The other financial institutions involved in the project are the International Finance Corporation (IFC), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), Bancolombia (NYSE: CIB), Bancóldex, and BBVA (NYSE: BBVA).

The project is sponsored by the Spanish company Sacyr (BME: SCYR). It covers a 128 km segment between Buga and Buenaventura, including the construction of 35 km of new roadway and bypasses, as well as the rehabilitation of 25 km. The plan also involves the upgrade and improvement of 186 km of existing road, in addition to the operation and maintenance of 244 km.

About FDN

Financiera de Desarrollo Nacional (FDN) operates as a private-sector development bank specializing in providing financial solutions for infrastructure projects. Its objective is to increase liquidity within the infrastructure sector.

The shareholders of FDN include Grupo Bicentenario, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation, and CAF – Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean. The inclusion of the two multilateral organizations and the Japanese private bank as shareholders has enhanced FDN’s operational autonomy, technical capacity, and financial strength by incorporating international best practices and a robust corporate governance framework.

Buga-Buenaventura highway. Photo credit: Sacyr website.

Adventure tourism service providers must comply with 100% of the requirements of the applicable technical standard to prevent accidents and protect the integrity of tourists, the community in the area, and guides.

This resolution, which regulated Article 12 of Law 2068 of 2020, defined the levels of tourism quality to ensure that service providers, destinations, and tourist attractions comply with quality, sustainability, and safety standards, to prevent accidents and protect the integrity of tourists, the community of the area, and guides.

During this period, the MinCIT has socialized the content of the resolution in 26 specific conferences in municipalities such as Mesetas, Guaduas, Santa Marta, Apía, Pereira, Buenaventura, Cali, Puerto Carreño and Guadalajara de Buga, among others, with more than 2,000 participants; and in scenarios such as technical assistance days on tourism quality, safety committees, National Tourism Quality Week, among other events, held since August 2024, reaching another 1,667 people.

Service providers should be aware that:

•  They must comply with technical safety standards at an outstanding level, which means meeting 100% of the requirements of the applicable technical standard.
• The certification must be granted by a Conformity Assessment Body (OEC), accredited by the National Accreditation Body of Colombia (ONAC). The OECs can be consulted in https://onac.org.co/directorio-de-acreditados/
• The mayors’ offices and territorial entities will supervise compliance and apply the sanctions established in Article 72 of Law 300 of 1996, which even contemplates the possibility of cancellation of the National Tourism Registry (RNT) for up to 5 years, depending on the seriousness of the offense.
• They must consult with the territorial entities on the mechanisms for notifying them of compliance with this requirement.
• They must include in their advertising that their activities are certified.
• This certification is not just a formality; it is a commitment to life so that adventure tourism is synonymous with excellence and prevention, and we continue to consolidate Colombia as The Country of Beauty.

Photo credit: MINCIT.

This year, the fair presented important novelties, including the inauguration of the “Tourism with Purpose” stand, a space dedicated to sustainable and inclusive tourism projects. Representatives of rural tourism, indigenous communities, the LGBTIQ+ population, and enterprises focused on accessible tourism for people with disabilities participated in this stand.

Likewise, the “Excellence Colombia” stand was highlighted, bringing together initiatives recognized for their high tourism quality standards. In addition, the momentum of the stands of “Heritage Towns” and “Colombia, Destinations of Peace” was maintained, the latter with the participation of 80 entrepreneurs who, through tourism, transform their territories.

A positive day

During the three days of the event, more business relationship meetings were held between various actors in the sector, with deals estimated at $54 million USD, with 80% of the information processed (according to ProColombia). The general balance of the Tourism Showcase, the most important event in the country in terms of tourism, confirms that the sector continues to consolidate itself as a key engine for national economic growth, with positive prospects for the end of this year.

At the inauguration, President Gustavo Petro highlighted: “The purpose is to replace foreign currency resulting from the extraction of non-renewable resources, such as coal and oil, with tourism, which is a sector that generates more employment and is more productive.”

For this purpose, MinCIT held strategic meetings with territorial entities and international authorities to establish lines of joint work and generate opportunities for the country’s tourism development through bilateral alliances. Among these are the meeting with the Minister of Tourism of Argentina and the meeting with the Director of Air and Maritime Access of the Puerto Rico Tourism Company, in addition to meetings with countries such as Cuba, China, and the Dominican Republic.

Colombia continues to consolidate itself as a leading destination in the region. The positive results of this edition show that articulated work between the public and private sectors is the key to strengthening the industry and positioning the “Country of Beauty” in the global tourism scenario. Photo credit: ANATO.

Regarding the growth of tourism, the Minister of Commerce, Industry, and Tourism, Luis Carlos Reyes, explained that the sector already exceeds coal in foreign exchange earnings. In addition, he said: “Although the goal of the four years is to reach 7.5 million non-resident visitors to Colombia, there is optimism about the possibility of exceeding these figures, since tourism is a point of consensus among all Colombians; something we all agree on, in that it not only brings foreign currency to the country, but also opportunities for people from traditionally excluded places.”

On the other hand, the General Manager of Fontur, Fernando Estupiñán, had a full agenda with tourism service providers and local authorities to provide support and project the development of high-impact tourism initiatives. Among the agreements reached is the signing of the agreement with the Mayor’s Office of Providencia and Santa Catalina for the implementation of efficient nautical signage for the beaches of the island of Providencia, with an investment of more than $4000 million.

The Anato 2025 Tourism Showcase not only exceeded expectations in terms of participation and completed business but also reaffirmed the role of tourism as a key driver for the country’s economy

Similarly, a meeting was held with the Ministry of Cultures, Arts and Knowledge, in which joint actions were defined to strengthen the destinations of the Macondo Route in a sustainable and friendly way with local communities. This inter-institutional articulation seeks to promote the safeguarding of intangible heritage, collective memory, and economic development of both the territory and local inhabitants.

“In the last editions of this Tourism Showcase, we see more and more qualified and complete offers from each of the entrepreneurs and destinations that participate. This demonstrates the importance of Fontur, which carries out fundamental work to promote tourism quality and accompany territorial entities and tourism service providers. A very clear example is Mompox, where last year, important investments were made to improve the tourist infrastructure in the Albarrada, which allowed to increase its promotion at this fair,” said Fernando Estupiñán.

Award for the best stand

The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism and Fontur awarded, for the third consecutive year, the most visited and creative stands of the Anato 2025 Tourist Showcase. In this edition, the winners were chosen by public vote, who chose their favorites.

With a total of 126,064 votes, the first three places with the highest scores were awarded. The winners received media plans for the promotion of their territories and financing of up to 100% for their participation in the next edition of the fair. The winners were:

• Third place: with 11,933 votes, the department of Buenaventura, which received a media plan package worth $40 million for the promotion of the destination.
• Second place: Boyacá, with a total of 16,369 votes. The department received a media plan for tourism promotion for $80 million.
• First place: Caquetá, which received 16,581 votes from those attending the event. As a prize, the department will obtain financing for the development of its stand at the Anato 2026 Tourist Showcase, which includes the rental of the space, design, assembly, and disassembly, for a value of up to $200 million.

The Anato 2025 Tourism Showcase not only exceeded expectations in terms of participation and completed business but also reaffirmed the role of tourism as a key driver for the country’s economy. With a clear commitment to sustainability, inclusion, and innovation, Colombia continues to consolidate itself as a leading destination in the region.

The positive results of this edition show that articulated work between the public and private sectors is the key to strengthening the industry and positioning the “Country of Beauty” in the global tourism scenario.

Headline Image credit: ANATO.

President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace (Paz Total) policy, designed to negotiate agreements with the country’s main armed groups and criminal gangs, is struggling to make any headway as he passes the halfway point of his four-year administration. The negotiations have had profound effects on the criminal dynamics in the country.

SEE ALSO: What Is Behind Increased Violence in Colombia?

After initial progress in dialogue with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), talks collapsed in May last year when a faction of the group split off to pursue separate peace negotiations. The ELN’s extensive infrastructure and leadership in Venezuela, where Nicolás Maduro remains in power following a widely criticized election, has further undermined the chances of peace with the Marxist-Leninist rebel force.

Similarly, negotiations with dissidents of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) have faced significant setbacks. Fragmentation within these groups has sparked infighting, with splinter factions emerging from the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) and the Second Marquetalia, the two largest dissident factions. As a result, the government is engaging with only a small portion of each group.

The country’s most powerful drug-trafficking organization, the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), remains largely outside the Total Peace framework. Efforts have been stalled by the absence of a legal framework for negotiations and a potential peace deal. Similar legal obstacles have hindered progress in “urban peace laboratories” in cities like Buenaventura, Quibdó, and Medellín, where gangs dominate neighborhoods through drug trafficking and extortion rackets.

As Petro begins the third year of his presidency, InSight Crime reviews the key developments in Colombia’s peace dialogues and examines their criminal implications for 2025.

ELN

Initial progress with the ELN effectively unraveled as disputes with the government led to the collapse of negotiations.

In January last year, the Comuneros del Sur Front (Frente Comuneros del Sur – FCS), an ELN faction in southern Nariño, broke ranks, announcing plans to pursue separate “regional dialogue” with the government. Frustrated by the limited progress at the national level and growing threats from rival groups, the FCS sought a more localized approach. However, ELN top commander Eliecer Erlinto Chamorro, alias “Antonio García,” condemned these parallel dialogues as unauthorized and illegitimate.

SEE ALSO: Kidnappings Surge in Colombia Amid ELN Peace Negotiations

By May, the FCS formally severed ties with the ELN, emerging as a dissident faction of the guerrilla group. It quickly established dialogue with the government, advanced in peace talks, and even committed to a partial weapons handover, according to Carlos Augusto Erazo Murcia, head of the government’s negotiating team.

This was followed by the collapse of a bilateral ceasefire between the ELN and the government, which expired in August without renewal. After the ceasefire lapse, the ELN escalated hostilities by attacking a military base in Arauca in September, killing three soldiers. In response, the government suspended peace talks indefinitely.

The ELN and the government resumed talks on November 25, agreeing to reconvene in 2025 to reassess the dialogue process and explore the possibility of a renewed ceasefire.

The ELN also stands to benefit greatly from what was widely considered a stolen election in Venezuela, extending by another six years of Maduro’s time at the helm of the country. Venezuela remains a critical hub for the ELN, hosting much of its leadership and infrastructure.

Since the FARC’s demobilization in 2016, the ELN has expanded its presence in Venezuela and Colombia’s border departments, strengthening its operations through a symbiotic relationship with the Maduro regime. The group now controls entire sections of the border, managing smuggling and drug-trafficking corridors between the two countries, while maintaining corridors moving troops. Its influence spans eight of Venezuela’s 24 states, with significant income derived from controlling illegal mining and cocaine production zones.

With little interference and often support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—who depend on the income generated by these groups, particularly amid severe US sanctions—the ELN has solidified its presence along the 2,219 km border with Venezuela and uses this haven to project into Colombia. This growing entrenchment further undermines the Total Peace initiative.

Ex-FARC

Government dialogue with the EMC, the largest ex-FARC organization, has also splintered the group. In March, Petro suspended a bilateral ceasefire with the EMC in the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño due to ongoing violence against Indigenous communities. This decision deepened internal divisions within the EMC. Its leader, Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias “Iván Mordisco,” refused further negotiations until the ceasefire was reinstated, while another faction, led by Alexander Díaz, alias “Calarcá Córdoba,” opted to continue talks.

By April, the government expelled Mordisco’s faction from the peace talks, shifting its focus to negotiations exclusively with Calarcá’s bloc. In July, his group signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement, marking a tentative step forward. However, significant challenges remain: Calarcá’s faction has been accused of threatening demobilized FARC members in Caquetá, and in December, six soldiers were killed in a minefield allegedly planted by the group.

Mordisco’s wing, on the other hand, has intensified violent activities, particularly in Cauca, an important region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. By September, Cauca had recorded 466 violent incidents over 12 months, the most of any department during that period, with numbers continuing to rise through the end of 2024.

Meanwhile, the Second Marquetalia, a separate group of FARC dissidents led by Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” became the third major group to enter Total Peace negotiations in 2024. However, internal divisions also plagued this effort. In November, two key factions—the Border Command and the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico)—broke away, frustrated by Márquez’s leadership. They formed the National Bolivarian Army Coordinator (Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano), led by José Vicente Lesmes, alias “Walter Mendoza.”

AGC and Urban Groups

The AGC has been largely excluded from the Total Peace initiative thus far, but signs emerged in 2024 that Petro sought to change this. In July, he authorized dialogue with the group, signaling a potential shift in policy.

But significant obstacles remain. The government’s classification of the AGC as a high-impact organized crime group, rather than a political organization like the ELN or FARC dissidents, has become a sticking point in the negotiations. This designation precludes the AGC from seeking transitional justice terms, such as guarantees against extradition and amnesty, similar to those offered to the FARC in the 2016 peace agreement. Under Colombian law, high-impact organized crime groups are only eligible for limited judicial benefits, such as reduced sentences, making negotiations far less appealing for the AGC.

SEE ALSO: GameChangers 2023: The Cocaine Flash-to-Bang in 2024

Despite minor progress—such as the attorney general lifting arrest warrants for key AGC leaders—negotiations have yielded few tangible results. Tensions remain high: in December, the military bombed an AGC camp in northern Antioquia, underscoring the ongoing hostilities.

Moreover, skepticism about the AGC’s intentions persists. Some analysts suggest the group is using negotiations as a tactical maneuver to secure a bilateral ceasefire and reduce military pressure, rather than genuinely committing to demobilization. At the same time, its ongoing territorial expansion and dominance over key criminal economies fuel doubts about its willingness to disarm.

The absence of a legal framework for gang demobilization, or “transition to legality,” as it is officially termed, has also hindered progress in cities like Medellín, Quibdó, and Buenaventura.

Efforts to pass legislation to formalize a framework for gang demobilization have stalled in Colombia’s gridlocked congress, leaving urban peace efforts in limbo.

In Medellín, several gangs agreed to reduce violence following Petro’s 2022 election, resulting in a notable drop in homicide rates. In June 2023, Petro initiated a dialogue table with former gang leaders at Itagüí prison, but progress faltered in 2024.

In Quibdó, the gangs Los Mexicanos, Lokos Yam, and RPS began talks in August 2023, achieving significant milestones like a commitment to halt the extortion of teachers and health workers. But in September 2024, a ceasefire between the gangs collapsed, amidst incursions by the AGC into the city. In December, Petro authorized exploratory talks to include three additional groups—the Zetas, Cabí, and AGC—in the Quibdó table.

In Buenaventura, negotiations with the Spartans and Shottas—which together command over 1,700 members—have produced mixed results. The groups agreed to a truce in August 2023, significantly reducing violence throughout 2024. While tensions flared in March when the Spartans temporarily withdrew from the negotiations, they eventually returned to the table, and have renewed the ceasefire, currently set to last until February 2025.

Looking Forward

Several key factors will significantly influence peace negotiations in 2025.

First, the fragmentation of major groups within the Total Peace process highlights the challenges of negotiating with organizations that appear unified but are, in fact, loose coalitions of diverse factions. The Comuneros del Sur’s split from the ELN exposed the group’s limited control over its regional fronts. Similarly, the EMC’s divided leadership—between Mordisco and Calarcá—mirrors the internal tensions within the Second Marquetalia, where Iván Márquez has struggled to maintain cohesion among factions like the Border Command.

These fractures risk escalating violence as splinter groups vie for territorial control and factions excluded from peace talks increase attacks on government targets.

Since the EMC split, clashes between Mordisco’s and Calarcá’s factions have escalated in Putumayo, a key region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. Violence has also surged in other southwestern departments, such as Cauca. The deadly ELN attack on the military base could also foreshadow more violent confrontations between criminal groups and government forces, despite the relative lull achieved by ceasefires in 2024.

Second, the absence of widespread ceasefires with criminal groups has leveled the criminal playing field once again. Ceasefires maintained by the ELN and EMC in 2023 temporarily shifted criminal dynamics, allowing these groups to expand their territorial control, recruit new members, and focus on rival factions rather than government forces.

“We know [armed groups] have taken advantage of the ceasefire to try to increase their illegal control over the territory,” Colombia’s Minister of Defense said in a press conference in March 2024.

This reprieve boosted profits from drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion. In contrast, the AGC, excluded from ceasefire agreements, continued to face government offensives.

SEE ALSO: The Informants of Tibú: How the Colombian State Unleashed a Wave of Femicides

Currently, only the Calarcá dissidents and the FCS have active bilateral ceasefires with the government. The FCS, being relatively small, is unlikely to use the ceasefire for significant territorial expansion but will likely consolidate its holdings and defend against incoming EMC incursions into Nariño. Conversely, the Calarcá dissidents are better positioned to exploit their ceasefire to strengthen their presence in critical drug trafficking zones, particularly along the Amazonian border with Brazil and in parts of the Venezuelan frontier.

For groups like the Mordisco dissidents and the ELN, the absence of ceasefires means they will lose their distinct advantage as they compete for control over territories essential for drug trafficking, illegal mining, and other key revenue streams. However, the lack of ceasefires could give the AGC an edge.

Despite facing sustained military pressure, the AGC has expanded along the Pacific coast in Chocó, the Caribbean coast in Bolívar, Córdoba, and Cesar, and is encircling Catatumbo in Norte de Santander—one of Colombia’s most critical coca cultivation regions. With its criminal rivals now experiencing the same pressure it has endured, the AGC is poised to solidify and take even greater control as cocaine production explodes and gold prices approach record highs.

Third, Maduro’s dependence on Colombian criminal groups ensures that the ELN and Second Marquetalia will continue to strengthen their footholds in Venezuela and along Colombia’s border. With minimal interference—and often direct support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—both groups have entrenched themselves in the region, controlling key criminal economies such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and contraband smuggling.

With the prospect of six more years of protection under Maduro, these groups have little immediate incentive to engage in peace negotiations. Instead, they are well-positioned to expand their operations further.

This article, written by Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

The economic backdrop for this initiative is a 9.1% GDP growth in 2023, elevating the Pacific region’s economic output to $211 trillion COP. The platform aims to leverage this growth by focusing on strengthening businesses in the cultural and environmental sectors, which are seen as pivotal for the region’s economic future.

The Plataforma Empresarial del Pacífico, with the support of regional Chambers of Commerce, could potentially play a key role in the business ecosystem of the Pacific region. These Chambers are tasked with promoting competitiveness and improving the export capacity of regional businesses, particularly those rooted in cultural traditions. The initiative is designed to facilitate better commercial relationships between Colombia and other countries, targeting the inclusion of businesses from the Pacific region.

Ana María Castillo, Director of Competitiveness and Internationalization at the Cali Chamber of Commerce, highlighted the platform’s potential to connect Pacific businesses with global markets. “This initiative will allow us to assess the readiness of Pacific entrepreneurs, strengthening them and linking them with national and international markets. One of our strategies this year is to support their participation in the Go Global Conference in Atlanta, Georgia, USA, in October 2024, which will undoubtedly contribute to the growth of these enterprises,” said Castillo.

As part of the platform’s activities, a business maturity diagnostic will be conducted to determine the readiness of companies for internationalization. This diagnostic will guide the development of tailored training programs that address identified barriers and strengths. For those companies deemed ready, an internationalization route will be defined, including certification processes, connections with key players in value chains, and relationship-building with partners.

The Juntanza Étnica Program of USAID and ACDI/VOCA is integral to this initiative, aiming to enhance the inclusion and competitiveness of businesses with a territorial focus in international markets. This includes designing a sustainability framework for the platform, integrating ethnic and territorial considerations into the Chambers of Commerce’s documents, and developing an international positioning route for cultural enterprises.

One key focus of the program is to create a support model for the growth and internationalization of businesses based on the Pacific region’s cultural assets. The expectation is that by 2025, there will be a strengthened offering of cultural enterprises in the region with a clear orientation towards international markets.

The platform was officially launched on August 13 at the Cali Chamber of Commerce, with participation from USAID, ACDI/VOCA, representatives from national, regional, and local governments, allied Chambers of Commerce, and other key stakeholders.

The Juntanza Étnica Program, in addition to promoting cultural heritage and safeguarding native languages as outlined in the Decade of Indigenous Languages Plan, emphasizes the contributions of Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities to the nation’s social, cultural, and economic fabric. This collaboration is part of a broader effort to strengthen governance, autonomy, identity, and sustainable development within these communities.

Photo: Science Minister Yesenia Olaya Requene and President Gustavo Petro (center) along with the Youth in Science for Peace program honorees. (Credit: Minciencias)

On their trip, the young academics, who come from Buenaventura, Tumaco, and Quibdó in the nation’s Pacific region, will participate in educational sessions and generally benefit from visiting the science laboratories at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), according the Ministry of Science, Technology, and Innovation.

The ministry is the sponsor of this Youth in Science for Peace program, which has funding of 3.9 billion Colombian pesos and is designed to benefit citizens between the ages of 18 and 228.

“You will be the ambassadors who will help us to elevate this program to each of the regions of Colombia,” said Yesenia Olaya Requene, Colombian minister of science, at the ceremony to unveil the honorees.

Cristian Meneses, who was selected to represent his home of Tumaco for his role with a Freedivers Pacific project, spoke about his work.

“Our project is to give workshops to young people to form underwater sports teams so that young people in the Pacific region can practice it,” he said. “Since these are sports for the rich, we want these to be [opportunities] for young people to get away from vulnerable contexts and also understand the importance of the marine ecosystem.”

He noted that the program will take different shapes depending upon where it is deployed.

“In Quibdo,” continued Meneses, “they want to make a kind of sanctuary of the only forest of fauna and flora. In Buenaventura, they want to make agriculture and fishing in the urban area with sustainability for the poorest houses … [This] can be an opportunity to see how majestic the marine ecosystem is and how to protect it — as well as offer our communities different visions so that we can be away from violence.”

This objective closely aligns with the Ministry of Science’s goal to motivate young people from Colombia’s Pacific regions to lead projects that use science to search for effective responses to local challenges, transform communities, and build peace with environmental sustainability.

“You are the vanguard to drag the rest of the youth towards these new horizons, where, undoubtedly, the Pacific coast, from being the poorest region of Colombia in terms of social statistics, could be the richest — not in terms of greed, but in terms of human development,” said President Gustavo Petro, who participated in the announcement.

After a week involving a high-profile kidnapping and alleged ceasefire violations by Colombia’s two largest armed groups, the future of President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace policy is in jeopardy.

Photo: President Gustavo Petro attending a meeting in Paris, France. (Credit: Presidencia de la República)

First, on October 28, members of the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) kidnapped the parents of Luis Díaz, a Colombian football star, at a gas station in Barrancas, La Guajira. The mother was quickly released, but the father, Luis Manuel Díaz, remains captive at the time of publication. [Editor’s note: He was released on November 9.]

The ELN’s Northern War Front (Frente de Guerra Norte), based in La Guajira, claimed responsibility for the abduction.

Then, on November 5, the ELN’s Western War Front (Frente de Guerra Occidental) declared an armed strike in Choco, claiming the Colombian military had violated the ceasefire by colluding with the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) in the region.

That same day, the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC), the largest faction of the ex-FARC mafia, a dissident group from the now demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), suspended peace talks with the government after just three weeks. A bilateral ceasefire remains in place.

The events capped a horrible turn for Petro’s Total Peace plan, which aims to end the country’s decades-long internal conflict by negotiating with armed and criminal groups. The plan was ambitious from the onset, but talks with the country’s two most important criminal groups, the ELN and the EMC, appear to be unraveling.

Kidnapping Plunges ELN Negotiations Into Crisis

The ELN’s kidnapping of Luis Manuel Díaz and the armed strike may have violated the group’s ceasefire with the government and raised concerns about its ability to adhere to any future peace agreements.

These violations leave the Colombian government in a precarious position as the ELN is Colombia’s largest armed group and is considered critical to the success of Total Peace. The ceasefire has been in place for almost a year and prohibits hostile actions between the ELN and Colombian security forces, while also strictly forbidding the ELN from taking hostages.

These incidents have underscored a longstanding concern surrounding ELN negotiations: The group’s decentralized command structure grants individual war fronts significant autonomy, leading to dissent, internal fragmentation, and seemingly rogue actions, such as the kidnapping of Díaz and the announcement of an armed strike.

The ELN has reportedly committed at least eleven potential violations of the ceasefire agreement between October 3 and November 3, according to the non-governmental organization Institute of Peace and Development Studies (Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz – Indepaz). But kidnapping has drawn international attention, increasing pressure for the government to establish a clear red line with the ELN.

Doubts About Ex-FARC Mafia’s Commitment to Peace

Negotiations between the Colombian government and the EMC have come to an abrupt halt just 20 days after establishing a ceasefire. On November 5, the EMC announced the government had failed to uphold its commitments agreed during negotiations, although the ceasefire would remain.

This breakdown came after a confrontation in the town of El Plateado in Argelia, in southern Cauca, a key drug trafficking hotspot under the control of the Carlos Patiño Front, which is part of the EMC. On October 26, it was reported that members of the Carlos Patiño Front were blocking the arrival of electoral materials ahead of local elections on October 29.

Their presence appears to have violated an agreement brokered with the government, under which the EMC troops would temporarily vacate the municipality during the elections and allow the army to make sure voting happened peacefully. Following the elections, the army was to withdraw. However, the army remained in El Plateado, leading to an alleged riot instigated by the Carlos Patiño Front, eventually leading to locals kidnapping, and later releasing, 20 members of the security forces.

The collapse of these talks has led to concerns among analysts that the EMC is using negotiations as a pretext to recruit more people and fortify its positions. After the collapse of two previous negotiations over the past year, the EMC expanded its influence in key areas.

The peace process with the EMC has also struggled due to a lack of monitoring, such as delays in establishing the monitoring and verification mechanism outlined in the ceasefire protocol. “[These agreements] can’t be done on the fly. You need to have everything ready for when the ceasefire comes into effect. These improvisations here show that this government didn’t have a strategic plan,” said Luis Fernando Trejos, a professor at Universidad del Norte and conflict analyst, told InSight Crime.

Negotiations Stalled Elsewhere

While talks with the ELN and the EMC are the largest roadblocks to Total Peace, other negotiations such as those in cities like Buenaventura and Medellín, also face significant challenges.

In Buenaventura, rival gangs, the Shottas and Espartanos, have tried to maintain ceasefires while talks progress. However, Colombia’s Congress has not approved the legal framework needed to allow negotiations with such criminal groups. In early October, members of Congress presented a bill aimed at amending the Justicia y Paz law, which facilitated the demobilization of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC) in 2006 to include newer gangs. Unfortunately, this move also faces stiff opposition in Congress, where the president’s party needs majorities.

The delay in establishing a legal framework also has significant implications for the potential resumption of negotiations with one of Colombia’s largest armed groups, the AGC. Peace talks with the AGC unraveled in March when the government accused the group of orchestrating an armed strike by miners in the Bajo Cauca region in northwestern Colombia.

Political and Public Stalemate

These strains are only further eroding political and public support for Total Peace.

Colombia’s regional elections, held on October 29, saw a slew of mayors and governors opposed to Petro’s government elected into office, further threatening support for Total Peace at the local level.

The events of the past year have also eroded public support for Petro’s flagship plan. From August 2022 to August 2023, polling showed the percentage of Colombians who approved of negotiations with armed groups had dropped from 76% to 59%, while those in favor of defeating these groups by military means climbed from 21% to 37%.

Even if the EMC and ELN talks soon continue, these may not be completed by the end of Petro’s current presidential term in 2026. The successful peace process with the FARC counted on far broader support and still took four years to complete. The responsibility for completing Total Peace may therefore well fall on a different government.

This article, by Henry Shuldiner and Lara Loaiza, was originally published by Insight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America.

Buenaventura is Colombia’s main port on the Pacific seaboard and one of the principal departure points for drug shipments. Long fought over by criminal groups, the city is now the scene of peace talks with the Colombian government.

Photo: Sunset in Buenaventura. (Image credit: Jose Fernando Lopez)

William Carvajal Obregón, alias “Jerónimo,” a tall and imposing figure dressed in military pants and a black shirt, is the spokesman for the Shottas gang. Along with their bitter rivals, the Spartans (Espartanos), the Shottas are engaged in peace talks with President Gustavo Petro’s government. Petro campaigned and won in part based on his “Total Peace” plan to bring an end to Colombia’s six-decade civil conflict.

She has the machinery of the Partido de la U party at her service, a party that under her directorship from 2020 until August 5 achieved broad influence in all regions and in decision-making positions in Bogotá.

Photo: Dilian Francisca Toro, frontrunner to win the October election to become governor of Valle del Cauca. (Credit: Partido de la U)

The only candidate within close proximity of her in recent polls, Tulio Gómez, is no longer in the race.

Despite holding nearly 25% in a recent poll of those who intend to vote by the firm MM Consultores, the Superinter founder was disqualified by the National Electoral Council (CNE) due to the fact that the football club he owns, América de Cali, has entered into multiple contracts with the mayor of Cali in recent years. Though he may appeal the decision, the vote was heavily against his ability to run in this election

The other main challengers — including Ferney Lozano, William Cruz, and Óscar Gamboa — have failed to register even 3% of expected voter, leaving a potentially easy path to victory if Gómez is in fact unable to participate.

Dilian Francisca Toro and Valle del Cauca

Valle del Cauca is the biggest and richest department in Colombia’s Pacific coast. Cali, its capital, is the third in the country (after Bogotá and Medellín) and receives the migratory flow from areas of the Pacific zone and southern Colombia. Additionally, on its coast of the Pacific Ocean is located the Port District of Buenaventura, where 44% of the nation’s foreign trade is moved.

Having an outlet to the Pacific also represents a challenge for the authorities because criminal drug trafficking organizations, heavily armed, seek this exit corridor for their illicit business and are in a continuous battle between them for territorial control.

In political terms, this part of Colombia holds special interest for Colombian President Gustavo Petro given that it was where he received his second-highest vote total when he was elected in 2022 with more than 1.3 million votes. (Petro received 2.25 million votes in Bogotá.)

Toro stood in first place in the race, holding favor with 31.5% of those with the intention to vote, in the MM Consultores poll on September 20 — even before Gómez was disqualified.

During her previous term, which began with her winning the election by more than 500,000 votes, she faced and solved social problems such as the increase in crime in the coastal city of Buenaventura and Palmira, a neighbor of Cali. Despite this, and financial instability of the region’s state hospitals, whose crisis had them on the brink of closure, she was selected as the best governor in the country by the Colombia Líder organization.

All those are known attainments that the inhabitants of this part of the country appear to remember and that they apparently recognize in terms of the favorability that backs her in the surveys. During Toro’s term, her manager of the Institute of Sports, Physical Education and Recreation of Valle del Cauca, was Clara Luz Roldán, who won the election later in 2019 and is the current Valle del Cauca’s governor.

On her official website, she recounted that her political career began as Mayor of Guacarí —a city where she was born and is located in the center of Valle del Cauca— from 1992 to 1994. Afterward, she held the position of Departmental Health Secretary between 1995 and 1997 and from 2002 until 2010, she was elected as senator in the National Congress.

Toro lost in her first attempt to win the governorship election in 2000 before her success in 2015. Concurrently, she expanded her participation in the Partido de la U party until she was chosen as its director in the midst of the pandemic, in 2020.

Having become an important actor in the Colombian political scene, it has earned her the nickname The Baroness, which she already accepts, although reluctantly, as she hinted in an interview with La Silla Vacía on August 13. For the 2023 candidacy, she has the support of six other political parties. Toro is also backed up by the majority of the Cambio Radical party senators.

For the 2022 presidential elections, her name was considered as an option, but in the end she declined. Because of this, it is not ruled out that Toro will try again to run for the first position in the country in future political campaigns.

Gómez, a Formidable Challenger, Exits the Governor’s Race

Gómez, originally from Caldas before relocating to Valle del Cauca more than 50 years ago, looked like a formidable challenger who potentially could have prevented Toro’s return to office.

But in a surprise turn of events, on September 25 de CNE revoked his candidacy with a vote of 6-2, according to them, because there were merits to overthrow Gomez’s aspiration given that he would be disqualified by law from holding the position.

The CNE had a pending request asking them to revoke his candidacy (file #CNE-E-DG-2023-019080), in view of the fact that the electoral regulations emphasize that no candidate for popularly elected office can have a contractual relationship with the state, at least one year before the corporation to which he wants to aspire.

In Tulio Gómez’s case, he signed arrangements with the municipality of Cali, in the last year, related to spaces that he rented at the Pascual Guerrero stadium, home to América de Cali, of which he is the largest shareholder.

It is known that he was involved — as representative of América de Cali — in three contracts, between November 2022 and January 2023, with the Sports Secretary, which is part of the Cali mayor’s office. When notified of the decision, Gómez may appeal it through an appeal resource and the court would have two days to respond.

On Twitter, Gómez decried the decision: “I am not a state contractor, they want to disqualify me for a place that they were going to rent to us for the América de Cali’s merchandise, but that place was not the one we needed, therefore the contract was not finalized. Let them defeat me at the polls, not with tricks.”

Who Is Tulio Gómez?

Gómez has a reputation as a successful businessman and savior of lost causes, although no experience in politics, per a characterization by Huevos Revueltos con el Partido (Scrambled Eggs with Politics), a well-known podcast covering Colombian politics.

His popularity emanates from the football. More specifically, his tenure as the main shareholder and president of América de Cali has seen the team promoted from the second division back to the top flight after several embarrassing years in the lower level for the storied club.

In the business world, since 2019, he has been the owner of a well-known network of retail supermarkets called Agromercados La Montaña. He is considered a successful business person because he went from having a little grocery store in a Cali’s low-income city area to becoming, in 1990, the owner of Super Inter, a large chain of supermarkets with commercial premises in several cities of Valle del Cauca. Years later, in 2014, he sold it to the giant economic group Éxito, based in Medellín.

La Silla Vacía highlights on its website that Gómez, who was registered by signatures before the National Registry representing the Valle 2.0 movement, received support from politicians such as Senator Carlos Motoa, from the Cambio Radical party, and Duvalier Sánchez, from the Alianza Verde Party. Also, he is backed up by Ritter López, a former senator of Partido de la U party and old ally of Dilian Francisca Toro.

In like manner, Horman David García, who was in the race for Valle del Cauca’s next governor with the endorsement of the Verde Oxígeno political movement, renounced his aspiration and joined Tulio Gómez’s campaign.

Other Candidates Remaining in the Race

The rest of aspirants sit below 3% in the latest by MM Consultores. Ferney Lozano (2.74%), promoted by the Pacto Histórico, the current national government coalition, worked closely with President Gustavo Petro during his position as Bogotá’s Mayor (2013), and actively was part of his campaign in Valle del Cauca when Petro ran for President in 2022.

In turn, William Cruz (1.20%) represents the Fuerza Ciudadana movement and this is his first foray into politics.

With the same percentage in the MM Consultores firm’s survey (1.20%), Óscar Gamboa is seeking for the third time to become governor of Valle del Cauca after obtaining more than 100,000 votes in 2015 and again in 2019, when he achieved a little more than 22,000 votes. On this occasion, he is supported by the Dignidad & Compromiso party. He is a close friend of the Colombian ambassador in Washington, Luis Gilberto Murillo.

The representative of the traditional parties is Santiago Castro, who appears with 1.03% in the survey. Castro has been part of the Conservador party (founded in 1849), which he represented as a congressman (2002-2006), but currently represents the Centro Democrático party.

At the bottom of the named survey are Luis Velásquez (0.85%) for the Liga Gobernantes Anticorrupción party (the political group of Rodolfo Hernández, former presidential candidate in 2022) and Horman David García (0.68%) who, as noted, is working on Gómez’s campaign.

MOE Monitors Elections in Valle del Cauca

One other major factor that will surround the upcoming elections are concerns over public order, a threat that has unsettled the Electoral Observation Mission (MOE) in this department.

Alejandro Sánchez, MOE coordinator in Valle del Cauca, told Finance Colombia that their worries are about the upper area of ​​Jamundí (city neighboring Cali, in the south), in the western mountain range, where the Jaime Martínez mobile column of the FARC dissidents is present. In addition to this area, MOE is concerned about the central mountain range, bordering the department Cauca, a part known as “The Marijuana Triangle” that involves cities in Cauca and Valle del Cauca, such as Pradera.

Additionally, there are cities about which the MOE presented reports on political violence, such as Buenaventura and Cali, which are the ones that historically, in the last 10 years, were beset by the violence associated with the voting processes. However, in Tuluá, a city located in the center of Valle del Cauca, has also attracted the attention of the MOE due to recent situations of electoral violence, including candidates killed and threatened last August.

This marks the second time that a similar call for bids has been called off, and now many fear for the long-term future of the gas supply in a region that lacks reserves, infrastructure, and stability.

The public tender, which the UPME unit of the Colombian Ministry of Mines and Energy voided with Resolution #000588 of 2023, was canceled due to the fact that it included the participation of just one bidder, Buenavegas consortium, and because that offer did not meet the established requirements. As a result, UPME closed a call for bids that had been opened on August 10, 2023 and terminated the Public Call UPME GN 001-2022.

The government agency was looking for an “investor for the provision of LNG storage services, processing, transportation of natural gas, and associated services of the natural gas importing infrastructure on the Colombian Pacific coast.” This project was intended to operate by receiving foreign LNG ships that would offload cargo to the terminal, which in turn would transform the natural gas from a liquid to a gaseous state in order to deliver it to the supply companies in the Pacific region.

“The results obtained from the latest volumetric balance of natural gas prepared by UPME for the period 2022–2031 shows that there will be a deficit as of May 2026. That is, the medium-term scenario shows a loss of self-sufficiency to supply the demand for natural gas from then on.”

“The results obtained from the latest volumetric balance of natural gas prepared by UPME for the period 2022–2031 shows that there will be a deficit as of May 2026,” states the resolution. “That is, the medium-term scenario shows a loss of self-sufficiency to supply the demand for natural gas from then on.”

This is the second time the public call for this terminal has been declared void. The previous attempt, in October 2021, saw seven interested parties, but none presented a formal proposal.

Why the Colombian Pacific Needs a Natural Gas Terminal

Currently, Colombia only has one LNG plant, which has been operated in Cartagena since December 2016 by Spec LNG, a facility that belongs to Promigas, a natural gas transportation company for the Caribbean coast located in the Barú sector.

Southwest Colombia’s need for a similar, stable solution has only grown more evident in recent years, as multiple emergencies have limited or entirely cut off the supply. 

In January 2022, the supply was cut when the Mariquita-Cali gas pipeline suffered damage and a high risk of rupture due to earth movement in this country’s largest coffee growing zone.

In May 2023, geological activity caused extreme heat that affected the ground where the gas pipelines run and forced the suspension of LNG supply to homes and vehicle service stations for several days.

In the aftermath, Valle del Cauca Governor Clara Luz Roldán urged governmental leaders to initiate the construction of the Regasificadora del Pacífico terminal in order to broaden supply options and prevent future emergencies. In an assessment shed posted to Twitter, a facility located in the coastal port city of Buenaventura would be capable of “refining of 400 million cubic feet per day (CFD), which will supply the entire southwest of the country, as well as the storage of 170,000 cubic meters of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG).”

Since there is no natural gas facility in this part of Colombia, homes and vehicles in the southwest must rely on supplies from other zones, such as the Caribbean coast or the Llanos Orientales. The Colombian Association of Natural Gas (Naturgas), made up of companies dedicated to the commercialization of gas, indicates that there are  876,424 natural gas users in Colombia’s southwest and central regions, 1.2 million in Valle del Cauca, and more than 600,000 in the Coffee Axis (Eje Cafetero).

Stella Murgas, president of Naturgas, believes Colombia should develop its potential reserves in pursuit of becoming more energy independent. (Photo credit: Naturgas)

Colombian Gas Industry Encourages More Supply Sources and Developing Reserves

Luz Stella Murgas, president of Naturgas, told Finance Colombia that an LNG terminal in the Pacific region would be a significant development. But while she stresses that “all sources of supply are welcome,” Murgas says she also believes that “we must insist on developing the potential reserves that we have to be self-sufficient in the long term and not depend on energy from other countries.”

Furthermore, Murgas revealed that, no matter what the outcome of a future public tender, Naturgas will continue working on regulatory aspects to achieve equitable transportation rates. 

“We have requested that the methodology for the transportation rate, the way it is generated today, must be modified given that it is calculated according to the signal distance,” said Murgas. “We stand for a stamp methodology, which is equivalent to a single rate for all consumers along the entire route of the gas pipeline. This implies that no matter if the consumers are far from the production fields or if others are a little closer, it will be the same for all of them, something much more equitable and that will alleviate the issue in the southwest of the country.”

Mónica Contreras, a representative for industry company International Gas Transporter (TGI), told Finance Colombia that the firm hopes UPME will continue to push for projects that will benefit the Supply Plan, including the Regasificadora del Pacífico Plant, so that “better conditions will be achieved that will make the project bankable” and “risks in the construction stage are covered, making it more attractive for national and foreign investment.”

Likewise, TGI expects that the government, aware of the risks present in this zone, will act as a facilitator for improving community relations, design of aspects related to licensing and communities, and specific risks that the project has had.

(Top photo credit: Naturgas)