Colombia’s Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia (Financial Superintendency of Colombia, or SFC) has published for public comment a draft external circular that would give banks, insurers and other supervised financial institutions temporary instructions to assist consumers affected by the magnitude 7.4 earthquake that struck the country on August 10, 2026. The comment period, open since August 12, closes at 11:59 p.m. on August 14, 2026, giving industry and the public a two-business-day window to respond, according to the draft text and the SFC’s own consultation record.

The earthquake, with an epicenter in the municipality of San José del Palmar in Chocó department and a depth of 96 kilometers, triggered 991 additional seismic events within a 900-kilometer radius, according to figures cited in the SFC’s draft circular, including 115 in the magnitude 5.0-to-5.9 range, 18 between magnitude 6.0 and 6.9, and three exceeding magnitude 7.0. The national government declared a state of national disaster the following day, August 11, through Decree 1171, covering Antioquia, Caldas, Cauca, Chocó, Quindío, Cundinamarca, Risaralda, Huila, Valle del Cauca, Tolima, Putumayo, Norte de Santander and other affected territories for an initial 12 months, renewable for an equal term, as Finance Colombia reported at the time.

Death toll still climbing

As of the evening of August 12, Colombian President Abelardo De La Espriella cited a balance from the Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (National Unit for Disaster Risk Management, or UNGRD) showing a toll that had continued to climb since the quake struck two days earlier.

“We have 25,872 affected families, 53,816 people, sadly 265 dead, 3,494 injured, and the number of missing has risen alarmingly to 496.”— Colombian President Abelardo De La Espriella, citing the UNGRD balance, August 12, 2026

The same balance reported 11,347 homes destroyed and 53,526 damaged, 140 buildings collapsed, and 1,819 schools and 631 community centers affected. Earlier counts from the same day had put the toll lower, underscoring that the figures remained provisional; international search-and-rescue teams, coordinated by UNGRD, were still arriving as of August 13 to assist Colombian personnel, and officials have cautioned the toll is likely to keep rising.

Colombia’s disaster management law, Ley 1523 de 2012, activates a special legal regime once a national disaster is declared, including articles 86 and 87, which allow affected debtors to seek refinancing of existing obligations. The SFC’s draft circular says it is exercising its instruction authority under the Estatuto Orgánico del Sistema Financiero (Organic Statute of the Financial System) and Decree 2555 of 2010 to translate that legal framework into binding instructions for the institutions it supervises.

Refinancing terms for affected borrowers

Under the draft measures, lending institutions would be required to adopt refinancing programs for borrowers affected by the disaster, subject to conditions drawn directly from the 2012 law: refinancing would apply only to obligations contracted before August 10, 2026, with payments due on or after that date; the new loan term could not exceed double the remaining term or 20 years, whichever is shorter; refinanced terms could not be more burdensome than the original ones; and borrowers would have to apply while the disaster declaration remains in force. No interest or late fees would accrue between the disaster declaration and the completion of the renegotiation, a period the draft caps at 90 days. Lenders could also offer additional voluntary relief, such as grace periods or special interest rates, provided the terms are no more burdensome for the consumer and the measures are not applied as a blanket restructuring practice rather than case-by-case review.

Credits refinanced under the program would keep the risk rating they carried before the disaster was declared, with credit-bureau reporting frozen for up to 12 months after the refinancing is completed, and the draft specifies the refinancing would not count as a modification or restructuring for prudential reporting purposes. Lenders would also be permitted to use alternative data sources to assess a borrower’s future repayment capacity, accounting for the likely economic recovery of the borrower’s sector.

Insurers, fund managers and severance withdrawals

Insurance companies would be required to establish expedited claims and payment channels for policyholders in affected areas, prioritize payment of healthcare providers’ invoices tied to the disaster, and adopt policies to facilitate premium payments, including for policies unrelated to credit operations. Trust companies and brokerage firms would be asked to evaluate mechanisms to speed redemptions from open-end investment funds without a minimum holding period, and to consider waiving early-redemption penalties for funds that carry one, for consumers affected by the disaster. Severance-fund administrators would be instructed to expedite housing-related severance withdrawals for affected members, within the bounds of Colombia’s existing severance-withdrawal rules.

The draft also directs supervised entities more broadly to maintain continuity of financial services where security conditions allow, disclose any changes to branch hours or closures, strengthen digital channels, and activate business-continuity plans in affected zones; to clearly publicize the terms of any relief programs; and to set up priority service channels for complaints and claims tied to the disaster. The SFC said it would establish its own priority contact channel to help affected consumers navigate complaints against supervised entities.

In its internal cost-benefit review, the SFC’s research and analysis unit found no reason to delay the proposal, concluding that reduced default risk, faster insurance payouts and improved liquidity access for affected consumers would outweigh the compliance costs institutions face in adapting systems, training staff and expanding service channels. The regulator said the draft requires no new budget appropriations and can be implemented with existing staff and technology. It also said a competition-impact questionnaire it completed under Colombia’s competition-advocacy rules returned entirely negative responses, meaning no referral to the Superintendencia de Industria y Comercio (Superintendency of Industry and Commerce) was required.

A two-day window, and a toll still being counted

The SFC set the unusually short two-business-day comment window under an exception in Colombian regulatory procedure that allows shortened public consultation periods when a rule responds to urgent, unforeseeable circumstances. The regulator said the scale of the disaster and the need for a prompt, uniform response from the financial sector justified the shortened timeline. Comments can be submitted using a standard form referencing filing number 2026182440, by email to normativa@superfinanciera.gov.co or in writing to the SFC’s deputy director of regulation. If adopted, the circular would take effect upon publication and would remain in force for as long as the national disaster declaration stands, though any relief already granted to consumers would continue on its own terms after the circular expires.

Colombia has also drawn $1.3 billion USD in international pledges since the earthquake struck. The comment window closes before search-and-rescue operations are expected to conclude, and the casualty figures the SFC cites as justification for the rule are themselves preliminary and likely to keep changing.

Above photo – Damage in Pereira, Colombia (Photo: Vance Campbell)

More than 600 students from indigenous, Afro-descendant, and campesino communities across Colombia have arrived at the EcoCampus of the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana (UPB) in Medellín for the in-person phase of the Licenciatura en Etnoeducación, the university’s ethnoeducation teaching degree.

The residency is run in partnership with the Instituto Misionero de Antropología (IMA). Students come from communities including the Awá, Embera, Kogui, Tikuna, and Wayuu peoples. UPB said more than 26 languages are represented among the participants, who take part in projects that focus on teaching their languages, traditions, cultural practices, and their communities’ own systems of governance.

“Through this degree program, the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana generates a real impact in the territories. We are proud to offer professional training to indigenous, Afro-descendant, and campesino teachers who, because of the geographic conditions of their communities, face greater barriers to accessing higher education.” — Olga Lucía Arbeláez Rojas, coordinator of the Licenciatura en Etnoeducación, Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana

Participants come from departments including Cauca, Putumayo, Amazonas, Vichada, Guainía, Chocó, Sucre, Córdoba, and Antioquia, along with students from Venezuela and Kenya.

UPB is marking 53 years of the Licenciatura en Etnoeducación, which it describes as a program that has brought higher education to communities far from major urban centers and now counts more than 5,000 graduates.

The model combines academic work carried out in the students’ home territories with intensive in-person sessions in Medellín. Each semester, students travel to the UPB EcoCampus to strengthen skills, share experiences, and consolidate knowledge they later apply in their communities.

“Through this degree program, the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana generates a real impact in the territories. We are proud to offer professional training to indigenous, Afro-descendant, and campesino teachers who, because of the geographic conditions of their communities, face greater barriers to accessing higher education,” said Olga Lucía Arbeláez Rojas, coordinator of the program.

The degree integrates anthropology, linguistics, pedagogy, and the social sciences, training students to work as promoters of ethnodevelopment and community-led change in their own regions.

According to UPB, graduates of the program work as teachers, cultural managers, farmers, and directors of community organizations, and some serve as mayors, councilmembers, and secretaries of education in different regions of the country.

More information about the program is available on UPB’s ethnoeducation page.

Colombians face three sharply different futures in May 31 vote

Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.

No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.

Click above to play the video!

A Race Reshaped by Late Polling

The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.

Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.

Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.

Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.

Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.

Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.

Security Policy: The Three Approaches to Armed Groups

Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.

Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.

Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.

De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.

For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.

Business Climate and Employment Conditions

The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.

Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.

Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.

De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.

Foreign Investment, Oil, and Mining

Ecopetrol holds a 31.5% stake in the Gunflint oil field in the Gulf of Mexico.

The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.

Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.

In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.

Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.

De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.

Foreign Policy: Washington Alignment vs. Multipolar Strategy

The US Embassy in Bogotá is said to be the 3rd largest US mission in the world (photo: Loren Moss)

Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.

Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.

Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.

De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.

“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.

Corruption and Judicial Independence

All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.

Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.

Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.

De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.

De la Espriella’s Legal Career: The Documented Record

De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.

Abelardo de la Espriella (screen capture from Twitter video)

His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.

De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.

The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.

Cepeda’s Family History and Ideological Background

Iván Cepeda (from Twitter)

Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.

Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.

The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.

What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.

Paloma Valencia (image Twitter)

Valencia and the Uribe Question

The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.

Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.

She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.

Press Freedom and the Media Environment

Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.

Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.

Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.

De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.

The Ideological Spectrum: Market Liberalism to State Direction

The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.

De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.

Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.

Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.

Minor Candidates: The Rest of the Ballot

Claudia López, senator of Colombia. (Credit: Patty Suescún)

Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.

Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.

Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.

Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.

Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.

Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.

Investment Implications

For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.

A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.

A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.

A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.

The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.

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An explosive attack on the Pan-American Highway near the municipality of Cajibío, in Colombia’s Cauca department, left at least 21 people dead and 56 injured, Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez Suárez confirmed.

The attack occurred Saturday, April 25, on one of the main roads in the country’s southwest, an area historically affected by the presence of illegal armed groups.

The minister attributed the attack to alias “Marlon,” described as one of the most wanted leaders in the region, “for whom we are offering a reward of up to $1.4 million USD,” he said.

According to local media reports cited by El Tiempo, “the attack was initially intended to target army troops. However, a change in military plans reportedly led to the explosive being detonated while civilians were passing through the area.”

The impact of the attack was significant. Spain’s El País reported “that the explosion created a large crater, left the road covered in debris, and forced rescue operations that lasted several hours due to difficult access conditions.”

Aerial view of the crater caused by the explosion on the Pan-American Highway. Photo courtesy of Colombia’s Ministry of Defense.

Cauca Governor Octavio Guzmán described the incident as one of the most serious attacks in the region in decades. “What happened on April 25 constitutes the most brutal and ruthless attack against civilians in decades,” he said.

The attack comes amid a resurgence of violence in southwestern Colombia, where illegal armed groups linked to drug trafficking, illegal mining and other illicit economies operate. Authorities continue operations in the area as investigations proceed to clarify the circumstances of the attack and determine responsibility.

According to reports by BBC Mundo, alias “Marlon” is a dissident FARC leader identified as Iván Jacobo Idrobo Arredondo, “the alleged head of the Jaime Martínez structure, part of the Estado Mayor Central (EMC),” one of the country’s most powerful illegal armed groups.

Operations and arrests

As part of response operations, the National Police reported the capture of José Alex Bitoco, alias “David” or “Mi Pez,” identified as the leader of the Dagoberto Ramos structure, another illegal armed faction, who is believed to have acted under orders from alias “Marlon”.

National Police Director Gen. William Rincón Zambrano said the detainee “will have to answer for the wave of terrorist activity” and linked him directly to the attack, stating that “he is responsible for what happened on April 25 in the El Túnel sector on the Pan-American Highway.”

The Defense Ministry reiterated that alias “Marlon” remains a priority target. “He is a high-value target, and we are searching for him with all the capabilities of the state. We have deployed a dedicated intelligence task force to locate him,” Sánchez said, confirming a reward of up to $1.4 million USD for information leading to his capture.

Context: criticism of “Paz Total” policy (Total Peace)

The attack comes amid growing security deterioration in Colombia, intensifying criticism of President Gustavo Petro’s “Total Peace” policy. The Ideas for Peace Foundation (FIP) has warned of a possible failure of the strategy, noting that “less than four months before the end of the government, the lack of progress in peace negotiations and the deterioration of security have become one of the main points of criticism of the Petro administration.”

According to the think tank, during the current administration “the number of disputed territories between illegal actors has nearly doubled, and the number of members in these structures has increased by 85%: they now total more than 27,000 members, including armed individuals and support networks.”

This figure not only represents a significant increase but also places the country at levels similar to, and even higher than, those seen before the peace process with the FARC began. Between 2011 and 2012, the estimate stood at around 26,800 members, compared with 14,600 at the end of Iván Duque’s administration in 2022.

The recent increase has also been rapid. According to the FIP, armed groups grew by 23.5% over the past year (from December 2024 to December 2025), reflecting a swift reconfiguration of these structures. At the same time, violence has intensified. Analysts such as Professor Karol Solís Menco note that over the weekend of April 25–26 alone, “26 terrorist attacks of varying magnitude” were recorded across the country.

Political analysis outlets point to a structural dynamic. According to La Silla Vacía, “Cauca is not experiencing an isolated event, but rather a phase of intensifying territorialized violence, marked by fragmentation among armed actors and a type of violence capable of producing national-level impacts.”

In this context, FARC dissident groups have once again taken center stage in the conflict. “Once again, attention is turning to FARC dissidents. Every attack, every gas cylinder bomb, every assault in Valle and Cauca ends with the same name on the table: the Jaime Martínez structure, one of the strongest groups of Iván Mordisco’s Estado Mayor Central,” El País reported.

Violence indicators also reflect sustained deterioration. “In the first four months of 2026, Colombia has already recorded 48 massacres, with 229 victims, most of them civilians, according to Indepaz. It is the highest figure in the past decade. With these numbers, which represent only a partial picture of the country’s violence, this election year is shaping up to be the most violent since the 2016 peace agreement with the now-defunct FARC guerrilla group,” the same outlet reported.

Cauca, where the attack took place, is considered one of the most sensitive regions. “Cauca is particularly complex because it combines multiple layers of conflict: the historic presence of Indigenous, peasant and Afro-descendant communities; illicit economies; Pacific corridors; disputes over drug trafficking routes; control of the Pan-American Highway; and the presence of FARC dissidents, particularly structures linked to Iván Mordisco,” El País said.

Experts agree that part of the difficulty lies in the design and implementation of the government’s strategy. “Early implementation was a valuable innovation in intent, but it failed to ensure minimum conditions of verification and institutional coherence,” said analyst Germán Valencia of the Peace and Reconciliation Foundation (Pares).

Taken together, these factors have led various sectors to conclude that the “Total Peace” policy faces serious structural limitations amid a scenario of armed fragmentation and territorial expansion by illegal groups.

The conflict centers on a resolution passed by the European Parliament on September 9, which highlighted an escalation in political violence in Colombia throughout 2025. The resolution condemned a series of violent acts, including the assassination of Senator and presidential pre-candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay, warning that such crimes are not isolated incidents but part of a wider pattern of intimidation that threatens democratic stability ahead of the 2026 elections.

Members of the European People’s Party (EPP), including Hermann Tertsch and Juan Ignacio Zoido, have voiced specific concerns. They allege that the Colombian executive branch is indirectly enabling groups such as the Clan del Golfo, FARC dissidents, and the Cartel de los Soles, a transnational criminal network allegedly operating out of Venezuela.

Speaking to Colombia’s W Radio, Tertsch asserted that these criminal organizations have expanded their operations during Petro’s tenure. “The international mafias could even be Gustavo Petro’s own interlocutors,” Tertsch stated, referencing alleged links between the government and criminal structures.

The parliamentarians cited recent high-profile attacks as evidence of the deteriorating security situation, including the murder of Senator Uribe Turbay, a car bomb attack in Cali, and the downing of a military helicopter in Antioquia that resulted in the deaths of 12 police officers. They argue these events are part of a coordinated strategy to destabilize Colombian institutions.

“The international mafias could even be Gustavo Petro’s own interlocutors,” Tertsch stated, referencing alleged links between the government and criminal structures.

Juan Ignacio Zoido, speaking to Blu Radio, clarified that the resolution is not a political judgment but a response to objective data. He reminded listeners of Petro’s campaign promise of “Total Peace,” contrasting it with the current security climate. “Armed violence is threatening the democratic stability of Colombia, by a man who had promised absolute peace but is achieving the highest rates of crime in the country,” Zoido declared. He added that the tone of speeches from the presidency contributes to social tension, indirectly facilitating the actions of criminal groups.

In response, President Gustavo Petro, during an official event in Timbío, Cauca, dismissed the European resolution as “senseless” (“una sinrazón”). He countered that the perpetrators behind Senator Uribe Turbay’s assassination were not domestic but rather an international mafia operating from Europe.

“It is not because of Petro’s speech that Senator Uribe Turbay was killed; he was killed by the mafia according to the evidence, and that mafia lives in Europe and not here in Colombia,” the president affirmed.

In a later, more extensive speech in Popayán, Petro directed a message to Europe, invoking historical grievances of colonialism and slavery and accusing the parliamentarians of hypocrisy. He asked the assembled crowd: “What does this town say to Europe? Is it the president who is denying democracy to Colombians, to Latin America, and to the world? What do the indigenous people of America say? Is President Petro anti-democratic?” He continued, “The anti-democrats are those who applaud those who drop bombs on babies… I ask the children and the youth of Europe, all of you, to rise.”

Despite the president’s rebuttal, the MEPs have stated their intention to continue monitoring the situation in Colombia closely, particularly as the 2026 election cycle approaches. Tertsch mentioned that parliamentary groups such as Patriots for Europe and the Spanish political party Vox, via its Foro Madrid initiative, will maintain rigorous oversight of the Colombian government.

Zoido rejected Petro’s characterization of the resolution’s supporters as far-right, insisting that a majority of the political parties that backed the measure are not. “What we want is for there to be a strong Colombia from a democratic point of view,” he said. “We have enough data to be concerned about the escalation of violence and insecurity in the country.”

The European Parliament’s resolution also calls for the protection of political candidates, human rights defenders, and members of the security forces, emphasizing that impunity for recent crimes only encourages further attacks.

European Parliament. Photo credit: Elekes Andor/Wikipedia.

Though Petro has cycled through ministers, Francia Marquez was popularly elected and cannot be removed from office by the President, though he can, and has removed her responsibilities, such as her appointment to the newly created “Ministry of Equality.”

“We are wanted in the photo but not in decision making. We are wanted as a symbol, but not as a people with a voice.”

In an emotional speech on July 25^th, Marquez “canto la tabla” as is said in Spanish, in other words, give someone a “severe talking to” as she denounced what she says is the mendacity, hypocrisy, and bigotry of Petro and his administration.

“We are wanted in the photo but not in decision making. We are wanted as a symbol, but not as a people with a voice. We are wanted to be obedient and if we do not obey, then comes punishment, political violence, cancellation and public dehumanization,” said Marquez, in Spanish, giving a speech in Cali, near her home turf of the Colombian Cauca department.

The vice president spoke at an international women’s event called “Juntas por la Restauración de Nuestra Dignidad” (Together for the Restoration of Our Dignity) held at the Universidad Libre, or Free University of Cali. Marquez stated that she has held her tongue for a long time, but she had to speak in her defense after political rivals close to Petro have called her arrogant and a traitor.

“…But I soon went from being the political phenomenon, the heroine, to being the traitor. Because in this country, when a woman rises, suspicion follows her. The system does not ask about her abilities, but rather whether she is in the place she deserves. If she steps outside the assigned margin, then she is arrogant, disloyal, clumsy, incapable and dangerous.”

Marques also referred to the controversy surrounding her time leading the Ministry of Equality, where she has been denounced for a perceived lack of execution in setting up the new ministry or executing against its mandate.

“From the campaign until today, I have experienced many episodes of delegitimization, sabotage and exclusion. I will tell you just a few. I was given the mission of creating an institution with no structure, no resources, no support. They told me ‘do it yourself.’ And when I argued that three vice ministries were too many, they demanded [I appoint] five. And I did it despite the systematic blockade. They accuse me of not executing, when they never gave me the instrument to do so.” In this case, Marquez is referring to the President’s inner circle wanting her to appoint vice ministers of their choice as sinecures, irrespective of need or capability.

Gustavo Petro, with the appointment of Francia Marquez as his running mate, tried to position himself as a racial progressive in Colombia, a country with a complex social fabric that struggles to overcome classism, regionalism, and political polarization, along with ethnicity. However, his treatment of Marquez along with many bigoted statements he has made during his term, arguably have exposed him as disingenuous at best, and one could make the case, racist.

“No one who is black can tell me!”

President Petro insisted upon the appointment of porn stars Alejandra Umaña (Amaranta Hank) and Juan Carlos Florián to political positions, which Marquez opposed on the grounds of their lack of qualification. Petro angrily responded in a televised ministerial meeting saying “No one who is black can tell me that a porn actor who created the sex workers’ union should be excluded,” not explaining why a black person would be excluded from having an opinion on the topic, as opposed to anyone else.

Then Foreign Minister Murillo (left) with Petro in better days between the two, earlier this year.

Petro’s former foreign minister says comments are “unacceptable”

The bigoted statement drew a rebuke from Petro’s former foreign minister, former ambassador to the US, and former governor of Chocó, Luís Gilberto Murillo, who said: “Do not say that ‘I don’t accept that a black tells me such and such a thing,’ because that racializes the discourse in Colombia, and even worse when it comes from the presidency of Colombia. It’s unacceptable, because we need to advance this inclusive nation.”

Petro, along with his penchant for calling people who disagree with him “neonazis,” has also made racist comments against people with a white phenotype such as US President Trump and French President Emmanuel Macrón. Facing Macrón in a conference earlier this month, Petro said “It’s easier to win votes with a lie and a fetish, saying that life will be better if we expel those who don’t have the same skin color, language, or religion…”to which Macrón shot back: “I never lecture someone from the South, and it’s a little strange to be lectured by someone from the South, just because they come from the South!”

French President Emmanuel Macrón Rebukes Petro in Spain

Petro seems to fancy himself an orator and leader of what some call the “Global South” but no one seems willing to follow him. In his own country, support hovers around 26-30% according to recent polls, and his frequent verbal gaffes are constant fodder for jokes and internet memes. Winning his election by a tight mandate against an ailing outsider candidate who died a few months later, Petro constantly refers to his “popular mandate” as if he has the support of the Colombian populace.

By appointing Francia Marquez, an Afrocolombian lawyer and community activist as his running mate, Petro, a leftist ex-guerilla, sought to define himself as progressive and inclusive. However, three years into his presidency, he and his political clique openly despise Marquez, excluding her from public events and important meetings. During the opening of this summer’s congressional session, she was excluded from the presidential entourage and had to make her own arrangements, as is her constitutional right, to attend the legislative session. Marquez is a nationally elected official, and as such, she does not owe fealty to the president and has the right to dissent. Still, Petro’s attitude towards her and others destroys whatever credibility he claims as a feminist and inclusive crusader for human rights.

This positive performance was reflected in 16 of the 23 cities with reference wholesale markets, with especially notable increases in Tibasosa (67.8%), Manizales (29.2%), Villavicencio (15.3%), Armenia (12.5%), Medellín (11.3%), and Bogotá (8.4%). Although there were reductions in some points, such as Ipiales (-25.4%) and Santa Marta (-22.8%), the national balance was largely positive.

By food groups, the greatest dynamism was in processed foods (15.3%), grains and cereals (12.8%), fish (10.2%), dairy products and eggs (9.2%) and tubers, roots and bananas (7.0%). Fruit (5.9%) and vegetables (4.4%) also increased. Only the meat group showed a slight decrease (-1.7%).

“This data confirms that the countryside is responding to the country’s food demand. To plan efficiently, we need to know what is coming, from where, and in what quantities. Technical monitoring of supply is key to guaranteeing food security and guiding production from rural territories,” said Dora Inés Rey, director of the UPRA.

In the group of vegetables, 180,620 tons entered, with outstanding behaviors in the supply of beans (33.9%), corn (32%), celery (19.4%), garlic (18.8%), cucumber (17%) and peppers (16.2%). Increases were also reported in carrots, onions, beans and other vegetables. On the other hand, the entry of green peas, cabbage, tomatoes, onions, pumpkins and lettuce decreased.
In the case of Cali, one of the main receiving cities, 42% of the volume of vegetables came from Valle del Cauca, followed by Nariño (22.8%), Bogotá (16.3%), Boyacá (14.3%) and Cauca (2%), evidencing the articulation between producing regions and urban markets.

Onions. Photo credit: moviedo from Pixabay.

“Although the El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) phenomenon is in a neutral phase and does not directly influence current weather conditions, the bulletin warns that there is still a high probability of rainfall above historical averages in several departments, with the potential for extreme events that could seriously impact agricultural production systems and rural infrastructure,” said Alfonso Triana.  A specialized professional of the UPRA.

Likewise, Cesar Cortés, UPRA expert, explained: “The UPRA analysis reveals that this risk would especially affect crops of banana, cocoa, coffee, fruit trees, vegetables, roots and tubers, with the possibility of anoxia in soils, spread of diseases and logistical difficulties for marketing, mainly in the Andean, Pacific, Caribbean regions and areas of the Orinoquia and Amazon.”

The departments with the highest concentration of vulnerable hectares are Antioquia, Cundinamarca, Cauca, Boyacá, Tolima, and Nariño, which reinforces the need to take measures with a differential and territorial approach.

The report also provides a detailed overview by region and municipality. “In the Andean region alone, around 340,000 ha were identified at low risk and about 1,500 ha at medium risk, distributed in 41 municipalities. In the Caribbean, more than 85,000 ha are at low risk and 624 ha at medium risk, while in the Pacific, low risk affects about 195,000 ha. In the Amazon and Orinoquía, although the area at risk is smaller, the vulnerability of rural infrastructure is a concern,” said Alexander Rodríguez Romero, UPRA’s technical director of efficient land use and land adaptation.

The bulletin includes an analysis by crop group that shows that, although the cultivated area at medium risk represents only 0.05% of the national total (2,440 ha of 4.7 million), the impact can be severe depending on the type of production:

• Fruit trees: 1,063 ha at risk (43.6% of the total at risk).
• Traditional tropical crops (cocoa, coffee, sugarcane): 891 ha.
• Oilseeds: 182 ha.
• Vegetables: 64 ha with a high proportion affected (0.09% of the total cultivated group).
• Cereals (maize and rice): 99 ha.
• Roots and tubers (potato, cassava, yams): 108 ha.
• Legumes and aromatics: 33 ha in total.

For her part, Dora Inés Rey Martínez, acting director of UPRA, concluded: “Faced with this panorama, UPRA reiterates the need for informed and preventive agroclimatic planning. Producers are recommended to adopt water management, drainage, pest monitoring, and planting staggering practices. Likewise, a call is made to the territorial authorities to strengthen agroclimatic technical assistance and support the most exposed territories with infrastructure and differential actions.”

Key figures:

• 0.7% of the agricultural frontier in Colombia, that is, about 300,000 hectares, is at specific risk, mainly low, due to excess rainfall in different regions of the country for the period between May and October.
• 2,440 hectares under cultivation are estimated at medium risk, especially fruit trees (43.6% of the total).
• Andean and Pacific regions, the most exposed by medium and low risk.

Walking in the rain. Photo credit: wal_172619 from Pixabay.

According to analysis based on IDEAM data (Colombia’s Institute of Hydrology, Meteorology and Environmental Studies), in the coming months, rainfall in the Andean, Caribbean, and Orinoquia regions is likely to be between normal values and up to 40% above historical averages. This increase, although natural in the rainy season, translates into a latent risk of extreme events that could affect both agricultural production and rural infrastructure,” explained Eliecer Díaz Almanza, an expert from the UPRA.

Headline image: Cacao fruits, when processed correcty, render chocolate.

The impact is expected to be especially relevant on crops sensitive to excess water, such as bananas and plantains, cacao, avocado, vegetables, and potatoes. In addition, high humidity conditions could lead to the proliferation of pests and diseases, affecting animal and plant health.

The acting director of the UPRA, Dora Inés Rey, highlighted the importance of consulting the Agroclimatic Bulletin to plan and, thus, reduce the impact of agroclimatic risks: “Having this information has been fundamental for decision-making. It allows farmers, producers, and authorities, both regional and national, to anticipate, prioritize actions in crops, adapt infrastructures, and protect production systems that are at risk.”

Special attention to the ACFEC

The bulletin highlights that productive areas under Ethnic and Community Family Peasant Agriculture (ACFEC) schemes are especially vulnerable. It is estimated that, in departments such as Antioquia, Cundinamarca, Boyacá, Nariño, Cauca, and Valle del Cauca, agroclimatic conditions increase the risk for small producers and production systems located in alluvial soils or with a high water table.

In regions such as the Caribbean, Pacific, and Andean, a medium and low risk of excess moisture is projected in agricultural and livestock areas in specific areas. The potential impact also extends to ACFEC’s production systems, where significant effects are expected in key departments such as Antioquia, Cundinamarca and Valle del Cauca.

The situation is similar in the Orinoquia and the Amazon, although with relatively minor impacts. In these areas, the risk of damage to rural roads and productive infrastructure stands out. “We call on regional and local authorities to make use of this information to anticipate and foresee risks, strengthen agro-ecological practices, improve drainage systems, plan planting in a staggered manner, and reinforce rural infrastructures,” explained Alexander Rodríguez Romero, technical director of Efficient Land Use and Land Adaptation at UPRA.

Likewise, we invite local authorities to redouble agroclimatic technical assistance with a differential approach for these population groups, vital in food production and food security in the country.

“The planning of agricultural activities must be guided by the climate predictions of Ideam, the UPRA Agroclimatic Bulletin, and the recommendations of the National Agroclimatic Technical Table, key tools for timely decision-making that contribute to mitigating risks and guaranteeing the sustainability of the sector,” concluded César Cortés, UPRA expert.

Key figures from the April 2025 Agroclimatic Bulletin

• 2.3 million hectares within the national agricultural frontier are at risk of excess water.
• In ACFEC areas, more than 852 thousand hectares are identified with low risk and about 86 thousand hectares with medium risk, especially in the Andean and Pacific regions.
• Andean Region: medium risk at 97,000 ha and low at 181,000 ha, with possible impact on crops such as Musaceae, fruit trees, and vegetables.
• Caribbean region: low risk in more than 179,000 ha, with critical points in agricultural areas such as Chiriguaná (Cesar).
• Pacific Region: medium risk in 109,000 ha and low in 164,000 ha; affects productive systems and mountain areas vulnerable to landslides.
• Orinoquia and Amazon regions: lower risk, but with potential effects on rural infrastructure and roads.

Photo credit: UPRA.

Health authorities are urgently calling on everyone in Colombia to get vaccinated against yellow fever starting at nine months of age, including individuals over 59 years old. Between September 2024 and now, 75 confirmed cases and 34 deaths have been reported nationwide, representing a cumulative fatality rate of 45.3%.

Confirmed cases are distributed across nine departments: Tolima (59 cases), Putumayo (7), Nariño (2), Caquetá (2), Huila (1), Vaupés (1), Cauca (1), Meta (1), and Caldas (1). Fatalities associated with the disease have been recorded in eight departments: Tolima (23 deaths), Putumayo (5), Caquetá (1), Nariño (1), Caldas (1), Cauca (1), Huila (1), and Meta (1).

Yellow fever is a viral illness transmitted through the bite of infected mosquitoes. Initial symptoms within the first 24 hours can include fever, headache, and general malaise. In the subsequent 72 hours, symptoms often intensify with gastrointestinal manifestations such as vomiting, diarrhea, and abdominal pain. From the fifth day onwards, signs like jaundice (yellowing of the skin and eyes) and bleeding may occur, which can be fatal in unvaccinated individuals. The disease is highly preventable through vaccination, with a reported fatality rate ranging between 40% and 50%.

Colombia is implementing an urgent, free, door-to-door vaccine program to prevent the gruesome disease from spreading via mosquitos.

Since September 2024, the National Government has implemented a series of strategic actions to control the spread of yellow fever and protect public health:

• Intensified Vaccination Strategy: The age range for immunization has been expanded to include individuals from 9 months of age and older, with mass mobilization efforts in affected municipalities.
• Strengthened Epidemiological Surveillance: Over 20 rapid response teams have been deployed for active community case finding and field investigations. Entomovirological, pathological, and laboratory surveillance has also been reinforced through the national reference laboratory of the National Health Institute (Instituto Nacional de Salud).
• Expanded Primary Care: More than 100 Basic Health Care Teams (Equipos Básicos de Atención en Salud – EBAS) have been activated in municipalities with confirmed virus presence.
• Coordination with Health Promotion Entities (EPS) and Vaccination Networks: Health Promotion Entities (Entidades Promotoras de Salud – EPS) have been instructed to establish and operate vaccination teams in coordination with the public and private healthcare network in all affected territories.
• Territorial Coordination through Unified Command Posts (PMU): Twenty-two PMU sessions have been held in the department of Tolima, one in Caldas, and one at the national level, involving local, departmental, and national authorities. Additionally, an extraordinary session of the Risk Management Committee was convened in Huila.
• National Communication and Education Campaign: An information and education strategy has been activated to promote vaccination, self-care, and vector control nationwide.
• Clear Technical Guidelines for the Health System: Circulars with precise instructions for all actors in the national and territorial health system have been issued, disseminated, and technically supported.

The outbreak has demonstrated a progressive expansion, particularly in areas of the Amazon basin, the Magdalena River valley, and departments such as Meta, within a short period. Cases have also emerged in territories with no historical records of the disease, such as the municipality of Neira in Caldas, located in the coffee-growing region.

While urban transmission of yellow fever has not been reported in Colombia since 1929, there is a potential risk of re-emergence due to the frequent entry of individuals into enzootic areas—where the virus circulates in its sylvatic cycle through Sabethes and Haemagogus mosquito species—and their subsequent movement to urban zones below 2,200 meters above sea level, inhabited by urban cycle transmitting species such as Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus.

Epidemiological monitoring has identified cases in populated centers and urban peripheries of municipalities with low population density, indicating a risk of expansion into larger urban centers. Given this scenario, vaccination remains the most effective tool for controlling yellow fever. Analysis of fatal cases has shown that the deceased individuals were unvaccinated, underscoring the urgency of increasing vaccination coverage. Territorial entities must prioritize immunization of the entire population over 9 months of age in high-risk municipalities and strengthen the intensification strategy in the rest of the country.

The Minister of Health and Social Protection (Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social), Dr. Guillermo Alfonso Jaramillo, stated, “With the declaration of the yellow fever emergency, we are intensifying actions to protect the entire population. Our Basic Health Teams, totaling more than 10,000, continue to travel to vaccinate all people in the most remote areas of the country, especially in high-risk zones. The vaccine is free, safe, and administered in a single dose, at least 10 days before entering risk areas.”

The Minister also added that door-to-door campaigns, vaccination drives in educational institutions, transportation terminals, military and police facilities, and other collective spaces will be strengthened. Furthermore, mosquito control measures will be reinforced, and immediate access to healthcare services without barriers will be guaranteed.

Considering the above, and within the framework of the declared health emergency, the following measures are adopted at the national level to contain the yellow fever outbreak, protect the lives of the population, and ensure a coordinated response from the health system:

• Mass Vaccination: A national mass mobilization will commence in high-risk municipalities and extend to the rest of the national territory. The vaccine is free, safe, administered in a single dose, and should be received 10 days before entering risk areas. Strategies will include door-to-door campaigns and vaccination in educational institutions, transportation terminals, military and police facilities, and other collective spaces.
• Integrated Vector (Mosquito) Control: Actions to control mosquitoes in homes, communities, healthcare facilities, and high-traffic areas such as market squares and terminals will be intensified. Mosquito nets will also be distributed in high-risk rural areas.
• Immediate Deployment of Basic Health Teams and Rapid Response Teams: These teams will play a crucial role in case identification, community education, epidemiological monitoring, and vaccine administration, bringing services closer to the most vulnerable and hard-to-reach populations.
• Centralized Management of Health Services: Regional Emergency and Disaster Centers (Centros Reguladores de Urgencias y Emergencias – CRUE) will assume control of the availability of Intensive Care Units (ICU) and patient transfers.
• Obligations of Health Promotion Entities (EPS): EPS are required to allocate all necessary technical and financial resources through their public, private, and mixed networks to guarantee vaccination, prevention, and care for their entire affiliated population. Prior authorization from EPS for the provision of health services is not required.
• National Hospital Alert: A yellow hospital alert is activated throughout the public, private, and mixed healthcare network nationwide. This will be elevated to orange alert in municipalities with human cases and, if justified, to red alert, based on the analysis conducted by the territorial entity with the support of the Ministry of Health and the National Health Institute.
• Mobility Restrictions: Local authorities may implement access restrictions to areas with active virus transmission, following established protocols and in coordination with police forces. The protection of medical personnel during these operations will be guaranteed.
• Requirement of International Vaccination Certificate for Travelers: In compliance with the International Health Regulations, international travelers entering the country may be required to present a yellow fever vaccination certificate. The vaccine must have been administered at least 10 days before entering risk areas. (This measure will be adjusted based on World Health Organization (WHO) recommendations to avoid impacting tourism and trade).
• Culture of Prevention: Citizens are urged to adopt self-care measures, eliminate mosquito breeding sites in their surroundings, and seek timely vaccination. In particular, residents of municipalities located below 2,200 meters above sea level are advised to use insect repellent, mosquito nets, and clothing that covers the skin as personal protection measures against the yellow fever transmitting mosquito.
• Risk Management Committees: Departmental, district, and municipal territorial entities located in high-risk areas will convene risk management committees to adopt comprehensive control and risk management plans.

The director of the National Health Institute, Diana Marcela Pava, reiterated the duty to protect the health and lives of Colombians. “The measure to declare a health emergency was subjected to a rigorous risk assessment exercise, which is an internationally validated process to establish the level of risk the country is facing,” explained the director, adding that “thanks to this exercise, the measures announced by the Ministry of Health were taken.”

The Vice Minister of Public Health, Jaime Urrego, stated, “This emergency has a preventive emphasis. The vaccine saves lives, and this emergency reminds us that we must take extreme precautions. There are two key points: the change in the behavior of the disease and the risk of urbanization, especially in municipalities below 2,200 meters where we must vaccinate the entire population. We are not seeking to generate fear but to act jointly with experts to stop yellow fever.”

The General Secretary of the Ministry of Health, Rodolfo Salas, affirmed, “Colombia is a social state governed by the rule of law, where the right to life and health prevails. According to Article 69 of Law 1753 of 2015, the Ministry of Health and Social Protection is the competent governing body to declare a health emergency in the event of epidemics that endanger the public health of the country. This virus is showing rapid transmission, so we call on the competent authorities to take the necessary measures to prevent its spread.”

The Ministry of Health and Social Protection calls for the shared responsibility of all actors in the health system, territorial authorities, and the community in general to confront this emergency and protect lives.

Information for Travelers and Individuals in Risk Areas:

Yellow fever is transmitted by the bite of infected Aedes and Haemagogus mosquitoes. These mosquitoes typically bite during the day. For travelers and residents in areas below 2,200 meters above sea level, especially those in the departments with reported cases, the following precautions are recommended:

• Vaccination: The yellow fever vaccine is highly effective and provides lifelong protection with a single dose. It is recommended to receive the vaccine at least 10 days before traveling to or residing in risk areas. The vaccine is available free of charge in affected municipalities for individuals over 9 months of age.
• Insect Repellent: Use insect repellent containing DEET.  Follow the instructions on the product label.  
• Protective Clothing: Wear long-sleeved shirts, long pants, socks, and shoes when outdoors, especially during peak mosquito biting times.
• Mosquito Nets: Use mosquito nets (bed nets), especially if sleeping outdoors or in unscreened accommodations. Permethrin-treated nets offer additional protection.
• Eliminate Mosquito Breeding Sites: Regularly empty and clean containers that can hold water, such as flowerpots, tires, buckets, and pet water dishes, around your home to prevent mosquito breeding.
• Seek Medical Attention: If you develop symptoms such as fever, headache, body aches, nausea, vomiting, or jaundice, especially after being in a risk area, seek medical attention immediately. Early diagnosis and supportive care can improve outcomes.
• International Travel Requirements: Travelers entering Colombia from countries with a risk of yellow fever transmission may be required to present an international certificate of vaccination against yellow fever, as per the International Health Regulations. It is advisable to check the latest requirements before traveling. Similarly, travelers departing from Colombia to certain countries may also need proof of vaccination.

The current health emergency underscores the importance of vaccination and preventive measures to mitigate the risk of yellow fever transmission in Colombia. Residents and travelers in affected areas should adhere to the recommendations of health authorities to protect themselves and prevent further spread of the virus.

Photos © Loren Moss