Four years after Gustavo Petro took office, Colombia is a different country from the one he inherited in August 2022, but it continues to face some of its deepest historical problems: inequality, violence, drug trafficking, illegal economies, corruption and the state’s limited ability to exercise control over large parts of the country.

Petro came to power with an ambitious promise: to transform the country. His election represented a historic change in itself. For the first time, a leader from the left reached the presidency, and social sectors traditionally distant from power gained direct representation in the executive branch.

Four years later, just as the self-described “Gobierno del Cambio” (Government of Change) comes to an end, the record is mixed. Petro leaves behind measurable social progress, a broader political spectrum capable of competing for power and significant reforms in labor and politics. But he also leaves unfinished projects, a peace policy that failed to achieve its objectives, a persistent crisis in the health care system, corruption scandals, and an administration marked by high ministerial turnover.

Perhaps his deepest legacy lies not in any specific reform, but in demonstrating that Colombian democracy could incorporate sectors that had remained on the margins of power for decades without altering the system of checks and balances that underpins the country’s democratic processes.

The main achievement: A broader democracy

Petro’s election in 2022 was the culmination of a political process Colombia had been experiencing for decades: the gradual expansion of the ideological spectrum with a realistic chance of reaching the presidency.

Francia Márquez‘s rise to the vice presidency carried equally profound significance. A Black woman from a region historically affected by poverty and conflict, her election became a symbol of political mobility and representation in a country where economic and social elites have traditionally dominated the main centers of power.

Márquez built part of her political discourse around the “nadies” (nobodies), an expression intended to champion historically excluded communities. Petro incorporated that narrative during his term and embraced political and social inclusion as one of the defining elements of his administration.

From that perspective, regardless of how its public policies are evaluated, the Petro administration leaves behind a broader democracy: after 2022, Colombia demonstrated that ideological, social, ethnic and regional groups previously distant from presidential power could also reach the Casa de Nariño. It was a necessary message for a country whose guerrilla movements emerged partly in response to the traditional two-party system of the last century.

Paradoxically, that expansion coexisted with an often-conflictive relationship between the president and some of the institutions designed precisely to limit the exercise of power.

At various points, Petro challenged Congress, the courts, the Banco de la República, the media and sectors of the opposition when their decisions stood in the way of parts of his agenda. Those checks, however, are not an anomaly in Colombia’s political system but one of its structural components: the system of checks and balances.

Incoming President Abelardo de la Espriella will likely face a similar reality. Without his own majorities in Congress, his ability to govern will also depend on negotiations, judicial oversight and institutional limits that no president can eliminate simply by winning an election.

Francia Márquez during her inauguration as vice president of Colombia at Plaza de Bolívar in Bogotá on August 7, 2022. Photo courtesy of the Presidency of Colombia.

Less poverty, more employment and higher wages

On social issues, several indicators improved during the Petro administration.

In 2025, according to figures from the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, or DANE, monetary poverty fell to 28%, the lowest level recorded in the country up to that point. Petro had taken office in 2022, when the rate stood at 36.6% following the sharp increase caused by the pandemic.

During the first three years of his administration, about 3.8 million people moved out of monetary poverty and nearly 1 million escaped extreme poverty, according to official DANE figures.

The labor market also improved. Unemployment, which stood at around 11.3% in 2022, fell to about 8% during the first months of 2026.

Petro also ended his term with a 23% increase in the minimum wage for 2026, far above inflation, which closed 2025 at 5.1%. The measure directly benefited about 2.5 million workers and their families and reflected one of the president’s most consistent political priorities: improving workers’ incomes and conditions.

The labor reform moved in the same direction, increasing the amount employers must pay for nighttime, Sunday and holiday work: one of the country’s long-standing labor policy shortcomings.

Those results allow the outgoing government to argue that part of its redistributive agenda produced tangible effects, even though Colombia remains a deeply unequal society.

Reforms that advanced and those left halfway

The record of Petro’s major structural reforms is considerably more complex.

Agrarian reform, one of his central campaign promises, fell far short of its goals. Petro had proposed purchasing 1.5 million hectares of land for distribution to farmers and advancing the formalization of 7 million hectares envisioned under the Peace Agreement.

According to figures from the Ministry of Agriculture, more than 462,000 hectares had been purchased by mid-2026, less than one-third of the announced target.

On pensions, the government succeeded in getting Congress to approve an overhaul of the system that replaced competition between public and private regimes with a system based on a public foundation and additional savings mechanisms administered by private entities. To secure its passage, the executive branch had to compromise on some of its original objectives. The reform was subsequently challenged in court, and its implementation was suspended while the Constitutional Court reviewed the legislative process, which remains unresolved in the absence of a final ruling from the court.

Colombia’s institutional system thus once again demonstrated the limits any president faces when attempting to implement structural transformations without sufficiently broad political consensus.

“Total Peace”, one of the administration’s biggest defeats

If there was one area where results fell particularly far short of initial expectations, it was security policy and the so-called “Total Peace” initiative.

Petro came to power proposing simultaneous negotiations with different armed organizations to reduce violence and move toward resolving the conflicts that persisted after the 2016 agreement with the FARC.

Four years later, his government ended without reaching a final agreement with the main armed groups with which it had opened negotiations.

During that period, organizations such as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), and the Clan del Golfo maintained or expanded their operational capacity in different territories, while the country continued to record kidnappings, recruitment of minors, attacks and killings of social and political leaders.

Political violence reached one of its most serious moments with the killing of presidential hopeful Miguel Uribe, an event that reminded the country of the dangers of political violence that Colombia had believed it had left behind.

The failure of Total Peace to produce sustainable agreements will likely be one of the most difficult aspects of the outgoing president’s legacy to defend.

A health care transformation that never came

Petro also failed to transform the health care system on the terms he had proposed during the campaign.

The reform became one of the main battlegrounds among the executive branch, Congress, insurers, health care providers and different political sectors.

As that dispute continued, patient petitions, complaints and claims increased from about 915,000 in 2021 to 2.1 million in 2025, according to figures from the Superintendencia Nacional de Salud.

By the end of the administration, many patients continued to report difficulties obtaining medications and receiving timely care at hospitals and clinics, while household out-of-pocket spending on health care increased.

Petro profoundly altered the debate over Colombia’s health care model, but he failed to replace it with the system he had promised.

Corruption undermined one of Petro’s central promises

Perhaps one of the government’s most politically costly contradictions was corruption.

Petro had built much of his political career denouncing links among corruption, public contracting, and traditional power structures. His arrival at the presidency came with a promise to govern differently.

His administration, however, ended up being affected by several scandals.

The most significant involved the Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (UNGRD), in which investigations pointed to the alleged use of public resources and contracts to benefit members of Congress in exchange for support for government initiatives.

The instability caused by the legal troubles surrounding Ricardo Roa, who headed the country’s most important oil and gas company, also had a profound economic impact, eroding both the company’s market value and the governance of one of the institutions underpinning the national economy.

Those controversies were compounded by investigations and disputes involving members of the president’s political and family circle. His son, Nicolás Petro, faced criminal proceedings related to funds received during the campaign, while Verónica Alcocer, then the president’s wife, remains at the center of questions over the use of public funds.

Determining individual responsibility is a matter for judicial and oversight authorities, but politically, the cases eroded one of the central elements of the message that had brought Petro to power.

More than 60 ministers in four years

Administrative instability also became a defining feature of the government. Over four years, more than 60 people served across 18 ministries, equivalent to an average of more than three officeholders per ministry.

The changes reflected political crises, disagreements within the governing coalition, differences between ministers and the president, shifts in the executive branch’s priorities and, at various points, difficulties maintaining a stable administrative course.

The result was a government with considerable rhetorical ability to place issues on the public agenda, but greater difficulty turning some of those debates into sustained policies over its four years in office.

Congresswoman María José Pizarro places the presidential sash on Gustavo Petro during his inauguration at Plaza de Bolívar in Bogotá on August 7, 2022. Photo courtesy of the Presidency of Colombia.

Petro changed who can govern, but not the rules of power

Gustavo Petro’s legacy can hardly be reduced to a simple choice between success and failure.

His administration produced tangible social results and expanded the boundaries of political representation in Colombia. It also put issues on the agenda that will likely remain part of the debate under future governments: inequality, the energy transition, agrarian reform, the functioning of the health care system, and representation for historically excluded populations.

But the promise of structural transformation was far broader than the results ultimately achieved.

Petro discovered, as his predecessors did and as De la Espriella probably will, that winning the presidency does not mean controlling the Colombian state. Congress, the courts, oversight agencies, the Banco de la República, regional governments, the media and a deeply polarized civil society impose limits on any political project.

Petro discovered, as his predecessors did and as De la Espriella probably will, that winning the presidency does not mean controlling the Colombian state. Congress, the courts, oversight agencies, the Banco de la República, regional governments, the media and a deeply polarized civil society impose limits on any political project.

In that sense, the main transformation of these four years may have been less institutional than democratic: Petro did not completely change the way Colombia works, but he did help change the idea of who can govern it.

De la Espriella’s arrival at the presidency from the opposite end of the ideological spectrum is, paradoxically, another manifestation of that expansion.

Colombia thus ends four years of its first left-wing government and begins its first far-right government. What remains between the two is a democracy with more diverse political alternatives, but one that is also deeply polarized, with institutions under intense strain and many of the country’s historical problems still unresolved.

In an extended interview on Noticias Caracol’s analysis program La Clave, Ricardo Calderón, director of the network’s investigative unit, laid out the case that the secret 2022 overtures his team documented between the Petro government and the Clan del Golfo were not empty exploratory talk — because, he argued, nearly everything the government’s peace envoy promised the criminal organization in private is matched, line by line, by what the state then did in public. The interview arrives roughly a month before outgoing President Gustavo Petro hands the Casa de Nariño (presidential palace) to president-elect Abelardo de la Espriella on August 7, and it reframes what began as a Colombian political scandal as a matter that Calderón believes will ultimately be examined in the United States.

The reporting rests on recordings from a September 2, 2022 meeting — three weeks into Petro’s term — in which the government’s alto comisionado para la Paz (High Commissioner for Peace), Danilo Rueda, met Luis Armando Pérez, alias “Jerónimo,” a commander of the Clan del Golfo, formally the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC). In the audio, Rueda offers a mutual military standstill he calls a game of “congelados” (freeze tag), a halt to aerial bombardments, a purge of military and police intelligence, and relief on extraditions, with no equivalent commitments recorded from the criminal side. Finance Colombia has tracked the failures of the paz total (total peace) strategy across the Petro term; what Calderón emphasized on La Clave is corroboration — the method by which his team tested whether the promises became policy.

The Method: Promises Checked Against the Public Record

Calderón described a verification process he said took roughly eight months and drew on more than twenty sources. Rather than publish the audio and let it speak for itself, the unit says it cross-checked each recorded commitment against the government’s own subsequent conduct, using official responses obtained through derechos de petición (right-to-petition requests) to the Ministry of Defense. 

“What we did was cross every sentence of the conversation with what actually happened in the following years,” Calderón said, describing the core of the exercise as confirming that “they were fulfilled.”

“There may eventually be favoritism shown to a terrorist and drug trafficking group here, and those are cases that will be taken there.” — Ricardo Calderón, director of the Noticias Caracol investigative unit

He also addressed authenticity directly, given the current climate of manipulated media, a concern sharpened by Petro’s claim that material recovered in a separate case had been fabricated with artificial intelligence. Calderón said the unit obtained original voice samples and commissioned forensic audio analysis (peritazgo) to confirm the speakers before publishing, a step he described as slow but essential. 

His team, he said, also consulted officials from prior peace processes and former intelligence directors to establish where the legitimate boundaries of each official’s role lay. They concluded that in the cases of both Rueda and the intelligence chief, “there are things that crossed the line.”

Promise by Promise, Matched to What Followed

On bombardments, the recording captures Rueda telling the Clan del Golfo emissaries he had spoken with the minister and that orders had been given to stop planned strikes in the group’s areas. Days after the meeting, then-Defense Minister Iván Velásquez publicly announced a halt to bombings where minors might be present. According to Ministry of Defense figures cited by Noticias Caracol, no aerial bombardment was carried out against the Clan del Golfo for roughly two years afterward; the first did not come until late 2024.

In the officer corps, Rueda presents a “cleanup” of intelligence as evidence of good faith. On August 12, 2022 — three weeks before the meeting — more than 35 generals were retired in the largest single command shakeup in recent Colombian history, and further removals followed, reaching roughly 40 senior officers. Calderón said the unit focused on three colonels named in the conversation because Jerónimo specifically asked for their removal: officers who had served in Operation Agamenón, the multi-year spearhead against the Clan del Golfo. 

Their strategic roles, and the systematic drawdown of elite units trained by United States and United Kingdom agencies to pursue the group, were confirmed against the record; Calderón described a gradual but permanent dismantling of “the most experienced units” fighting the Clan del Golfo and the dissident groups.

On intelligence itself, Rueda is heard reassuring the emissary that the government was “dismantling intelligence.” Calderón said the paper trail of command changes and unit disbandments tracked that statement. On extradition, which is historically the Colombian state’s most effective instrument against cartel leadership, the recording shows Rueda accepting the group’s concerns as something that “gets done,” a concession Calderón and his sources characterized as far outside the mandate of a peace commissioner.

The macro-level corroboration, Calderón argued, is what the Clan del Golfo did with the space it was given. Drawing on Ministry of Defense data, Noticias Caracol reported that between 2022 and 2025 the organization’s membership nearly tripled, from 4,061 to 9,915 fighters, while its municipal footprint more than doubled, from 145 to 338 municipalities, even as, in Calderón’s words, the group “did nothing on peace.” InSight Crime has documented the same pattern of criminal expansion under permissive conditions, and Finance Colombia’s editorial analysis concluded that total peace had produced total chaos.

Two Investigations, One Thread

Calderón described the reporting as having “two legs.” The first is the Rueda audio. The second grew out of a parallel inquiry into the Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia (National Intelligence Directorate, DNI), the successor to the disbanded DAS, after the unit obtained conversations involving its then-director, Jorge Lemus. 

That strand placed Lemus, who was accompanied by the DNI’s counterintelligence chief, Ricardo Rey Rosanía, in an August 2025 meeting in central Bogotá with Edward Ferney Rincón, an emerald trader (esmeraldero) and confessed former narcotrafficker known as alias “Boyaco Sinaloa.” 

President Gustavo Petro in New York joining rally for Palestine. Photo credit: Colombia Presidency.

According to the recordings, the officials asked Rincón to use his contacts in Congress to advance the ley de sometimiento (criminal-submission bill) that then-Justice Minister Eduardo Montealegre had filed in July 2025, and to help arrange direct contact with alias “Chiquito Malo,” the Clan del Golfo’s top commander. The common denominator across both investigations, three years apart, Calderón said, was the Clan del Golfo.

The DNI thread also cuts against one of Petro’s signature security narratives. In the recording, the intelligence director’s own interlocutor dismisses the existence of the so-called Junta del Narcotráfico (Narcotics Trafficking Board), the Dubai-based cartel “board” that Petro has repeatedly claimed wants to assassinate him. Calderón noted that no intelligence agency, police, or prosecutor has validated the alleged plot, yet the government assembled an organizational chart around it — a construction that, he said, its own sources contradicted.

From Obstruction to Terror-Support: Why the Venue Shifts to Washington

The escalation Calderón stressed is jurisdictional. The United States designates the Clan del Golfo as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, and the US State Department has offered reward money for the capture of its leaders. 

Dismantling US- and UK-trained interdiction units in a manner that Calderón says was intended to benefit that structure is, in his framing, more than possible obstruction. “There may be favoring of a terrorist and drug-trafficking organization here, and those are cases that will be handled over there,” he said, pointing to the US. 

The same exposure, he added, attaches to the treatment of the dissident groups. Washington’s interest is not abstract: the US Drug Enforcement Administration has already opened a probe of Petro himself for alleged cartel ties.

The Fiscalía’s Silence

Against that backdrop, Calderón pointed to the inaction of Colombia’s Fiscalía General de la Nación (Office of the Attorney General). He noted that when the unit published the “computers of Calarcá” — which were files tied to a dissident commander — in November 2025, the Fiscalía had already held the devices for more than a year and a half. 

Had prosecutors acted, he argued, some of the individuals later shown to have participated in the killings of social leaders might have been captured: “in colloquial terms, we could have saved lives.” 

On the current matter, he said, the Fiscalía opened a preliminary inquiry into Rueda only in early July 2026 — days before the interview, and more than a week after the audio was published. This is a sequence he said “leaves many questions” about the office’s role. That inquiry names four former officials — Rueda, Iván Velásquez, Jorge Lemus, and Ricardo Rey Rosanía — over the benefits allegedly offered to the Clan del Golfo, and was assigned to the unit of prosecutors delegated before the Supreme Court of Justice.

A Four-Year Pattern, and a Government About to Change

Calderón placed the recordings inside a longer series of disclosures over the Petro term: the Calarcá computers, the emergency-management chats, and other episodes pointing to opaque contacts between senior officials and armed structures. As many as 22 regional peace tables were opened, he noted, on promises resembling those in the audio. The pattern lands at a moment of maximum political consequence: Petro, himself a former member of the M-19 (Movimiento 19 de Abril) guerrilla movement before its 1990 demobilization, is weeks from handing power to a successor who has staked his mandate on the opposite approach.

De la Espriella, who won the June 21 runoff over senator Iván Cepeda with running mate José Manuel Restrepo, has already issued a communiqué urging the vice-president-elect to investigate the disclosures and, if warranted, to refer them to US authorities. In his victory address he vowed that “there will be no zones off-limits to the State” and “no organizations above the Constitution and the law,” and he has said Colombia will join a regional counter-crime initiative promoted by Washington. 

Security analysts expect the peace zones established under the Ley de Paz Total (Total Peace Law), which carry no legal permanence beyond the current government, to be revoked after the August 7 handover. Petro has spent his final months pressing to formalize Clan del Golfo concentration zones before he leaves office.

Rueda’s Defense

Rueda, who surfaced only after the first report aired, has maintained that the encounters were preliminary, exploratory approaches involving promises that, by his account, were never fulfilled, and that no presidential decision was ever taken to halt operations against the Clan del Golfo. Calderón’s rebuttal returns to the corroboration: the Ministry of Defense’s own statistics, he said, “prove otherwise.” Whether that gap between the recorded private commitments and the government’s public posture amounts to a crime is now, belatedly, before the Fiscalía — and, if Calderón is right about the US interest, may not stay in Colombia.

Primary reporting by the Noticias Caracol investigative unit, drawn from Ricardo Calderón’s interview on the program La Clave. Related Finance Colombia coverage: Editorial: Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace Has Led to Total Chaos in Colombia; Halfway Through His Term, Petro’s Total Peace Is Failing; InSight Crime: Colombian Criminal Groups Gaining Strength Under Petro; Petro Advances Temporary Concentration Zones for Clan del Golfo.

Headline image: Colombian government representative Álvaro Jiménez (left) shakes hands with Clan del Golfo spokesperson Luis Armando Pérez in the presence of Qatar’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammed bin Abdulaziz bin Saleh Al-Khulaifi (center), in Doha on September 18, 2025, at the start of peace talks. Photo shared by Colombia’s Office of the High Commissioner for Peace

Barring any post-election drama, President-elect de la Espriella will take over a very divided country, and if he is smart, he will understand that he was the first choice of only a minority of the electorate. He will have a choice. He can govern for the small hard core, or he can be a conciliator.

Colombia has a nasty history of political violence, going back to the country’s founding. The person most Colombians see as the founder of the nation, Colombia’s George Washington figure, Simón Bolívar, barely escaped with his life during what was known as the Septembrine Conspiracy, which was born out of a conflict in visions for the new country. For most of the country’s history, the hostility between the Conservatives and the Liberals, the two primary political parties for most of Colombia’s history, manifested itself with bullets every bit as much as with ballots. Even though Colombia has, for almost all of its history, been a real democracy; the country has had only one military strongman dictator, and even he tried to be something of a reformer; violence has always had a hand in politics.

“With less than half the vote, the only mandate he holds is for an inclusive, conciliatory approach.” — Loren Moss, Finance Colombia

I once was at a talk in Medellín, years ago, where the businessman Chris Daes was asked, “When will Colombia advance?” “When we learn to stop hating each other,” he said.

Last night, after the election results were announced, police stations in Kennedy and Bosa, low-income neighborhoods in the southwest of Bogotá, were attacked. Why? The police hadn’t done anything. Riot police were called out to Puerto Rellena in Cali after roads were blocked by Cepeda supporters. In Medellín, some supporters of the president-elect turned up with bats and clubs outside Plaza Mayor, one of the city’s main public squares, probably supporters of de la Espriella, and let me emphasize that this is my guess, but no violence was reported.

Outgoing President Gustavo Petro called for calm, but also complained about US President Donald Trump’s open support of de la Espriella, forgetting that just months ago he was in the US and called for the US military to turn against its own government. Petro and the losing candidate, Senator Iván Cepeda, have said that while they acknowledge the preliminary vote count, they will not concede until an official final count, and they are calling for a scrutiny of the ballots.

So what happened here?

Three weeks ago, Colombia held the first round of presidential voting. The early favorite, Paloma Valencia of the right-wing establishment Centro Democrático party, backed by former president Álvaro Uribe, came in third, behind the right-wing outsider Abelardo de la Espriella and the ally of outgoing president Gustavo Petro, Senator Iván Cepeda of the leftist Pacto Histórico (Historic Pact). In Colombia there is an open first round, which can field many candidates, but the top two vote-getters advance to a final round unless one candidate clears 50% plus one.

Most people thought Cepeda would come in first with a unified left, but de la Espriella came in first, Cepeda second, and Valencia third. My take on this is very clear: Colombians were saying that they reject Gustavo Petro’s collectivist socialist experiment, but that they also reject Álvaro Uribe as the flag-bearer for the right. A sort of “we don’t like them, but we don’t like you either.”

So what happened in the past three weeks? Exactly what I expected. The outgoing president’s political machine moved to mass mobilization: get the buses out, get the affinity groups, such as indigenous leaders and unions, to mobilize. Something interesting happened: a government worker I know in immigration was told, and convinced, that she would lose her job if de la Espriella won. Her union told her this, of course. Cepeda and Petro’s movement has counted on its ability to mobilize people through group affiliation, working through organized structures to get out the vote. It was very effective, but not quite enough.

On the other hand, the split vote between Paloma Valencia and Abelardo de la Espriella came together, sort of, but not in a coordinated fashion. There was no real way to mobilize lukewarm people who were not already behind one of those two candidates. The business community had largely already opposed the Petro-Cepeda project, but it does not have the same mobilization machinery in place.

There will be time for a lot more journalism on this, but I want to get this initial reporting out quickly. Beyond that dynamic, what other factors came into play? Several:

• The outgoing president ran his administration like a game of thrones, or some kind of reality show. On average, he was bringing in a new cabinet minister every three weeks. It was nonstop drama and intrigue, and Cepeda’s message of “stay the course” ran up against that.
• Then there was the treatment of Vice President Francia Márquez. Petro used her to try to win the Afro-Colombian vote, but once they were elected, they tried to sideline her and treat her as a token. She rebelled against that and has called out her own administration for its corruption and racism. Over the past four years, Márquez has actually seemed more serious than Petro, who has a habit of crazy talk. By picking Aída Quilcué, Cepeda made it look like more of the same, and, fair or not, it made Quilcué look like a token candidate. Maybe it isn’t fair, but you can blame the Petro administration for creating that environment.
• Uribe’s first candidate choice, Senator Miguel Uribe Turbay (no relation), was assassinated on the orders of, according to Gustavo Petro’s own attorney general, the Segunda Marquetalia, a FARC dissident structure co-founded by Jesús Santrich, who was on his way to being extradited to the United States until that was allegedly blocked by Iván Cepeda’s efforts. Whether or not it is fair, for a lot of people in Colombia this is emblematic of Cepeda’s nurturing approach to the guerrilla groups, which have been growing stronger under the Pacto Histórico’s dialogue-first approach.
• The current administration is stained with several corruption scandals: the UNGRD scandal, in which money meant to bring water to poor, isolated families in the deserts of La Guajira was robbed for a political bribery fund; the ongoing scandals around Ricardo Roa and state petroleum company Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC), where Roa has been charged over alleged campaign-spending violations; the fiasco over the printing of Colombian passports; and a move that really angered the paisas (people of Antioquia and Medellín), the appointment of indicted former mayor Daniel Quintero to a government position supervising the finances of the country’s health system. Here you have a man with something like 40 counts of indictment for corruption, though let me be clear, he has not been convicted yet, and you appoint him to supervise the finances of the country’s primary health system? Usually when people are facing charges, they say something like “I am innocent, but I will resign to focus on clearing my name.” This one went full steam ahead. That undoubtedly cost votes among those who prioritize clean government.
• Cepeda’s running mate, Aída Quilcué, who never went to college, accused graduates of Colombia’s best universities of having “only learned to steal the people’s money.” She tried to walk that back after her statement blew up, but the damage was done. She was clearly attacking people who attended private universities in Colombia, many of which have no elite pretensions and specialize in educating low-income students.

What do I think will happen?

Assuming the vote count is not overturned, de la Espriella will take over the executive branch with no political machinery in Congress, so he will have to negotiate to get anything done. This is not a situation like El Salvador or Venezuela, where you come in and take over the whole government. To its credit, Colombia has strong institutions. Had Cepeda won, he would have come in with the largest bloc of legislators in Congress and might have found it relatively easy to push through his agenda. With de la Espriella, not so much, and I think this is a good thing. Personally, I like divided government as a concept, because it encourages moderation, consensus, and negotiation.

I expect the guerrilla groups to try to seize the initiative, and I expect their violence to increase in the short term as they try to assert their authority. Longer term, I think they are worse off, and they know the military will be after them soon, so they will make what hay they can while the sun shines. Expect them to try to “punish” the country for electing the candidate most hostile to them, a pattern that has already mocked the outgoing government’s “Total Peace” strategy.

Outgoing President Gustavo Petro will not shut up once out of office. He will become a full-time presence on social media and make as much noise as possible in opposition to the incoming administration. Unlike former President Juan Manuel Santos, Petro will be more like Álvaro Uribe, who has remained addicted to the spotlight, to influence, and to the thrill of power. In places where there is a tradition of former presidents ceding the spotlight, he won’t follow it. Petro will take every opportunity to travel around the world and throughout Colombia to speak, as he is entitled to, and to fashion for himself the role of dear father of the oppressed.

Petro and Cepeda and their movement will, if not explicitly then tacitly, reactivate the primera línea (front line), the aggressive activist youth street movement, not a formal organization, that mobilizes, sometimes peacefully and sometimes violently, against whoever opposes the Pacto Histórico. Last night we already saw violence in the low-income areas of Bogotá, and we saw riot police called out in Cali. It is not always that someone gives an order to go out and protest, even though there have been accusations of exactly that, for example against Petro ally and senator Gustavo Bolívar.

Colombian law says the runner-up in the presidential election gets a seat in the Senate, so Cepeda will return to the Senate, where he will lead the opposition. He already has a bloc of some 30 legislators behind him and is a Senate veteran, so he will be a very powerful voice.

What do I hope will happen?

I hope de la Espriella will have a plan to lift up the poor and the marginalized, and Colombia has plenty. He says he will govern for all the people, and I hope so. This was a very polarized election. People who feel excluded from opportunity largely voted for Cepeda and now feel they have lost. De la Espriella has a window of opportunity to do what he said in his election-night speech and govern for all Colombians. I hope he understands that, with less than 50% of the vote, the only mandate he has is for an inclusive, conciliatory approach.

His administration is inheriting a fiscal mess, as the current government has run up the debt. I hope that, along with Vice President-elect José Manuel Restrepo, they can properly manage this and navigate Colombia’s economy through rough times. Because the government will need to find dollars to make these debt payments, the peso will eventually fall, unless the US does something stupid to wreck its own currency. The opposition will try to blame the new administration for this, even though they planted the seeds for these fiscal weeds that will soon sprout.

I hope Colombia becomes safer for Colombians, and that the guerrilla groups, the mafias, and the drug traffickers shrink. It may be utopian to think they will be eliminated in four years, but my hope is that Colombia becomes safer, especially for poor Colombians, who are by far the primary victims of these groups. In recent years, unlike in the old days, the rich have been largely insulated from the depredations of guerrillas and extortionists, but the poor continue to suffer. So I hope de la Espriella goes after these groups, but in a way that respects and protects human rights, something Uribe failed to do during his time in power, leading to many innocent people becoming victims not just of the guerrillas, but of state violence. I sincerely hope, and will be watching closely, that the state becomes a protector of the poor rather than a victimizer of them. Many poor Colombians suffered under Uribe’s watch, and many continue to suffer under the current Petro government, which has simply not protected them from the depredations of groups like the ELN, the Clan del Golfo, and the FARC dissidents.

People to watch

• Armando Benedetti. The interior minister has been Petro’s consigliere, but he also seems to hold some kind of strange power over Petro. The US government, or in other words Donald Trump, placed him on the Clinton List, which will complicate his life personally and professionally once he is out of office.
• Daniel Quintero. The former Medellín mayor is already battling serious corruption charges, and while he found a friend in Gustavo Petro, that protection will no longer be there. There will be no place for him in the incoming government, and he still has to face all these charges. With no power to protect his allies, many of them also indicted, will they turn on him and spill the frijoles?
• Álvaro Uribe. No doubt pleased, he didn’t get his first choice, which was his own candidate, but he and de la Espriella clearly share a fondness, and their families go way back. De la Espriella’s father was a Liberal Party supporter of Uribe, and Uribe rewarded him with a juicy notary appointment decades ago.

A win for the business sector

Objectively, this is a win for the business sector. Business groups like Fenalco and ANDI have expressed their support for de la Espriella, and he has expressed his explicit support for the petroleum and mining sectors. I just don’t see any major businesses or trade groups that came out in support of Cepeda. Certainly Cepeda and Petro have support from individual businesspeople, but as organized industry groups, I just haven’t seen it anywhere.

Anecdotes

The polls closed barely twelve hours ago, and overnight I tried to gather the opinions of a few people. This is not a scientific poll, and to be clear and fair, Finance Colombia is a business-oriented publication, and I simply know a lot more businesspeople and entrepreneurs than I know community organizers and militant activists. So this is not any kind of objective sample; it is simply personal feedback gathered the very night of the election:

• A member of the Wayúu community in La Guajira told me they went for Cepeda, so they are not pleased.
• In a split family, both spouses professionals from humble backgrounds, the husband, a labor lawyer who contracts with the government, went for Cepeda, but his wife, a middle manager at a bank, went for de la Espriella.
• A psychologist who originally voted for Sergio Fajardo in the first round told me she voted blank, because she saw both candidates as extremists, a left-wing extremist versus a right-wing extremist, and she was disgusted at her country’s polarization.
• A police officer commented to me, “Better this loco than the other loco,” meaning he would take de la Espriella but considered both of them crazy. I think this is a common sentiment; it was not an endorsement of one so much as thinking the other was the worse option.
• A domestic worker told me she voted for de la Espriella, hoping he will take action against rising crime and violence.
• There were pro-Cepeda protests and some street violence in the mostly poor southwest of Bogotá, but there were celebrations in parts of the north of the city, and in the high-income El Poblado area of Medellín the celebrations looked like Colombia had just won the World Cup. Even where I live, in a rural area about an hour from Medellín, you could hear spontaneous car parades and firecrackers all through the night.
• Small businesspeople and Colombian investors I know have, to a person, been celebrating.

The most important takeaway, and something Colombians should be proud of, is that they have just held a peaceful, free, and fair election. Not every country can do that. A lot of hard work remains, and a lot can still go wrong. Count on Finance Colombia to bring you timely updates and analysis.

Colombians face three sharply different futures in May 31 vote

Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.

No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.

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A Race Reshaped by Late Polling

The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.

Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.

Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.

Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.

Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.

Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.

Security Policy: The Three Approaches to Armed Groups

Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.

Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.

Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.

De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.

For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.

Business Climate and Employment Conditions

The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.

Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.

Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.

De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.

Foreign Investment, Oil, and Mining

Ecopetrol holds a 31.5% stake in the Gunflint oil field in the Gulf of Mexico.

The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.

Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.

In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.

Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.

De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.

Foreign Policy: Washington Alignment vs. Multipolar Strategy

The US Embassy in Bogotá is said to be the 3rd largest US mission in the world (photo: Loren Moss)

Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.

Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.

Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.

De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.

“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.

Corruption and Judicial Independence

All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.

Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.

Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.

De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.

De la Espriella’s Legal Career: The Documented Record

De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.

Abelardo de la Espriella (screen capture from Twitter video)

His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.

De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.

The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.

Cepeda’s Family History and Ideological Background

Iván Cepeda (from Twitter)

Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.

Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.

The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.

What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.

Paloma Valencia (image Twitter)

Valencia and the Uribe Question

The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.

Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.

She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.

Press Freedom and the Media Environment

Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.

Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.

Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.

De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.

The Ideological Spectrum: Market Liberalism to State Direction

The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.

De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.

Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.

Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.

Minor Candidates: The Rest of the Ballot

Claudia López, senator of Colombia. (Credit: Patty Suescún)

Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.

Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.

Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.

Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.

Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.

Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.

Investment Implications

For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.

A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.

A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.

A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.

The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.

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President Gustavo Petro is moving forward with the creation of temporary concentration zones, known as Zonas de Ubicación Temporal (ZUT), for members of the Estado Mayor Conjunto del Ejército Gaitanista de Colombia (EGC), also known as the Clan del Golfo, the country’s largest drug trafficking armed group, in a renewed effort to advance his Total Peace (Paz Total) policy just days before Colombia’s presidential elections on May 31, 2026.

According to an official statement from Colombia’s presidency, the ZUTs would initially allow the concentration of more than 400 combatants while parallel negotiations continue over a possible peace agreement with the Colombian government, although no preliminary agreements have yet been reached.

The temporary concentration zones would function as designated areas where combatants suspend armed activities while participating in talks with the government and preparing for a potential reintegration into civilian life.

According to the government, the zones would remain in effect until December 31, 2026, meaning their future would ultimately depend on Colombia’s next president, who will take office on August 7, as well as on the broader future of the Total Peace policy.

Colombia’s most powerful criminal organization

The Clan del Golfo is considered by specialized organizations, including the Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP), to be Colombia’s most powerful criminal structure.

According to the organization, the group has nearly 10,000 armed members and operates in multiple strategic regions linked to drug trafficking, illegal mining and territorial control.

The US government has designated the group a transnational terrorist organization, while President Donald Trump previously warned of possible US military actions in Colombian territory over security and narcotics concerns, comments that sparked diplomatic tensions with Petro’s administration.

Institutional clash over arrest warrants and extradition requests

The ZUT proposal comes amid tensions between Colombia’s executive branch and the Attorney General’s Office over the legal conditions required to move the process forward.

The Office of the High Commissioner for Peace requested the suspension of arrest warrants against 29 Clan del Golfo members, including 13 individuals subject to extradition requests, among them Jobanis de Jesús Ávila Villadiego, alias “Chiquito Malo,” the group’s top leader.

Attorney General Luz Adriana Camargo rejected the request, citing legal limitations regarding individuals sought by foreign authorities.

Following the refusal, Petro publicly defended the process in a message on X. “I have been clear that, in the early stages of the process, individuals facing extradition do not participate,” the president wrote, denying any intention to suspend extradition orders unless there is “an advanced peace process, as established by law.”

Amid the controversy, the Clan del Golfo itself issued a statement accepting that individuals facing extradition requests would not initially participate in the temporary concentration zones.

“As an unequivocal demonstration of political will and coherence, the Joint High Command of the Gaitanista Army of Colombia accepts, in good faith, that access to the Temporary Concentration Zones will be limited to combatants who are not subject to extradition requests by any foreign government,” the group said.

The group added that the decision seeks to “remove any shadow of doubt” over the process and prevent extradition disputes from obstructing negotiations.

The presidency later highlighted that the EGC accepted the government’s conditions for concentrating fighters in Tierralta, Córdoba, and in the municipalities of Belén de Bajirá and Unguía, Chocó. According to the government, combatants and commanders are expected to begin entering the zones on June 25.

Criticism over timing

The initiative has sparked criticism because of its timing, arriving just days before presidential elections and during a government transition period.

Ombudswoman Iris Marín warned that the process creates uncertainty over how armed groups might interpret the political transition.

“The move toward those zones creates expectations among armed groups in the middle of an electoral context and government transition. It is impossible for disarmament to happen before August 7, 2026, so how do armed groups interpret that in an electoral context?” Marín said in a video shared on social media.

Marín clarified, however, that Colombia’s Constitution grants the president authority to pursue peace negotiations, meaning concerns center not on the legality of the initiative itself but on its political timing.

Negotiations between the Colombian government and the Clan del Golfo have been underway since 2025 in Doha, Qatar, which has quietly hosted talks between both parties. According to official sources, the ZUTs are intended as confidence-building measures and humanitarian relief for communities affected by the group’s violence.

*

Photo: Colombian government representative Álvaro Jiménez shakes hands with Clan del Golfo spokesperson Luis Armando Pérez in the presence of Qatar’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammed bin Abdulaziz bin Saleh Al-Khulaifi, in Doha on September 18, 2025, at the start of peace talks. Photo shared by Colombia’s Office of the High Commissioner for Peace.

Nubia Carolina Córdoba, governor of Chocó, Colombia (photo from her Twitter account)

According to figures compiled by the Universidad Externado and reported by The City Paper Bogotá, Colombia has recorded 40,663 homicides during the first three years of the Petro presidency. Over 400 human rights defenders have been slaughtered between 2022 and 2025 according to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights. Human Rights Watch reports that the ELN and FARC dissidents have expanded their territories by up to 55%. They are taking back over Colombia.

Under Gustavo Petro’s watch, Colombia has returned to the Institute for Economics and Peace’s Global Terrorism Index top ten list of countries impacted by terrorism, along with Total Peace destinations like Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia, and Syria. Just this past week, a Clan del Golfo poster was put up within walking distance from the Aeropuerto Internacional José María Córdova just outside of Medellín. This Total Peace nonsense is a failure.

Right now, in the neglected Pacific department of Chocó, the ELN has kidnapped whole communities. Petro ran a campaign promising that he was going to embrace these historically neglected communities—places like Chocó, Nariño, La Guajira, and Norte de Santander—but insecurity is increasing. Chocó’s governor, Nubia Carolina Córdoba, says 6,047 people are trapped inside of their homes because the ELN has announced an illegal armed curfew in the municipality of Bajo Baudó. Most of these people are already poor, and now they have been kidnapped en masse by this guerilla group that operates with impunity because Gustavo Petro coddles them with “dialogue.”

According to Governor Córdoba, they attacked the police station in the village of Santa Rita using grenades attached to drones. It has gotten so bad that Colombia has restricted the entry of drones into the country. These people are calling out for help, but the president insists on talking as the ELN grows and continues to menace the police forces, the Colombian military, and, most importantly, the innocent public.

There is currently public disorder where belligerents have completely blocked the roads in the north of Antioquia, in the region called Bajo Cauca, and also in the neighboring department of Córdoba. The city of Caucasia is under curfew. Antioquia’s Governor, Andrés Rendón, has urgently called on the national government to stop the talk and take action. Groups are attacking ambulances and burning people’s motorcycles as they try to get by the roadblocks, regardless of the emergency.

Governor Rendón stated: “There can be no dialogue amidst blockades and human rights violations. It’s been seven days now with the Bajo Cauca region paralyzed and the country held hostage by chaos.” He called on the Fiscalía General de la Nación to bring those responsible to justice and challenged the Minister of Defense, Pedro Sánchez, to order the immediate reopening of the roads. “We’re not talking about small-scale miners here; behind this are criminal structures, as everyone knows, that finance themselves through illegal mining and move billions of pesos,” Rendón added, demanding full authority against the criminals who use communities as a shield.

El gobernador de Antioquia, @AndresJRendonC, se pronunció sobre la situación de orden público en el Bajo Cauca, en medio de los bloqueos que ya completan varios días y afectan la movilidad y la seguridad en la región. @GobAntioquia pic.twitter.com/4SPQgTa68r

— MiOriente (@MiOriente) March 22, 2026

The current situation with these organized criminal groups—whether regular mafias like the Clan del Golfo or murderous Marxist guerillas like the ELN and the FARC dissidents—is reminiscent of a classroom where a substitute teacher has lost all control. Petro promised Total Peace, but the result has been Total Chaos. Investors do not want to deal with this mess. While the Petro government claims they want tourism to be a major economic driver, road blocks make many areas look like scenes out of Mad Max: Road Warrior. Whole zones of the Pacific coast are unsafe even for residents, met with pure impotence from the regime.

Ten years ago, it was safe to drive from Medellín to the beachside town of Coveñas in Sucre, but that is no longer the case. While it remains safe to visit Colombia for business or tourism in major hubs like Bogotá, Medellín, Santa Marta, or the San Andrés islands, the long-term outlook is concerning. My hope is that Colombians choose a future leader serious about law and order as a prerequisite for human rights. It is not only the government that we need to protect human rights from; those who kill, steal, kidnap, and forcibly recruit children are violating those rights as well.

Colombian anti-explosives experts inspect propaganda by the Clan del Golfo mafia group just minutes away from Medellin’s international airport in March, 2026 (image from Facebook).

The conflict centers on a resolution passed by the European Parliament on September 9, which highlighted an escalation in political violence in Colombia throughout 2025. The resolution condemned a series of violent acts, including the assassination of Senator and presidential pre-candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay, warning that such crimes are not isolated incidents but part of a wider pattern of intimidation that threatens democratic stability ahead of the 2026 elections.

Members of the European People’s Party (EPP), including Hermann Tertsch and Juan Ignacio Zoido, have voiced specific concerns. They allege that the Colombian executive branch is indirectly enabling groups such as the Clan del Golfo, FARC dissidents, and the Cartel de los Soles, a transnational criminal network allegedly operating out of Venezuela.

Speaking to Colombia’s W Radio, Tertsch asserted that these criminal organizations have expanded their operations during Petro’s tenure. “The international mafias could even be Gustavo Petro’s own interlocutors,” Tertsch stated, referencing alleged links between the government and criminal structures.

The parliamentarians cited recent high-profile attacks as evidence of the deteriorating security situation, including the murder of Senator Uribe Turbay, a car bomb attack in Cali, and the downing of a military helicopter in Antioquia that resulted in the deaths of 12 police officers. They argue these events are part of a coordinated strategy to destabilize Colombian institutions.

“The international mafias could even be Gustavo Petro’s own interlocutors,” Tertsch stated, referencing alleged links between the government and criminal structures.

Juan Ignacio Zoido, speaking to Blu Radio, clarified that the resolution is not a political judgment but a response to objective data. He reminded listeners of Petro’s campaign promise of “Total Peace,” contrasting it with the current security climate. “Armed violence is threatening the democratic stability of Colombia, by a man who had promised absolute peace but is achieving the highest rates of crime in the country,” Zoido declared. He added that the tone of speeches from the presidency contributes to social tension, indirectly facilitating the actions of criminal groups.

In response, President Gustavo Petro, during an official event in Timbío, Cauca, dismissed the European resolution as “senseless” (“una sinrazón”). He countered that the perpetrators behind Senator Uribe Turbay’s assassination were not domestic but rather an international mafia operating from Europe.

“It is not because of Petro’s speech that Senator Uribe Turbay was killed; he was killed by the mafia according to the evidence, and that mafia lives in Europe and not here in Colombia,” the president affirmed.

In a later, more extensive speech in Popayán, Petro directed a message to Europe, invoking historical grievances of colonialism and slavery and accusing the parliamentarians of hypocrisy. He asked the assembled crowd: “What does this town say to Europe? Is it the president who is denying democracy to Colombians, to Latin America, and to the world? What do the indigenous people of America say? Is President Petro anti-democratic?” He continued, “The anti-democrats are those who applaud those who drop bombs on babies… I ask the children and the youth of Europe, all of you, to rise.”

Despite the president’s rebuttal, the MEPs have stated their intention to continue monitoring the situation in Colombia closely, particularly as the 2026 election cycle approaches. Tertsch mentioned that parliamentary groups such as Patriots for Europe and the Spanish political party Vox, via its Foro Madrid initiative, will maintain rigorous oversight of the Colombian government.

Zoido rejected Petro’s characterization of the resolution’s supporters as far-right, insisting that a majority of the political parties that backed the measure are not. “What we want is for there to be a strong Colombia from a democratic point of view,” he said. “We have enough data to be concerned about the escalation of violence and insecurity in the country.”

The European Parliament’s resolution also calls for the protection of political candidates, human rights defenders, and members of the security forces, emphasizing that impunity for recent crimes only encourages further attacks.

European Parliament. Photo credit: Elekes Andor/Wikipedia.

In a written statement, Trump said:

“In Colombia, coca cultivation and cocaine production have surged to all-time records under President Gustavo Petro, and his failed attempts to seek accommodations with narco-terrorist groups only exacerbated the crisis.  Under President Petro’s leadership, coca cultivation and cocaine production have reached record highs while Colombia’s government failed to meet even its own vastly reduced coca eradication goals, undermining years of mutually beneficial cooperation between our two countries against narco-terrorists.  For this reason, I have designated Colombia as having failed demonstrably to meet its drug control obligations. Colombia’s security institutions and municipal authorities continue to show skill and courage in confronting terrorist and criminal groups, and the United States values the service and sacrifice of their dedicated public servants across all levels of government.  The failure of Colombia to meet its drug control obligations over the past year rests solely with its political leadership.  I will consider changing this designation if Colombia’s government takes more aggressive action to eradicate coca and reduce cocaine production and trafficking, as well as hold those producing, trafficking, and benefiting from the production of cocaine responsible, including through improved cooperation with the United States to bring the leaders of Colombian criminal organizations to justice.”

The US State Department on social media directly blamed Gustavo Petro for the failures, but also noted that the US government issued a 1-year waiver, meaning bilateral cooperation, and almost half a billion USD in security and antinarcotics aid to Colombia will not end immediately. One year from now, Colombia will have a new president, as Petro’s term comes to an end August 7^th, 2026.

The decertification puts half a billion dollars of US security aid to Colombia at risk. Mafia & insurgent groups have flourished during the government of Gustavo Petro.

“Under Petro’s misguided leadership, coca cultivation & cocaine production in Colombia has increased to historic levels…President Trump “has determined that the Colombian government failed to uphold its drug control obligations, but he has issued a waiver so critical US cooperation, including on counter-narcotics, can continue. Results matter – we must see progress and it must be soon!” the State Department tweeted.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro ran on a presidential campaign promising “total peace” and pledging programs that would replace coca production with other food crops, increasing Colombia’s agricultural exports. What has happened, however, is the reverse. Narco-insurgent groups such as FARC dissident mafias, communist rebels ELN, and the Clan del Golfo (Gulf Clan) mafia are all resurgent and taking over territory from government control. Over the weekend, narco-insurgents bombed an electrical tower in Medellin, and this just a few weeks after a massive truck bomb killed over 19 in Cali, Colombia’s third largest city. Under the Petro administration, cocaine production has surpassed levels seen during the days of the cartels and Pablo Escobar.

Petro, a former member of the M-19 guerilla group himself, has made statements defending cocaine, calling it “no worse than whisky,” and in April, his own former foreign minister Alvaro Leyva publicly accused him of being a drug addict.

“It was in Paris where I was able to confirm that you had a problem with drug addiction. But what could I do? Surely, I was not up to the task. I should have reached out, helped, intervened. I carry the regret of not having tried to lend a hand. The truth is, you never recovered. That is the reality,” said Leyva.

A defiant Gustavo Petro refused to accept any responsibility and said that the Trump administration’s decision demonstrates that US policy has failed.

Petro’s own Interior Minister, Armando Benedetti, is an admitted recovering drug addict.

Last night, a defiant Petro blamed the US and defended his administration’s efforts, saying that the move would end Colombia’s dependence on the United States, and cited the government’s recent cocaine seizures, without mentioning the skyrocketing production during his Council of Ministers meeting.

“You begin with a factual lie. Coca crop growth has occurred during (Iván) Duque’s administration, and with forced fumigation. It is U.S. policy that has failed. To reduce coca leaf cultivation, what is needed is not glyphosate dropped from airplanes, but a decrease in demand for cocaine, primarily from the U.S. and Europe,” said Petro in response to the US State Department statement.

Former Colombian President Ernesto Samper, whose administration also experienced decertification, and whose 1994 campaign was partially financed by the Cali Cartel drug lords, assured that decertification was “not the end of the world.” The former president added that “we must once again demand that consumer countries like the United States and many in Europe fulfill their commitment to reducing drug demand, precisely at a time when consumption of plant-based drugs has declined and the devastating effects of synthetic drugs like fentanyl and other narcotics we don’t produce are being felt.”

Samper stated that the decision to decertify Colombia in its fight against drugs “is illegal, political, and regressive.” He explained that it is “illegal because no country is authorized to impose unilateral sanctions on another country or its nationals. Only the United Nations can do so under established circumstances and in justified cases of necessity,” and it is political “because it has always been used to punish countries considered “enemies” of the United States. The worst right-wing dictatorships have benefited from the non-application of decertification, while our country, which has paid high human and institutional costs, is decertified every time the Colombian government appears as an “enemy” of the United States government.”

Paisa politicians blame Petro

Not all Colombian politicians are defending Petro. Medellín’s mayor Federico “Fico” Gutierrez, who returned from the US on his own diplomatic missive to meet with US officials  in direct defiance of Petro’s orders not to go, issued a statement damning the Colombian President:

“Colombia is being decertified by the United States in the fight against drugs. It was to be expected. Petro sided with the worst criminals. They are the only ones who have won under this disastrous government. During our visit to Washington last week, our position was to ask that Colombia not be decertified. And if it were to happen, we asked that support for our public forces in the fight against drug trafficking not be withheld, nor that the trade on which millions of jobs depend in Medellín and throughout Colombia be affected. Indeed, our agenda in Washington was successful in defending Colombia. Although Colombia is decertified, it leaves the door open for support for our public forces and expressly highlights the recognition that the United States gives to our public forces and mayors: *“Colombia’s security institutions and municipal authorities continue to demonstrate skill and courage in confronting terrorist and criminal groups, and the United States values ​​the service and sacrifice of its dedicated public servants at all levels of government.”* (see photo) In the midst of all this, we would have solutions as a country. But seeing Petro’s absurd statements, his intention is for Colombia to lose this opportunity and for us to be plunged into chaos. It is very evident that this is what he wants and has sought all along: to be left alone and remain in power. All the more reason we remain steadfast in the defense of Colombia and our people. We pull Colombia forward from the regions.” (below video)

Colombia es descertificada por Estados Unidos en la lucha contra las drogas. Era de esperarse. Petro se puso fue del lado de los peores criminales. Son los únicos que han ganado con este nefasto gobierno.
En nuestra visita a Washington de la semana pasada, nuestra posición fue… pic.twitter.com/2qEIBTpTGU

— Fico Gutiérrez (@FicoGutierrez) September 16, 2025

The Governor of Antioquia, Andrés Julián Rendón, also had a scathing rebuke for his own president. Antioquia is the Colombian department where Medellín is capital and is home to much of Colombia’s economic activity. Rendón tweeted:

“Regarding the decertification of Colombia, the Government of @petrogustavo – It’s a snapshot of the failure of “total peace,” of temporizing with criminals, of dealing with them in a friendly way while they destroy the country and Colombians. – Now, the Petro government should stop playing the victim coming up with resentful, outdated, anti-US rhetoric. The President is reaping his own harvest of incompetence and failure: he sided with the criminals. The world and the US are paying him back. – Antioquia is the first victim: flooded in a sea of ​​cocaine by a weak government that ties up soldiers and police to prevent action. The criminals win, and we Antioqueños lose. Drugs, drugs, and more drugs to poison our youth and to enrich and strengthen the criminals. – Aerial spraying was the most successful tool in the past: effective in eradication, it protected our soldiers and police. It must be reactivated. Tomorrow will be too late! It’s been proven: more cocaine seizures are not proof of greater effectiveness in the fight against drug trafficking; rather, they are the ultimate proof of a historic peak in production. We’ve gone back more than 20 years, but fortunately, this government has only months left. In Antioquia, despite intimidation and judicial persecution, we will continue working to defend the interests of my fellow citizens, adhering to the Constitution and appealing to the courage of soldiers and police. In our government, we understand peace as the rule of law, security, justice, and social opportunity. We will remain there, even if our lives and freedom are at risk.

Sobre la decertificación a Colombia, al Gobierno de @petrogustavo:

– Es una radiografía del fracaso de la paz total, de contemporizar con criminales, de tratarlos por las buenas mientras acaban con el país y los colombianos.

– Ahora que el Gobierno Petro no se haga la víctima… pic.twitter.com/OygRV29NER

— Andrés Julián (@AndresJRendonC) September 16, 2025

Business calls for cooler heads to prevail

Amcham Colombia, the binational Colombian-American chamber of commerce based in Bogotá and made up of both Colombian and US businesses involved in bilateral trade, issued a statement lamenting the decision, while also calling for the Colombian President to do more to save the relationship.

“AmCham Colombia firmly and respectfully calls on the National Government to urgently present and implement a roadmap with achievable and verifiable goals that demonstrate political will and substantial improvements in crop eradication, production and trafficking reduction, judicial cooperation, and the financial dismantling of criminal organizations. Only then can the country request reconsideration of the designation in the next cycle and maintain assistance within the national interest of the United States.

Respectfully, AmCham Colombia invites the United States Government to recognize the progress in interdiction and seizures and to consider announcing the resumption of spraying when appropriate and under the safeguards of the Constitutional Court, complemented by alternative development and a comprehensive state presence. These signals should contribute to avoiding measures that affect trade, tourism, and investment between the two countries.”

🇺🇲🇨🇴 #Descertificación con interés nacional@AmChamCol hace un llamado firme y respetuoso al Gobierno Nacional para presentar y ejecutar con urgencia una hoja de ruta con metas alcanzables y verificables que evidencie voluntad política y una mejora sustancial en: erradicación… pic.twitter.com/qDer8SKYFl

— Maria Claudia Lacouture (@mclacouture) September 16, 2025

Above image: Gustavo Petro during his council of ministers meeting where he defended his administration and blamed Trump for his country’s decertification. Photo credit: Ovidio González – Presidencyof The Republic

In the southern city of Cali, a truck bomb detonated outside the Marco Fidel Suárez Air Force Base on Thursday afternoon, killing at least six civilians and injuring more than 70 others. The powerful explosion, which occurred at approximately 2:50 PM, ripped through a bustling commercial area, leaving a trail of destruction. Eyewitnesses described a scene of chaos and horror, with victims strewn across the street and buildings reduced to rubble.

Hours earlier, in the rural northern municipality (in Colombia, a “municipality” is somewhat equivalent to a county) of Amalfi, Antioquia, a helicopter carrying police officers engaged in coca crop eradication was taken down by an explosive-laden drone. The attack, which claimed the lives of 12 police officers and a civilian, was a chilling demonstration of the evolving tactics and military capacity of the armed groups operating in the region.

The attacks have been widely condemned by national and local officials, who have called for a decisive response to the growing wave of violence. President Gustavo Petro, who campaigned on a promise of achieving “Total Peace” through negotiations with the country’s various armed factions, traveled to Cali to oversee the government’s response. In a statement on X (formerly Twitter), the president attributed the Cali bombing to the Carlos Patiño Front, a dissident faction of the former FARC guerrilla group, and described it as a “terrorist reaction” to recent military operations against them.

However, critics argue that the “Total Peace” policy, which has included ceasefires and negotiations with groups like the National Liberation Army (ELN), Segunda Marquetalia, and the powerful mafia organization, the Clan del Golfo (also known as the Urabeños), has emboldened these organizations, allowing them to expand their territorial control and illicit economies.

Andrés Julián Rendón, the governor of Antioquia, confirmed that the downed helicopter in his department was providing air support for a coca eradication mission. In a public statement, he lamented the loss of life. He called for a more forceful approach to combating the drug trade, which he identified as the primary driver of violence in the region.

Colombia’s President Gustavo Petro campaigned on a promise of “Total Peace” but guerilla groups are thriving during his term, showing no interest in ceasing crime or terrorism.

The mayor of Medellín, Federico Gutierrez, echoed these sentiments, expressing his condolences to the families of the victims and calling for national unity in the face of the growing security crisis. In a recent meeting with US senators, Gutierrez highlighted the interconnectedness of drug trafficking, terrorism, and corruption, and the need for a comprehensive strategy to address these challenges.

In Cali, Mayor Alejandro Eder announced a reward of up to $400 million COP (approximately $90,000 USD) for information leading to the capture of those responsible for the air base attack. “Cali is once again the victim of a narco-terrorist attack,” he declared, ordering the militarization of the city to restore order. Eder also confirmed the capture of two individuals believed to be members of the Jaime Martínez front of the FARC dissidents, who are now in the custody of the Fiscalía General de la Nación.

The acting governor of Valle del Cauca, Dilian Francisca Toro, has also been vocal in her condemnation of the violence, urging a united front against organized crime. “We must work together against this crime,” she stated in a recent interview, highlighting the need for greater coordination between local and national authorities.

The recent attacks have cast a long shadow over the Petro administration’s security policy. While the government has touted record cocaine seizures in 2025, with 601 tons confiscated so far, coca cultivation has also reached historic highs. This paradox suggests that while law enforcement efforts are having some success in interdicting drug shipments, they are failing to address the root of the problem: the relative impunity protecting the narco-mafias, who have enjoyed legitimacy under the Petro administration as negotiating partners. Rather than eradicating the criminal mafias, President Petro has treated them as diplomatic delegations that have come to negotiate as legitimate civil society actors.

The flourishing drug trade has provided a financial windfall for groups like the FARC dissidents and the ELN, allowing them to recruit (often forcibly) new members, acquire sophisticated weaponry such as attack drones, and challenge the authority of the state in a way not seen in years. The use of an explosive-laden drone to down a helicopter is a particularly ominous development, signaling a new level of technological sophistication among these groups.

As the country mourns the victims of these latest attacks, a difficult question hangs in the air: Will President Petro, a former guerrilla himself, abandon his soft-on-terrorism “Total Peace” policy and allow the country’s security forces to persecute these narco-criminals? Nothing in his record says “yes.” Colombia has less than a year until the next president is inaugurated. Colombia experimented with its first leftist president in modern history, who promised “total peace,” but as the mafia groups that plague Colomba are gaining power like it’s the 1980s, as political assassinations have returned to the case of presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay, Colombians may turn back to a more hard-line leader who can promise eradication of narco-mafias and the cocaine they produce, while hopefully respecting human and civil rights better than some past administrations.

Cali attack. Photo from Twitter.

Video credit: infoLibre YouTube.