Vancouver-based Soma Gold Corp. (TSXV: SOMA) (WKN: A2P4DU) (OTC: SMAGF) has confirmed that the first shipment of mineralized material from the formalized Diamantina mine has been received at the El Limon mill in Zaragoza, Antioquia. This delivery follows a formalization process that lasted more than five years under Colombian law. The contractual agreement allows the company to purchase material from small-scale miners in exchange for a percentage of the gold contained in each shipment.

The Diamantina mine is currently permitted to produce up to 40 MT per day. The company intends to reach this production rate by mid-year, while 1,700 MT of existing stockpiled material is being moved to the mill for processing. This site is the first of 24 small mines on the 43,000-hectare property currently in various stages of the formalization process. These 24 mines represent a portion of the approximately 60 small-scale operations located on the company’s concessions. Management expects additional mines to complete the process and begin supplying the El Limon facility later in 2026.

“Formalization of small miners has been a key part of our strategy for many years, and it is gratifying to see the first one complete.” — Geoff Hampson, CEO of Soma Gold Corp.

To support the increased volume from both company-owned assets like the Aurora and Escondida mines and third-party formalized miners, the El Limon mill was restarted in the third quarter of 2025. Material may also be processed at the El Bagre mill, where new ore-sorting equipment is being installed. This equipment arrived in Colombia recently and is expected to be operational by the second half of 2026. Once commercialized, the ore-sorting system is projected to increase the throughput at El Bagre from 450 TPD to a range between 700 and 750 TPD.

Development at the Nechi mine is also progressing, with the Programa de Trabajos y Obras (PTO) application expected to be submitted in April 2026. If approved by the end of the year, the Nechi mine is projected to provide an additional 250 TPD to the El Bagre facility, potentially adding approximately 25,000 AuEq ounces to annual production.

Total gold equivalent production for 2025 was 18,670 ounces. This figure was below previous projections, which the company attributed to a two-month work stoppage and subsequent difficulties in hiring qualified personnel and addressing mechanical issues during the restart phase. In a separate corporate development, the board of directors approved the grant of 1,118,334 stock options at an exercise price of $2.06 CAD per share, along with 159,910 restricted share units and 76,756 deferred share units to directors and employees.

Soma Gold Corp. operates mineral concessions along the Otu fault in Antioquia, maintaining two mills within 25 kilometers of each other with a combined capacity of 675 TPD. The company also maintains an exploration property near Tucuma, Para, Brazil, which is under option to Ero Copper Corp. (TSX: ERO) (NYSE: ERO).

“Just a few months ago, the fighting was so intense that no one dared retrieve the dead,” said Javier, who spoke with InSight Crime at the end of 2024. “At one point, animals were eating the corpses,” he added, lowering his voice.

Over the last 20 years, Javier has seen how a conflict once rooted in ideology — between guerrillas and paramilitaries — has transformed into a battle over coca crops, drug trafficking corridors, and gold deposits.

Today, a resurgence of violence has been sparked by clashes between Colombia’s three main criminal actors: the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), the country’s last remaining insurgency; the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC); and dissidents of the now-defunct Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), known as the ex-FARC mafia—both products of past demobilization efforts.

“The FARC and ELN say, ‘Leave, or we’ll kill you.’ The AGC says, ‘If you leave, we’ll kill you,’” said Javier. “The communities are left with no way out.”

All three groups have sought talks with the Colombian government under the “Total Peace” plan, which aims to negotiate separately with the country’s illegal armed groups. However, this policy has done little to curb the territorial disputes unfolding in Bajo Cauca and throughout Colombia.

Fighting to Fill the Vacuum

Guerrilla-paramilitary clashes in Bajo Cauca date back to the late 1990s. But over the past two decades, these groups have evolved and become further criminalized. Attempts to demobilize their forces – first the 2006 demobilization of the paramilitaries of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC), then the 2016 peace deal with the FARC – led to new conflicts as splinter groups and rivals fought to fill the power vacuum and control the criminal economies left behind.

SEE ALSO: Colombia’s Peace Efforts Spark Criminal Disputes and Divisions 

The latest escalation began when the AGC — the most powerful criminal group in Bajo Cauca — moved into the Serranía de San Lucas. Located in the south of the neighboring department of Bolívar, this mountain range is rich in gold deposits and coca crops and has long been an ELN stronghold. Homicides in El Bagre, which connects San Lucas with the Bajo Cauca, rose to 29 last year, up from 20 in 2023. But murders are just one element of the conflict, which has also led to mass displacements and the confinement of whole communities. Some 145 people were displaced to El Bagre in December 2024 following clashes. By early January 2025, that number had risen to 230.

Still, the violence continued. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 395 people were forcibly displaced in Montecristo, southern Bolívar, on February 7, while another 144 were confined to their homes by the fighting. On February 18, 26 people were displaced from Segovia, which borders El Bagre to the south, due to fighting between the ELN and the AGC.

“What we’re seeing now is the AGC gaining ground against the ELN,” Javier said.

To defend its turf, the ELN has allied with the 18th and 36th Fronts of the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente – EMBF).

“The ELN’s alliance with the FARC dissidents is what’s stopped the AGC from advancing in the Serranía de San Lucas,” he added.

Local police told InSight Crime that another group, known as “Los de Abajo” or “Los de Cuturrú” — a remnant of longtime AGC rivals the “Caparros” — also appears to have joined the alliance.

What’s at Stake in Bajo Cauca?

The conflict is driven by a fight for control of a region brimming with criminal opportunities. The area contains over 8,000 hectares of coca crops and vast gold reserves. Between January and September 2024, 11.64 metric tons of gold were extracted from the subregion, accounting for 54% of all gold mined in Antioquia and 41% of Colombia’s total.

Both the AGC and the ELN profit from mining by charging fees for moving machinery and supplies, extorting legal and illegal miners, and taking a cut of gold production or fixed fees per mine.

SEE ALSO: Major Criminal Powers Dispute Key Corridors in Colombia

Bajo Cauca is also a strategic point on Colombia’s criminal map, connecting coca-producing zones in the east and north with drug dispatch points on the Pacific and Caribbean coasts. Controlling this corridor guarantees illicit revenue flows.

But beyond the economic value, groups with deep roots in the region, such as the ELN, are clinging violently to their turf.

“This is about ego. One group wants to take over, the other says, ‘You’re not pushing me out,’” said a humanitarian worker based in Bajo Cauca who asked not to be identified as they had not been authorized to speak publicly.

Bajo Cauca’s Expanding Battle Lines

While violence is concentrated on the border with southern Bolívar, tensions are rising elsewhere in the region. In Cáceres, a municipality in central-western Bajo Cauca, authorities reported the forced displacement of several families in December 2024 due to clashes in San Pablo, a key mining hub.

The AGC has established a permanent presence in San Pablo, where it has battled both the Colombian army and the ELN. In December 2024, four AGC members were killed in an airstrike in the area.

In neighboring Tarazá, in western Bajo Cauca, social leaders, civil society members, and local officials told InSight Crime that tensions are flaring in various hamlets historically used for coca cultivation and cocaine production. The sources warned that violence is likely to worsen in the coming months.

“What’s next? The same as always: massacres, displacement, threats, forced disappearances,” said a public official in Tarazá, who requested anonymity for fear of reprisals.

In early March, the ELN detonated an explosive device on the road linking Tarazá and Medellín, the capital of Antioquia. In December 2024, the group attacked a public transport vehicle on the same route, injuring two people.

The deteriorating security is reflected in homicide statistics: Cáceres recorded 34 murders in 2024, up from 18 in 2023; Tarazá saw 29 homicides, compared to 12 the year before, according to National Police data. Yet killings are only one metric — communities are also suffering from a range of abuses that underscore the grip these groups have over daily life.

The Mechanics of Social Control

As criminal clashes have intensified in Bajo Cauca, so has the pressure on civilians. Each group uses fear and violence to enforce rules, assert control, and project authority.

“The AGC is using the same tactics the FARC used — like laying landmines,” said Javier.

The now-defunct FARC was notorious for mining territory to slow the army’s advance and protect coca fields. While the practice declined after the FARC’s 2016 demobilization, the AGC appears to be reviving it in areas like Cáceres and El Bagre to keep guerrilla rivals out. Mines are often placed along footpaths, trapping rural communities.

SEE ALSO: What Is Behind Increased Violence in Colombia?

The AGC has also imposed rules and distributed behavior manuals, mandating curfews and punishing rule-breakers. The group has confined entire communities during clashes with rivals.

The civilian population has been caught between the competing demands of armed groups. One group demands displacement; another forbids it. Some communities have taken a stand.

“People were displaced for about 15 days. When they came back, they reopened their businesses and agreed to resist the groups,” said Javier. “They told them, ‘Your fight is your problem. Go kill each other — but let us work.’”

However, while Javier and other residents of Bajo Cauca seek to break the cycles of violence they have suffered for generations, the profits on offer from mining and drug trafficking mean armed groups will continue to fight over the territory, and violence will remain their main tool to assert their power.

*Name changed to protect identity.

This article, written by Sara Garcia and Alicia Florez, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

Unauthorized mining operations by unidentified parties on EPM-owned properties within Anorí and Amalfi municipalities have been identified. These activities pose risks to downstream populations along the Porce III discharge area and the Nechí River.

The illicit mining has led to slope instability and compromised the Porce III plant’s infrastructure. Alterations in the Porce River’s dynamics have increased the likelihood of landslides and flash floods, potentially affecting several communities.

Monitoring indicates that these mining activities are also threatening the stability of the Porce III facilities, thereby jeopardizing the nation’s energy security. EPM has initiated legal proceedings against those responsible for the unauthorized mining to safeguard nearby communities and protect the plant’s infrastructure. Contingency measures are being implemented to mitigate identified risks.

To address these critical risks, immediate actions will commence, including the removal of an illegally constructed embankment in the riverbed. This removal may temporarily increase downstream water flow in the Porce River as the river’s hydraulic section is restored. Communities are advised to stay informed through established communication channels—phone calls, WhatsApp groups, and community leaders—for timely updates and safety instructions.

Porce III Hydroelectric Dam. 

Image Credit: EPM, DAGRAN.

Finance Colombia’s Executive Editor Loren Moss spent a few minutes with Mineros SA CFO Alan Wancier to discuss the company’s social commitments and unusual (for Colombia) mining techniques.

Finance Colombia: I’m here with Alan Wancier of Mineros. Mineros has been a long-time sponsor of the Colombia Gold Summit. We’re here at CGS 2024. You just gave a really interesting presentation talking about Mineros. Mineros is a mining company. I think, if I’m not mistaken, you guys are based right here in Medellín, right?

Click on the above image to view the video.

Alan Wancier: Yes, our headquarters are in Medellín. Yeah.

Finance Colombia: Yeah, but you’re on the TSX.

Alan Wancier: Yes, also.

Finance Colombia: Great, great. And so, you guys have an interesting model because a lot of the mines, the precious metals mines that I’ve seen here in Colombia are your traditional kind of deep tunnel mines, but you guys have diverse operations. You guys have here in the north of Antioquia an interesting alluvial mining operation. If you could touch a little bit on that.

Alan Wancier: Yeah, so, we have an alluvial operation in El Bagre, Antioquia. It’s called the Nechí Mine. We have roughly five bucket dredges, nine suction dredges, and another couple of Brazilian dredges. We mine the bank of the river. Not the river, per se, in a closed pond. We create a closed pond, water doesn’t mix with the river water. And our deposit is between 15 meters and 30 meters deep. We dredge the deposit, we do the beneficiation within the bucket dredges, and inside the bucket dredges, all gold is separated just by water and gravity.

Finance Colombia: So that’s another thing I was going to ask you, because a lot of traditional mining operations need either cyanide or mercury, but you guys have a process that you use, I think a gravity-based process, that’s a lot more environmentally friendly.

Alan Wancier: Yes. We only use water and gravity, no chemicals, and the electricity for the dredges comes from our hydroelectric plants. So we have a very, let’s say, green gold. Our gold is very, very sustainable. And as we move upwards in the deposit or downstream in the river, we close the mine, we put a layer of soil, we plant again, and grass and forests grow again.

Finance Colombia: So, very environmentally responsible.

Alan Wancier: Yes, very environmentally responsible.

Finance Colombia: Now, that area of Colombia has also suffered from underinvestment and a lack of attention from the authorities. You also mentioned some of the things that, you know, you talked about the environmental responsibility that you guys have, but you also have some social programs and ways that you interact with the local economy up there, right?

Alan Wancier: Yes, we invest a lot in the local economy. We have a bee plantation, a bee…I’m not sure how you say it in English.

Finance Colombia: In Spanish.

Alan Wancier: An aviary…Beekeeping.

Finance Colombia: For a bird. Hatchery, a bird-

Alan Wancier: No, but for bees. Bees.

Finance Colombia: Oh, bees. Okay, apiculture.

Alan Wancier: Apiculture.

Finance Colombia: I forget the word for honey and bees. Yeah, there’s a word for it. I forget what it is in English [laughs].

Alan Wancier: We also have one of the biggest rubber plantations-

Finance Colombia: Oh, wow.

Alan Wancier: In the country. We also have some small projects, growing fish. And we also invest a lot in infrastructure.

Finance Colombia: Okay.

Alan Wancier: We invest a lot in the education; we have built bridges, we have built roads, and we invest a lot in the community, and we are very, very close to the community, and the community is very close to us for that reason.

Finance Colombia: I see, and that’s good. You know, I know that you guys have been good citizens. I’ve followed you all for some time, being here in Colombia. And I think one of the things also that you talked about, you know, our audience is made up of a lot of institutional investors, and it sounds like your shares are kind of trading at a bargain rate of discount, right now.

Alan Wancier: Yes, our shares, compared to our peers, are very cheap.

This is because, maybe several reasons. Probably the major reason is that we’ve been public in Colombia for 50 years.

Finance Colombia: Yeah.

Alan Wancier: Since the 1980s, give or take. But Colombia is a very illiquid market. We were the only gold mining company in the exchange. So, people and investors do not know how to value us in Colombia.

Finance Colombia: Right.

Alan Wancier: That’s why we did an IPO in Canada in 2021, with the idea that more people are going to know us and the idea for us to be better valued and to be able to do more business with other mining companies. In Canada, we started with a small float, only $25 million in the IPO.

But we’ve slowly been moving shares, or investors have been moving shares, from Colombia to Canada. And as more shares are moving in Canada, we get more liquidity in Canada and a better share price. As an example, last year in Canada, we were trading at 20,000 shares per day on average. Today, we’re trading 80,000 shares per average. So we have quadrupled the liquidity in Canada, and our strategy is to keep increasing that liquidity to maybe get a better rate or to get a re-rate in the future. Our stock has almost tripled since nine months ago, a year ago, for various reasons. Primarily because we have a new majority shareholder.

So those changes in shareholders have made a good positive impact in the Canadian and economic market. Also, of course, the price of gold has increased. That helps all gold mining companies. We have had very good results, and we hope to continue to have good results in the future. We also have had a bigger exposure to investors. We are going to every conference we can, and we are getting our name out.

Finance Colombia: I see that, and that’s important. You guys, I think that, one, when you bring in a majority shareholder, that’s a vote of confidence from the institutional capital markets. And it’s also, I think, important to point out that you guys are no startup. I think you guys are celebrating, like, your 50th anniversary.

Alan Wancier: We celebrated our 50th anniversary about a month ago, 3 weeks ago. Yes, we’re no startup, and we produce cash. We’re one of the few companies that actually makes cash and pays a dividend, and we pay a hefty dividend. Our current dividend yield is at 10%, and we have paid dividends for decades. We are probably an aristocrat dividend payer, probably compared to Agnico in terms of the number of years paying dividends consistently.

Finance Colombia: That’s unusual because a lot of the mining companies we see here in Colombia, not all of them, but a lot of them, are early-stage, still exploratory, juniors, things like that. But you guys are an established operation with a track record, and so I think that your move to TSX, your continued growth, and your responsibility as a company means that more investors are going to be inevitable, and I think that they are aware of you. So, thanks again for your time. Great presentation. And I think that mineros.com.co is how people can find out about it. And what’s the TSX symbol again?

Alan Wancier: MSA.

Finance Colombia: MSA.

Alan Wancier: MSA on the TSX.

Finance Colombia: Worth keeping a look-out.  I’m going to add that to my watch list, if not more, so thanks a lot.

Between February 23 and 26, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) orchestrated a so-called paro armado, or armed strike across Colombia that included violent attacks, according to the Institute for Peace and Development Studies (Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz – Indepaz).

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

For 72 hours, the group blocked off national highways, set off explosions, burned vehicles, carried out targeted killings and hung the ELN’s flag from public buildings. Additionally, armed members of the group patrolled the streets of villages and towns in parts of Colombia where they maintain a strong presence. Indepaz registered 65 separate incidents during the armed strike across the departments of Norte de Santander, Santander, Cesar, Cauca, Nariño, Casanare, Arauca, Valle del Cauca, Huila, Antioquia and Chocó.

Prior to the start of the armed strike, the Colombian government insisted the ELN would not have the ability to carry it out and suggested political interests were behind their attempts to paralyze the country. However, the ELN proved it could do so, both in its traditional strongholds and in areas where it has increased its power since the now-extinct Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) came to a peace agreement with the government in 2016.

Though dissident FARC factions, known as the ex-FARC Mafia, continue to threaten Colombia, the ELN has taken on the mantle of being Colombia’s prime security threat. Already in 2018, InSight Crime named the group its Criminal Winner for the year. And the escalation of its criminal control can be seen by comparing the location and number of events during a previous 72-hour armed strike in March 2020. That strike saw 27 incidents in nine departments. The latest one recorded 38 more incidents in 11 departments. Colombia’s Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz – JEP), recorded actions in even more departments, saying that 17 of Colombia’s 32 departments had been affected by the latest armed strike.

See also: Special Jurisdiction For Peace Warns Of Weakening Authority of Colombian State Under Duque Administration

Here, InSight Crime explores some of the strengths that have allowed the ELN to become Colombia’s largest criminal threat.

Territorial Control

The armed strike showed the range of criminal governance the ELN enjoys in distinct parts of Colombia. Almost half of the incidents during this armed strike took place in Norte de Santander, a crucial area along the Venezuelan border that has been the focus of much criminal violence of late. There, the ELN openly patrolled the streets of several towns, blocked off highways, torched vehicles and left suspected explosive devices. It is no surprise that the ELN has doubled down on Norte de Santander. The local capital, Cúcuta, and its surrounding area are home to trails crossing the Venezuelan border, along which drugs, migrants, weapons and contraband are moved. The ELN has battled for control of the area against a range of Colombian and Venezuelan non-state armed actors, including the ex-FARC Mafia, the Rastrojos, the Urabeños and the Tren de Aragua.

In Cauca, an important coca-growing hub, the placement of explosives devices and the burning of vehicles were recorded. Temporary curfews were also enforced in both departments, and businesses were forced to close.

The armed strike also spread to areas of Colombia that had been spared in 2020. The northwest department of Antioquia and the southwest department of Nariño, crucial for drug trafficking to Central America and Ecuador respectively, felt the impact of the ELN. In El Bagre, a municipality in Antioquia, a number of schools and 90 percent of businesses were closed, according to Gabriel Rodríguez, a government official in the town, who spoke to RCN Radio.

In Nariño, one of Colombia’s main coca-growing areas, the ELN shut down entire highways and burned vehicles to create road blocks. This department has become a frequent backdrop for disputes between ELN and its rivals, as it is one of Colombia’s major dispatch points for cocaine being sent to North America and Europe.

In the eastern department of Arauca, right on the border with Venezuela, the ELN attacked a police station in the town of Fortul, while in nearby Saravena, shopkeepers were forced to close their businesses. In recent months, Arauca has been a regular battleground between the ELN and the ex-FARC 10th Front for control of cross-border drug trafficking and extortion.

An Unstoppable Force

The 2016 peace agreement between the government and the FARC left a major power vacuum, which the ELN has filled.

In 2017, when the FARC demobilized, the ELN was estimated to have some 1,400 members. Its status as the country’s remaining guerrilla force served to fill its ranks. By 2019, the force swelled to about 4,000 militants. Its current number of fighters is hard to estimate but it is likely to be even higher, due to its rapid territorial expansion and its strong presence in Venezuela, which has given the ELN more opportunities for recruitment.

No longer playing second fiddle to the FARC, the ELN has strengthened significantly. Peace talks with the Colombian government, ongoing since 2017, were derailed in January 2019 when a an ELN car bomb exploded at a police training school in Bogotá, killing 21 people.

When Duque attended a security meeting in Arauca to discuss security, ELN members appeared openly on the streets of Arauquita, a town not far from the meeting, making a mockery of the administration’s efforts.

The man responsible for ordering the crime was allegedly Gustavo Aníbal Giraldo, alias “Pablito,” currently the ELN’s third-in-command.

Since the attack, President Iván Duque has ordered security forces to relentlessly target ELN members and infrastructure. But while arrests of ELN members and seizures of its drug shipments happen regularly, the group does not appear to have been significantly weakened.

Instead, its defiance has only grown. When Duque attended a security meeting in the department of Arauca to discuss clashes between the ELN and dissident FARC groups in January this year, ELN members appeared on the streets of Arauquita, a town not far from the meeting.

Catch Me if You Can

While the ELN has maintained some presence in Venezuela since the 1980s, it has steadily strengthened its ties to official and criminal actors in that country, especially in recent years.

InSight Crime has reported on how the ELN has acted as an extension of the Venezuelan State in parts of the country, including enforcing control of criminal activities, fighting rival groups and ensuring authorities get a cut of criminal economies, such as illegal mining.

Venezuela has also become more than a refuge for the ELN. There, the criminal group is now firmly entrenched, drawing manpower and profiting from drug trafficking, illegal mining and other activities.

With the ELN ostensibly an ally of the Venezuelan government, it can use territory and resources there to plan actions, train members and grow stronger without the fear of being attacked by security forces, as in Colombia. This is only reinforced by its control of the border crossings between the two countries, which members can largely do at will.

While the group’s strength in Venezuela grows, its power in Colombia does as well. The range and intensity of the recent armed strike, especially when compared to the one in 2020, show how the ELN has only increased its criminal empire in the country where it was born.

This article generously shared by Insight Crime. The original can be read here.

See also: 13 Police Injured In Cali Bombing, ELN Claims Responsibility

Finance Colombia’s executive editor Loren Moss was able to connect with Trejo to discuss Antioquia’s growth and resiliency during the pandemic, also exploring the role of Colombia’s departmental government (Colombia has departments instead of states or provinces) in investment promotion along with the municipal agencies like ACI Medellín, and the national agencies like ProColombia.

Finance Colombia: I want to ask you about the current status of Antioquia, how are we doing after a year of pandemic? Antioquia has a very diverse economy, obviously there is a lot of activity in the agricultural and industrial area, but it’s also a department that has tourism and events, large events. So my question is, how do you see the entire economic state of Antioquia and in which sectors has it affected the economy the most? But before that I ask you to explain your role and what your responsibilities are in the government, so that people understand what Daniela Trejo is doing in Antioquia.

Daniela Trejo Rojas: First of all, let me introduce myself. I am Daniela Trejo, the new secretary of economic development, innovation and new economies of the department of Antioquia. Previously I had been working as director of internationalization and this brings me new challenges, thinking first of all about employment. Employment is like the pain and the cut off of everything that this secretary does, and it’s to take care of and protect the business fabric, I will tell you a little by way of context, Antioquia is the second largest population conglomerate and economy of Colombia.

Here we speak very well of businesspeople and others. Whenever we talk about Antioquia one thinks of Medellín and then in Valle de Aburrá (Aburrá Valley, where Medellín is situated). In Valle de Aburrá there are 10 municipalities that make it up, but in the department, there are 125 municipalities. We are the department of Antioquia and of those 125 in Medellín and in the Aburra Valley, in these 10 municipalities we have very important companies such as Familia, Grupo Argos, Grupo Éxito, Grupo BIOS, Bancolombia, Suramericana, which are the large holding companies of Colombia, which are in the stock market and that for us they are all a source of pride because they represent that business fabric and that productive specialization of the department.

Antioquia is home to several of Latin America’s most important multinational enterprises.

It’s convenient to tell you that COVID hit us very hard. Last year we closed with a loss of approximately 130,000 jobs. The main economy of Antioquia is in the services sector, in the commerce sector, of course they were very affected sectors and that was largely due to those strict closures that we had in the first three months of the pandemic, where we doubled the unemployment we had, in December of last year we had a recovery of 150,000 jobs and we closed the year with a loss of 130,000. This year we have that goal, and it’s to recover 100,000 jobs, but that is not a goal for the department of Antioquia alone, it’s a goal that we have with other sectors such as construction, services and manufacturing, and merchants. We know that we have to come together to move the department forward.

Regarding the context for those who haven’t traveled and for those who don’t know either Colombia or Antioquia, we are divided into 9 subregions. In those 9 subregions we have the Aburra Valley, and here we have a whole ecosystem of innovation, for us this is a source of pride. We have Ruta-N and we have many entrepreneurs and enterprises that are publishing everything; creative industries and business ventures, technology and added value, but we have other subregions, all very different with a diversity of climates, with a diversity of soils, and that has allowed us to specialize. If we go north, we find ourselves in Urabá where we have access to the sea. In Urabá we have an important logistical location for the tertiary economy and from there 40% of the bananas and plantains that the country exports go out.

But if we go down a little bit, we get to the southwest where the specialties are coffees and citrus fruits. Today we are finding very specialized markets in Europe & Asia for our coffees, not only exporting them as commodity coffees, green coffee but already specialized coffees. We have a region in the North where dairy and textiles are also very significant. We have of course historical knowledge in mining, especially the Mid-Magdalena region and there we already have foreign companies that are in the exploration stage.

We have eastern Antioquia where our José María Córdova international airport is located, there we also find very diverse soil and we are promoting all the exploration in medicinal Cannabis, but also the Hass avocado, passionflower, mango, vegetables. This is how our territory is made up, we also have a sub-region that I forgot, the Occident of Antioquia. From the Occident of Antioquia, we have very agricultural locations and we also have a mining presence so we think of it as an important logistics corridor for the development that we are going to have in Urabá.

That is a context for you to understand that Antioquia has a multiplicity of soils and territories, however, what contributes the most to the Antioquia team is trade, manufacturing and construction, those are the factors that contribute the most and that were most affected in the pandemic.

Finance Colombia: Well speaking of the Occident of Antioquia, they are building the 4G highway projects and they are also building the Antioquia port. When do you plan to finish all this? If I understand correctly, you are going to start making a 4 lane highway from Las Palmas to El Tablazo, near the José Maria Cordova international airport (serving Medellín), a project that will be carried out for 36 months under construction by the firm Conconcreto. I remember 6 years ago when Rionegro was a rural town, and Rionegro is a suburb now, as Envigado was before. It’s how Las Palmas was 10 years ago, it’s already Rionegro, they are expanding the roads into double lanes each way, and I imagine that La Ceja and El Carmen de Viboral will be the next. But speaking of that, with so much growth, when do you think the 4G projects and the port of Antioquia will be finished? How is that going? And what changes do you hope these development projects will bring to the regional economy?

Daniela Trejo Rojas: We have a series of infrastructure projects, some more representative than others, of course betting on the regions where we see that there is significant potential. The Department of Antioquia is very focused on Urabá trying to strengthen the port that we already have there. These are projects that are medium-term, but committing to a special date is difficult because each of the projects has a trajectory and has a dynamic, but we hope in three years to be able to have the roads and also the port developments in Urabá, that will allow us to have competitive advantages between Antioquia and other departments, we will be much closer as a port than other departments that have a large flow of merchandise and that today they are leaving through Barranquilla, they are leaving through Cartagena and that they will be able to pass through Antioquia and have to close all the commercialization there.

With Viva Air announcing Medellin as its new international hub, Antioquia can expect nonstop connectivity throughout North America, South America, and Europe.

So for us that also implies changing the locations of the soil a bit, going from having almost concentrated the spirit of Urabá in the production and commercialization of plantain, banana, pineapple and passion fruit, also moving to products transformed with high added value that also induce us to compete with other markets, but you know that port developments also bring social and cultural impact.

You were asking me about the Orient of Antioquia around Llanogrande: the San Nicolás Valley implies a challenge and immense potential for us. Today we can say that they are two valleys that are connected, it’s even very difficult to determine when Envigado ends and when I am in La Ceja, or when Envigado ends and I am already in Rionegro through the same infrastructure. Before it was very easy because you could notice the change in the roads and lighting, and today you go from Rionegro to La Ceja and find more dynamic restaurants, hotels and others, so we can say that they are two valleys that are completely established, and that has also allowed us to have developments such as  the Orient of Antioquia Tunnel that connects us easily between the two valleys, and allows us to have more interaction and that is finally competitiveness for the department, that I can land in Rionegro and in 15 minutes I can be in Medellín, that increases the competitiveness that we have as a territory. After this year of pandemic, we saw that people are leaving Medellín to live in  the Orient of Antioquia, people are located in Llanogrande, in La Ceja, in El Carmen, in El Retiro and there is a real estate pressure that for the mayors has been a bit complex to handle. People are already migrating to  the Orient of Antioquia, to the entire San Nicolás Valley and this also brings to mind some adversities in infrastructure and waste collection, and all the solid waste management is very important.

Also in the same ecosystem, we forget that there are territories that don’t have very good networks of public services, that don’t have good drinking water networks, we still find many of those municipalities that their villages have aqueducts that have been built by the communities themselves and that they themselves administer. Today that means that we are arriving there with demands that the territory is not very prepared to handle. It’s important not only with roads, in  the Orient of Antioquia we from the department have an important position especially in Rionegro, we also have the decentralization of innovation centers where we are talking with the Orient of Antioquia’s chamber of commerce, where we are talking with businessmen from  the Orient of Antioquia and we have a special project that is  the Orient of Antioquia’s airport city, thinking towards the future and taking advantage of the free zone that we already have there.

In the future we are going to start building the second most important complex in Colombia, today El Dorado (Bogotá’s international airport) is not enough, it’s the Bogotá airport, today it doesn’t provide for the maintenance, spare parts and others of its aircraft, and we are understanding that the transport and logistics sector is leaving to migrate to eastern Antioquia, that implies that we have to help young people think about the areas in which they want to work, what kind of professions and trades we need to promote in  the Orient of Antioquia because if the demand reaches us and we don’t have someone to fill it, it would be a problem, but that cannot be solved overnight, that has to be with enough time, so that is why we are preparing. But if we envision where the urban growth is and the economic development of the department, surely the answer is: towards  the Orient of Antioquia and towards Urabá.

Finance Colombia: Yes, I was at an event with the mayor of Medellín and the president of Viva Air and they announced that they are going to name Rionegro as the hub and their vision is that they have about 20 planes already in the factory being built, and it’s funny because like when they already have 20 planes on order, and they say their long-term vision is to connect—basically they are doing what COPA (Copa Airlines) did with Tocumen in Panama, that’s what they want to do with Medellín, and connect, in the words of the president of Viva Air, from Buenos Aires to New York all with connectivity in Medellín. I imagine that they are going to have to build or expand the airport again, they just finished renovating the José María Córdova airport, but I imagine they will have to expand it more, I also hear about making a second runway. I don’t see where; I imagine they know how to do that.

What can you tell me? Because I have also heard rumors of making more airports, for example in the Occident of Antioquia, since Santa Fe de Antioquia is a very touristy area, at least they are expanding the highway, but beyond Santa Fe and San Jerónimo, there is also a lot of activity in Buriticá, with 4G highways that are already under construction, are there current plans? I understand that you are not Secretary of Transportation but if there is something you can tell me about plans to expand the roads?

Daniela Trejo Rojas: Answering you very precisely if we are now promoting developments other than our José María Córdova international airport? No, we have to go step by step, the Orient of Antioquia still has a lot of capacity, since we don’t have overcrowding. The demand that the airport has, we have where to grow, and we are also betting that free zones are a tool for economic development. They can bring foreign direct investment, we don’t see that we still have to bet on airport issues in another region other than the Orient of Antioquia so that it becomes very strong, but speaking of competitiveness, we have all the rehabilitation of the railway system, which is a nice project that is led by the department through the Antioquia railway.

Where many of the sections of the Antioquia railway will be rehabilitated, which was liquidated in 1956 and some sections were left without use, absolutely without use. Today we see all the potential for them to be rehabilitated, many of these sections are in feasibility, others are in pre-feasibility, and in particular there is one that I want to tell you about, which is the one that goes from Barbosa to Puerto Berrio, all of the Rio Magdalena to Medellín.

Antioquia intends to rebuild its railway network.

In that section, today there is a national government plan to rehabilitate the navigability of the Magdalena River, this river is one of the arteries of the country, it crosses all the states, including Antioquia, and in Puerto Berrio there are plans to have a multimodal port that we allow the loading and unloading of maritime merchandise and connect it with the railway section between Barbosa & Puerto Berrio, especially we have the garbage ecosystem, almost all the waste and garbage collection of the Aburra Valley goes to this side of the department of Antioquia, and in the garbage we see a potential for a circular economy and green business.

We think this section of the railway in one day can transport people and in others, for example at night, it can transport garbage, but it’s not only transportation but also to achieve that garbage to complete a cycle, that we call green business and circular economy, and that we can see value in the management of that garbage. It’s a project that today is ahead of schedule in its completion, since last year the feasibility of the project was verified and it’s a work that we hope has already been very viable in that administration. We also have other sections that are being rehabilitated, among that we have the section of the “Tren del Rio,” it’s expected that we will have the railway crossing the Aburra Valley, that project is also in pre-feasibility, and there is a section that goes to Urabá, inclusive. This is the section that is more in its infancy, but it’s expected that we will achieve rail connectivity throughout the entire department. Previously we had it, 60 years ago we had it and today we see the potential of having a multimodal plate, also of lowering the load a little off our roads so that they are more efficient, and that we can also take advantage of the Magdalena River and be able to have loading and unloading of multimodal merchandise in this important area in Puerto del Rio.

I don’t know if you knew that in the 1920s all merchandise taken out from Antioquia was by mule, they had 1 or 2 days of travel crossing mountains to go down to the middle Magdalena (river) and arrive especially at Cisneros, in Cisneros the order was made and the Magdalena was crossed until reaching Puerto Berrio, and in Puerto Berrio the merchandise left to Barranquilla. In Barranquilla there were all the ships with international destinations, including those that were leaving Antioquia and if they wanted to go to Europe they had to go to New York and from New York on to Europe.

That is to say that ancestrally there were already some roads, this is very beautiful, in its time Puerto del Rio was a point of arrival for artists, for tourism it’s spectacular. You started the conversation with tourism and I have not mentioned much about that, and we have some municipalities with a history, still with that railway and with those spectacular railway stations, preserved, with still very light infrastructures that have allowed nature to be preserved. Today ecotourism is important in Antioquia, bird watching and being able to enjoy nature today is one of the great bets we have in the department This is especially speaking of infrastructure other than road and airport infrastructure.

Finance Colombia: Yes, that is something I remember my first time in Colombia almost 20 years ago, that was something very curious for me, that there are no trains. One thing that impacts me, still the case but much better now, is that Colombia has always been very regional, as you mentioned there was no transportation to go to Bogotá or Medellín before modern times. I talked to the president of Tecnoglass and he commented on how expensive it is to transport materials within Colombia, due to lack of infrastructure. They are in Barranquilla because that is where the port is, they export a lot of merchandise. Colombia now is changing a lot, before it was not a great force in exporting, perhaps a little coffee, and before,  textiles, so that seems great to me, mainly because of the industry that can grow by having railways but also for example in the tourism sector.

In Bogotá I took the tourist train to go from Bogotá to Cajicá and Zipaquirá, in this case it would be longer distances. I imagine it is like taking a train from here to Puerto Berrio, but you are there near Hacienda Napoles and so many things of nature that can be seen, right? I find it very interesting that the railway system can be used not only to transport people and make more connectivity not only with the Magdalena River, but there can also be access to Bogotá and that tourist part of western Antioquia, far west near the Magdalena River, and also connecting with Santander and towards Bucaramanga and those areas because they also connect with the Magdalena River.

Speaking of which, because you mentioned Urabá, are there tax incentives? I know that here we have the free zone, here nearby if I understand correctly there are three free zones in Antioquia, but what incentives are there? Because in Urabá we are already going to have the port, but that area has been an area to some extent forgotten, that is to say, much development is lacking, there is still opportunity and we cannot complain about what happened in history, but currently there is a lot of development that is missing. Are there incentives to encourage or promote investment and development in the north of Antioquia? Speaking more specifically after the mountains, speaking of the coastal plain there in Urabá.

Daniela Trejo Rojas: Well I’ll tell you, we have a particularity as a department and that is that after the signing of the peace process, the national government came up with a strategy called ZOMAC and PDET regions that consists of those municipalities and the most affected areas by the armed conflict and where for more than 10 years we have been investing in changing the productive vocation of the soil, trying to replace illicit crops. Especially in Antioquia we have done it with coffee and cocoa, but also with other projects, fish farming and beekeeping projects.

We in Antioquia have a corridor where we have four subregions where we can find 55 ZOMAC, areas that were declared the most affected by the armed conflict, and 24 PDET municipalities, that in other words is a strategy where the government says what we can do with these territories, How can I change the productive vocation to encourage the establishment of local and foreign companies so that we can generate the different dynamics of the economy, promote development in another way, and this is often not so easy. It is not easy to simply make a refund, but who am I selling to? How do I trade? How do I inject technology and innovation into it? Sometimes very complex and important investments are required. We have those municipalities in Antioquia, we have four sub-regions, among them is Urabá that we have mentioned so much, we also have municipalities in the north, in the northeast and in Bajo Cauca, almost all the municipalities or areas that are there as most affected are in those four subregions that if you see them on the map, it is as if they formed a corridor that weaves through Urabá.

There the national government through its agency for the renewal of the territory implements the PDET strategy along with tax incentives, that is: “how do I make a businessman decide to invest in Mutatá, in Caucasia, in Vegachí, in El Bagre,” and not in the Orient of Antioquia where the port, where the free zones are located? So special tax incentives are created both in income tax and in industry and commerce. We also have slightly lighter incentives where entrepreneurs get a very important discount. I am going to tell you about some municipalities:  Caucasia, Tarazá, Puerto Nare, Puerto Berrio, Támesis, Vegachí, Santa Fe de Antioquia are municipalities that have very good tax incentives, they are ZOMAC, and they are a little more distributed throughout the territory. The PDETs are concentrated in this corridor that runs from the northeast, Bajo Cauca and that ends in Urabá. There we have proper incentives in industry with trade discounts, notices and boards, and we have three permanent free zones, we have one in Apartado, Urabá, we have one in  the Orient of Antioquia in Rionegro, and we have one in Caldas, in the Aburra Valley (north of Medellín) These are the strips, for us they are the poles of development and commercial exchange where businesspeople have some discounts, where they have tax extensions to bring inputs and to export. Those free zones still have a lot of potential. We see that entrepreneurs are a bit fearful, but it has become a hub for the development of suppliers where within the free zone where, for example, as a businessperson I occupy the textile space, I can find someone who brings me the fabrics, who brings me the threads, all the spare parts for the machines and that way I can export and import more easily and obviously benefit from important incentives.

Today we are looking to have more expansion of these zones, so they don’t remain only in the special areas. We also seek to have special free zones…today for example in Guarné they already have their free zone, companies are already seeking to participate, and the legislation is new, “fresh from the oven.” We spent more than six months reviewing it, sending comments to the ministry, and they shared it just 15 days ago. It’s just published, it is a strategy of the national government to be able to attract investments directly so that they can install themselves in those territories and see that for many years they will have significant discounts in sales, commerce, notices and boards, among others.

Now that you mentioned the textile sector, we in Antioquia historically have an important vocation in the textile area. In the 60s we had the largest companies in the Aburra Valley installed in Itagüí and in Medellín, today we see that it is a sector that continues to grow, and which has been growing by 2.4% a year. Today it represents around 18,000 companies and 117,000 jobs generated. This is according to the chamber of commerce (so the statistics are) formal, the legalized business. Outside of this. the number must be doubled (due to the informal economy) but the numbers that I give you are those that we have in the chamber of commerce.

The textile sector continues to have gigantic potential, and we have been promoting it. From the department of Antioquia, we have been betting on it because we know that there is ancestral knowledge that has passed from generation to generation and that moves local economies and especially economies of gender. When we go to the municipalities, we find that those clothing and fashion companies are led by women and this helps us to boost local economies. It’s another sector that I did not make much mention of, but I would not want to let it pass because it is a sector that we have been betting on and that we see that there are export opportunities especially to the United States. That even with the pandemic, a business line was developed of supplies and personal protective equipment. Last year we had four companies within the department that did export, especially masks to the United States, and this is important because it shows the resilience of entrepreneurs to take advantage of the difficulty of a pandemic and turn it into an opportunity to transfer it to their own business production line. So Loren, this is a summary of what we have been doing, of these productive bets, of those large infrastructure projects; not only roads but also railways, ports in Urabá and the job we have in the Orient of Antioquia, Airport city. If you are living in the Orient of Antioquia, you are going to see the transformation that it will have in 5 years. It will be an impressive thing because we know that it is the “second story” of Medellín and the Aburrá Valley. We want to thank you for the space, for opening the space in your agenda that we had postponed many times, thank you for that and that it is not the first and the last time.

Finance Colombia: Yes, of course, one last question and I also want to give you space if there is a subject or a topic that I forgot to ask you, I also want to give you the opportunity to mention if there is any news from the government but my last question is how does the government of Antioquia work and collaborate with other actors in the development of the economy?

Daniela Trejo Rojas: Last year was a very interesting year for us from the department’s perspective because our development plan set goals for this secretariat which were very different from the ones they had been working on before. We have a direction that is the focus on internationalization that it had been focusing its efforts on international cooperation. The United 2020-2023 development plan presents us with three other challenges: The promotion of exports, the attraction of direct foreign investment and the promotion of the territory, which are topics of the focus for what ACI Medellín has been doing and also what the national government does for ProColombia.

Antioquia has one of Colombia’s most diverse economies.

This forces us to open our gaze towards the department and understand that when we talk about internationalization it is not only international cooperation but also that export issues are fundamental, to enable, for example, competitive infrastructures. They are fundamental for the internationalization of companies, but also to promote the territory. Who more than we who know the municipalities, who speak with the mayors, can promote the territory and attract investors to settle here? Since last year we began to work hand in hand with ACI and with other organizations, including ProColombia of the national government, the ACI has two foci: the attraction of foreign investment and also international cooperation. They do not work in the export line, although I think they are going to start doing it because we are already seeing that need. They are very focused on Medellín and Valle de Aburra, but the alliance we made last year for the internationalization of the territory put a challenge on us that is to always work with the gaze of both a city and region.

I, as an Antioquian, I tell them: I enjoy all the effort they have made in Medellín to position the city, but it is not a lie that the companies that are in Antioquia today have their production outside the Valley of Aburra. They cooperate, but outside of the Aburra Valley, so there is a connection that is impossible to separate and makes our relationship necessary, since to us as a team and as the manager put us a challenge and that is that we have to do it together, territorial promotion: see what the productive stakes are, that Medellín is not walking on the one hand and I on the other, but that it is a regional & city setting.

Since last year we signed an agreement outside the internationalization alliance, we have been doing it, the work is extremelyhand-in-hand and not only with the city-region but also with the national government through ProColombia because there are many promotion issues where they are the experts, where they have regional alliances in other countries then we know that it is a matter of working together. For you to understand a little, Antioquia has four purposes from our secretary: international operation, attracting investment, promoting the territory and promoting exports. The ACI complements a lot in that purpose and ProColombia helps us with the issue of exports and territorial promotion, that is the job. We even have a table that is the internationalization table where we are with other entities such as ProAntioquia, the chamber of commerce in Medellín for Antioquia, talking about the issues and having a common discourse and narrative that is very important.

Finance Colombia: I think this will be the first meeting between us and to see how we can support you in your missions, Daniela Trejo, thank you very much for your time.

Daniela Trejo Rojas: Many thanks Loren, see you soon.

Images courtesy ACI Medellín

• In Soledad, Atlántico a large industrial suburb south of Barranquilla, prosecutors are investigating accusations of organized vote buying. In several points throughout the city, witnesses observed a crowd of people demanding payment for “logistical services” (vote buying) for several candidates.

The prosecutors say they have videos, testimony and audio that details the charges, and will announce further action soon.

Barranquilla’s Ernesto Cortissoz international airport (BAQ) is located on the south side of Soledad.

• Agents of Colombia’s Cuerpo Técnico de Investigación (CTI), somewhat analogous to the FBI in the United States, captured in the city of Ibagué, the outgoing mayor of the town of Valle de San Juan, Tolima, Héctor Orlando Padilla Barragán for the crime of aggravated conspiracy, and voter corruption.

According to the Attorney General, between July and October of this year, the former mayor conspired with the new mayor elect Daniel Ricardo García Castillo to steal the election for mayor and for several city council seats.

Prosecutors indicate that the suspects gave away construction material, water tanks, and cash in exchange for votes in favor of Garcia Castillo. Further, the suspects are accused of using government vehicles to deliver vote-buying contraband.

On October 26, the mayor elect was captured and charged. Garcia Castilla remains in jail awaiting trial.

• The mayor of El Paso, Cesar, Hidalfo Rafael De La Cruz Ortiz, and his wife Neyruth Diurbis Murgas Fuentes were captured for voter corruption and voter intimidation. Charges indicate that the mayor threatened to fire 4 municipal employees if they did not support his chosen candidates. Charges further state he transferred employees, traded votes for employment, and threatened contractors with cancellation of contracts. De La Cruz is charged with offering over 2 million pesos in exchange for votes.

In the course of the investigation, it was established that Mrs. Murgas Fuentes allegedly prepared a survey of voters in the hospital of the municipality, in such a way that whoever did not favor her interests in the elections could lose his or her position.

Mrs. Murgas also is alleged to have threatened the removal of older adults from a social program should they not cooperate.

The investigators have documented meetings in which the mayor warned contractors that they must support his candidate, and even forced them to do political work, under penalty of being fired.

• In El Rosario, Nariño, mayoral candidates Lauro Nel Arturo Guerrero of the Conservative Party and Alberto Folleco Eraso of the Radical Change Party, along with accomplice Mariela Castro Guerrero were captured for vote buying, and massive operations to have voters participate in elections away from their residences.

Prosecutors established that both candidates hired buses and transported busloads of voters in from different cities to change their céduias (ID cards, and registration) to El Rosario, Nariño, despite having no residency or connection to the municipality.

The corrupt candidates allegedly paid from $50,000 to $500,000 pesos, promised after voting, plus transportation, food and lodging. Voters were also offered zinc tiles, plumbing, cement, and bricks, as well as contracts with the administration should their candidate be elected.

• In San Onofre, Sucre, Silgado Tehran Oscar Segundo was captured with 294 million pesos, and charged with money laundering.
• Jhon Marlon Gómez Rojas was captured in Sucre with 78 million pesos.
• Cristian Dario Burgos Galván was captured in Moñitos, Córdoba with 24 million pesos.
• In the village of El Rosario, Nariño, city council candidate Jesús Gilder Ojeda accepted charges of voter registration fraud.
• Celso Jiménez Erazo, candidate for city council of San Benito Abad, Sucre was charged with voter corruption.
• In Atlántico department, a woman was captured with $1,170,000 Colombian Pesos in cash, and a list of voters and cédulas. According to the document, each voter was paid $50,000 pesos.
• In a Bolivar department polling station, a person was captured with 17 envelopes, each holding $50,000 pesos.
• In Montería, Córdova, two people were captured with gift certificates used to exchange goods for votes.
• Outside of El Bagre, Antioquia, a city council candidate was captured with $620,000 pesos in cash, and his own electoral propaganda.
• In El Piñon, Magdalena, a person was captured with four marked ballots. Additional reports of ballot theft were reported in San Zenón and Pijiño.
• Elsewhere in Magdalena, a department that has suffered voter corruption, extortion and organized crime, authorities captured 58 people for crimes such as conspiracy, extortion, theft, attempted murder, public corruption, domestic violence, and food assistance theft. Two people who were thought dead or missing showed up to vote.
• The prosecutors state that more than $400 million pesos have been seized, destined for electoral corruption.
• 249 complaints of voter registration fraud have been received.
• 247 complaints of voter corruption (typically vote-buying) have been received.
• 29 complaints of suffrage restriction (voter intimidation) have been received.
• 70 complaints of illegal electoral activity (such as campaigning) by public officials have been received.
• 44 complaints of illegal election of candidates have been received.

The Ricardo González indigenous rural school, delivered February 14, is composed of three circular wooden tambo-type modules. Of these, two are equipped for multi-functional classrooms and one for the kitchen, dining room and bathrooms for children. Traditions, customs, symbols and beliefs of the indigenous ethnic group were incorporated into its construction.

The indigenous rural school La Union was delivered March 25, in a special ceremony at 10:00 am, within the Aldeas program, thanks to an inter-administrative association agreement with municipalities of Pueblorrico, Ciudad Bolívar, Murindó, Urrao and El Bagre

Though constructed in traditional Tambo styles with indigenous input, the structures are structurally & mechanically modern. (Photos courtesy of EPM)

With a total investment of $ 179 million pesos (approx. $550,000 USD), these are the 2nd and 3^rd of 10 indigenous schools being constructed by the EPM Aldeas program, which incorporates mature wood from the forest plantations located around EPM hydroelectric reservoirs, to develop sustainable infrastructure that improves the quality of life of vulnerable communities in the region.

Aldeas (meaning ‘villages’) is a sustainability initiative of EPM, in which which the wood from late-stage lifecycle trees is periodically harvested from the more than 4,000 hectares (9,900 acres) of forest plantations that the company has around its reservoirs, to return social value through offering a portfolio of construction solutions for communities and territories with a high degree of socio-economic vulnerability and living in areas where EPM is present or builds and operates its energy infrastructure projects.

Between 2011 and 2018, the Aldeas program delivered 1,990 homes, benefiting 10,000 people in 23 municipalities of Antioquia, making the dream of owning or improving their homes come true. Aldeas is a program of environmental and social management for sustainable construction in wood, which includes infrastructure, social and community equipment (environmental classrooms, community halls, schools, playgrounds), tourist infrastructure and fencing.

The 10 indigenous schools are developed thanks to the inter-administrative association agreement between the Indigenous Management Agency of Antioquia, the Departmental Education Secretariat, EPM (Empresas Públicas de Medellín) and the towns of Ciudad Bolivar, Pueblorrico, Murindó, Urrao, Coredo and Bachidubi (municipality of Murindó), Caliche and Penderisco (municipality of Urrao), Hermeregildo Chakiama (municipality of Ciudad Bolívar), Bernardino Panchi (municipality Pueblorrico), Shoibadó (municipality El Bagre), Dojura (Chigorodó municipality), El Polvillo (San Pedro de Urabá) and El Delirio (Caucasia), and El Bagre, in order to “join forces” for the improvement of the quality of life of the indigenous communities within the framework of the Aldeas program for the department of Antioquia.

In addition to the inter-administrative association agreement, the municipalities of Chigorodó, San Pedro de Urabá and Caucasia were also added.

The indigenous schools are distributed throughout Antioquia, as follows:

• Two in the municipality of Murindó (Coredo and Bachidubi communities)
• Two in the municipality of Urrao (Caliche and Penderisco communities)
• One in the municipality of Ciudad Bolívar (community Hermeregildo Chakiama, the Ricardo González school)
• One in the municipality of Pueblorrico (Bernardino Panchi community, La Unión school)
• One in the municipality of El Bagre (indigenous community of Shoibadó, the San Pedro El Puerto school)
• One in the municipality of Chigorodó (Dojura)
• One in the municipality of San Pedro de Urabá (El Polvillo)
• One in the municipality of Caucasia (El Delirio)

The official ceremony and ribbon cutting for the Ciudad Bolivar school took place on February 14 and was attended by the Governor Luis Pérez Gutierrez of the department of Antioquia, Indigenous reserve Governor Albeiro Arcila, the Mayor of Ciudad Bolívar, Antonio Castaño, Ana Milena Joya Camacho, EPM’s Environmental & Social Affairs Manager, and the Indigenous Affairs Manager of Antioquia, Llanedt Rosa Martínez Ruiz.

The financial aspects of this agreement amount to $ 1,719,987,500 COP ($541,142 USD), of which EPM contributes $579,987,500 COP total: $335,000,000 COP cash, $214,987,500 COP in-kind (declared value of the approximately 945 tons of wood), and $30,000,000 COP worth of professional labor in the architectural and design work necessary for the construction of schools.