The Criminal Chamber, in a ruling spanning more than 700 pages, determined that the evidence presented did not sufficiently establish that Uribe, the founder and political leader of the Democratic Center party, had instructed his former lawyer, Diego Cadena, to engage in the alleged bribery of imprisoned individuals and former paramilitary members.

The court’s decision, delivered via a report by Judge Manuel Antonio Merchán, concluded that the lower court’s conviction contained “serious errors and biases” that constituted a violation of the former president’s due process rights. Specifically, the ruling indicated that the initial judgment, issued in August, had accepted evidence without fully assessing its credibility, particularly citing inconsistencies in the sworn testimony of witnesses such as former paramilitary Carlos Enrique Vélez, known by the alias “Víctor.”

The case centers on accusations that Uribe or individuals acting on his behalf sought to influence testimony related to his alleged historical links with the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), a demobilized paramilitary group.

The legal proceedings originated in 2011 following an interview conducted by then-Congressman Iván Cepeda with Juan Guillermo Monsalve. During the interview, Monsalve alleged a connection between Uribe and the AUC’s “Metro” bloc operating in the Antioquia region. Following Cepeda’s dissemination of this interview in the National Congress, Uribe filed a complaint against the legislator, accusing him of manipulating witnesses to cause harm.

After several judicial inquiries, the Supreme Court of Justice declined to investigate Cepeda in February 2018. Instead, the court opened a preliminary inquiry against Uribe for allegedly directing or tolerating efforts to discredit Cepeda’s claims and secure favorable testimonies.

Political and Legal Repercussions

Following the acquittal, Senator Cepeda, a member of the current governing coalition Pacto Histórico, announced that the legal team representing the victims will file a casación (appeal) before the Supreme Court of Justice.

Cepeda stated that the court’s majority ruling ignored the potential criminal liability of lawyer Diego Cadena, who had also been convicted in the first instance. The senator highlighted the 400-page dissenting vote presented by Magistrate María Leonor Oviedo Pinto, characterizing it as a contrasting position that provided a robust evidentiary assessment.

Cepeda emphasized that the acquittal would not terminate the legal process, asserting, “Contrary to any illusion by Álvaro Uribe and his defense that this litigation ends here, no, we are totally committed to the search for the truth. We feel our rights as victims have been violated.” The attorneys representing the victims, Reinaldo Villalba and Miguel Ángel del Río, echoed Cepeda’s position, expressing respect for the judicial decision while simultaneously questioning the legal merit of the Tuesday ruling.

]]> https://www.financecolombia.com/colombian-senator-presidential-candidate-miguel-uribe-turbay-dies-2-months-after-shooting/ Mon, 11 Aug 2025 16:43:08 +0000 https://www.financecolombia.com/?p=35660 39 Year Old Miguel Uribe Turbay died at 1:56am local time this morning, two months after he was shot in the head by a 14 year old assassin. The young senator affiliated with the Centro Democrático political party was giving a speech on the west side of Bogotá, not far from the El Dorado International Airport, when a teenager approached him from behind and shot him multiple times.

Throughout the summer, Turbay had been in critical condition, and intensive care at Bogotá’s Fundación Santa Fé Hospital as he underwent various brain and cranial surgeries led by neurosurgeon Dr. Fernando Hakim in an attempt to save his life. Though at the end of July it appeared his condition may be improving, things turned for the worse in early August.

At the age of five, Uribe Turbay (no relation to former president Alvaro Uribe) lost his mother, journalist Diana Turbay, who died while held kidnapped by Pablo Escobar.  Former President Julio César Turbay was his grandfather. Uribe studied law and public policy at University of The Andes in Bogotá and began his political career as a Liberal Party member of the Bogotá City Council at the age of 25.

Former President Álvaro Uribe invited Uribe Turbay to run for senate with his Centro Democrático party. Uribe Turbay won the seat in 2022 with strong support and served as senator until, at Alvaro Uribe’s invitation, announcing his run for the presidency, with elections next year.

Urbe, dead at the hands of a child assassin, lost his mother to Pablo Escobar when himself a child.

The Assassins

So far, several individuals have been detained for allegedly participating in Uribe’s murder:

• The 15-year-old assassin, who is being held in the Attorney General’s headquarters.
• Carlos Eduardo Mora, who drove the teen to where Uribe was speaking.
• Christian González Ardila, the man who was to drive the getaway motorcycle.
• Elder José Arteaga, “El Costeño” the organizer of the assassination.
• Katerine “Gabriela” Martinez, accomplice and lover of El Costeño, provided the handgun to the assassin.
• William González Cruz, “El Viejo”

The current hypothesis put forward by Colombian law enforcement is that Elder José Arteaga, “El Costeño,”was a local small time gang leader unaffiliated with any of the larger mafia groups that plague Colombia, but while serving prison time in Meta, Colombia, he met “Daniel” (nom de guerre), part of the “Teófilo Forero squad of the Segunda Marquetalia, a guerilla mafia made up of former FARC members who rejected the 2016 peace accord signed between the FARC and the government. Accomplice Katerine Martinez was directed to Caquetá after the shooting by José Arteaga, according to her, to seek protection from the Segunda Marquetalia, active in the area. There she was captured by Colombian authorities.

General Carlos Triana Beltrán, director of Colombia’s National Police, said in a press conference last week that they believe Luciano Marín Arango “Ivan Márquez” and “José Aldinever Sierra Sabogal “Zarco Aldinever,” leaders of the Segunda Marquetalia, are the brains behind the assassination and contracted with El Costeño to carry it out.

Unconfirmed reports from last week say that Zarco Aldinever was killed near the Venezuelan border during a battle between the Segunda Marquetalia and rival guerilla mafia, the ELN. Those reports have not been confirmed and could be an attempt to redirect attention, hopefully (by the Segunda Marquetalia) staving off military action by Colombian forces.

Analysis

The Petro administration had already been criticized for refusing to provide the additional security that Uribe Turbay had asked for. The government is responsible for providing security to presidential candidates and other public figures who may be under threat of political violence, such as social activists, witnesses, legislators and local officials.

Uribe Turbay was the leading of five candidates of Alvaro Uribe’s Centro Democrático party and promised loyalty to the party’s godfather. “I aspire to be the best version of Miguel Uribe for Colombia, but of course with the best advisor in Álvaro Uribe,” he told Medellín’s leading daily El Colombiano in April.

With Alvaro Uribe convicted of witness tampering and the current administration of Gustavo Petro facing its own scandals and unpopularity, Colombia is approaching an especially divided election cycle. Hard core “Uribistas” or Uribe Supporters insist he is innocent despite the evidence and an independent judiciary. One does not have to be an Uribe supporter however, to see that current President Gustavo Petro’s promise of “Total Peace” and an end to guerrilla violence has been a complete failure. Groups such as the ELN, Clan del Golfo and Segunda Marquetalia are gaining territory and becoming even more brazen.

Though Uribe Turbay’s death may have a “sympathy vote” effect, Uribistas were already going to vote for the Centro Democrático candidate, and “pura sangre” (pure blood) Petristas, or Petro supporters, never would. When it comes to the largest group of voters with allegiances neither to Uribe or Petro, it is likely that dissatisfaction with Petro’s handling of security along with a distaste for Alvaro Uribe’s criminal record may lead to the emergence of a candidate from one of the right leaning parties outside of the Centro Democrático, such as Cambio Radical.

To be clear, no one serious is blaming President Petro for being involved in the attack. Still, he is blamed not just by Uribistas, but by other opposition figures for his coddling stance towards guerilla groups like the Segunda Marquetalia, for not providing adequate security for opposition candidates, and a worsening security climate where an act like this assassination can take place.

While there is not yet conclusive proof they are the ones who ordered the attack, the motivation for Segunda Marquetalia could be to stop the likely Uribista candidate early in the electoral process, because of their pledge to eliminate the remnants of guerilla groups like the ELN and Segunda Marquetalia.

A family’s pain

Uribe Turbay leaves behind his wife, María Claudia Tarazona. They met when he was 24 years old. She was 10 years older and had three daughters, so at first didn’t take his advances seriously but over time working together, their bonds grew, and they formed a family, having one more son together.

Photo:Instagram account of  Maria Claudia Tarazona

Judge Heredia’s ruling orders the immediate house arrest of Uribe at his rural property in Rionegro, Antioquia. The judge cited five primary reasons for her decision to impose immediate detention, noting the need to prevent the former president from committing new crimes and to reinforce the principle that all citizens are equal before the law. Heredia stated that allowing Uribe to remain free would send the wrong signal and that his actions had eroded public trust in Colombian institutions, necessitating a “strong and exemplary response.” She also pointed to what she described as maneuvers to delay the trial and concluded there was a significant risk that Uribe, due to his international recognition, might flee the country to avoid serving his sentence.

Uribe’s defense team, led by attorneys Jaime Granados and Jaime Lombana, has announced its intention to appeal the decision. Judge Heredia has granted the defense seven days to file the appeal. The case will then be reviewed by a three-judge panel at the Superior Tribunal of Bogotá, which will issue a final ruling. The case must be resolved by October 15, as the statute of limitations will expire on that date. A failure to issue a final decision by this deadline would result in the dismissal of the charges.

The Bribery and Witness Tampering Charges

The case against Uribe dates back to a long-standing legal and political dispute with Senator Iván Cepeda Castro of the Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático) party. The conflict originated in 2012 when Cepeda, then a congressman, was conducting investigations into alleged ties between Uribe and paramilitary groups. As part of his work, Cepeda interviewed former paramilitaries who claimed Uribe and his brother, Santiago Uribe, had connections to these groups. In response, Uribe accused Cepeda of witness tampering, alleging that the senator had offered benefits to inmates in exchange for false testimony. Uribe formally filed a criminal complaint against Cepeda with the Colombian Supreme Court of Justice.

The supreme court investigated both Uribe’s claims and Cepeda’s evidence. In 2018, the court dismissed the case against Cepeda, concluding that his actions were protected under his mandate as a legislator and that there was no evidence of coercion or bribery. Instead, the court found evidence that Uribe and his associates had engaged in witness tampering and bribery. Consequently, the supreme court initiated a criminal investigation against Uribe for procedural fraud and witness bribery.

The Supreme Court’s case was later transferred to the Attorney General of Colombia, which proceeded with the prosecution. According to the court’s recent ruling, the prosecution, led by prosecutor Marlene Orjuela, successfully demonstrated “beyond a reasonable doubt” that Uribe had instructed lawyer Diego Cadena to bribe and pressure witnesses.

Judge Heredia determined that Uribe had “instrumentalized” Cadena, an attorney known for representing narcotics traffickers, to solicit false statements from incarcerated paramilitaries. The objective was for these individuals to falsely declare that Cepeda had offered them legal and financial benefits in exchange for implicating Uribe in paramilitary activities. The court found that Uribe was aware of the false nature of the testimonies collected by Cadena and still authorized their submission to the court, which constituted the crime of procedural fraud.

The judge also specified three instances where Cadena, at Uribe’s behest, offered benefits to potential witnesses:

1. Juan Guillermo Monsalve: Offered legal benefits.
2. Carlos Vélez: Offered cash payments.
3. Euridice Cortés (alias “Diana”): Offered cash payments.

The court did, however, acquit Uribe on a separate charge of simple bribery involving former prosecutor Hilda Niño, concluding that she had secured a prison transfer through legal channels rather than Uribe’s intervention. A charge related to ex-paramilitary Harlington Mosquera was also dismissed due to a lack of evidence.

Social Media Exchanges Escalate Following Uribe’s Conviction

The first-instance ruling against Álvaro Uribe has intensified long-standing political hostilities, with social media becoming a primary arena for public statements and counter-arguments. The day after the conviction, current Colombian President Gustavo Petro, a long-time political rival of Uribe, published a series of messages that were widely interpreted as references to the former president.

Petro’s posts alluded to Uribe without naming him directly:

“The landowner, legitimate heir of the Spanish feudal lord, ends up in years that are for rest and love, and grandchildren, imprisoned in his hacienda. The horse trots the hallways of the house, again and again, because the hidalgo cannot gallop out as he would like, perhaps, as the horse would like, to be free in the hills or the meadows of the plains.”

He added further:

“It is a time for rest; the warrior knows how to rest. It’s a time for freedom. No more hidalgos and landowners of fertile lands without producing food.”

Petro’s posts, which mentioned the 1975 novel The Autumn of the Patriarch by Gabriel García Márquez, prompted a response from the political party Uribe founded, the Centro Democrático (Democratic Center). The party’s official account replied to Petro:

“Calm down, President, no one asked you to write your autobiography in the form of an alcoholic soliloquy. How curious that you talk about haciendas, horses, slaves, and women who serve coffee, as if Colombia were the eternal stage of your class traumas and not a republic with real problems that you neither know nor want to solve. Are you talking about freedom? But you attack the press, justice, private property, investment, and even grandparents who retire in the countryside. Your idea of freedom is that of the confused commander, locked in his palace, hearing voices and believing himself to be the messiah. While children go hungry and the countryside remains unproductive (under your government, not the hidalgo’s), you drown in metaphors that not even your ministers understand.”

Senator Iván Cepeda also made a public statement on social media, criticizing what he claimed was an effort by Uribe’s allies to lobby the United States government.

“The infamous lobbying that the envoys of the first-instance convict, Álvaro Uribe Vélez, are doing in the USA seeks not only to weaken the judicial branch, but to generate sanctions for all Colombians if they fail to regain their impunity. It is, without a doubt, treason against the homeland.”

In response, Tomás Uribe, the former president’s son, wrote directly to Cepeda:

“Mr. Iván Cepeda Castro, I invite you to turn yourself in to the American authorities and seek an agreement in exchange for ratting out your FARC friends and revealing the cocaine routes and the political masterminds of drug trafficking. Dr. Cadena can help you with this.”

Cepeda later addressed this exchange in a media interview, challenging Tomás Uribe to take his allegations to the proper legal channels:

“If he has any complaint to make, let him file it, and if he wants, we’ll see each other in court, just as I did with his father.”

Over the next several months and years, various investigations were carried out by the FBI and by other US federal agencies as well as an investigation by Congress. Some personalities already in government positions at the time had to resign, some ended up on trial, others in jail. Some entities among them disappeared including the infamous remembered Cambridge Analytics. But President Trump took possession even survived an impeachment trial and after all, today he is in the race for a re-election that does not It looks as easy as it could have been.

Foreign intervention in any way in the election system in the US is illegal. However, that is the legal theory. In practice we have already seen how different types of foreign forces have managed to influence the elections in one way or another: Mexico through its descendants in the states of the west coast of the country; Cuba since the 1960s has been generating influence in federal politics, especially in the southern state of Florida. And it is there, where now a group of Latin Americans with dual nationality and voting power are today a topic of interest in the debate on political proposals. So four years later, things are still similar with a new protagonist: Colombia.

While it is true, Colombia remains a country of little importance in international politics and is almost unknown to the natives of the United States, the Andean country has taken an unusual importance in recent months given that the State of Florida put a large number of members in the electoral College to win the presidency of the country as it happened in both 2000 and 2016.

Florida, before the second world war, had not been important in the game of power in Washington. Things began to change with the arrival of the Cubans who settled in Miami and Tampa and little by little, taking positions of importance, turning South Florida into an epicenter of the US foreign relations game with Latin America. Years later, Central Americans, Haitians, Brazilians, Argentines, and more recently Venezuelans and Colombians also arrived.

Some of those Colombians in South Florida have been playing a media game in recent weeks that could influence the balance of power in Washington with the upcoming election on November 3^rd. The Colombian-American votes, divided between both contenders, on the one hand, influenced by some members of the Centro Democrático (Democratic Center) party from Colombia, could reach about 300,000 votes that would weigh upon the result without a doubt—without necessarily violating the rules of foreign intervention in the electoral apparatus and thus determining the end result for a new president in the White House.

Centrist and peace process supporter Sergio Fajardo and left-leaning Humberto de la Calle both announced that they would submit a “voto en blanco” at the ballot box on June 17, meaning that they will submit a blank ballot rather than vote for either candidate.

While rightwing candidate Iván Duque was unlikely to receive the support of his rivals, Petro has a lot of ground to make up and would have benefited from an endorsement.

Photo: While former Medellín mayor Sergio Fajardo does not have “king-making” sway in Colombia, his decision to not support Gustavo Petro in the June 17 election is a setback for the leftist candidate. (Photo Credit: Inter-American Dialogue)

The first round of the election was held on May 27. But because no candidate earned a 50% majority, as mandated by Colombian law to avoid a runoff, the top two vote-getters move on to vie head-to-head in the second round.

Fajardo narrowly missed out on making the second round. While Duque easily came in first — his 7,569,693 votes were 39.14% of the total cast — Fajardo’s 4,589,696 votes were just 261,558 fewer than the 4,851,254 received by second-place finisher Petro.

Both of the remaining candidates will spend their next few weeks on the campaign trail trying to convince Fajardo voters to pick them. But without an endorsement from the centrist former Medellín mayor, Petro is likely to find it difficult to make up the wide gap with Duque, the “Urbista” candidate of the Democratic Center party and its ideological leader former President Álvaro Uribe.

While the Fajardo support was likely to splinter to some degree regardless of his endorsement (and many would have logged a “voto en blanco” anyway) Petro is more reliant on it.

In addition to beating Petro by more than 2.7 million votes, Duque can likely count on much wider support among the more than 1.4 million who voted for right-leaning former vice president Germán Vargas Lleras in the first round.

De la Calle, a former vice president who lead Colombia’s peace negotiations in Cuba that led to historic accord with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2016, also announced that he will “voto en blanco” and not endorse either of the remaining candidates. He finished fifth in the first round, albeit with only 399,180 votes.

Though the losing candidates themselves do carry weight, various political parties within the country whose candidates of choice were ousted have picked sides for the second round.

The Alternative Democratic Pole party, which supported Fajardo in round one, has announced its support for Petro. The Liberal Party, who supported De la Calle in the first round and is one of two traditional parties in the country, has thrown its hat in for Duque.

The Party of the U, which is led by President Juan Manuel Santos, announced that it will not formally support either of the remaining candidates. It had supported Vargas Lleras in the first round.

READ MORE: Duque, Petro Face Off for Colombian Presidency in Vote on June 17

The Duque campaign and Democratic Center party have also been in coalition-building discussions this week about forming a larger alliance in Congress with the right-leaning Radical Change party, which has supported Vargas Lleras.

If successful, this could potentially help to a victorious Duque presidential administration build a majority in the legislature as he attempts to carry out campaign promises.

“The continued dominance by center and center-right parties in Colombia’s recent congressional elections should reinforce the country’s macroeconomic and fiscal policy framework,” added the New York-based credit rating agency.

“The strength of Colombia’s fiscal and macro policy institutions, and the public consensus for macroeconomic stability, are likely to prevent major economic policy changes.” – Fitch Ratings

While the agency expects minimal disruption to fiscal stability being introduced by the new makeup of the congress, which saw former President Álvaro Uribe’s Democratic Center party increase its representation over even while losing one seat in the Senate, it also acknowledges that the upcoming presidential election in May will prove more influential on the overall policy agenda.

Nevertheless, it doesn’t see the head-of-state change, with two-term President Juan Manuel Santos concluding his tenure, kickstarting a major shift.

Others have come to similar conclusions. “We ended up with a very balanced Senate,” stated Medellín-based Bancolombia in a note to investors this week. “Whoever wins the presidential election is going to have to work with a broad church and radical changes are unlikely.”

The specter of uncertain elections has been seen as a looming risk to economies throughout Latin America. Within an 18-month period, in a voting season that has already kicked off, six countries — including the three largest in the region in Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia — will have new presidents.

Colombians went to the ballot on March 11 to elect representatives for both houses of Congress. In a primary held simultaneously, they also chose who will represent the main conservative and liberal coalitions in the presidential election, with Uribe’s handpicked candidate, Iván Duque, winning out on the right and former Bogotá mayor Gustavo Petro getting the most support on the left.

“The strength of Colombia’s fiscal and macro policy institutions, and the public consensus for macroeconomic stability, are likely to prevent major economic policy changes regardless of which presidential candidate wins,” stated Fitch Ratings.

“Economic and corruption-related issues have gained prominence in the political discourse,” it added. “Security and implementation of the controversial FARC peace accord, which was signed and ratified by the government and FARC in late 2016, also remain salient issues.”

READ MORE: Colombian Congressional Election: Uribe, Democratic Center Gain Steam

In addition to Duque and Petro, others have thrown their hat in the ring. While more political wrangling is already underway and could result in potential rivals joining forces to join together their support, former Medellín mayor Sergio Fajardo, former vice president Germán Vargas Lleras, and lead peace process negotiator Humberto de la Calle are currently three of the other notable candidates in the presidential race.

Still, even with a large field, the firm doesn’t see major policy changes ahead.

“Fitch believes that a sharp divergence from the existing macroeconomic policy framework is unlikely from any of the major candidates,” stated the agency. “The composition of the new centre-right dominated congress should help to ease policymaking should Duque win the presidency, while acting as a policymaking constraint if Petro wins. The checks and balances built into Colombia’s political system — notably, the public consensus that supports macro stability and facilitated the 2016 tax reform, the fiscal rule and framework, the congressional powers, and the independent central bank — act as key constraints to major economic policy changes.”

Fitch Ratings has forecast Colombian gross domestic product (GDP) to increase by 2.8% this year and 3.5% in 2019. Though this remains below the growth seen before the plummet in oil prices in 2014, when the economy was expanding by upwards of 4% to nearly 7% for the better part of a decade, it is a significant improvement from the low-growth of 1.8% and 2.0% seen in 2017 and 2016, respectively.

Photo: Before they became rivals, then-President Álvaro Uribe (right) and then-Defense Minister Juan Manuel Santos (center) meet with U.S. officials in Washington. (Credit: U.S. Defense Department)

Colombians went to the polls this weekend to elect their new representatives in both houses of Congress, and the results reflected the wide plurality of political views in a country that has grow highly divided over an extended peace process, the scourge of corruption, economic stagnation, and how to solve a host of commonplace issues from healthcare and education to security and environmental concerns.

While the coalitions on the right and left both saw movement in terms of representation, the final totals show five parties relatively lumped together, with none grasping the type of numerical seat advantage that will allow it to exert dominance.

The Democratic Center (Centro Democrático) party of former president Álvaro Uribe, however, fared the best in terms of gaining seats while the Party of the U (Partido de la U) of President Juan Manuel Santos lost a lot of ground.

Nevertheless, the leading parties will all still need to continue building coalitions to push their agendas in the next legislative session in what has become the fragmented political landscape in Colombia today.

“We ended up with a very balanced Senate,” stated Medellín-based Bancolombia today in a note to investors. “Whoever wins the presidential election is going to have to work with a broad church and radical changes are unlikely.”

One factor highlighting this dynamic are the gains made yesterday by the Green Alliance (Alianza Verde). Compared to the 2014 congressional election, the smaller, left-wing party nearly doubled its number of seats across the two houses to put it on the map as a more-serious force.

Analysts at the London-based Capital Economics saw the results similarly to those at Bancolombia. “A highly fragmented Congress will lean against a big shift in policy in either direction,” stated the research group in its investors’ note.

In the Senate, the Democratic Center ended up on top with 19 seats, followed by Radical Change (Cambio Radical) with 16, and the Conservative party (Conservador Colombiano) with 15 seats. The Liberal party (Liberal Colombiano) and Party of the U (Partido de la U) were closely behind with 14 seats each.

Among the individual Senate candidates, Uribe received by far the highest volume of national support. The only candidate to come anywhere near the right-wing ex-president’s 875,554 vote tally was two-time former Bogotá mayor Aurelijus Mockus with 540,783, whose large base further showed the rise of the Green Alliance.

Orge Enrique Robledo of the Alternative Democratic Pole (Polo Democrático Alternativo) also garnered heavy support, with 226,099 votes, while 10 other candidates finished with more than 100,000 votes.

Results in the territorial-based lower house were similarly stratified, although the top three parties managed to carve out a more substantial advantage in terms of seats won. The Liberal party, with more than 16.6% of the national vote, earned 35 seats followed closely by the Democratic Center with 32 and Radical Change with 30 seats.

The Party of the U, of sitting, and soon to be outgoing, President Santos, fared better in the lower house than the Senate. Its 25 seats put it fourth and ahead of the 21 seats won by the Conservative party, but this still represents a significant drop-off from its power-wielding position throughout the second term of Santos.

The Green Alliance, garnering almost 6% of the national tally, ranked much further behind in the Chamber. Its roughly 884,000 votes were less than half of the top five parties, leaving it with 9 seats.

While much was made about the first-ever electoral participation of the party that emerged from the demobilized FARC guerrilla group, voters gave the former rebels almost no support at the ballot box. The party comprised of ex-guerrilla candidates from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, which has retained the FARC acronym, got less than 0.4% of the national vote in both the Senate and the Chamber. (Regardless of the results, under the peace accord, the FARC party is set to receive five seats in each house of Congress.)

“The FARC, despite all the fears when the peace agreement was signed, mustered a miserly 52,000 votes,” stated Bancolombia,” adding that “they do get give seats as part of the agreement but they are non-voting seats.”

In addition to the congressional election, the primaries to decide the candidates for Colombia’s conservative and liberal factions were also held on Sunday. Iván Duque, on the right, and leftist candidate Gustavo Petro were the runaway winners for each side and will represent their respective coalitions in the May 27 presidential election. They are expected to remain the frontrunners in the race.

While other political wrangling and coalition building could continue to alter the makeup of the rest of the field, other likely presidential candidates include former Medellín mayor Sergio Fajardo, former vice president Germán Lleras Vargas, and lead governmental peace process negotiator Humberto de la Calle.

“The same four candidates are still expected to dominate the polls — Duque, Petro, Lleras, Fajardo — and it is still a close call at this point and the second round is still fully expected to be a left vs. right run off,” stated Bancolombia. “The only factor being discussed during the analysis of last night’s results would be a potential first round victory if either side could create a grand alliance ahead of the vote but that would require certain candidates to withdraw from the election and pledge their support.”

At press time, with more than 98% of the primary ballots counted, leftist Gustavo Petro had received nearly 85% of the votes to represent his side over rival Carlos Caicedo. On the right, conservative Iván Duque had taken more than two-thirds of the votes to beat out challengers Martha Lucía Ramírez (26%) and Alejandro Ordoñez (6%).

Photo: Gustavo Petro and Ivan Duque, the left and right coalition candidates in the 2018 presidential election in Colombia. (Credit: Prensa de Bogotá / Leoboud)

While Petro’s support was larger in percentage terms on his side of the ledger, Duque gained much more support in terms of raw voting totals due to the right’s primary having much higher turnout.

Potentially also running against several non-coalition party candidates — such as former Medellín mayor Sergio Fajardo, former vice president Germán Vargas Lleras, and lead peace process negotiator Humberto de la Calle — these two coalition leaders now become the likely favorites in the May 27 election to replace outgoing two-term President Juan Manuel Santos. (If, as expected, no candidate receives more than 50% of the votes, a second-round run-off election between the top two vote-getters will take place on June 17.)

But the overwhelming margins did not ease the minds of the many Colombians on both sides who suspected impropriety when their local voting sites reportedly ran out of primary ballots to fill out. The outcry was substantial on social media, with at least one video going viral that showed angry voters verbally confronting the location’s elections officials.

READ MORE: Colombia’s Private-Sector-Friendly President? Analyzing the Candidates

To many, it represented yet another hint of manipulation in an election cycle that has seen the issue of corruption move to the forefront following the near-constant revelation of issues like the unprecedented upheaval of the region-wide Odebrecht scandal, a sweeping criminal investigation that has implicated multiple former Supreme Court justices, among other politicians, and various other private sector crimes and instances of graft from public officials.

According to Colombia Reports, the governmental National Register chalked up the problem to a clerical printing error and authorized the stations to photocopy remaining blank ballots on site. The agency refused, however, to extend voting hours to account for the lost time and confusion created in some areas by the lack of ballots.

Congressional Election

The new composition of the Colombian Congress — both its Senate and Chamber of Representatives — was also voted upon today in what was the kickoff of an election season that will overhaul both the legislative and executive branches in Colombia for the next four years. In all, today’s voting will define the selection of 102 members of the Senate and 166 members of the Chamber.

There were not widespread reports of ballot shortages in the congressional elections throughout the day.

Late in the evening, with nearly 90% of the votes tallied, the Democratic Center (Centro Democrático) party, which has come to be synonymous with former president Álvaro Uribe, led the national voting for Senate. Support is widely fragmented, however, with the top five parties all receiving between 19% and 14% of the recorded votes.

READ MORE: Seven Colombian Corruptions Scandals that Have Eroded Faith in Justice

While Democratic Center leads thus far with roughly 19%, it is followed closely by Radical Change (Cambio Radical) at 16%, and three parties that each have received 14% of the votes: the Liberal Party (Partido Liberal), Conservative Party (Partido Conservador), and Party of the U (Partido de la U).

In the lower house, the Liberal Party had a slight edge over the other leaders to take the most seats. Not far behind were Democratic Center and Radical Change followed by Party of the U and the Conservative Party.

The larger number of congress members now on the right side of the aisle, particularly the gains by the Uribe-minded Democratic Center, means that there likely will be more criticism and pressure looming this year for the peace accord with FARC signed in late 2016, the signature work of eight years in office by Party of the U head Santos.

While court rulings could help protect the accord to a degree, aspects of the roughly 300-page document have already been slow to develop under a more-welcoming legislative branch, while Uribe and some others on the far right have pledged to block the implementation of many provisions of the deal. Such tensions would expect to be greater if the right-leaning legislative wave portends a Duque victory in the presidential election.

Today’s election also marked the first to include candidates from the newly created political party of the former FARC guerrilla faction. Though it received paltry support — less than 0.5% in both the Senate and the Chamber — the 2016 peace accord with the government that led to the demobilization of the armed group guarantees the party of FARC to receive five seats in each house.

FARC will run no candidate in May’s presidential election. Former top commander Rodrigo Londoño, aka Timochenko, had launched a campaign earlier this year but he recently called off his plan to run after undergoing heart surgery.