José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever,” second-in-command of the Second Marquetalia (Segunda Marquetalia), was allegedly killed in an August 5 ambush in the southern reaches of the Colombia-Venezuela border, according to a statement from the group. The Second Marquetalia is a dissident group of former fighters from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia — FARC), also known as the ex-FARC Mafia.

The statement accused the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional — ELN) of carrying out the attack using explosives and said it also claimed the lives of four other fighters. However, Colombian authorities have so far been unable to independently verify the claims.

*Sierra Sabogal’s death, which occurred during an ELN attack near the Colombia-Venezuela border, was confirmed on August 11 by Colombia’s Defense Minister, Pedro Sánchez.

The Second Marquetalia accused “Pedro Pablo” or “Copete,” commander of the José Daniel Pérez Carrero Front of the ELN’s Eastern War Front, of orchestrating the ambush. He allegedly invited high-ranking members of the Second Marquetalia to a meeting to lure them into the ambush.

“The ELN acted with malice and treachery. They carried out premeditated simultaneous attacks on other Second Marquetalia units located in the region,” the group said in the statement.

The killing is linked to a series of recent armed confrontations between the ELN and Second Marquetalia in the municipality of Maroa in Venezuela’s Amazonas state, which local sources began reporting to InSight Crime on August 3. The battles between both groups, according to those reports, took place along the border with the Colombian department of Guainia.

Colombian President Gustavo Petro confirmed the armed confrontation between the guerrilla groups. “The ELN has entered into war with the Second Marquetalia and their conflict extends into Venezuela, where they have already killed people,” the president said in a post on X.

SEE ALSO: Major Criminal Powers Dispute Key Corridors in Colombia

Before this fighting, both the ELN’s Eastern War Front and the dissident Acacio Medina Front, an ally of the Second Marquetalia, had maintained certain financial arrangements and territorial divisions along this part of the border. This allowed them each to manage the area and oversee illegal mining in Amazonas, as well as the drug trafficking routes that cut through this area.

Zarco Aldinever had been in the crosshairs of Colombian authorities. They accused him of being one of the main suspects behind the June shooting of Senator and presidential candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in the capital city of Bogotá.

The breaking down of the guerrilla alliance in this strategic border region may lead to further military advances from the ELN and spark a new conflict with major implications for both Colombia and Venezuela.

After Hugo Chávez became Venezuela’s president in 1999, he welcomed many FARC commanders into the country who went on to establish operations in several border states. However, when President Nicolás Maduro rose to power in 2013, he established more favorable relations with the ELN. With the tacit support of his regime, the ELN began to expand its operations across the border, eventually displacing some of the dissident FARC factions still there.

The latest flare-up between the ELN and ex-FARC Mafia comes about eight months after the start of another conflict between the guerrilla groups. In January 2025, the ELN launched a violent assault on the ex-FARC’s 33rd Front in the contested Catatumbo region, which is one of the world’s top cocaine-producing areas.

SEE ALSO: Colombia’s Peace Efforts Spark Criminal Disputes and Divisions

With the ELN also controlling key territory on the Venezuelan side in the state of Zulia, this cemented the guerrilla group as the top armed actor on the northern part of the border, granting them access to drug trafficking routes leading to dispatch points in Venezuela.

The ELN’s latest confrontation with the Second Marquetalia in the south suggests this may be the next key battleground for control of the border.

Unlike prior fighting, this conflict may develop more on the Venezuelan side. That is largely because the ex-FARC Mafia’s Acacio Medina Front has more military capacity on that side and can rely on more than a decade of experience operating there. Illegal mining in Amazonas and the drug trafficking corridors near Brazil represent hugely important financial resources for both groups, making it unlikely that either will cede control without a fight.

There is also the risk that the confrontation could expand further north into Venezuela’s Apure state, which borders the Colombian departments of Arauca and Vichada. The Second Marquetalia maintains a strong presence there, particularly in the town of Elorza in the municipality of Rómulo Gallegos. This has long been the preferred place for ex-FARC commanders to operate, and they have taken over ranches and set up camps in the region.

The alleged killing of Zarco Aldinever would add him to a growing list of FARC dissidents killed in Venezuela. Other infamous commanders killed there include Miguel Botache Santanilla, alias “Gentil Duarte,” Seuxis Pausías Hernández Solarte, alias “Jesús Santrich,” Hernán Darío Velásquez Saldarriaga, alias “El Paisa,” and Henry Castellanos Garzón, alias “Romaña.” The Second Marquetalia’s top leader, Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” was also gravely injured in Venezuela.

This article, written by the Venezuela Investigative Unit, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

The 15-year-old who shot Uribe on June 7 in Bogotá has been sentenced to seven years in a juvenile detention center for attempted homicide, the Attorney General’s Office reported on August 27.

The teenager pleaded guilty before Uribe died of his injuries on August 11, which prevented prosecutors from upgrading the charge to homicide, since Colombian law prohibits changes to charges once a formal accusation is filed against a minor. Five adults have also been arrested in connection with the case.

Authorities have suggested that the Second Marquetalia, a dissident faction of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), could have had a hand in Uribe’s killing, but have yet to present concrete evidence. National Police Director Carlos Fernando Triana first suggested a connection to the group in July, and Defense Minister Pedro Sánchez Suárez repeated the claim in August after Uribe’s death.

SEE ALSO: Colombia-Venezuela Border Killing Hints at Growing Guerrilla Conflict

The link to the group is vague, and via one of the five people arrested in connection with Uribe’s murder.

That’s Elder José Arteaga Hernández, alias “El Costeño,” who allegedly began working as a hired assassin after meeting a former FARC fighter known as “Daniel” in prison in 2019, according to police sources cited by Colombian newspaper El Espectador.

Daniel, once a member of the Teófilo Forero Mobile Column, an elite FARC unit behind some of the group’s most notorious attacks, has reportedly been helping rebuild the column within the Second Marquetalia in southern Huila and northern Caquetá, according to Colombian newspaper El Colombiano. Therefore, he would serve as a potential bridge between the Second Marquetalia and the Uribe assassination.

Two other suspects currently in custody also appear tied to Caquetá, where the Teófilo Forero Column is allegedly reorganizing. Katerine Andrea Martínez Martínez, alias “Gabriela,” who supplied the minor with the weapon to shoot Uribe, was arrested in Florencia in June, while Carlos Eduardo Mora González has faced an arms trafficking case before a Florencia court since 2024.

Nearly three months after the shooting of Turbay, investigators have yet to clarify who ordered the crime. The arrests point to a network of low- and mid-level operatives with ties to FARC dissident circles, but no clear political motive has emerged.

However, the available evidence suggests the focus on the Second Marquetalia may be misplaced. Once a feared rebel faction, the group is now among Colombia’s weakest armed organizations, having had its leadership decimated over the past five years.

Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” the group’s leader, was seriously injured in a 2022 attack, prompting repeated reports of his death. He resurfaced in 2024 through a video and later a public appearance, confirming he was alive, though widely believed to be in poor health.

Other senior figures have also been eliminated. Seuxis Pausías Hernández Solarte, alias “Jesús Santrich,” who co-founded the Second Marquetalia with Márquez after rejecting the 2016 peace deal, was killed in 2021. That same year, commanders Hernán Darío Velásquez, alias “El Paisa,” and Henry Castellanos Garzón, alias “Romaña,” were killed in Venezuela’s Apure state. Most recently, in August 2025, José Manuel Sierra Sabogal, alias “Zarco Aldinever,” one of Márquez’s key lieutenants, was also killed in Venezuela.

SEE ALSO: Who Was Behind the Attempted Hit on a Colombian Presidential Hopeful?

As well as these losses, the Second Marquetalia suffered a major rift in November 2024. The Border Command (Comandos de la Frontera – CDF) and the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico – CGP), two of its most influential factions operating in Nariño and Putumayo, announced they were breaking away after disagreements over the group’s stance in peace talks with the government.

Given the group’s fragile internal state and mounting competition from rival criminal actors, authorities have yet to present evidence of any clear motive for the Second Marquetalia to order such an assassination.

Nonetheless, the lack of clarity about the attack underscores the risks heading into Colombia’s elections next year. Uribe’s assassination sets a precedent that could embolden other armed groups to use targeted political violence as leverage. With organized crime interests tied to the continuation of peace talks and possible judicial benefits stemming from negotiations, the next electoral cycle may see criminal actors intervening more directly in politics through violence.

This article, written by Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

After several months of tracking and surveillance, Colombian security forces arrested Larry Amaury Álvarez Núñez, alias “Larry Changa,” leader and co-founder of Tren de Aragua, the Venezuelan-born criminal organization with tentacles across different countries. He was hiding in a luxurious mansion he built from the ground up, in an exclusive rural area of the municipality of Circasia, in the department of Quindío. A security ring of nine bodyguards usually protected him and drove a luxury vehicle around the coffee-growing region.

“‘Larry Changa’ would have arrived in Colombia in 2022, obtaining false documents. He was in charge of the criminal strategy for the territorial expansion of the ‘Tren de Aragua’ in Colombian territory,” the Colombian Ministry of Defense posted on its X account.

Larry Changa, according to Chilean prosecutors and Colombian police who spoke to InSight Crime, was initially responsible for the establishment of Tren de Aragua cells in Chile and the wider logistical deployment in the south of the continent. After his presence was detected by Chilean security agencies, he had to flee and seek a new refuge.

His arrival in Colombia was just another chapter in Tren de Aragua’s continental expansion.

In addition to being the first choice of the nearly eight million Venezuelan migrants who have fled economic collapse, Colombia had already proven to be fertile territory for Tren de Aragua’s operations, expanding its criminal rents and offering refuge to some of its most notorious leaders.

Hiding among more than two million Venezuelans in Colombia, Tren de Aragua had been putting down roots in different parts of the country, including the capital, Bogotá. But the most established strongholds are along the Colombia-Venezuela border, where the Venezuelan criminals charge tolls to migrants. Here, Tren de Aragua begins its exploitation of the exodus, the starting point for the human smuggling networks that extend across South America and northwards to the United States.

La Parada: Tren de Aragua Shows Its Face

The irregular border crossings, known as “trochas,” which allow millions of Venezuelan migrants to enter Colombia, also became strategic routes for the transnational advance of Tren de Aragua.

In 2018, according to authorities and residents consulted by InSight Crime, Tren de Aragua established its first bases in the township of La Parada, in the municipality of Villa del Rosario, in Colombia’s Norte de Santander department. Adopting a low profile, its members took advantage of the growing human flow to consolidate an illicit business that thrived amid the vulnerability of the passing migrants.

At that time, Colombia was home to more than a million Venezuelan migrants scattered across different regions of the country. Villa del Rosario, in particular, had consolidated itself as one of the main entry points, serving as a key corridor for the migratory flow from Venezuela.

“This is an attractive place for them because it is a point where illegality proliferates, especially in smuggling and trafficking of irregular migrants,” an officer from the Metropolitan Police of Cúcuta, the capital of Norte de Santander, who requested anonymity for institutional reasons, told InSight Crime.

Once settled in several different border neighborhoods in La Parada, Tren de Aragua began exercising strict control over the Los Mangos and La Marina trochas, among other clandestine trails. The gang began to dominate several illegal economies through the use of violence and terror.

Migrants became their main target. Since the group’s arrival in this border area and until 2022, the border was closed, and the main legal crossing point, the Simón Bolívar International Bridge. This forced thousands of migrants to use the trochas, exposing them to extortion and abuse. Tren de Aragua charged travelers a $10 toll to cross, while bus drivers carrying migrants had to pay up to $125 in “taxes.”

“Tren de Aragua controls the Colombian side. To travel to Bogotá and then to Quito, Ecuador, you have to pay a fee to that group,” said a resident of La Parada, who preferred not to reveal his identity.

In addition, the gang imposed curfews in the areas under their control and demanded weekly payments of between $10 and $15 from local merchants. Those who refused to pay faced brutal reprisals, such as the throwing of grenades or the use of indiscriminate violence, a Tren de Aragua hallmark. In some areas of La Parada, media reports and security sources revealed the existence of torture houses, where those who disobeyed the rules or did not pay extortion fees were punished.

Faced with the advance of Tren de Aragua and increased insecurity in La Parada and several neighborhoods of the city of Cúcuta, the security forces intensified their efforts, capturing several members of the organization, including some leaders and hired killers.

In addition to facing state action, Tren de Aragua has had to contend with superior criminal rivals.

Following an armed dispute between 2021 and 2022 with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), the Colombian guerrilla group that dominates the criminal scene along the Colombian-Venezuelan border, a territorial division was created. Tren de Aragua was left controlling the Colombian side with no possibility of entering or doing business on the Venezuelan side, which remained under the control of the insurgency, acting with the blessing of the Maduro regime. The ELN was protected in Venezuela, but exposed to the security forces in Colombia.

Despite the state’s offensive and struggles with the ELN and other criminal groups, the gang continued to operate in Villa del Rosario and Cúcuta. Immersed in migrant smuggling, human trafficking, small-scale drug trafficking, prostitution, and extortion, they managed to consolidate themselves as one of the main criminal players in this part of the border.

SEE ALSO: With Venezuelan Criminal Groups Strengthening, Violence in Cúcuta Rises

Tren de Aragua’s criminal fiefdom at this crossing point allowed the entry into Colombia of other gangs of Venezuelan origin that were boosted by the reputation of Tren de Aragua.

Linked to more than 50 murders in Cucuta, according to official reports cited by the local press, the AK-47 gang, led by Jhoswar Saul Hernandez Sanabria, alias “Saul,” – captured in Venezuela – began as a satellite cell of Tren de Aragua before becoming independent. It currently operates in the center of the city, where it extorts merchants and has several drug sales points under its control.

The evolution of this faction, of Venezuelan origin, has escalated into a fierce dispute with other criminal organizations over control of the currency exchange houses. These financial operations, often used as a front for money laundering, have become points of friction. In addition, the recruitment of Colombians into their ranks demonstrates the gang’s ability to offer more attractive incentives than those of local criminal organizations.

Expanding Operations Beyond the Border

In the early morning hours of August 25, 2022, residents of a working-class neighborhood in Bogotá, Colombia, awoke to a gruesome scene. In the middle of the street, abandoned in a cart, were three corpses wrapped in black plastic garbage bags.

Leaving these bodies in public view was no random act. Behind the grim display was a violent territorial dispute between Tren de Aragua and local gangs for control over illicit activities in the Bogotá districts of Kennedy, Bosa, and Los Mártires.

Aníbal Fernández de Soto, then Bogotá’s security secretary, confirmed this in a statement. “The Tren de Aragua organization is the main group responsible for homicides in which bodies have been left in bags in public spaces in several areas of the city,” he said.

Between 2022 and 2023, local authorities documented at least 57 cases of people killed and found wrapped in garbage bags, many of them dismembered and showing clear signs of torture. It is unknown how many of these killings were directly carried out by Tren de Aragua.

The gang’s extreme violence was key to securing its place in the Colombian capital’s criminal underworld.

In its first phase, the group infiltrated Bogotá’s local criminal organizations, triggering a wave of betrayals that ended with its takeover of gangs like the Camilos. This conflict, which left more than 36 dead, allowed the Venezuelan group to consolidate control in strategic areas of Bogotá, including the commercial hub known as Corabastos and retail drug sale points in Kennedy and Ciudad Bolívar.

“To grow, they first ally with other criminal structures. That’s what happened when Tren de Aragua began to emerge in Aragua state and later extended its influence by partnering with organizations in other states to increase its criminal profits,” an investigator with Colombia’s anti-kidnapping and anti-extortion police unit told InSight Crime.

One faction that followed this strategy was the gang led by José Manuel Vera, alias “Satanás.” Initially operating as a satellite of Tren de Aragua, the group eventually gained enough manpower and illicit revenue to break away and form an autonomous network focused on extortion and microtrafficking in several Bogotá neighborhoods.

Although Satanás was arrested in Ecuador in November 2023 and extradited to Colombia, his criminal influence did not end. From inside the Palogordo prison in Santander department – and with the complicity of corrupt guards – his network remained active, using contraband cell phones to extort victims and keep cash flowing. Even behind bars, his power remained intact.

Corruption inside the security forces also impacted the streets of Bogotá.

In early 2023, a joint intelligence operation by the police and the Attorney General’s Office uncovered Tren de Aragua’s infiltration of the capital, identifying one lieutenant and five noncommissioned officers on the gang’s payroll. These police officers provided a range of services to the transnational network, including protecting leaders, collecting extortion payments, selling confidential information, and issuing safe conducts to control areas of sexual exploitation and small-scale drug trafficking in Kennedy.

Colombian authorities have continued investigating the group. In Bogotá, they also discovered that the gang owned several nightclubs used to launder proceeds from its criminal activities. The parties held in these venues – which featured international DJs – helped boost its other businesses, especially retail drug trafficking. The logistical coordinator of these operations, identified by the alias “Eryk,” was arrested in October 2024 after months of investigation.

While Tren de Aragua’s attempts to expand into other parts of the city have been thwarted, the gang has achieved a degree of consolidation in its strongholds in the capital. At the same time, efforts to enter other Colombian departments have failed, particularly in areas where they have encountered more experienced and better-established local criminal structures.

Putting the Brakes on Criminal Greed

After establishing an effective grip on certain territories and illicit economies in Bogotá and Norte de Santander, Tren de Aragua sought to replicate its model in other parts of Colombia.

However, this expansion has been hindered by the presence of more heavily armed local criminal groups and the response of security forces.

Unlike Bogotá, where criminal control is more fragmented, Medellín – famous as the cradle of Pablo Escobar’s drug trafficking empire – has resisted Tren de Aragua’s advance, thanks in part to a consolidated criminal underworld unwilling to cede territory.

“In Medellín, we’ve found it striking, especially compared to other cities, that they haven’t managed to break in,” a police investigator told InSight Crime in 2024.

Security experts consulted for this investigation, including Hugo Acero, former Bogotá security secretary, say the level of criminal governance exercised by structures like the Oficina de Envigado – a federation of criminal organizations that began as a hitman-for-hire network in the 1980s under the Medellín Cartel – prevents new players like Tren de Aragua from putting down roots in this city.

However, the gang did not give up. In Medellín’s busy streets and entrenched criminal underworld, the city has seen multiple Tren de Aragua members seek refuge in 2025 — only to be found by authorities or killed by rival criminals. These opportunities, during which they have also explored the potential of local criminal markets, show the gang’s ongoing interest in Colombia’s second city.

In one case in late July, two alleged members who had arrived in March from the United States used their stay to traffic weapons and sell synthetic drugs, according to Colombian police investigations.

SEE ALSO: Colombia Nabs Another Top Tren de Aragua Leader With Venezuela’s Help

Beyond Medellín, Tren de Aragua and other Venezuelan-origin gangs have also faced resistance in other parts of Colombia.

In 2021, the discovery of a corpse bearing a sign reading “killed for being from Tren de Aragua” revealed the resistance they encountered in Arauca, a border region known for drug and migrant trafficking. Their main rivals there were dissident elements of the now demobilized guerrillas of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia — FARC), whose experience and military power thwarted the Venezuelan group’s push into this border region.

In addition to FARC dissidents, Arauca is an ELN stronghold, making it an extremely difficult area to penetrate. Tren de Aragua could not replicate its border-expansion strategy there, as it did in Villa del Rosario, unable to defeat two very powerful Colombian criminal structures.

Even so, Tren de Aragua appears to have identified the potential of other areas in Colombia not as places to install a criminal presence, but as safe havens amid heightened security force pressure.

Several major arrests of the group’s leaders have occurred in towns and departments where the group has no visible operations. Instead, members have focused on investments in rural areas in the country’s interior. This was the case with Larry Changa, who was arrested at a mansion under construction in an exclusive sector of Circasia, in the Colombian department of Quindío, driving a luxury vehicle.

Another leading figure in Tren de Aragua’s Chilean operations was also arrested in Colombia. In December 2024, police captured Carlos Francisco Gómez Moreno, alias “Bobby,” in Los Patios, a municipality bordering Villa del Rosario in Norte de Santander. Chilean prosecutors say Bobby is one of Tren de Aragua’s leaders in Chile, suggesting Colombia may have become both a base of operations and a hideout for the gang’s international leadership.

Also noteworthy was the arrest of gang member Jeison Alexander Lorca Salazar, alias “Jeison Comino,” found at a luxury ranch in Los Santos, in the Santander department.

The movements of these Venezuelan criminals have not gone unnoticed. Colombian security forces have actively worked to prevent these transnational organizations from gaining ground in the country, establishing cooperation mechanisms with neighboring nations where Tren de Aragua operates. In some cases, they have even received help from the Venezuelan government, as in the capture of Jeison Comino.

That arrest was billed as a high-level operation, with Jeison Comino described as the gang’s second-in-command. In reality, the criminal, who had been active in Venezuela, was a lieutenant in the gang of El Conejo, one of Tren de Aragua’s satellite groups in Aragua state that weakened after its leader died in 2023.

The lack of reliable, verified information – partly due to the absence of Venezuelan cooperation and the low credibility of the little information they do share – leads to inflated claims about arrests and the gang’s reach.

Even so, other significant captures have dealt real blows to the group’s Colombian expansion, such as that of Salomón Fernández Torres, alias “Salomón,” on June 27, 2024. A top confidant of Niño Guerrero and the group’s financial chief in Bogotá, he was arrested as part of a series of operations by police and prosecutors that, by June 2024, had led to more than 240 Tren de Aragua members being detained.

Authorities now have their sights set on Giovanny Vicente Mosquera Serrano, alias “Giovanny San Vicente,” considered the gang’s top coordinator in Colombia and a liaison between its factions abroad. US authorities have offered a reward of up to $3 million for information leading to his arrest.

But just as the movement of migrants did not stop in Colombia, neither did Tren de Aragua’s operations.

Members of the organization moved into the municipality of Ipiales, in Nariño department at Colombia’s southern border— a strategic point on the migration route to Ecuador, Peru, and Chile — where they profited from migrant flows and extorted locals, according to leaked emails and documents from Colombia’s Attorney General’s Office in what became known as the NarcoFiles project.

Tren de Aragua’s next stop on the migrant trail to the south, Peru, offered a criminal market ripe for extortion, fueled by a growing Venezuelan migrant community that allowed the gang to establish itself. In a less crowded criminal landscape, with less experienced security forces and an unstable political climate, Tren de Aragua was able to flourish like never before.

This article, written by the Venezuela Investigative Unit, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

“Just a few months ago, the fighting was so intense that no one dared retrieve the dead,” said Javier, who spoke with InSight Crime at the end of 2024. “At one point, animals were eating the corpses,” he added, lowering his voice.

Over the last 20 years, Javier has seen how a conflict once rooted in ideology — between guerrillas and paramilitaries — has transformed into a battle over coca crops, drug trafficking corridors, and gold deposits.

Today, a resurgence of violence has been sparked by clashes between Colombia’s three main criminal actors: the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), the country’s last remaining insurgency; the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC); and dissidents of the now-defunct Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC), known as the ex-FARC mafia—both products of past demobilization efforts.

“The FARC and ELN say, ‘Leave, or we’ll kill you.’ The AGC says, ‘If you leave, we’ll kill you,’” said Javier. “The communities are left with no way out.”

All three groups have sought talks with the Colombian government under the “Total Peace” plan, which aims to negotiate separately with the country’s illegal armed groups. However, this policy has done little to curb the territorial disputes unfolding in Bajo Cauca and throughout Colombia.

Fighting to Fill the Vacuum

Guerrilla-paramilitary clashes in Bajo Cauca date back to the late 1990s. But over the past two decades, these groups have evolved and become further criminalized. Attempts to demobilize their forces – first the 2006 demobilization of the paramilitaries of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC), then the 2016 peace deal with the FARC – led to new conflicts as splinter groups and rivals fought to fill the power vacuum and control the criminal economies left behind.

SEE ALSO: Colombia’s Peace Efforts Spark Criminal Disputes and Divisions 

The latest escalation began when the AGC — the most powerful criminal group in Bajo Cauca — moved into the Serranía de San Lucas. Located in the south of the neighboring department of Bolívar, this mountain range is rich in gold deposits and coca crops and has long been an ELN stronghold. Homicides in El Bagre, which connects San Lucas with the Bajo Cauca, rose to 29 last year, up from 20 in 2023. But murders are just one element of the conflict, which has also led to mass displacements and the confinement of whole communities. Some 145 people were displaced to El Bagre in December 2024 following clashes. By early January 2025, that number had risen to 230.

Still, the violence continued. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), 395 people were forcibly displaced in Montecristo, southern Bolívar, on February 7, while another 144 were confined to their homes by the fighting. On February 18, 26 people were displaced from Segovia, which borders El Bagre to the south, due to fighting between the ELN and the AGC.

“What we’re seeing now is the AGC gaining ground against the ELN,” Javier said.

To defend its turf, the ELN has allied with the 18th and 36th Fronts of the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor de los Bloques y Frente – EMBF).

“The ELN’s alliance with the FARC dissidents is what’s stopped the AGC from advancing in the Serranía de San Lucas,” he added.

Local police told InSight Crime that another group, known as “Los de Abajo” or “Los de Cuturrú” — a remnant of longtime AGC rivals the “Caparros” — also appears to have joined the alliance.

What’s at Stake in Bajo Cauca?

The conflict is driven by a fight for control of a region brimming with criminal opportunities. The area contains over 8,000 hectares of coca crops and vast gold reserves. Between January and September 2024, 11.64 metric tons of gold were extracted from the subregion, accounting for 54% of all gold mined in Antioquia and 41% of Colombia’s total.

Both the AGC and the ELN profit from mining by charging fees for moving machinery and supplies, extorting legal and illegal miners, and taking a cut of gold production or fixed fees per mine.

SEE ALSO: Major Criminal Powers Dispute Key Corridors in Colombia

Bajo Cauca is also a strategic point on Colombia’s criminal map, connecting coca-producing zones in the east and north with drug dispatch points on the Pacific and Caribbean coasts. Controlling this corridor guarantees illicit revenue flows.

But beyond the economic value, groups with deep roots in the region, such as the ELN, are clinging violently to their turf.

“This is about ego. One group wants to take over, the other says, ‘You’re not pushing me out,’” said a humanitarian worker based in Bajo Cauca who asked not to be identified as they had not been authorized to speak publicly.

Bajo Cauca’s Expanding Battle Lines

While violence is concentrated on the border with southern Bolívar, tensions are rising elsewhere in the region. In Cáceres, a municipality in central-western Bajo Cauca, authorities reported the forced displacement of several families in December 2024 due to clashes in San Pablo, a key mining hub.

The AGC has established a permanent presence in San Pablo, where it has battled both the Colombian army and the ELN. In December 2024, four AGC members were killed in an airstrike in the area.

In neighboring Tarazá, in western Bajo Cauca, social leaders, civil society members, and local officials told InSight Crime that tensions are flaring in various hamlets historically used for coca cultivation and cocaine production. The sources warned that violence is likely to worsen in the coming months.

“What’s next? The same as always: massacres, displacement, threats, forced disappearances,” said a public official in Tarazá, who requested anonymity for fear of reprisals.

In early March, the ELN detonated an explosive device on the road linking Tarazá and Medellín, the capital of Antioquia. In December 2024, the group attacked a public transport vehicle on the same route, injuring two people.

The deteriorating security is reflected in homicide statistics: Cáceres recorded 34 murders in 2024, up from 18 in 2023; Tarazá saw 29 homicides, compared to 12 the year before, according to National Police data. Yet killings are only one metric — communities are also suffering from a range of abuses that underscore the grip these groups have over daily life.

The Mechanics of Social Control

As criminal clashes have intensified in Bajo Cauca, so has the pressure on civilians. Each group uses fear and violence to enforce rules, assert control, and project authority.

“The AGC is using the same tactics the FARC used — like laying landmines,” said Javier.

The now-defunct FARC was notorious for mining territory to slow the army’s advance and protect coca fields. While the practice declined after the FARC’s 2016 demobilization, the AGC appears to be reviving it in areas like Cáceres and El Bagre to keep guerrilla rivals out. Mines are often placed along footpaths, trapping rural communities.

SEE ALSO: What Is Behind Increased Violence in Colombia?

The AGC has also imposed rules and distributed behavior manuals, mandating curfews and punishing rule-breakers. The group has confined entire communities during clashes with rivals.

The civilian population has been caught between the competing demands of armed groups. One group demands displacement; another forbids it. Some communities have taken a stand.

“People were displaced for about 15 days. When they came back, they reopened their businesses and agreed to resist the groups,” said Javier. “They told them, ‘Your fight is your problem. Go kill each other — but let us work.’”

However, while Javier and other residents of Bajo Cauca seek to break the cycles of violence they have suffered for generations, the profits on offer from mining and drug trafficking mean armed groups will continue to fight over the territory, and violence will remain their main tool to assert their power.

*Name changed to protect identity.

This article, written by Sara Garcia and Alicia Florez, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

This grim reality was made evident in late January when the army seized more than 2,600 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), including landmines belonging to the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) in Tibú, in the Catatumbo region. Just days earlier, authorities had confiscated 300 landmines in the same area from FARC dissidents. Roads, rural paths, and farms in the region have become impassable.

The increase in demining efforts, landmine seizures, and suspected minefields reported by Colombian authorities in 2024 underscores that, despite the historic decline in landmine use since the 2016 Peace Agreement, criminal groups in the country continue to deploy these devices in their territorial disputes.

Throughout 2024, Colombia’s Office of the High Commissioner for Peace reported 998 incidents related to anti-personnel mines (APMs) and unexploded ordnance (UXO), including demining activities, reports of suspected minefields, and the seizure of these devices, most of which were handmade.

These figures represent an over 11% increase compared to the previous year, which saw 896 incidents. The upward trend has continued since 2021, when 316 incidents were recorded, followed by 412 in 2022. Experts consulted by InSight Crime agree that no single factor explains this surge.

A staggering 94% of the reported incidents were related to demining operations. Increased military activity in strategic areas and greater accessibility to former conflict zones—once heavily mined during the war between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) and the state before the 2016 Peace Agreement—account for many of these cases. However, other areas remain inaccessible to both military and humanitarian demining operations due to the control exerted by armed groups.

In Cauca and Nariño, the number of incidents surpassed those recorded immediately after the Peace Agreement: 58 and 69 incidents, respectively, that year. A similar trend has been seen in other departments with lower historical mine activity, such as Guaviare, Casanare, Bolívar, and Cesar.

Although Colombia signed the Ottawa Treaty banning the use and destruction of anti-personnel mines in 1997, it wasn’t until 2016 that the country’s largest guerrilla group and primary user of landmines—the FARC—committed to demining efforts as part of their demobilization.

“In the years following the Peace Agreement, the impact of landmines had dropped dramatically. Now, we are seeing figures reminiscent of the early post-agreement period, with the added problem that today, civilians are more affected than military personnel,” said Camilo Serna, director of the Colombian Campaign Against Mines (Campaña Colombiana Contra Minas), in an interview with InSight Crime.

Below are the three main reasons why landmine use has resurged in Colombia.

1. Criminal Disputes

Military pressure and ongoing territorial disputes in an increasingly fragmented criminal landscape have led some armed groups to resume planting landmines.

In Arauca, bordering Venezuela, authorities reported 101 incidents, mostly in the municipalities of Arauquita and Puerto Rondón, where the ELN’s Eastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Oriental) and the FARC dissidents’ 10th and 28th Fronts operate.

In Cauca and Nariño, key departments for coca cultivation, cocaine production, and trafficking corridors to Ecuador, 142 and 318 incidents were recorded, respectively. Most incidents occurred in the municipalities of Argelia and Tumaco, where FARC dissident factions and the ELN are locked in violent battles for control of these illicit economies.

SEE ALSO: BACRIM Turn to Landmines in Colombia

“Today, armed groups are fighting each other and using landmines against one another. It is no longer a tactical tool primarily used against government troops moving through an area,” Serna explained.

In Catatumbo, a strategic border region with Venezuela, the ELN’s Northeastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Nororiental) has been clashing with the FARC dissidents’ 33rd Front since early January. Landmine use in this area has also prevented authorities from conducting demining operations for years.

According to Colombia’s Deputy Inspector General for Peace Agreement Monitoring, Javier Sarmiento, who has been tracking the humanitarian crisis in Catatumbo, the presence of landmines has made it impossible for over 50,000 displaced people to return home safely.

In other strategic regions for organized crime—such as Chocó, Cauca, and Arauca—increased military presence and demining operations have prompted armed groups to use more explosives to defend their territories.

2. The Fragmentation of FARC Dissidents

In 2024, Colombian authorities attributed 618 landmine-related incidents to the various dissident factions of the FARC. These figures, alongside those from 2023 (638 incidents), mark the highest landmine use by these groups since the Peace Agreement. Before then, FARC dissidents had never been linked to more than 222 such incidents in a single year.

The fragmentation of these groups—previously divided between the Estado Mayor Central (EMC) and Segunda Marquetalia but now splintering even further—has fueled clashes where landmines are a key battlefield tactic.

The ELN, a long-time user of landmines, was responsible for 164 of the incidents recorded in 2024.

Beyond the ELN and FARC dissidents, other armed groups were responsible for 47 landmine-related incidents in 2024—the highest number ever recorded for this category.

SEE ALSO: Gaitanistas Landmines are Guerrilla Tactic from Colombia’s Dark Past

Among them, the Gaitanista Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) stand out. Though they typically use direct armed force to exert control, their increasing involvement in landmine incidents suggests knowledge transfer. Following the FARC’s demobilization, some former guerrilla fighters were recruited by the AGC, bringing new tactics to the group’s military operations.

Disputed territories—where the ELN, FARC dissidents, and AGC are vying for control—are the main hotspots for landmine replanting in Colombia.

3. The Rise of IEDs

IEDs can be built using easily accessible materials, some of which have become more durable. Technological innovations, such as the use of PVC tubes, have extended the lifespan of these devices by better protecting the internal ignition mechanisms, which may include electronic triggers or more sophisticated pressure-activated systems.

“It is now extremely difficult to control because numerous groups and individuals know how to build both command-detonated improvised explosive devices and victim-activated landmines,” an anti-personnel mine expert told InSight Crime on the condition of anonymity for security reasons.

In the end, the combination of ongoing armed group conflicts, tactical knowledge transfer between the key former FARC factions at the heart of the conflict, and the ease of manufacturing these devices has severely hindered Colombia’s demining efforts.

This article, written by Beatriz Vicent Fernández, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

As part of a joint security operation with prosecutors and other government officials at the end of February, Colombia’s national police seized 100 weapons, and eight properties, and arrested three legal representatives of several private security companies. A former colonel and captain in the country’s police force were detained. Both now face charges of conspiracy to commit money laundering and illegal enrichment.

Authorities targeted three security companies that allegedly facilitated access to weapons and provided bodyguard licenses to members of criminal groups operating across various departments and the cities of Bogotá, Neiva, Ibagué, Puerto Triunfo, and Villavicencio.

SEE ALSO: How Ecuador’s Criminals Are Taking Advantage of Private Security Firms

During a March 10 cabinet meeting, President Gustavo Petro questioned the irregularities within the private security industry that allow these practices to occur.

“Criminals are being given a free pass,” he said during the meeting. “The owners of security companies are paramilitaries and drug traffickers, sometimes ex-military and ex-police officers.”

The Colombian government awarded contracts to some companies recently implicated through the National Protection Unit (Unidad Nacional de Protección – UNP), the state body in charge of managing protection measures provided to individuals and communities living in high-risk environments.

InSight Crime Analysis

The involvement of former members of Colombia’s security forces in using private security companies to provide illegal services to crime groups highlights the continuation of a years-long, mutually beneficial relationship that has bolstered the country’s armed groups.

This is just one consequence of the outsourcing of public security in Colombia, a country that has been deeply affected by a multi-decade armed conflict featuring dozens of criminal actors, according to Luis Fernando Quijano, a security analyst in Medellín and president of the non-profit Corporation for Peace and Social Development (Corporación para la Paz y el Desarrollo Social – Corpades).

“The privatization of public security has turned private security companies into a profitable business,” he told InSight Crime. “The state has facilitated some illegal activity in this country, and the issue of [private] security is a clear example.”

For many years, crime groups from all over Colombia have relied on these companies to source weapons and pass members off as registered bodyguards.

Alexander Ruíz Pulido, for example, the retired colonel who was among those arrested during the February operation, also directed several similar businesses in the cities of Cúcuta, Barranquilla, Medellín, and Pereira, as well as in the United States in Miami, Florida. Some of Ruíz Polido’s companies had links to former paramilitary leaders with the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia – AUC). Among those who reportedly received weapons and official licenses was Oliverio Isaza Ramírez, alias “Terror,” a commander with the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), the main armed group to emerge from the ashes of the AUC. Security forces killed Terror in February.

SEE ALSO: Paramilitary Commander Salvatore Mancuso Reveals AUC’s Connections in Colombia

In another case, a company called SIP Security registered Alejandro Restrepo Marulanda, alias “El Zarco,” and Matías Álvarez Tabares, alias “Keiber” – members of two of Medellín’s most prominent crime groups, Los Tirana and La Terraza – as bodyguards with access to weapons. The chief operating officer of that company is a retired police officer named John Velásquez, according to a November 2024 report from El Tiempo. On one occasion, El Zarco managed to avoid arrest by using documents that showed he was a bodyguard. Velásquez had reportedly obtained police accreditation for those documents.

Beyond providing access to weapons and licenses, private security companies have also helped thwart criminal prosecutions in Colombia. In April 2024, a judge ordered the release of Juan Carlos Castro, alias “Pichi Belén,” a leader of the Oficina de Envigado. Police caught the gang boss openly threatening another person with a weapon in Medellín, but authorities released him because he had a legal permit from a private security company to possess the weapon.

Castro was a client of José Omar Urrego Chitiva, a former police captain and representative of Securbel Ltda. Who was also captured as part of the February operation. Urrego Chitiva used his company to issue a work certificate to Castro that allowed him to later recover the seized weapon, according to a telephone conversation authorities intercepted between Castro and another individual.

Many other major criminal actors in Colombia have used private security companies to give their illicit activities a veneer of legality. The AUC strengthened its military operations through private security and surveillance cooperatives known as the Convivir. These groups served as a point of intersection between the paramilitaries, the military, and business elites, aiding the paramilitary expansion by acting as a conduit to channel weapons, classified information, and other resources into their hands.

The Convivir continues to exist in cities like Medellín. While some maintain their role as local security providers, they have also become involved in illegal activities such as micro trafficking and extortion.

This article, written by Sara Garcia and Juan Camilo Jaramillo, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

The number of migrants crossing the Darién Gap between Colombia and Panama plummeted to just over a dozen per day in February, as fears of stricter US immigration policies under the administration of President Donald Trump have deterred new crossings. Only 408 migrants crossed the Darién Gap in February — a staggering drop from the more than 37,000 who made the journey during the same month last year.

But the slowdown is not just a reduction in numbers; migrants across Central America and Mexico are abandoning their plans to reach the United States and instead heading south, returning to their countries of origin.

SEE ALSO: The Forgotten Human Smuggling Route in the Darién

The vast majority of those returning are Venezuelans, according to Colombia’s Foreign Ministry, which reported that 1,885 migrants arrived in Colombia from Panama between January 15 and February 28. In March, the flow has accelerated, with more than 200 migrants per day traveling by boat from Panama to Colombia, according to the Wall Street Journal.

Meanwhile, the number of migrants entering Panama from the north is also rising, with about 3,100 people crossing the Costa Rican border last week, according to Panamanian authorities.

After entering Panama, migrants make their way to the port of Colón, where large boats take them to La Miel, a town close to the border with Colombia. Migrants are charged $230 USD per person for the journey. From there, they transfer to smaller boats to reach Capurganá, Colombia, then travel by motorcycle to Acandí, and finally take another boat to Necoclí — the point where many previously began their journey north across the Darién.

InSight Crime Analysis

The plummeting number of migrants traveling through the Darién could lead to a sharp decline in profits for the AGC, which maintains a monopoly on migrant smuggling operations in the region that were worth tens of millions of dollars a year at their peak.

The group’s primary source of profit came from extorting both formal and informal businesses connected to the migration flow, including hotels, guides, restaurants, stores, and transporters. Additionally, the AGC earned direct profits by facilitating the movement of migrants through its zone of control, placing their earnings between $17.5 million USD and $25 million USD by 2023, according to InSight Crime’s estimates.

SEE ALSO: Colombia’s AGC Squeezes Profits From Control Of Key Migration Choke Point

However, the decline in migrant traffic through the Darién has put a dent in both formal and informal economies, resulting in a reduction of profits for the AGC.

“The economy of that area changed in recent years. An economic bubble was created that, when it burst, would bring a very bleak context,” said a person working for a state entity in the area, who requested to remain anonymous as they were not authorized to speak. Now, they added, that bubble has burst, hurting many who formerly profited off migrants. The increase in migrants heading south still is not large enough to compensate for the dropoff in northward flows.

“These are very small flows. From a business perspective, which is what these groups always see, it’s not an attractive phenomenon for them,” they said.

The AGC appears to be filling the gaps with other illegal economies. The group is increasing “collaboration” — their term for extortion — with other sectors, such as cattle ranchers, according to a local resident, who requested anonymity for security reasons.

The AGC needs consistent income to sustain an unrelenting war with their main enemy, the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), for control of the department of Chocó, directly south of the Urabá region, which is home to important criminal economies such as illegal gold mining. The drop in migrant flows will likely shift the AGC’s focus back to drug trafficking through the Darién and the Colombian region of Urabá, which remains the group’s most critical stronghold.

This article, written by Henry Shuldiner and Sara Garcia, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace (Paz Total) policy, designed to negotiate agreements with the country’s main armed groups and criminal gangs, is struggling to make any headway as he passes the halfway point of his four-year administration. The negotiations have had profound effects on the criminal dynamics in the country.

SEE ALSO: What Is Behind Increased Violence in Colombia?

After initial progress in dialogue with the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN), talks collapsed in May last year when a faction of the group split off to pursue separate peace negotiations. The ELN’s extensive infrastructure and leadership in Venezuela, where Nicolás Maduro remains in power following a widely criticized election, has further undermined the chances of peace with the Marxist-Leninist rebel force.

Similarly, negotiations with dissidents of the demobilized Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – FARC) have faced significant setbacks. Fragmentation within these groups has sparked infighting, with splinter factions emerging from the Central General Staff (Estado Mayor Central – EMC) and the Second Marquetalia, the two largest dissident factions. As a result, the government is engaging with only a small portion of each group.

The country’s most powerful drug-trafficking organization, the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC), remains largely outside the Total Peace framework. Efforts have been stalled by the absence of a legal framework for negotiations and a potential peace deal. Similar legal obstacles have hindered progress in “urban peace laboratories” in cities like Buenaventura, Quibdó, and Medellín, where gangs dominate neighborhoods through drug trafficking and extortion rackets.

As Petro begins the third year of his presidency, InSight Crime reviews the key developments in Colombia’s peace dialogues and examines their criminal implications for 2025.

ELN

Initial progress with the ELN effectively unraveled as disputes with the government led to the collapse of negotiations.

In January last year, the Comuneros del Sur Front (Frente Comuneros del Sur – FCS), an ELN faction in southern Nariño, broke ranks, announcing plans to pursue separate “regional dialogue” with the government. Frustrated by the limited progress at the national level and growing threats from rival groups, the FCS sought a more localized approach. However, ELN top commander Eliecer Erlinto Chamorro, alias “Antonio García,” condemned these parallel dialogues as unauthorized and illegitimate.

SEE ALSO: Kidnappings Surge in Colombia Amid ELN Peace Negotiations

By May, the FCS formally severed ties with the ELN, emerging as a dissident faction of the guerrilla group. It quickly established dialogue with the government, advanced in peace talks, and even committed to a partial weapons handover, according to Carlos Augusto Erazo Murcia, head of the government’s negotiating team.

This was followed by the collapse of a bilateral ceasefire between the ELN and the government, which expired in August without renewal. After the ceasefire lapse, the ELN escalated hostilities by attacking a military base in Arauca in September, killing three soldiers. In response, the government suspended peace talks indefinitely.

The ELN and the government resumed talks on November 25, agreeing to reconvene in 2025 to reassess the dialogue process and explore the possibility of a renewed ceasefire.

The ELN also stands to benefit greatly from what was widely considered a stolen election in Venezuela, extending by another six years of Maduro’s time at the helm of the country. Venezuela remains a critical hub for the ELN, hosting much of its leadership and infrastructure.

Since the FARC’s demobilization in 2016, the ELN has expanded its presence in Venezuela and Colombia’s border departments, strengthening its operations through a symbiotic relationship with the Maduro regime. The group now controls entire sections of the border, managing smuggling and drug-trafficking corridors between the two countries, while maintaining corridors moving troops. Its influence spans eight of Venezuela’s 24 states, with significant income derived from controlling illegal mining and cocaine production zones.

With little interference and often support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—who depend on the income generated by these groups, particularly amid severe US sanctions—the ELN has solidified its presence along the 2,219 km border with Venezuela and uses this haven to project into Colombia. This growing entrenchment further undermines the Total Peace initiative.

Ex-FARC

Government dialogue with the EMC, the largest ex-FARC organization, has also splintered the group. In March, Petro suspended a bilateral ceasefire with the EMC in the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, and Nariño due to ongoing violence against Indigenous communities. This decision deepened internal divisions within the EMC. Its leader, Néstor Gregorio Vera Fernández, alias “Iván Mordisco,” refused further negotiations until the ceasefire was reinstated, while another faction, led by Alexander Díaz, alias “Calarcá Córdoba,” opted to continue talks.

By April, the government expelled Mordisco’s faction from the peace talks, shifting its focus to negotiations exclusively with Calarcá’s bloc. In July, his group signed a bilateral ceasefire agreement, marking a tentative step forward. However, significant challenges remain: Calarcá’s faction has been accused of threatening demobilized FARC members in Caquetá, and in December, six soldiers were killed in a minefield allegedly planted by the group.

Mordisco’s wing, on the other hand, has intensified violent activities, particularly in Cauca, an important region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. By September, Cauca had recorded 466 violent incidents over 12 months, the most of any department during that period, with numbers continuing to rise through the end of 2024.

Meanwhile, the Second Marquetalia, a separate group of FARC dissidents led by Luciano Marín Arango, alias “Iván Márquez,” became the third major group to enter Total Peace negotiations in 2024. However, internal divisions also plagued this effort. In November, two key factions—the Border Command and the Pacific Guerrilla Coordinating Committee (Coordinadora Guerrillera del Pacífico)—broke away, frustrated by Márquez’s leadership. They formed the National Bolivarian Army Coordinator (Coordinadora Nacional Ejército Bolivariano), led by José Vicente Lesmes, alias “Walter Mendoza.”

AGC and Urban Groups

The AGC has been largely excluded from the Total Peace initiative thus far, but signs emerged in 2024 that Petro sought to change this. In July, he authorized dialogue with the group, signaling a potential shift in policy.

But significant obstacles remain. The government’s classification of the AGC as a high-impact organized crime group, rather than a political organization like the ELN or FARC dissidents, has become a sticking point in the negotiations. This designation precludes the AGC from seeking transitional justice terms, such as guarantees against extradition and amnesty, similar to those offered to the FARC in the 2016 peace agreement. Under Colombian law, high-impact organized crime groups are only eligible for limited judicial benefits, such as reduced sentences, making negotiations far less appealing for the AGC.

SEE ALSO: GameChangers 2023: The Cocaine Flash-to-Bang in 2024

Despite minor progress—such as the attorney general lifting arrest warrants for key AGC leaders—negotiations have yielded few tangible results. Tensions remain high: in December, the military bombed an AGC camp in northern Antioquia, underscoring the ongoing hostilities.

Moreover, skepticism about the AGC’s intentions persists. Some analysts suggest the group is using negotiations as a tactical maneuver to secure a bilateral ceasefire and reduce military pressure, rather than genuinely committing to demobilization. At the same time, its ongoing territorial expansion and dominance over key criminal economies fuel doubts about its willingness to disarm.

The absence of a legal framework for gang demobilization, or “transition to legality,” as it is officially termed, has also hindered progress in cities like Medellín, Quibdó, and Buenaventura.

Efforts to pass legislation to formalize a framework for gang demobilization have stalled in Colombia’s gridlocked congress, leaving urban peace efforts in limbo.

In Medellín, several gangs agreed to reduce violence following Petro’s 2022 election, resulting in a notable drop in homicide rates. In June 2023, Petro initiated a dialogue table with former gang leaders at Itagüí prison, but progress faltered in 2024.

In Quibdó, the gangs Los Mexicanos, Lokos Yam, and RPS began talks in August 2023, achieving significant milestones like a commitment to halt the extortion of teachers and health workers. But in September 2024, a ceasefire between the gangs collapsed, amidst incursions by the AGC into the city. In December, Petro authorized exploratory talks to include three additional groups—the Zetas, Cabí, and AGC—in the Quibdó table.

In Buenaventura, negotiations with the Spartans and Shottas—which together command over 1,700 members—have produced mixed results. The groups agreed to a truce in August 2023, significantly reducing violence throughout 2024. While tensions flared in March when the Spartans temporarily withdrew from the negotiations, they eventually returned to the table, and have renewed the ceasefire, currently set to last until February 2025.

Looking Forward

Several key factors will significantly influence peace negotiations in 2025.

First, the fragmentation of major groups within the Total Peace process highlights the challenges of negotiating with organizations that appear unified but are, in fact, loose coalitions of diverse factions. The Comuneros del Sur’s split from the ELN exposed the group’s limited control over its regional fronts. Similarly, the EMC’s divided leadership—between Mordisco and Calarcá—mirrors the internal tensions within the Second Marquetalia, where Iván Márquez has struggled to maintain cohesion among factions like the Border Command.

These fractures risk escalating violence as splinter groups vie for territorial control and factions excluded from peace talks increase attacks on government targets.

Since the EMC split, clashes between Mordisco’s and Calarcá’s factions have escalated in Putumayo, a key region for coca cultivation and drug trafficking. Violence has also surged in other southwestern departments, such as Cauca. The deadly ELN attack on the military base could also foreshadow more violent confrontations between criminal groups and government forces, despite the relative lull achieved by ceasefires in 2024.

Second, the absence of widespread ceasefires with criminal groups has leveled the criminal playing field once again. Ceasefires maintained by the ELN and EMC in 2023 temporarily shifted criminal dynamics, allowing these groups to expand their territorial control, recruit new members, and focus on rival factions rather than government forces.

“We know [armed groups] have taken advantage of the ceasefire to try to increase their illegal control over the territory,” Colombia’s Minister of Defense said in a press conference in March 2024.

This reprieve boosted profits from drug trafficking, illegal mining, and extortion. In contrast, the AGC, excluded from ceasefire agreements, continued to face government offensives.

SEE ALSO: The Informants of Tibú: How the Colombian State Unleashed a Wave of Femicides

Currently, only the Calarcá dissidents and the FCS have active bilateral ceasefires with the government. The FCS, being relatively small, is unlikely to use the ceasefire for significant territorial expansion but will likely consolidate its holdings and defend against incoming EMC incursions into Nariño. Conversely, the Calarcá dissidents are better positioned to exploit their ceasefire to strengthen their presence in critical drug trafficking zones, particularly along the Amazonian border with Brazil and in parts of the Venezuelan frontier.

For groups like the Mordisco dissidents and the ELN, the absence of ceasefires means they will lose their distinct advantage as they compete for control over territories essential for drug trafficking, illegal mining, and other key revenue streams. However, the lack of ceasefires could give the AGC an edge.

Despite facing sustained military pressure, the AGC has expanded along the Pacific coast in Chocó, the Caribbean coast in Bolívar, Córdoba, and Cesar, and is encircling Catatumbo in Norte de Santander—one of Colombia’s most critical coca cultivation regions. With its criminal rivals now experiencing the same pressure it has endured, the AGC is poised to solidify and take even greater control as cocaine production explodes and gold prices approach record highs.

Third, Maduro’s dependence on Colombian criminal groups ensures that the ELN and Second Marquetalia will continue to strengthen their footholds in Venezuela and along Colombia’s border. With minimal interference—and often direct support from military forces and local officials within the Maduro regime—both groups have entrenched themselves in the region, controlling key criminal economies such as drug trafficking, illegal mining, and contraband smuggling.

With the prospect of six more years of protection under Maduro, these groups have little immediate incentive to engage in peace negotiations. Instead, they are well-positioned to expand their operations further.

This article, written by Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

Juan Sebastian Aguilar, 58, was shot in the chest by a proficient sniper who reportedly spent days lying in wait in the mountains above his target’s upscale home in northern Bogotá. The marksman, according to media reports, escaped on horseback into the lush mountains behind the housing complex, ending in an almost cinematic killing. His exit also complicated police efforts to track his movements.

Aguilar’s death at first glance appeared to be a simple settling of scores — revenge for past betrayals — between rival gem traders. But the sophistication of the hit has since led observers to speculate that the killing could be connected to broader criminal groups like drug trafficking and money laundering syndicates. Others believe he may have been eliminated to ease the way for killing another emerald trader.

SEE ALSO:‘Selective and Silent’: The New ‘Green War’ for Colombia’s Emeralds

“This is a settling of scores, but not among the emerald traders, it’s among the drug traffickers,” Petrit Baquero, who authored “The New Green War” (La Nueva Guerra Verde), a book about ties between Colombia’s emerald barons and organized crime, told InSight Crime.

Aguilar had become a powerful individual with significant security around him, he added. “Whoever decided to target him had people trained in the exercise of violence and used war weapons – not just a hitman on a motorcycle. It was something entirely professionalized and undoubtedly an attack that must have been worth a lot of money,” said Baquero.

This is not the first time Aguilar had been targeted. He narrowly survived an attempt on his life last year, and, according to El Tiempo, investigators are exploring whether it could be the same killer. And while almost certainly linked to the emerald business, sources shrug off the idea of a new round of tit-for-tat killings — an extension of what has been called the Green War — and believe that more criminal elements are at play.

The Green War

Though Colombia’s emerald industry dates back over 500 years to the time of the Spanish Conquest, the modern-day business has a murky history. It is marred by violence and conflict, particularly during the Green Wars of the 1980s, during which up to 6,000 people were killed in clashes between rival mining clans and right-wing paramilitary groups fighting for control over the lucrative mining regions in Boyacá, about 150 kilometers from Bogotá.

The recently deceased Aguilar, also known as “Pedro Alguilar” or “Pedro Pechuga,” came from that era. He began his emerald career as bodyguard and then head of security for so-called “Emerald Czar” Victor Carranza, who, in the 1980s, successfully fought against notorious drug lords Pablo Escobar and Jose Rodriguez Gacha for control of the gem industry.

Prior to his death from cancer in April 2013, Carranza was the most powerful figure in Colombia’s emerald business.

The financial spoils are not just access to the $150 million in annual emerald exports, but ample opportunities for money laundering. The exchange of stones for cash often takes place on Bogotá’s streets, making them ripe for leaking dirty money into the system.

SEE ALSO:Colombia’s Great Survivor: Victor Carranza

Baquero reckons the score against Aguilar may date back to the post-Carranza days and the push for power from rival emerald barons whose business interests shifted into the drug trade and money laundering.

“These are the aftershocks,” he said. “Maybe Aguilar was not a drug trafficker, but there are links and power relations with people involved in that environment, and his assassination may be due to that.”

Stubborn Frontmen?

One theory is that former members of the so-called Junta Directiva, or Board of Directors, found that frontmen — among them possibly Aguilar — were unwilling to return properties and businesses held for them.

This shadowy organization once held significant influence in Colombia’s criminal underworld, according to sources and media reports. Allegedly headed by Julio Lozano Pirateque, The Board’s associates operated behind the scenes, controlling networks that straddled illicit operations and legitimate businesses, such as foreign exchange houses and the emerald trade, to launder money.

“The well-established connections between emerald traders and drug trafficking highlight how organized crime is intertwined with both legal and illegal economies, nationally and internationally,” Andres Preciado, director of Colombian think tank Fundación Ideas para la Paz, told InSight Crime.

Enemies of Hernando Sànchez

Another theory is that Horacio Triana, an emerald dealer and Carranza’s historical rival who is serving time in a US prison on drug-related charges, may have wanted Aguilar out of the way.

Triana’s beef with Aguilar likely stems from the dead man’s close association and friendship with Hernando Sànchez, heir to Carranza’s emerald empire. Sánchez inherited control of Colombia’s biggest and most productive mining area — the Santa Rosa — when Carranza died. That put him, and thus, Aguilar, in the business crossfire of rival emerald barrons and traffickers, like Triana, as well as another key player, Pedro Rincon Castillo, known as “Pedro Orejas.”

Sánchez could be at the center of this deadly puzzle, says Baquero. Still a big player in the emerald world, he has survived several assassination attempts, receiving 11 shots in an exclusive Bogotá clothing store in 2012. His immense power, garnered after Carranza’s death, made him an obvious target, but he also faced accusations — notably from Triana — that he owed money for the purchase of shares in the Cunas Mine, which produces a significant amount of gems for Santa Rosa.

Aguilar’s “associates must be very scared and protecting themselves,” said Baquero.

Aligned with Triana in the same emerald faction, Pedro Orejas may have his own motivation for wanting Aguilar out of the picture — again, due to conflict with Sánchez over control of the mines but also over a potential lingering suspicion he could have been involved in his son’s death in 2013.

Although there is no direct evidence, some allege Triana paid a group of assassins for the hit on Sánchez in 2012. Ousting Aguilar, who ran the heavily armed security company, Seguridad Oriental Ltda., that protected Sánchez and other local and international mine owners would leave Sánchez more vulnerable to another attempt on his life.

Sánchez was also fingered by Triana and Pedro Orejas for being a frontman for Lozano, who now resides in Dubai.

Or Could it Be The AGC?

There is yet another possible perpetrator, the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC). Although there are no direct links between Aguilar and the AGC (also known as the Clan del Golfo), its former leader, Dario Antonio Úsuga, alias “Otoniel,” who is now in US custody, allegedly ordered hits on Sánchez and had long coveted a piece of the emerald trade in Boyacá. Some media reports say the AGC and Lozano have worked together before.

SEE ALSO: Gaitanistas – Gulf Clan Criminal Profile

Aguilar’s assassination would send a powerful message to Sánchez, whose elimination is important to realize AGC ambitions. But the group, known for getting rid of rivals in pretty sophisticated ways, may have worked with Triana and Pedro Orejas to take out Aguilar in return for a footing in the mining business.

“What’s clear is that Aguilar was on a kill list for some time, it was a homicide already paid for,” said Preciado.

But as investigators continue to grapple with the latest bloodshed in Colombia’s emerald trade, there is only one certainty, and that is that the violence — and sophistication of the hit that claimed Aguilar’s life — will continue. And that will leave more than a few worried.

This article, written by Helen Murphy, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America. It has been generously shared with Finance Colombia under a Creative Commons license.

The bilateral ceasefire, in effect for the past year, ended after the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional – ELN) rejected government offers to discuss a renewal.

The agreement was plagued by continued violence and hostilities, such as armed strikes and kidnappings, with both sides accusing each other of not upholding their end of the bargain.

“Just extending the ceasefire isn’t enough if it doesn’t come with new steps to protect civilians from attacks, hostilities, kidnappings, and threats,” said Otty Patiño, Colombian High Peace Commissioner.

Meanwhile, the ELN has accused the government of not negotiating in good faith.

“What’s the point of urging the ELN to sign new agreements if the previous ones haven’t been upheld?” asked the group’s commander, Eliecer Erlinto Chamorro, alias “Antonio Garcia,” in a statement released on July 26.

SEE ALSO: From Total to Partial Peace: Colombia’s Talks With Crime Groups Fragment

The negotiations between the ELN and the government had advanced further than any other talks held under President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace (Paz Total) plan, which has sought demobilization agreements with criminal and armed groups across Colombia.

But the expiration of the ceasefire adds to a series of recent setbacks, including the ELN’s refusal to stop kidnappings and deepening internal divisions, and could lead the guerrillas to abandon the negotiating table completely.

Ceasefire Violations

While the ceasefire agreement primarily prohibits offensive military operations between the parties, it also includes other conditions, such as banning the ELN from “taking hostages,” widely understood to mean kidnapping.

The ELN has violated the agreement at least 39 times over the past year, according to the Colombian think tank, the Conflict Analysis Resource Center (Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos – CERAC). These violations include five deaths, three injuries, and at least 52 kidnappings.

One of the most notable incidents occurred less than three months after the ceasefire took effect, in October 2023, when ELN members kidnapped the parents of Colombian football star Luis Díaz. After international attention pushed the group to release them, the ELN announced that it would cease kidnappings for ransom — a key part of their criminal operations.

Despite the ELN’s violations, negotiators agreed to extend the ceasefire on February 5 for another six months.

SEE ALSO: What Is Behind Increased Violence in Colombia?

But internal divisions on the ELN side soon became apparent, leading to larger problems for the negotiations.

On February 20, the ELN delegation declared a crisis in the peace negotiations, angered over the government’s “regional dialogue” with the Comuneros del Sur, a dissident ELN faction in Nariño that had started parallel negotiations with the government without the consent of the guerrilla group’s top leaders.

Over the next few months, the ELN temporarily suspended its participation in the talks and reneged on its promise to cease kidnappings, citing the government’s “lack of will” in establishing a donor fund to provide alternative financing, which the group claimed left them reliant on kidnapping. The government, however, argued that the fund could not be established while negotiations were stalled, creating a catch-22 situation.

Willingness for Peace

For weeks leading up to August 3, the government’s negotiation team had warned that time was running out to renew the ceasefire with the ELN, and continuously asked the guerrilla group to resume the peace talks.

At the same time, key officials were critical of the ELN’s willingness to negotiate, especially on the issue of kidnapping, an issue that has derailed negotiations in the past. Patiño stressed that the Colombian government would not sign agreements with the ELN if the group continued the practice.

The government has also questioned the group’s desire for peace.

“After years of dialogue, the ELN still has not answered whether it is willing to transition to peace or if, on the contrary, it sees this process as an opportunity to strengthen themselves militarily,” said the press release.

Some experts agree that the ELN seems to have taken advantage of the negotiations with no intention of ever laying down arms. The group advanced negotiation items that benefited its political cause, without moving forward on demobilization, Jorge Mantilla, a political scientist who studies Colombia’s armed conflict and security, told InSight Crime.

“The ELN has been aiming to buy time from the very start of the negotiations,” Mantilla said

What Does This Mean for the ELN?

The end of the ceasefire between the Colombian government and the ELN has dealt a potentially mortal blow to an already fragile negotiation.

As the ELN has refused to continue negotiations with the government, the process with the group’s dissident Comuneros del Sur Front has moved forward. So far, this is the only ELN front to have split from the Central Command.

If the parallel peace talks succeed, it could encourage other factions to split from the ELN and seek peace with the government, especially among fronts under pressure from belligerent rivals.

The main concern is the Western War Front (Frente de Guerra Occidental – FGOC) in Chocó, which has been fighting a losing battle with the Gaitanist Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia – AGC) since 2018 for control over drug trafficking routes and illegal mining. In this area, the lapse of the ceasefire and an eventual return to military operations against the ELN could push the FGOC to the same decision as the Comuneros del Sur.

In other areas, however, the ELN has taken advantage of the ceasefire to solidify its control. The ELN continues to be a dominant criminal group along large stretches of the Colombia-Venezuela border, increasing its control over rural communities. The lapse of the ceasefire could lead to increased violence in these areas as the group retaliates against the Colombian government and continues its territorial disputes with other criminal actors.

The ELN also has a presence in Venezuela and close ties to the government of President Nicolás Maduro, who claimed victory in recent elections despite irregularities in vote counting.

The Eastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Oriental – FGO) and the Northeastern War Front (Frente de Guerra Nororiental) on the border between Colombia and Venezuela are key to the Maduro regime’s criminal balancing act. Since at least 2016, the ELN has expanded along the border with Venezuela with the approval of the Venezuelan political and military forces, and has adopted an increasingly paramilitary role, defending the interests of the Maduro government. Should Maduro cling to power, these fronts would be less likely to make a deal with the Colombian government.

This article, written by Lara Loaiza and Henry Shuldiner, was originally published by InSight Crime, a Medellín-based foundation dedicated to the investigation and analysis of crime and security in Colombia and Latin America.