower economic strata. Levels 1 and 2 of the population, because we were able to add value. And those are Rosario values. So we are now admitting a larger proportion of students in those economic conditions, so long as they have human potential. Talent. Because what is going to make a difference in the future of an elite university is the academia and talent. It is not going to make a difference if you come from a high, low or medium economic strata. What makes a difference in the future is the talent of your people. What we are then, is an institution that governs and manages talent. So we decided to go though that path, and precisely it is in that direction that we have been designing all of our academic programs.

Finance Colombia: How do you assure that those students of low income feel included in academic life, because that is very important?

José Manuel Restrepo: There is an accompanying program. But there is a characteristic that Rosario has and it is that historically, it has been a true university. “Unity in the middle of diversity.” And the diversity is everything. Diversity of gender, ideological diversity, political diversity, religious diversity, diversity in race. Rosario I think has the capacity, contrary to other institutions, that people that think differently and are different do not stay at either side of the bridge but instead find each other in the middle of it. And in that capacity a country is being constructed. Because the country is not a country of “Strata 6.”  The country is a diverse country by nature. So what we have been doing with the accompanying program is taking advantage of that characteristic of Rosario, that the student understands since he starts the first day of classes. The same student later converts himself into the mentor tutoring the young ones that come let’s say, from the program “Ser pilo paga.” We build up an accompanying program with students, consisting of basic skills improvement with a mentor that is a graduate student. The graduate student accompanies the young student and transfers to him what I call “social capital.” Because yes, in our society the social capital matters a lot, doesn’t it?

Finance Colombia: True.

José Manuel Restrepo: So we have to transfer to him that capital. And the way to transfer it is with an excellent graduate student that can soon be a judge, or a company president, or a well-known doctor, so that he accompanies that young student and gives him that social capital. There is a commitment.

Finance Colombia: There is a saying about Harvard that says that it is not that Harvard has a better quality education than other universities, but it is the people you get to know, the contacts that you make.

José Manuel Restrepo: And it is what has to be given. And it is given through mentors; students and graduates that play as mentors.

Finance Colombia: Something like 50% of Google’s professionals are from Stanford because Google’s original owners are from Stanford and they looked up their friends. That was a good example. In what way can the private sector, the business sector here in Colombia, work together with Rosario?

José Manuel Restrepo: I tell them that there are 3 paths. The path of training in leadership. The path of innovation and the path of commitment with the country. In the path of leadership it is all about accompanying us in a strategy that is just this. To try to find shared resources, shared efforts to admit talented people with economic difficulties, and being able to accompany them until they finish their academic careers.

Second: Innovation. I am convinced that the business sector and the private sector have to participate more actively in the generation of new knowledge. In giving it an added value so that the productive sector can be more profitable. So we have been developing a strategy around innovation: Innovation on subjects such as diseases…rheumatoid diseases, autoimmune disease, where we have, I would say, the best researchers of the country and the region; and in second place, in tax matters. These are just examples. In transitional justice matters, in competitiveness matters, in the same matters of placement and reintegration derived from the peace process. So we work with actors from the private sector so that they become partners in a strategy that fosters innovation.

And the third way is the country’s commitment. Commitment with a different national vision. This nation has the greatest potential I would say, of all of Latin America if we take advantage of it. And the best way to take advantage of it is not only a government effort, but an effort from the government, private sector and academia to allow this country to become a fairer one. So it develops its justice system, develops its issues of political parties, of government, of institutions, of competitiveness, of production, and poverty reduction, of inequality reduction. Bringing assets to the country and that is not done alone.

g