Four years after Gustavo Petro took office, Colombia is a different country from the one he inherited in August 2022, but it continues to face some of its deepest historical problems: inequality, violence, drug trafficking, illegal economies, corruption and the state’s limited ability to exercise control over large parts of the country.

Petro came to power with an ambitious promise: to transform the country. His election represented a historic change in itself. For the first time, a leader from the left reached the presidency, and social sectors traditionally distant from power gained direct representation in the executive branch.

Four years later, just as the self-described “Gobierno del Cambio” (Government of Change) comes to an end, the record is mixed. Petro leaves behind measurable social progress, a broader political spectrum capable of competing for power and significant reforms in labor and politics. But he also leaves unfinished projects, a peace policy that failed to achieve its objectives, a persistent crisis in the health care system, corruption scandals, and an administration marked by high ministerial turnover.

Perhaps his deepest legacy lies not in any specific reform, but in demonstrating that Colombian democracy could incorporate sectors that had remained on the margins of power for decades without altering the system of checks and balances that underpins the country’s democratic processes.

The main achievement: A broader democracy

Petro’s election in 2022 was the culmination of a political process Colombia had been experiencing for decades: the gradual expansion of the ideological spectrum with a realistic chance of reaching the presidency.

Francia Márquez‘s rise to the vice presidency carried equally profound significance. A Black woman from a region historically affected by poverty and conflict, her election became a symbol of political mobility and representation in a country where economic and social elites have traditionally dominated the main centers of power.

Márquez built part of her political discourse around the “nadies” (nobodies), an expression intended to champion historically excluded communities. Petro incorporated that narrative during his term and embraced political and social inclusion as one of the defining elements of his administration.

From that perspective, regardless of how its public policies are evaluated, the Petro administration leaves behind a broader democracy: after 2022, Colombia demonstrated that ideological, social, ethnic and regional groups previously distant from presidential power could also reach the Casa de Nariño. It was a necessary message for a country whose guerrilla movements emerged partly in response to the traditional two-party system of the last century.

Paradoxically, that expansion coexisted with an often-conflictive relationship between the president and some of the institutions designed precisely to limit the exercise of power.

At various points, Petro challenged Congress, the courts, the Banco de la República, the media and sectors of the opposition when their decisions stood in the way of parts of his agenda. Those checks, however, are not an anomaly in Colombia’s political system but one of its structural components: the system of checks and balances.

Incoming President Abelardo de la Espriella will likely face a similar reality. Without his own majorities in Congress, his ability to govern will also depend on negotiations, judicial oversight and institutional limits that no president can eliminate simply by winning an election.

Francia Márquez during her inauguration as vice president of Colombia at Plaza de Bolívar in Bogotá on August 7, 2022. Photo courtesy of the Presidency of Colombia.

Less poverty, more employment and higher wages

On social issues, several indicators improved during the Petro administration.

In 2025, according to figures from the Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística, or DANE, monetary poverty fell to 28%, the lowest level recorded in the country up to that point. Petro had taken office in 2022, when the rate stood at 36.6% following the sharp increase caused by the pandemic.

During the first three years of his administration, about 3.8 million people moved out of monetary poverty and nearly 1 million escaped extreme poverty, according to official DANE figures.

The labor market also improved. Unemployment, which stood at around 11.3% in 2022, fell to about 8% during the first months of 2026.

Petro also ended his term with a 23% increase in the minimum wage for 2026, far above inflation, which closed 2025 at 5.1%. The measure directly benefited about 2.5 million workers and their families and reflected one of the president’s most consistent political priorities: improving workers’ incomes and conditions.

The labor reform moved in the same direction, increasing the amount employers must pay for nighttime, Sunday and holiday work: one of the country’s long-standing labor policy shortcomings.

Those results allow the outgoing government to argue that part of its redistributive agenda produced tangible effects, even though Colombia remains a deeply unequal society.

Reforms that advanced and those left halfway

The record of Petro’s major structural reforms is considerably more complex.

Agrarian reform, one of his central campaign promises, fell far short of its goals. Petro had proposed purchasing 1.5 million hectares of land for distribution to farmers and advancing the formalization of 7 million hectares envisioned under the Peace Agreement.

According to figures from the Ministry of Agriculture, more than 462,000 hectares had been purchased by mid-2026, less than one-third of the announced target.

On pensions, the government succeeded in getting Congress to approve an overhaul of the system that replaced competition between public and private regimes with a system based on a public foundation and additional savings mechanisms administered by private entities. To secure its passage, the executive branch had to compromise on some of its original objectives. The reform was subsequently challenged in court, and its implementation was suspended while the Constitutional Court reviewed the legislative process, which remains unresolved in the absence of a final ruling from the court.

Colombia’s institutional system thus once again demonstrated the limits any president faces when attempting to implement structural transformations without sufficiently broad political consensus.

“Total Peace”, one of the administration’s biggest defeats

If there was one area where results fell particularly far short of initial expectations, it was security policy and the so-called “Total Peace” initiative.

Petro came to power proposing simultaneous negotiations with different armed organizations to reduce violence and move toward resolving the conflicts that persisted after the 2016 agreement with the FARC.

Four years later, his government ended without reaching a final agreement with the main armed groups with which it had opened negotiations.

During that period, organizations such as the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), and the Clan del Golfo maintained or expanded their operational capacity in different territories, while the country continued to record kidnappings, recruitment of minors, attacks and killings of social and political leaders.

Political violence reached one of its most serious moments with the killing of presidential hopeful Miguel Uribe, an event that reminded the country of the dangers of political violence that Colombia had believed it had left behind.

The failure of Total Peace to produce sustainable agreements will likely be one of the most difficult aspects of the outgoing president’s legacy to defend.

A health care transformation that never came

Petro also failed to transform the health care system on the terms he had proposed during the campaign.

The reform became one of the main battlegrounds among the executive branch, Congress, insurers, health care providers and different political sectors.

As that dispute continued, patient petitions, complaints and claims increased from about 915,000 in 2021 to 2.1 million in 2025, according to figures from the Superintendencia Nacional de Salud.

By the end of the administration, many patients continued to report difficulties obtaining medications and receiving timely care at hospitals and clinics, while household out-of-pocket spending on health care increased.

Petro profoundly altered the debate over Colombia’s health care model, but he failed to replace it with the system he had promised.

Corruption undermined one of Petro’s central promises

Perhaps one of the government’s most politically costly contradictions was corruption.

Petro had built much of his political career denouncing links among corruption, public contracting, and traditional power structures. His arrival at the presidency came with a promise to govern differently.

His administration, however, ended up being affected by several scandals.

The most significant involved the Unidad Nacional para la Gestión del Riesgo de Desastres (UNGRD), in which investigations pointed to the alleged use of public resources and contracts to benefit members of Congress in exchange for support for government initiatives.

The instability caused by the legal troubles surrounding Ricardo Roa, who headed the country’s most important oil and gas company, also had a profound economic impact, eroding both the company’s market value and the governance of one of the institutions underpinning the national economy.

Those controversies were compounded by investigations and disputes involving members of the president’s political and family circle. His son, Nicolás Petro, faced criminal proceedings related to funds received during the campaign, while Verónica Alcocer, then the president’s wife, remains at the center of questions over the use of public funds.

Determining individual responsibility is a matter for judicial and oversight authorities, but politically, the cases eroded one of the central elements of the message that had brought Petro to power.

More than 60 ministers in four years

Administrative instability also became a defining feature of the government. Over four years, more than 60 people served across 18 ministries, equivalent to an average of more than three officeholders per ministry.

The changes reflected political crises, disagreements within the governing coalition, differences between ministers and the president, shifts in the executive branch’s priorities and, at various points, difficulties maintaining a stable administrative course.

The result was a government with considerable rhetorical ability to place issues on the public agenda, but greater difficulty turning some of those debates into sustained policies over its four years in office.

Congresswoman María José Pizarro places the presidential sash on Gustavo Petro during his inauguration at Plaza de Bolívar in Bogotá on August 7, 2022. Photo courtesy of the Presidency of Colombia.

Petro changed who can govern, but not the rules of power

Gustavo Petro’s legacy can hardly be reduced to a simple choice between success and failure.

His administration produced tangible social results and expanded the boundaries of political representation in Colombia. It also put issues on the agenda that will likely remain part of the debate under future governments: inequality, the energy transition, agrarian reform, the functioning of the health care system, and representation for historically excluded populations.

But the promise of structural transformation was far broader than the results ultimately achieved.

Petro discovered, as his predecessors did and as De la Espriella probably will, that winning the presidency does not mean controlling the Colombian state. Congress, the courts, oversight agencies, the Banco de la República, regional governments, the media and a deeply polarized civil society impose limits on any political project.

Petro discovered, as his predecessors did and as De la Espriella probably will, that winning the presidency does not mean controlling the Colombian state. Congress, the courts, oversight agencies, the Banco de la República, regional governments, the media and a deeply polarized civil society impose limits on any political project.

In that sense, the main transformation of these four years may have been less institutional than democratic: Petro did not completely change the way Colombia works, but he did help change the idea of who can govern it.

De la Espriella’s arrival at the presidency from the opposite end of the ideological spectrum is, paradoxically, another manifestation of that expansion.

Colombia thus ends four years of its first left-wing government and begins its first far-right government. What remains between the two is a democracy with more diverse political alternatives, but one that is also deeply polarized, with institutions under intense strain and many of the country’s historical problems still unresolved.

Abelardo de la Espriella, the conservative outsider who led the first round of Colombia’s presidential election and now heads into a June 21 runoff against leftist senator Iván Cepeda, has put an unusual question on the table: could Colombia, for the first time, elect a president who is also a citizen of the United States?

De la Espriella holds three nationalities. He was born in Colombia — making him Colombian by birth — inherited Italian nationality through his maternal grandparents, and obtained US citizenship by naturalization in February 2023, according to La Silla Vacía. It is that third passport, not the mere fact of multiple nationalities, that has triggered a constitutional debate which could shadow the campaign to its final day.

More than thirty jurists, academics, and constitutionalists — among them, La Silla Vacía reported, former Council of State president Stella Conto Díaz, Álvaro Echeverri, Ramiro Bejarano, Leopoldo Múnera, and Rodrigo Uprimny — signed a statement warning that his US citizenship could amount to an “incompatibility” with the presidency. Their objection is specific. Colombian naturalization in the United States requires an oath in which new citizens declare they renounce “absolutely and entirely” all allegiance to any other state of which they have been subjects. There, the signatories argue, lies a tension between that oath and the duties a Colombian head of state must perform — a concern they tie to the Constitutional Court’s own references to “potential conflicts of national loyalty.”

“Constitutional disqualifications are not discovered. They are expressly established or, simply, they do not exist.” — Mauricio Gaona, constitutional lawyer

The debate turns on what the Constitution actually requires. Article 191 states that to be president a person must be Colombian by birth, a citizen in exercise, and over 30 years of age. As campaign legal adviser Germán Calderón España told La FM, those are the only three conditions, and none excludes a Colombian by birth who holds a second nationality. Disqualifications, he argued, must be expressly written into the Constitution or the law rather than inferred. Calderón also said the campaign was facing what he called a “tutelatón” — an estimated 30 tutela constitutional-rights petitions a day from allies of the Pacto Histórico, Cepeda, and President Gustavo Petro.

Constitutional lawyer Mauricio Gaona reached the same conclusion in a published legal opinion, reported by Infobae. Gaona wrote that dual nationality is legally valid, that holding simultaneous legal duties to more than one state is possible, and that US naturalization — including its allegiance oath — “does not create a constitutional disqualification to exercise the Presidency of the Republic of Colombia.” He grounded the analysis in the Constitution, Law 43 of 1993, US nationality law, and US Supreme Court rulings including Afroyim v. Rusk (1967), Kawakita v. United States (1952), and Vance v. Terrazas (1980), as well as the US State Department’s position that “U.S. law does not require a U.S. citizen to choose between U.S. citizenship and another nationality.”

Current Colombian President Gustavo Petro is also an Italian citizen.

Gaona pointed to Article 191’s silence as decisive: the text, he wrote, does not require exclusive nationality, the absence of foreign citizenship, prior renunciation of another nationality, or a certificate of exclusive loyalty. He acknowledged that some specific posts — those tied to national security, intelligence, or classified information — can carry dual-nationality restrictions, but said any such limit must be expressly established. “Constitutional disqualifications are not discovered,” he wrote. “They are expressly established or, simply, they do not exist.”

The campaign has pointed to a sitting precedent: Petro himself holds Italian nationality, which he acquired through family descent, has openly acknowledged, and has cited as letting him travel to the United States without a visa; the US Treasury’s sanctions listing on the Colombian president records an alternate Italian citizenship, and in September 2025 he publicly weighed renouncing it in protest over the war in Gaza. The comparison has limits, however, and they cut to the heart of the dispute: Petro’s Italian citizenship — like De la Espriella’s own Italian nationality, which no one contests — was acquired by descent, without an oath. The critics’ argument rests specifically on the renunciation oath sworn in US naturalization, a step neither Petro’s nor De la Espriella’s Italian status involved.

There is also a political irony the candidate’s opponents have seized on: De la Espriella has built much of his campaign on overtly nationalist imagery, including the Colombian flag and the national soccer team’s jersey — symbols a tribunal ordered him to remove from his campaign within 24 hours, La Silla Vacía reported. His wife drew attention shortly before the first round when she suggested the family might move to Italy if he lost, a remark she later softened.

For now, the candidacy stands. The Fifth Section of the Council of State rejected a lawsuit seeking to strike De la Espriella from the ballot over his triple nationality, finding that the registration was not subject to that form of judicial review, La Silla Vacía reported. Whether the broader incompatibility argument ever reaches a definitive ruling — and from which court — remains unresolved.

The stakes are concrete for a country whose largest trading and security partner is the United States. De la Espriella, who campaigns as an admirer of US President Donald Trump and whose running mate is former finance minister José Manuel Restrepo, would bring an openly Washington-friendly posture to the Casa de Nariño; Cepeda would broadly continue the foreign policy of the Petro government. Voters return to the polls on June 21. If De la Espriella wins, the question of a president who also answers, at least on paper, to a second flag will move from the seminar room to the presidential palace.

Colombians face three sharply different futures in May 31 vote

Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.

No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.

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A Race Reshaped by Late Polling

The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.

Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.

Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.

Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.

Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.

Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.

Security Policy: The Three Approaches to Armed Groups

Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.

Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.

Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.

De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.

For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.

Business Climate and Employment Conditions

The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.

Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.

Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.

De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.

Foreign Investment, Oil, and Mining

Ecopetrol holds a 31.5% stake in the Gunflint oil field in the Gulf of Mexico.

The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.

Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.

In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.

Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.

De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.

Foreign Policy: Washington Alignment vs. Multipolar Strategy

The US Embassy in Bogotá is said to be the 3rd largest US mission in the world (photo: Loren Moss)

Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.

Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.

Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.

De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.

“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.

Corruption and Judicial Independence

All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.

Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.

Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.

De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.

De la Espriella’s Legal Career: The Documented Record

De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.

Abelardo de la Espriella (screen capture from Twitter video)

His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.

De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.

The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.

Cepeda’s Family History and Ideological Background

Iván Cepeda (from Twitter)

Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.

Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.

The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.

What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.

Paloma Valencia (image Twitter)

Valencia and the Uribe Question

The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.

Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.

She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.

Press Freedom and the Media Environment

Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.

Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.

Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.

De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.

The Ideological Spectrum: Market Liberalism to State Direction

The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.

De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.

Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.

Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.

Minor Candidates: The Rest of the Ballot

Claudia López, senator of Colombia. (Credit: Patty Suescún)

Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.

Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.

Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.

Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.

Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.

Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.

Investment Implications

For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.

A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.

A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.

A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.

The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.

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With less than two weeks remaining before Colombia’s presidential election, whose first round is scheduled for May 31, three candidates are concentrating most voter support and competing for access to the presidential palace, Casa de Nariño: ruling coalition senator Iván Cepeda, candidate of the left-wing Pacto Histórico party; senator Paloma Valencia, representing the right-wing Centro Democrático party; and lawyer and businessman Abelardo de la Espriella, a figure of Colombia’s far right.

Although 13 candidates will appear on the ballot, two contenders: Clara López and Luis Gilberto Murillo, withdrew their campaigns to support Cepeda, while the remaining candidates have failed to surpass 3.5% voter support in pre-elections polls, a figure close to the statistical margin of error.

If polling trends hold, no candidate is expected to secure the 50% plus one vote needed to win outright in the first round, making a runoff election on June 21, 2026, highly likely.

Cepeda has remained relatively stable in polls, with voter support ranging between 35% and 43%, effectively securing his place in a second round if trends continue.

The key question: Who will face Cepeda in a runoff?

The main electoral uncertainty centers on who will finish second and challenge the ruling coalition in a likely runoff.

Under Colombia’s electoral system, only the two candidates receiving the highest vote totals advance to the second round. The fragmentation of the political right has complicated efforts to consolidate support behind either Valencia or De la Espriella.

Polls suggest a competitive scenario. Valencia has registered between 14% and 21% voter support, while De la Espriella fluctuates between 16% and 24%, depending on the poll and methodology used.

The lack of unity between the two camps stems from both ideological differences and their political structures. Valencia is a member of the political party founded by former President Álvaro Uribe, while De la Espriella entered the race through an independent signature campaign, marking the first time Colombia’s far right has emerged as a viable contender for the presidency.

A campaign shaped by the absence of public debates

The presidential campaign has been marked by an unusual lack of debates among the leading candidates.

Cepeda has refused to participate in events organized by media outlets, arguing that proposed formats do not offer guarantees of neutrality or what he describes as “fair rules” established by news organizations.

As a result, part of the political confrontation has shifted to Congress, where both Cepeda and Valencia currently serve in the Senate.

Critics, however, have challenged Cepeda’s decision. Former Bogotá Mayor and presidential candidate Claudia López argued that his absence from debates reflects that “Cepeda does not want to take responsibility for the failures of Total Peace (Paz Total),” the negotiation policy with armed groups promoted by President Gustavo Petro, in which Cepeda played a key role as a lawmaker.

Instead of regular debates, the campaign has been dominated by disputes over media formats, digital presence, social media strategies and public controversies aimed at amplifying candidates’ visibility.

De la Espriella embraces confrontation

One of the candidates who has most effectively capitalized on the digital environment is Abelardo de la Espriella, whose political strategy has been compared to right-wing populist leadership styles such as those of Argentine President Javier Milei and US President Donald Trump.

In recent weeks, De la Espriella has faced several media controversies, including an incident involving journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM, for which he later apologized after accusations of inappropriate sexual conduct. He also clashed live on air with television presenter María Lucía Fernández of Caracol Noticias, whom he called “ignorant.”

Questions also emerged following reports by digital outlet La Silla Vacía regarding donations linked to the US Republican Party.

Despite the controversies, the strategy appears to be strengthening his electoral standing. An Atlas Intel poll for Semana magazine, published May 15, showed De la Espriella surpassing Valencia by a two-to-one margin for the first time, with 32.9% support compared with 16.7%.

However, the polling firm is currently under investigation by Colombia’s National Electoral Council (CNE) amid concerns over whether its methodology complies with national standards. If irregularities are confirmed, the firm could face suspension of its operations in Colombia.

Valencia seeks to broaden support toward the political center

Meanwhile, Valencia has sought to expand her electoral base by shifting strategically toward the political center.

As part of that effort, on May 17 she officially introduced her proposal “Mámá No Está Sola (Mom Is Not Alone),” aimed at female heads of household and focused on access to credit, employment and housing property. The proposal also includes a promise to deliver 1 million homes prioritized for women community leaders.

Valencia’s candidacy also marks a historic first for Colombia’s political right: it is the first time a major conservative party has nominated a woman for president.

Her vice presidential running mate, former Bogotá councilman Juan Daniel Oviedo, has openly identified as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a move that represents a significant shift for the Centro Democrático traditionally conservative electorate.

Colombia appears headed for a runoff

With a highly fragmented field and no signs of consolidation among right-wing candidates, Colombia appears increasingly likely to hold a presidential runoff on June 21, 2026.

Barring a major shift in polling trends, the contest seems set to come down to Iván Cepeda and whichever opposition candidate manages to emerge from an increasingly competitive battle within Colombia’s political right.

On April 10, former Colombian Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva Durán released a formal statement responding to his indictment by the Fiscalía General de la Nación. Leyva faces charges related to his 2023 decision to declare a passport procurement tender void, a process that involved the private security printing firm Thomas Greg & Sons. The former official characterized the legal proceedings as a politically motivated maneuver orchestrated from the Casa de Nariño.

The indictment for prevarication centers on Leyva’s intervention in the bidding process, which the Fiscalía interprets as a deliberate breach of administrative law. In his defense, Leyva maintained that his actions were necessary to address irregularities and ensure the application of the Constitución Política de Colombia. He argued that the prosecuting body’s thesis would criminalize the conduct of any public servant who identifies unconstitutional terms in a government contract.

“If that argument is accepted, then any official who declares a bidding process void because they find the terms and conditions unconstitutional or illegal should go to jail.” — Álvaro Leyva Durán, former Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Leyva also directed accusations toward his successor at the Cancillería, Luis Gilberto Murillo. According to the statement, Murillo suspended a subsequent legal bidding process to justify a state of emergency, which Leyva claims led to an unnecessary markup of approximately $30 billion COP. Furthermore, Leyva alleged that software contracts exceeding $10 billion COP were improperly managed and that the funds remain unaccounted for under the current administration.

The former minister’s statement included severe personal and political criticisms of President Gustavo Petro. Leyva alleged a lack of moral conduct by the head of state during international state visits and questioned the president’s sobriety in public settings. The letter further asserted that US authorities are currently investigating potential links between the executive branch and narcotics trafficking organizations.

Regarding the domestic political landscape, Leyva warned of perceived risks to the Colombian electoral process. He alleged that the administration has engaged in the illegal interception of political candidates and intends to undermine the integrity of future vote counts. Leyva concluded by affirming his intention to defend his record and his legal decisions before the Corte Suprema de Justicia.

COMUNICADO pic.twitter.com/7YYhoHJD4B

— Álvaro Leyva Durán (@AlvaroLeyva) April 10, 2026

Finance Colombia translation of Leyva’s recent open letter dated April 10th

Some time ago, I denounced in a public communiqué that Gustavo Petro had woven against me an atrocious persecution, as retaliation for my denunciations of his closeness to the world of drugs—denunciations that have led to the United States having him cornered today. There I warned that, from within the government, intrigues were being made to throw me in prison and that attempts would be made against my life.

Now, months later, the Attorney General’s Office accuses me of malfeasance (prevaricato) because I declared void a passport tender that, according to that same institution, was based on a “catch-all specifications document” (pliego sastre). For the accusing entity, I should not have fulfilled the obligation of applying the Constitution that I myself helped draft and, by seeking equality, I acted with malicious intent. The world turned upside down.

Understand the gravity: if that thesis is accepted, any official who declares a tender void because they find unconstitutional or illegal specifications must go to prison. So, faced with such a thing, the trial is welcome. I will give the battle in the Supreme Court with all my strength. Because I trust its magistrates, because my life has been a permanent struggle for Colombia, and because justice, reason, and the law are with me.

The acquittal will be the logical consequence of the process in which I will prove, with official documents and among other things, the following: that I left in motion a new, clean, and legal tender, which Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo suspended. That he thus justified another manifest urgency, completely unnecessary, and added an overcharge of nearly 30 billion pesos to it. And that he contracted software for more than 10 billion additional pesos, which was pocketed. All by hand-picking. All murky. All without control. Thus, by brute force, the door was opened to the passport debacle of today. I warned Petro of what was coming down on the country. But he kept silent.

Today I feel the pride of having helped unmask the boss of the mafia that has plunged Colombia into its darkest hours. I took office as his Foreign Minister with the hope of change. But then I came to know his life of vice and decadence. I was slow to understand his vileness and, surely, also slow to denounce it. But from my father Jorge Leyva Urdaneta, exiled for opposing the dictatorship, I inherited courage and respect for institutions; from Álvaro Gómez Hurtado, I learned the necessity of a just order; and from Misael Pastrana Borrero, I learned to think about social peace. So, faithful to myself and to the spirit of my mentors, I denounced in various letters the moral, political, and personal degeneration that I came to know in Gustavo Petro. And time has proven me right.

The President is an infamous being: international human trafficking is a scourge of the poor girls of Colombia, and he, in the middle of a state visit, ends up as a customer of a brothel in Lisbon; he claims to be a champion of peace, but full of hatred he violently divides society with his stale, classist, and racist rhetoric; he claims to fight drug trafficking, but he goes out into the public square drugged, drunk on alcohol and sectarianism, to mistreat and insult those who contradict him, while in the United States his ties to narcos are being investigated. And so, from scandal to scandal, the horrible night does not cease: the homeland trampled by its own President is today the object of all the mockery abroad.

Petro knows that the upcoming electoral process resembles the one recently lived in Chile. And, to avoid the same result, he illegally intercepts candidates, seeks to destroy them, and is already trying to cast a mantle of doubt over the vote count. But Colombia deserves a new dawn. And the radical left, which—turned into the President’s hooligan squad—forgives him everything, seems condemned to the desert. We shall see whether, in the future, they also forgive him for being responsible for their possible defeat. For my part, I remain ready for all battles: always embracing justice against oppression, and with the law as my spear, shield, and banner.

The charges stem from a two year-old investigation of evidence that Uribe had been trying to convince witnesses to retract statements they had made tying him to paramilitary groups.

Current President Ivan Duque, who owes his political existence to Uribe, quickly came to Uribe’s defense:

“It hurts as a Colombian that many of those who have lacerated the country defend themselves in freedom or, even, are guaranteed never to go to prison, and that an exemplary public servant, who has held the highest dignity of the State, is not allowed defend themselves in freedom, with the presumption of innocence.”

Other “Uribistas” as his defenders and (Uribe’s political party) Centro Democratico partisans are called were organizing this afternoon to take to the streets, despite Coronavirus COVID-19 curfew restrictions. Uribe’s base of supporters is not large nationally, but it is fervent, especially in his home turf of Medellín and the rural areas to the east of the city. The mayors of Bogotá and Medellín have within the last two hours warned that such protests are prohibited due to the Pandemic.

La privación de mi libertad me causa profunda tristeza por mi señora, por mi familia y por los colombianos que todavía creen que algo bueno he hecho por la Patria

— Álvaro Uribe Vélez (@AlvaroUribeVel) August 4, 2020

Above:  Uribe announces his detention via Twitter, saying “The privation of my liberty causes me profound sadness for my wife, for my family, and for the Colombians who still believe that I have done something good for the country.”

Colombian analyst Sergio Guzmán of Colombia Risk Analysis says this is really big: “I mean Uribe is Colombia’s most powerful person, his arrest is likely to suggest that political polarization in Colombia is going to increase substantially during the following two years. Whereas President Duque had a very significant legislative agenda to include issues like pension reform, labor reform, potentially tax reform and healthcare reform, all of it is now likely to take a back seat to a potential reform to the judicial system brought by the ruling party.”

It is certain that the judicial branch will be under intense political pressure, especially with an Uribista, President Ivan Duque occupying Casa de Nariño, Colombia’s presidential palace. “Obviously this also puts the independence of the court’s legitimacy into question, because of the political contours of the case.  However, I think it is important to remember that this case and this arrest is not something that puts into question Uribe’s role in the past 20 years in Colombia. Rather of specific events dealing with a judicial case where there is allegedly substantial evidence to back up the court’s decision, adds Guzmán.

Background

Uribe’s father was killed in 1983 by communist FARC guerrillas near Yarumál, Colombia. Uribe as president was widely hailed domestically and internationally for breaking the back of the FARC militarily, but also entering into a peace accord with anti-FARC paramilitaries. Both the FARC and the paramilitaries, or “paracos” have been responsible for a large portion of Colombia’s narcotics industry. After the paramilitaries signed their peace agreement, many simply continued as apolitical (but generally pro-Uribe) mafias to this day.

Uribe’s popularity began to decline after the candidate he supported as his successor, Juan Manuel Santos refused to act as his puppet after gaining the presidency and went his own way. Santos, who as Uribe’s defense minister was famed for directing some of the most successful actions against the FARC signed a peace agreement with the FARC, which infuriated Uribe and his Centro Democratico militants. Santos eventually received the Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.

The witness tampering charges stem from a 2018 investigation into allegations that Uribe through his lawyers were pressuring witnesses that had testified under oath that while governor of Antioquia, Uribe was one of the founders of the AUC’s (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia, or Colombian Self-Defense Force—the paramilitaries) Bloque Metro. Uribe resigned his post as senator, then immediately retracted his resignation. Uribe’s brother Santiago Uribe is awaiting judgement for forming the “12 Apostles” death squad, and for the 1994 murder of Camilo Barrientos. His trial concluded in January of this year, but the judge has yet to hand down a sentence or exoneration.

The witness tampering charges have roots that date back eight years ago, when Uribe accused a Colombian senator, Ivan Cepeda, of bribing witnesses and generally concocting a conspiracy to tie the ex-president to paramilitary-related crimes. The Supreme Court eventually dismissed Uribe’s accusations against his colleague and later began probing into whether it was in fact Uribe who has been illicitly tampering with justice through witness manipulation.

Juan Guillermo Monsalve is a former paramilitary who grew up on the Uribe family’s “Guacharacas” estate near Yarumal, Antioquia; 3 hours northeast of Medellín. He testified that Uribe’s family was allied with the paramilitaries, but now claims Uribe lawyer Diego Cadena pressured him to change his story, and make up the accusation that Uribe nemesis, Senator Iván Cepeda told him to lie. Uribe denounced Cepeda, but the court became suspicious of the story and it both absolved Cepeda and began to investigate Uribe and his lawyer Diego Cadena.

See also: Former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe, 2 Sons Are Infected With Coronavirus COVID-2

Another witness, originally called by Uribe as a defense witness, Carlos Enrique Velez Ramirez also testifies that Diego Cadena made various payments to him in exchange for testimony.

Diego Cadenas, Uribe’s attorney admits to giving the money to Vélez “as a humanitarian act.” Cadena now faces his own charges, indicted last week for offering 200 million pesos (just over $53,000 USD) and legal representation to both Vélez and Monsalve if only they would change their testimonies to Uribe’s favor. Cadenas is also under house arrest.

There is a rouge’s gallery of other witnesses and relevant figures, many of them already serving prison time. The defense strategy of Uribe and Cadenas so far seems to be that the key witnesses are conspiring with Ivan Cépeda, though they can’t seem to explain their own payments, or why right-wing paramilitaries would want to conspire with Cepeda of the far-left Polo Democratico party (not to be confused with the right wing Centro Democratico). Just as problematic is that the whole scandal originated with Uribe’s allegations against Cépeda.

With the country polarized and politically divided, one thing can be certain: Uribe’s core of Uribista supporters will stand by him no matter what he is convicted of or how conclusive the evidence is against him. This case will grip the country and either outcome: guilty or not, will shock some portion of the population. Observers will be watching how President Duque handles having his patron & political godfather on trial during his presidency.

“A measure that has been successful in many parts of the world and that we now bring to our country as one more tool to protect those people who have worked so hard and who have worked so hard, for our country,” said Duque.

Reverse mortgages will be provided to consumers through financial institutions such as banks.

The new program is aimed at people over 65 who are homeowners and want to have a complementary income. With this new mechanism, they will be able to mortgage their property in exchange for a monthly lifetime income. Housing Minister Jonathan Malagón stressed that with the reverse mortgage, applicants will be able to secure their financial support during old age.

Reverse mortgages allow a homeowner to make an arrangement with a financial institution where typically they receive a monthly payment for the rest of their lives in exchange for a security interest in their home.

Upon the death of the homeowner, the heirs can pay off the mortgage debt with their resources, selling the property and paying the corresponding percentage or handing over the property as payment for the rent that their relative received.

The government pointed out that the instrument manages three types of income, depending on the needs of those who decide to use it: life annuity, which consists of a monthly payment until the person dies. Temporary income, which is the destination of a monthly value for a certain number of years, and the single income, in which the entire value is received in a single installment.

The value of the monthly payment depends on several factors, such as the appraisal of the home, the age of the applicants for the product and the selected reverse mortgage modality. Regarding age, in the Colombian implementation both the applicant and the beneficiaries must be over 65 years of age.

Rural home photo in Santandercito, Cundinamarca © Loren Moss

The controversial JEP will seek what is called “transitional justice” for the victims of the nation’s 50-plus-year war with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) that ended in late 2016 after four years of formal negotiations with the Santos-led government.

Photo: President Juan Manuel Santos gives a speech at Casa de Nariño in Bogotá introducing justices for the Special Jurisdiction for Peace, or JEP. (Credit: Presidencia de la República)

While the bulk of the roughly 7,000 members of the now-demobilized guerrilla group are expected to receive amnesty as laid out in the peace deal, higher-ranking officials found responsible for atrocities can face some form of limited confinement and will be expected to cooperate in the search for truth about past crimes.

“Victims want truth more than to see their victimizers behind bars,” said Santos in a speech from the Casa de Nariño, calling once again for the nation to embrace reconciliation in an attempt to leave decades of conflict in the past. “Victims are better served by reparation than revenge.”

While this provision of the accord has been among the most divisive in a nation split over supporting the peace process, Santos stressed that anyone found responsible for crimes against humanity, war crimes, or other grave human rights violations will not be granted amnesty. Prosecutors and officials have suggested they will specifically look to try those involved child recruitment, sexual violence, kidnapping, civilian massacres, large-scale attacks, and even acts that severely damaged the environment.

Politicians, members of the military, other armed group actors, and even private citizens from the business world may also be named by the victims who will be heard by the JEP, a prospect that various Colombian politicians and civic groups have pushed to limit.

Nevertheless, Santos said that the tribunal, which may continue its work for a decade or more, will “judge and punish conduct committed on occasion or in connection with the armed conflict, not only of guerrillas or agents of the state, but also of civilians who submit to it and have had active or decisive participation in the most serious crimes.”

For years, current Colombian Senator and former President Álvaro Uribe has been the most prominent opposition voice against the peace process. Following the announcement by Santos, the ex-head of state said, on Twitter, that former FARC commander Rodrigo Londoño, aka Timochenko, is currently a “presidential candidate” rather than paying for his crimes.

On Twitter, Uribe asked why does “Santos insist on deceiving us, declaring that there will be no impunity for those responsible for the crimes of humanity when that is not a fact.”

Santos has so far named 30 of the 38 justices who will sit on the JEP, a complex body with various components and responsibilities related to truth-seeking, reviewing criminal charges, weighing appeals, and sentencing.

The head of state noted that he has sought diversity in the makeup of the JEP, including people from the judicial branch, the military, private law practice, human rights organizations, and academia. More than half of those appointed are women, Santos also noted.

”Today is a very special day for the construction of peace in our country,” said Santos. “It is a very special day for advancing the guarantee of the rights of victims of our conflict. And it is a very special day to continue healing the wounds that more than half a century of internal war have left.”

While controversy over the process elements still rages in Colombia, the creation of the JEP in late 2017, despite some key questions raised by Human Rights Watch and others, was largely applauded by international groups as a positive step forward for the peace process.

Last year, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) — while recognizing some flaws with the makeup of the tribunal — categorized the JEP as “fundamental for the effective fulfillment of international obligations in the field of human rights.”

The full list of JEP judges appointed so far is as follows:

Director of the Investigation and Accusation Unit
Giovanny Álvarez Santoyo

Court of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace
Adolfo Murillo
Alejandro Ramellí Artega
Ana Caterina Heyck Puyana
Camilo Andrés Suárez Aldana
Claudia López Díaz
Gloria Amparo Rodríguez
Gustavo Adolfo Salazar Arbeláez
María del Pilar Valencia García
Raúl Eduardo Sánchez Sánchez
Reinere de los Ángeles Jaramillo Chaverra
Roberto Carlos Vidal López
Rodolfo Arango Rivadeneira
Sandra Rocío Gamboa Rubiano
Ana Manuela Ochoa Arias

Chambers of the Special Jurisdiction for Peace
Alexandra Sandoval Mantilla
Belkis Floretina Izquierdo Torres
Catalina Díaz Gómez
Claudia Rocío Saldaña Montoya
Heidy Patricia Baldosea Perea
José Miller Hormiga Sánchez
Juan José Cantillo Pushaina
Julieta Lemaitre Ripoll
Lily Andrea Rueda Guzmán
Marcela Giraldo Muñoz
Nadiezhda Natazha Henríquez Chacín
Óscar Javier Parra Vera
Pedro Díaz Romero
Pedro Julio Mahecha Ávila
Sandra Jeannette Castro Ospina
Xiomara Cecilia Balanta Moreno
Giovanny Álvarez Santoyo

To do so, the president has tasked Rivera Flórez, who has served as the Ministry of the Interior‘s deputy minister and as a national Congress member from the Liberal Party, with solidifying the structures underlying the peace process finalized late last year with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrilla group.

“You have to do the work, Dr. Guillermo Rivera, to make peace irreversible — more irreversible — as soon as possible, with facts,” said Santos during today’s welcoming of the 47-year-old minister at the Casa de Nariño in Bogotá.

Photo: From left to to right, the outgoing Juan Fernando Cristo, President Juan Manuel Santos, and new Minister of the Interior Guillermo Rivera Flórez. (Credit: Presidencia de la República)

Santos believes that the Externado University-trained layer, who hails from the department of Putumayo where the capital of Mocoa was recently devastated by flash flooding, will be capable of leading strong outreach and advancing “social dialogue” with “different sectors of society.”

Juan Fernando Cristo stepped down last week so he would not be precluded from running as a candidate in the nation’s 2018 elections, said the outgoing minister. While the politician, who served as president of the Senate before joining the Ministry of the Interior, has not announced definitive plans to run for office, he reportedly wanted to leave the administration now in case he decides to put his name on the ballot.

In stepping down, Juan Fernando Cristo has followed the lead of others in recent months. Former Vice President Germán Vargas Lleras stepped down in March, former National Planning Department Director Simón Gaviria Muñoz left the administration earlier this month, and former Colombian Ambassador to the United States Juan Carlos Pinzón resigned from his post in Washington last week.

“I am very sorry that Minister Cristo has left because he has been a great minister, a great teammate, and he has done extraordinary work in government,” said Santos last week.