<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:wfw="http://wellformedweb.org/CommentAPI/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
	xmlns:slash="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/slash/"
	>

<channel>
	<title>council of state &#8211; Finance Colombia</title>
	<atom:link href="https://www.financecolombia.com/tag/council-of-state/feed/" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>https://www.financecolombia.com</link>
	<description>Connecting Colombia to the global capital markets, analysts, economists, investors, and executives that matter</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sat, 13 Jun 2026 20:08:52 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<language>en-US</language>
	<sy:updatePeriod>
	hourly	</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>
	1	</sy:updateFrequency>
	

 
	<item>
		<title>Will Colombia Elect Its First US Citizen President?</title>
		<link>https://www.financecolombia.com/will-colombia-elect-its-first-us-citizen-president/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Loren Moss]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 13 Jun 2026 20:08:52 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Law, Justice & Peace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[2026 Colombian presidential election]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[abelardo de la espriella]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Article 191]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Casa de Nariño]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[colombia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[colombia elections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Constitutional Court]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[council of state]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[dual nationality]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Germán Calderón España]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gustavo Petro]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ivan cepeda]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[jose manuel restrepo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Latin America politics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mauricio Gaona]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[naturalization]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pacto historico]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ramiro Bejarano]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rodrigo Uprimny]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[runoff]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Stella Conto Díaz]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[triple nationality]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[US citizenship]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.financecolombia.com/?p=37573</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Front-runner Abelardo de la Espriella holds triple citizenship, and jurists are split on whether his US passport bars him from Colombia's presidency....]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>While opponents seek to invalidate de la Espriella&#8217;s candidacy, current President Gustavo Petro is also an Italian citizen.</h2>
<p>Abelardo de la Espriella, the conservative outsider who led the first round of Colombia&#8217;s presidential election and now heads into a June 21 runoff against leftist senator Iván Cepeda, has put an unusual question on the table: could Colombia, for the first time, elect a president who is also a citizen of the United States?</p>
<p>De la Espriella holds three nationalities. He was born in Colombia — making him Colombian by birth — inherited Italian nationality through his maternal grandparents, and obtained US citizenship by naturalization in February 2023, <a href="https://www.lasillavacia.com/en-vivo/juristas-advierten-conflicto-de-lealtades-por-nacionalidad-abelardo/">according to La Silla Vacía</a>. It is that third passport, not the mere fact of multiple nationalities, that has triggered a constitutional debate which could shadow the campaign to its final day.</p>
<p>More than thirty jurists, academics, and constitutionalists — among them, La Silla Vacía reported, former Council of State president Stella Conto Díaz, Álvaro Echeverri, Ramiro Bejarano, Leopoldo Múnera, and Rodrigo Uprimny — signed a statement warning that his US citizenship could amount to an &#8220;incompatibility&#8221; with the presidency. Their objection is specific. Colombian naturalization in the United States requires an oath in which new citizens declare they renounce &#8220;absolutely and entirely&#8221; all allegiance to any other state of which they have been subjects. There, the signatories argue, lies a tension between that oath and the duties a Colombian head of state must perform — a concern they tie to the Constitutional Court&#8217;s own references to &#8220;potential conflicts of national loyalty.&#8221;</p>
<blockquote><p>“Constitutional disqualifications are not discovered. They are expressly established or, simply, they do not exist.” — Mauricio Gaona, constitutional lawyer</p></blockquote>
<p>The debate turns on what the Constitution actually requires. Article 191 states that to be president a person must be Colombian by birth, a citizen in exercise, and over 30 years of age. As <a href="https://www.lafm.com.co/politica/abelardo-de-la-espriella-nacionalidad-estadounidense-impedimento-ser-presidente-401965">campaign legal adviser Germán Calderón España told La FM</a>, those are the only three conditions, and none excludes a Colombian by birth who holds a second nationality. Disqualifications, he argued, must be expressly written into the Constitution or the law rather than inferred. Calderón also said the campaign was facing what he called a &#8220;tutelatón&#8221; — an estimated 30 <em>tutela</em> constitutional-rights petitions a day from allies of the Pacto Histórico, Cepeda, and President Gustavo Petro.</p>
<p>Constitutional lawyer Mauricio Gaona reached the same conclusion in a published legal opinion, <a href="https://www.infobae.com/colombia/2026/06/12/mauricio-gaona-resolvio-dudas-sobre-la-polemica-por-doble-nacionalidad-de-abelardo-de-la-espriella-la-constitucion-esta-escrita/">reported by Infobae</a>. Gaona wrote that dual nationality is legally valid, that holding simultaneous legal duties to more than one state is possible, and that US naturalization — including its allegiance oath — &#8220;does not create a constitutional disqualification to exercise the Presidency of the Republic of Colombia.&#8221; He grounded the analysis in the Constitution, Law 43 of 1993, US nationality law, and US Supreme Court rulings including <em>Afroyim v. Rusk</em> (1967), <em>Kawakita v. United States</em> (1952), and <em>Vance v. Terrazas</em> (1980), as well as the US State Department&#8217;s position that &#8220;U.S. law does not require a U.S. citizen to choose between U.S. citizenship and another nationality.&#8221;</p>
<div id="attachment_37575" style="width: 490px" class="wp-caption alignleft"><a href="https://www.financecolombia.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/small-gustavo-petro-italiano.jpg"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-37575" class="size-medium wp-image-37575" src="https://www.financecolombia.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/small-gustavo-petro-italiano-480x480.jpg" alt="Current Colombian President Gustavo Petro is also an Italian Citizen." width="480" height="480" srcset="https://www.financecolombia.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/small-gustavo-petro-italiano-480x480.jpg 480w, https://www.financecolombia.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/small-gustavo-petro-italiano-250x250.jpg 250w, https://www.financecolombia.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/06/small-gustavo-petro-italiano.jpg 768w" sizes="(max-width: 480px) 100vw, 480px" /></a><p id="caption-attachment-37575" class="wp-caption-text">Current Colombian President Gustavo Petro is also an Italian citizen.</p></div>
<p>Gaona pointed to Article 191&#8217;s silence as decisive: the text, he wrote, does not require exclusive nationality, the absence of foreign citizenship, prior renunciation of another nationality, or a certificate of exclusive loyalty. He acknowledged that some specific posts — those tied to national security, intelligence, or classified information — can carry dual-nationality restrictions, but said any such limit must be expressly established. &#8220;Constitutional disqualifications are not discovered,&#8221; he wrote. &#8220;They are expressly established or, simply, they do not exist.&#8221;</p>
<p>The campaign has pointed to a sitting precedent: Petro himself holds Italian nationality, which he acquired through family descent, has openly acknowledged, and has cited as <a href="https://www.semana.com/confidenciales-semanacom/articulo/petro-dice-que-tiene-ciudadania-italiana-y-no-necesita-visa-a-usa/593474/">letting him travel to the United States without a visa</a>; the US Treasury&#8217;s sanctions listing on the Colombian president records an alternate Italian citizenship, and in September 2025 he <a href="https://www.semana.com/politica/articulo/gustavo-petro-respondio-a-comentarios-sobre-su-nacionalidad-italiana-hablo-de-vida-y-patria/202600/">publicly weighed renouncing it</a> in protest over the war in Gaza. The comparison has limits, however, and they cut to the heart of the dispute: Petro&#8217;s Italian citizenship — like De la Espriella&#8217;s own Italian nationality, which no one contests — was acquired by descent, without an oath. The critics&#8217; argument rests specifically on the renunciation oath sworn in US naturalization, a step neither Petro&#8217;s nor De la Espriella&#8217;s Italian status involved.</p>
<p>There is also a political irony the candidate&#8217;s opponents have seized on: De la Espriella has built much of his campaign on overtly nationalist imagery, including the Colombian flag and the national soccer team&#8217;s jersey — symbols a tribunal ordered him to remove from his campaign within 24 hours, La Silla Vacía reported. His wife drew attention shortly before the first round when she suggested the family might move to Italy if he lost, a remark she later softened.</p>
<p>For now, the candidacy stands. The Fifth Section of the Council of State rejected a lawsuit seeking to strike De la Espriella from the ballot over his triple nationality, finding that the registration was not subject to that form of judicial review, La Silla Vacía reported. Whether the broader incompatibility argument ever reaches a definitive ruling — and from <a href="https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/">which court</a> — remains unresolved.</p>
<p>The stakes are concrete for a country whose largest trading and security partner is the United States. De la Espriella, who campaigns as an admirer of US President Donald Trump and whose running mate is former finance minister José Manuel Restrepo, would bring an openly Washington-friendly posture to the Casa de Nariño; Cepeda would broadly continue the foreign policy of the Petro government. Voters return to the polls on June 21. If De la Espriella wins, the question of a president who also answers, at least on paper, to a second flag will move from the seminar room to the presidential palace.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>The Next Battle After the Election: Courts, Citizens and Presidential Power in Colombia</title>
		<link>https://www.financecolombia.com/the-next-battle-after-the-election-courts-citizens-and-presidential-power-in-colombia/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Jadin Samit Vergara]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 01:10:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[OpEd, Expert, or Guest Contribution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[abelardo de la espriella]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Colombia´s Election]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Colombia´s Presidential Elections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Colombia´s Supreme Court]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Colombia's Constitutional Court]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Constitutional Court]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[council of state]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iván Cepeda Castro]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pacto Histórico Party]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Salvación Nacional Movement]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Supreme Court]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.financecolombia.com/?p=37515</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Beyond party labels and ideology, winning the election is only the beginning: courts, constitutional review and public pressure await Colombia’s next president....]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Both <a href="https://ivancepedacastro.com/">Iván Cepeda</a> of the <a href="https://www.pactohistoricoparticipa.com/">Pacto Histórico</a> coalition and <a href="https://abelardistas.com/">Abelardo de la Espriella</a> of the <a href="https://salvacionnacional.com/">Salvación Nacional</a> movement would face significant governability challenges if elected Colombia’s next president in the June 21, 2026, runoff election.</p>
<p>While much of the political debate has focused on each candidate’s ability to build congressional majorities, governability will also depend on other institutional and political factors, including the role of the <a href="https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/">Constitutional Court</a>, judicial oversight mechanisms and the capacity of their respective political bases to mobilize public support.</p>
<p>Beyond legislative alliances and governing coalitions, Colombia’s next president will have to navigate a complex system of checks and balances as well as a highly polarized society, where government decisions are likely to face scrutiny from the country’s highest courts and pressure from competing social and political groups.</p>
<h2>The role of the Constitutional Court</h2>
<p>Colombia’s <a href="https://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/">Constitutional Court</a> is composed of nine justices elected by the Senate for eight-year terms from slates submitted by the <a href="https://cortesuprema.gov.co/">Supreme Court</a>, the <a href="https://www.consejodeestado.gov.co/index.htm">Council of State</a> and the president.</p>
<p>The court is currently viewed as having a predominantly progressive orientation, a factor that could favor Cepeda, particularly because he would have the opportunity during his term to nominate candidates for future vacancies, adding to justices appointed during Petro’s presidency.</p>
<p>Several vacancies are expected during the next presidential term, allowing the incoming president to participate indirectly in the renewal of part of the court. However, no president controls the court’s composition on their own or can guarantee its rulings.</p>
<p>Recent experience also demonstrates that legislation approved by Congress may later face constitutional review. Several reforms promoted by Petro’s administration have encountered judicial scrutiny, particularly pension reform, which remains under review by the Constitutional Court and has also faced setbacks before the Council of State.</p>
<blockquote><p>Recent experience also demonstrates that legislation approved by Congress may later face constitutional review. Several reforms promoted by Petro’s administration have encountered judicial scrutiny, particularly pension reform, which remains under review by the Constitutional Court and has also faced setbacks before the Council of State.</p></blockquote>
<h2>Governing a divided country</h2>
<p>Beyond institutional dynamics, the next president will have to govern a politically fragmented society. The concentration of votes around two ideologically opposed candidates reflects a deeply divided electorate.</p>
<p>One of the major questions will be the role of citizen mobilization. Given the country’s political fragmentation, whoever wins will likely face strong opposition that could manifest itself through demonstrations, protests and sustained social mobilization.</p>
<p>In that context, issues such as control over security forces, an area generally associated with De la Espriella’s platform, and the capacity to mobilize social movements, often linked to Petro and Cepeda’s political base, are likely to remain important factors.</p>
<p>At the same time, the president retains significant tools of power, particularly the ability to set budget priorities and direct government action through executive decrees, appointments and public policies.</p>
<p>Presidential decrees provide considerable flexibility in implementing policy initiatives, although any administration must still contend with judicial oversight, including constitutional review by the courts and legal challenges brought before bodies such as the Council of State.</p>
<p>The government also controls the national budget and public spending priorities, which can shape the future of social programs such as subsidies for farmers, people living in extreme poverty and older adults, or, alternatively, increase funding for the military and police.</p>
<h2>A political system that imposes constraints</h2>
<p>Regardless of who wins the June 21 runoff, the next president will govern within a system of checks and balances that regulates both the functioning of government and any attempt to modify laws or the Constitution, regardless of political ideology.</p>
<p>The next administration will therefore operate within an institutional framework that limits the concentration of power and requires continuous negotiation among political actors.</p>
<p>In addition, Colombia’s Constitution explicitly prohibits presidential reelection and limits each term to four years, a factor that reduces the likelihood of far-reaching structural changes without sustained legislative and judicial support.</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Colombian Council of State Suspends 23% Minimum Wage Increase for 2026</title>
		<link>https://www.financecolombia.com/colombian-council-of-state-suspends-23-minimum-wage-increase-for-2026/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Loren Moss]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 15 Feb 2026 01:43:23 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[andi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bancolombia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[BVC: BCOLOMBIA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[colombia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[consejo del estado]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[council of state]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fedesarrollo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fenalco]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gustavo Petro]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[holland & knight]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[lopez y asociados]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[lumen\]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[minimum wage]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ministry of labor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mintrabajo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[NYSE: CIB]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[perez llorca gomez pinzon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[posse herrera ruiz]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.financecolombia.com/?p=36826</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[Colombian President Gustavo Petro's decreed 23% raise in the country's minimum wage may now be rescinded for failing to follow laws mandating limits for such measures....]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<h2>The surprise ruling is a temporary win for employers, but creates even more uncertainty. The Council of State has ruled that Petro’s 23% raise in minimum wage violates technical limits established by law.</h2>
<p>The Colombian <a href="https://www.consejodeestado.gov.co/">Council of State</a> has issued a provisional suspension of the government decree that established a 23% increase in the national minimum wage for 2026. The judicial decision halts the implementation of the adjustment, which had set the monthly salary at $1,750,905 COP plus a transportation assistance allowance, totaling approximately $2,000,000 COP.</p>
<p>The suspension follows several legal challenges arguing that the administration of President Gustavo Petro exceeded its authority by setting an increase significantly higher than the 5.1% inflation rate recorded in 2025. The court found reasonable doubt regarding whether the executive branch adhered to the technical criteria mandated by Law 278 of 1996, which requires adjustments to be based on inflation, productivity, and economic growth.</p>
<h3>Immediate Regulatory Timeline and Compliance</h3>
<p>The high court has granted the <a href="https://www.mintrabajo.gov.co/web/guest/inicio">Ministry of Labor</a> an eight-day window to issue a new provisional decree. During this period, employers are instructed to maintain current payment levels until the new administrative act is published.</p>
<p>Legal experts emphasize that the ruling does not have retroactive effects. Juan Pablo López, managing partner at <a href="https://www.lopezasociados.net/">López &amp; Asociados</a>, told daily El Tiempo that payments made between January 1 and the issuance of the new decree remain valid. Companies are legally prohibited from discounting or requesting the return of the additional 23% already paid to employees for January and the first half of February.</p>
<p>Vicente Umaña, partner at <a href="https://phrlegal.com/">Posse Herrera Ruiz</a>, clarified to the same publication that while payments currently due must honor the 23% increase, the forthcoming decree will likely establish a lower rate. This adjustment will subsequently impact other costs indexed to the minimum wage, including administration fees, fines, and transport costs.</p>
<h3>Economic and Labor Market Projections</h3>
<p>The initial 23% hike sparked concerns among economic think tanks regarding formal employment and inflation. <a href="https://www.fedesarrollo.org.co/">Fedesarrollo</a> published an analysis suggesting that such an increase could lead to the loss of up to 600,000 formal jobs and a three-percentage-point rise in labor informality.</p>
<p>Economic researchers at <a href="https://www.bancolombia.com/">Bancolombia</a> (BVC: BCOLOMBIA, NYSE: CIB) estimated potential job losses could reach 734,000. Their data highlights specific sectors at risk:</p>
<ul>
<li>Professional activities: 390,537 jobs</li>
<li>Commerce: 71,917 jobs</li>
<li>Construction: 54,537 jobs</li>
<li>Manufacturing: 42,774 jobs</li>
</ul>
<p>According to Medellín-based <a href="https://www.elcolombiano.com/">El Colombiano,</a> Camilo Cuervo, partner at <a href="https://www.hklaw.com/">Holland &amp; Knight</a>, noted that the Council of State’s language suggests the original decree may not survive a final merits review. Luis Fernando Mejía, CEO of <a href="https://www.lumen.com/">Lumen Economic Intelligence</a>, indicated that the suspension could serve to stabilize price escalations observed in early 2026.</p>
<h3>Business Community and Government Reactions</h3>
<p>The <a href="https://www.fenalco.com.co/">National Federation of Merchants</a> (FENALCO) and the <a href="https://www.andi.com.co/">National Business Association of Colombia</a> (ANDI) have addressed the ruling. Jaime Alberto Cabal, president of FENALCO, described the suspension as a necessary correction to an adjustment that did not reflect economic realities. Bruce Mac Master, president of ANDI, stated that the ruling establishes important jurisprudence for technical responsibility in wage setting.</p>
<p>Mauricio Montealegre, partner at <a href="https://www.perezllorca.com/es-co/">Pérez-Llorca Gómez-Pinzón</a>, observed that while the government could theoretically attempt to justify the same figure in a new decree, the president has called for a new concertation table to align with the court&#8217;s criteria.</p>
<h3>Guidance for Employers</h3>
<p>Business owners and human resources departments operating in Colombia should consider the following steps:</p>
<ul>
<li><strong>Maintain Current Payroll:</strong> Continue paying the 1,750,905 COP base salary until the new decree is officially published in the government gazette.</li>
<li><strong>Avoid Retroactive Deductions:</strong> Ensure that no attempts are made to recoup the 23% increase already paid to staff for previous periods.</li>
<li><strong>Monitor the New Decree:</strong> Prepare for a mid-month adjustment in the second half of February, as the new rate will apply immediately upon publication.</li>
<li><strong>Contractual Review:</strong> Assess contracts and service agreements tied to the minimum wage to prepare for downward adjustments in indexed costs if the new rate is lower.</li>
</ul>
<p style="text-align: right;">Photo © Loren Moss</p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
		<item>
		<title>Colombia “Decertified” By US For Failures In Antinarcotics Efforts, Imperiling Hundreds of Millions of Dollars in Aid</title>
		<link>https://www.financecolombia.com/colombia-decertified-by-us-for-failures-in-antinarcotics-efforts-imperiling-hundreds-of-millions-of-dollars-in-aid/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Loren Moss]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 16 Sep 2025 12:52:08 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Law, Justice & Peace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Afghanistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[alvaro leyva]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[amcham]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[american chamber of commerce]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Andrés Julián Rendon]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[andrés Rendón]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[antioquia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[armando benedetti]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[belize]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[bolivia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[burma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cali]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cali cartel]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[china]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Clan del Golfo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[coca]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[cocaine]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[colombia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[costa rica]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[council of state]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Crop Substitution]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[decertification]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Donald Trump]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ecuador]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[el salvador]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[eln]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[eradication]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Ernesto Samper]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[farc]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[FARC Dissidents]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Federico Gutierrez]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[fico]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[glyphosate]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[guatemala]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[gulf caln]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Gustavo Petro]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[haiti]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[honduras]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[india]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Iván Duque]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[jamaica]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Laos]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[m-19]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[martia claudia lacouture]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[medellin]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mexico]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[nicaragua]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[paisa]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[pakistan]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[panama]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[peru]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[petrogustavo]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[state department]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[the bahamas]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[the Dominican Republic]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[united states]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[venezuela]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.financecolombia.com/?p=36127</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[The decertification puts half a billion dollars of US security aid to Colombia at risk. Mafia &#038; insurgent groups have flourished during the government of Gustavo Petro....]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Yesterday evening, September 15<sup>th</sup>, US President Donald Trump issued a determination to Congress, designating Colombia a “major drug transit or major illicit drug producing country” along with Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Burma, China, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.</p>
<p>In a <a href="https://www.state.gov/releases/office-of-the-spokesperson/2025/09/presidential-determination-on-major-drug-transit-or-major-illicit-drug-producing-countries-for-fiscal-year-2026/">written statement,</a> Trump said:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">“In Colombia, coca cultivation and cocaine production have surged to all-time records under President Gustavo Petro, and his failed attempts to seek accommodations with narco-terrorist groups only exacerbated the crisis.  Under President Petro’s leadership, coca cultivation and cocaine production have reached record highs while Colombia’s government failed to meet even its own vastly reduced coca eradication goals, undermining years of mutually beneficial cooperation between our two countries against narco-terrorists.  For this reason, I have designated Colombia as having failed demonstrably to meet its drug control obligations. Colombia’s security institutions and municipal authorities continue to show skill and courage in confronting terrorist and criminal groups, and the United States values the service and sacrifice of their dedicated public servants across all levels of government.  The failure of Colombia to meet its drug control obligations over the past year rests solely with its political leadership.  I will consider changing this designation if Colombia’s government takes more aggressive action to eradicate coca and reduce cocaine production and trafficking, as well as hold those producing, trafficking, and benefiting from the production of cocaine responsible, including through improved cooperation with the United States to bring the leaders of Colombian criminal organizations to justice.”</p>
<p>The US State Department on social media directly blamed Gustavo Petro for the failures, but also noted that the US government issued a 1-year waiver, meaning bilateral cooperation, and almost half a billion USD in security and antinarcotics aid to Colombia will not end immediately. One year from now, Colombia will have a new president, as Petro’s term comes to an end August 7<sup>th</sup>, 2026.</p>
<blockquote><p>The decertification puts half a billion dollars of US security aid to Colombia at risk. Mafia &amp; insurgent groups have flourished during the government of Gustavo Petro.</p></blockquote>
<p>“Under Petro’s misguided leadership, coca cultivation &amp; cocaine production in Colombia has increased to historic levels…President Trump “has determined that the Colombian government failed to uphold its drug control obligations, but he has issued a waiver so critical US cooperation, including on counter-narcotics, can continue. Results matter – we must see progress and it must be soon!” the State Department tweeted.</p>
<p>Colombian President Gustavo Petro ran on a presidential campaign promising “total peace” and pledging programs that would replace coca production with other food crops, increasing Colombia’s agricultural exports. What has happened, however, is the reverse. Narco-insurgent groups such as FARC dissident mafias, communist rebels ELN, and the Clan del Golfo (Gulf Clan) mafia are all resurgent and taking over territory from government control. Over the weekend, narco-insurgents bombed an electrical tower in Medellin, and this just a few weeks after a massive truck bomb killed over 19 in Cali, Colombia’s third largest city. Under the Petro administration, cocaine production has surpassed levels seen during the days of the cartels and Pablo Escobar.</p>
<p>Petro, a former member of the M-19 guerilla group himself, has made statements defending cocaine, calling it “no worse than whisky,” and in April, his own former foreign minister Alvaro Leyva <a href="https://www.financecolombia.com/petros-government-officials-accuse-and-confess-in-drug-scandal-allegations/">publicly accused him</a> of being a drug addict.</p>
<p>“It was in Paris where I was able to confirm that you had a problem with drug addiction. But what could I do? Surely, I was not up to the task. I should have reached out, helped, intervened. I carry the regret of not having tried to lend a hand. The truth is, you never recovered. That is the reality,” said Leyva.</p>
<blockquote><p>A defiant Gustavo Petro refused to accept any responsibility and said that the Trump administration&#8217;s decision demonstrates that US policy has failed.</p></blockquote>
<p>Petro’s own Interior Minister, Armando Benedetti, is an admitted recovering drug addict.</p>
<p>Last night, a <a href="https://www.presidencia.gov.co/prensa/Paginas/Cultivos-de-coca-no-se-reducen-tirando-glifosato-desde-aviones-sino-disminuyendo-la-demanda-de-cocaina-de-EEUU-250915.aspx">defiant Petro blamed the US and defended his administration’s efforts,</a> saying that the move would end Colombia’s dependence on the United States, and cited the government’s recent cocaine seizures, without mentioning the skyrocketing production during his Council of Ministers meeting.</p>
<p>&#8220;You begin with a factual lie. Coca crop growth has occurred during (Iván) Duque&#8217;s administration, and with forced fumigation. It is U.S. policy that has failed. To reduce coca leaf cultivation, what is needed is not glyphosate dropped from airplanes, but a decrease in demand for cocaine, primarily from the U.S. and Europe,&#8221; said Petro in response to the US State Department statement.</p>
<p>Former Colombian President Ernesto Samper, whose administration also experienced decertification, and whose 1994 campaign was partially financed by the Cali Cartel drug lords, assured that decertification was “not the end of the world.” The former president added that &#8220;we must once again demand that consumer countries like the United States and many in Europe fulfill their commitment to reducing drug demand, precisely at a time when consumption of plant-based drugs has declined and the devastating effects of synthetic drugs like fentanyl and other narcotics we don&#8217;t produce are being felt.&#8221;</p>
<p>Samper stated that the decision to decertify Colombia in its fight against drugs &#8220;is illegal, political, and regressive.&#8221; He explained that it is &#8220;illegal because no country is authorized to impose unilateral sanctions on another country or its nationals. Only the United Nations can do so under established circumstances and in justified cases of necessity,&#8221; and it is political &#8220;because it has always been used to punish countries considered &#8220;enemies&#8221; of the United States. The worst right-wing dictatorships have benefited from the non-application of decertification, while our country, which has paid high human and institutional costs, is decertified every time the Colombian government appears as an &#8220;enemy&#8221; of the United States government.&#8221;</p>
<h2>Paisa politicians blame Petro</h2>
<p>Not all Colombian politicians are defending Petro. Medellín’s mayor Federico &#8220;Fico&#8221; Gutierrez, who returned from the US on his own diplomatic missive to meet with US officials  in direct defiance of Petro’s orders not to go, issued a statement damning the Colombian President:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">“Colombia is being decertified by the United States in the fight against drugs. It was to be expected. Petro sided with the worst criminals. They are the only ones who have won under this disastrous government. During our visit to Washington last week, our position was to ask that Colombia not be decertified. And if it were to happen, we asked that support for our public forces in the fight against drug trafficking not be withheld, nor that the trade on which millions of jobs depend in Medellín and throughout Colombia be affected. Indeed, our agenda in Washington was successful in defending Colombia. Although Colombia is decertified, it leaves the door open for support for our public forces and expressly highlights the recognition that the United States gives to our public forces and mayors: *“Colombia&#8217;s security institutions and municipal authorities continue to demonstrate skill and courage in confronting terrorist and criminal groups, and the United States values ​​the service and sacrifice of its dedicated public servants at all levels of government.”* (see photo) In the midst of all this, we would have solutions as a country. But seeing Petro&#8217;s absurd statements, his intention is for Colombia to lose this opportunity and for us to be plunged into chaos. It is very evident that this is what he wants and has sought all along: to be left alone and remain in power. All the more reason we remain steadfast in the defense of Colombia and our people. We pull Colombia forward from the regions.” (below video)</p>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet" data-media-max-width="560">
<p dir="ltr" lang="es">Colombia es descertificada por Estados Unidos en la lucha contra las drogas. Era de esperarse. Petro se puso fue del lado de los peores criminales. Son los únicos que han ganado con este nefasto gobierno.<br />
En nuestra visita a Washington de la semana pasada, nuestra posición fue… <a href="https://t.co/2qEIBTpTGU">pic.twitter.com/2qEIBTpTGU</a></p>
<p>— Fico Gutiérrez (@FicoGutierrez) <a href="https://twitter.com/FicoGutierrez/status/1967794430024286439?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">September 16, 2025</a></p></blockquote>
<p><script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script></p>
<p>The Governor of Antioquia, Andrés Julián Rendón, also had a scathing rebuke for his own president. Antioquia is the Colombian department where Medellín is capital and is home to much of Colombia’s economic activity. Rendón tweeted:</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">“Regarding the decertification of Colombia, the Government of @petrogustavo &#8211; It&#8217;s a snapshot of the failure of “total peace,” of temporizing with criminals, of dealing with them in a friendly way while they destroy the country and Colombians. &#8211; Now, the Petro government should stop playing the victim coming up with resentful, outdated, anti-US rhetoric. The President is reaping his own harvest of incompetence and failure: he sided with the criminals. The world and the US are paying him back. &#8211; Antioquia is the first victim: flooded in a sea of ​​cocaine by a weak government that ties up soldiers and police to prevent action. The criminals win, and we Antioqueños lose. Drugs, drugs, and more drugs to poison our youth and to enrich and strengthen the criminals. &#8211; Aerial spraying was the most successful tool in the past: effective in eradication, it protected our soldiers and police. It must be reactivated. Tomorrow will be too late! It&#8217;s been proven: more cocaine seizures are not proof of greater effectiveness in the fight against drug trafficking; rather, they are the ultimate proof of a historic peak in production. We&#8217;ve gone back more than 20 years, but fortunately, this government has only months left. In Antioquia, despite intimidation and judicial persecution, we will continue working to defend the interests of my fellow citizens, adhering to the Constitution and appealing to the courage of soldiers and police. In our government, we understand peace as the rule of law, security, justice, and social opportunity. We will remain there, even if our lives and freedom are at risk.</p>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet">
<p dir="ltr" lang="es">Sobre la decertificación a Colombia, al Gobierno de <a href="https://twitter.com/petrogustavo?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">@petrogustavo</a>:</p>
<p>&#8211; Es una radiografía del fracaso de la paz total, de contemporizar con criminales, de tratarlos por las buenas mientras acaban con el país y los colombianos.</p>
<p>&#8211; Ahora que el Gobierno Petro no se haga la víctima… <a href="https://t.co/OygRV29NER">pic.twitter.com/OygRV29NER</a></p>
<p>— Andrés Julián (@AndresJRendonC) <a href="https://twitter.com/AndresJRendonC/status/1967786278285398208?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">September 16, 2025</a></p></blockquote>
<p><script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script></p>
<h2>Business calls for cooler heads to prevail</h2>
<p><a href="https://amchamcolombia.co/">Amcham Colombia,</a> the binational Colombian-American chamber of commerce based in Bogotá and made up of both Colombian and US businesses involved in bilateral trade, issued a statement lamenting the decision, while also calling for the Colombian President to do more to save the relationship.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">“AmCham Colombia firmly and respectfully calls on the National Government to urgently present and implement a roadmap with achievable and verifiable goals that demonstrate political will and substantial improvements in crop eradication, production and trafficking reduction, judicial cooperation, and the financial dismantling of criminal organizations. Only then can the country request reconsideration of the designation in the next cycle and maintain assistance within the national interest of the United States.</p>
<p style="padding-left: 40px;">Respectfully, AmCham Colombia invites the United States Government to recognize the progress in interdiction and seizures and to consider announcing the resumption of spraying when appropriate and under the safeguards of the Constitutional Court, complemented by alternative development and a comprehensive state presence. These signals should contribute to avoiding measures that affect trade, tourism, and investment between the two countries.”</p>
<blockquote class="twitter-tweet">
<p dir="ltr" lang="es">🇺🇲🇨🇴 <a href="https://twitter.com/hashtag/Descertificaci%C3%B3n?src=hash&amp;ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">#Descertificación</a> con interés nacional<a href="https://twitter.com/AmChamCol?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">@AmChamCol</a> hace un llamado firme y respetuoso al Gobierno Nacional para presentar y ejecutar con urgencia una hoja de ruta con metas alcanzables y verificables que evidencie voluntad política y una mejora sustancial en: erradicación… <a href="https://t.co/qDer8SKYFl">pic.twitter.com/qDer8SKYFl</a></p>
<p>— Maria Claudia Lacouture (@mclacouture) <a href="https://twitter.com/mclacouture/status/1967803501414580719?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw">September 16, 2025</a></p></blockquote>
<p style="text-align: right;"><script async src="https://platform.twitter.com/widgets.js" charset="utf-8"></script><br />
Above image: Gustavo Petro during his council of ministers meeting where he defended his administration and blamed Trump for his country&#8217;s decertification. Photo credit: <span dir="auto">Ovidio González &#8211; Presidencyof The Republic</span></p>
]]></content:encoded>
					
		
		
			</item>
	</channel>
</rss>

<!--
Performance optimized by W3 Total Cache. Learn more: https://www.boldgrid.com/w3-total-cache/?utm_source=w3tc&utm_medium=footer_comment&utm_campaign=free_plugin

Page Caching using Disk: Enhanced 
Lazy Loading (feed)
Minified using Disk

Served from: www.financecolombia.com @ 2026-08-20 03:52:59 by W3 Total Cache
-->