“Colombia recognizes Morocco’s sovereignty over its Sahara,” Bula Escobar said at the meeting. Restrepo described the announcement as “a new beginning” for the two countries and called Morocco “Colombia’s first ally in Africa,” adding that Bogotá wants to build a strategic partnership with Rabat. Restrepo also raised the possibility of negotiating a free trade agreement to encourage Moroccan investment in Colombia, though no such talks have formally begun.

Colombia reconoció la soberanía de Marruecos sobre el Sáhara Occidental.

El anuncio se dio durante el primer encuentro del vicepresidente José Manuel Restrepo (@jrestrp) y el canciller Omar Bula (@omarbula) con el Ministro de Asuntos Exteriores del país africano.

Con esta… pic.twitter.com/aas0pirwSc

— Cancillería Colombia (@CancilleriaCol) August 8, 2026

Two days later, Colombia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (the Cancillería) issued a formal statement confirming the decision followed a “sovereign review” of the recognition its predecessor government had granted to the entity it calls the República Árabe Saharaui Democrática (Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, or SADR), noting that the United Nations does not recognize it as a member state. Bogotá said it would freeze all political and diplomatic contact with the SADR, halt exchanges of missions, and withdraw support for it in multilateral forums, “including the United Nations and the Security Council, where Colombia currently serves as a non-permanent member.” The ministry identified trade, investment promotion, tourism, food security, port and logistics development, and Atlantic connectivity as areas it wants to expand with Morocco.

A colonial-era dispute still unresolved

Western Sahara has been contested since Spain withdrew from its former colony in 1975. Morocco organized the “Green March” that year, sending hundreds of thousands of civilians into the territory to press its claim, and has administered most of it since. The Polisario Front, an armed movement representing the territory’s indigenous Sahrawi population, fought Morocco and declared a government-in-exile, the SADR, in 1976. A 1991 ceasefire monitored by the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) held for nearly three decades without the referendum ever taking place; fighting between Morocco and the Polisario Front resumed in November 2020 and has continued intermittently since. Morocco controls roughly the western three-quarters of the territory, separated from the Polisario-administered “Free Zone” to the east by a fortified sand berm running the length of the territory. Morocco has offered the region autonomy under its sovereignty since 2007; the Polisario Front continues to demand a UN-supervised independence referendum.

A widening diplomatic tilt toward Rabat

Colombia’s move follows a broader realignment in Morocco’s favor. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2797 on October 31, 2025, renewing the MINURSO mandate and, for the first time, calling on the parties to negotiate on the basis of Morocco’s autonomy proposal as the most “feasible” path to a settlement. Eleven Council members voted in favor; China, Russia and Pakistan abstained, and Algeria — not a Council member at the time — did not take part. Morocco’s foreign ministry says more than 130 countries now back the autonomy plan as the most realistic basis for resolving the dispute, and only about a dozen of the African Union’s 54 members still recognize the SADR. Mali withdrew its recognition of the SADR in April 2026 and Ecuador suspended its own in 2024; Peru ended its recognition in 2023. Colombia’s reversal extends that trend into what had been one of the Polisario Front’s remaining strongholds in Latin America.

For Morocco, Colombia’s recognition is a further diplomatic gain and another setback for Algeria, the Polisario Front’s principal regional backer. It also positions Rabat as an intermediary between Latin American and African markets, a role Bourita highlighted directly, saying Morocco and Colombia “could represent economic platforms for each other” given their respective positions on the two continents. He described Colombia’s decision as “historic,” saying it could give “great momentum” to bilateral relations, and said his presence in Cali reflected the Kingdom’s intent to elevate ties “to a higher level.”

“A regrettable quid pro quo arrangement driven by a deeply ideological agenda.” — Polisario Front, in a statement condemning Colombia’s decision

The Polisario Front rejected the decision. In a statement carried by Moroccan outlet Yabiladi, the movement said it “strongly condemned” Colombia’s move, calling it “a regrettable quid pro quo arrangement driven by a deeply ideological agenda” that helps “legitimize a situation resulting from the military occupation of a territory that remains subject to a decolonization process.” The Front argued the decision conflicts with Article 9 of Colombia’s own constitution, which grounds the country’s foreign relations in respect for international law and peoples’ right to self-determination, and said it undermines “Colombia’s international role as an important actor in the pursuit of peace.” It called on Bogotá to reconsider. Algeria has long framed the dispute as a matter of “incomplete decolonization and an unfulfilled right to self-determination,” and has backed the Polisario Front diplomatically and militarily for decades.

Why Colombia had not recognized Morocco’s claim before

Colombia’s position on Western Sahara has shifted with its governments for four decades. Bogotá first recognized the SADR in 1985 under President Belisario Betancur, then froze those ties in 2001 under President Andrés Pastrana. President Gustavo Petro restored full diplomatic relations with the SADR in August 2022, shortly after taking office, framing it as support for Sahrawi self-determination consistent with his government’s broader identification with Global South and non-aligned foreign-policy positions. Petro reaffirmed that stance as recently as November 2025, pledging what he called “unrestricted” support for the Sahrawi cause and linking it to Colombia’s arrival on the UN Security Council for a two-year term beginning in 2026.

That position did not survive the change of government. De la Espriella, a right-of-center former defense lawyer who took office August 7, had campaigned on unwinding Petro’s foreign policy, and moved quickly on more than one front: alongside the Western Sahara reversal, his government also recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights and moved to restore ties with Israel, becoming only the second country after the United States to do so. Colombia’s recognition of Morocco’s claim over Western Sahara is best read in that context — less a response to new facts in the territory than a marker of where the incoming administration wants to position Colombia internationally, closer to Washington, Jerusalem and Rabat and further from the non-aligned coalition Petro had cultivated.

What remains untested is the commercial follow-through. Restrepo’s reference to a possible free trade agreement was aspirational rather than an announcement of negotiations, and the Colombian and Moroccan governments have yet to lay out a timeline for the trade, investment, port-logistics and Atlantic-connectivity cooperation both sides say they want to pursue.

Colombia’s Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores convened ambassadors, international organizations, agricultural producers, and strategic partners in Bogotá on May 15, 2026, to present the Ruta del Café y Cacao, a government-led strategy that uses the diplomatic network to connect Colombian specialty coffee and cacao producers directly with international buyers, importers, and distributors. The session was organized in coordination with the Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP), Colombia Compra Eficiente, and the Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (SENA), with additional participation from the Agencia de Desarrollo Rural and the Unidad de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz.

Between 2025 and 2026, the Ruta del Café y Cacao has participated in international trade fairs and multilateral venues in Asia, the Americas, and Europe, generating more than 1,200 commercial contacts and exports exceeding 100 tons. The strategy is coordinated through Colombia Nos Une, a directorate within the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores that oversees relations with Colombian communities and commercial networks abroad.

“This strategy is not limited to the promotion of a product. It is a tool of economic diplomacy, productive inclusion, rural development, and peacebuilding.” — Rosa Yolanda Villavicencio Mapy, Minister of Foreign Relations of Colombia

Foreign Minister Rosa Yolanda Villavicencio Mapy used the event to outline the government’s rationale for embedding agricultural trade promotion into foreign policy. “From the Ministry of Foreign Relations, we want economic diplomacy to translate into concrete results for the territories,” she said. “Foreign policy must have the capacity to open opportunities, connect markets, and contribute to the productive development of our communities.” She added that the strategy extends beyond product promotion: “It is a tool of economic diplomacy, productive inclusion, rural development, and peacebuilding.”

Natalia Irene Molina Posso, director general of the Departamento Nacional de Planeación, presented the Café Social program as a related mechanism designed to strengthen small agricultural producers. The initiative links public procurement policy with territorial development and small-scale coffee farming, creating demand channels within Colombia’s public sector for domestically produced specialty coffee.

Gloria Cuartas Montoya, director of the Unidad de Implementación del Acuerdo de Paz, addressed the relationship between coffee and cacao production and post-conflict territorial transformation. “You have all the entities that have been working on the implementation of the Peace Agreement and in the new processes being carried out, so that territorial peace finds in these two [commodity] lines paths of enormous value and projection,” she said. Cuartas also referenced recent engagement in Barcelona, where business operators and organizations expressed interest in awareness-building activities around Colombian coffee and cacao, citing the social and community dimensions behind those products.

A central element of the event was the participation of producers and associations from multiple regions of Colombia, convened by the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores through the Colombia Nos Une directorate. The participants included cooperatives and producer groups led by women, former combatants who signed the 2016 Peace Agreement, ethnic communities, and victims of the armed conflict. These groups presented their productive and commercial operations directly to diplomatic delegations attending the event.

The session also included a guided coffee tasting led by SENA’s Escuela Nacional del Café, during which attendees sampled specialty coffee varieties and received information on production processes and the characteristics that differentiate Colombian coffees participating in the Ruta del Café y Cacao. The tasting segment was designed to give diplomatic representatives direct exposure to the product profiles of the producers involved in the strategy.

Photo courtesy of Ministry of Foreign Relations of Colombia

 An incident on April 12, 2026, has reignited diplomatic and security tensions in the Amazon border region between Colombia and Peru, following an exchange of gunfire between a Colombian civilian vessel and the Marina de Guerra del Perú, a Peruvian Navy River unit, on the Putumayo River. The incident left one Colombian citizen dead and one person injured on each side.

The episode occurred near Marandúa (Amazonas, Colombia), across from the Peruvian town of El Estrecho. According to Colombia’s Defense Minister, Pedro Sánchez, the fatal victim was identified “as José Miguel Gutiérrez Baquero, owner of the cargo vessel involved in the incident, and one of his sons was injured,” while two other crew members were detained by Peruvian authorities.

Conflicting accounts of the operation

According to the Peruvian government statement, “the incident occurred during a patrol operation aimed at securing the electoral process,” previously coordinated between the two countries. Authorities said two Navy speedboats requested that the Colombian vessel stop for identification.

Peru’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is leading the process, said that “the Colombian vessel refused to comply with the control order and opened fire on two Peruvian Navy units, which returned fire.” As a result, “a member of the Peruvian Navy was also injured, although he is out of danger.”

Colombian authorities, led by the Foreign Ministry, have requested a full clarification of the events and verification of the circumstances surrounding the exchange of gunfire.

Diplomatic channels activated

Following the incident, the governments of Colombia and Peru activated diplomatic and military channels. Colombia’s defense minister said that “preliminary measures were agreed, including prioritizing medical attention for the injured, facilitating the work of judicial authorities, and establishing a binational commission to investigate what happened.”

Colombia’s Foreign Ministry formally requested clarification of “the circumstances of time, mode and place” of the attack, while the Peruvian government expressed its “willingness to cooperate and maintain border coordination mechanisms.”

The detained individuals “remain in the custody of the Fiscalía Provincial Mixta de Putumayo, with access to consular assistance and due process guarantees.”

So far, no final responsibilities have been determined, and both countries agree on the need for a thorough investigation. Both governments said the issue will be addressed at the next High-Level Mechanism on Security and Judicial Cooperation meeting, scheduled for May 2026 in Bogotá.

Context of prior tensions

The incident comes amid sensitive bilateral relations. In recent months, Colombia and Peru have had disagreements over territorial issues in the Amazon, particularly regarding Santa Rosa de Loreto island.

The dispute dates back to August 5, 2025, when President Gustavo Petro said on X that the “government of Peru has taken over territory that belongs to Colombia” and alleged a “violation of the Rio de Janeiro Protocol, which defines the boundaries between the two countries.”

“The Rio de Janeiro Protocol established that the border is the deepest channel of the Amazon River and that any dispute must be resolved between the parties,” Petro said, referring to the emergence of new river islands “north of the current deepest channel,” which, according to his position, should belong to Colombia.

In response, Peru’s Foreign Ministry expressed its “strongest and most forceful protest,” stating that the island, home to about 3,000 residents, mostly Peruvians, is part of its territory and is key to regional river trade.

Tensions escalated days later when then-presidential pre-candidate Daniel Quintero traveled to the island and raised a Colombian flag during a campaign event broadcast on social media, saying: “I will not allow them to take the Amazon from us. Santa Rosa is Colombia.”

The Peruvian government described the act as an “unnecessary action” that “distracts from the cooperation efforts that Peru and Colombia must prioritize to jointly address urgent challenges.”

Headline photo: President Gustavo Petro, Vice President Francia Márquez and Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez at an event held in Leticia (Amazonas) to address tensions with Peru, Aug. 7, 2025. Photo courtesy of Colombia’s Ministry of Defense.

On April 10, former Colombian Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva Durán released a formal statement responding to his indictment by the Fiscalía General de la Nación. Leyva faces charges related to his 2023 decision to declare a passport procurement tender void, a process that involved the private security printing firm Thomas Greg & Sons. The former official characterized the legal proceedings as a politically motivated maneuver orchestrated from the Casa de Nariño.

The indictment for prevarication centers on Leyva’s intervention in the bidding process, which the Fiscalía interprets as a deliberate breach of administrative law. In his defense, Leyva maintained that his actions were necessary to address irregularities and ensure the application of the Constitución Política de Colombia. He argued that the prosecuting body’s thesis would criminalize the conduct of any public servant who identifies unconstitutional terms in a government contract.

“If that argument is accepted, then any official who declares a bidding process void because they find the terms and conditions unconstitutional or illegal should go to jail.” — Álvaro Leyva Durán, former Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Leyva also directed accusations toward his successor at the Cancillería, Luis Gilberto Murillo. According to the statement, Murillo suspended a subsequent legal bidding process to justify a state of emergency, which Leyva claims led to an unnecessary markup of approximately $30 billion COP. Furthermore, Leyva alleged that software contracts exceeding $10 billion COP were improperly managed and that the funds remain unaccounted for under the current administration.

The former minister’s statement included severe personal and political criticisms of President Gustavo Petro. Leyva alleged a lack of moral conduct by the head of state during international state visits and questioned the president’s sobriety in public settings. The letter further asserted that US authorities are currently investigating potential links between the executive branch and narcotics trafficking organizations.

Regarding the domestic political landscape, Leyva warned of perceived risks to the Colombian electoral process. He alleged that the administration has engaged in the illegal interception of political candidates and intends to undermine the integrity of future vote counts. Leyva concluded by affirming his intention to defend his record and his legal decisions before the Corte Suprema de Justicia.

COMUNICADO pic.twitter.com/7YYhoHJD4B

— Álvaro Leyva Durán (@AlvaroLeyva) April 10, 2026

Finance Colombia translation of Leyva’s recent open letter dated April 10th

Some time ago, I denounced in a public communiqué that Gustavo Petro had woven against me an atrocious persecution, as retaliation for my denunciations of his closeness to the world of drugs—denunciations that have led to the United States having him cornered today. There I warned that, from within the government, intrigues were being made to throw me in prison and that attempts would be made against my life.

Now, months later, the Attorney General’s Office accuses me of malfeasance (prevaricato) because I declared void a passport tender that, according to that same institution, was based on a “catch-all specifications document” (pliego sastre). For the accusing entity, I should not have fulfilled the obligation of applying the Constitution that I myself helped draft and, by seeking equality, I acted with malicious intent. The world turned upside down.

Understand the gravity: if that thesis is accepted, any official who declares a tender void because they find unconstitutional or illegal specifications must go to prison. So, faced with such a thing, the trial is welcome. I will give the battle in the Supreme Court with all my strength. Because I trust its magistrates, because my life has been a permanent struggle for Colombia, and because justice, reason, and the law are with me.

The acquittal will be the logical consequence of the process in which I will prove, with official documents and among other things, the following: that I left in motion a new, clean, and legal tender, which Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo suspended. That he thus justified another manifest urgency, completely unnecessary, and added an overcharge of nearly 30 billion pesos to it. And that he contracted software for more than 10 billion additional pesos, which was pocketed. All by hand-picking. All murky. All without control. Thus, by brute force, the door was opened to the passport debacle of today. I warned Petro of what was coming down on the country. But he kept silent.

Today I feel the pride of having helped unmask the boss of the mafia that has plunged Colombia into its darkest hours. I took office as his Foreign Minister with the hope of change. But then I came to know his life of vice and decadence. I was slow to understand his vileness and, surely, also slow to denounce it. But from my father Jorge Leyva Urdaneta, exiled for opposing the dictatorship, I inherited courage and respect for institutions; from Álvaro Gómez Hurtado, I learned the necessity of a just order; and from Misael Pastrana Borrero, I learned to think about social peace. So, faithful to myself and to the spirit of my mentors, I denounced in various letters the moral, political, and personal degeneration that I came to know in Gustavo Petro. And time has proven me right.

The President is an infamous being: international human trafficking is a scourge of the poor girls of Colombia, and he, in the middle of a state visit, ends up as a customer of a brothel in Lisbon; he claims to be a champion of peace, but full of hatred he violently divides society with his stale, classist, and racist rhetoric; he claims to fight drug trafficking, but he goes out into the public square drugged, drunk on alcohol and sectarianism, to mistreat and insult those who contradict him, while in the United States his ties to narcos are being investigated. And so, from scandal to scandal, the horrible night does not cease: the homeland trampled by its own President is today the object of all the mockery abroad.

Petro knows that the upcoming electoral process resembles the one recently lived in Chile. And, to avoid the same result, he illegally intercepts candidates, seeks to destroy them, and is already trying to cast a mantle of doubt over the vote count. But Colombia deserves a new dawn. And the radical left, which—turned into the President’s hooligan squad—forgives him everything, seems condemned to the desert. We shall see whether, in the future, they also forgive him for being responsible for their possible defeat. For my part, I remain ready for all battles: always embracing justice against oppression, and with the law as my spear, shield, and banner.

The lawsuit, submitted to the Administrative Tribunal of Cundinamarca, demands the “absolute nullity” of the inter-administrative agreement signed on July 18. The contract partners include the Cancillería (Foreign Ministry), Colombia’s Imprenta Nacional (National Mint), and Portugal’s state-owned mint, the Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda (INCM).

The Procuraduría, led by Gregorio Eljach Pacheco, argues that the agreement violates Colombian public contracting law. The primary objections cited are the failure to conduct a competitive public bidding process and the direct adjudication of the contract. The oversight body also alleges that the agreement does not meet the legal requirements for such a partnership, stating that the foreign entity, INCM, contributed only 21% of the project’s total value, significantly below the legally mandated 50% minimum financing. The lawsuit requests the court to compel the Portuguese mint to return all funds it has received under the challenged agreement.

In its public communiqué, the Foreign Ministry clarified that it had not, at the time of the release, been formally notified by the court of the lawsuit’s admission. The ministry stressed that the filing represents the beginning of a legal process and is not a verdict against the contract’s legitimacy.

“The existence of a control measure, in this case a lawsuit, in no way prevents the continued execution of the projects, plans, and programs related to the issuance of the new passport model,” the ministry’s statement reads. It further added, “To date, there is no ruling against the Colombian Foreign Ministry that would make it impossible to move forward with the production process of new passports for Colombia.”

The Cancillería has confirmed its intent to mount a full legal defense through its juridical division once formally served. The judicial process will unfold in two stages, beginning at the Administrative Tribunal of Cundinamarca and potentially advancing to the Council of State, Colombia’s highest court for administrative matters.

President Gustavo Petro has publicly distanced himself from the Procuraduría’s legal action. Commenting on the social media platform X, the president stated, “I completely disagree with the Procurador on this issue. The country has the right for its printing press to be able to make its citizens’ identification documents because intimate data should not be in private hands.”

This legal challenge is the latest chapter in a controversy that began in 2023 when then-Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva suspended a public tender for the passport contract. Leyva cited concerns over a lack of competition, which appeared to favor the long-standing provider, Thomas Greg & Sons, a company that had produced Colombia’s passports for the preceding 17 years. Following that suspension, the government pursued the current direct agreement with the Imprenta Nacional and INCM.

The Procuraduría had previously initiated disciplinary investigations into alleged irregularities surrounding the implementation of the new passport model. These investigations include former Foreign Minister Rosa Villavicencio and her predecessors, Laura Sarabia and Luis Gilberto Murillo, as well as the former chief of staff for the presidency, Alfredo Saade.

The Foreign Ministry has sought to quell public concern over passport availability, stating that contingency plans are in effect and that a pre-existing contract ensures the continuous supply of passport booklets. “We give a piece of tranquility to the public,” the ministry stated, assuring that there “is not, nor will there be, a shortage.”

Headline Photo: Imprenta Nacional de Colombia. Photo credit: Imprenta Nacional de Colombia/Facebook.

Medellin’s Mayor Federico “Fico” Gutierrez

According to the Mayor’s Office, Mayor Federico Gutiérrez has sent multiple formal communications since 2024 to the national immigration authority, Migración Colombia, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Cancillería), urging them to increase staffing and operational capacity at the airport. To date, the national government has not provided a formal response to these requests.

A new letter was sent on July 21, 2025, again highlighting the city’s concern as it prepares for Colombiamoda 2025 and the Feria de las Flores (Festival of the Flowers). These two events are expected to draw tens of thousands of domestic and international tourists, placing further strain on the airport’s already overwhelmed immigration infrastructure.

The situation is critical given the region’s growing tourism sector, which saw over 1.8 million visitors in 2024. The city administration has stated that the current number of immigration officials is insufficient to handle the volume of travelers.

An immigration official with Migración Colombia but unauthorized to speak to the media on behalf of the immigration agency told FInance Colombia that the Petro administration refuses to authorize additional hires, meaning that there are no more than nine, and often as few as four immigration officers to handle both departures and arrivals.

As part of its proposal, the Medellín government has offered to provide resources to support processes such as the Biomig biometric registration system and to deploy personnel to guide travelers, particularly for services like passport claim processing. These measures are intended to create a more efficient and secure entry process in collaboration with the local tourism sector and business guilds.

José María Córdova International Airport is operated by the private concessionaire Airplan S.A.S., which has not issued a statement on the matter.

Headline photo:International Arrivals at José María Córdova International Airport (MDE/SKRG) outside of Medellín. Photo © Loren Moss

The gathering, officially the 122nd meeting of the UN Tourism Executive Council, will be held in October and led by the Colombian Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism (MinCIT) along with the support from the Cartagena mayor’s office, the nation’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, national business promotion agency ProColombia, and tourism promotion agencies Fontur and Corpoturismo.

The decision, which was made during a session held in Barcelona, saw Colombia’s Caribbean tourism jewel beat out second-place vote getter, the Bahamas, by a 21 to 11 margin.

“Thanks to the support of 21 nations for our candidacy and the outstanding experience of Colombia in building a culture of peace through tourism, we will receive this event that will represent a great economic impact for Cartagena, with an average expenditure of $480 USD per day per participant, according to data from the International Congress and Convention Association,” said Arturo Bravo, Colombia’s vice minister of tourism.

In parallel with the October meeting the “UN Tourism Tech Adventure Colombia” will be held to further promote tourism in the country.

Photo: One of Cartagena’s many iconic historic plazas. (Credit: MinCIT)

The five new consulates will be opened in Charlotte, Phoenix, Dallas, Denver, and Seattle, according to Foreign Affairs Minister Luis Gilberto Murillo.

“The presence of Colombia is expanded through these consulates and is a response to the need that the Colombian diaspora, the extended Colombia, the population that lives in the outside,” said Murillo. “And we will do this, obviously not only in the United States, but in other countries where our population requires the attention of our government.”

In announcing the news, the ministry also highlighted the recognition it has received from the United States for the nation’s leadership in terms of welcoming migrants from Venezuela.

“We applaud President [Gustavo] Petro in his decision to expand regularization and protection options this year to give almost three million Venezuelans residing in Colombia the opportunity to work, send their children to school and have access to health services,” said Richard Verma, undersecretary of state for the United States.

Murillo added context by providing an update on the Venezuelan migrant situation in Colombia. “We have about 2.3 million Venezuelans here integrating into our society and we are also going to welcome about 500,000 – 600,000 more,” said Murillo.

The two nations also discussed plans regarding Colombians who have migrated, particularly the current US family unification program aimed at helping Colombians reunite with their families in the United States.

“About 58,000 a thousand Colombians will benefit,” said Murillo. “Authorization and invitation have already been given by the [US] State Department for 6,000, and there are already close to 500 families in the United States that have been reunified through this program.”

For the first time, the United States has also provided authorization for nearly 20,000 Colombians to apply for non-agricultural work visas and approximately 1,000 visas for young people to work in summer in different cities in the United States.

“There are nearly 9,000 Colombian men and women studying in the United States, which also shows the strength of this relationship in these aspects,” said Murillo.

Photo: Colombian Minister of Foreign Affairs Luis Gilberto Murillo. (Photo credit: Cancillería of Colombia)

Photo: Colombian Foreign Minister Álvaro Leyva. (Credit: Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

While bureaucratic details such as passport issuance particulars normally don’t draw significant attention, Colombians have been suffering for months with long wait times and lines while trying to get or renew a passport.

According to the office of the inspector general, Leyva “violated the law, exhibited capricious behavior, and disregarded the principles of transparency and morality” when he cancelled the bidding process last year in which only one company, incumbent provider Thomas Greg & Sons, submitted a bid. Leyva purportedly lacked the legal and technical foundation to make such a decision and may have violated principles of transparency and responsibility in state contracting.

Thomas Greg & Sons had already filed a lawsuit claiming impropriety before the suspension order came down.

For the inspector general’s office, Tatiana del Carmen Moreno, Jesualdo Villero Payares, and Esiquio Manuel Sánchez are the officials handling the case.

The saga may also be entangled by an interpersonal conflict that Leyva previously had with Martha Lucía Zamora, former director of the State Legal Defense Agency (ADJDE). According to local media outlet Reporte Coronell within W Radio, Leyva took issue with a conciliation that had Zamora reportedly made with Thomas Greg & Sons and it led to a a verbal confrontation. Zamora would later resign.

Juan Manuel Galán, former presidential candidate and brother of the Mayor of Bogotá Carlos Fernando, has called for the removal to be made permanent. “We ask that he be removed from office and that a foreign minister be appointed to lead a strategic policy for the nation,” he said in a publicized video.

Others have made similar calls, and one emerging candidate to take over at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs if Leyva is ousted is Luis Gilberto Murillo, the nation’s current ambassador to the United States. He formerly served as governor of Chocó and minister of environment.

Colombian Freelance Visa Misconceptions

What are the Colombian Freelance Visa Requirements?

• A scanned copy of the first page of a valid passport. Also, a scanned copy of the entry stamp to Colombia, and copies of any previously held Colombian visas
• A passport-style photo with a white background and 3 x 4cm dimensions
• A visa application letter detailing your intentions of being an independent worker in Colombia, for how long and why
• A professional resume detailing your experience and background within your occupation
• Scanned copies of at least 3 certificates that show your educational and professional attainment for your occupation. These documents must be apostilled, translated and/or legally recognized by an appropriate authority.
• References from Colombian employers who have an interest in procuring your independent services.
• The previous 6-months of your personal bank statements. These must show that you’ve been earning over 10-times the Colombian minimum monthly wage ($877,903 COP). This means that you must be able to show an amount of $8,779,030 COP (roughly $2350 USD) every month.

How much does the Colombian Freelance Visa Cost?

1. PSE
2. Servibanca ATM
3. Banco GNB Sudameris (This can only be done in the headquarters of Migración in Bogotá at Avenida Carrera 19 No. 98-03, Edificio Torre 100, 1st Floor. Payments must be made in cash by pesos. During quarantine, you may only visit Migración headquarters by special request)
4. Visa Credit/Debit card

Can I Still Apply for the Colombian Freelance Visa During COVID-19?

Apply for the Colombian Freelance Visa through an Experienced Agency