According to US authorities “Saab is charged with laundering the proceeds of violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) in connection with a scheme to pay bribes to take advantage of Venezuela’s government-controlled exchange rate.”

Saab is accused of siphoning around $350 million USD out of Venezuela and into overseas accounts via the US. The US also alleges Saab was behind a corruption network involving a government-subsidized food program called CLAP that allowed Maduro and his allies to steal millions of dollars.

Saab faces money laundering and fraud charges in his native Colombia as well. According to reports by the the Colombian publication El Espectador, Colombia’s prosecutors opened a case against Saab immediately after his arrest in Cape Verde.

“According to the investigative body, Saab would have resorted to multiple maneuvers to evade tax and customs responsibilities, and give the appearance of legality to an irregular scheme of exports and imports, especially through its company Shatex S.A., which for years was dedicated to the export of textiles and construction materials.

Among the multiple irregularities, it was found that the company registered an economic growth of 923% in 2007, unusual growth if one takes into account that between 2004 and 2006 the company actually lost money and revenues fell by 33%. Shatex S.A. ceased operations in 2010 but in the following years, supposedly made exports, conducted sales and purchase operations, and in 2011 it channeled the flow of more than $2 billion COP abroad through the Colombian exchange system”, reads the report.

Colombian President Iván Duque lauded the extradition of Saab, calling it a “triumph in the fight against drug trafficking, money laundering and corruption led by the dictatorship of Nicolás Maduro.”

Saab, a 49-year old Colombian national was born in Barranquilla, son of a Lebanese migrant. Saab was arrested in June 2020 when his plane stopped to refuel in Cape Verde on the way to Iran. The arrest was followed by a lengthy legal battle as the United States has no extradition treaty with Cape Verde and Saab, who also holds Venezuelan citizenship, was given diplomatic coverage by the Maduro government after the arrest.

Saab had also been sanctioned in the past by the Trump administration for allegedly utilizing a network of shell companies spanning the globe, in the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Hong Kong, Panama, Colombia and Mexico, to hide huge profits from overvalued food contracts obtained through bribes and kickbacks.

Venezuelan authorities have called the US charges politically motivated. The government of the South American nation, accused the United States of kidnapping Saab, whom they describe as a diplomatic envoy in a mission to Iran to negotiate supplies of fuel and food that have been interrupted by U.S. sanctions.

Venezuela’s government said Saturday it would halt the Mexico-based negotiations with the opposition in retaliation for the extradition. Nicolás Maduro had named Saab as a member of its negotiating team in these talks, which began in September.

Venezuelan authorities also re-apprehended six oil executives, including five American citizens, who had been under house arrest. The executives worked for Citgo Petroleum, a Houston-based subsidiary of the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA. They were arrested in 2017 on embezzlement charges stemming from a never-executed proposal to refinance some $4 billion in CITGO bonds by offering a 50% stake in the company as collateral. Last year, they were sentenced to between 8 and 13 years in prison.

On May of this year, the so-called “CITGO 6” were released to house arrest in an apparent gesture of goodwill to the Biden administration. The US State Department denounced the imprisonment of “six wrongfully detained Americans in Venezuela” and called for their release.

According to court papers filed November 1^st, US prosecutors have agreed to dismiss almost all of the lengthy indictment against Alex Saab as part of a secret deal made with Cape Verde to gain his extradition to the United States. However, Saab still faces up to 20 years in prison on the lone remaining money-laundering charge. After an initial court appearance on October 18, Saab is now set to appear for his arraignment date in federal court on November 15.

Ecopetrol reports sales down 23.6% year-on-year for the 4^th quarter of 2020, to 14,190 trillion Colombian pesos, or 3.95 billion USD. Full year sales are down 29.4% to 13.8 billion. The company was able to report net income of 1.7 trillion pesos, or $471 million USD.

The financial summary income statement follows below

“2020 was a challenging year for the industry, due to the collapse in oil prices stemming from the oversupply caused by disagreements within OPEC+ and later due to the challenges associated with the Covid-19 pandemic. This pandemic was a health emergency at global and local level that was accompanied by a sharp contraction in demand for crude oil and products with multiple social and economic challenges,” said Ecopetrol CEO Felipe Bayón Pardo (above).

Ecopetrol was able to face this unprecedented challenge demonstrating its resilience and capacity to adapt to an adverse and volatile environment, always prioritizing life and the care of our employees.”

“Our financial results prove it: we closed the year with a COP 16.8 trillion EBITDA and net income of COP 1.7 trillion, being Ecopetrol one of the few companies of the global oil industry with profit for the year. The crisis response plan, which assured operational continuity and led to decisive interventions in costs, prioritization of investments, maximizing revenue and timely financing, allowed to benefit from the recovery of supply and demand of crude oil worldwide in the second half of the year. Thus, leveraged in the business strategy of the Ecopetrol Group (EG) focused on diversifying export destinations and anticipating sales of our crude, we managed to achieve recuperation of realization prices in our export portfolio, which increased 6% between the Q3 and Q4 2020, from 38.4 USD/bl to 40.7 USD/bl.,” Bayón continued.

Some investors fear that Ecopetrol is being pressured by the cash strapped Colombian government to purchase ISA, benefitting the Duque administration at the expense of investors. Bayón defends the pending purchase saying: “The eventual acquisition of the stake in ISA responds to Ecopetrol’s strategic interest of entering into new businesses aligned with the opportunities for electrification and decarbonization, dictated by the energy transition, and which in turn leverage the Group’s profitable growth and improve its business risk profile.”

Bayón’s full comments follow:

2020 was a challenging year for the industry, due to the collapse in oil prices stemming from the oversupply caused by disagreements within OPEC+ and later due to the challenges associated with the Covid-19 pandemic. This pandemic was a health emergency at global and local level that was accompanied by a sharp contraction in demand for crude oil and products with multiple social and economic challenges.

Ecopetrol was able to face this unprecedented challenge demonstrating its resilience and capacity to adapt to an adverse and volatile environment, always prioritizing life and the care of our employees.

Our financial results prove it: we closed the year with a COP 16.8 trillion EBITDA and net income of COP 1.7 trillion, being Ecopetrol one of the few companies of the global oil industry with profit for the year. The crisis response plan, which assured operational continuity and led to decisive interventions in costs, prioritization of investments, maximizing revenue and timely financing, allowed to benefit from the recovery of supply and demand of crude oil worldwide in the second half of the year. Thus, leveraged in the business strategy of the Ecopetrol Group (EG) focused on diversifying export destinations and anticipating sales of our crude, we managed to achieve recuperation of realization prices in our export portfolio, which increased 6% between the Q3 and Q4 2020, from 38.4 USD/bl to 40.7 USD/bl.

Ecopetrol conducted a disciplined monitoring on its costs and expenses, achieving a balance between optimizations and the availability of resources to guarantee a safe and reliable reactivation of the operation. Thus, the total unit cost for the year 2020 was close to 27 USD/bl, a 23% decrease as compared to the previous year, and cost savings of around COP 700 billion.

In the middle of this challenging environment, during 2020 Ecopetrol Group’s maintained a steadfast commitment to the well-being of Colombians and the strengthening of the local economy, in the framework of the health emergency caused by COVID-19. Over COP 88 billion were committed through our social investment program “Apoyo País” (Countrywide Support), of which we allocated 86% as of year-end, benefiting about 252,000 families and 250 institutions. We have supported the strengthening of the health system with medical equipment, personal protection and cleaning items; we have delivered humanitarian and solidarity aid at the national level, promoted innovation and research initiatives and provided technological support to the National Government. Furthermore, Ecopetrol Group has joined Governmental programs such as “Comparto mi Energía” (Sharing my Energy) and “Ayudar nos hace bien” (Helping does us good). Similarly, the Group designed and implemented different commercial flexibility and liquidity programs for suppliers and customers.

Reserves balance reached 1,770 million barrels of oil equivalent (mboe) reflecting a 6.5% reduction, a lower outcome than the initial forecast of a decrease in the range of 15% to 20%, due to fall in prices and less activity during the period. The result reflects the addition of new drilling projects, positive revisions due to good performance in production, recovery, and the optimization of technical-economic variables.  Gas reserves represented 29% of the total balance.

In exploration, Ecopetrol completed the drilling of 18 wells, 3 of which were successful, 9 ended the year under evaluation and 6 were dry. The commercial viability for discoveries Andina (in Colombia) and Esox (in the Gulf of Mexico) was approved in 4Q20. The National Hydrocarbons Agency, ANH, approved the transfer of Ecopetrol’s 50% stake to Shell in three blocks in which the Gorgon and Kronos gas discoveries are located. This association will allow progress the development of these discoveries in the offshore gas province of the Colombian Caribbean.

In regard to production, a cumulative average of 697 mboed was reached in 2020, in line with the goal of achieving levels close to 700 mboed. Compared to 3Q20, production in 4Q20 increased thanks to higher sales of LPG and gas, as well as to better performance at Chichimene and Piedemonte fields, despite the impacts by public order and the closure of Castilla’s water discharge in December.

With respect to natural gas, a strategic priority for Ecopetrol Group, represented 17 % of the total equivalent production. The EBITDA margin for the year was north of 50% and had a contribution by over 30 % of the segment’s EBITDA. The foregoing is supported by the stability of prices in dollars and the good commercial dynamics observed during the period.

In turn, the production of unconventional hydrocarbons in Permian contributed an average of 5.2 Mboed in 2020, increasing its share in the total EG’s production. We closed the year with 22 wells in production and 22 additional wells drilled, which are expected to be completed and put to work during 1Q21.

Regarding the execution of the Comprehensive Research Pilot Projects – PPII for unconventional hydrocarbons, the first Special Contract for Research Projects – CEPI , was signed with the ANH on December 24, for the Kalé project. This enables the start of the licensing and preparation stage for the execution of Ecopetrol’s PPII’s in Colombia. In 2021, we will be focused on obtaining environmental licenses and complying with other requirements as established in the robust regulations in force before starting to operate, always informing, and including our stakeholders and highlighting the scientific and technical nature of the project.

The annual EBITDA of the upstream segment was COP 6.7 trillion, equivalent to an 18% margin. The midstream segment obtained results in line with our expectations, with volumes transported in the amount of1,017 mbd, according to the country’s production. Also noteworthy are the lower maintenance times for repairing the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline, which allowed it to operate more days and without any reversal cycles being necessary in Bicentenario pipeline. The segment reported an EBITDA in the amount of COP 9.3 trillion, equivalent to a 76 % margin.

The downstream segment reached a consolidated throughput load of 355 mbd in 4Q20, the highest of the year. Advancing on the path of fuel quality, in December gasoline production with an average sulfur content of maximum 50 ppm, was achieved, which is lower than the levels requited under current regulations. The operational and commercial performance of the refineries enabled competitive margins in a negative environment for the sector. Likewise, Esenttia records in production and sales, stood-out in 2020. The segment reported an EBITDA of COP 0.9 trillion, equivalent to a 3.3% margin.

Despite the challenges faced in 2020, our commitment to TESG was strengthened on different fronts. Accumulated reductions of 1.8 MtCO2e were achieved in energy transition, resulting from the implementation of projects which have been running since 2010, thus achieving in advance the goal that was initially set for 2022. On the front of renewable energy, an agreement was signed for the construction of the San Fernando Solar Eco Park, which will have a capacity up to 59 MW and is expected to start operations in 2Q21. In turn, Castilla Solar Eco Park reported savings in operating costs close to COP 3.8 billion in 2020. On the other hand, GHE emissions produced by routine gas flaring were reduced by 19 % as compared to 2019, thus contributing to the commitment to reduce CO2e emissions.

Digital transformation was a fundamental pillar in the operational continuity during the pandemic. It ensured remote connections for more than 15,000 employees, and to hold more than 8,000 virtual meetings, per day, during the year.

Regarding the commitment of strengthening corporate governance, we adhered to the World Economic Forum’s Stakeholder Capitalism Metrics (SCM) coalition, a global group of more than 61 companies seeking to harmonize sustainability metrics to facilitate comparisons across companies and industries, on various key issues related to people, environment, prosperity, and governance.

In November, Ecopetrol received a 66-point rating on the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI) scale, ranking 13th in the global integrated oil and gas industry. This score allowed the company to enter the DJSI Latin American Integrated Market – MILA, being the only company in the sector in Latin America to achieve it. In addition, the company received a rating from the CDP Climate Change report in December with a C rating, ranking above the region’s overall average performance.

Reflecting our ability to adapt and to react to the changing conditions of a particularly complex market, we updated our 2021-2023 Organic Business Plan, which aims at ensuring a profitable growth for Ecopetrol on a Brent price path of USD 45 per barrel by 2021, and USD 50 per barrel onwards. The plan also seeks to increase competitiveness, to strengthen the energy transition agenda and to deepen TESG as one of the strategic pillars for our operation.

The following elements stand out within the organic component of the new plan: i) an investment ranging from USD 12,000 to USD 15,000 million, funded mainly with internal cash generation; ii) profitable production levels close to 750 Mboed by 2023 maintaining focus on the development of fields with the greatest impact on our value chain in Colombia, the growth of Permian, the drilling of more than 40 exploratory wells and the continuity of our successful enhanced recovery program; iii) volumes transported in excess of one million barrels per day reflecting positive expectations of economic growth; iv) joint throughput of refineries ranging from 340 to 365 thousand barrels per day in 2021, seeking to reach around 420 thousand barrels per day in 2023, with the IPCC ; v) reduction of 3 MtCO2 as of 2023 and redefining  medium and long term emission reduction goals during 2021; vi) increasing generation capacity with renewable energies  around 400 MW by 2023; and vii) social and environmental investments for COP 1.7 trillion between 2020 and 2024. Similarly, we will invest between USD 100 and USD 150 million in innovation and technology to accelerate the digital transformation. This plan is aligned with our cultural principles: life first, ethics, passion for excellence, making the impossible possible, leadership and inclusion, as well as teamwork. Similarly, it responds to the challenges of the environment with a focus on sustainability and ensures a strategy that adds value to EG and the country.

On the other hand, on January the 27, 2021, the Company announced its interest in acquiring 51.4% of the outstanding shares of ISA, currently owned by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit.

The eventual acquisition of the stake in ISA responds to Ecopetrol’s strategic interest of entering into new businesses aligned with the opportunities for electrification and decarbonization, dictated by the energy transition, and which in turn leverage the Group’s profitable growth and improve its business risk profile.

The stake in ISA would allow Ecopetrol’s stockholders to achieve a material position in an established company, leader in a strategic sector for the energy transition, with a world-class portfolio, a first-rate leadership team, and proven corporate governance. Through a single transaction, Ecopetrol would position itself in a key link in the electricity business with clear prospects for future growth. Furthermore, a business with similar characteristics to the oil infrastructure one, in which Ecopetrol already participates through its subsidiary Cenit, could also be added to EG’s portfolio.  These businesses are capital intensive, regulated, with significant entry barriers, and margins and competitive capital returns that provide stability to the cash flow, relative to hydrocarbons price volatility.

The acquisition would be partially financed with a stock issuance whose specific purpose is to fund this opportunity of growth and consolidation. This would allow Ecopetrol to undertake a transformational opportunity without changing the investment plans in its core oil & gas business, and without impacting the debt ratios that support its investment grade.

Moving forward, in case of succeeding in the transaction, we envision a more robust Ecopetrol, with a solid position in oil, gas, energy infrastructure and low-emission energy. The Company will continue to focus on the hydrocarbons business, with a growing share of gas. Renewable generation for self-consumption will continue to be key for reducing operating costs and emissions footprint. We will increase our level of ambition in decarbonization in terms of reducing emissions, and we will move forward with the evaluation of new technologies and business models, such as natural climate solutions, CCUS (Carbon Capture, Use and Storage) and green hydrogen.

That said, we have started 2021 with a solid financial position, strengthened after the crisis, with expectations of profitable and sustainable growth on all fronts of the business, and with the clear aspiration to materialize a transformational opportunity for the Company through the potential acquisition of the stake in ISA. This plan addresses the challenges and opportunities of the environment, keeping our promise to create value for our shareholders and stakeholders, leveraged on the pillars of growth, capital discipline and cash protection, all supported on TESG.

Felipe Bayón Pardo

CEO

Ecopetrol SA

* Excluding the effect of expenses associated to the Voluntary Retirement Plan, EBITDA amounts to COP 4,629 billion in 4Q20 and COP 17,471 billion as of year-end.

Over 400 human rights defenders have been killed since 2016. In most cases by rural mafias and drug traffickers. Under the Duque administration, coca harvests have reached all-time records. Local farmers who resist growing the crop; the raw ingredient for cocaine production, face intimidation and assassination by rural mafia enforcers, and there is almost a consensus that the government has failed to provide adequate protection.

The letter sent to Secretary Pompeo reads as follows. A PDF version can be downloaded here.

Dear Secretary Pompeo,

As the coronavirus pandemic exposes and magnifies existing problems in each of the countries it ravages, we are particularly concerned that it is affecting the safety of Colombia’s brave human rights defenders and social leaders who are putting their lives on the line to build lasting peace.

We write to ask you to actively urge the Duque Administration to consider recommitting to implementing the historic 2016 peace accords and protecting Colombia’s endangered human rights defenders whose vulnerability has only increased during the COVID-19 quarantine.

Colombia is now the most dangerous country in the world for human rights defenders. Over 400 human rights defenders have been murdered since the signing of the peace accords – a loss of committed and valiant civic leaders that Colombia cannot afford. The Colombian government’s slowness in implementing the peace accords, its failure to bring the civilian state into the conflict zones, and its ongoing inability to prevent and prosecute attacks against defenders have allowed this tragedy to go unchecked. This appears to have intensified as illegal armed groups take advantage of the pandemic while the government fails to respond, further increasing the vulnerability of targeted rights defenders and local leaders.

For example, on March 19, three armed men entered a meeting where farmers were discussing voluntary coca eradication agreements and killed community leader Marco Rivadeneira. He promoted peace and coca substitution efforts in his community, represented his region in the guarantees working group to protect human rights defenders, and was a member of the national human rights network Coordinación Colombia Europa Estados Unidos. Afro-Colombian, indigenous, and poor farming communities like the San José de Apartadó peace community continue to suffer and are even more vulnerable from the unchecked presence of illegal armed actors in their territories.

Marco Rivadeneira was one of 23 social leaders killed between March 15 and April 24, during the first weeks of Colombia’s pandemic lockdown. According to the Colombian NGO, Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz – INDEPAZ, in the first six months of 2020, 153 social leaders and defenders were killed in Colombia.

To stop this tragedy, we ask you to firmly urge the Duque Administration to consider the following:

• • Improve protection of human rights defenders and social leaders, starting with effective investigations of attacks and threats against them, identifying those who ordered these crimes and publicly presenting the outcomes of these investigation.
  • Develop a road map for protection in consultation with defenders in the guarantees working group, including for pandemic-related challenges such as the need for personal protective equipment.
  • Fund and implement collective protection measures with differentiated ethnic and gender approaches in consultation with communities through the National Protection Unit. Collective measures agreed to with Afro-descendant and indigenous communities’ authorities must be guaranteed. The self-protection mechanisms of the San José de Apartadó peace community and similar humanitarian zones should be respected, including the support provided by international accompaniers, even during the pandemic.
  • Dismantle the paramilitary successor networks involved in drug trafficking, which fuel much of the violence against human rights defenders and social leaders. The government must honor its commitment to regularly convene the National Commission of Security Guarantees, which was established by the accords to develop and implement plans to dismantle illegal groups and protect communities, social leaders, and ex-combatants.
  • Effectively investigate, prosecute, and present results about these paramilitary and criminal networks through the Attorney General’s special investigative unit. We welcome the new agreement between the Colombian Attorney General’s Office and the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia to train prosecutors and investigators in aggressively addressing these human rights crimes. It is critical the State end impunity in the murders, disappearances, assaults and threats against human rights defenders, social leaders, land rights and environmental activists, journalists, trade unionists and other defenders.
  • Swiftly hold accountable Colombian Army intelligence members, including at the highest ranks, who ordered and carried out mass surveillance on 130 journalists (including U.S. reporters), human rights defenders, political leaders, and military whistleblowers. The U.S. should also ensure that U.S. security and intelligence assistance does not assist, aid or abet such illegal surveillance, now or in the future.
  • Vigorously implement the peace accords, including by adequately funding the transitional justice system, fully implementing the Ethnic Chapter, delivering on commitments for protection for ex-combatants and productive projects to reintegrate them into civilian life, and honoring commitments for truth, justice, reparations, and guarantees of non-repetition for victims of the conflict.

We urge you, Mr. Secretary, to ensure that all agencies of the United States speak with one clear voice to condemn these ever-escalating murders and to press the Duque Administration to take the necessary steps to identify and prosecute the intellectual authors of these crimes and dismantle the criminal structures that protect them.

Finally, we urge you to continue to provide valuable U.S. assistance to Colombia to implement the peace accords, provide humanitarian assistance for Venezuelan refugees and refugee receiving communities, and address the health and food security crisis of the COVID-19 pandemic. The U.S. should also take advantage of opportunities provided by the peace accords to carry out sustainable and lasting eradication of illegal crops by working with communities to replace coca with legal livelihoods and by dismantling trafficking networks.

Thank you for your attention to these important concerns in this difficult time.

94 House members signed the letter. Their names can be seen here.

Q: Were the strikes violent?

A: It is important to note that the strikes were with few exceptions, inclusive and non-violent. In Cartagena, Barranquilla, and Colombia’s second largest city of Medellín, there were only minor incidents. Medellín’s metro system continued to operate. Cali and the impoverished Pacific port city of Buenaventura experienced some looting in limited areas.

Protesters in the Colombian capital of Bogotá, Colombia: EEIM – CC BY-SA 4.0,

In Bogotá the marches were calm and orderly in most areas. However in some areas the protests turned violent, with most violence directed towards the government and government assets such as the city’s Transmilenio and SiTP bus systems. It is important to note that a significant portion of the violence in Bogota appears to be police instigated. Police have often been denounced in the past as disguising as protesters and infiltrating protests, and apparently it is the case as verified by major Colombian media. Early in the day, two police were caught attempting to infiltrate the march in Bogotá. One of the major issues presented by the protesters is bad behavior by the police, especially the ESMAD (riot police), and ineptitude by the leadership of the security forces. In October the Defense Minister was ousted after the military bombed a camp of FARC dissidents but ended up killing at least 8 children who may have been captured against their will.

Most of the violent exceptions shown on international news channels took place in the poor neighborhoods in the south and west of Bogotá, and away from mainstream business and tourist areas. Medellín and Cartagena were free of violent protests. 3 police were killed by an improvised device in a small town in a troubled area in Southwest Colombia.

Q: What started it?

A: Labor unions originally called for a strike to protest certain economic proposals put forth by the current government, which probably would not have passed even without a protest. A business group proposed lowering the minimum wage for younger workers, an hourly wage (Colombians traditionally receive a monthly salary), and several measures adjusting pension and health contributions. Some members of Duque’s party in congress were considering the measure.

Normally this would not attract much attention outside of organized labor, but a year ago, Students protested, and teachers held national strikes protesting education funding. Duque’s administration promised additional funding for education, but a year later, students and teachers claim that the government reneged on its promises so they joined the strike.

From there, the movement caught the national zeitgeist and general mood of dissatisfaction against the current administration. Indigenous tribes and afrocolombians both suffering violence and forced displacement at the hands of land robbers and narcotrafickers were already upset with the government for not taking enough action to protect them joined in the strike. Even Colombia’s other conservative parties, who don’t want to be seen as close to the unpopular president joined in.

Q: What do the protesters want?

A: It is not just one thing. In this case there are lots of people protesting lots of different things. Many if not most people belong to multiple of the following groups:

• Students and teachers claim the government has not kept its promises regarding education funding.
• Labor Unions protest the (failed) proposals to decrease the minimum wage for younger workers, add hourly wages allowing part time workers, and increases in pension and healthcare contributions.
• Peace advocates: A broad segment of the population is upset with the Duque administration’s deliberate foot-dragging in implementing the peace agreement reached with the FARC by former President Juan Manuel Santos in 2016. There is support for implementation of the peace agreement across the political spectrum, except in Ivan Duque’s Centro Democratico party, which holds a minority of seats in congress and is deeply unpopular.
• Indigenous Colombians (Native South American tribes): There is an epidemic of killings of Indigenous Colombians and their leaders that has flared during the current administration. While nobody is accusing the government of organizing the killing, the government is faulted for adequately taking steps to fight the violence and prosecute those responsible. Duque has refused to meet with indigenous leaders, sending a signal that they are not a priority for his administration—or that their lives don’t sufficiently matter to him, and emboldening the perpetrators. Most of the violence appears to be committed by land thieves, and narcotrafickers who want isolated rural lands to conduct their illegal activities unseen.
• Afro-Colombian groups and their supporters are protesting for reasons identical to the indigenous groups. Afro-Colombians tend to inhabit the sparsely populated coastal lowlands desired by drug traffickers and the illegal mining industry, which tends to be controlled by the same violent mafias that control international drug trafficking.
• Desplazados (internally displaced refugees) and victims of violence want Duque to take the implementation of the peace accords more seriously. The government also has certain legal obligations to support these groups and ensure that they see justice. Many victims say the current administration is ignoring them.
• Anticorruption advocates: Duque’s political patron Alvaro Uribe is on trial for witness tampering and accused of “parapolitics” or collaborating with paramilitary forces. Uribe’s party, essentially made up of his hand-picked supporters, has consistently tried to run interference for the caudillo (political strongman) in the legislature. With Uribe now on trial and facing prison, clean government advocates from across the political spectrum are voicing their displeasure.
• Left wing ideologues already are opposed to the current administration and their generally center right economic policies.
• Right wing ideologues and centrists, from conservative parties such as “The Conservative Party” and Cambio Radical who want to distance themselves from the current administration at all costs.
• Other groups: The LGBT community, environmental activists, there were even protesters demanding an end to shark fishing. Practically any organized group you can think of feeling any dissatisfaction with the current administration was represented to some degree.

Below a protester holds a sign demanding an end to shark fishing in Colombia:

No a la comercialización de las aletas de tiburón. Asesinos @ivanduque pic.twitter.com/mzGM6wcV8W

— ruben arango (@rubenarango2003) November 21, 2019

Q: If the current administration is so unpopular, how did it take power?

A: Colombia’s 2018 presidential elections saw a first round with multiple candidates. The three major candidates were Ivan Duque, supported by Alvaro Uribe and his right-wing Centro Democratico party, centrist former mayor of Medellín Sergio Fajardo, and far left candidate Gustavo Petro. Petro was once a Marxist militant and member of the armed M-19 revolutionary group and is a former mayor of Bogotá.

The crisis in Venezuela and economic morass of Argentina has left average Colombians with little appetite for leftist revolutionary adventurers these days. When the FARC laid down arms and became a political party after the 2016 peace accords, they won zero seats in congress.

As the top two vote getters, establishment Ivan Duque faced populist Gustavo Petro in a runoff. Centrists, fearful of Petro’s revolutionary past and his unpopular term as mayor of Bogotá (he was temporarily removed from office for causing a garbage crisis in the city of 9 million), supported Duque as an inexperienced, but more predictable choice. Petro also did not help himself with his habit of picking fights with center-left and centrist leaders who might otherwise at least consider political cooperation with him.

In this year’s local elections held in October, President Duque’s Centro Democratico did embarrassingly poorly, sending a strong message to the president and his congressional minority that they in no way have a mandate. Left wing parties such as Petro’s Colombia Humana also were rejected, with voters expressing a centrist, reformer mood.

Q: Are the protests anti-American or anti-foreign?

A: No. The protests are largely over domestic issues. You can certainly find almost every kind of political opinion within the vast number of protesters, but these protests are overwhelmingly domestic in nature. The major issues are almost entirely about domestic policy. The protests are directed at the current presidential administration and not at foreign businesses or tourists. The protests are not about foreigners or foreign policy, and protesters are not looking for foreigners. Still, the prudent traveler will seek avoid protests in unfamiliar areas.

Q: Is it safe to travel to Colombia?

A: Yes, generally as safe as normal. Business and tourism travel to Colombia should not face any distress. The first two days of the protests, some flights were delayed or cancelled but travel has largely returned to normal. Within the cities, most businesses are functioning normally, grocery stores and shopping malls are open, and the vast majority of businesses are operating as normal. If you have any travel plans, check with your venue, travel provider and hosts for any last-minute updates. Travelers anywhere would be well advised to avoid protests or large groups of upset people under any circumstance, and in any country.

Q: What will happen now?

A: After initially resisting, the President has agreed to meet with strike representatives. Hopefully the government will take some of their concerns seriously, especially those that have broad support such as the peace process, protection of the population, and attention to education. The government has already tapped the state-owned petroleum company Ecopetrol for a billion dollars to spend on initiatives. If the administration continues to drag its feet, we can expect unrest to intensify in 2020.

It is unlikely to see, and no one seems to be asking for, significant changes to Colombia’s political structure, such as we are seeing in Chile or Venezuela, nor is there a constitutional crisis such as in Bolivia or Peru. The economy though challenged is fundamentally sound and there is no debt or liquidity crisis.

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Headline photo, Cali, Colombia: Roboting – CC BY-SA 4.0,

Front page photo, Bogotá, Colombia: EEIM – CC BY-SA 4.0,

Law firm Baker McKenzie has added Carolina Duque to its Colombia Banking and Finance practice. Duque is a local partner based in Medellín specializing in local and international project finance.

Global law firm Baker McKenzie has added Carolina Duque to its Colombia Banking and Finance practice. Duque is a local partner specializing in local and international project finance. Duque’s addition is expected to complement the firm’s growth strategy defined by the partners.

Duque is a lawyer from the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, with a specialization in Constitutional Law and a Masters in Law from Boston College in the United States. Her extraordinary performance in some of the most complex transactions carried out in recent years in Colombia has earned her constant recognition since 2012 from publications such as Chambers & Partners and Legal 500 and more recently by Chambers Global, positioning her as one of the most recognized lawyers in Colombia.

Although during the last 4 years Duque has focused on advising lenders in project financing, particularly those related to Colombia’s 4G highway concessions, she has also advised developers, special purpose vehicles, commercial companies and government entities.

Duque’s experience will add to the efforts of Ricardo Trejos and the local Banking and Finance team, seeking to expand this practice in the country and bring Baker McKenzie’s global support to the local and international financial market.

“I feel very happy to join Baker Mckenzie, a firm with an indisputable trajectory, institutional, recognition and global positioning. The challenges that lie ahead are not minor and the competition is highly qualified, but I am convinced that with the Banking and Finance team and the international infrastructure of the firm, we will overcome them successfully,” said Duque.

With the integration of Duque as partner, and her office in Medellin, the firm will also seek to expand its reach to other regions of the country, mainly in the Department of Antioquia, work that will be led by the lawyer. This flexibility is possible thanks to the technological tools that support the work-life balance policy that the firm promotes globally and that allows maximum professional performance, taking care to balance the firm’s business with personal life.

Rappi has taken off very strongly in Latin America since its founding in 2015, with a presence now in Colombia, Uruguay, Peru, Mexico, Costa Rica, Chile, Brasil and Argentina. The company, with major investments by Softbank, is valued at over $1 billion USD.

Rappi allegedly issued a statement (Finance Colombia has been unable to obtain it) denouncing categorically any act that disturbs public order or puts citizens at risk. On the other hand, the dispute is attracting political attention, with Colombian Senator Jorge Enrique Robledo tweeting (translated here) “We all know that the labor conditions of Rappi are so contrary to decent work as to offend human dignity. This is not how to construct a truly democratic country that we Colombians dream of. And Duque doesn’t do anything.”

It is important to point out that in Colombia, a country of relatively complex labor laws, it can be difficult to obtain formal employment, and the laws are such that formal part-time employment is impractical. For example, an employer would have to pay full time pension and health benefits to a student employee working 3 hours per day after school under Colombian law. The gig economy is creating opportunities for many Colombians—and also Venezuelan refugees—who otherwise would be unable to find a source of income.

That being the case, scenes of 20 or 30 Rappitenderos waiting on their next delivery to come across their smartphone are not uncommon in areas such as Bogotá’s Parque 93 or Medellín’s Parques de Laureles. As independent delivery workers, there is no minimum or guaranteed income, and pay is per delivery. A surplus of available delivery people means less work for each available Rappitendero.

So far the protest seems to be isolated however as Rappi grows and attracts the attention of the public, politicians, unions and regulators, the company’s navigation through these obstacles as it continues to grow will be key to its success.

Also in 2017, the government passed a “visa reform” package that purported to simplify the visa process for foreigners wishing to enter or stay in Colombia. As with the Peace Accord, the promise doesn’t match up with reality.

Legitimate, experienced foreign journalists operating in Colombia are being denied  visas by Colombia’s Cancillería (Ministry of Foreign Affairs), a move that seems more in line with the Maduro government next door in Venezuala than in Colombia, a country that just celebrated, after years of trying, accession into the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development).

While the argument can be made that the fault lies with Colombia’s congress for the “fine print” that made up the text of the immigration reform bill, it is clear that something unusual is going on. Is the government trying to cover up its failures in the peace process? Or in failing to prevent the macabre parade of assassinations (over 330 since 2016) of community leaders and activists from across the social and political spectrum?

The United Nation’s human rights chief in Colombia, Alberto Brunori was only given a temporary visa, and this after a delay that prevented him from presenting the UN’s annual human rights report, critical of the government’s failure to comply with its side of the bargain negotiated in the peace accord.

Meanwhile, through confirmation with colleagues, correspondents, photojournalists and reporters from some of the largest (not that it should matter) global media outlets have been either denied or are facing complications with their journalist visa issuance or renewal. This includes journalists who have reported for The Washington Post, The Guardian, New York Times, El Tiempo, Bloomberg, MSN, Getty Images; the list is much longer.

“Just because you do not take an interest in politics doesn’t mean politics won’t take an interest in you.” -Pericles (apocryphal)

One excuse given to victims of this apparent crackdown by the government is that the new legislation requires journalists to submit an apostilled and notarized university degree in the field of journalism, verified and signed off on by the Colombian Ministry of Education (!)—an absurd demand! I established Finance Colombia 4 years ago, and I am proud of our journalism and our professional team. I have a degree neither in finance nor journalism, but I did spend a decade in the US stock markets, owned an insurance brokerage, and managed institutional real estate portfolios as part of a corporate team.

Before launching Finance Colombia, I worked as senior or managing editor of 4 different print & online news publications, worked full time as senior editor for a hardcover business book publisher in the US, edited or published several books, from novels to non-fiction exposés of political corruption; but under the new draconian (anti-) journalism visa regulations, it could be argued I don’t qualify because I don’t have a journalism degree. 30 years ago I took my first full time position with a print newspaper in a major US city as sports editor and director of photography, where I ran the darkroom (back then we used chemicals), and was responsible for the quality of the newspaper’s photography. In addition to photography which is my passion, I have worked in television engineering for ESPN and prime time production for ABC in the US.

For photojournalists the situation may be even more dire. A small minority of professional photographers have degrees in photography or photojournalism. Most universities in the US don’t even offer such a degree. Like sculptors or artists, your credential is your body of work.

This isn’t about me, I dare write this opinion piece because I feel relatively safe. I have a long-term visa and other interests in Colombia that give me the confidence to speak out—though nothing is assured. Neither is this about Colombia’s sovereign right to control who passes within its borders, a right that I absolutely support and respect. Legally at least, my ability to live and work in Colombia is a privilege, not a right.

Still, when a country makes what can only be interpreted as obvious moves to restrict access and coverage by foreign journalists at this critical time in Colombia’s history, everyone with a conscience, journalist or not, Colombian or not, has a duty to speak out.

I am proud of what my team and I have done at Finance Colombia in the last 4 years. Like many publications, what started out as “some dude with a laptop” has grown into what I hope is a meaningful and positive contribution to Colombia’s economic and societal advancement.

As Finance Colombia’s publisher, I call on Colombia’s government to end this repression, intentional or not of foreign journalists and revise both its written policy and apparent unwritten strategy that muzzles the diffusion of diverse yet responsible reporting. In the long run, this reporting, even what might be perceived as “negative stories” only helps the country to advance.

This very morning I finished the book “Bad Blood” by John Carreyrou. It is the account of how one Wall Street Journal investigative reporter exposed Silicon Valley biotech company Theranos as a multi-billion dollar fraud. In this case, journalism actually saved lives, as the biotech firm had inked a deal to deploy its dangerous blood testing machines across the US in a deal with national pharmacy chain Walgreens.  Thanks to journalists we know about The Pentagon Papers and Watergate. Countless journalists in Colombia and other countries have become martyrs for the sake of their calling. I have colleagues here in Colombia right now that have recent death threats against them.

“Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, than that good men should look on and do nothing.” – John Stuart Mill

Colombia has a new government, and these problems seem to have started and taken place largely under the latter days of the Santos administration: Surprising as former President and Nobel Peace Prize winner Juan Manuel Santos was an award winning (Nieman Fellow) reporter and columnist in his own right before becoming a politician. Santos is from a family of journalists: his family controlled the country’s largest newspaper El Tiempo for almost a century, until shortly before Santos’ presidential campaign. One of his brothers served as editor.

I am willing to give the Duque administration the benefit of the doubt, perhaps they had nothing to do with, or didn’t know of the dire situation facing foreign journalists in Colombia. But especially if that is true, we call on the new government to right these wrongs, take the muzzle off legitimate, qualified foreign journalists, and demonstrate by its actions that it supports and promotes the free exchange of ideas, news, insight, and opinion.

We also call on neighboring countries of The Americas, Europe and, multilateral organizations such as the OECD, EU, UN, OAS, and NGOs such as RSF,  FLIP and the Pulitzer Center to encourage the Colombian government to take immediate action to admit and protect these journalists. As a US citizen, I ask the US government to leverage our close, friendly and benevolent relations with Colombia to encourage them to “do the right thing.” This issue is already being raised through diplomatic channels, and I am optimistic that soon we will once again be headed in the right direction.

We are here to help. Let us do our job.

Inside photo credit: Pixabay

Cover photo credit: Leidy Yrani Osorio Ramirez