In an extended interview on Noticias Caracol’s analysis program La Clave, Ricardo Calderón, director of the network’s investigative unit, laid out the case that the secret 2022 overtures his team documented between the Petro government and the Clan del Golfo were not empty exploratory talk — because, he argued, nearly everything the government’s peace envoy promised the criminal organization in private is matched, line by line, by what the state then did in public. The interview arrives roughly a month before outgoing President Gustavo Petro hands the Casa de Nariño (presidential palace) to president-elect Abelardo de la Espriella on August 7, and it reframes what began as a Colombian political scandal as a matter that Calderón believes will ultimately be examined in the United States.

The reporting rests on recordings from a September 2, 2022 meeting — three weeks into Petro’s term — in which the government’s alto comisionado para la Paz (High Commissioner for Peace), Danilo Rueda, met Luis Armando Pérez, alias “Jerónimo,” a commander of the Clan del Golfo, formally the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC). In the audio, Rueda offers a mutual military standstill he calls a game of “congelados” (freeze tag), a halt to aerial bombardments, a purge of military and police intelligence, and relief on extraditions, with no equivalent commitments recorded from the criminal side. Finance Colombia has tracked the failures of the paz total (total peace) strategy across the Petro term; what Calderón emphasized on La Clave is corroboration — the method by which his team tested whether the promises became policy.

The Method: Promises Checked Against the Public Record

Calderón described a verification process he said took roughly eight months and drew on more than twenty sources. Rather than publish the audio and let it speak for itself, the unit says it cross-checked each recorded commitment against the government’s own subsequent conduct, using official responses obtained through derechos de petición (right-to-petition requests) to the Ministry of Defense. 

“What we did was cross every sentence of the conversation with what actually happened in the following years,” Calderón said, describing the core of the exercise as confirming that “they were fulfilled.”

“There may eventually be favoritism shown to a terrorist and drug trafficking group here, and those are cases that will be taken there.” — Ricardo Calderón, director of the Noticias Caracol investigative unit

He also addressed authenticity directly, given the current climate of manipulated media, a concern sharpened by Petro’s claim that material recovered in a separate case had been fabricated with artificial intelligence. Calderón said the unit obtained original voice samples and commissioned forensic audio analysis (peritazgo) to confirm the speakers before publishing, a step he described as slow but essential. 

His team, he said, also consulted officials from prior peace processes and former intelligence directors to establish where the legitimate boundaries of each official’s role lay. They concluded that in the cases of both Rueda and the intelligence chief, “there are things that crossed the line.”

Promise by Promise, Matched to What Followed

On bombardments, the recording captures Rueda telling the Clan del Golfo emissaries he had spoken with the minister and that orders had been given to stop planned strikes in the group’s areas. Days after the meeting, then-Defense Minister Iván Velásquez publicly announced a halt to bombings where minors might be present. According to Ministry of Defense figures cited by Noticias Caracol, no aerial bombardment was carried out against the Clan del Golfo for roughly two years afterward; the first did not come until late 2024.

In the officer corps, Rueda presents a “cleanup” of intelligence as evidence of good faith. On August 12, 2022 — three weeks before the meeting — more than 35 generals were retired in the largest single command shakeup in recent Colombian history, and further removals followed, reaching roughly 40 senior officers. Calderón said the unit focused on three colonels named in the conversation because Jerónimo specifically asked for their removal: officers who had served in Operation Agamenón, the multi-year spearhead against the Clan del Golfo. 

Their strategic roles, and the systematic drawdown of elite units trained by United States and United Kingdom agencies to pursue the group, were confirmed against the record; Calderón described a gradual but permanent dismantling of “the most experienced units” fighting the Clan del Golfo and the dissident groups.

On intelligence itself, Rueda is heard reassuring the emissary that the government was “dismantling intelligence.” Calderón said the paper trail of command changes and unit disbandments tracked that statement. On extradition, which is historically the Colombian state’s most effective instrument against cartel leadership, the recording shows Rueda accepting the group’s concerns as something that “gets done,” a concession Calderón and his sources characterized as far outside the mandate of a peace commissioner.

The macro-level corroboration, Calderón argued, is what the Clan del Golfo did with the space it was given. Drawing on Ministry of Defense data, Noticias Caracol reported that between 2022 and 2025 the organization’s membership nearly tripled, from 4,061 to 9,915 fighters, while its municipal footprint more than doubled, from 145 to 338 municipalities, even as, in Calderón’s words, the group “did nothing on peace.” InSight Crime has documented the same pattern of criminal expansion under permissive conditions, and Finance Colombia’s editorial analysis concluded that total peace had produced total chaos.

Two Investigations, One Thread

Calderón described the reporting as having “two legs.” The first is the Rueda audio. The second grew out of a parallel inquiry into the Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia (National Intelligence Directorate, DNI), the successor to the disbanded DAS, after the unit obtained conversations involving its then-director, Jorge Lemus. 

That strand placed Lemus, who was accompanied by the DNI’s counterintelligence chief, Ricardo Rey Rosanía, in an August 2025 meeting in central Bogotá with Edward Ferney Rincón, an emerald trader (esmeraldero) and confessed former narcotrafficker known as alias “Boyaco Sinaloa.” 

President Gustavo Petro in New York joining rally for Palestine. Photo credit: Colombia Presidency.

According to the recordings, the officials asked Rincón to use his contacts in Congress to advance the ley de sometimiento (criminal-submission bill) that then-Justice Minister Eduardo Montealegre had filed in July 2025, and to help arrange direct contact with alias “Chiquito Malo,” the Clan del Golfo’s top commander. The common denominator across both investigations, three years apart, Calderón said, was the Clan del Golfo.

The DNI thread also cuts against one of Petro’s signature security narratives. In the recording, the intelligence director’s own interlocutor dismisses the existence of the so-called Junta del Narcotráfico (Narcotics Trafficking Board), the Dubai-based cartel “board” that Petro has repeatedly claimed wants to assassinate him. Calderón noted that no intelligence agency, police, or prosecutor has validated the alleged plot, yet the government assembled an organizational chart around it — a construction that, he said, its own sources contradicted.

From Obstruction to Terror-Support: Why the Venue Shifts to Washington

The escalation Calderón stressed is jurisdictional. The United States designates the Clan del Golfo as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, and the US State Department has offered reward money for the capture of its leaders. 

Dismantling US- and UK-trained interdiction units in a manner that Calderón says was intended to benefit that structure is, in his framing, more than possible obstruction. “There may be favoring of a terrorist and drug-trafficking organization here, and those are cases that will be handled over there,” he said, pointing to the US. 

The same exposure, he added, attaches to the treatment of the dissident groups. Washington’s interest is not abstract: the US Drug Enforcement Administration has already opened a probe of Petro himself for alleged cartel ties.

The Fiscalía’s Silence

Against that backdrop, Calderón pointed to the inaction of Colombia’s Fiscalía General de la Nación (Office of the Attorney General). He noted that when the unit published the “computers of Calarcá” — which were files tied to a dissident commander — in November 2025, the Fiscalía had already held the devices for more than a year and a half. 

Had prosecutors acted, he argued, some of the individuals later shown to have participated in the killings of social leaders might have been captured: “in colloquial terms, we could have saved lives.” 

On the current matter, he said, the Fiscalía opened a preliminary inquiry into Rueda only in early July 2026 — days before the interview, and more than a week after the audio was published. This is a sequence he said “leaves many questions” about the office’s role. That inquiry names four former officials — Rueda, Iván Velásquez, Jorge Lemus, and Ricardo Rey Rosanía — over the benefits allegedly offered to the Clan del Golfo, and was assigned to the unit of prosecutors delegated before the Supreme Court of Justice.

A Four-Year Pattern, and a Government About to Change

Calderón placed the recordings inside a longer series of disclosures over the Petro term: the Calarcá computers, the emergency-management chats, and other episodes pointing to opaque contacts between senior officials and armed structures. As many as 22 regional peace tables were opened, he noted, on promises resembling those in the audio. The pattern lands at a moment of maximum political consequence: Petro, himself a former member of the M-19 (Movimiento 19 de Abril) guerrilla movement before its 1990 demobilization, is weeks from handing power to a successor who has staked his mandate on the opposite approach.

De la Espriella, who won the June 21 runoff over senator Iván Cepeda with running mate José Manuel Restrepo, has already issued a communiqué urging the vice-president-elect to investigate the disclosures and, if warranted, to refer them to US authorities. In his victory address he vowed that “there will be no zones off-limits to the State” and “no organizations above the Constitution and the law,” and he has said Colombia will join a regional counter-crime initiative promoted by Washington. 

Security analysts expect the peace zones established under the Ley de Paz Total (Total Peace Law), which carry no legal permanence beyond the current government, to be revoked after the August 7 handover. Petro has spent his final months pressing to formalize Clan del Golfo concentration zones before he leaves office.

Rueda’s Defense

Rueda, who surfaced only after the first report aired, has maintained that the encounters were preliminary, exploratory approaches involving promises that, by his account, were never fulfilled, and that no presidential decision was ever taken to halt operations against the Clan del Golfo. Calderón’s rebuttal returns to the corroboration: the Ministry of Defense’s own statistics, he said, “prove otherwise.” Whether that gap between the recorded private commitments and the government’s public posture amounts to a crime is now, belatedly, before the Fiscalía — and, if Calderón is right about the US interest, may not stay in Colombia.

Primary reporting by the Noticias Caracol investigative unit, drawn from Ricardo Calderón’s interview on the program La Clave. Related Finance Colombia coverage: Editorial: Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace Has Led to Total Chaos in Colombia; Halfway Through His Term, Petro’s Total Peace Is Failing; InSight Crime: Colombian Criminal Groups Gaining Strength Under Petro; Petro Advances Temporary Concentration Zones for Clan del Golfo.

Headline image: Colombian government representative Álvaro Jiménez (left) shakes hands with Clan del Golfo spokesperson Luis Armando Pérez in the presence of Qatar’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mohammed bin Abdulaziz bin Saleh Al-Khulaifi (center), in Doha on September 18, 2025, at the start of peace talks. Photo shared by Colombia’s Office of the High Commissioner for Peace

Colombians face three sharply different futures in May 31 vote

Colombia votes on May 31 with its presidential race concentrated around three candidates whose platforms diverge on nearly every dimension of economic and security policy relevant to foreign investors. For corporate executives, institutional investors, and multinational operations with Colombian exposure, the choice between senator Iván Cepeda, senator Paloma Valencia, and defense attorney Abelardo de la Espriella carries direct, measurable implications for the regulatory environment, foreign direct investment (FDI) conditions, energy sector licensing, and geopolitical alignment through at least 2030.

No candidate is projected to clear the 50%-plus-one threshold required to win outright on May 31, making a runoff election on June 21 the expected outcome. The question that will determine the direction of that runoff — and by extension the next administration — is which of the two opposition candidates finishes second.

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A Race Reshaped by Late Polling

The final-week polling picture shifted substantially, and the trajectory matters as much as the snapshot. The CONDOR weighted aggregate — which incorporates surveys from six polling firms and applies greater weight to more recent data — placed the race as of May 23 at: Cepeda 36.3%, De la Espriella 29.1%, Valencia 16.7%.

Invamer, one of Colombia’s most established polling firms, surveyed 3,800 respondents across 152 municipalities between May 13 and May 20, registering Cepeda at 44.6%, De la Espriella at 31.6%, and Valencia at 14.0%. The Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) published a survey conducted May 22 and 23 showing Cepeda at 33.4%, De la Espriella at 30.9%, and Valencia at 12.6%.

Comparing those figures to the Fundación Génesis Crea survey from May 4 through May 11 — which placed Cepeda at 35.1%, Valencia at 25.4%, and De la Espriella at 21.6% — indicates a multi-poll trend of De la Espriella gaining approximately nine to ten percentage points in three weeks while Valencia shed a comparable share. AS/COA’s poll tracker confirms the directional consistency across firms.

Atlas Intel, which published figures more favorable to De la Espriella, is currently under investigation by Colombia’s Consejo Nacional Electoral (CNE) for potential methodology violations and could face suspension of its operations. Those figures are treated with caution in this analysis.

Runoff modeling diverges between firms. Fundación Génesis Crea showed Valencia defeating Cepeda 49.1% to 44.7% in a second-round matchup — meaning she was the stronger opposition candidate in that scenario. The Guarumo/Ecoanalítica survey found Cepeda losing all hypothetical runoff scenarios, including against De la Espriella. Two minor candidates — former senator Clara López and former Chocó governor Luis Gilberto Murillo — withdrew and endorsed Cepeda before the first round, a consolidation that appears to have had limited effect on his polling numbers.

Finance Colombia reported in May that the campaign has been marked by an unusual absence of traditional televised debates. Cepeda declined to participate in events organized by major media outlets, stating that proposed formats lacked neutrality. Former Bogotá Mayor Claudia López, herself a candidate, said publicly that Cepeda’s refusal was motivated by an unwillingness to defend his record as the architect of President Gustavo Petro‘s Paz Total security negotiation strategy.

Security Policy: The Three Approaches to Armed Groups

Public security is the top voter concern heading into the election. InSight Crime documented that the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) launched a major offensive against FARC dissident factions in Norte de Santander in early 2025, resulting in mass civilian casualties in the Catatumbo region. In Chocó and Antioquia, the ELN and the Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC), commonly known as the Clan del Golfo, are competing for control of illegal gold mining corridors and drug trafficking routes. In Cauca, FARC dissident factions have established territorial control in areas where state presence has collapsed.

Cepeda’s approach to security is defined by his role as the principal legislative architect of Paz Total. As chair of the Senate‘s peace commission, he designed the framework that extended negotiating status to the ELN, FARC dissident groups, and the Clan del Golfo. His stated rationale is that targeting the financial leadership of drug networks rather than foot soldiers produces more durable results — a position that has academic backing in narcotics policy literature. In practice, Paz Total produced ceasefires that were repeatedly violated, and security indicators in conflict-affected departments deteriorated during the Petro administration. A Cepeda presidency is expected to continue the negotiated settlement model, with the military operating under political constraints.

Valencia’s security platform is based on reinstating Seguridad Democrática, the doctrine associated with former president Álvaro Uribe’s administrations from 2002 to 2010. The core elements are expanded military presence in rural conflict zones, dismantling of rural criminal networks, and resumption of extradition agreements with the United States — which Petro suspended, effectively shielding cartel leadership from US federal prosecution. The Uribe-era approach resulted in measurable reductions in homicide rates, forced displacement, and ELN and FARC territorial control, though human rights organizations documented serious abuses by security forces during that period.

De la Espriella has stated explicitly that his government would have no peace process. He advocates for a model similar to El Salvador’s under President Nayib Bukele: mass incarceration, construction of high-security prison facilities, classification of guerrilla and cartel organizations as foreign terrorist organizations, and broad military offensives. He has not detailed how such operations would be financed or how the mass detention model would interact with Colombia’s Constitutional Court, which has repeatedly constrained executive security powers.

For the armed groups operating in Norte de Santander and Cauca, the historical record indicates that Colombia’s criminal organizations respond more acutely to sustained, institutionally grounded military pressure and functioning extradition pipelines than to political rhetoric. By that measure, Valencia’s platform — which rebuilds the institutional security apparatus incrementally — represents a more structurally credible threat to the ELN and the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) FARC dissidents. For the Clan del Golfo leadership, extradition to the United States has historically been the principal deterrent, and Valencia’s program explicitly restores it.

Business Climate and Employment Conditions

The Petro administration enacted a series of minimum wage increases totaling more than 60% over four years — including a 16% increase for 2023, the largest single-year hike in Colombian history, and a 23.78% increase for 2026 — restructured labor regulations to expand premium pay requirements for night, weekend, and holiday shifts, and raised corporate tax rates to fund social spending programs. The Asociación Nacional de Empresarios de Colombia (ANDI) characterized the regulatory environment as adverse to private investment. Finance Colombia tracked a material decline in FDI in the extractive sector over the same period.

Cepeda supported those labor and fiscal reforms throughout their legislative passage. His platform extends the Petro model: increased state social spending, continued land redistribution programs, and maintenance of the current wage and labor cost structure. For companies with established Colombian operations, the regulatory environment is manageable; for companies evaluating market entry or operational expansion, the cost structure adds friction.

Valencia’s economic program emphasizes corporate stability and private sector investment as the primary mechanisms of job creation. Her vice-presidential running mate, Juan Daniel Oviedo — former director of DANE, Colombia’s national statistics agency — represents a technocratic orientation focused on reducing structural market distortions, streamlining public procurement, and scaling back state administrative overhead. Oviedo’s appointment is a direct signal to the business community that economic management would be data-driven rather than ideologically directed. Oviedo also publicly identifies as a member of the LGBTQ+ community, a departure from the traditional social conservatism of Centro Democrático.

De la Espriella’s economic orientation is pro-business with protectionist elements. His vice-presidential candidate, José Manuel Restrepo — who served as Colombia’s Finance Minister and Commerce Minister — provides institutional credibility on fiscal and trade policy. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket signals commitment to fiscal discipline and regulatory reduction in the extractive and commercial sectors. De la Espriella’s personal style, however, introduces operational uncertainty; his campaign has generated multiple high-profile controversies, including a public altercation with Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández during a live broadcast and a formal apology following misconduct allegations by journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM.

Foreign Investment, Oil, and Mining

Ecopetrol holds a 31.5% stake in the Gunflint oil field in the Gulf of Mexico.

The extractive sector is the most consequential economic policy dimension for international capital. Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) — Colombia’s state-controlled energy company and the largest corporation in the country — has operated under exploration restrictions during the Petro administration, which has opposed new fossil fuel contracts on climate grounds.

Cepeda’s position extends the Petro framework: mandatory transition away from fossil fuels, heavy restrictions or outright prohibitions on new oil and gas exploration contracts, and stringent environmental licensing requirements for open-pit mining operations. Foreign investment would be directed by policy toward green hydrogen, ecotourism, and smallholder agriculture. For the multinational oil majors with Colombian operations and for institutional investors in the mining sector, a Cepeda presidency represents a continuation of the current constraints and, in some contract scenarios, an accelerated wind-down of Colombian portfolios.

In a related development, Finance Colombia reported in May that Ecopetrol’s president, Ricardo Roa, has been formally charged in connection with alleged campaign spending violations during Petro’s 2022 presidential campaign. The case will be inherited by whoever takes office in August.

Valencia’s position is that hydrocarbon revenues are essential to Colombia’s macroeconomic stability and that the country cannot exit the sector before alternative revenue structures exist. Her platform actively encourages FDI in petroleum exploration, is open to regulated fracking, and commits to clearing the environmental licensing backlog that has stalled multiple large-scale gold and copper mining projects. For energy and mining companies currently blocked by administrative delays, this represents the most direct path to project advancement.

De la Espriella’s position goes further: essentially deregulating the environmental licensing process for major extraction projects on the grounds that Colombia’s economic sovereignty takes precedence over environmental restrictions he characterizes as externally imposed. The practical constraint is whether a De la Espriella administration would have the institutional coherence and congressional support to deliver regulatory rollback, given that his movement has no established political party structure and entered the race through an independent signature campaign.

Foreign Policy: Washington Alignment vs. Multipolar Strategy

The US Embassy in Bogotá is said to be the 3rd largest US mission in the world (photo: Loren Moss)

Colombia’s relationship with the United States deteriorated materially under Petro, who aligned Colombia with Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro, pursued closer ties with China and Russia, and suspended extradition agreements. US counternarcotics cooperation was strained throughout the period.

Cepeda is committed to what he describes as a multipolar foreign policy — maintaining functional diplomatic channels with Washington and Brussels while deepening strategic and commercial relationships with China and Russia. His alignment with regional left-of-center governments in Mexico, Brazil, and Bolivia would position Colombia as part of a Latin American bloc that has grown increasingly skeptical of US regional leadership. For US companies operating in Colombia, this trajectory does not mean immediate operational disruption, but it reduces Colombia’s utility as a reliable counterpart on security cooperation, counter-narcotics intelligence sharing, and trade dispute resolution.

Valencia positions a return to the Western alignment as a core objective. She would prioritize restoring the US-Colombia relationship, reinforcing the bilateral Free Trade Agreement, and reestablishing intelligence-sharing mechanisms that were reduced under Petro. Her framing positions Colombia as a democratic anchor in a region experiencing authoritarian pressures.

De la Espriella takes the most explicit pro-US position in the race. La Silla Vacía reported that De la Espriella or entities linked to his campaign donated more than $90,000 USD to the US Republican Party, a fact that raises questions about the nature and expectations of those relationships. He has publicly aligned himself with the populist right in the United States, takes a hostile posture toward China, Russia, and Venezuela, and has characterized his security approach as consistent with a transactional alliance with Washington focused on counter-narcotics enforcement and cartel designation as foreign terrorist organizations.

“Ese pisco robó a 200 mil colombianos.” — Claudia López, former Mayor of Bogotá, referring to presidential candidate Abelardo de la Espriella’s legal representation of DMG pyramid scheme founder David Murcia Guzmán, during a presidential campaign event.

Corruption and Judicial Independence

All three candidates have stated commitments to fighting corruption, though their approaches and focal points differ in ways that are material to the institutional environment for business operations.

Cepeda’s legislative record includes serious, documented work investigating paramilitary infiltration of Colombia’s political institutions — the period known as parapolítica — and pursuing accountability for those cases. His blind spot, his critics argue, is corruption within the current administration. When Ecopetrol’s Ricardo Roa was formally charged in connection with Petro’s 2022 campaign, the response from the Pacto Histórico coalition was subdued. Cepeda has been Álvaro Uribe’s primary judicial antagonist in the Senate; a Cepeda administration would offer no institutional protection to Uribe and would be expected to support the full progress of judicial proceedings against him. For left-wing politicians facing legal exposure, including former Medellín mayor Daniel Quintero, a Cepeda administration would be expected to be more receptive to amnesty frameworks.

Valencia’s approach to anti-corruption is structural rather than prosecutorial: strengthening the independence of the Contraloría General de la República and the Fiscalía General de la Nación, implementing digital transparency in public procurement, and reducing informal executive influence over judicial processes. She would be expected to apply political and rhetorical pressure on behalf of Uribe — her political mentor and a close ally — though her legislative track record indicates a degree of institutional independence from Centro Democrático party orthodoxy.

De la Espriella’s anti-corruption rhetoric centers on severe criminal penalties for corrupt officials. The credibility of that position is complicated by his professional history, which is examined in detail below.

De la Espriella’s Legal Career: The Documented Record

De la Espriella’s campaign has faced sustained scrutiny over his client history as one of Colombia’s highest-profile criminal defense attorneys. The record is documented in reporting by El Colombiano, El Espectador, and the investigative outlet Corrupción al Día.

Abelardo de la Espriella (screen capture from Twitter video)

His documented client roster includes Salvatore Mancuso, the former supreme commander of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary network; multiple legislators convicted in the parapolítica scandal, which established systematic infiltration of Colombia’s congress by paramilitary organizations; David Murcia Guzmán, the operator of the DMG pyramid scheme that defrauded an estimated 200,000 Colombian investors; the Nule Primos, convicted of large-scale public contract fraud; and Álex Saab, the Colombian businessman extradited to the United States on charges of acting as the primary money launderer for the Maduro government in Venezuela. According to Corrupción al Día, De la Espriella’s legal fees from Saab reportedly reached $12 million USD and included private aircraft travel.

De la Espriella’s response to this line of criticism rests on due process principles: that every accused person is entitled to vigorous legal defense regardless of the charges, and that his ability to navigate Colombia’s criminal code at its most complex levels demonstrates the expertise required to enforce the law from the executive branch. The argument has legal validity as a principle. The specific issue for foreign compliance officers and US government counterparts is the Saab representation: the same Nicolás Maduro whose regime De la Espriella’s campaign now characterizes as an ideological enemy received legal services from De la Espriella’s firm when the representation was commercially available.

The Fiscalía investigated De la Espriella in connection with alleged paramilitary links in 2009 and again in 2012; both investigations were dismissed for insufficient evidence, and he carries no convictions or active investigations on those matters.

Cepeda’s Family History and Ideological Background

Iván Cepeda (from Twitter)

Critics of Iván Cepeda, including Enrique Gómez of the Salvación Nacional party, have argued that his family background constitutes evidence of structural alignment with guerrilla movements. The record on this point merits examination.

Cepeda is the son of Manuel Cepeda Vargas, who served as Secretary-General of the Colombian Communist Party and as a senator for the Unión Patriótica (UP), a left-wing political movement that was systematically exterminated by a combination of state actors and paramilitary organizations during the 1980s and 1990s. Manuel Cepeda Vargas was assassinated on August 9, 1994. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights subsequently found the Colombian state responsible for his murder. The FARC-EP named its Frente Urbano Manuel Cepeda Vargas — an urban front operating within the Bloque Occidental — in the elder Cepeda’s honor.

The Fundación Paz y Reconciliación (PARES) has documented that Iván Cepeda’s relationship with his father’s political positions was more complex than the family lineage alone suggests. After studying in Bulgaria in 1981, Cepeda broke from his father’s Soviet-oriented communist framework and aligned with democratic leftists including Bernardo Jaramillo Ossa, who publicly rejected the FARC’s armed strategy. Cepeda has repeatedly stated his repudiation of the FARC’s use of his father’s name. No documented evidence connects him to operational coordination with current armed groups.

What the family history does establish is the ideological framework through which Cepeda processes security policy: a belief, grounded in personal and political experience, that the Colombian state’s institutional violence has been as destructive as guerrilla violence, and that negotiated settlements are structurally preferable to military solutions. That framework generates Paz Total. It also generates a posture toward ELN and FARC dissident negotiators that prioritizes process continuity over verified compliance — a disposition that armed groups have demonstrably exploited to maintain territorial and operational positions while negotiation frameworks provided legal cover.

Paloma Valencia (image Twitter)

Valencia and the Uribe Question

The comparison to former president Iván Duque (2018–2022) comes up regularly in discussions of Valencia’s political independence. Duque, who had limited independent political standing before Uribe selected him, was perceived throughout his term as governing within constraints set by his patron — a dynamic that Colombian political cartoonists characterized as ventriloquism.

Valencia’s profile differs materially. She is the granddaughter of former Colombian president Guillermo León Valencia, carries her own political lineage, and has served in the Senate for over a decade, building positions on agrarian reform, judicial modernization, and indigenous land rights that have placed her at variance with standard Centro Democrático positions on those issues. She won the Gran Consulta por Colombia primary on March 8 with more than 45% of the vote — over 3.2 million Colombians — establishing a democratic mandate distinct from any party endorsement.

She would be expected to use institutional and rhetorical channels to support Uribe in the ongoing judicial proceedings against him, and to apply pressure on the trajectory of those cases. Whether that constitutes political interference with judicial independence or normal advocacy within democratic norms is a question on which observers disagree. What the legislative record does not support is the characterization of Valencia as incapable of independent governance.

Press Freedom and the Media Environment

Press freedom carries an indirect but measurable correlation with rule-of-law quality, which in turn affects operational risk for companies that rely on regulatory predictability and transparent legal processes.

Cepeda has maintained a posture toward critical media that mirrors President Petro’s practice of characterizing adversarial outlets as acting in the interests of economic elites. Under Petro, this produced a systematic exclusion of critical media from official information flows and persistent rhetorical delegitimization of independent journalism, though the press remained legally free to operate. A Cepeda administration would be expected to continue this pattern.

Valencia’s background in Colombia’s traditional political and intellectual establishment, combined with a decade in a party that has faced sustained critical coverage from Colombia’s major outlets, points toward a conventional institutional relationship with the press — adversarial at times, but within professional norms.

De la Espriella’s conduct during the campaign provides direct evidence of his approach. He publicly called Caracol Noticias journalist María Lucía Fernández “ignorant” in a live interview. He issued a formal apology after journalist Laura Rodríguez of Piso 8 FM made allegations of inappropriate conduct. His campaign strategy has drawn comparisons to the approach of Argentine president Javier Milei and US president Donald Trump in its use of direct digital channels to circumvent traditional media while publicly attacking outlets that publish critical coverage. The press would remain legally protected under a De la Espriella administration, but the operational environment for investigative journalism would be hostile.

The Ideological Spectrum: Market Liberalism to State Direction

The question of which candidate is most aligned with free-market principles requires a distinction that the international business press frequently elides: the difference between economic deregulation and political authoritarianism. These can, and in this election do, exist independently.

De la Espriella’s platform is often described in international coverage as the most pro-market. His deregulation proposals for the extractive sector and his corporate tax rhetoric support that reading in the economic domain. His security platform, however, involves a substantial expansion of state coercive power: mass detention operations, a mega-prison construction program, and the suspension of standard due process protections to facilitate rapid incarceration of criminal suspects. The Cato Institute‘s framework of economic freedom as inseparable from civil liberties would categorize a state powerful enough to detain people without standard procedural protections as a state that represents an institutional risk to property rights and contract enforcement as well.

Valencia’s platform, anchored by Oviedo’s technocratic program of structural market reform — reduced administrative barriers, streamlined procurement, smaller state overhead, maintained civil liberties — represents the closest approximation to coherent market liberalism available in this field. It does not carry the rhetorical force of De la Espriella’s deregulation proposals, but it has more institutional grounding.

Cepeda’s platform is the furthest from market liberalism by any standard measure: state-directed investment allocation, wealth redistribution through tax and transfer mechanisms, state expansion in healthcare and pension administration, and agrarian land redistribution. His program is continuous with the Petro administration’s economic framework.

Minor Candidates: The Rest of the Ballot

Claudia López, senator of Colombia. (Credit: Patty Suescún)

Several other candidates remain on the ballot and are drawing small but potentially consequential vote shares in a first round where the margin between second and third place could be narrow.

Claudia López, former mayor of Bogotá running under the Con Claudia Imparables coalition, positions herself as a progressive centrist with a documented anti-corruption record. Her polling has not broken 3.5% in major surveys, and her high polarization ratings from her mayoral term limit her growth ceiling. Her attacks on De la Espriella during the campaign — she publicly called him a “defender of the mafia” in reference to his client history — have been among the most pointed in the race, and factually grounded on the public record.

Sergio Fajardo, making his third consecutive presidential run under Dignidad y Compromiso, continues to represent a technocratic, education-focused centrism grounded in his work transforming Medellín in the early 2000s. He has not broken 3.5% in any major poll in this cycle.

Roy Barreras, running under La Fuerza de la Paz following his Frente por la Vida primary victory, is one of the most experienced political operatives in Colombia, having been part of multiple coalition governments across ideological lines over two decades. He polls below the threshold for meaningful first-round impact.

Miguel Uribe Londoño, running under Partido Demócrata, represents a younger-generation conservative platform emphasizing fiscal discipline and private sector growth, broadly consistent with Valencia’s program. He also polls below 3.5%.

Carlos Caicedo, running on a regionalist platform emphasizing decentralization away from Bogotá, draws support primarily from the Costa Caribe. His structural argument about Colombia’s administrative over-centralization is substantively grounded, though his national profile is insufficient to affect the first-round outcome.

Investment Implications

For international capital with Colombian exposure, the three-way race produces three materially different operational scenarios.

A Cepeda victory — which remains the single most likely first-round outcome based on available polling — would signal continuity of the Petro-era regulatory framework: sustained capital outflow pressure, high corporate tax rates, no new fossil fuel exploration contracts for Ecopetrol (NYSE: EC; BVC: ECOPETROL) or private operators, continued labor cost escalation, and a foreign policy trajectory away from Washington. Colombian equity valuations would be expected to remain under pressure. The mining licensing backlog would continue to accumulate. A Cepeda administration would not replicate Venezuela’s economic trajectory — Colombia’s independent central bank, Banco de la República, its functioning constitutional court, and its institutional depth provide meaningful buffers — but the investment headwinds would be structural rather than cyclical.

A Valencia victory would represent the sharpest regulatory reversal available in this field. Ecopetrol exploration contracts would be expected to advance. The mining licensing backlog would be addressed. US bilateral relations would be restored, reactivating security intelligence cooperation and trade facilitation mechanisms. The Colombian peso would be expected to strengthen as country risk premium declined. The path to that outcome now requires her to either close the gap significantly on De la Espriella in the first round or rely on runoff polling that showed her as the stronger second-round candidate — data that predates the most recent polling shift.

A De la Espriella victory introduces the widest distribution of possible outcomes. The upside scenario involves Restrepo managing fiscal and trade policy competently, genuine regulatory rollback in the extractive sector, aggressive extradition resumption, and security operations that reduce the physical risk premium in conflict-affected departments including Cauca, Norte de Santander, and Chocó. The downside scenario involves recurring crises generated by De la Espriella’s personal conduct, conflicts of interest arising from his former client relationships, and authoritarian security measures that attract international human rights attention and complicate bilateral relationships. Restrepo’s presence on the ticket reduces the probability of the downside scenario but does not eliminate it.

The current polling trend indicates that right-wing voters are consolidating around De la Espriella at Valencia’s expense. Whether that consolidation produces a runoff between De la Espriella and Cepeda — and whether the runoff produces a left or right-wing government — remains uncertain. What the polling data does not support is the scenario, widely assumed until recently, of a Cepeda-Valencia runoff in which Valencia was positioned as the structurally stronger opposition candidate.

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“Just a few months ago, the fighting was so intense that no one dared retrieve the dead,” said Javier, who spoke with InSight Crime at the end of 2024. “At one point, animals were eating the corpses,” he added, lowering his voice.

Over the last 20 years, Javier has seen how a conflict once rooted in ideology — between guerrillas and paramilitaries — has transformed into a battle over coca crops, drug trafficking corridors, and gold deposits.

Today, a resurgence of violence has been sparked by clashes between Colombia’s three main criminal actors: the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), the country’s last remaining insurgency; the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC); and dissidents of the now-defunct Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), known as the ex-FARC mafia—both products of past demobilization efforts.

“The FARC and ELN say, ‘Leave, or we’ll kill you.’ The AGC says, ‘If you leave, we’ll kill you,’” said Javier. “The communities are left with no way out.”

All three groups have sought talks with the Colombian government under the “Total Peace” plan, which aims to negotiate separately with the country’s illegal armed groups. However, this policy has done little to curb the territorial disputes unfolding in Bajo Cauca and throughout Colombia.

Fighting to Fill the Vacuum

Guerrilla-paramilitary clashes in Bajo Cauca date back to the late 1990s. But over the past two decades, these groups have evolved and become further criminalized. Attempts to demobilize their forces – first the 2006 demobilization of the paramilitaries of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC), then the 2016 peace deal with the FARC – led to new conflicts as splinter groups and rivals fought to fill the power vacuum and control the criminal economies left behind.

SEE ALSO: Colombia’s Peace Efforts Spark Criminal Disputes and Divisions 

The latest escalation began when the AGC — the most powerful criminal group in Bajo Cauca — moved into the Serranía de San Lucas. Located in the south of the neighboring department of Bolívar, this mountain range is rich in gold deposits and coca crops and has long been an ELN stronghold. Homicides in El Bagre, which connects San Lucas with the Bajo Cauca, rose to 29 last year, up from 20 in 2023. But murders are just one element of the conflict, which has also led to mass displacements and the confinement of whole communities. Some 145 people were displaced to El Bagre in December 2024 following clashes. By early January 2025, that number had risen to 230.

Still, the violence continued. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 395 people were forcibly displaced in Montecristo, southern Bolívar, on February 7, while another 144 were confined to their homes by the fighting. On February 18, 26 people were displaced from Segovia, which borders El Bagre to the south, due to fighting between the ELN and the AGC.

“What we’re seeing now is the AGC gaining ground against the ELN,” Javier said.

To defend its turf, the ELN has allied with the 18th and 36th Fronts of the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente – EMBF).

“The ELN’s alliance with the FARC dissidents is what’s stopped the AGC from advancing in the Serranía de San Lucas,” he added.

Local police told InSight Crime that another group, known as “Los de Abajo” or “Los de Cuturrú” — a remnant of longtime AGC rivals the “Caparros” — also appears to have joined the alliance.

What’s at Stake in Bajo Cauca?

The conflict is driven by a fight for control of a region brimming with criminal opportunities. The area contains over 8,000 hectares of coca crops and vast gold reserves. Between January and September 2024, 11.64 metric tons of gold were extracted from the subregion, accounting for 54% of all gold mined in Antioquia and 41% of Colombia’s total.

Both the AGC and the ELN profit from mining by charging fees for moving machinery and supplies, extorting legal and illegal miners, and taking a cut of gold production or fixed fees per mine.

SEE ALSO: Major Criminal Powers Dispute Key Corridors in Colombia

Bajo Cauca is also a strategic point on Colombia’s criminal map, connecting coca-producing zones in the east and north with drug dispatch points on the Pacific and Caribbean coasts. Controlling this corridor guarantees illicit revenue flows.

But beyond the economic value, groups with deep roots in the region, such as the ELN, are clinging violently to their turf.

“This is about ego. One group wants to take over, the other says, ‘You’re not pushing me out,’” said a humanitarian worker based in Bajo Cauca who asked not to be identified as they had not been authorized to speak publicly.

Bajo Cauca’s Expanding Battle Lines

While violence is concentrated on the border with southern Bolívar, tensions are rising elsewhere in the region. In Cáceres, a municipality in central-western Bajo Cauca, authorities reported the forced displacement of several families in December 2024 due to clashes in San Pablo, a key mining hub.

The AGC has established a permanent presence in San Pablo, where it has battled both the Colombian army and the ELN. In December 2024, four AGC members were killed in an airstrike in the area.

In neighboring Tarazá, in western Bajo Cauca, social leaders, civil society members, and local officials told InSight Crime that tensions are flaring in various hamlets historically used for coca cultivation and cocaine production. The sources warned that violence is likely to worsen in the coming months.

“What’s next? The same as always: massacres, displacement, threats, forced disappearances,” said a public official in Tarazá, who requested anonymity for fear of reprisals.

In early March, the ELN detonated an explosive device on the road linking Tarazá and Medellín, the capital of Antioquia. In December 2024, the group attacked a public transport vehicle on the same route, injuring two people.

The deteriorating security is reflected in homicide statistics: Cáceres recorded 34 murders in 2024, up from 18 in 2023; Tarazá saw 29 homicides, compared to 12 the year before, according to National Police data. Yet killings are only one metric — communities are also suffering from a range of abuses that underscore the grip these groups have over daily life.

The Mechanics of Social Control

As criminal clashes have intensified in Bajo Cauca, so has the pressure on civilians. Each group uses fear and violence to enforce rules, assert control, and project authority.

“The AGC is using the same tactics the FARC used — like laying landmines,” said Javier.

The now-defunct FARC was notorious for mining territory to slow the army’s advance and protect coca fields. While the practice declined after the FARC’s 2016 demobilization, the AGC appears to be reviving it in areas like Cáceres and El Bagre to keep guerrilla rivals out. Mines are often placed along footpaths, trapping rural communities.

SEE ALSO: What Is Behind Increased Violence in Colombia?

The AGC has also imposed rules and distributed behavior manuals, mandating curfews and punishing rule-breakers. The group has confined entire communities during clashes with rivals.

The civilian population has been caught between the competing demands of armed groups. One group demands displacement; another forbids it. Some communities have taken a stand.

“People were displaced for about 15 days. When they came back, they reopened their businesses and agreed to resist the groups,” said Javier. “They told them, ‘Your fight is your problem. Go kill each other — but let us work.’”

However, while Javier and other residents of Bajo Cauca seek to break the cycles of violence they have suffered for generations, the profits on offer from mining and drug trafficking mean armed groups will continue to fight over the territory, and violence will remain their main tool to assert their power.

*Name changed to protect identity.

This article, written by Sara Garcia and Alicia Florez, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

This grim reality was made evident in late January when the army seized more than 2,600 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including landmines belonging to the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) in Tibú, in the Catatumbo region. Just days earlier, authorities had confiscated 300 landmines in the same area from FARC dissidents. Roads, rural paths, and farms in the region have become impassable.

The increase in demining efforts, landmine seizures, and suspected minefields reported by Colombian authorities in 2024 underscores that, despite the historic decline in landmine use since the 2016 Peace Agreement, criminal groups in the country continue to deploy these devices in their territorial disputes.

Throughout 2024, Colombia’s Office of the High Commissioner for Peace reported 998 incidents related to anti-personnel mines (APMs) and unexploded ordnance (UXO), including demining activities, reports of suspected minefields, and the seizure of these devices, most of which were handmade.

These figures represent an over 11% increase compared to the previous year, which saw 896 incidents. The upward trend has continued since 2021, when 316 incidents were recorded, followed by 412 in 2022. Experts consulted by InSight Crime agree that no single factor explains this surge.

A staggering 94% of the reported incidents were related to demining operations. Increased military activity in strategic areas and greater accessibility to former conflict zones—once heavily mined during the war between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) and the state before the 2016 Peace Agreement—account for many of these cases. However, other areas remain inaccessible to both military and humanitarian demining operations due to the control exerted by armed groups.

In Cauca and Nariño, the number of incidents surpassed those recorded immediately after the Peace Agreement: 58 and 69 incidents, respectively, that year. A similar trend has been seen in other departments with lower historical mine activity, such as Guaviare, Casanare, Bolívar, and Cesar.

Although Colombia signed the Ottawa Treaty banning the use and destruction of anti-personnel mines in 1997, it wasn’t until 2016 that the country’s largest guerrilla group and primary user of landmines—the FARC—committed to demining efforts as part of their demobilization.

“In the years following the Peace Agreement, the impact of landmines had dropped dramatically. Now, we are seeing figures reminiscent of the early post-agreement period, with the added problem that today, civilians are more affected than military personnel,” said Camilo Serna, director of the Colombian Campaign Against Mines (Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas), in an interview with InSight Crime.

Below are the three main reasons why landmine use has resurged in Colombia.

1. Criminal Disputes

Military pressure and ongoing territorial disputes in an increasingly fragmented criminal landscape have led some armed groups to resume planting landmines.

In Arauca, bordering Venezuela, authorities reported 101 incidents, mostly in the municipalities of Arauquita and Puerto Rondón, where the ELN’s Eastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Oriental) and the FARC dissidents’ 10th and 28th Fronts operate.

In Cauca and Nariño, key departments for coca cultivation, cocaine production, and trafficking corridors to Ecuador, 142 and 318 incidents were recorded, respectively. Most incidents occurred in the municipalities of Argelia and Tumaco, where FARC dissident factions and the ELN are locked in violent battles for control of these illicit economies.

SEE ALSO: BACRIM Turn to Landmines in Colombia

“Today, armed groups are fighting each other and using landmines against one another. It is no longer a tactical tool primarily used against government troops moving through an area,” Serna explained.

In Catatumbo, a strategic border region with Venezuela, the ELN’s Northeastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Nororiental) has been clashing with the FARC dissidents’ 33rd Front since early January. Landmine use in this area has also prevented authorities from conducting demining operations for years.

According to Colombia’s Deputy Inspector General for Peace Agreement Monitoring, Javier Sarmiento, who has been tracking the humanitarian crisis in Catatumbo, the presence of landmines has made it impossible for over 50,000 displaced people to return home safely.

In other strategic regions for organized crime—such as Chocó, Cauca, and Arauca—increased military presence and demining operations have prompted armed groups to use more explosives to defend their territories.

2. The Fragmentation of FARC Dissidents

In 2024, Colombian authorities attributed 618 landmine-related incidents to the various dissident factions of the FARC. These figures, alongside those from 2023 (638 incidents), mark the highest landmine use by these groups since the Peace Agreement. Before then, FARC dissidents had never been linked to more than 222 such incidents in a single year.

The fragmentation of these groups—previously divided between the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and Segunda Marquetalia but now splintering even further—has fueled clashes where landmines are a key battlefield tactic.

The ELN, a long-time user of landmines, was responsible for 164 of the incidents recorded in 2024.

Beyond the ELN and FARC dissidents, other armed groups were responsible for 47 landmine-related incidents in 2024—the highest number ever recorded for this category.

SEE ALSO: Gaitanistas Landmines are Guerrilla Tactic from Colombia’s Dark Past

Among them, the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) stand out. Though they typically use direct armed force to exert control, their increasing involvement in landmine incidents suggests knowledge transfer. Following the FARC’s demobilization, some former guerrilla fighters were recruited by the AGC, bringing new tactics to the group’s military operations.

Disputed territories—where the ELN, FARC dissidents, and AGC are vying for control—are the main hotspots for landmine replanting in Colombia.

3. The Rise of IEDs

IEDs can be built using easily accessible materials, some of which have become more durable. Technological innovations, such as the use of PVC tubes, have extended the lifespan of these devices by better protecting the internal ignition mechanisms, which may include electronic triggers or more sophisticated pressure-activated systems.

“It is now extremely difficult to control because numerous groups and individuals know how to build both command-detonated improvised explosive devices and victim-activated landmines,” an anti-personnel mine expert told InSight Crime on the condition of anonymity for security reasons.

In the end, the combination of ongoing armed group conflicts, tactical knowledge transfer between the key former FARC factions at the heart of the conflict, and the ease of manufacturing these devices has severely hindered Colombia’s demining efforts.

This article, written by Beatriz Vicent Fernández, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

As part of a joint security operation with prosecutors and other government officials at the end of February, Colombia’s national police seized 100 weapons, and eight properties, and arrested three legal representatives of several private security companies. A former colonel and captain in the country’s police force were detained. Both now face charges of conspiracy to commit money laundering and illegal enrichment.

Authorities targeted three security companies that allegedly facilitated access to weapons and provided bodyguard licenses to members of criminal groups operating across various departments and the cities of Bogotá, Neiva, Ibagué, Puerto Triunfo, and Villavicencio.

SEE ALSO: How Ecuador’s Criminals Are Taking Advantage of Private Security Firms

During a March 10 cabinet meeting, President Gustavo Petro questioned the irregularities within the private security industry that allow these practices to occur.

“Criminals are being given a free pass,” he said during the meeting. “The owners of security companies are paramilitaries and drug traffickers, sometimes ex-military and ex-police officers.”

The Colombian government awarded contracts to some companies recently implicated through the National Protection Unit (Unidad Nacional de Protección – UNP), the state body in charge of managing protection measures provided to individuals and communities living in high-risk environments.

InSight Crime Analysis

The involvement of former members of Colombia’s security forces in using private security companies to provide illegal services to crime groups highlights the continuation of a years-long, mutually beneficial relationship that has bolstered the country’s armed groups.

This is just one consequence of the outsourcing of public security in Colombia, a country that has been deeply affected by a multi-decade armed conflict featuring dozens of criminal actors, according to Luis Fernando Quijano, a security analyst in Medellín and president of the non-profit Corporation for Peace and Social Development (Corporación para la Paz y el Desarrollo Social – Corpades).

“The privatization of public security has turned private security companies into a profitable business,” he told InSight Crime. “The state has facilitated some illegal activity in this country, and the issue of [private] security is a clear example.”

For many years, crime groups from all over Colombia have relied on these companies to source weapons and pass members off as registered bodyguards.

Alexander Ruíz Pulido, for example, the retired colonel who was among those arrested during the February operation, also directed several similar businesses in the cities of Cúcuta, Barranquilla, Medellín, and Pereira, as well as in the United States in Miami, Florida. Some of Ruíz Polido’s companies had links to former paramilitary leaders with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC). Among those who reportedly received weapons and official licenses was Oliverio Isaza Ramírez, alias “Terror,” a commander with the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), the main armed group to emerge from the ashes of the AUC. Security forces killed Terror in February.

SEE ALSO: Paramilitary Commander Salvatore Mancuso Reveals AUC’s Connections in Colombia

In another case, a company called SIP Security registered Alejandro Restrepo Marulanda, alias “El Zarco,” and Matías Álvarez Tabares, alias “Keiber” – members of two of Medellín’s most prominent crime groups, Los Tirana and La Terraza – as bodyguards with access to weapons. The chief operating officer of that company is a retired police officer named John Velásquez, according to a November 2024 report from El Tiempo. On one occasion, El Zarco managed to avoid arrest by using documents that showed he was a bodyguard. Velásquez had reportedly obtained police accreditation for those documents.

Beyond providing access to weapons and licenses, private security companies have also helped thwart criminal prosecutions in Colombia. In April 2024, a judge ordered the release of Juan Carlos Castro, alias “Pichi Belén,” a leader of the Oficina de Envigado. Police caught the gang boss openly threatening another person with a weapon in Medellín, but authorities released him because he had a legal permit from a private security company to possess the weapon.

Castro was a client of José Omar Urrego Chitiva, a former police captain and representative of Securbel Ltda. Who was also captured as part of the February operation. Urrego Chitiva used his company to issue a work certificate to Castro that allowed him to later recover the seized weapon, according to a telephone conversation authorities intercepted between Castro and another individual.

Many other major criminal actors in Colombia have used private security companies to give their illicit activities a veneer of legality. The AUC strengthened its military operations through private security and surveillance cooperatives known as the Convivir. These groups served as a point of intersection between the paramilitaries, the military, and business elites, aiding the paramilitary expansion by acting as a conduit to channel weapons, classified information, and other resources into their hands.

The Convivir continues to exist in cities like Medellín. While some maintain their role as local security providers, they have also become involved in illegal activities such as micro trafficking and extortion.

This article, written by Sara Garcia and Juan Camilo Jaramillo, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace (Paz Total) policy, designed to negotiate agreements with the country’s main armed groups and criminal gangs, is struggling to make any headway as he passes the halfway point of his four-year administration. The negotiations have had profound effects on the criminal dynamics in the country.

SEE ALSO: What Is Behind Increased Violence in Colombia?

After initial progress in dialogue with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), talks collapsed in May last year when a faction of the group split off to pursue separate peace negotiations. The ELN’s extensive infrastructure and leadership in Venezuela, where Nicolás Maduro remains in power following a widely criticized election, has further undermined the chances of peace with the Marxist-Leninist rebel force.

Similarly, negotiations with dissidents of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) have faced significant setbacks. Fragmentation within these groups has sparked infighting, with splinter factions emerging from the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) and the Second Marquetalia, the two largest dissident factions. As a result, the government is engaging with only a small portion of each group.

The country’s most powerful drug-trafficking organization, the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), remains largely outside the Total Peace framework. Efforts have been stalled by the absence of a legal framework for negotiations and a potential peace deal. Similar legal obstacles have hindered progress in “urban peace laboratories” in cities like Buenaventura, Quibdó, and Medellín, where gangs dominate neighborhoods through drug trafficking and extortion rackets.

As Petro begins the third year of his presidency, InSight Crime reviews the key developments in Colombia’s peace dialogues and examines their criminal implications for 2025.

ELN

Initial progress with the ELN effectively unraveled as disputes with the government led to the collapse of negotiations.

In January last year, the Comuneros del Sur Front (Frente Comuneros del Sur – FCS), an ELN faction in southern Nariño, broke ranks, announcing plans to pursue separate “regional dialogue” with the government. Frustrated by the limited progress at the national level and growing threats from rival groups, the FCS sought a more localized approach. However, ELN top commander Eliecer Erlinto Chamorro, alias “Antonio García,” condemned these parallel dialogues as unauthorized and illegitimate.

SEE ALSO: Kidnappings Surge in Colombia Amid ELN Peace Negotiations

By May, the FCS formally severed ties with the ELN, emerging as a dissident faction of the guerrilla group. It quickly established dialogue with the government, advanced in peace talks, and even committed to a partial weapons handover, according to Carlos Augusto Erazo Murcia, head of the government’s negotiating team.

This was followed by the collapse of a bilateral ceasefire between the ELN and the government, which expired in August without renewal. After the ceasefire lapse, the ELN escalated hostilities by attacking a military base in Arauca in September, killing three soldiers. In response, the government suspended peace talks indefinitely.

The ELN and the government resumed talks on November 25, agreeing to reconvene in 2025 to reassess the dialogue process and explore the possibility of a renewed ceasefire.

The ELN also stands to benefit greatly from what was widely considered a stolen election in Venezuela, extending by another six years of Maduro’s time at the helm of the country. Venezuela remains a critical hub for the ELN, hosting much of its leadership and infrastructure.

Since the FARC’s demobilization in 2016, the ELN has expanded its presence in Venezuela and Colombia’s border departments, strengthening its operations through a symbiotic relationship with the Maduro regime. The group now controls entire sections of the border, managing smuggling and drug-trafficking corridors between the two countries, while maintaining corridors moving troops. Its influence spans eight of Venezuela’s 24 states, with significant income derived from controlling illegal mining and cocaine production zones.

With little interference and often support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—who depend on the income generated by these groups, particularly amid severe US sanctions—the ELN has solidified its presence along the 2,219 km border with Venezuela and uses this haven to project into Colombia. This growing entrenchment further undermines the Total Peace initiative.

Ex-FARC

Government dialogue with the EMC, the largest ex-FARC organization, has also splintered the group. In March, Petro suspended a bilateral ceasefire with the EMC in the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño due to ongoing violence against Indigenous communities. This decision deepened internal divisions within the EMC. Its leader, Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias “Iván Mordisco,” refused further negotiations until the ceasefire was reinstated, while another faction, led by Alexander Díaz, alias “Calarcá Córdoba,” opted to continue talks.

By April, the government expelled Mordisco’s faction from the peace talks, shifting its focus to negotiations exclusively with Calarcá’s bloc. In July, his group signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement, marking a tentative step forward. However, significant challenges remain: Calarcá’s faction has been accused of threatening demobilized FARC members in Caquetá, and in December, six soldiers were killed in a minefield allegedly planted by the group.

Mordisco’s wing, on the other hand, has intensified violent activities, particularly in Cauca, an important region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. By September, Cauca had recorded 466 violent incidents over 12 months, the most of any department during that period, with numbers continuing to rise through the end of 2024.

Meanwhile, the Second Marquetalia, a separate group of FARC dissidents led by Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” became the third major group to enter Total Peace negotiations in 2024. However, internal divisions also plagued this effort. In November, two key factions—the Border Command and the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico)—broke away, frustrated by Márquez’s leadership. They formed the National Bolivarian Army Coordinator (Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano), led by José Vicente Lesmes, alias “Walter Mendoza.”

AGC and Urban Groups

The AGC has been largely excluded from the Total Peace initiative thus far, but signs emerged in 2024 that Petro sought to change this. In July, he authorized dialogue with the group, signaling a potential shift in policy.

But significant obstacles remain. The government’s classification of the AGC as a high-impact organized crime group, rather than a political organization like the ELN or FARC dissidents, has become a sticking point in the negotiations. This designation precludes the AGC from seeking transitional justice terms, such as guarantees against extradition and amnesty, similar to those offered to the FARC in the 2016 peace agreement. Under Colombian law, high-impact organized crime groups are only eligible for limited judicial benefits, such as reduced sentences, making negotiations far less appealing for the AGC.

SEE ALSO: GameChangers 2023: The Cocaine Flash-to-Bang in 2024

Despite minor progress—such as the attorney general lifting arrest warrants for key AGC leaders—negotiations have yielded few tangible results. Tensions remain high: in December, the military bombed an AGC camp in northern Antioquia, underscoring the ongoing hostilities.

Moreover, skepticism about the AGC’s intentions persists. Some analysts suggest the group is using negotiations as a tactical maneuver to secure a bilateral ceasefire and reduce military pressure, rather than genuinely committing to demobilization. At the same time, its ongoing territorial expansion and dominance over key criminal economies fuel doubts about its willingness to disarm.

The absence of a legal framework for gang demobilization, or “transition to legality,” as it is officially termed, has also hindered progress in cities like Medellín, Quibdó, and Buenaventura.

Efforts to pass legislation to formalize a framework for gang demobilization have stalled in Colombia’s gridlocked congress, leaving urban peace efforts in limbo.

In Medellín, several gangs agreed to reduce violence following Petro’s 2022 election, resulting in a notable drop in homicide rates. In June 2023, Petro initiated a dialogue table with former gang leaders at Itagüí prison, but progress faltered in 2024.

In Quibdó, the gangs Los Mexicanos, Lokos Yam, and RPS began talks in August 2023, achieving significant milestones like a commitment to halt the extortion of teachers and health workers. But in September 2024, a ceasefire between the gangs collapsed, amidst incursions by the AGC into the city. In December, Petro authorized exploratory talks to include three additional groups—the Zetas, Cabí, and AGC—in the Quibdó table.

In Buenaventura, negotiations with the Spartans and Shottas—which together command over 1,700 members—have produced mixed results. The groups agreed to a truce in August 2023, significantly reducing violence throughout 2024. While tensions flared in March when the Spartans temporarily withdrew from the negotiations, they eventually returned to the table, and have renewed the ceasefire, currently set to last until February 2025.

Looking Forward

Several key factors will significantly influence peace negotiations in 2025.

First, the fragmentation of major groups within the Total Peace process highlights the challenges of negotiating with organizations that appear unified but are, in fact, loose coalitions of diverse factions. The Comuneros del Sur’s split from the ELN exposed the group’s limited control over its regional fronts. Similarly, the EMC’s divided leadership—between Mordisco and Calarcá—mirrors the internal tensions within the Second Marquetalia, where Iván Márquez has struggled to maintain cohesion among factions like the Border Command.

These fractures risk escalating violence as splinter groups vie for territorial control and factions excluded from peace talks increase attacks on government targets.

Since the EMC split, clashes between Mordisco’s and Calarcá’s factions have escalated in Putumayo, a key region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. Violence has also surged in other southwestern departments, such as Cauca. The deadly ELN attack on the military base could also foreshadow more violent confrontations between criminal groups and government forces, despite the relative lull achieved by ceasefires in 2024.

Second, the absence of widespread ceasefires with criminal groups has leveled the criminal playing field once again. Ceasefires maintained by the ELN and EMC in 2023 temporarily shifted criminal dynamics, allowing these groups to expand their territorial control, recruit new members, and focus on rival factions rather than government forces.

“We know [armed groups] have taken advantage of the ceasefire to try to increase their illegal control over the territory,” Colombia’s Minister of Defense said in a press conference in March 2024.

This reprieve boosted profits from drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion. In contrast, the AGC, excluded from ceasefire agreements, continued to face government offensives.

SEE ALSO: The Informants of Tibú: How the Colombian State Unleashed a Wave of Femicides

Currently, only the Calarcá dissidents and the FCS have active bilateral ceasefires with the government. The FCS, being relatively small, is unlikely to use the ceasefire for significant territorial expansion but will likely consolidate its holdings and defend against incoming EMC incursions into Nariño. Conversely, the Calarcá dissidents are better positioned to exploit their ceasefire to strengthen their presence in critical drug trafficking zones, particularly along the Amazonian border with Brazil and in parts of the Venezuelan frontier.

For groups like the Mordisco dissidents and the ELN, the absence of ceasefires means they will lose their distinct advantage as they compete for control over territories essential for drug trafficking, illegal mining, and other key revenue streams. However, the lack of ceasefires could give the AGC an edge.

Despite facing sustained military pressure, the AGC has expanded along the Pacific coast in Chocó, the Caribbean coast in Bolívar, Córdoba, and Cesar, and is encircling Catatumbo in Norte de Santander—one of Colombia’s most critical coca cultivation regions. With its criminal rivals now experiencing the same pressure it has endured, the AGC is poised to solidify and take even greater control as cocaine production explodes and gold prices approach record highs.

Third, Maduro’s dependence on Colombian criminal groups ensures that the ELN and Second Marquetalia will continue to strengthen their footholds in Venezuela and along Colombia’s border. With minimal interference—and often direct support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—both groups have entrenched themselves in the region, controlling key criminal economies such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and contraband smuggling.

With the prospect of six more years of protection under Maduro, these groups have little immediate incentive to engage in peace negotiations. Instead, they are well-positioned to expand their operations further.

This article, written by Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

Juan Sebastian Aguilar, 58, was shot in the chest by a proficient sniper who reportedly spent days lying in wait in the mountains above his target’s upscale home in northern Bogotá. The marksman, according to media reports, escaped on horseback into the lush mountains behind the housing complex, ending in an almost cinematic killing. His exit also complicated police efforts to track his movements.

Aguilar’s death at first glance appeared to be a simple settling of scores — revenge for past betrayals — between rival gem traders. But the sophistication of the hit has since led observers to speculate that the killing could be connected to broader criminal groups like drug trafficking and money laundering syndicates. Others believe he may have been eliminated to ease the way for killing another emerald trader.

SEE ALSO:‘Selective and Silent’: The New ‘Green War’ for Colombia’s Emeralds

“This is a settling of scores, but not among the emerald traders, it’s among the drug traffickers,” Petrit Baquero, who authored “The New Green War” (La Nueva Guerra Verde), a book about ties between Colombia’s emerald barons and organized crime, told InSight Crime.

Aguilar had become a powerful individual with significant security around him, he added. “Whoever decided to target him had people trained in the exercise of violence and used war weapons – not just a hitman on a motorcycle. It was something entirely professionalized and undoubtedly an attack that must have been worth a lot of money,” said Baquero.

This is not the first time Aguilar had been targeted. He narrowly survived an attempt on his life last year, and, according to El Tiempo, investigators are exploring whether it could be the same killer. And while almost certainly linked to the emerald business, sources shrug off the idea of a new round of tit-for-tat killings — an extension of what has been called the Green War — and believe that more criminal elements are at play.

The Green War

Though Colombia’s emerald industry dates back over 500 years to the time of the Spanish Conquest, the modern-day business has a murky history. It is marred by violence and conflict, particularly during the Green Wars of the 1980s, during which up to 6,000 people were killed in clashes between rival mining clans and right-wing paramilitary groups fighting for control over the lucrative mining regions in Boyacá, about 150 kilometers from Bogotá.

The recently deceased Aguilar, also known as “Pedro Alguilar” or “Pedro Pechuga,” came from that era. He began his emerald career as bodyguard and then head of security for so-called “Emerald Czar” Victor Carranza, who, in the 1980s, successfully fought against notorious drug lords Pablo Escobar and Jose Rodriguez Gacha for control of the gem industry.

Prior to his death from cancer in April 2013, Carranza was the most powerful figure in Colombia’s emerald business.

The financial spoils are not just access to the $150 million in annual emerald exports, but ample opportunities for money laundering. The exchange of stones for cash often takes place on Bogotá’s streets, making them ripe for leaking dirty money into the system.

SEE ALSO:Colombia’s Great Survivor: Victor Carranza

Baquero reckons the score against Aguilar may date back to the post-Carranza days and the push for power from rival emerald barons whose business interests shifted into the drug trade and money laundering.

“These are the aftershocks,” he said. “Maybe Aguilar was not a drug trafficker, but there are links and power relations with people involved in that environment, and his assassination may be due to that.”

Stubborn Frontmen?

One theory is that former members of the so-called Junta Directiva, or Board of Directors, found that frontmen — among them possibly Aguilar — were unwilling to return properties and businesses held for them.

This shadowy organization once held significant influence in Colombia’s criminal underworld, according to sources and media reports. Allegedly headed by Julio Lozano Pirateque, The Board’s associates operated behind the scenes, controlling networks that straddled illicit operations and legitimate businesses, such as foreign exchange houses and the emerald trade, to launder money.

“The well-established connections between emerald traders and drug trafficking highlight how organized crime is intertwined with both legal and illegal economies, nationally and internationally,” Andres Preciado, director of Colombian think tank Fundación Ideas para la Paz, told InSight Crime.

Enemies of Hernando Sànchez

Another theory is that Horacio Triana, an emerald dealer and Carranza’s historical rival who is serving time in a US prison on drug-related charges, may have wanted Aguilar out of the way.

Triana’s beef with Aguilar likely stems from the dead man’s close association and friendship with Hernando Sànchez, heir to Carranza’s emerald empire. Sánchez inherited control of Colombia’s biggest and most productive mining area — the Santa Rosa — when Carranza died. That put him, and thus, Aguilar, in the business crossfire of rival emerald barrons and traffickers, like Triana, as well as another key player, Pedro Rincon Castillo, known as “Pedro Orejas.”

Sánchez could be at the center of this deadly puzzle, says Baquero. Still a big player in the emerald world, he has survived several assassination attempts, receiving 11 shots in an exclusive Bogotá clothing store in 2012. His immense power, garnered after Carranza’s death, made him an obvious target, but he also faced accusations — notably from Triana — that he owed money for the purchase of shares in the Cunas Mine, which produces a significant amount of gems for Santa Rosa.

Aguilar’s “associates must be very scared and protecting themselves,” said Baquero.

Aligned with Triana in the same emerald faction, Pedro Orejas may have his own motivation for wanting Aguilar out of the picture — again, due to conflict with Sánchez over control of the mines but also over a potential lingering suspicion he could have been involved in his son’s death in 2013.

Although there is no direct evidence, some allege Triana paid a group of assassins for the hit on Sánchez in 2012. Ousting Aguilar, who ran the heavily armed security company, Seguridad Oriental Ltda., that protected Sánchez and other local and international mine owners would leave Sánchez more vulnerable to another attempt on his life.

Sánchez was also fingered by Triana and Pedro Orejas for being a frontman for Lozano, who now resides in Dubai.

Or Could it Be The AGC?

There is yet another possible perpetrator, the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC). Although there are no direct links between Aguilar and the AGC (also known as the Clan del Golfo), its former leader, Dario Antonio Úsuga, alias “Otoniel,” who is now in US custody, allegedly ordered hits on Sánchez and had long coveted a piece of the emerald trade in Boyacá. Some media reports say the AGC and Lozano have worked together before.

SEE ALSO: Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan Criminal Profile

Aguilar’s assassination would send a powerful message to Sánchez, whose elimination is important to realize AGC ambitions. But the group, known for getting rid of rivals in pretty sophisticated ways, may have worked with Triana and Pedro Orejas to take out Aguilar in return for a footing in the mining business.

“What’s clear is that Aguilar was on a kill list for some time, it was a homicide already paid for,” said Preciado.

But as investigators continue to grapple with the latest bloodshed in Colombia’s emerald trade, there is only one certainty, and that is that the violence — and sophistication of the hit that claimed Aguilar’s life — will continue. And that will leave more than a few worried.

This article, written by Helen Murphy, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

The bilateral ceasefire, in effect for the past year, ended after the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) rejected government offers to discuss a renewal.

The agreement was plagued by continued violence and hostilities, such as armed strikes and kidnappings, with both sides accusing each other of not upholding their end of the bargain.

“Just extending the ceasefire isn’t enough if it doesn’t come with new steps to protect civilians from attacks, hostilities, kidnappings, and threats,” said Otty Patiño, Colombian High Peace Commissioner.

Meanwhile, the ELN has accused the government of not negotiating in good faith.

“What’s the point of urging the ELN to sign new agreements if the previous ones haven’t been upheld?” asked the group’s commander, Eliecer Erlinto Chamorro, alias “Antonio Garcia,” in a statement released on July 26.

SEE ALSO: From Total to Partial Peace: Colombia’s Talks With Crime Groups Fragment

The negotiations between the ELN and the government had advanced further than any other talks held under President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace (Paz Total) plan, which has sought demobilization agreements with criminal and armed groups across Colombia.

But the expiration of the ceasefire adds to a series of recent setbacks, including the ELN’s refusal to stop kidnappings and deepening internal divisions, and could lead the guerrillas to abandon the negotiating table completely.

Ceasefire Violations

While the ceasefire agreement primarily prohibits offensive military operations between the parties, it also includes other conditions, such as banning the ELN from “taking hostages,” widely understood to mean kidnapping.

The ELN has violated the agreement at least 39 times over the past year, according to the Colombian think tank, the Conflict Analysis Resource Center (Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos – CERAC). These violations include five deaths, three injuries, and at least 52 kidnappings.

One of the most notable incidents occurred less than three months after the ceasefire took effect, in October 2023, when ELN members kidnapped the parents of Colombian football star Luis Díaz. After international attention pushed the group to release them, the ELN announced that it would cease kidnappings for ransom — a key part of their criminal operations.

Despite the ELN’s violations, negotiators agreed to extend the ceasefire on February 5 for another six months.

SEE ALSO: What Is Behind Increased Violence in Colombia?

But internal divisions on the ELN side soon became apparent, leading to larger problems for the negotiations.

On February 20, the ELN delegation declared a crisis in the peace negotiations, angered over the government’s “regional dialogue” with the Comuneros del Sur, a dissident ELN faction in Nariño that had started parallel negotiations with the government without the consent of the guerrilla group’s top leaders.

Over the next few months, the ELN temporarily suspended its participation in the talks and reneged on its promise to cease kidnappings, citing the government’s “lack of will” in establishing a donor fund to provide alternative financing, which the group claimed left them reliant on kidnapping. The government, however, argued that the fund could not be established while negotiations were stalled, creating a catch-22 situation.

Willingness for Peace

For weeks leading up to August 3, the government’s negotiation team had warned that time was running out to renew the ceasefire with the ELN, and continuously asked the guerrilla group to resume the peace talks.

At the same time, key officials were critical of the ELN’s willingness to negotiate, especially on the issue of kidnapping, an issue that has derailed negotiations in the past. Patiño stressed that the Colombian government would not sign agreements with the ELN if the group continued the practice.

The government has also questioned the group’s desire for peace.

“After years of dialogue, the ELN still has not answered whether it is willing to transition to peace or if, on the contrary, it sees this process as an opportunity to strengthen themselves militarily,” said the press release.

Some experts agree that the ELN seems to have taken advantage of the negotiations with no intention of ever laying down arms. The group advanced negotiation items that benefited its political cause, without moving forward on demobilization, Jorge Mantilla, a political scientist who studies Colombia’s armed conflict and security, told InSight Crime.

“The ELN has been aiming to buy time from the very start of the negotiations,” Mantilla said

What Does This Mean for the ELN?

The end of the ceasefire between the Colombian government and the ELN has dealt a potentially mortal blow to an already fragile negotiation.

As the ELN has refused to continue negotiations with the government, the process with the group’s dissident Comuneros del Sur Front has moved forward. So far, this is the only ELN front to have split from the Central Command.

If the parallel peace talks succeed, it could encourage other factions to split from the ELN and seek peace with the government, especially among fronts under pressure from belligerent rivals.

The main concern is the Western War Front (Frente de Guerra Occidental – FGOC) in Chocó, which has been fighting a losing battle with the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) since 2018 for control over drug trafficking routes and illegal mining. In this area, the lapse of the ceasefire and an eventual return to military operations against the ELN could push the FGOC to the same decision as the Comuneros del Sur.

In other areas, however, the ELN has taken advantage of the ceasefire to solidify its control. The ELN continues to be a dominant criminal group along large stretches of the Colombia-Venezuela border, increasing its control over rural communities. The lapse of the ceasefire could lead to increased violence in these areas as the group retaliates against the Colombian government and continues its territorial disputes with other criminal actors.

The ELN also has a presence in Venezuela and close ties to the government of President Nicolás Maduro, who claimed victory in recent elections despite irregularities in vote counting.

The Eastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Oriental – FGO) and the Northeastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Nororiental) on the border between Colombia and Venezuela are key to the Maduro regime’s criminal balancing act. Since at least 2016, the ELN has expanded along the border with Venezuela with the approval of the Venezuelan political and military forces, and has adopted an increasingly paramilitary role, defending the interests of the Maduro government. Should Maduro cling to power, these fronts would be less likely to make a deal with the Colombian government.

This article, written by Lara Loaiza and Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America.

The Colombian armed group, which alternatively is referred to as the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) or just the Gaitanistas, have been the largest belligerent force operating widely in the Pacific and western Caribbean region for years, with a hand in a wide range of criminal activities, including drug trafficking, illegal mining, extortion, and generally exerting influence on smuggling and migrant routes.

Specifically, those who provide valuable information can earn millions under these three reward offers, as publicized by the State Department:

1. up to $2 million for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of any key leader of Clan del Golfo involved in human smuggling in the Darién
2. up to $1 million for information leading to the disruption of financial mechanisms of the Clan del Golfo to finance, sustain, or support human smuggling operations in the Darién
3. up to $5 million for information leading to the arrest and/or conviction of any key leader of Clan del Golfo involved in human smuggling in the Darién by encouraging and inducing aliens to enter the United States resulting in death [in violation of Title 8, U.S. Code, sections 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and 1324(a)(1)(B)(iv)]

“Today’s three reward offers support law enforcement efforts in Colombia, Panama, and the United States to disrupt the exploitive treatment of migrants from all over the world who seek passage through the Darién region,” noted the State Departement.

The agency added that information and tips can be submitted to the Homeland Security Investigations and the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) by calling (866) 347-2423 (toll free) or by submitting online at www.ice.gov/tips.

The incentives to provide information fall within the State Department’s “anti-smuggling rewards initiative” within the wider Transnational Organized Crime Rewards Program (TOCRP), according to the US agency.

Photo: US Department of State headquarters in Washington DC. (Photo credit: AgnosticPreachersKid)

Changes in the leadership of Colombia’s illicit crop substitution program and problems in its implementation raise questions about how organized crime is hindering the government initiative.

Colombia’s Comprehensive National Crop Substitution Program (Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos) was born out of the 2016 peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC). The program’s goal is to reduce the amount of coca crops in the country through substitution, depriving criminal groups of the raw material needed for cocaine production.

However, the project’s implementation has faced major obstacles. Colombia continues to have the largest number of hectares of coca in the world and has recently broken records in cocaine production.

In mid-May, President Gustavo Petro named Gloria Miranda as the new national director of the Directorate for the Substitution of Illicit Crops, the entity in charge of implementing the program. Until then, Miranda had served as Director of Drug Policy and Related Activities in the Ministry of Justice.

Miranda’s new appointment is in response to criticism that the government has done little to implement the substitution program. During a Congressional debate in April, representatives announced that only 5% of the budget allocated to the program was used during 2023.

As a result of its failure to implement the program, the government’s relationship with communities in coca-growing areas has deteriorated. Coca growers in departments such as Norte de Santander and Córdoba announced that they will go on strike due to the government’s failure to uphold the substitution program. Families who signed substitution agreements continue to demand answers.

Below, InSight Crime explains key points from the current debate on coca cultivation in Colombia, how organized crime has hindered the implementation of the substitution program, and the role armed groups may play in the future of the initiative.

A Road Full of Obstacles

When the substitution program was created in 2017, experts considered it Colombia’s most ambitious coca crop substitution strategy yet. It was organized around agreements between families and the national government: families would eradicate their crops, and, in return, the government would provide subsidies and technical advice for short- and long-term agricultural projects.

“It was an overly ambitious program with huge goals,” Luis Felipe Cruz, a researcher at DeJusticia, a legal and social research center, explained to InSight Crime.

From the beginning, the substitution program was plagued with problems, starting with the lack of coordination between its management and the Ministry of Agriculture and other government institutions. The program was also hindered by its lack of budget and program design that failed to consider the different needs of different territories, according to a report by the Center for Studies on Security and Drugs of the Universidad de los Andes.

Criminal groups in coca-growing areas pointed to the shortcomings of the substitution program to legitimize their claims about the government’s failure to comply with the peace accords, and to increase distrust of the government among affected communities.

The failure to implement the substitution program also put social leaders who supported it in their territories at risk. After the government and families signed the agreements, the murder rate of social leaders increased by 546%, according to a study by economist Lucas Marín Llanes.

The national government’s drug policy outlines its strategy to implement the program, which consists of making payments of 36 million pesos — about $9,000 — to the families that joined. But the governments’ commitments to productive projects established at the outset of the program remain undefined.

The complex social and economic reality in coca-growing areas means these measures will not be enough to solve the violence that plagues local communities, where criminal groups have strengthened in the last year.

A Missed Opportunity

With recent changes in the criminal landscape, the coca market in Colombia has shifted.

Since the second half of 2022, farmers in departments that produce most of the country’s coca crops, such as Norte de Santander, Cauca, Nariño, and Putumayo, experienced a drop in coca leaf and coca paste prices of 45% and 30%, respectively.

There are several factors that influence changes in coca prices, such as a rise in the cost of raw material and the saturation of drug trafficking routes, or shifts in criminal control. One such change followed the FARC’s post-peace agreement exit from the territories in 2017.

Previously, the FARC dominated the coca market in the areas where they exercised territorial control. Since the FARC disarmed, other criminal groups have failed to establish the same level of control. Territorial disputes between groups such as the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) and FARC dissidents have exacerbated the drop in coca prices, as international buyers are reluctant to visit these contested areas.

As a result of the collapse in coca prices, more coca growers are willing to consider substitute crops. In parts of the department of Cauca, farmers have even turned to coffee as a solution. This is a window of opportunity that has not yet been taken advantage of by the government.

An Uncertain Future

Colombia’s current drug policy represents a different approach in the fight against drug trafficking in the country: instead of attacking small growers, it targets international cocaine trafficking networks.

However, the policy has distanced itself from its initial substitution approach, arguing that these programs are limited, as they focus on short-term agreements and overlook structural aspects that are key to understanding and addressing the dependence of certain territories on illicit economies.

In response, debate has arisen around how coca production could be channeled toward legal uses for the coca leaf as an alternative to substitution. This has become one of the Petro government’s main policy priorities regarding coca cultivation.

At the end of 2023, the Colombian Agricultural Institute (Instituto Colombiano Agropecuario – ICA) approved the first license for organic fertilizer made from coca leaf, grown in the departments of Cauca and Huila. In addition, Indigenous, peasant, and Afro-Colombian organizations have used coca leaf in the production of food and beverages, fabric dyes, and fertilizers.

The creation of alternative economies is an important opportunity. A member of an international agency — who spoke to InSight Crime on condition of anonymity because they are not authorized to comment on the issue — said that beyond substituting one crop for another, strategies can also focus on replacing illegal economies with legal ones, which can also help boost economic opportunities beyond agriculture.

However, they pointed out that, if the state fails to replace one economy with another, the vacuum will continue to be filled by criminal groups and illegal economies. This is already happening in some coca-growing territories where, faced with falling coca prices, growers have migrated to illegal mining, an illicit economy that is making millions in profits for criminal groups.

This article, written by Alicia Florez and Sara Garcia, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America.