According to Semana, neither sister held any employment or contract with the government during the period in question, yet between 2024 and 2026 they accumulated enough influence to sway executive-branch decisions, and — according to the magazine’s sources — effectively took control of three state entities: the Departamento Administrativo de la Presidencia de la República (Dapre, the administrative department of the presidency), the Fondo Colombia en Paz (Colombia in Peace Fund), and the now-liquidated Ministerio de la Igualdad (Ministry of Equality). El Tiempo, El Espectador, and other Colombian outlets picked up the allegations within hours.

A Price List for Access

The three whistleblowers, whose identities Semana withheld citing safety concerns, described a fixed tariff structure. A first meeting with the sisters cost $1 million COP. Juliana Guerrero would then allegedly handle the lobbying inside the government in exchange for an advance of $200 million COP plus 10 percent of the value of each project awarded, while businessmen were instructed to communicate exclusively with Verónica Guerrero for status updates. A separate $1 million COP fee applied for arranging meetings between mayors and national government officials.

The money, according to the report, was initially collected by David Trespalacios, a young Barranquilla man close to the family, who told the businessmen in a December 10, 2024 message that Verónica “does not want money in her accounts, which is why I have been collecting and delivering. I am handing her cash in Bogotá.” After an apparent falling-out with Trespalacios, Semana reports, the sisters began receiving deposits directly — including through the mobile payments platform Nequi, to an account number that Verónica identified in a December 28, 2024 chat as belonging to her sister Juliana. Deposit receipts reviewed by the magazine include transfers of $5 million COP, $1.8 million COP, $3.2 million COP, $3.95 million COP, $3.05 million COP, and $10 million COP, among others, and one distribution instruction attributed to Trespalacios reads: “Verónica Guerrero, savings account, 12.5 here; Juliana Guerrero, 12.5 here; Wilmer Trespalacios, 10.”

“If it is true, they gave money like fools, thinking that the ministers or I myself act under pressure from women or out of greed.” — President Gustavo Petro, on X

Aqueducts, Housing, and Security Cameras

The promised projects included an aqueduct in a Cesar municipality to be funded by the Ministry of Housing and channeled — according to what Verónica Guerrero told the businessmen — through then-Vice Minister of Water and Basic Sanitation Edward Libreros, whom Petro later fired on camera during a televised October 2025 council of ministers. Airline tickets purchased by the businessmen on December 5, 2024, to fly Verónica from Bogotá to Aguachica, Cesar, and back from Bucaramanga the same day, form part of the evidence. Semana’s report documents her subsequent WhatsApp updates: “My sister is already on it. She already spoke with him (Edward Libreros). They agreed to meet so she can tell him about the commitment.”

Other promised deals included home-improvement programs across multiple municipalities — under terms one businessman described as $35 million COP per municipality awarded, plus 10 percent of each project’s value — a security camera initiative financed by the Fondo Nacional de Seguridad y Convivencia Ciudadana (Fonsecon, the Interior Ministry’s security and coexistence fund), and, in June 2025, an aqueduct contract in La Guajira worth more than $27 billion COP through the Ministry of Housing. “That one is only with me, because I am the one who assigns it,” Verónica allegedly wrote of the La Guajira project.

“The Boss of Bosses”

Throughout the chats, Verónica Guerrero invoked her sister’s access to the highest levels of the government. “Juliana has a meeting today with the boss of bosses,” she wrote on January 21, 2025, when businessmen pressed for results — an expression the whistleblowers say the sisters used to refer to President Petro. In other messages she claimed to be sitting in budget-release meetings, reported that “the boss of bosses has already given clarity and is signing the unfreezing of ministry resources,” and described maneuvering to protect a secretary general at the Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible (Ministry of Environment): “If they topple my secretary, I lose a lot of things here.”

The magazine’s evidence also points to alleged influence or attempted influence at Fiduagraria S.A. (the state agricultural fiduciary), the Agencia Nacional de Tierras (National Land Agency), the Ministerio de Defensa in contracts at the Hospital Militar Central, and the Dapre. One chat suggests money flowed beyond the sisters: “I understand that is for the people inside (the government) and for you,” a businessman wrote, a characterization Verónica confirmed in the exchange, according to Semana.

More Than $600 Million COP, and Nothing Delivered

None of the promised contracts materialized. The three businessmen told Semana they handed over more than $600 million COP in total between 2024 and 2025. “They robbed us and do not want to give the money back,” they told the magazine. When one of them confronted Juliana Guerrero in the second half of 2025 over $70 million COP transferred to her Nequi account, she replied, per the chats: “I have no problem returning that, but let me talk to her (Verónica) first.” No refund followed, the businessmen say. None of the reports reviewed by Finance Colombia includes a public response from either sister; Semana published video of the two attending the Fiestas del Mar festival in Santa Marta on July 24, the night before the story broke.

Las pruebas que aquí se indican, reflejan, que los llamados “empresarios* se pusieron furiosos y a lo mejor entregaron los chats, porque no les cumplieron. Si es verdad, dieron dineros como pendejos, pensando que los ministros o yo mismo, actuamos por presiones de mujeres o por… https://t.co/JWaAtnGYz0

— Gustavo Petro (@petrogustavo) July 25, 2026

Petro: They “Gave Money Like Fools”

President Petro responded on his X account the same day, arguing that the story proves his government’s safeguards worked precisely because the contracts were never awarded. “The evidence indicated here reflects that the so-called ‘businessmen’ got furious and probably handed over the chats because they were not delivered for. If it is true, they gave money like fools, thinking that the ministers or I myself act under pressure from women or out of greed,” he wrote, adding: “The magazine would do a great favor by handing those chats to the prosecutor’s office… The corrupt businessmen appear to have been swindled, and the government prevented the theft.” He also quipped that the “boss of bosses apparently torpedoed the deals because he thinks about things other than greed,” and suggested the businessmen might “even turn out to be abelardistas” — a reference to supporters of President-elect Abelardo De La Espriella, who takes office August 7.

Criticism came from inside Petro’s own coalition. Carlos Carrillo, former director of the Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (UNGRD, the national disaster risk management unit) — itself the center of an earlier procurement scandal that shook the Petro administration — wrote on X that although Semana “has an evident political bias, the evidence it publishes against the Guerrero sisters is very serious. The justice system must investigate what crimes may have been committed. It is very worrying that Fonsecon is also being mentioned — the multibillion-peso Interior Ministry fund in the hands of Armando Benedetti’s friends.” Benedetti, the interior minister whom Colombian media have long described as Juliana Guerrero’s political sponsor, was himself sanctioned by the US Treasury’s OFAC in October 2025 alongside President Petro and members of the president’s family.

The report also vindicates warnings made months earlier by Angie Rodríguez, the former Dapre director who left the government in January 2026 and gave an explosive interview to Semana in April: “She (Juliana Guerrero), without any scruples, has the nerve to go to state entities to give orders, to say what gets contracted, who gets hired and who does not. She and her sister go to the Ministry of Equality and make decisions without being public officials,” Rodríguez said at the time.

The Only Case So Far: Fake Diplomas

Despite the mounting allegations, the only criminal proceeding currently facing Juliana Andrea Guerrero Jiménez is the fake-credentials case that derailed her 2025 nomination as vice minister of youth. The Fiscalía General de la Nación (Office of the Attorney General) has finalized an indictment charging her with procedural fraud and ideological falsehood in a public document, alleging she uploaded fake accounting degrees from the Fundación Universitaria San José — an institution where prosecutors say she never attended class or sat an exam — to the government’s SIGEP II résumé system in order to qualify for the vice ministry. The accusation hearing is set for August 5 at 4:00 p.m. before Bogotá’s 46th Circuit Court, two days before Petro leaves office. The university’s former secretary general, Luis Carlos Gutiérrez Martínez, faces charges of falsehood in a public document in the same proceeding for signing off on the degrees.

Guerrero remains the presidency’s delegate to the university council of the Universidad Popular del Cesar (Popular University of Cesar) and retains a state-funded protection detail from the Unidad Nacional de Protección (National Protection Unit). Prior to the events described in the investigation, her only documented government work was an $11 million COP advisory contract at the Interior Ministry, while Verónica Guerrero held two contracts totaling $19 million COP at Colombia Compra Eficiente (Colombia’s public procurement agency) and one for $11 million COP at the Interior Ministry, according to public procurement records cited by Semana.

The scandal lands in the final two weeks of a presidency already battered by corruption cases — from the UNGRD contracting affair to the illicit-enrichment investigation of former foreign minister Laura Sarabia — and hands incoming president De La Espriella’s attorney general appointees an early test: whether the chats, audios, and bank records now in Semana’s possession become a criminal file.

Who’s Who in the Guerrero Case

• Juliana Guerrero — Cesar-born political operator, former Interior Ministry adviser, and failed nominee for vice minister of youth; described by Semana as the most powerful woman in the Petro government. Accused by three businessmen of selling access to ministry contracts; separately indicted for uploading fake university degrees, with an accusation hearing set for August 5.
• Verónica Guerrero — Juliana’s sister and, per the chats, the network’s day-to-day interlocutor with the paying businessmen. Former contractor at Colombia Compra Eficiente and the Interior Ministry, with no state role during the alleged scheme.
• David Trespalacios — A young Barranquilla man close to the Guerrero family who, according to the report, collected cash and deposits so the sisters could keep money out of their own accounts, before a falling-out changed the arrangement.
• Gustavo Petro — Outgoing president of Colombia, leaving office August 7. The “boss of bosses” invoked in the chats, per the whistleblowers. He says the story shows his government blocked the corruption and that the businessmen were swindled.
• Edward Libreros — Former vice minister of water and basic sanitation, named in the chats as the channel for the Cesar aqueduct project; fired by Petro during a televised council of ministers in October 2025. The chats record the sisters’ claims about him; no response from Libreros appears in the published reports.
• Angie Rodríguez — Former Dapre director and one-time Petro confidante who publicly warned in April 2026 that the sisters were giving hiring and contracting orders inside state entities without holding any public office.
• Armando Benedetti — Interior minister and Juliana Guerrero’s longtime political sponsor, per Colombian press reports; sanctioned by OFAC in October 2025. Carrillo warned that Fonsecon, a fund under Benedetti’s ministry, figures in the allegations.
• Carlos Carrillo — Former UNGRD director who called the published evidence “very serious” and urged the justice system to investigate.
• Elvia Milena Sanjuán and Jorge “Popo” Barros — Governor of Cesar and a Cesar departmental deputy linked to the Gnecco political clan, respectively; the businessmen asked the sisters to broker meetings with both. An audio records Juliana agreeing. Neither is accused of wrongdoing in the report.
• Luis Carlos Gutiérrez Martínez — Former secretary general of the Fundación Universitaria San José, dismissed in late 2025 and charged with falsehood in a public document for certifying Guerrero’s degrees.
• The three businessmen — Unnamed contractors from Norte de Santander, Valle del Cauca, Cesar, and Santander who say they paid more than $600 million COP and received nothing. Petro suggests they were simply defrauded; they remain the case’s key witnesses.

Road corridors across the department of Cesar have been blocked since early July by campesino communities demanding something they say they were promised but never legally received: the registered deeds to land that the national government of President Gustavo Petro publicly adjudicated to them. Families who stood at official ceremonies and, in many cases, walked away with adjudication resolutions say that months later they still hold no escrituras (registered deeds) establishing them as the legal owners of their plots.

The gap between the ceremony and the paperwork has left hundreds of rural families in legal limbo over the homes they occupy and the crops they plant. Their central fear is timing. President Petro’s administration leaves office on August 7, when president-elect Abelardo de la Espriella is inaugurated, and the affected communities worry that once the clock runs out, no one will finish titling the parcels handed over in what several protesters have described as largely symbolic acts.

According to Infobae, close to a hundred farmers initially gathered outside the Valledupar offices of the Agencia Nacional de Tierras (National Land Agency), or ANT, the entity responsible for the program. When no officials came out to address them, the group moved to block the department’s main road corridors, halting regional transport. The protesters include campesinos from Cesar, La Guajira, and Magdalena.

A campesino leader from the municipality of Chimichagua, who withheld her name, publicly accused the ANT’s director and two members of Congress — representatives Alexandra Pineda and Nadia Umaña — of handing over land “symbolically and irregularly … generating false expectations in the communities,” according to Noticias Caracol. She said the communities felt they had been used as part of a media event while the documents formalizing ownership never arrived.

“When they carry out those handovers, the mayors are never called in. When they fail to deliver, the problem is left with us, and they block the city.” — Ernesto Orozco, Mayor of Valledupar

The mayor of Valledupar, Ernesto Orozco, placed responsibility on the agency’s management and the absence of its director, Juan Felipe Harman. Orozco said ANT officials had come to the region, handed out some resolutions, and left without completing the legal process, leaving a major social problem in the hands of the municipalities. His administration activated social-dialogue protocols through its security and government secretariats and spoke with the protesters for more than three days, he said, but could not find a single national-government representative in Valledupar willing to meet them.

“Here we are talking about the director of the National Land Agency, whose officials came, symbolically handed over some things, some with a resolution, but they have not given them the titles, and that is what the campesinos are demanding — their land titles,” Orozco said.

The only response, the mayor said, came from Bogota, where an ANT official explained that the agency was in the middle of its institutional handover to the incoming administration and could not send a delegate to Cesar. The agency’s proposed solution was for the farmers themselves to form a commission and travel to the capital. Lacking the resources to do so, the affected families relied on a private citizen, arranged through the Valledupar mayor’s office, to cover the bus fares for five campesino leaders who made the trip to Bogota. Officials warned that the corridors could close again if the delegation returned without concrete answers.

“We are not against agrarian reform or anything of the sort, but let them hand over the titles, or do things the way they should be done,” Orozco said. “When they carry out those handovers, the mayors are never called in. In my case, they did not call me, they did not tell me who received land or anything like that, but when they fail to deliver, the problem is left with us, and they block the city.”

The dispute lands at a moment of unusual instability at the top of the agency. Harman resigned as ANT director in early June to join the presidential campaign of leftist candidate Iván Cepeda, then returned to his post after Cepeda lost the June runoff to de la Espriella. The incoming president has threatened to eliminate the ANT altogether, sharpening the communities’ concern that the titling of their plots could stall in the transition.

The land at the center of the protests is tied to Petro’s flagship agrarian reform program. In its response to Noticias Caracol, the ANT said Harman had met with campesino communities from Cesar and elsewhere and that some titles would be issued during the second half of July. The agency said part of the parcels are properties recovered from the Sociedad de Activos Especiales (Special Assets Company), or SAE, the state entity that manages assets seized through extinción de dominio (asset forfeiture). The agriculture sector’s own tally counted more than 550 parcels recovered across several departments, including Cesar. The plots handed to the Cesar families were formerly SAE-administered properties that the agency acquired for about $1 trillion COP, part of 250 parcels purchased under a single agreement, with a titling process the agency said can take up to seven months but remains in force. Should a plot later face a legal reversal through a forfeiture proceeding, the agency said the parcel would not be taken back from the campesino; instead, the corresponding value would be paid to the former owner or alleged front holder.

Neither Harman nor the ANT’s central office had issued a definitive public resolution for the affected families as of Infobae’s publication. For an incoming administration that has questioned the agency’s very existence, the episode underscores how far a redistribution program can advance politically — through ceremonies, resolutions, and public tallies — while stopping short of the registered title that gives a rural family durable, bankable ownership of the ground beneath it.

The allocation follows capital discipline criteria and maintains investment levels comparable to projected 2025 year-end figures. Approximately 70% of the total budget ($17.2 trillion COP) is designated for core hydrocarbons operations, including production, refining, and transportation. The remaining 30% ($7.1 trillion COP) is slated for energy transition initiatives, power transmission, and corporate investments.

The 2026 financial model is built on an estimated Brent crude price of $60 USD per barrel and an average annual exchange rate near COP 4,050:1 USD. Under these assumptions, the Ecopetrol Group projects an approximate EBITDA margin of 40%, in line with 2025 levels. Transfers to the Colombian government are estimated at approximately $28 trillion COP. To support these financial targets and maintain debt metrics, the group plans to implement a portfolio rotation program.

A profitability and efficiency program is expected to contribute approximately $5.7 trillion COP, impacting EBITDA, investments, and working capital. This program is structured to support performance in total refining costs and transported barrel costs, while sustaining lifting costs below $12 USD per barrel.

Approximately $1.7 trillion COP is allocated to the company’s “SosTECnibility” strategy, focusing on climate change, sustainable territories, materials and waste management, and occupational health.

Hydrocarbons and Midstream Operations

Investment in exploration and production totals $14 trillion COP, constituting the largest single allocation. This is split with 89% dedicated to crude oil and 11% to natural gas, focused on achieving organic production levels of 730–740 thousand barrels of oil equivalent per day (BOED). Production is anticipated to consist of 80% crude, 15% gas, and 5% white products, utilizing recovery technologies to optimize resources. The strategy involves increasing crude oil output in Colombia to offset natural gas field declines.

The Ecopetrol Group plans to drill between 380 and 430 development wells, with 95% located in Colombia and 5% in the US. The exploration program includes 8 to 10 exploratory wells in Colombia, primarily in offshore, Meta, and Putumayo areas. Gas investments are estimated at $1.5 trillion COP, mainly targeting the Llanos Foothills and offshore areas to develop Caribbean gas, contributing an estimated 105–110,000 BOED.

Transport investments total about $1.5 trillion COP, representing 6% of the budget. The funding is primarily for integrity and reliability projects managed by Cenit, Ocensa, Oleoducto de Colombia S.A.), and Oleoducto del Llano S.A. Transported volumes are targeted between 1,110,000 and 1,120,000 barrels per day.

Refining investments are set at close to $1.7 trillion COP (7% of the budget), targeting reliability, availability, and sustainability at the Barrancabermeja and Cartagena refineries, aiming to reduce product imports and improve fuel quality. Combined refinery throughput is forecast between 410,000 and 420,000 barrels per day.

Energy Transition and Transmission Segment Growth

Interconexión Eléctrica S.A. E.S.P. (ISA) (BVC: ISA), an Ecopetrol subsidiary, is allocated between $6.2 and $6.8 trillion COP in 2026, comprising roughly 26% of the group’s annual budget, with approximately 80% dedicated to its electric transmission business.

For the core energy transition efforts, approximately $0.9 trillion COP (3% of the plan) is earmarked for non-conventional renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. This investment seeks to add approximately 750 MW of clean energy generation capacity from projects in operation, construction, and development.

Renewable Energy Acquisition Moves Ecopetrol Closer to 900 MW Target

In a separate announcement, Ecopetrol confirmed the successful conclusion of negotiations on November 28, 2025, with Grenergy Renovables S.A. (BME: GRE), a Spanish renewable energy company. The negotiations concern the potential acquisition by Ecopetrol of seven solar photovoltaic project companies in Colombia, located across the departments of Córdoba (3), Cesar (2), Magdalena (1), and Sucre (1).

Each of the seven companies owns the assets, licenses, agreements, and permits for a solar project with an estimated renewable energy generation capacity of up to ~12.6 MWp. The completion of this acquisition is contingent upon certain conditions precedent and legal requirements.

Upon closing, the transaction would contribute to Ecopetrol’s decarbonization and energy transition goals by adding installed capacity toward its internal target of 900 MW of self-generated renewable energy. These projects are intended to support low-emission energy generation under competitive conditions for the Ecopetrol Group’s self-consumption, reducing the company’s reliance on bilateral energy contracts and mitigating exposure to spot market energy purchases.

Corporate Governance Changes

Ecopetrol also reported changes to its corporate leadership. During a meeting held on November 27, 2025, the board of directors elected Ángela María Robledo Gómez as Chairwoman and Álvaro Torres Macías as Vice Chairman of the Board. Both individuals were elected to the Ecopetrol Board of Directors in a slate that was “proposed by the government” (President Gustavo Petro’s administration).

Additionally, the company reported the resignation of Independent Director Guillermo García Realpe, citing personal reasons. His resignation is effective as of December 12, 2025. Ecopetrol acknowledged his service to the company during his tenure.

Ecopetrol operates as a key integrated energy firm on the American continent. In Colombia, it is responsible for more than 60% of hydrocarbon production and manages the majority of the nation’s transportation, logistics, and hydrocarbon refining systems. Through its 51.4% stake in ISA, the company holds positions in energy transmission across Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia, as well as road concessions in Chile, and participates in real-time systems management through XM and the Barranquilla – Cartagena coastal highway concession. Internationally, Ecopetrol has drilling and exploration operations in oilfields across the US (Permian basin and the Gulf of Mexico), Brazil, and Mexico.

According to analysis based on IDEAM data (Colombia’s Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies), in the coming months, rainfall in the Andean, Caribbean, and Orinoquia regions is likely to be between normal values and up to 40% above historical averages. This increase, although natural in the rainy season, translates into a latent risk of extreme events that could affect both agricultural production and rural infrastructure,” explained Eliecer Díaz Almanza, an expert from the UPRA.

Headline image: Cacao fruits, when processed correcty, render chocolate.

The impact is expected to be especially relevant on crops sensitive to excess water, such as bananas and plantains, cacao, avocado, vegetables, and potatoes. In addition, high humidity conditions could lead to the proliferation of pests and diseases, affecting animal and plant health.

The acting director of the UPRA, Dora Inés Rey, highlighted the importance of consulting the Agroclimatic Bulletin to plan and, thus, reduce the impact of agroclimatic risks: “Having this information has been fundamental for decision-making. It allows farmers, producers, and authorities, both regional and national, to anticipate, prioritize actions in crops, adapt infrastructures, and protect production systems that are at risk.”

Special attention to the ACFEC

The bulletin highlights that productive areas under Ethnic and Community Family Peasant Agriculture (ACFEC) schemes are especially vulnerable. It is estimated that, in departments such as Antioquia, Cundinamarca, Boyacá, Nariño, Cauca, and Valle del Cauca, agroclimatic conditions increase the risk for small producers and production systems located in alluvial soils or with a high water table.

In regions such as the Caribbean, Pacific, and Andean, a medium and low risk of excess moisture is projected in agricultural and livestock areas in specific areas. The potential impact also extends to ACFEC’s production systems, where significant effects are expected in key departments such as Antioquia, Cundinamarca and Valle del Cauca.

The situation is similar in the Orinoquia and the Amazon, although with relatively minor impacts. In these areas, the risk of damage to rural roads and productive infrastructure stands out. “We call on regional and local authorities to make use of this information to anticipate and foresee risks, strengthen agro-ecological practices, improve drainage systems, plan planting in a staggered manner, and reinforce rural infrastructures,” explained Alexander Rodríguez Romero, technical director of Efficient Land Use and Land Adaptation at UPRA.

Likewise, we invite local authorities to redouble agroclimatic technical assistance with a differential approach for these population groups, vital in food production and food security in the country.

“The planning of agricultural activities must be guided by the climate predictions of Ideam, the UPRA Agroclimatic Bulletin, and the recommendations of the National Agroclimatic Technical Table, key tools for timely decision-making that contribute to mitigating risks and guaranteeing the sustainability of the sector,” concluded César Cortés, UPRA expert.

Key figures from the April 2025 Agroclimatic Bulletin

• 2.3 million hectares within the national agricultural frontier are at risk of excess water.
• In ACFEC areas, more than 852 thousand hectares are identified with low risk and about 86 thousand hectares with medium risk, especially in the Andean and Pacific regions.
• Andean Region: medium risk at 97,000 ha and low at 181,000 ha, with possible impact on crops such as Musaceae, fruit trees, and vegetables.
• Caribbean region: low risk in more than 179,000 ha, with critical points in agricultural areas such as Chiriguaná (Cesar).
• Pacific Region: medium risk in 109,000 ha and low in 164,000 ha; affects productive systems and mountain areas vulnerable to landslides.
• Orinoquia and Amazon regions: lower risk, but with potential effects on rural infrastructure and roads.

Photo credit: UPRA.

This grim reality was made evident in late January when the army seized more than 2,600 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including landmines belonging to the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) in Tibú, in the Catatumbo region. Just days earlier, authorities had confiscated 300 landmines in the same area from FARC dissidents. Roads, rural paths, and farms in the region have become impassable.

The increase in demining efforts, landmine seizures, and suspected minefields reported by Colombian authorities in 2024 underscores that, despite the historic decline in landmine use since the 2016 Peace Agreement, criminal groups in the country continue to deploy these devices in their territorial disputes.

Throughout 2024, Colombia’s Office of the High Commissioner for Peace reported 998 incidents related to anti-personnel mines (APMs) and unexploded ordnance (UXO), including demining activities, reports of suspected minefields, and the seizure of these devices, most of which were handmade.

These figures represent an over 11% increase compared to the previous year, which saw 896 incidents. The upward trend has continued since 2021, when 316 incidents were recorded, followed by 412 in 2022. Experts consulted by InSight Crime agree that no single factor explains this surge.

A staggering 94% of the reported incidents were related to demining operations. Increased military activity in strategic areas and greater accessibility to former conflict zones—once heavily mined during the war between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) and the state before the 2016 Peace Agreement—account for many of these cases. However, other areas remain inaccessible to both military and humanitarian demining operations due to the control exerted by armed groups.

In Cauca and Nariño, the number of incidents surpassed those recorded immediately after the Peace Agreement: 58 and 69 incidents, respectively, that year. A similar trend has been seen in other departments with lower historical mine activity, such as Guaviare, Casanare, Bolívar, and Cesar.

Although Colombia signed the Ottawa Treaty banning the use and destruction of anti-personnel mines in 1997, it wasn’t until 2016 that the country’s largest guerrilla group and primary user of landmines—the FARC—committed to demining efforts as part of their demobilization.

“In the years following the Peace Agreement, the impact of landmines had dropped dramatically. Now, we are seeing figures reminiscent of the early post-agreement period, with the added problem that today, civilians are more affected than military personnel,” said Camilo Serna, director of the Colombian Campaign Against Mines (Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas), in an interview with InSight Crime.

Below are the three main reasons why landmine use has resurged in Colombia.

1. Criminal Disputes

Military pressure and ongoing territorial disputes in an increasingly fragmented criminal landscape have led some armed groups to resume planting landmines.

In Arauca, bordering Venezuela, authorities reported 101 incidents, mostly in the municipalities of Arauquita and Puerto Rondón, where the ELN’s Eastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Oriental) and the FARC dissidents’ 10th and 28th Fronts operate.

In Cauca and Nariño, key departments for coca cultivation, cocaine production, and trafficking corridors to Ecuador, 142 and 318 incidents were recorded, respectively. Most incidents occurred in the municipalities of Argelia and Tumaco, where FARC dissident factions and the ELN are locked in violent battles for control of these illicit economies.

SEE ALSO: BACRIM Turn to Landmines in Colombia

“Today, armed groups are fighting each other and using landmines against one another. It is no longer a tactical tool primarily used against government troops moving through an area,” Serna explained.

In Catatumbo, a strategic border region with Venezuela, the ELN’s Northeastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Nororiental) has been clashing with the FARC dissidents’ 33rd Front since early January. Landmine use in this area has also prevented authorities from conducting demining operations for years.

According to Colombia’s Deputy Inspector General for Peace Agreement Monitoring, Javier Sarmiento, who has been tracking the humanitarian crisis in Catatumbo, the presence of landmines has made it impossible for over 50,000 displaced people to return home safely.

In other strategic regions for organized crime—such as Chocó, Cauca, and Arauca—increased military presence and demining operations have prompted armed groups to use more explosives to defend their territories.

2. The Fragmentation of FARC Dissidents

In 2024, Colombian authorities attributed 618 landmine-related incidents to the various dissident factions of the FARC. These figures, alongside those from 2023 (638 incidents), mark the highest landmine use by these groups since the Peace Agreement. Before then, FARC dissidents had never been linked to more than 222 such incidents in a single year.

The fragmentation of these groups—previously divided between the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and Segunda Marquetalia but now splintering even further—has fueled clashes where landmines are a key battlefield tactic.

The ELN, a long-time user of landmines, was responsible for 164 of the incidents recorded in 2024.

Beyond the ELN and FARC dissidents, other armed groups were responsible for 47 landmine-related incidents in 2024—the highest number ever recorded for this category.

SEE ALSO: Gaitanistas Landmines are Guerrilla Tactic from Colombia’s Dark Past

Among them, the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) stand out. Though they typically use direct armed force to exert control, their increasing involvement in landmine incidents suggests knowledge transfer. Following the FARC’s demobilization, some former guerrilla fighters were recruited by the AGC, bringing new tactics to the group’s military operations.

Disputed territories—where the ELN, FARC dissidents, and AGC are vying for control—are the main hotspots for landmine replanting in Colombia.

3. The Rise of IEDs

IEDs can be built using easily accessible materials, some of which have become more durable. Technological innovations, such as the use of PVC tubes, have extended the lifespan of these devices by better protecting the internal ignition mechanisms, which may include electronic triggers or more sophisticated pressure-activated systems.

“It is now extremely difficult to control because numerous groups and individuals know how to build both command-detonated improvised explosive devices and victim-activated landmines,” an anti-personnel mine expert told InSight Crime on the condition of anonymity for security reasons.

In the end, the combination of ongoing armed group conflicts, tactical knowledge transfer between the key former FARC factions at the heart of the conflict, and the ease of manufacturing these devices has severely hindered Colombia’s demining efforts.

This article, written by Beatriz Vicent Fernández, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace (Paz Total) policy, designed to negotiate agreements with the country’s main armed groups and criminal gangs, is struggling to make any headway as he passes the halfway point of his four-year administration. The negotiations have had profound effects on the criminal dynamics in the country.

SEE ALSO: What Is Behind Increased Violence in Colombia?

After initial progress in dialogue with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), talks collapsed in May last year when a faction of the group split off to pursue separate peace negotiations. The ELN’s extensive infrastructure and leadership in Venezuela, where Nicolás Maduro remains in power following a widely criticized election, has further undermined the chances of peace with the Marxist-Leninist rebel force.

Similarly, negotiations with dissidents of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) have faced significant setbacks. Fragmentation within these groups has sparked infighting, with splinter factions emerging from the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) and the Second Marquetalia, the two largest dissident factions. As a result, the government is engaging with only a small portion of each group.

The country’s most powerful drug-trafficking organization, the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), remains largely outside the Total Peace framework. Efforts have been stalled by the absence of a legal framework for negotiations and a potential peace deal. Similar legal obstacles have hindered progress in “urban peace laboratories” in cities like Buenaventura, Quibdó, and Medellín, where gangs dominate neighborhoods through drug trafficking and extortion rackets.

As Petro begins the third year of his presidency, InSight Crime reviews the key developments in Colombia’s peace dialogues and examines their criminal implications for 2025.

ELN

Initial progress with the ELN effectively unraveled as disputes with the government led to the collapse of negotiations.

In January last year, the Comuneros del Sur Front (Frente Comuneros del Sur – FCS), an ELN faction in southern Nariño, broke ranks, announcing plans to pursue separate “regional dialogue” with the government. Frustrated by the limited progress at the national level and growing threats from rival groups, the FCS sought a more localized approach. However, ELN top commander Eliecer Erlinto Chamorro, alias “Antonio García,” condemned these parallel dialogues as unauthorized and illegitimate.

SEE ALSO: Kidnappings Surge in Colombia Amid ELN Peace Negotiations

By May, the FCS formally severed ties with the ELN, emerging as a dissident faction of the guerrilla group. It quickly established dialogue with the government, advanced in peace talks, and even committed to a partial weapons handover, according to Carlos Augusto Erazo Murcia, head of the government’s negotiating team.

This was followed by the collapse of a bilateral ceasefire between the ELN and the government, which expired in August without renewal. After the ceasefire lapse, the ELN escalated hostilities by attacking a military base in Arauca in September, killing three soldiers. In response, the government suspended peace talks indefinitely.

The ELN and the government resumed talks on November 25, agreeing to reconvene in 2025 to reassess the dialogue process and explore the possibility of a renewed ceasefire.

The ELN also stands to benefit greatly from what was widely considered a stolen election in Venezuela, extending by another six years of Maduro’s time at the helm of the country. Venezuela remains a critical hub for the ELN, hosting much of its leadership and infrastructure.

Since the FARC’s demobilization in 2016, the ELN has expanded its presence in Venezuela and Colombia’s border departments, strengthening its operations through a symbiotic relationship with the Maduro regime. The group now controls entire sections of the border, managing smuggling and drug-trafficking corridors between the two countries, while maintaining corridors moving troops. Its influence spans eight of Venezuela’s 24 states, with significant income derived from controlling illegal mining and cocaine production zones.

With little interference and often support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—who depend on the income generated by these groups, particularly amid severe US sanctions—the ELN has solidified its presence along the 2,219 km border with Venezuela and uses this haven to project into Colombia. This growing entrenchment further undermines the Total Peace initiative.

Ex-FARC

Government dialogue with the EMC, the largest ex-FARC organization, has also splintered the group. In March, Petro suspended a bilateral ceasefire with the EMC in the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño due to ongoing violence against Indigenous communities. This decision deepened internal divisions within the EMC. Its leader, Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias “Iván Mordisco,” refused further negotiations until the ceasefire was reinstated, while another faction, led by Alexander Díaz, alias “Calarcá Córdoba,” opted to continue talks.

By April, the government expelled Mordisco’s faction from the peace talks, shifting its focus to negotiations exclusively with Calarcá’s bloc. In July, his group signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement, marking a tentative step forward. However, significant challenges remain: Calarcá’s faction has been accused of threatening demobilized FARC members in Caquetá, and in December, six soldiers were killed in a minefield allegedly planted by the group.

Mordisco’s wing, on the other hand, has intensified violent activities, particularly in Cauca, an important region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. By September, Cauca had recorded 466 violent incidents over 12 months, the most of any department during that period, with numbers continuing to rise through the end of 2024.

Meanwhile, the Second Marquetalia, a separate group of FARC dissidents led by Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” became the third major group to enter Total Peace negotiations in 2024. However, internal divisions also plagued this effort. In November, two key factions—the Border Command and the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico)—broke away, frustrated by Márquez’s leadership. They formed the National Bolivarian Army Coordinator (Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano), led by José Vicente Lesmes, alias “Walter Mendoza.”

AGC and Urban Groups

The AGC has been largely excluded from the Total Peace initiative thus far, but signs emerged in 2024 that Petro sought to change this. In July, he authorized dialogue with the group, signaling a potential shift in policy.

But significant obstacles remain. The government’s classification of the AGC as a high-impact organized crime group, rather than a political organization like the ELN or FARC dissidents, has become a sticking point in the negotiations. This designation precludes the AGC from seeking transitional justice terms, such as guarantees against extradition and amnesty, similar to those offered to the FARC in the 2016 peace agreement. Under Colombian law, high-impact organized crime groups are only eligible for limited judicial benefits, such as reduced sentences, making negotiations far less appealing for the AGC.

SEE ALSO: GameChangers 2023: The Cocaine Flash-to-Bang in 2024

Despite minor progress—such as the attorney general lifting arrest warrants for key AGC leaders—negotiations have yielded few tangible results. Tensions remain high: in December, the military bombed an AGC camp in northern Antioquia, underscoring the ongoing hostilities.

Moreover, skepticism about the AGC’s intentions persists. Some analysts suggest the group is using negotiations as a tactical maneuver to secure a bilateral ceasefire and reduce military pressure, rather than genuinely committing to demobilization. At the same time, its ongoing territorial expansion and dominance over key criminal economies fuel doubts about its willingness to disarm.

The absence of a legal framework for gang demobilization, or “transition to legality,” as it is officially termed, has also hindered progress in cities like Medellín, Quibdó, and Buenaventura.

Efforts to pass legislation to formalize a framework for gang demobilization have stalled in Colombia’s gridlocked congress, leaving urban peace efforts in limbo.

In Medellín, several gangs agreed to reduce violence following Petro’s 2022 election, resulting in a notable drop in homicide rates. In June 2023, Petro initiated a dialogue table with former gang leaders at Itagüí prison, but progress faltered in 2024.

In Quibdó, the gangs Los Mexicanos, Lokos Yam, and RPS began talks in August 2023, achieving significant milestones like a commitment to halt the extortion of teachers and health workers. But in September 2024, a ceasefire between the gangs collapsed, amidst incursions by the AGC into the city. In December, Petro authorized exploratory talks to include three additional groups—the Zetas, Cabí, and AGC—in the Quibdó table.

In Buenaventura, negotiations with the Spartans and Shottas—which together command over 1,700 members—have produced mixed results. The groups agreed to a truce in August 2023, significantly reducing violence throughout 2024. While tensions flared in March when the Spartans temporarily withdrew from the negotiations, they eventually returned to the table, and have renewed the ceasefire, currently set to last until February 2025.

Looking Forward

Several key factors will significantly influence peace negotiations in 2025.

First, the fragmentation of major groups within the Total Peace process highlights the challenges of negotiating with organizations that appear unified but are, in fact, loose coalitions of diverse factions. The Comuneros del Sur’s split from the ELN exposed the group’s limited control over its regional fronts. Similarly, the EMC’s divided leadership—between Mordisco and Calarcá—mirrors the internal tensions within the Second Marquetalia, where Iván Márquez has struggled to maintain cohesion among factions like the Border Command.

These fractures risk escalating violence as splinter groups vie for territorial control and factions excluded from peace talks increase attacks on government targets.

Since the EMC split, clashes between Mordisco’s and Calarcá’s factions have escalated in Putumayo, a key region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. Violence has also surged in other southwestern departments, such as Cauca. The deadly ELN attack on the military base could also foreshadow more violent confrontations between criminal groups and government forces, despite the relative lull achieved by ceasefires in 2024.

Second, the absence of widespread ceasefires with criminal groups has leveled the criminal playing field once again. Ceasefires maintained by the ELN and EMC in 2023 temporarily shifted criminal dynamics, allowing these groups to expand their territorial control, recruit new members, and focus on rival factions rather than government forces.

“We know [armed groups] have taken advantage of the ceasefire to try to increase their illegal control over the territory,” Colombia’s Minister of Defense said in a press conference in March 2024.

This reprieve boosted profits from drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion. In contrast, the AGC, excluded from ceasefire agreements, continued to face government offensives.

SEE ALSO: The Informants of Tibú: How the Colombian State Unleashed a Wave of Femicides

Currently, only the Calarcá dissidents and the FCS have active bilateral ceasefires with the government. The FCS, being relatively small, is unlikely to use the ceasefire for significant territorial expansion but will likely consolidate its holdings and defend against incoming EMC incursions into Nariño. Conversely, the Calarcá dissidents are better positioned to exploit their ceasefire to strengthen their presence in critical drug trafficking zones, particularly along the Amazonian border with Brazil and in parts of the Venezuelan frontier.

For groups like the Mordisco dissidents and the ELN, the absence of ceasefires means they will lose their distinct advantage as they compete for control over territories essential for drug trafficking, illegal mining, and other key revenue streams. However, the lack of ceasefires could give the AGC an edge.

Despite facing sustained military pressure, the AGC has expanded along the Pacific coast in Chocó, the Caribbean coast in Bolívar, Córdoba, and Cesar, and is encircling Catatumbo in Norte de Santander—one of Colombia’s most critical coca cultivation regions. With its criminal rivals now experiencing the same pressure it has endured, the AGC is poised to solidify and take even greater control as cocaine production explodes and gold prices approach record highs.

Third, Maduro’s dependence on Colombian criminal groups ensures that the ELN and Second Marquetalia will continue to strengthen their footholds in Venezuela and along Colombia’s border. With minimal interference—and often direct support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—both groups have entrenched themselves in the region, controlling key criminal economies such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and contraband smuggling.

With the prospect of six more years of protection under Maduro, these groups have little immediate incentive to engage in peace negotiations. Instead, they are well-positioned to expand their operations further.

This article, written by Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

The rationing will primarily affect Colombia’s Caribbean region, encompassing departments such as Bolívar, Magdalena, La Guajira, Cesar, Córdoba, Sucre, San Andrés, and Atlántico. This recently planned restriction will mostly impact industrial sectors, with thermal power plants in the Caribbean facing significant reductions in gas availability. Residential and small commercial consumers are expected to remain unaffected in the short term, according to the Ministry of Mines and Energy.

The planned maintenance of the Spec LNG regasification plant in Cartagena—a critical facility for liquefied natural gas (LNG) processing—directly influences the gas rationing decision. Maintenance is typically conducted annually and is mandated under Decree 1073 of 2015. However, this year’s maintenance is notable due to the decreased gas reserves and high demand.

Gas Supply Shortfall and Import Strategy

The Colombian Natural Gas Association (Naturgas), represented by its president Luz Stella Murgas, has emphasized the urgency of sourcing gas imports from neighboring countries to counter declining internal reserves. According to Murgas, increasing gas imports is the only viable option to avoid mid- to long-term shortages. Colombia’s domestic reserves have seen accelerated depletion, raising alarms within the industry and highlighting a critical need for regulatory adjustments.

Colombia’s reliance on hydroelectric power sources—which account for approximately 70% of national electricity—compounds the situation. Reservoir levels dropped significantly due to the El Niño phenomenon, which concluded in April 2024. Although reservoirs have since begun recovering, their current levels remain below optimal. As of October 20, Ecopetrol reported reservoir levels at 53.64% capacity, a figure that remains insufficient as the country anticipates a dry season with lower-than-average rainfall beginning in December.

The increased reliance on thermal power plants to compensate for lower hydroelectric output has put additional strain on natural gas supplies. The Ministry of Mines and Energy indicated that imported gas volumes have been insufficient to meet this demand surge, leading to the current shortage. In response, the ministry has proposed regulatory “enablers” to facilitate gas imports, a policy adjustment aimed at stabilizing market conditions, according to Minister Andrés Camacho.

Rationing Details and Implications for the Industrial Sector

The rationing strategy includes staged reductions in gas supply to major industrial consumers over the four-day period, with planned volumes of:

• October 31 – November 1: 84.6 million cubic feet
• November 2: 75.7 million cubic feet
• November 3: 60.3 million cubic feet
• November 4: 72.4 million cubic feet

These allocations are part of a broader inventory management approach aimed at maintaining energy system balance. However, experts have raised concerns that these volumes may fall short of meeting the region’s rising industrial demand, especially in the Caribbean.

Broader Energy Policy and Economic Impact

The rationing decision highlights the complex intersection of Colombia’s energy policies, supply dynamics, and environmental factors. The Caribbean region’s high concentration of energy-intensive industries is expected to feel the brunt of the rationing’s indirect effects on electricity stability. While this measure remains temporary, the government’s exploration moratorium and current reserve limitations suggest a challenging outlook for Colombia’s energy sector.

The Ministry of Mines and Energy’s gas rationing strategy illustrates the critical need for policy adaptations to mitigate shortfalls and ensure energy security in the face of fluctuating internal resources and environmental variables. As the situation evolves, the government will face mounting pressure from industrial stakeholders and the public to develop more resilient energy policies.

Although Colombia’s regional elections, held on October 29, were more peaceful than those held four years ago, they showed that organized crime continues to be a severe threat to electoral proceedings.

Photo: Members of the Electoral Observation Mission (MOE), including director Alejandra Barrios, meeting in August before the elections. (Credit: MOE)

In these elections, Colombians voted for their local and departmental representatives, including mayors and governors, for the period 2024-2026. While the results were mixed, right-wing parties claimed several important victories, leaving President Gustavo Petro’s leftist government with few allies at the regional level.

This will likely influence the government’s Total Peace plan, which seeks to negotiate with armed groups across the country, as several prominent critics of this policy were elected.

While most of the elections took place without public disturbance, attacks on polling stations were reported in Norte de Santander, Cauca, and parts of the Caribbean coast.

InSight Crime presents three conclusions on the role organized crime played in these elections:

No Interference by Armed Groups on the Day

In 2023, the elections saw an absence of violence by criminal groups in the electoral scenario. Armed groups such as the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) of the ex-FARC Mafia, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) and the Gaitanista Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) were not behind any violent acts during the polls.

The government’s current ceasefires with the ELN and the EMC, achieved through Total Peace talks, as well as the patchy presence of the AGC, played an important part, according to Diego Rubiano, a senior analyst for the Electoral Observation Mission (Misión de Observación Electoral – MOE).

“Since 2014-2015, we always had an action by an armed actor. There was always the detonation of an explosive device or a frontal attack on a polling station. This year, we didn’t have a single incident,” he said.

The few disturbances at polling stations did not appear to have any links to armed groups.

The elections were canceled in some municipalities of the southern departments of Putumayo and Nariño due to the perceived risks of violent attacks. Other events also overshadowed proceedings. Supporters of a mayoral candidate in La Gamarra, Cesar, set fire to an electoral office building, killing one official, identified as Duperly Arévalo Carrascal. And in Argelia, Cauca, demonstrators angry with the voting results set fire to electoral materials.

Other irregularities were also registered. The amount of cash seized nationwide by authorities on the day for allegedly being used for electoral corruption skyrocketed by 289% over the last polls to reach 1.2 billion pesos ($300,000). The mayor of Yondó in Antioquia, Fabián Echavarría Rangel, was arrested after being caught with 150 million pesos ($37,000) in his van.

In addition, 389 people were arrested, 189 for judicial records and 35 for crimes such as the destruction of electoral material and obstructing the carrying out of the elections.

Political Violence Rose During Campaign

Although election day was calm, the previous months saw an increase in political violence.

According to the MOE, between October 29, 2022 and September 29, 2023, violence against political leaders increased by 92% compared to 2019, although violence against social leaders decreased by 15.6%. At least 28 political candidates were killed.

“There is a change in the strategy of political participation [of the armed groups],” Rubiano commented, adding that they are seeking to “take advantage of the electoral process.”

The MOE recorded 1,352 violent incidents related to armed groups over this period, an increase of 129% compared to the 2019 regional elections and 66% higher than during the 2022 presidential elections. For its part, between January and September 2023, the Ombudsman’s Office recorded at least 375 acts of violence, including threats, attacks and homicides, allegedly perpetrated by armed groups such as the ex-FARC mafia (56 acts), the AGC (54) and the ELN (44). Attacks on local authorities led to at least 12 mayors having to govern outside their municipalities from somewhere else due to threats from armed groups.

“This violence…occurs much more at the beginning of the electoral calendar, where we begin to see problems with registering people, complaints that [groups are extorting candidates] to let them campaign or to be able to mobilize,” said Mauricio Vela, coordinator of the MOE’s Political and Electoral Observatory of Democracy.

The departments of Cauca, Nariño, Valle del Cauca and Antioquia were the most affected by violence against political and social leaders.

Local Elections Remain Important to Organized Crime

Although the violence was not attributable to criminal groups, InSight Crime was able to collect testimonies in departments such as Norte de Santander, Chocó and Cauca that show the interference of these groups in the elections.

Criminal groups in the country continued to unduly influence elections by extorting candidates and telling local communities who to vote for.

“Every political actor has to go and talk to the guerrillas in order to be able to work, campaign and everything. They are very strict about buying votes,” a social leader in Guapi, Cauca, told InSight Crime before the elections.

In Hacarí, Norte de Santander, ELN members blocked voters for one mayoral candidate, and in Bolívar, alleged AGC members intimidated voters in the municipality of San Jacinto del Cauca, according to a statement from the Ombudsman’s Office.

For decades, municipal budgets have been a source of income for armed groups, who extort money from officials and contractors. In addition, Colombia’s current coca price crisis has forced the groups to further diversify their criminal portfolios, giving more weight to illicit economies such as extortion.

This article, by Lara Loaiza and Juan Diego Cárdenas, was originally published by Insight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America.

Between December 19 and January 18, 2023, more than 1.3 million policies have already been issued, with the greatest response is in the motorcycle segment, with 765,816 policies issued (104% growth).

“We see with satisfaction that citizens have responded positively to the measure of the national government and insurance companies have accompanied its implementation. 2022 closed with 9.4 million vehicle owners with life-saving insurance, 348,150 more than at the end of 2021,” said David Colmenares, president of the Fasecolda Board of Directors.

SOAT policy issuance for motorcycles went from 375,554 policies in the period from 12/19/2021 to 01/18/22 up to 765,816 policies sold in November, before the price reduction measure took effect.

Colombia’s Caribbean region, including the departments of Atlántico, Córdoba, Bolívar, César, Magdalena, Sucre, and Guajira, registered a 40% growth in policy issuance.

All registered vehicles using Colombian roads must carry this liability insurance coverage that pays for physical harm or death due to vehicular accidents in the country. SOAT covers drivers, passengers, and pedestrians, and is underwritten by private insurance companies.

“On the road we are all protagonists, therefore, from the insurance industry, we call on citizens to have good behavior on the roads and continue to comply with the obligation to acquire the SOAT to be protected,” admonished Colmenares.

Image courtesy Fasecolda

As always, the event also features extensive programming on silver and copper along with gold and other precious metals commercially important to the Colombian mining sector.

Finance Colombia’s Loren Moss is slated to present on technological innovation in the mining sector.

Call for papers

Programming for the event has already begun, though organizer Paul Harris says that we: “would like to invite anyone interested in presenting to email us the topic and a brief summary for consideration by the programming committee. As a reminder, our website is www.ColombiaGold.co which we are working to update.”

CGS Economic Development Awards

Harris added: “We also request nominations for the CGS Economic Development Awards which seek to recognize innovative and impactful projects development by companies to further the economic opportunities in the communities within which they work.”

Sponsorships & Exhibitor Opportunities

CGS Medellin will feature a range of sponsorship opportunities, while the Intercontinental Hotel will enable the event to host a larger commercial exhibit space. Interested exhibitors should email Monica at direccion@eme2.co to request the brochure.

CGSMedellin Draft Program

Regulatory & Social Environment

• Mining regulation panel moderated by Jorge Neher, Dentons Cardenas
• Mining finance trends, Antonio Pichardo, BNP Paribus

Environment

• Water and mining, protecting and sharing water resources, Patrick Williamson, Intera
• Developing a forest strategy for a mine development project, Juan David Ramirez, Gramalote/B2Gold
• The role of NGOs: a collaborative approach on compensation, Conservation International.
• Eco mining strategy, Alfonso Monge

Mining Trends

• Mining Trends, Javier Quintana, EY
• Engaging communities for success, Guillen Calvo, Insuco
• Mining risk management system, Luis Aparicio, Terranova Consulting

Innovation

• Drones and their application in Mining 4.0, George Sobelman, Procontours
• AGDAS full-waveform distributed array IP for copper and gold exploration, Jose Arce, Arce Geofisicos
• Integrated tailings dewatering plant, Cameron Stockman, Responsible Mining Solutions
• Loren Moss, Technology for Mining

Gold

• GCM Mining, Segovia
• Aris Gold, Marmato & Soto Norte
• Royal Road Minerals, Antioquia and Nicaragua
• Antioquia Gold, Cisneros
• Los Cerros, Miraflores
• Guayabales, Collective Mining
• GCM Mining, Toroparu
• Gold Mining, La Mina-Garrucha

Copper

• Copper opportunities in Latin America, Francisco Acuña, CRU
• Max Resource, Cesar
• MCC, Colombia porphyry copper belt
• Cobrasco, Rugby Mining
• Reducing the carbon footprint, Julio Iturriaga, Alvarez & Marshal

CGS Awards